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1 - 10 of 12 (0.29 seconds)Section 15 in The Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 [Entire Act]
Section 15 in The Transfer Of Property Act, 1882 [Entire Act]
Section 14 in The Transfer Of Property Act, 1882 [Entire Act]
Section 113 in The Transfer Of Property Act, 1882 [Entire Act]
Section 14 in The Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 [Entire Act]
The Chamber Of Colours And Chemicals (P) ... vs Trilok Chand Jain on 28 May, 1973
(20) The observations of S.N. Andley, J. (as he then was) in the case of the Chamber of Colours & Chemicals Ltd. v. Shri Trilok Chand Jain, 1978 R.L.R. 343 while dealing with a case of tenanted premises having been destroyed by fire are pertinent. The learned Judge opined that where tenancy premises are wholly destroyed or rendered substantially and permanently unfit by fire, the right of the lessee under section 108(e) of the Transfer of Property Act is to exercise his option and treat the lease as being void. In such a case the lessee cannot continue to hold on to the premises or say that the lease continues but he will not pay the rent. There cannot be any unilateral suspension of rent. The tenant continues to be liable for the whole of the rent until he obtains an order from the Court or agreement from the landlord for reduction of the proportionate part of the rent.
Section 39 in The Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 [Entire Act]
Munshi Lal vs Thakur Prem Chand on 31 July, 1969
(22) In Munshi Lal v. Thahur Prem Chand, 1979 R.C J. 496, Deshpande, J., as he then was, held that the correct principle of interpreting section 14(2) is that the tenant is allowed by section 14(2) a special statutory benefit of defeating the landlord's petition for eviction by fully complying with the order under section 15(3) read with section 15(1). As such the order must be strictly construed. This means compliance not only of that order for payment of arrears of rent but also with regard to future payment of rent month by month.
V. Dhanapal Chettiar vs Yesodai Ammal on 23 August, 1979
(27) The question of waiver of the first notice of demand has not been raised earlier, nor is there any finding of fact on this point. In the application for eviction under Section 14(1)(a) it has been asserted in paragraph 18(a) and 18(b) that a notice of demand had been served on 30th June, 1970. It would, therefore, appear, that the landlady had an effective cause of action on 1st September, 1970. Since the tenant had been granted the statutory period of two month to pay the arrears, the landlady could have proceeded with the matter. Since at that time it was also considered to be necessary to give a notice of termination of the tenancy before filing a petition, this is what the subsequent notice is. But, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in V. Dhonapal Chettiar v. Yasodai Ammal , this is no longer necessary. But this cannot have the effect of waiving the notice of demand.