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Ims Ag, Mumbai vs Deputy Commissioner Of Income Tax ... on 13 July, 2020 cites

C.I.T. vs Wipro Ltd. on 12 November, 2018

The assessee before us is a company incorporated, and fiscally domiciled, in Switzerland. The assessee company is engaged in providing market research report on pharmaceutical sector to its customers across the world at a predetermined subscription prices, The company collects, processes and utilizes the data and information, particularly in the field of medicine and pharmaceuticals for the delivery of reports through online IMS knowledge link. The company enters into agreements with its customers for providing the review reports (IMS reports) setting out the details of modules required to be accessed by the customers and the consideration for these services. In essence thus, the IMS reports, based on module selected, are statistical database compilations, providing geo economical data, about a pharma molecule, providing insight into the connected issues relating to information and developments. The licence access so granted is a non- exclusive and non-transferable right. It is consideration received, as allowing this non- exclusive, non-transferable access to the database and IMS reports which is subject matter of dispute before us. The authorities below have held that in the light of Hon'ble Karnataka High Court's judgment in the case of CIT Vs Wipro Ltd [(2011) 203 Taxman 621 (Kar)] and other judgments by the same Hon'ble High Court, which have been followed by a coordinate bench of this Tribunal as well, these receipts are required to be taxed as royalty under section 9(l)(vi) as also under article 12(3) of the Indo Swiss DTAA.
Supreme Court - Daily Orders Cites 0 - Cited by 10 - M M Shantanagoudar - Full Document

Otters Club, Mumbai vs Dit (E), Mumbai on 15 June, 2018

8. In the light of the above discussions, we are of the considered view that rather than taking a pedantic view of the rule requiring pronouncement of orders within 90 days, disregarding the important fact that the entire country was in lockdown, we should compute the period of 90 days by excluding at least the period during which the lockdown was in force. We must factor ground realities in mind while interpreting the time limit for the pronouncement of the order. Law is not brooding omnipotence in the sky. It is a pragmatic tool of the social order. The tenets of law being enacted on the basis of pragmatism, and that is how the law is required to interpreted. The interpretation so assigned by us is not only in consonance with the letter and spirit of rule 34(5) but is also a pragmatic approach at a time when a disaster, notified under the Disaster Management Act 2005, is causing unprecedented disruption in the functioning of our justice delivery system. Undoubtedly, in the case of Otters Club Vs DIT [(2017) 392 ITR 244 (Bom)], Hon'ble Bombay High Court did not approve an order being passed by the Tribunal beyond a period of 90 days, but then in the present situation Hon'ble Bombay High Court itself has, vide judgment dated 15th April 2020, held that directed "while calculating the time for disposal of matters made time- bound by this Court, the period for which the order dated 26th March 2020 continues to operate shall be added and time shall stand extended accordingly". The extraordinary steps taken suomotu by Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court and Hon'ble Supreme Court also indicate that this period of lockdown cannot be treated as an ordinary period during which the normal time limits are to remain in force. In our considered view, even without the words "ordinarily", in the light of the above analysis of the legal position, the period during which lockout was in force is to excluded for the purpose of time limits set out in rule 34(5) of the Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1963. Viewed thus, the exception, to 90-day time-limit for pronouncement of orders, inherent in rule 34(5)(c), with respect to the pronouncement of orders within ninety days, clearly comes into play in the present case. Of course, there is no, and there cannot be any, bar on the discretion of the benches to refix the matters for clarifications because of considerable time lag between the point of time when the hearing is concluded and the point of time when the order thereon is being finalized, but then, in our considered view, no such exercise was required to be carried out on the facts of this case.
Income Tax Appellate Tribunal - Mumbai Cites 5 - Cited by 152 - Full Document
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