Karnataka High Court
Smt Yashoda vs The Competent Authority on 20 January, 2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 20TH DAY OF JANUARY, 2026
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL
MISCELLANEOUS FIRST APPEAL NO.380 OF 2025 (KPIDFA)
BETWEEN:
1 . SMT. YASHODA
W/O LATE GANAPATHI M.
AGED ABOUT 68 YEARS
RESIDING AT No.5/1
1ST CROSS, CHIKKANNA GARDEN
SHANKARAPURAM
BENGALURU-560 004.
2 . SRI. RAMANARAYANA SHARMA
S/O LATE GANAPATHI M.
AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS
RESIDING AT No.5/1
1ST CROSS, CHIKKANNA GARDEN
SHANKARAPURAM
BENGALURU-560 004.
3 . MALATHI
D/O LATE GANAPATHI M.
AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS
RESIDING AT No.5/1
1ST CROSS, CHIKKANNA GARDEN
SHANKARAPURAM
BENGALURU-560 004.
...APPELLANTS
(BY SRI. KIRAN S. JAVALI, SR. ADVOCATE FOR
SRI. SRINIVAS S.V., ADVOCATE)
2
AND:
1. THE COMPETENT AUTHORITY
FOR M/S. SRI VASISTA CREDIT
SOUHARDA CO-OPERATIVE LTD.,
2ND FLOOR, 'C' BLOCK
TTMC BUILDING, SHANTHINAGAR
BENGALURU-560 027.
REPRESENTED BY COMPETENT AUTHORITY
SRI. SUDARSHAN B.K.
ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER
OFFICE OF SPECIAL OFFICER
AGED ABOUT 33 YEARS
2. M/S. SRI VASISTA CREDIT SOUHARDA
CO-OPERATIVE LTD.,
REPRESENTED BY ITS
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER (CEO)
VENKATANARAYANA K.V.
No.01, FIRST FLOOR
RAMANJANEYA ROAD, HANUMANTH NAGAR
BENGALURU-560 061.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. VEERESH R. BUDIHAL, ADVOCATE FOR C/R1)
THIS MFA IS FILED UNDER SECTION 16 OF THE
KARNATAKA PROTECTION OF INTEREST OF DEPOSITORS IN
FINANCIAL ESTABLISHMENTS ACT, AGAINST THE ORDER DATED
20.12.2024 PASSED IN MISC.No.248/2024 ON THE FILE OF XCI
ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE, AND SPECIAL
JUDGE FOR KPIDFE CASES, BENGALURU, (CCH-92), ALLOWING
THE PETITIONS FILED U/S.5(2) OF THE KPIDFE ACT, 2004.
THIS MFA HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR
JUDGMENT ON 05.12.2025 AND COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT OF JUDGMENT THIS DAY, ANU SIVARAMAN
J., PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:
CORAM: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN
and
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL
3
CAV JUDGMENT
(PER: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN) This Miscellaneous First Appeal is preferred by the appellants assailing the order dated 20.12.2024 passed by the XCI Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, and Special Judge for KPIDFE cases, Bengaluru (CCH-92) ('Special Court' for short) in Misc.No.248/2024 filed by respondent No.1 under Section 5(2) of the Karnataka Protection of Interest of Depositors in Financial Establishments Act, 2004, ('KPIDFE Act' for short) thereby confirming the interim order of attachment dated 13.09.2023 in respect of the suit schedule property.
2. We have heard Shri. Kiran S. Javali, learned senior counsel as instructed by Shri. Srinivas S.V, learned Advocate appearing for the appellants and Shri. Veeresh R. Budihal, learned counsel appearing for the caveator/respondent No.1.
3. The brief facts of the case are as follows:-
The appellants herein are the legal representatives of late Shri. M. Ganapathi, who was arrayed as respondent 4 No.2 before the Special Court. It is alleged that Shri. M. Ganapathi was a loan defaulter to respondent No.2 -
Society. The Society is stated to have failed to recover the alleged loan amount and has further contended that the deposit amounts collected from the depositors were not returned. Shri. M. Ganapathi purchased the subject property under a registered Sale Deed dated 02.05.2001 and became its absolute owner. The said purchase was made much prior to the registration or existence of respondent No.2- Society.
Shri. M. Ganapathi availed a loan of Rs.1,55,00,000/-
from respondent No.2 - Society on behalf of one Shri. B. N.Prakash on 07.07.2010. A sum of Rs.1,50,00,000/- was disbursed into the bank account of Shri. M. Ganapathi, who thereafter transferred the amount to Shri. B. N. Prakash as instructed. Shri. M. Ganapathi, subsequently made payments to the Society in respect of the said loan. Despite repeated requests made by Shri. M. Ganapathi and his son for loan account statements, the Society failed to furnish proper or correct statements reflecting accurate figures.5
It is alleged by respondent No.2 - Society that Shri. M. Ganapathi availed an additional loan of Rs.5,00,00,000/- on 29.01.2020 and defaulted in repayment. Shri. M. Ganapathi died on 08.05.2021. A notice under Section 41A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, was issued in the name of deceased Shri. M. Ganapathi by the Economic Offences Wing, Criminal Investigative Department. Upon being informed of the death of Shri. M. Ganapathi, his son appeared before the Investigating Officer, furnished all known details, and produced original documents relating to the alleged loan transactions.
The Investigating Officer had been appointed in respect of respondent No.2, submitted reports to the Government seeking attachment of properties under Section 3(2) of the KPIDFE Act. Consequently, the State passed an interim order of attachment dated 13.09.2023 vide Notification No.E-RD 121 GRC 2023, attaching the subject property standing in the name of deceased Shri. M. Ganapathi.
Pursuant thereto, respondent No.2 filed Misc.No.248/2024 before the Special Court under Section 6 5(2) of the KPIDFE Act seeking confirmation of the interim attachment. The said petition was initially filed against Shri. M. Ganapathi, despite his death, with a delay of 117 days. Upon issuance of notice, respondent No.1 - Competent Authority filed an application under Order XXII Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ('CPC' for short) and the present appellants were brought on record as legal representatives of the deceased. After entering appearance, they filed their statement of objections. The appellants led evidence through respondent No.2(b), marked Ex.R-1, and subjected RW-1 for cross-examination. Written submissions were also filed on their behalf. The appellants did not lead independent evidence and relied only on documents annexed to the petition. During the course of proceedings, the appellants filed applications seeking summoning of original documents from the Investigating Officer in Crime No.61/2022. Such applications were dismissed by the Special Court on 14.10.2024 and again on 23.11.2024, even after liberty was granted by this Court in MFA No.7069/2024 to file a fresh application.
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The appellants also filed an application under Order VII Rule 11(a) of CPC seeking rejection of the petition on the ground that the interim attachment was passed against a dead person. The said application was dismissed by the Special Court by order dated 17.08.2024 on the ground that the CPC does not apply to KPIDFE proceedings. Ultimately, by order dated 20.12.2024, the Special Court allowed Misc. No.248/2024 and made the interim order of attachment dated 13.09.2023, absolute. Aggrieved by the said order and the manner in which the proceedings were conducted, the appellants have preferred the present appeal.
4. It is contended by the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants that the Special Court failed to consider that the KPIDFE Act is a Special Act, which provides for a period of limitation under Section 5(2) of the KPIDFE Act along with a period of extension and Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 ('Limitation Act' for short) cannot be invoked due to inapplicability.
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5. It is further contended that the Special Court has failed to take note of the absence of any document to show compliance of proviso to Section 5(2) of the KPIDFE Act. The Special Court erred in the interpretation of the term "shall" in Section 5(2) of the KPIDFE Act as being directory and not mandatory while condoning the delay. Further, it is contended that similar provisions contained in the Tamil Nadu Protection of Interests of depositors (in Financial Establishments) Act, 1997 ('TNPID Act' for short) cannot be said to be pari materia with Sections 5(2) and 5(3) of the KPIDFE Act.
6. It is further contended that the Special Court failed to consider that the respondents who have alleged that a loan has been availed, have not produced any document to substantiate the same and the burden of proof was on the one who sought the confirmation of the interim order. The Special Court has erred in holding that the personal property of any person to whom the funds have flown from the financial institution can be attached under the KPIDFE Act.
9
7. It is contended that the alleged availing of a loan of Rs.5,00,00,000/- by late Shri. M. Ganapathi on 29.01.2020, is disputed and has not been proved by the respondents. However, the Special Court held that the loan transaction stood admitted. The finding that the subsequent loan was secured by the earlier mortgage for Rs.1,55,00,000/- is without pleadings or evidence and amounts to an untenable assumption.
8. It is further contended that the Special Court has wrongly relied upon Exs.P-1 and P-2, overlooking discrepancies and contradictions in the entries therein. These documents do not establish the availing of the alleged loan. It is contended that the Special Court has failed to appreciate that the burden of proof lay on the respondents, particularly when the very availing of the loan was disputed. The respondents did not discharge this burden and merely relied on defective passbooks and unproven documents.
9. It is further contended that the dismissed applications filed by the respondents seeking summoning of original documents, and thereafter faulted the respondents 10 for not producing documents, which is self-contradictory. Reliance was placed on isolated answers in cross- examination, taken out of context, to wrongly conclude that a loan of Rs.5,00,00,000/- was availed.
10. It is contended that the interim order of attachment was passed against a dead person and is therefore non est in the eye of law. An order, that is, void ab initio could not have been confirmed by the Special Court. The finding that the attachment was against the "schedule property" and not against the deceased individual is flawed.
11. It is further contended that the Special Court has erred in holding that the mere inclusion of property details in the annexure satisfies the mandatory requirements of Section 3(2) of the KPIDFE Act. The interim attachment order does not record any reasons as mandated by law.
12. It is also contended that the proceedings under Section 5 of the KPIDFE Act cannot be expanded to cover alleged loan defaulters, nor can the Special Court assume 11 jurisdiction to recover loan amounts under the guise of depositor protection.
13. The learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants has relied on the following decisions:-
• Mohinder Singh Gill and Others v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and Others, reported in MANU/SC/0209/1977;
• Opto Circuit India Ltd. v. Axis Bank and Others, reported in MANU/SC/0049/2021;
• Radha Krishan Industries v. State of Himachal Pradesh and Others, reported in MANU/SC/0293/2021;
• K.C. Natarajan v. State of Karnataka and Others, by Order dated 13.01.2023 passed in Writ Petition No.18682 of 2022 (GM-RES);
• Amba Bai and Others v. Gopal and Others, reported in MANU/SC/0286/2001;
• Mohinder Pal Singh v. Municipal Corporation, Amirtsar and Others, by Order dated 23.04.2015 passed in CWP No.20390 of 2014 (O & M);
• Puran Singh through Narinder Kaur v. Deputy Commissioner, Amritsar and Others, by Order dated 23.04.2015 passed in CWP No.20379 of 2014 (O & M);12
• U. Subhadramma and Others v. State of A.P. and Another, reported in ABC 2016 (II) 55 SC;
• Ram Chander v. The State of Chhattisgarh and Others, reported in MANU/SC/0532/2022;
• State of Maharashtra and Others v. Sangharaj Damodar Rupawate and Others, reported in MANU/SC/0466/2010;
• Leharibai v. The State of Karnataka and Others, reported in MANU/KA/0015/1980;
• Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar v. Mahomed Haji Latif and Others, reported in MANU/SC/0168/1969;
• Union of India (UOI) v. Popular Construction Co., reported in MANU/SC/0613/2001;
• Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission and Others, reported in MANU/SC/0252/2010;
• Basawaraj and Others v. The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, reported in MANU/SC/0850/2013; • Thirunagalingam v. Lingeswaran and Others, reported in MANU/SC/0678/2025;
• Fairgrowth Investments Ltd v. The Custodian, reported in MANU/SC/0898/2004; and • State Bank of India and Others v. Rajesh Agarwal and Others, reported in MANU/SC/0308/2023. 13
14. The learned counsel appearing for respondent No.1 submitted that the appellants' contention was that Section 5(2) of the KPIDFE Act prescribes a non-condonable mandatory upper limit, is incorrect because there is no express exclusion of the Limitation Act. It is contended that "mandatory" compliance does not exclude judicial discretion where the statute is silent. Procedural timelines are generally treated as directory unless jurisdiction is expressly ousted.
15. It is further contended that the burden of proof stood discharged through documentary evidence placed on record, including registered mortgage deeds, bank passbooks, loan sanction documents, and bank statements evidencing the disbursal of funds. There is evidence to the account that a sum of Rs.5 Crores was disbursed on 29.01.2020 to the account of the deceased borrower and that the subject property had been offered as security for the said loan. These documents established a prima facie nexus between the loan transaction, the mortgaged property, and the alleged default.
14
16. It is further contended that the nature of proceedings under Section 5(2) of the KPDIFE Act does not require the Court to finally adjudicate upon title, liability, or quantum of dues. The Court is only required to assess whether sufficient material exists to confirm the attachment in order to safeguard depositor interests.
17. It is further contended that an ad-interim attachment issued under KPIDFE Act is not rendered void merely because the person named in the attachment order has died. The attachment contemplated under the Act is in rem in nature and is directed against the property itself rather than being punitive or personal to the individual. The death of the individual does not extinguish the estate or the liabilities attached rather, the property devolves upon the legal heirs subject to all existing charges, claims and encumbrances.
18. It is further contended that the proceedings are not vitiated unless the party alleging invalidity establishes actual prejudice or a miscarriage of justice. It is further submitted that the Special Court's reference to pari materia 15 provisions in TNPID Act was a legitimate interpretive aid and the absence of identical language in the statute does not render such comparison invalid.
19. It is further contended that the reliance placed on the upper limit of the proviso to Section 5(2) of the KPIDFE Act as an absolute bar is incorrect as outer limits are reconciled with judicial discretion in exceptional circumstances upon showing "sufficient cause". This has been contemplated by the Special Court. It is further contended that while each of the enactments prescribe a specific period within which an appeal or application is to be filed none of them contain any express exclusion of the Limitation Act.
20. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents has relied on the following decisions:-
• Smt. Lila Vati Bai v. State of Bombay, reported in 1957 AIR SC 521;
• Krishnadatt Avasthy v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others ,reported in 2024 INSC 252;
• A. Ayyavu (Died) v. Mari, reported in 2016 SCC Online MAD 23236;16
• S.N. Simha and Another v. The State of Karnataka and Others, by Order dated 04.10.2012 passed in Writ Petition No.24840 of 2012 (LA-KIADB);
• Mohd Abaad Ali and Another v. Directorate of Revenue Prosecution Intelligence, by reported in 2024 INSC 125;
• M/s. Patel Brothers v. State of Assam and Others, by Order dated 04.01.2017 passed in Civil Appeal Nos.49-50 of 2017;
• Consolidated Engineering Enterprises v. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department and Others, reported in (2008) 7 SCC 169;
• Gopal Sardar v. Karuna Sardar, reported in (2004) 4 SCC 252;
• Nasiruddin and Others v. Sita Ram Agarwal, reported in (2003) 2 SCC 577;
• State of M.P. and Another v. Pradeep Kumar and Another, reported in (2000) 7 SCC 372;
• N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, reported in (1998) 7 SCC 123;
• State of Nagaland v. Lipok AO and Others, reported in (2005) 3 SCC 752;
• Executive Officer, Antiyur Town Panchayat v. G. Arumugam (D) by LRs, by Order dated 19.01.2015 passed in Civil Appeal No.8577 of 2014; and 17 • Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari and Others, reported in 1968 SCC OnLine SC 139.
21. We have considered the contentions advanced. Section 3(2) of the KPIDFE Act provides for issuance of an order by publishing in the Official Gazette, attaching the money or property believed to have been acquired by the Financial Establishment in its own name, or in the name of any other person from and out of deposits collected by the Financial Establishment. Where such property is not sufficient for repayment of the deposits, such other property of the Financial Establishment or the personal assets of promoters, partners, or other persons related to the establishment can also be attached. It is clear that what is contemplated under Section 3(2) of the KPIDFE Act is only an order of interim attachment of money or property which is "believed to have been acquired" by the Financial Establishment or the personal assets of its Directors etc. The said provisional attachment can be made absolute only after following the procedure under Section 5 of the KPIDFE Act. 18
22. Further, Section 5 of the KPIDFE Act contemplates an application to be made by the competent authority under the Act before the Special Court to make the order of attachment, absolute. It also contemplates a consideration of objections by any person having an interest in the property. Section 11 of the KPIDFE Act provides for the powers of the Special Court regarding realisation of assets and payment to depositors. The Special Court under Section 11(2)(f) of the KPIDFE Act has the power to pass any order for realisation of the assets of the Company and repayment to the depositors.
23. Further, Section 12(3) of the KPIDFE Act specifically provides that any person claiming an interest in the property attached or any portion thereof may, notwithstanding that no notice has been served upon him under this Section, make an objection, as aforesaid, to the Special Court at any time before an order is passed under sub-Section (4) or sub-Section (6).
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24. Section 19 of the KPIDFE Act provides that, "Save as otherwise provided in the Act, the provisions of the Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or any custom or usage or any instrument having effect by virtue of any such law."
25. It is clear that the KPIDFE Act is an enactment intended to provide for protection of interest of gullible depositors in financial establishments. It is a regulatory and penal statute and has to be construed specifically as such, so that the purpose of the enactment can be given effect to.
26. Section 5(2) of the KPIDFE Act provides a period of 30 days from the date of the order made under Section 3 of the KPIDFE Act for the competent authority to apply to the Special Court for making the order of attachment absolute. A proviso has been added to sub Section 5(2) by the Karnataka Act No.06 of 2021, providing as follows:-
"Provided that, the Secretary to Government, Revenue Department, may on the request of the Competent Authority, extend this period by another 20 fifteen days in cases having valid reasons and based on the merits of the case."
27. It is to be noticed here that there is no provision in the KPIDFE Act excluding the provisions of the Limitation Act for filing applications under the KPIDFE Act. The High Court of Madras in a series of decisions has held that where the applications are to be filed before a Special Court and where there is no express exclusion of the provisions of the Limitation Act, then, the Limitation Act is applicable. The enactment being considered was the TNPID Act, which was in pari materia to the provisions of the KPIDFE Act before its amendment by introduction of the proviso to Section 5(2) of the KPIDFE Act.
28. The Apex Court in K.K. Baskaran v. State Represented by its Secretary, Tamil Nadu and others reported in (2011) 3 SCC 793, upheld the legal validity of the TNPID Act and held that the object of the Act to safeguard the interest of the gullible depositors from fraudulent activities of the financial establishments. It 21 further held at Paragraphs No.28 to 30, which reads as follows:-
"28. In the case of the Tamil Nadu Act, the attachment of properties is intended to provide an effective and speedy remedy to the aggrieved depositors for the realisation of their dues. The offences dealt with in the impugned Act are unique and have been enacted to deal with the economic and social disorder in society, caused by the fraudulent activities of such financial establishments.
29. Under Sections 3 and 4 of the Tamil Nadu Act, certain properties can be attached, and there is also provision for interim orders for attachment after which a post-decisional hearing is provided for. In our opinion this is valid in view of the prevailing realities.
30. The Court should interpret the constitutional provisions against the social setting of the country and not in the abstract. The Court must take into consideration the economic realities and aspirations of the people and must further the social interest which is the purpose of the legislation, as held by Holmes, Brandeis and Frankfurter, JJ. of the US Supreme Court in a series of decisions. Hence the courts cannot function in a vacuum. It is for this reason that courts presume in favour of constitutionality of the statute because there is always a presumption that the legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its own people."22
29. We notice that the proviso to Section 5(2) of the KPIDFE Act gives the Government in the Revenue Department a right to extend the period of 30 days by 15 more days for the Competent Authority to move the Special Court. However, such power given to the Government to extend the time by 15 more days cannot be construed as being a bar on the power of the Special Court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. We are of the clear opinion that the proviso granting a power to the Government dehors the power of the Special Court to extend the time for making the application before the Special Court cannot, in any way, limit the powers of the Special Court.
30. The Special Court is constituted under Section 10 of the KPIDFE Act. Such Court is clearly a "Court" for the application of the Limitation Act. As such, the Special Court exercises its power under Section 5 of the KPIDFE Act by virtue of its status as a Court. The time period provided under the Act and the power provided to the Government to extend the time for a period of 15 days thereafter cannot 23 therefore, be construed as limiting the powers of the Special Court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
31. Further, we notice that the Special Court has considered the specific grounds raised in the application for condonation of delay and has found that in the nature of the application under Section 5(2) of the KPIDFE Act, sufficient cause has been shown to condone the delay in filing the application. To arrive at this conclusion, the Special Court has specifically considered the nature of the statute under which the proceedings are filed and the consequences of the rejection of Section 5(2) of the KPIDFE Act application on the ground of delay. We are of the opinion that such considerations cannot be totally lost sight of and the order of the Special Court cannot be said to be illegal or invalid due to the consideration of the said grounds.
32. The further ground raised is that the attachment under Section 3(2) of the KPIDFE Act was against a dead person and was therefore non est in law. The learned counsel for the respondent has relied on several decisions to 24 contend that it is not in all circumstances that an order passed against a dead person becomes invalid. In Smt. Lila Vati Bai's case (supra), the Apex Court has clearly held that an order cannot said to be unenforceable only because it was directed against a dead person in all proceedings. Where the order is not the one in the nature of an order in judicial proceedings and is administrative in nature, the order will not be rendered non est only on account of the fact that it is passed against a dead person.
33. In the instant case, the order of attachment is passed as against the property. The order is notified and duly published. The copy of the order is also affixed on all the properties which are subject to attachment. Thereafter, an opportunity is given to any person interested in the property or any part thereof to show cause as to why the order of attachment shall not be made absolute. The appellants have utilised this opportunity and have appeared before the Special Court and placed their contentions on record.
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34. In the above circumstances, it is clear that no prejudice has been caused to the appellants by virtue of an administrative order of attachment having been passed as against the property in question. In the scheme of the KPIDFE Act, the initial attachment is only a temporary attachment. Once the application under Section 5 of the KPIDFE Act is preferred before the Tribunal, there is a clear opportunity provided to any person interested in any of the attached properties, or having a right in the same, to approach the Special Court and show cause as to why the attachment shall not be made absolute. If sufficient cause can be shown by the persons having interest in the property or portions thereof, the attachment cannot be made absolute.
35. Further, in the light of the provisions of the KPIDFE Act and the intentions of the Act, we are of the clear opinion that the contention that the entire proceedings are bad on account of the fact that the initial order of temporary attachment had been issued as against a dead person, cannot be accepted. As rightly contended by the learned 26 counsel appearing for respondent No.1, relying on the decisions of the Apex Court, it is not in every situation that legal proceedings against a dead person becomes invalid.
36. Further, the contention that the Competent Authority should have proved the facts before the Special Court is also unsustainable. In view of the clear provisions of the KPIDFE Act, once an attachment order is made and duly published and an application is made under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, it is for the person who claims interest in any of the properties attached to show cause as to why the attachment shall not be made absolute.
37. Further, we notice that the competent authority had produced all documents before the Special Court in support of their contention that the appellants' predecessor- in-interest had availed a loan of Rs.5,00,00,000/- which was in arrears to the financial establishment. The Special Court has clearly considered the materials placed on record by the appellants and has come to the clear conclusion that the evidence adduced is insufficient to show that the loan availed by the appellants' father was for any lesser amount 27 as alleged or that the liability stood discharged. The contentions on facts that the loan was availed on behalf of another person and that no amount had been appropriated by the appellants' predecessor-in-interest has also been clearly considered and rejected by the Special Court.
38. In the nature of the provisions of the enactment under which the proceedings have been taken, we are clearly of the view that it was for the appellants to have shown cause as to why the attachment should not be made absolute. Having failed to do so, it is not open to the appellants to raise contentions in this appeal including those which have not been raised before the Special Court.
39. Having considered the contentions advanced, we are of the opinion that no good grounds have been made out to interfere with the order under appeal. The appeal therefore fails and the same is accordingly dismissed. 28
Pending interlocutory applications shall stand disposed of.
Sd/-
(ANU SIVARAMAN) JUDGE Sd/-
(VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL) JUDGE cp*