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1 - 10 of 16 (0.26 seconds)Section 23 in The Limitation Act, 1963 [Entire Act]
Consumer Protection Act, 2019
Samruddhi Co Operative Housing Society ... vs Mumbai Mahalaxmi Construction Pvt. ... on 11 January, 2022
10. In the present case, the Complainants executed their respective
Agreements to Lease and Tripartite Maintenance Agreements between
2010 and 2015, and possession was taken between 2013 and 2015.
The allegations in the complaint pertain to the contractual framework
governing maintenance charges, governance structure, formation of
association, and methodology of billing, that is, matters which were fully
known to the lessees at the time of execution and possession. The
present complaint, instituted only in 2025, is thus barred by limitation as
per Section 24A of the Act. The Complainants sought to justify the delay
by invoking the concept of a "continuing wrong" as per Section 22 of the
Limitation Act, 1963 which states that a fresh period of limitation begins
to run at every moment during which the breach continues. However, in
our considered view the grievances and allegations, being a part of the
contractual documents between the parties and the Complainants are
IA/10257/2025 IN CC/45/2025 10
fully aware of the implications and adhering to the same. Further, while
undisputedly there was no change to the said contractual terms
between the parties, significant time has lapsed. Therefore, these do
not constitute a continuing breach within the meaning of the said
section. At this point we would like to rely on Samruddhi Co-Operative
Housing Society v. Mumbai Mahalaxmi Construction Pvt. Ltd, 2022
SCC OnLine SC 35 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that:
Section 24A in The Consumer Protection Act, 1986 [Entire Act]
Section 5 in The Limitation Act, 1963 [Entire Act]
Brigade Enterprises Limited vs Anil Kumar Virmani on 17 December, 2021
The original Complainant being over
70 years of age and unable to pursue further proceedings, did not re-
institute the matter, prompting the present Complainants to do so. He
asserted that recurring maintenance bills, repeated cost escalations,
and continuing denial of essential services constituted successive
causes of action under Section 22 of the Limitation Act, and therefore,
the complaint fell within the period of limitation. He argued that the Act
of 2019, now, expressly empowered Consumer Commissions to strike
down one-sided and unreasonable clauses as unfair contract terms and
the OPs' conduct, failure to fulfil contractual obligations, and denial of
participatory governance, constitutes "unfair contract" and "deficiency in
service." He urged that in view of the continuing violations, the delay, if
any, be condoned and appropriate directions be issued to declare the
unfair terms void, rationalise maintenance charges, enforce committed
services, and recognise AURA for participatory management. He relied
on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Brigade Enterprises
Ltd. v. Anil Kumar Virmani, (2022) 4 SCC 138 and Samruddhi Co-
Operative Housing Society v. Mumbai Mahalaxmi Construction
Pvt. Ltd, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 35.
Basawaraj & Anr vs Spl.Laq Officer on 22 August, 2013
for not filing the complaint within the prescribed period. The Apex Court
in Basawaraj and Ors. v. The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, AIR
2014 SC 746 discussed the concept of "sufficient cause" as below:
Balkrishna Savalram Pujari And Others vs Shree Dnyaneshwar Maharajsansthan & ... on 26 March, 1959
"12. Section 22 of the Limitation Act 1963 provides for the
computation of limitation in the case of a continuing breach of
contract or tort. It provides that in case of a continuing breach of
contract, a fresh period of limitation begins to run at every moment
of time during which the breach continues. This Court in
Balakrishna Savalram Pujari Waghmare v. Shree Dhyaneshwar
Mahara Sansthan elaborated on when a continuous cause of
action arises. Speaking for the three-judge Bench, Justice PB
Gajendragadkar (as the learned Chief Justice then was) observed
that
"31. [...] Does the conduct of the trustees amount to a
continuing wrong under Section 23? That is the question which
this contention raises for our decision. In other words, did the
cause of action arise de die in diem as claimed by the
appellants? In dealing with this argument it is necessary to
bear in mind that Section 23 refers not to a continuing right but
to a continuing wrong. It is the very essence of a continuing
wrong that it is an act which creates a continuing source
of injury and renders the doer of the act responsible and
liable for the continuance of the said injury. If the wrongful
act causes an injury which is complete, there is no
continuing wrong even though the damage resulting from
the act may continue. If, however, a wrongful act is of
such a character that the injury caused by it itself
continues, then the act constitutes a continuing wrong. In
this connection it is necessary to draw a distinction
between the injury caused by the wrongful act and what
may be described as the effect of the said injury. It is only
in regard to acts which can be properly characterised as
continuing wrongs that Section 23 can be invoked."
Jivan Lal Dhiwar vs Vinod Kumar Soni 6 Mcc/479/2019 Suresh ... on 17 June, 2019
13. The law governing condonation is settled. Hon'ble Supreme Court
in Ram Lal and Ors. vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd, AIR 1962 Supreme
Court 361, has observed: