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Budri Narain vs Sheo Koer on 2 June, 1885

We are not prepared to accept the contention of the appellants; and, in the view we take, we are supported by the principle which underlies the decisions of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Rajab Ali v. Amir Hosssin 17 C. 1 and Budri Narain v. Sheo Koer 17 C. 512 : 17 I.A. 1, which were applied by this Court in the case of Golab Chand v. Bahuria Ram Murat Koer 13 C.L.J. 432 : 10 Ind. Cas. 268. We hold, therefore, that it was competent to the Court to entertain an application for enlargement of time under Sub-section 3 of Section 17 4 after the expiry of the period prescribed in the decree in conformity with Sub-section 2 and even after the decree-holder had applied for execution. The second contention of the appellants must consequently be overruled.
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Bodh Narain vs Mahomed Moosa on 8 March, 1899

3. With reference to the second ground, it has been argued that an application for extension of time under Sub-section (3) of Section 178 must be made before the time has expired, and, in any event, before an application for execution has been presented. The learned Vakil for the appellants, who has addressed to the Court a very able and forcible argument on this part of the case, has contended that upon the expiry of the time prescribed by the decree, the tenancy is forfeited and a valuable right accues to the landlord to re-enter upon the premises. That right, it has been suggested, ought not to be taken away for the benefit of the defendant who has failed to carry out the order of the Court and has not been diligent enough to make an application for extension before expiry of the prescribed time. But we are of opinion that a narrow construction ought not to be placed upon the terms of Sub-section 3 of Section 178. It may be observed that the sub-section does not specifically prescribe the limit of time within which an application for extension of time may be made, in fact, the sub-section authorizes the Deputy Commissioner to extend the time even without an application As was explained by Mr. Justice Banerji in the case of Bodh Narain v. Mahomed Moosa 26 C. 639 : 3 C.W.N. 628, where a question arose as to the interpretation of Section 66 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, which corresponds to Section 178 of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, 1908, as ejectment for non-payment of rent is in the nature of a penalty of forfeiture, the provision for extension of time for payment to avoid the penalty of forfeiture is a remedial provision and should * be construed liberally so as not to restrict the remedy and make it inapplicable to cases to which it ought obviously to extend. It was further pointed out by the same learned Judge that the section authorises the Court for special reasons to extend the period, and there is no reason why we should interpolate words so as to limit the power of the Court to make an order for enlargement of time. It is, indeed, conceivable that needless hardship may be caused to litigants if the contention of the appellant were to prevail. For instance, if the defendant, by reason of accidental circumstances over which he has no control, finds it impossible, in spite of his diligence, to deposit the decretal amount on the last day of the prescribed period, he may be driven to make an application for extension of time on the day following by reason of adverse events which he had not foreseen and which made it impossible for him to carry out the direction of the Court. There is no good reason why the section should be narrowly interpreted so as to exclude relief in such a case.
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