Bombay High Court
Purna Cooperative Sugar Factory (Purna ... vs Dr. Jaiprakash S/O. Shankarlal ... on 24 October, 2002
Equivalent citations: 2003(3)MHLJ292
Author: A.P. Deshpande
Bench: A.P. Deshpande
JUDGMENT A.P. Deshpande, J.
1. Heard the learned Advocates appearing for the parties.
2. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith by consent of parties.
Respective Advocates waive service for the respondents in the both petitions.
3. Writ Petition No. 1752/2002 is filed by Purna Cooperative Sugar Factory, Basmatnagar and one Jaiprakash Salunke, who is presently the Chairman (Managing Director) of the petitioner no. 1 / Society. The respondent no. 1 in the said petition is one Shri Jaiprakash Mundada, who is presently a Member of the Legislative Assembly. Writ Petition No. 2422/2002 is filed by the respondent no. 1 (Shri Jaiprakash Mundada). An order passed by the Secretary, Department of Cooperation, State of Maharashtra, dated 19-4-2002 is challenged in both the petitions and, as such, the petitions were heard and are being disposed of by this common judgment. For the sake of clarity in the judgment, parties are referred to as are in the cause title in Writ Petition No. 1752/2002. Petitioner No. 1 / Purna Cooperative Sugar Factory is referred in the judgment as " Society " for the sake of brevity.
4. The Petitioner no. 1 is a registered Cooperative Society and is a Specified Society within the meaning of Section 73G of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). The petitioner no. 2 is the member of petitioner no. 1 / Society, so also, is its Chairman. During the earlier term of the Managing Committee of the Society commencing from 1995 to 2000, the petitioner no. 2, so also, the respondent no. 1 were the members of the Managing Committee (Directors) of Sakhar Karkhana along with others. During the relevant period, the respondent no. 1 was Cabinet Minister for Cooperation in the State of Maharashtra. For the failure on the part of the Managing Committee, to call and hold the Annual General Meeting, as is mandated by Section 75 of the said Act, the Regional Joint Registrar / respondent no. 3, issued show cause notice to all the members of the Managing Committee and thereafter passed an order dated 21-12-2001 disqualifying 16 of the members of the Managing Committee including the respondent no. 1, disqualifying the 1st respondent for a period of 2 years to be a member of the Managing Committee of any Society. The Regional Joint Registrar, on facts, found that 4 Directors including the petitioner no. 2 were not guilty, for the reason that the said 4 Directors were pursuing the other Directors to call Annual General Meeting but the other Directors who were in majority in the Managing Committee, did not call the meeting. It is also found by the Joint Registrar that 4 of the Directors including the petitioner no. 2 were repeatedly making representation for holding of the Annual General Meeting. The order passed by the Joint Registrar dated 21-12-2001 came to be challenged by filing a Revision before the State Government under Section 154 of the said Act. The said Revision came to be heard and decided by the Secretary in Cooperation Department. The Revision came to be partly allowed and the disqualification for a period of 2 years, to be a member of the Managing Committee, came to be restricted, inasmuch as the revisional order directed the respondent 1s disqualification to be a member of the Committee of the petitioner no. 1 / Society alone. Effect thereof is that the respondent no. 1 is only disqualified, by the revisional order to be a member of the Managing Committee of petitioner no. 1 / Society alone, to the exclusion of all other Societies. The revisional order passed by the Secretary is challenged in both the petitions, by the Society in Writ Petition No. 1752/2002, contending that the revisional order is patently wrong and the disqualification need to be in relation to all the Societies; whereas the respondent no. 1 has contended in Writ Petition No. 2422/2002, that the revision ought to have been allowed fully and the order passed by the Joint Registrar ought to have been set aside.
5. The learned Advocate for the petitioners has made the following submissions :
(1) The provisions of the Act, more particularly, Section 72 and 73, and Bye-law No. 24(2)(A) cast an obligation on the Committee Members to call the Annual General Meeting as mandated by Section 75 of the said Act and failure to call Annual General Meeting during the prescribed period and/or extended period would render the Committee Members liable for an action of disqualification. Section 75(5) read in the light of the provisions contained in Section 73FF and Section 144E of the Act leaves no room of doubt, that the disqualification has to be in regard to all the Committees of all the Cooperative Societies.
(2) That, the Secretary in the Department of Cooperation of the State of Maharashtra has no power, authority and jurisdiction to hear and decide a Revision preferred before the State Government. A decision by the Secretary, Cooperation Department, cannot amount to be a decision by the State Government. Placing reliance on the provisions contained in Rules of Business framed under Article 166(3) of the Constitution of India, the definition of "State Government"
contained in General Clauses Act, 1897, and two judgments of this Court reported in 2001(3) Mah.L.R. 420, in the case of Ravindra M. Gaikwad and others Vs. State of Maharashtra and others; and Full Bench judgment , in the case of Sheikh Mohamed Fatemohamed and etc. Vs. Raisuddin Azimuddin Katil and others, it is contended that the order passed by the Secretary cannot be termed as an order passed by the State Government.
6. As against the above submissions made by the petitioners, the respondent no. 1 has submitted -
(A) That, the provisions of the Act including provisions contained in Section 75 and the Rules made thereunder are not applicable to the petitioner no. 1 / Society, as a special order under Section 157 of the Act has been passed, exempting the petitioner no. 1 / Society from the operations of the provisions of the said Act.
(B) An alternative submission is made that even assuming that the provisions of the said Act applies, the Committee was under no obligation to call the Annual General Meeting and the Secretary alone could be blamed for not calling the meeting. The said submission is made by placing reliance on Rule 60 and Rule 63 of the Rules read in the light of language of Section 76 of the Act.
(C) That, the order of disqualification passed under Section 75(5) of the said Act is in violation of principles of natural justice as the respondent no. 1 was denied a reasonable and fair opportunity of being heard in the matter by the Joint Registrar.
(D) That, the petitioners viz.
Sakhar Karkhana and its Chairman have no locus standi to file the instant petition challenging the order passed by the State Government as they are in no way aggrieved thereby and hence, the petition is misconceived.
7. In the first place, I proceed to consider submission No. (A) made by the learned Advocate appearing for the respondent no. 1, as to whether the order of exemption purported to have been issued under Section 157 can provide immunity to the Committee Members from the operation of the provisions contained in Section 75(5) of the said Act. Section 75 of the Act deals with Annual General Meeting. Sub-Section 1 thereof lays down that every Society shall, within a period of three months next after the date fixed for making up its accounts for the year under the rules for the time being in force, call a general meeting of its members. The proviso to Sub-Section 1 reads thus :-
"Provided that, the Registrar may, by general or special order, extend the period for holding such meeting for a further period not exceeding three months, however, in the case of the specified societies and urban cooperative banks such extension shall be granted only after recording the reasons in writing and after obtaining the previous approval of the Government for granting such extension. "
The clear language used in Sub-Section 1 and the proviso reveals that every year a meeting of the members has to be called, within a period of three months next, after the date fixed for making up its accounts and the said period can be extended, only by a further period of 3 months, for reasons to be recorded in writing. In the present case, three orders are placed on record; the first is dated 4th October 1997, second is dated 17th April 1998 and the last one is of 22nd June 1998. The said orders are issued by the Director of Sugar & Registrar, Government of Maharashtra, stating therein that in exercise of powers under Section 157 of the Act, Purna Cooperative Sugar Factory has been granted extension of time to hold the Annual General Meeting. By the first order time for holding the Annual General Meeting for the year 1995-96 is extended upto 31-1-1998. The order then states that exemption is granted to the petitioner no. 1 / Society from the operation of the provisions contained in Section 75(1) of the Act. What needs to be noted is that a composite order is purported to have been passed, which, in the first place exempts the petitioner no. 1 / Sugar Factory from the operation of Section 75(1) of the said Act, and in the second place, for holding the Annual General Meeting for the year 1995-96, extension of time is granted upto 31-1-1998. The learned Advocate for the petitioner has emphatically contended that the order dated 4th October 1997 is an order passed without jurisdiction, inasmuch as, the Registrar is empowered to grant an extension only for a period of 3 months and no further. Power to grant extension postulates, passing of the order of extension of time before the expiry of the period. It is pointed out that the period for holding the meeting is sought to be extended by passing an order dated 4th October 1997 in regard to the meeting for the year 1995-96. To the extent, the order relates to extending the time to call Annual General Meeting, which is referable to proviso to Sub-Section 1 of Section 75, the same is unsustainable, for the reasons to follow. It may not be out of place to state at this juncture, that the respondent no. 1 besides being the member of the Committee (Director of the Sugar Factory), was also a Cabinet Minister for Cooperation in the State of Maharashtra. The said orders dated 4th October 1997, 17th April 1998 and 22nd June 1998 are issued while the respondent no. 1 was a Cabinet Minister. So far as the order dated 17th April 1998 is concerned, it extends the period for holding of Annual General Meeting for the year 1995-96 upto 30th June 1998, and the last order dated 22nd June 1998 extends the period for calling the Annual General Meeting for the years 1995-96 and 1996-97 upto 30th June 1998. It is really strange that no Annual General Meeting has been held every year, as is required to be held by Section 75 of the said Act, but by passing various orders, the period for holding of the Annual General Meeting is extended, lastly by an order, upto 30th June 1998. No meeting was held at any point of time from the year 1995 to 2000. A Government Circular came to be issued on 25th January 2000, exempting all Sugar Factories from the provisions of Section 75(1) of the said Act. The said Circular proceeds to extend the period for calling the Annual General Meeting for the year 1998-99 upto 21-3-2000. The Circular refers to the exercise of power under Section 157 of the Act. Similar is the Circular dated 7th March 2000 whereby the period is extended for holding Annual General Meeting upto 30th June 2000 and by the Circular dated 4th July 2001, the period for holding Annual General Meeting of Sugar Factories is extended upto 30th June 2002.
8. Perusal of the various orders and the Circulars reveal that powers under Section 157 of the Act are sought to be invoked to exempt the petitioner no. 1 / Sugar Factory from the operation of the provisions contained in Section 75(1) and time has been extended from time to time, for years and years, when the statute permits only one extension not beyond 3 months. The learned Advocate for the petitioner has contended that all this was done with a view to favour the respondent no. 1 as he was the Cabinet Minister for Cooperation at the relevant point of time.
9. As pointed out herein above, it is clear that extension of time beyond 3 months is not permissible under the proviso to Sub-Section 1 of Section 75 and if such an extension is granted, which is wholly impermissible in law, the same is non est. The orders granting extension are void ab initio and hence cannot protect the Committee Members from an action under Section 75(5) of the Act.
10. The learned Advocate appearing for the respondent no. 1 has submitted that even if no extension is possible, the exemption granted under Section 157 from holding a meeting, as required under Section 75(1), would grant immunity to the Committee Members from the rigor of Section 75(5) of the Act. The learned Advocate for the petitioner has contended that Section 157 is clearly intended to exempt a Society or class of Societies and the said provision cannot be read so as to enable the State Government to exempt the Committee Members from incurring a disqualification. The protection which could be granted by the State Government in exercise of powers under Section 157 is referable to the Society or Societies and not to the Committee or the members of the Committee.
11. The learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner has placed reliance on a judgment of the Apex Court reported in 1999(7) SRJ 386, in the case of Indian Labour Cooperative Society Ltd. & another Vs. Union of India and others. The said case is under the provisions of Multi State Cooperative Societies Act, 1984. Section 36 and 37 of the Act lays down the eligibility criteria for holding of office in Cooperative Society. Section 36 provides that no person shall be eligible to hold, at the same time, office of the president or chairman or vice-president or vice-chairman on the board of more than one Multi-State Cooperative Society; whereas Section 37 provides that no person shall be eligible to hold the office of a president or chairman or vice-president or vice-chairman on the board of a Multi-State Cooperative Society, after he has held the office as aforesaid during two consecutive terms, whether full or part. Reading of the said provisions make it amply clear that said Sections provide for disqualification of a person to hold the office on the board of more than one Multi-State Cooperative Society and no person can hold the office for more than two terms. In the case before the Apex Court, with a view to nullify the effect of Section 36 and Section 37, the Central Government issued orders under Section 99(2) of the Multi-State Cooperative Societies Act. The provisions contained in Section 99 of the said Act are in pari materia with the provisions contained in Section 157 of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960. Section 99(2)(a) reads thus :
"The Central Government may, by general or special order and for reasons to be recorded therein, -
(i) exempt any Multi-State Cooperative Society or any class of such societies from any of the provisions of this Act or of the rules; or
(ii) direct that such provisions shall apply to such society or class of societies with such modifications not affecting the substance thereof as may be specified in the order. "
Reading of the said provision clearly reveals that the language used in the said Section and the spirit behind the same is by and large, same as is obtained in Section
157. The Apex Court was called upon to interpret Section 99(2) vis-a-vis Sections 36 and 37. The Apex Court repelled the contentions, as are made by the learned Advocate for the respondent in the present petition, and held thus :
"9. As we read Section 99(2)(a) it appears to us that the power of the Central Government under the said provision is to exempt a multi-state cooperative society or any class of such societies from any of the provisions of the Act or the rules and this provision does not contemplate given exemption to anyone else. In other words, if the society is required to comply with any of the provisions or the rules and a case is made out for granting exemption then the Central Government can, in the manner provided by the said section, grant exemption.
10. What is contended before us is that under Section 99(2) it is the society which is granted exemption from complying with the provisions of Section 36 and Section 37.
11. Section 36 and Section 37 are provisions which inter alia create a bar or an impediment on a person holding office of more than one society as the president at the same time or for continuing to hold such office for more than two consecutive terms. The rigour of these two provisions is qua an individual and not qua the society. Section 99(2) enables the Government to give relief to the society from the operation of any provisions of the Act but what has now been done is to give relief to an individual, namely, respondent No. 4, from the operation of Section 36 and Section 37. That certainly is not the intention nor the letter of the law. "
The Court then proceeded to quash the orders issued by the Central Government under Section 99(2). The situation in the present case is fully covered by the judgment of the Apex Court and I have no hesitation to hold that the orders and the circulars issued from time to time, purportedly in exercise of power under Section 157, cannot grant any protection to the Committee Members, for the reason that the power under Section 157 has to be exercised qua the Society and not qua the Committee Members. In this view of the matter, I am of the clear opinion that the provisions of the Act, more so, Section 75 are very much applicable and would operate against the respondent no. 1, if the 1st respondent is found to be guilty of failure to call the Annual General Meeting.
12. In view of the discussion made herein above, I have no hesitation in concluding that the provisions of Section 75(5) of the said Act are applicable and the order purported to have been passed under Section 157 of the said Act cannot be read so as to grant immunity to the Committee Members.
13. Secondly, I proceed to deal with Submission No. (1) made on behalf of the petitioners and the Submission No. (B) made on behalf of the respondent no. 1. It requires to be found out as to whose responsibility it is to call a meeting, as is expected to be held annually, having regard to the provisions contained in Section 75 of the said Act. Section 72 declares that the final authority of every Society shall vest in the general body of members in general meeting, summoned in such a manner as may be specified in the bye-laws. Bye-law No. 24(2)(A) reads thus :
The said bye-law clearly provides that the Managing Committee shall call the General Meeting of the members. The manner in which the meeting is to be called having been specified by the bye-laws, it is obvious that the responsibility to call the meeting under Section 75(1) was that of the members of the Managing Committee. Section 73 is also relevant, inasmuch as, it provides :
"The management of every society shall vest in a committee, constituted in accordance with this Act, the rules and by-laws, which shall exercise such powers and perform such duties as may be conferred or imposed respectively by this Act, the rules and the by-laws. "
The language of Section 73 clearly postulates that the management of every Society shall vest in a Committee. If the management is to vest in a Committee, it is the Committee which has to perform the duties as may be conferred by Act, Rules and/or Bye-laws. Here again, Bye-law No. 24(2)(A) comes into play. Reading of Section 72, 73 and Bye-law No. 24(2)(A) an inescapable conclusion has to be reached, that it is the responsibility and the duty of the Managing Committee to convene and hold an Annual General Meeting, as laid down in Sub-Section 1 of Section 75 of the said Act.
14. The learned Advocate appearing for the respondent no. 1 has tried to rely on Rule 60 of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Rules, 1961, to point out that all General Meetings of the Society excepting the first General Meeting shall be convened by the Secretary or any other officer authorized under the Bye-laws to convene such meeting under intimation to the Registrar. Reliance is placed also on Rule 63 which lays down :
"If the annual general meeting of a society is not called in accordance with the provisions of Section 75 or if the Chairman or a majority of the committee of the society fail to call a special general meeting in accordance with the provisions of Section 76, the Registrar may authorise any person subordinate to him or any officer or employee of a federal society to call the annual general meeting or the special general meeting, as the case may be. "
Reading the said provisions contained in Rule 60 and Rule 63, it is sought to be contended that the responsibility to convene a meeting is that of the Secretary and not of the members of the Committee. The learned Advocate for the respondent has also tried to seek support from the language used in Section 76 of the said Act which specifically cast an obligation on the Chairman or by a majority of the committee to call Special General Meeting. In my view, Section 76 does not provide any assistance in interpreting Section 75(5). There is a clear mandate in Sections 72 and 73, that the management of every Society vest in Committee and it has to perform duties as imposed by the Act, Rules and the Bye-laws. The manner in which the Annual general meeting is to be convened, is laid down under the Bye-laws and in the instant case, Bye-law No. 24(2)(A) regulates the same. Reading of Sections 72, 73 and 75 and Bye-law No. 24(2)(A) leaves no room of doubt that it was the responsibility of the members of the Managing Committee of the petitioner no. 1 / Society to call Annual General Meeting, as is expected under Section 75 of the Act.
15. Having concluded that it was the responsibility of all the members of the Managing Committee to call Annual General Meeting and as there is no dispute that in the instant case, there has been utter failure on the part of the members of the Committee to call a meeting for as long a period as of 5 years, and as such, the Committee Members have been found to be in default in calling the Annual General Meeting and, as such, the Regional Joint Registrar was justified in issuing a show cause notice under Section 75(5) of the said Act and in passing the order of disqualification.
16. The next question that arises to be adjudicated is as to whether the disqualification has to be in relation to the concerned Society or the disqualification relates to other Societies, as well. The Joint Registrar has passed an order disqualifying the respondent no. 1 from being a member of the Committee of all the Societies for a period of 2 years; whereas the Revisional Authority has modified the said order and directed the disqualification to be only in regard to the petitioner no. 1 / Society.
17. A careful reading of Sub-Section 5 of Section 75 clearly reveals that if default is made in calling a general meeting, within the period prescribed or, as the case may be, the extended period, the Joint Registrar may by an order declare any member of the Committee, whose duty it was to call such a meeting, disqualified for being elected and for being a member of the Committee for such period not exceeding 3 years. The term "Committee" is defined under Section 2 Sub-Section 7 of the Act, which reads thus :
""Committee" means the committee of management or board of directors or other directing body, by whatever name called, in which the management of the affairs of a society is vested under section 73. "
Section 73FF deals with disqualifications for membership of Committee and Sub-Section 1(iv) is material. It reads thus :
"Without prejudice to the other provisions of this Act or the rules made thereunder in relation to the disqualification of being member of a committee, no person shall be eligible for being appointed, nominated, elected, co-opted or, for being a member of a committee, if he has incurred any disqualification under this Act or the rules made thereunder. "
If a person has incurred disqualification because of passing of an order under Section 75(5), that disqualification by itself disqualifies the person under Section 73FF to become a member of a Committee of any other Society and if this be so, there is no reason to restrict the disqualification as is contemplated under Section 75(5) only to the Committee in regard to the concerned Society. A perusal of Section 144E also would give a clue to understand the legislative intent in the matter of disqualification. Section 144E of the said Act reads as under :
"A person shall be disqualified for being elected as, and for being a member of the committee of any specified society if he is so disqualified by or under any other provision of this Act. "
Section 144E finds its place in Chapter XI-A which deals with the elections of Committees of certain Societies belonging to the categories specified in Section 73G. The petitioner no. 1 is a Specified Society which is regulated by the provisions contained in Section 144-E.
