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1 - 10 of 15 (0.24 seconds)Arul Nadar vs Authorised Officer, Land Reforms on 22 September, 1998
13. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant also relied on judgment of the Apex Court reported in the case of Arul Nadar v. Authorised Officer, Land Reforms, . In my view, the ratio of the said judgment also would not be any assistance to the appellant- The question which fell for consideration before the Apex Court was whether the provisions of Section 21-A of the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act, 1961, would apply to the facts and circumstances of the case and whether the appellant in the said case would derive any benefit of the same. The Apex Court held that Section 21-A does apply to a proceeding which was pending on the date that the aforesaid provision was inserted in the parent Act even though the proceeding may have been initiated under the parent Act itself. Under these circumstances, the Apex Court held that there was no justification for giving any restrictive meaning to the provision of Section 21-A of the said Act. In my view, the ratio of the said judgment would not be applicable to the facts of the case, because if the legislature had intended to include the case of a gratuitous licensee, it could have so indicated specifically in Section 4-A itself.
State Of Punjab And Ors vs Brigadier Sukhjit Singh on 11 June, 1993
11. So far as the judgment of the Apex Court reported in the case of State of Punjab and Ors. v. Brigadier Sukhjit Singh, is concerned, the ratio of the said judgment would not apply to the facts of the present case. One of the question before the Apex Court in the said case was whether the payment of licence fee was essential in the subsistence of a licence and in the said context, the Apex Court has observed that the payment of licence fee was not an essential attribute for the subsistence of a licence. The observation of the Apex Court is as follows:
Ashwini Kumar Govardhandas Gandhi And ... vs Gangadhar Dattatraya Gadgil on 12 December, 1989
14. Even otherwise, the second submission of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent also will have to be accepted. In the present case, the defendant in her written statement has come out with a plea that she was the owner of the premises and she had also renounced the title of the plaintiff and it was her specific case that the plaintiff was not the owner. A Division Bench of this court has held that in such a case the permission of the Rent Controller was not required. The said case is Askwinikumar Govardhandas Gandhi and Anr. v. Gangadhar Dattatraya Gangil, 1990 Mh.LJ. 18. In my view, the ratio of the said judgment also would be applicable to the facts of the present case.
Davis vs Sebastian on 19 August, 1999
12. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant further relied on judgment of the Apex Court reported in the case of Davis v. Sebastian, on the question of interpretation of words. In my view, the ratio of the said judgment also would not be applicable to the facts of the present case. In the said case before the Apex Court the question is for consideration was regarding two comprehensive expressions "additional accommodation" and "personal use" which were found in Sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Kerala Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. The Apex Court while interpreting the said expression observed as follows in para 8 :
Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882
Nababkhan Abdullakhan And Ors. vs Jamrubi W/O Abdullakhan on 19 December, 1991
9. In my view, the submission made by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant cannot be accepted. This question is squarely covered by the judgment of this Court reported in 1992 Mh.LJ. 260 (supra). In my view , the lower appellate court has rightly relied on this judgment and held that the prior permission of the Rent Controller was not required in the case of the licensee who is not paying rent. In the present case, it is an admitted position that the defendant was the licensee who was not paying rent to the plaintiff. A Division Bench of this court also had an occasion to consider the expression 'licensee' used in Section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882. The question which was required to be decided by the Division Bench was whether a suit by a licensor against a gratuitous licensee is tenable before the Presidency Small Causes Court under Section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 or should such a suit be filed before the Civil Court? The Division Bench, after considering various contradictory decisions given by this court, had held that the suit by a licensee against a gratuitous licensee was not tenable before the Presidency Small Causes Court and under Section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 and that such a suit should be filed before the Civil Court or the High Court depending on the valuation. While deciding this issue, the Division Bench has observed as follows in paras 38 and 39 :
State 0F Bombay & Others vs The Hospital Mazdoor Sabha & Others on 29 January, 1960
We are, therefore, of the view that the expressions "licensor and licensee" used in Section 41 derive their colour from the expression "landlord and tenant". The latter is a relationship based on material consideration; the same concept must, therefore, colour and permeate the expression "licensor and licensee". Further, the use of the expression "licence fee, charge or rent" in close juxtaposition is also not without reason, and must colour the expression "licensor and licensee" used in the section. The observations of Supreme Court in the State of Bombay and Ors. v. The Hospital Mazdoor Sabha and Ors., and in M.K. Ranganathan and Anr. v. Government of Madras and Ors., , (vide paragraphs 21 and 22) and (in Rohit Pulp and Paper Mills Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, Baroda, support this canon of interpretation of the statute."
M. K. Ranganathan And Another vs Government Of Madras And Others on 20 April, 1955
We are, therefore, of the view that the expressions "licensor and licensee" used in Section 41 derive their colour from the expression "landlord and tenant". The latter is a relationship based on material consideration; the same concept must, therefore, colour and permeate the expression "licensor and licensee". Further, the use of the expression "licence fee, charge or rent" in close juxtaposition is also not without reason, and must colour the expression "licensor and licensee" used in the section. The observations of Supreme Court in the State of Bombay and Ors. v. The Hospital Mazdoor Sabha and Ors., and in M.K. Ranganathan and Anr. v. Government of Madras and Ors., , (vide paragraphs 21 and 22) and (in Rohit Pulp and Paper Mills Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, Baroda, support this canon of interpretation of the statute."
Rohit Pulp And Paper Mills Ltd vs Collector Of Central Excise, Baroda on 26 April, 1990
We are, therefore, of the view that the expressions "licensor and licensee" used in Section 41 derive their colour from the expression "landlord and tenant". The latter is a relationship based on material consideration; the same concept must, therefore, colour and permeate the expression "licensor and licensee". Further, the use of the expression "licence fee, charge or rent" in close juxtaposition is also not without reason, and must colour the expression "licensor and licensee" used in the section. The observations of Supreme Court in the State of Bombay and Ors. v. The Hospital Mazdoor Sabha and Ors., and in M.K. Ranganathan and Anr. v. Government of Madras and Ors., , (vide paragraphs 21 and 22) and (in Rohit Pulp and Paper Mills Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, Baroda, support this canon of interpretation of the statute."