Search Results Page
Search Results
1 - 10 of 12 (0.33 seconds)The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
Article 226 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Section 25 in The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 [Entire Act]
Section 25E in The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 [Entire Act]
The Mines Act, 1952
The Associated Cement Companies ... vs Its Workmen & Another on 5 May, 1959
7. It was, however, argued by Sri Panduranga Rao, learned Counsel for the petitioners that HAL was a single company under which there are six divisions and two detachments. According to the definition given in Standing Order No. 2(i) " company " means Hindustan Aeronautics Limited wherever situated and includes the factory or factories, show rooms, service centres. Head Office and other administrative offices and branches. Hence, it is argued all the factories wherever situated and all the units wherever functioning should be deemed to be " one establishment" for the purpose of the Act. Having regard to the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court, the definition of " company " in the Standing Order is not determinative of the question whether the several factories owned by the company constitute " one establishment" for the purpose of industrial law. The several test laid down by the Supreme Court have to be applied for this purpose. The definition of " company " which is a juristic person cannot be always identical with the concept of an industrial establishment for the purpose of settlement of an industrial dispute.
The Factories Act, 1948
N. Lakshmana Rao & Ors. Etc vs State Of Karnataka & Ors. Etc on 29 April, 1975
11. The learned Counsel relied upon a decision in N. Lakshmana v. State of Karnataka (1975) 25 L. W. 323. That was a case in which pursuant to the option exercised by the workmen the management appointed the workmen and no service conditions were thereafter stipulated. The question that arose for consideration was what the service conditions of the workmen employed pursuant to the exercise of option were. The Court, in the absence of any other express conditions of service stipulated between the parties, held that whatever terms and conditions were specified in the option form signed by the workmen, constituted a contract between the parties. In that decision the question whether by the mere exercise of the option offered by the management, the workmen acquired an indefeasible right to employment did not arise for consideration. In our view on the strength of that decision it cannot be held that the petitioners in the instant case acquired any right to appointment or absorption which was binding on the management.
State Of Andhra Pradesh & Ors vs Chitra Venkata Rao on 29 August, 1975
These observations cannot be stretched to mean that merely because a dispute is referred to the Tribunal, the Tribunal may in exercise of the powers vested in to mould the relief could also bestow a right on the workmen to be appointed under any employer. Before any relief could be granted the right of the workmen for appointment in the establishment of a particular employer should be established. Only when that right is established the question of granting any relief or moulding the relief having regard to the facts and circumstances of a particular case would arise. As discussed above, the Tribunal tightly held that no such right was established. Exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, this Court is precluded from reappraising the evidence and coming to a different conclusion on the several issues that have been sepcifically referred to and decided by the Tribunal with reference to the evidence adduced before it. In State of A.P. v. Chitra Venkata Rao , the Supreme Court following its earlier decision in Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radha Krishnan and Ors. , held
The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under Article 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction. The Court exercises it not as an appellate Court. The findings of fact reached by an inferior Court or Tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence are not reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by a Tribunal, a writ can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal, had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Again if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. A finding of fact recovered by the Tribunal cannot be challenged on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal is insufficient or inadequate to sustain a finding. The adequacy or insufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal.