Karnataka High Court
The Secretary vs The State Of Karnataka on 25 February, 2025
R
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 25TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2025
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL
WRIT APPEAL NO.1031 OF 2022 (LA-RES)
C/W
WRIT APPEAL NO.1029 OF 2022 (LA-RES);
WRIT APPEAL NO.1030 OF 2022 (LA-RES);
WRIT APPEAL NO.1033 OF 2022 (LA-RES);
WRIT APPEAL NO.1037 OF 2022 (LA-RES)
IN W.A.No.1031/2022:
BETWEEN:
THE SECRETARY
THE SPECIAL AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE
MARKETING COMMITTEE FOR FRUITS AND VEGETABLES
AGRAHARA TANK BUND ROAD
BINNYPET, BENGALURU-560 023
...APPELLANT
(BY SMT. SHWETHA KRISHNAPPA, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY
REVENUE DEPARTMENT
M.S. BUILDING
BENGALURU-560 001
2. THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER
VISHVESWARAIAH CENTRE
3RD FLOOR, PODIUM BLOCK
DR. AMBEDKAR VEEDHI
BENGALURU-560 001
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2
3. SRI. KRISHNA REDDY
S/O H. THIMMAIAH REDDY
AGED ABOUT 62 YEARS
4. SRI. T.R. RAMASWAMY REDDY
S/O H. THIMMAIAH REDDY
AGED ABOUT 61 YEARS
5. SRI. R.T. VENKATASWAMY
SINCE DEAD BY LR'S
5(a). B.N. RATNA
W/O LATE R.T. VENKATASWAMY
AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS
(DEAD), BY LR RESPONDENT No.5(b)
V.O. DATED 28.05.2024
5(b). SRI. ROOPESH R.V.
S/O LATE R.T. VENKATASWAMY
AGED ABOUT 29 YERS
RESIDING AT RAMASAGRA VILLAGE
ATTIBELE HOBLI, ANEKAL TALUK
BENGALURU DISTRICT-560 099
6. SRI. R.T. SRINIVASA REDDY
SINCE DEAD, BY LR'S
6(a). R.S. DEEPTI
D/O LATE R.T. SRINIVASA REDDY
AGED ABOUT 28 YEARS
6(b). R.S. DIVYA
D/O LATE R.T. SRINIVASA REDDY
AGED ABOUT 26 YEARS
BOTH ARE R/AT. RAMASAGRA VILLAGE
ATTIBELE HOBLI, ANEKAL TALUK
BENGALURU DISTRICT-560 099
7. SRI. R.T. NARAYANA REDDY
S/O H. THIMMAIAH REDDY
AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS
-
3
8. SRI. R.T. GOPALA REDDY
S/O H. THIMMAIAH REDDY
AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS
RESPONDENTS No.3, 4, 7 & 8 ARE
RESIDING AT RAMASAGRA VILLAGE
ATTIBELE HOBLI, ANEKAL TALUK
BENGALURU DISTRICT-560 099
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. K. SHASHI KIRAN SHETTY, ADVOCATE GENERAL WITH
SRI. DEVARAJ C.H., GOVERNMENT ADVOCATE &
SMT. ANUKANKSHA KALKERI, HCGP FOR R1 & R2;
SRI. K.G. RAGHAVAN, SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR
SRI. MITHUN G.A., ADVOCATE FOR R3 TO R8)
THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED U/S 4 OF THE KARNATAKA
HIGH COURT ACT, 1961, PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE IMPUGNED
JUDGMENT AND ORDER DATED 06.09.2002 IN W.P.
No.11553/2019 PASSED BY THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE AND
DISMISS THE WRIT PETITION WITH COSTS.
IN WA No.1029 OF 2022:
BETWEEN:
THE SPECIAL AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE MARKET
COMMITTEE FOR FRUITS AND VEGETABLES
AGRAHARA TANK BUND ROAD
BINNYPET, BENGALURU-560 023
REP BY ITS SECRETARY
...APPELLANT
(BY SRI. ASHOK HARANAHALLI, SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR
SRI. NANDA KISHORE, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY
REVENUE DEPARTMENT
M.S. BUILDING
BENGALURU-560 001
2. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY
-
4
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE PRODUCE
MARKET COMMITTEE
M.S. BUILDING
BENGALURU-560 001
3. THE DIRECTOR
AGRICULTURE PRODUCE MARKET COMMITTEE
INFANTRY ROAD
BEHIND INCOME TAX OFFICE
BENGALURU-560 001
4. THE SPECIAL DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
BENGALURU DISTRICT
BENGALURU-560 009
5. THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER
PHODIUM BLOCK
VISHVESWARAIAH CENTRE, 3RD FLOOR
DR. AMBEDKAR VEEDHI
BENGALURU-560 001
6. SHRI. VENKATASWAMAIAH
S/O LATE KRISHNAPPA
AGED ABOUT 73 YEARS
R/AT No.68, 11TH MAIN
BTM 1ST STAGE, DRC POST
BENGALURU-560 029
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. K. SHASHI KIRAN SHETTY, ADVOCATE GENERAL WITH
SRI. DEVARAJ C.H., GOVERNMENT ADVOCATE &
SMT. ANUKANKSHA KALKERI, HCGP FOR R1 TO R5)
THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED U/S 4 OF THE KARNATAKA
HIGH COURT ACT, 1961, PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE IMPUGNED
JUDGMENT AND ORDER DATED 06.09.2002 IN W.P.
No.25759/2017 PASSED BY THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE AND
DISMISS THE WRIT PETITION WITH COSTS.
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5
IN WA No.1030 OF 2022:
BETWEEN:
THE SECRETARY
THE SPECIAL AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE MARKETING
COMMITTEE FOR FRUITS AND VEGETABLES
AGRAHARA TANK BUND ROAD
BINNYPET, BENGALURU 560023
...APPELLANT
(BY SRI. ASHOK HARANAHALLI, SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR
SRI. NANDA KISHORE, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
REP. BY ITS SECRETARY
REVENUE DEPARTMENT
M.S. BUILDING
BENGALURU-560 001
2. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY ITS SECRETARY
DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE PRODUCE
MARKET COMMITTEE
M.S. BUILDING
BENGALURU-560 001
3. THE DIRECTOR
DEPT. OF AGRICUTURE PRODUCE
MARKET COMMITTEE
INFANTRY ROAD
BEHIND INCOME TAX OFFICE
BENGALURU-560 001
4. THE SPECIAL DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
K.G. ROAD
BENGALURU DISTRICT
BENGALURU-560 009
5. THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISTION OFFICER
VISHVESWARAIAH CETNRE
3RD FLOOR, PODIUM BLOCK
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6
DR. AMBEDKAR VEEDHI
BENGALURU-560 001
6. SRI. N. KRISHNAPPA
S/O LATE K.R. NARAYANA REDDY
AGE: MAJOR
R/T No.147, OLD MADIWALA
BTM LAYOUT
BENGALURU-560 068
7. SRI. N. CHADNRA REDDY
S/O LATE K.R. NARAYANA REDDY
AGE: MAJOR, OCC: AGRICULTURE
R/AT. No.147, OLD MADIWALA
BTM LAYOUT
BENGALURU-560 068
8. SRI. N. NAGARAJU
S/O LATE K.R. NARAYANA REDDY
AGE: MAJOR, OCC: AGRICULTURE
R/AT No.147, OLD MADIVALA
BTM LAYOUT
BENGALURU-560 068
9. SMT. MADHAVI SIMPI REDDY
S/O SHYAMASUNDAR REDDY
AGE: MAJOR, OCC: AGRICULTURE
R/AT No.147, OLD MADIVALA
BTM LAYOUT
BENGALURU-560 068
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. K. SHASHI KIRAN SHETTY, ADVOCATE GENERAL WITH
SRI. DEVARAJ C.H., GOVERNMENT ADVOCATE &
SMT. ANUKANKSHA KALKERI, HCGP FOR R1 TO R5;
SRI. V. LAKSHMINARAYANA, SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR
SMT. ANUSHA L., ADVOCATE FOR C/R6 & ALSO
FOR R7 TO R9)
THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED U/S 4 OF THE KARNATAKA
HIGH COURT ACT, 1961, PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE IMPUGNED
JUDGMENT AND ORDER DATED 06.09.2002 IN W.P.
No.25329/2017 PASSED BY THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE AND
DISMISS THE WRIT PETITION WITH COSTS.
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WA NO 1033 OF 2022:
BETWEEN:
THE SECRETARY
THE SPECIAL AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE MARKETING
COMMITTEE FOR FRUITS AND VEGETABLES
AGRAHARA TANK BUND ROAD
BINNYPET, BENGALURU-560 023
...APPELLANT
(BY SRI. ASHOK HARANAHALLI, SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR
SRI. NANDA KISHORE, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY
REVENUE DEPARTMENT
M.S. BUILDING
BENGALURU-560 001
2. THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER
VISHVESWARAIAH CENTRE
3RD FLOOR, PODIUM BLOCK
DR. AMBEDKAR VEEDHI
BENGALURU-560 001
3. SRI. M. SURESH KUMAR
S/O A.R. MUTHU KUMAR
AGE: MAJOR
R/AT. No.331/2, 2ND CROSS
29TH MAIN ROAD
NEAR GAYATHRI APARTMENT
BTM 1ST PHASE
BENGALURU-560 068
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. K. SHASHI KIRAN SHETTY, ADVOCATE GENERAL WITH
SRI. DEVARAJ C.H., GOVERNMENT ADVOCATE &
SMT. ANUKANKSHA KALKERI, HCGP FOR R1 & R2;
SRI. S.S. NAGANAND, SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR
SRI. MITHUN G.A., ADVOCATE FOR C/R3)
THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED U/S 4 OF THE KARNATAKA
HIGH COURT ACT, 1961, PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE IMPUGNED
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JUDGEMENT AND ORDER DATED 06.09.2022 IN WP
No.11550/2019 PASSED BY THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE AND
DISMISS THE WRIT PETITION WITH COSTS.
