Jose T.Simon vs State Of Kerala on 27 September, 2013
M. Rose Simon vs State & anr. Page no. 24 of 25
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1 - 10 of 12 (0.37 seconds)Section 138 in The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 [Entire Act]
Section 139 in The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 [Entire Act]
The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881
Section 118 in The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 [Entire Act]
Hiten P. Dalal vs Bratindranath Banerjee on 11 July, 2001
In Krishna Janardhan Bhat vs Dattatraya G. Hegde's case
(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court did not disagree with the view taken
in Hiten P. Dalal vs Bratindranath Banerjee's case (supra) and K. N.
Beena vs Muniyappan and another's case (supra) but added a
dimension to the same by observing that :
Krishna Janardhan Bhat vs Dattatraya G. Hegde on 11 January, 2008
In Krishna Janardhan Bhat vs Dattatraya G. Hegde's case
(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court did not disagree with the view taken
in Hiten P. Dalal vs Bratindranath Banerjee's case (supra) and K. N.
Beena vs Muniyappan and another's case (supra) but added a
dimension to the same by observing that :
K.N. Beena vs Muniyappan And Another on 18 October, 2001
In Krishna Janardhan Bhat vs Dattatraya G. Hegde's case
(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court did not disagree with the view taken
in Hiten P. Dalal vs Bratindranath Banerjee's case (supra) and K. N.
Beena vs Muniyappan and another's case (supra) but added a
dimension to the same by observing that :
Section 3 in The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 [Entire Act]
The State Of Madras vs A. Vaidyanatha Iyer on 26 September, 1957
"21. Because both Section 138 and 139 require that
the Court "shall presume" the liability of the drawer
of the cheques for the amounts for which the cheques
are drawn, as noted in State of Madras vs A.
Vaidyanatha Iyer, AIR 1958 SC 61, it is obligatory on
the Court to raise this presumption in every case
where the factual basis for the raising of the
presumption had been established. "It introduced an
exception to the general rule as to the burden of proof
in criminal cases and shifts the onus onto the
accused" (ibid). Such a presumption is a presumption
of law, as distinguished from a presumption of fact
which describes provisions by which the Court "may
presume" a certain state of affairs.