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1 - 10 of 23 (0.22 seconds)Section 13 in The Bombay University Act, 1974 [Entire Act]
Section 87B in The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [Entire Act]
B. Banerjee vs Anita Pan on 20 November, 1974
11. Mr. Mathur made a refere B. Banerjee v. Anita Pan (AIR 1975 1146). In that case the amendment brought by Section 13 (3A) came up for con--sideration and it was held by a majority that it was retrospective in operation. It has however to be seen that this clause was given a retrospective effect specifically by Section 13 of the Amendment Act by providing that it shall apply to suits including appeals which are pending at the commencement of the Act. The question was whether the retrospective operation was ultra vires the Articles 14 and 19 and the majority of the Court rejected this plea. This case has no applicability.
Mukund Deo (Dead) Represented By His ... vs Mahadu And Ors. on 31 August, 1964
12. Mr. Calla, the counsel for the respondent referred to Kasibai v. Mahadu (AIR 1965 SC 703). In that case Civil Procedure Code was made applicable in the State of Hyderabad from 1-4-1951. A suit had earlier been filed in the State of Hyderabad under the Hydearbad Code in which a second appeal lay even on facts. The question before the Supreme Court was whether after 1-4-51 when the Civil Procedure Code had been made applicable in Hyderabad State, the second appeal will be governed by the Hyderabad Code of Civil Procedure or by the Civil Procedure Code. The Supreme Court held that as the suit had been filed earlier to the coming into force of Section 100, C.P.C. the power of the High Court in dealing with such second appeal would have to be seen with reference to the Hyderabad Civil Procedure Code and the restriction could only apply to cases instituted after 1-4-51.
Moti Ram vs Suraj Bhan & Others on 3 February, 1960
In Moti Ram v. Suraj Bhan (AIR 1960 SC 655) an application for ejectment was filed on 28-8-56 on the basis of unamended Section 13 (3) (a) (Hi) of East Punjab Rent Act, which provided for recovery of possession of building by landlord if he required it for reconstruction, Before however a written statement could be filed the Act was amended in September, 1956. By the amendment this provision was substantially modified and provided that in the case of any building if he requires it to carry(sic) building work at the instance of Government or local authority, (sic) It was common case that if the amended provision applied to the suit the landlord would not be entitled to obtain any order of ejectment. The Supreme Court observed that the Amending Act does not make the relevant provision re-trospective in terms and it saw no reason to accept the suggestion that the retrospective operation can be spelled out as a matter of necessary implication. The Supreme Court refused to draw this inference by considering the implication that if the provision was held retrospective, "Inevitably all pending actions in which landlords may have applied for possession of their buildings let out to the tenants under the provisions of Section 13 (3) (a) (iii) as it stood before the amendment would automatically fail because they would not satisfy the tests imposed by the amended provision. If such a drastic consequence was really intended by the Legislature it would certainly have made appropriate provisions in express terms in that behalf."
Bulidan Singh vs Pitar Emmenual And Ors. on 14 July, 1969
In Bulidan Singh v. Pitar Em-menual (1969 WLN 472) (Raj) a suit had been filed for compensation against the defendant for having caused the death of the deceased by his negligent driving. The suit had been filed in the civil court, During the tendency of the suit State Government under Section 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act constituted a tribunal; Section 110-F of the Motor Vehicles Act provided that where any tribunal has been constituted no civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any question re-lating to any claim or compensation. A question was raised whether in view of Section 110-F pending proceedings before the civil court could be continued. Tyagi, J. (as his Lordship then was) held that as the suit was instituted earlier to the constitution of the Tribunal the civil courts were competent to continue with that suit. His Lordship said that Section 110-F which says that no civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any question relating to claim for compensation did not mean that no civil court shall have jurisdiction to maintain or continue with the suit and that it only means that no civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain a suit in its inception.