WA NO 1037 OF 2022:
BETWEEN:
THE SPECIAL AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE MARKETING
COMMITTEE FOR FRUITS AND VEGETABLES
AGRAHARA TANK BUND ROAD
BINNYPET, BENGALURU-560 023
REP. BY ITS SECRETARY
...APPELLANT
(BY SRI. ASHOK HARANAHALLI, SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR
SRI. NANDA KISHORE, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
REP. BY ITS SECRETARY
REVENUE DEPARTMENT
M.S. BUILDING
BENGALURU-560 001
2. THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER
VISHVESWARAIAH CENTRE
3RD FLOOR, PODIUM BLOCK
DR. AMBEDKAR VEEDHI
BENGALURU-560 001
3. SRI. M. SURESH KUMAR
S/O A.R. MUTHU KUMAR
AGE: MAJOR
R/AT. No.231/1
2ND CROSS, 29TH MAIN
BTM LAYOUT
BENGALURU-560 068
4. SMT. DHANALAKSHMI
W/O A.R. MUTHU KUMAR
AGE: MAJOR
R/AT. No.231/1
-
9
2ND CROSS, 29TH MAIN
BTM LAYOUT
BENGALURU-560 068
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. K. SHASHI KIRAN SHETTY, ADVOCATE GENERAL WITH
SRI. DEVARAJ C.H., GOVERNMENT ADVOCATE &
SMT. ANUKANKSHA KALKERI, HCGP FOR R1 & R2;
SRI. S.S. NAGANAND, SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR
SRI. MITHUN G.A., ADVOCATE FOR C/R3 & R4)
THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED U/S 4 OF THE KARNATAKA
HIGH COURT ACT PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE IMPUGNED
JUDGEMENT AND ORDER DATED 06.09.2022 IN WRIT PETITION
Nos.11551/2019 PASSED BY THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE AND
DISMISS THE WRIT PETITION WITH COSTS.
THESE APPEALS HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR
JUDGMENT ON 06.02.2025 AND COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT OF JUDGMENT THIS DAY, ANU SIVARAMAN
J., PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:
CORAM: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN
and
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL
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10
CAV JUDGMENT
(PER: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN) These Writ Appeals arise from a common judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 06.09.2022 passed in Writ Petition No.11551/2019 c/w. Writ Petitions No.25329/2017, 25759/2017, 11550/2019 and 11553/2019.
2. We have heard Shri. Ashok Haranahalli, learned senior counsel as instructed by Shri. Nanda Kishore, learned advocate for the appellant/beneficiary in W.A.No.1029/2022, W.A.No.1030/2022, W.A.No.1033/2022 and W.A. No.1037/2022 and Smt. Shwetha Krishnappa, learned Special Counsel for the appellant/beneficiary in W.A. No.1031/2022. Shri. K. Shashi Kiran Shetty, learned Advocate General along with Smt. Shwetha Krishnappa, learned Additional Government Advocate for respondents/State, Shri K.G. Raghavan, learned senior counsel as instructed by Shri. Mithun G. A, Shri S.S. Naganand, learned senior counsel as instructed by Shri. Mithun G. A, and Sri V. Lakshminarayana, learned senior
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11 counsel as instructed by Shri. Pratham N and Smt. Anusha L., advocate appearing for the respondents/landowners.
3. The Writ Petitions were filed seeking a declaration that the acquisition proceedings initiated as per Preliminary Notification dated 20.05.2002 followed by Final Notification dated 02.08.2003 have lapsed under Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short 'the 1894 Act'), for not making an award within two years from the date of the order of the learned Single Judge in an earlier round of writ petitions requiring the passing of such awards.
4. The learned Single Judge considered the contentions raised and framed the following questions for consideration:-
"1. Whether once a direction has been issued in a Writ Petition for an award to be passed, would the time period prescribed under Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 be applicable or would it get extended merely on the ground that a Writ Appeal had been filed and pending?
2. Whether the time for passing of an award would get extended since the proceedings were pending before the Hon'ble Apex Court in a SLP?
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3. What is the reference point of time for considering the period prescribed under Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894?
4. What is the reference point of time for calculating the time period prescribed under Section 25 of Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013?
5. Whether in the given facts and circumstances, the acquisition proceedings in the present matter has lapsed?
6. Whether the beneficiary can claim that the delay in acquisition is by the State and/or SLAO and as such, the acquisition needs to be upheld to protect the interest of the beneficiary?"
5. After considering all the contentions raised, the statutory provisions and the decisions on the point, it was held that mere filing of a Writ Petition, Writ Appeal or Special Leave Petition would not extend the period fixed under Section 11A of the 1894 Act for making an award. It was further found that in case of an acquisition initiated prior to coming into force of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, ('the 2013 Act' for short), the time
-
13 period for passing the award under Section 25 of the 2013 Act, will have to be reckoned from 01.01.2014. It was further found that the beneficiary cannot contend that the acquisition is saved, since the delay is on account of the default of the State and/or SLAO. The Writ Petitions were accordingly allowed and the Preliminary Notification dated 20.05.2002 and the Final Notification dated 02.08.2003, were quashed. The awards, if any, were also quashed reserving liberty to the beneficiary to initiate such proceedings, if any, against the State for damages caused to the beneficiary.
6. The learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant would contend that the appellant is the Special APMC for Fruits and Vegetables, which is the beneficiary of the acquisition and that the acquisition was for an urgent public purpose, that is, the formation of a Vegetable Market, which is a pressing need of the City of Bengaluru. It is contended that the Preliminary Notification was issued on 20.05.2002 and a Final Notification on 02.08.2003. An award was passed on 30.01.2005 and the beneficiary had
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14 deposited the entire amount of Rs.2,31,057,507/- towards the cost of the acquisition. After the award was passed, but before possession of the lands could be taken over, the Writ Petitioners had filed the first round of Writ Petitions challenging the acquisition stating that the final notification/declaration was not issued within one year from the date of Preliminary Notification under Section 6(1) of the 1894 Act. On 22.11.2010, W.P.No.11298/2005 and connected matters were disposed of upholding the acquisition proceedings but quashing the award dated 30.01.2005 and directing as follows:-
"i. Writ petitions are partly allowed. ii. The Writ Petitions in so for as it relates to quashing of preliminary notification dated 20.05.2002 and the final notification dated 02.08.2003 are hereby dismissed.
iii. The impugned award dated 30.01.2005 is hereby quashed.
iv. The Land Acquisition Officer is hereby directed to pass a fresh award by taking into consideration the market value of the lands in question as on today.
v. If the petitioners are dissatisfied with the compensation to be determined by the Land
-15
Acquisition Officer, it is open for them to seek enhancement of compensation as per law. Ordered accordingly."
7. The appellant as well as the landowners filed writ appeals challenging the judgment but the appeals were dismissed on 05.09.2011. The operative portion of the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in W.As.No.33- 34/2011 reads as follows:-
"47. While the acquisition proceedings are liable to be quashed, they are being saved (not upheld) in public interest. If the acquisition proceedings are quashed, the Government has to start from the scratch by issuing the preliminary notification. This course would entitle the writ petitioners to claim and would make the APMC liable to pay the compensation by determining the market value prevailing as on the date of the issuance of the fresh preliminary notification.
48. For all the aforesaid reasons, we affirm the learned Single Judge's order. In the result, all these appeals are dismissed. Review Petition No.302/2011 is allowed by modifying the order dated 08.06.2011 in W.A. No.46/2011 in terms of the instant order."
8. Thereafter, both sides preferred Special Leave Petitions before the Apex Court challenging the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court. The SLP was dismissed on
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16 17.04.2017, upholding the acquisition proceedings. While the matter was pending in SLP, the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 came into effect on 01.01.2014. It is contended by the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant that though specific contentions had been raised with reference to the lapsing of the acquisitions, the Apex Court, while dismissing the SLP had left open only the contention as to the applicability of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. It is therefore contended that all other questions which stood raised in the earlier round of Writ Petitions stood concluded as against the writ petitioners. It is contended that thereafter, the present batch of Writ Petitions were filed in 2017 and 2019, again raising contentions as to the lapsing of the acquisition, which have now been allowed by the learned Single Judge. It is therefore contended that the prayers are barred by the principle of constructive res judicata and the liberty having been reserved by the Apex Court only to raise contentions in
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17 terms of the 2013 Act, the learned Single Judge could not have been considered the contentions raised afresh.
9. Further, it is contended that since the award had admittedly been passed on 25.08.2020, the directions of the Apex Court stood complied with and there was only a delay in passing the award and no lapsing of the acquisitions as alleged by the petitioners. It is further contended that there was an inordinate delay on the part of the writ petitioners in approaching the Court as against an acquisition which was initiated on 20.05.2002 since the Writ Petitions were filed only in 2017 and 2019. Further, it is contended that even in case, it is found that there was an undue delay on the part of the appellant in passing the award, the proper course open to this Court would be to save the acquisition by directing the payment of the compensation taking note of the land value as exists at present and the quashing of the Notification is not proper.
10. The learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant placed the following decisions in support of his contentions:-
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• Gurmeet Singh v. Dhirendra Kumar, reported in (2005) 13 SCC 434;
• Deepak Malik and Others v. Rakesh Batra, reported in (2005) 13 SCC 113;
• Tirupati Balalji Developers (P) Ltd. and Others v. State of Bihar and Others, reported in (2004) 5 SCC 1;
• Bharat Builder Pvt. Ltd. and Others v. Parijat Flat Owners Coop. Housing Society Ltd., reported in (1999) 5 SCC 622;
• New Okhla Industrial Development Authority v. Harkishan (Dead) through Legal Representatives and Others, reported in (2017)3 SCC 588; • M. Nagabhushana v. State of Karnataka and Others, reported in (2011) 3 SCC 408;
• Executive Engineer, Gosikhurd Project Ambadi, Bhandara, Maharashtra Vidarbha Irrigation Development Corporation v. Mahesh and Others, reported in (2022) 2 SCC 772;
• Competent Authority v. Barangore Jute Factory and Others, reported in (2005) 13 SCC 477.
• Asgar and Others v. Mohan Varma and Others, reported in (2020) 16 SCC 230;
• Delhi Development Authority v. Bhola Nath Sharma (Dead) by LRs and Others, reported in (2011) 2 SCC 54;
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19 • Himalayan Tiles and Marble (P) Ltd. v. Francis Victor Coutinho (Dead) by LRs, reported in (1980) 3 SCC 223;
• Bombay Metropolitan Region Development Authority, Bombay v. Gokak Patel Volkart Ltd. and Others, reported in (1995) 1 SCC 642;
• M.M. Quasim v. Manohar Lal Sharma and Others, reported in (1981) 3 SCC 36;
• Mithilesh Kumari and Another v. Prem Behari Khare, reported in (1989) 2 SCC 95;
• Shankara Cooperative Housing Society Limited v. M. Prabhakar and Others, reported in (2011) 5 SCC 607; and • Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz and Others v. Government of Karnataka and Others, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 20.
11. Shri. K. Shashi Kiran Shetty, learned Advocate General appearing for the State submits that since the acquisition in question was admittedly for an important public purpose. The learned Single Judge was not justified in having interfered with the same on technical grounds. It is submitted that the finding of the learned Single Judge that the acquisition has lapsed would result in undue delay in
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20 completing the proceedings which are initiated for a larger public purpose and will also lead to higher financial burden for the State and the beneficiary. It is contended that the mere delay in complying with the directions in the judgment of the learned Single Judge in the earlier round of Writ Petitions does not result in lapsing of the entire acquisition. Since the Courts, in the first round of litigation had permitted the passing of a fresh award, the delay is only in passing the award as directed and the provisions of Section 11A of the 1894 Act would have no application in the situation.
12. The learned Advocate General appearing for the appellant placed the following decisions in support of his contentions:-
• Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal and Others, reported in (2020) 8 SCC 129;
• General manager, Department of Telecommunications, Thiruvananthapuram v. Jacob s/o Kochuvarkey Kalliath (Dead) by LRs and Others, reported in (2003) 9 SCC 662;
• Director of Inspection of Income Tax (Investigation), New Delhi and Another v. Pooran
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Mal & Sons and Another, reported in (1975) 4 SCC 568; and • Ramniklal N. Bhutta v. State of Maharashtra reported in (1997) 1 SCC 134.
13. For the respondents/land losers, Shri. K.G.Raghavan, learned senior counsel submits that the contentions raised in the first round of litigation was specifically that the declaration under Section 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was not within the prescribed time and that the acquisition was bad for non compliance of the prescribed procedure including the proper publication of the Notification, issuance of individual notices and consideration of the contentions raised. The said contentions were considered and it was found that the proceedings for acquisition were clearly initiated by procedural irregularities. Though, the acquisition was saved relying on the decision of the Apex Court in Barangore Jute Factory's case (supra), the awards were quashed. During the pendency of the first batch of Writ Petitions, there was a stay of proceedings operating. Judgment was rendered on 22.11.2010.
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22 Thereafter, there was no stay and the award was admittedly passed only on 25.08.2020.
14. It is submitted that the Division Bench as well as the Apex Court had clearly found that there was manipulation of records placed before the Court to make it appear that there was a later Notification under Section 4(1) of the 1894 Act and this aspect is clearly mentioned in paragraph No.10 of the Judgment of the Apex Court. It is submitted that an acquiring authority, who had indulged in sharp practices before the Court cannot seek any equity before this Court in these proceedings. It is further contended that the question whether the acquisition had lapsed by operation of statute by not passing the award within the time as permitted by this Court and the Apex Court was not directly and substantially in issue in the earlier round of the Writ Petitions and is therefore a fresh cause of action and the Writ Petitions were maintainable.
15. The learned senior counsel has placed the following decisions in support of his contentions:-
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• Gokak Patel Volkart Limited v. Collector of Central Excise, Belgaum, reported in (1987) 2 SCC 93;
• Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. v. Church of South India Trust Association, CSI Cinod Secretariat, Madras, reported in (1992) 3 SCC 1;
• J.S. Parihar v. Ganpat Duggar and Others, reported in (1996) 6 SCC 291;
• Padma Sundara Rao (Dead) and Others v. State of T.N. and Others, reported in (2002) 3 SCC 533;
• Bhimandas Ambwani (Dead) through LRs v. Delhi Power Company Limited, reported in (2013) 14 SCC 195;
• Sajan P.M. S/o Late Madhavan v. The Land Acquisition Officer, reported in 2015 SCC OnLine Ker 29722;
• Central Bank of India and Others v. Dragendra Singh Jadon, reported in (2022) 8 SCC 378; • Pyare Lal and Others v. Union of India and Others, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine All 2857; and • Kolkata Municipal Corporation and Another v. Bimal Kumar Shah and Others, reported in (2024) 10 SCC 533.
16. Shri S.S.Naganand, learned senior counsel appearing for the private respondents submitted that res
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24 judicata is a question which must be decided on facts and not on law. He contended that the cause of action being separate and the issues raised also being distinct, there would be no question of res judicata, constructive or otherwise. It is further contended that though the beneficiary is a person interested in the acquisition proceedings, the beneficiary cannot maintain a appeal against the judgment holding that the acquisition has lapsed, without the acquiring authority challenging the same. Further, reliance is placed on paragraphs No.19 and 20 of the judgment of the learned Single Judge in W.P.No.11298/2005 and connected matters, the judgment of the Division Bench as well as the findings of the Apex Court in the earlier round of litigation.
17. The learned senior counsel would also place reliance on the following judgments of the Apex Court:-
• Kanoria Chemicals and Industries Ltd. and Others v. U.P. State Electricity Board and Others, reported in (1997) 5 SCC 772;
-25
• Union of India and another v. Special Land Acquisition Officer and others, reported in (1996) 6 SCC 454;
• Executive Engineer, Gosikhurd Project Ambadi, Bhandara, Maharashtra Vidarbha Irrigation Development Corporation v. Mahesh and Others, reported in (2022) 2 SCC 772; (paragraph No.30) • Hope Plantations Ltd. v. Taluk Land Board, Peermade and Another, reported in (1999) 5 SCC 590;
• Laxman Pandya and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, reported in (2011) 14 SCC 94; and • Executive Engineer, Tamil Nadu Housing Board v.
R. Parthasarathi and Others, reported in 2020 SCC OnLine Mad 2962.
18. Shri. V. Lakshminarayana, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents, on the other hand, contends that the question of res judicata does not arise in the present case at all. It is contended that there is a clear distinction between the prayer to quash a Notification and a contention that the acquisition has lapsed by operation of law. It is contended that the first batch of Writ Petitions filed before this Court was on the allegation that the final
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26 notification/declaration under Section 6(1) of the 1894 Act was not within time from the issuance of the Preliminary Notification. The learned Single Judge found that the Preliminary Notification was on 20.05.2002 and the declaration under Section 6(1) of the 1894 Act was on 02.08.2003, that is after the period of one year and therefore the acquisition stood lapsed and no award could have been passed thereafter. The Awards were therefore quashed. The Land Acquisition Officer (LAO) was directed to pass a fresh award taking into consideration the market value of the lands as on the date of the judgment that is 22.11.2010. This finding was affirmed in Appeals, which came to be dismissed on 05.09.2011. As on the said date, the time provided to pass the award had not lapsed.
19. Though the matter was taken up by both sides before the Apex Court, there was no interim order passed by the Apex Court. Therefore, the time provided to pass the award expired during the pendency of the SLPs. Section 11A of the 1894 Act, being admittedly applicable and the language of the Section being clear, it is urged that in the
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27 absence of an order of stay, the time would have continued to run and the acquisition, therefore, stood lapsed. It is contended by the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents that even if the dismissal of the SLP is taken as the starting point for time under Section 11A of the 1894 Act, no award was passed within the time provided and thus, the acquisitions again stood lapsed. It is contended that the lapsing of the acquisition by not passing of an award within the time provided even after the dismissal of the Writ Appeal is a fresh cause of action and the principle of constructive res judicata can have absolutely no application. It is further contended that the written submissions placed before the Apex Court cannot be construed as pleadings and the arguments raised before the Apex Court cannot be held against the petitioner in these proceedings since the earlier cause of action being completely distinct and different from the present one. It is further contended that the time provided under Section 11A of the Act, cannot be extended by the Courts especially where what is being construed is a provision in a beneficial legislation.
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20. Though it is contended by the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents that the appellant is not the beneficiary of the acquisition in question, we notice that the respondents themselves had made the appellant a party to the Writ Petitions as the beneficiary of the acquisition and therefore the said contention need not be considered.
21. The learned senior counsel would also place reliance on the following judgments:-
• Vijayadevi Navalkishore Bhartia and Another v. Land Acquisition Officer and Another, reported in (2003) 5 SCC 83;
• Sri. Doddanarasimha Reddy v. State of Karnataka, by Order dated 13.11.2020 passed in W.P.No.16351 of 2014 (LA-RES);
• Kunwar Pal Singh (Dead) by LRs v. State of U.P. and Others, reported in (2007) 5 SCC 85;
• Ashok Kumar and Others v. State of Haryana and Another, reported in (2007) 3 SCC 470;
• Reliance Power Limited, Formerly R.E. Generan Limited v. Babu Singh and Others, reported in (2014) 10 SCC 785;
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29 • Jayamma and Others v. Deputy Commissioner, Hassan District, Hassan and Others, reported in (2013) 7 SCC 554;
• A.S. Naidu and Others v. State of Tamil Nadu and Others, reported in (2010) 2 SCC 801;
• Union of India and Others v. Mahendra Girji and Others, reported in (2010) 15 SCC 682;
• Singareni Collieries Company Limited v. Vemuganti Ramakrishan Rao and Others, reported in (2013) 8 SCC 789;
• Girnar Traders (3) v. State of Maharashtra and Others, reported in (2011) 3 SCC 1;
• Delhi Development Authority v. Sukhbir Singh and Others, reported in (2016) 16 SCC 258;
• Smt. Nagu Bai and Others v. State of Karnataka, reported in ILR 2001 KAR 1169;
• State of Telangana and Others v. D. Mahesh Kumar and Another, reported in (2018) 15 SCC 703; • State of Maharashtra and Others v. Moti Ratan Estate and Another, reported in (2019) 8 SCC 552; • Raj Kumar Gandhi v. Chandigarh Administration and Others, reported in (2018) 7 SCC 763;
• Khub Chand and Others v. State of Rajasthan and Others, reported in (1967) 1 SCR 120;
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30 • Kaliyappan v. State of Kerala and Others, reported in (1989) 1 SCC 113;
• R.B. Dealers Private Limited v. Metro Railway, Kolkata, reported in (2019) 20 SCC 658; • Union of India and Another v. Special Land Acquisition Officer and Others, reported in (1996) 6 SCC 454;
• The Special Agricultural Produce Market Committee for Fruits and Vegetables v. N. Krishnappa and Others etc., by Order dated 17.04.2017 passed in Civil Appeal Nos.5248-5274 of 2017;
• M. Suresh Kumar and Another v. The State of Karnataka and Others, by Order dated 06.09.2022 passed in W.P.No.11551 of 2019 (LA-RES) and connected matters;
• Anil Kumar Gupta v. State of Bihar and Others, reported in (2012) 12 SCC 443;
• Delhi Development Authority v. Simla Devi and Others, reported in (2018) 17 SCC 268;
• Haryana State Industrial and Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited and Others v. Deepak Aggarwal and Others, reported in (2023) 6 SCC 512;
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31 • Government (NCT of Delhi) and Another v. Mahendra Singh and Others, reported in (2017) 11 SCC 382;
• Mallavva w/o Ramappa Sheelavantar and Others v. The State of Karnataka and Others, by Order dated 15.11.2022 passed in W.P.No.103235 of 2021 (KLR- RR/SUR);
• Laxmi Devi v. State of Bihar and Others, reported in (2015) 10 SCC 241;
• Soorajmull Nagarmull v. State of Bihar and Others, reported in (2015) 10 SCC 270;
• R. Rajashekar and Others v. Trinity House Building Cooperative Society and Others, reported in (2016) 16 SCC 46;
• State of Haryana and Another v. Devander Sagar and Others, reported in (2016) 14 SCC 746; • Virtual Soft Systems Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi, reported in (2007) 9 SCC 665; • Vijay Mahadeorao Kubade v. State of Maharashtra, through the Collector, reported in (2018) 8 SCC 266; and • U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Jainul Islam and Another, reported in (1998) 2 SCC 467.
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22. We have considered the contentions advanced as also the statutory provisions and the decisions relied on. The only question we are called upon to decide is whether the detailed findings of the learned Single Judge on facts and law require interference in this intra-Court appeal.
23. The admitted facts are that the acquisition was initiated as early as in the year 2002, under the provisions of the 1894 Act. The initial award passed in the year 2005 stood quashed by this Court, which was upheld upto the Apex Court. Therefore, it is clear that an award, as known to law ought to have been passed by the acquiring authority under the provisions of the statute. The land belonging to a private person cannot be appropriated by the State or the acquiring authority otherwise than by due process of law. With the quashing of the award dated 30.01.2005, it was imperative on the acquiring authority to make an award, in accordance with law, within the statutorily permissible period available in law.
24. We notice that the initial challenge raised to the acquisition was on the ground that the declaration under
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33 Section 6(1) of the 1894 Act was beyond the time and that there were violations of the statutory requirements in the publication of the notifications under Section 4 as well as the declaration under Section 6 of the 1894 Act. In the initial batch of writ petitions, the learned Single Judge has found as follows:-
"19. I am in respectful agreement with the law declared by the Kerala High Court in M. Syed Mohammed Shafi's case and therefore the last date of publication in the Chavdi on 5.8.2002 is to be taken into consideration for the purpose of computing the period of one year specified in Section 6(1) of the Act. It is not in dispute that the final notification under Section 6(1) of the Act was issued on 2.8.2003. Therefore, the final notification issued on 2.8.2003 is within the period of one year from the date of preliminary notification published in the Chavdi of the village on 5.8.2002. Therefore, the contention of learned counsel for the petitioners that there is delay in issuing final notification is hereby rejected.
20. The defect in publishing the preliminary notification in Kannada daily EE SANJE evening edition, not serving personal notice on some of the petitioners under Section 5-A enquiry after Bangalore bundh day on 12.09.2002 and the non-consideration of the objections filed by the petitioners in detail by the Land Acquisition Officer in his 5-A enquiry report may be grounds for quashing the impugned notifications. If the impugned
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notifications are quashed, the same is not a legal impediment for the respondents to initiate fresh acquisition proceedings and in that event the respondents may require to pay the present market value as compensation. x x x x x"
25. Thereafter, relying on the decision of the Apex Court in Barangore Jute Factory's case (supra), the learned Single Judge upheld the Notifications, but, quashed the award dated 30.01.2005 and directed the passing of a fresh award by taking into consideration the market value as on the date of the judgment.
26. In appeal, the Division Bench specifically considered the matter, summoned the records and held at paragraphs No.41 and 42 of the judgment in W.As.No.33- 34/2011, as follows:-
"41. For yet another reason too, we find it hard to believe that the substance of the preliminary notification was displayed in the chavadi on 05.08.2002. When some of the land-losers filed the applications under the Right to Information Act and sought to know whether the statement containing the substance of the preliminary notification was affixed in the village panchayat, they got the endorsement that the original file pertaining to the land acquisition is not available.
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42. For the two aforesaid reasons, we find it hard to accept that the final notification, dated 02.08.2003 is within one year from the date of the last of the publications of the preliminary notification, dated 20.05.2002. Thus, the acquisition proceedings do suffer from the failure to comply with the statutory requirement. Strictly speaking, the acquisition proceedings are to be quashed on the ground of the publication of the final notification beyond 1 year from the date of the last of the publications of the preliminary notification."
27. However, the Division Bench, considering the larger public interest urged, saved the acquisition and upheld the direction of the learned Single Judge to pass awards afresh taking note of the current market value of the property. The judgment of the Division Bench was taken up before the Apex Court by the land losers as well as the beneficiary. The Apex Court in it's order dated 17.04.2017 in Civil Appeals No.5248-5274/2017, held at paragraphs No.8 to 10, as under:-
"8. We have considered the submissions on behalf of the parties. The original acquisition records had also been summoned by us. The observations of the Division Bench appear justified. But in the nature of the order passed, moulding the relief keeping in mind the
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larger public interest involved in the acquisition, and in view of Barangore Jute Factory (supra), we are not satisfied that the order of the High Court calls for interference.
9. In Barangore Jute Factory (supra) the acquisition suffered from statutory non-compliance. In view of the larger public interest involved in the acquisition, declining to set aside the acquisition the relief was moulded in the interest of justice observing:-
"14.........No useful purpose will be served by quashing the impugned notification at this stage. We cannot be unmindful of the legal position that the acquiring authority can always issue a fresh notification for acquisition of the land in the event of the impugned notification being quashed. The consequence of this will only be that keeping in view the rising trend in prices of land, the amount of compensation payable to the landowners may be more. Therefore, the ultimate question will be about the quantum of compensation payable to the landowners. Quashing of the notification at this stage will give rise to several difficulties and practical problems. Balancing the rights of the petitioners as against the problems involved in quashing the impugned notification, we are of the view that a better course will be to compensate the landowners, that is, the writ petitioners appropriately for what they have been deprived of. Interests of justice persuade us to adopt this course of action."
10. Since the contention with regard to the 2013 Act will require examination of facts with due opportunity, we do not consider it necessary to deal with the same in the present proceedings and leave it open
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37 for the aggrieved to pursue their remedies in accordance with law before the appropriate forum, if so advised."
28. Even if we accept all the contentions raised by the learned senior Counsel for the appellant, it was for the beneficiary to have prevailed on the Government to pass the award within the statutory time limit, in case the public need was so pressing. We fail to see what prevented the acquiring authority and the beneficiary from taking appropriate steps to pass the award within time. Having already suffered a finding that the notification was liable to be quashed for non compliance of statutory timelines, the appellant ought to have taken appropriate steps to see that the remaining timelines are strictly adhered to. This was not done. More so, we notice that the acquiring authority who was duty bound to pass the awards in time has not even filed an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge.
29. The learned Single Judge has considered all the contentions raised in detail and has found that even if all the contentions raised by the beneficiary are accepted, the
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38 awards should have been passed at least within the permissible time limit from the date of dismissal of the SLP that is 17.04.2017. There is no dispute that the award is passed only on 25.08.2020. We have no hesitation to hold that the contentions raised in the appeals with regard to extension of time limits are totally devoid of merits. We are also of the opinion that the cause of action which led to the present batch of Writ Petitions is totally different and the principle of constructive res judicata can have no application, where the cause of action as well as the issues raised are entirely different. The issue raised in this batch of writ petitions that the acquisition had lapsed on account of the award not being passed within the statutory time limit as prescribed in Section 11A of the 1894 Act was never in issue in the previous round of litigation.
30. The contention that the writ petitions were belated also cannot be accepted since the cause of action for filing of the present batch of writ petitions arose only when the award was not passed within time as provided under the Act. At the relevant time, the parties were still in Court on
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39 the question whether the earlier award was sustainable or not. Therefore, the said contention also cannot be accepted. The further contention raised that the acquisition is to be saved in public interest and that the land value as on today can be reckoned also cannot be accepted in the facts and circumstances of the instant case.
31. Having given our anxious consideration to the contentions raised, we are of the opinion that there is absolutely no ground made out for interference with the findings of the learned Single Judge, which are well- reasoned and legally sustainable. The writ appeals therefore fail and the same are accordingly dismissed.
Pending IAs, if any, in all the appeals, shall stand disposed of.
Sd/-
(ANU SIVARAMAN) JUDGE Sd/-
(VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL) JUDGE cp*