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1 - 10 of 12 (0.20 seconds)The Hindu Succession Act, 1956
Section 69 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
Section 68 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
Morasa Anjaiah vs Kondragunte Venkateswarlu (Died) And ... on 3 February, 1992
15. One of the principles laid down by the Division Bench in M. Anjaiah's case (supra) is that if no steps are taken to bring on record the legal representatives of a deceased party, the defaulting party has to take the consequences mentioned in Rule 9 of Order XXII C.P.C. and cannot be allowed to have recourse to the general provision of Order I Rule 10 C.P.C. for impleading the legal representatives of a deceased party by circumventing the provisions of Order XXII C.P.C., and that an administration/partition suit does not abate as a whole due to non-bringing on record of the legal representatives of a deceased party (co-sharer/co-owner) as each party is in position of a plaintiff, and so the heirs of a deceased (co-sharer/co-owner) party to the suit, can come on record on an application under Order I Rule 10 C.P.C. In my opinion it is not necessary to go into the question whether the appeal stood abated, because of the mother of 2nd appellant not being brought on record consequent on the death of 2nd appellant, inasmuch as the deceased 2nd appellant, who was a minor, was being represented by the 1st appellant, his father. It means that the 1st appellant is in possession and management of the assets and the estate of the deceased-2nd appellant. As per the definition of 'legal representative' in Section 2(11) C.P.C. a person, who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased also would be a legal representative of a deceased. In this case since 1st appellant, as father of 2nd appellant was managing the estate of the 2nd appellant, he, for the purpose of Section 2(11) C.P.C., would be deemed to be a legal representative to the estate of the deceased-2nd appellant. It is now well settled that when one of the legal representatives is already on record, the proceedings against a deceased party do not abate, and his other legal representatives, who also represent his estate, can be brought on record or allowed to come on record at any time even beyond the period of limitation prescribed. Therefore the mother of the deceased-2nd appellant can be permitted to come on record, be it as an appellant or respondent, since 1st appellant is adequately representing the estate of the deceased-2nd appellant. So the question of entire appeal getting abated due to the death of the 2nd appellant does not arise. Hence I hold that the appeal did not abate and the mother of the 2nd appellant i.e., petitioner in C.M.P. No. 24117 of 2000 can be permitted to come on record. Hence the petition is allowed.
Daya Ram And Others vs Shyam Sundari on 8 September, 1964
13. The contention of the learned counsel for appellants is that since 2nd appellant is a minor and is being represented by the 1st appellant, the fact that his heir-at-law, i.e., his mother, who is a petitioner in C.M.P. No. 24117 of 2000 was not brought on record per se, is not a ground to hold that the appeal stood abated, because the estate of the 2nd appellant is sufficiently represented by the 1st appellant. He relied on Daya Ram v. Shyam Sundari, , where it is held that if after diligent and bona fide enquiry legal representatives of a deceased defendant or respondents are brought on record within time, there would be no abatement of the suit or appeal, even though some legal representatives, who remained unknown, were not impleaded, if the legal representatives who were impleaded sufficiently represent the estate of the deceased, and that a decision obtained against those legal representatives would bind the estate of the deceased. If however it is brought to the notice of the appellant, during the pendency of the appeal, that some of the legal representatives had not been impleaded, it would be the duty of the appellant, who was made aware of his default, to bring those others on record. In my opinion this decision has no application to the facts of this case, because that case relates to the death of a respondent in an appeal, and this is a case where the 2nd appellant died. Appellants 1 and 3 who are father and brother of the deceased-2nd appellant, know who the heirs-at-law of the 2nd appellant are.
Kalyan Singh, London Trained, ... vs Smt. Chhoti And Ors on 1 December, 1989
In Kalyan Singh case (supra) the Supreme Court clearly held that it is the duty of the Court to see that the document propounded as a Will is the real Will and testament of the person who is said to have executed the said document, because the alleged executant would not be available either to admit or deny its execution before the Court, and so depending on the facts and circumstances of the case and the nature of dispositions in the Will, Court has to test and believe or disbelieve the evidence adduced by the parties. In this case no reasons are mentioned in Ex.B1 as to why no bequest is being made in favour of the 1st respondent, who is but the daughter of the testator. It is contended that since 1st respondent was given in marriage to a person hailing from an affluent family, the testator did not provide anything to 1st respondent. If it is so, nothing prevented the testator from stating so in Ex.B1. That suspicious circumstance is not dispelled by the appellants.
Section 63 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
Karri Nookaraju vs Putra Venkatarao And Ors. on 20 December, 1972
he contended that in spite of the hostile
attitude of C.W.I, Ex.B1 should be held to
be validly proved. The contention of the
learned counsel for 1st respondent is that
Section 69 of Evidence Act applies only to
cases where no attesting witness is available,
but not to a case where one or more
attesting witness is or are available, and
since the evidence of C.W.I, one of the
attestors to Ex.B1, does not establish the
due execution and attestation of Ex.B1 as
required by Section 63 of the Succession
Act, the finding of the trial Court on Ex.B1
needs no interference. It is his contention
that the testator completely disinheriting
1st respondent, without assigning reasons,
and giving away the major portion of his
property to appellants 2 and 3, who are the
sons of 4th appellant, is a suspicious
circumstance. He relied on K. Nookaraju
v. P. Venkatarao, , where
it is held that in order to prove the due
execution and attestation of a Will, an attestor
should speak not only about the testator's
signature or affixing his mark to the Will
or somebody else signing it in his presence
by his direction, or should state that he
had attested the Will after taking
acknowledgement from the testator of his
signature or mark, and also should speak
that each of the witnesses had signed the
Will in the presence of the testator.
Madhavji Khatau Katira And Anr. vs Trikamdas Narandas Tanna on 28 June, 1968
He relied on Madhavji v. Trikamdas, , for the same proposition.