18. Reading all the three Sections which deal with disqualification viz. Sections 73FF, 75(5) and 144E (As the petitioner no. 1 is a Specified Society), there is a clear pointer, indicating the intention of legislature, that if a person is disqualified under any other provision of the Act, he stands disqualified for being elected, and for being a member of the Committee of any Specified Society. A conjoint reading of the said Sections make it amply clear that a disqualification order issued under Section 75(5) cannot be restricted, so as to disqualify a Committee Member only in regard to the concerned Society without affecting his right of election, co-option, nomination, appointment or for being a member of a Committee in regard to other Societies. I am of the opinion that it is not possible to restrict the sweep of the order issued under Section 75(5) so as to limit it to the petitioner no. 1 / Society only, to the exclusion of all other Societies, as has been done by the order passed by the Revisional Authority.
19. Hence, I hold that the order passed by the Regional Joint Registrar disqualifying the respondent no. 1 to be a member of the Committee of any Society for a period of two years was perfectly in tune with the scheme in regard to disqualification contained in above referred Sections of the Act. I am also of the clear view that the respondent no. 4, Secretary of the Government of Maharashtra in the Department of Cooperation, is wrong in trying to restrict the disqualification only in regard to the Committee of the petitioner no. 1 / Society by reading down the language used in Sub-Section 5 of Section 75 of the said Act. As discussed herein above, the moment a Member of Committee is disqualified under any provision of the Act, he incurs a disqualification under Section 73FF, so also, under Section 144E of the Act and if this be so, he would stand disqualified to be a member of any Committee of any Society for a period for which he has been disqualified.
20. Thirdly, I proceed to deal with Submission No. (2) made on behalf of the petitioner. It is the submission made on behalf of the petitioner that the Secretary of the Department of Cooperation, State of Maharashtra, has no power, authority or jurisdiction to decide a Revision filed under Section 154 of the said Act. Section 154 provides for revisional powers of the State Government and the Registrar. The said Section lays down that :
"The State Government or the Registrar, suo motu or on an application, may call for and examine the record of any inquiry or proceedings of any matter, other than those referred to in sub-section (9) of section 149, where any decision or order has been passed by any subordinate officer, and no appeal lies against such decision or order for the purpose of satisfying themselves as to the legality or propriety of any such decision or order, and as to the regularity of such proceedings. If in any case, it appears to the State Government, or the Registrar, that any decision or order so called for should be modified, annulled or reversed, the State Government or the Registrar, as the case may be, may, after giving the person affected thereby an opportunity of being heard, pass such orders thereon as to it or him may seem just.
2. Under this section, the revision shall lie to the State Government if the decision or order is passed by the Registrar, the Additional Registrar or a Joint Registrar, and to the Registrar if passed by any other officer.
2A. No application for revision shall be entertained against the recovery certificate issued by the Registrar under section 101 unless the applicant deposits with the concerned society, fifty per cent amount of the total amount of recoverable dues.
3. No application for revision shall be entertained, if made after two months of the date of communication of the decision or order. The revisional authority may entertain any such application made after such period, if the applicant satisfies it that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period.
4. The State Government may, by order, direct that the powers conferred on it by this section shall, in such circumstances and under such conditions, if any, as may be specified in the direction, be exercised also by an officer of the rank of Secretary to Government. "
21. Placing reliance on a judgment reported in 2001(3) Mah.L.R. 420, in the case of Ravindra M. Gaikwad and others Vs. State of Maharashtra and others, it is contended that the Secretary, Cooperation Department of the State of Maharashtra, has no power, authority or jurisdiction to either decide an appeal under Section 152 or a revision under Section 154. It is submitted that what is true of Section 152 is equally true in relation to Section 154. It is relevant to note that in the judgment referred to herein above, the learned Single Judge of this Court has held that the Secretary of the State of Maharashtra has no power to decide an appeal under Section 152. The learned Single Judge has held that an appeal lies before the State Government under Section 152(1) of the Act and that there is no provision in the Act empowering the delegation of powers by the State Government in favour of the Secretary to hear the appeals under Section 152 and, therefore, the Secretary has no jurisdiction under Section 152. The learned Assistant Government Pleader, Mr. Ghatge, has very ably tried to distinguish the language used in Section 152 and Section 154 of the Act. In the submission of the learned Assistant Government Pleader, Sub-Section 4 of Section 154 makes all the difference. He contends that Sub-Section 4 very much provides for delegation of power by the State Government in favour of the Secretary to the Government, Cooperation Department. Such a provision is absent in Section 152. Relying upon the difference in the language used and the absence of the provision as is contained Sub-Section 4 of Section 154, it is contended that the judgment relied upon by the learned Advocate for the petitioner, referred to herein above, has no application while deciding a revision under Section 154.
22. To me, the language used in Section 152 and Section 154 is totally different. Sub-Section 4 of Section 154 clearly provides for delegation of power by the State, to be exercised also by an officer of the rank of Secretary to Government. There is no provision in Section 152, akin to the provision contained in Sub-Section 4 of Section 154. Along with an affidavit in reply, filed on behalf of the State Government, by the Under Secretary, an order has been placed on record, dated 16th April 1991, which reads thus :
"In exercise of the powers conferred by section 154 of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960, the Government of Maharashtra hereby directs that the powers conferred on it by the said section shall also be exercised by the Secretary to Government, Cooperation Department. "
The said order issued by the State, is issued in the name of the Governor of Maharashtra and is duly authenticated. A perusal of the order passed by the Revisional Authority, as well, makes a reference to another Government order dated 20th December 2001, delegating quasi judicial powers. Having regard to the Government Order dated 16th April 1991, read in the light of the provisions contained in Sub-Section 4 of Section 154, I am of the considered view that the Secretary, Cooperation Department of the State of Maharashtra has been validly delegated the power to decide revisions under Section 154 of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960, and in this view of the matter, I reject the submission made by the learned Advocate for the petitioner about want of power, authority or jurisdiction with the Secretary to decide the Revision Application. To me, the judgment reported in 2001(3) Mah.L.R. 420 has no application to a revision which is decided by the Secretary consequent upon delegation of power under Sub-Section 4 of Section
154.
23. This brings me to the last limb of contention raised by the respondent no. 1 to the effect that the impugned order of disqualification is violative of the principles of natural justice and, as such, bad in law; and the next submission, that the petitioners have no locus standi to file the instant petition challenging the order passed by the Secretary of the State of Maharashtra. A perusal of the order passed by the respondent no. 3, disqualifying the respondent no. 1 under Section 75(5) clearly reveals that fair and reasonable opportunity was granted to the respondent no. 1, so also, others against whom the order has been passed. Initially show cause notices were served on all the members of the Managing Committee including the respondent no. 1 and explanation was called. The respondent no. 1 had also engaged a lawyer to represent him before the 3rd respondent. Various adjournments were sought from time to time and the same were granted obviously with a view to grant fair opportunity. The matter was listed for hearing on 24-7-2001, 25-7-2001, 14-8-2001, 29-8-2001, 4-9-2001, 13-9-2001, 18-9-2001 and 20-9-2001. On 20-9-2001, the Counsel for the respondent no. 1 assured to file reply / explanation by 1-10-2001. In the application moved on 20th September 2001, the Counsel for the respondent no. 1 has categorically stated, and it is so observed in the order passed by the respondent no. 3, that besides filing of the reply / explanation, the Counsel will not advance further arguments. On 1-10-2001, the respondent no. 1 filed as many as 10 applications and thereby demanded documents, better particulars and records. What is relevant to note is that all the documents and records were in custody of the Society and not in custody of the respondent no. 3. At no point of time, the respondent no. 1 demanded copies of documents and/or record from the Society. The very fact that on 1-10-2001 as many as 10 applications are moved, reveals an intention to prolong and protract the proceedings. The third respondent being of the view that the applications were filed with a view to protract the proceedings, did not allow the said applications and proceeded further with the matter. Having regard to the controversy, I do not feel that the documents and better particulars asked for have any relevance. The controversy is, as to whether the Committee Members have failed to call Annual General Meeting every year during the term for which they were the members. It is not in dispute that not even one Annual General Meeting was called. It also appears that the point urged before this Court, about the order passed by the respondent no. 3 was passed in violation of principles of natural justice, was not pressed in service in revision as the revisional order does not deal with the same. Having regard to the totality of facts and circumstances, I have no hesitation in concluding that the impugned order passed under Section 75(5) was so passed after granting fair and reasonable opportunity to the respondent no. 1. The last submission made by the learned Advocate for the respondent is only required to be stated for it being rejected viz. that the petitioners have no locus to file the instant petition. These are proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The petitioners are parties to the proceedings before the authorities below and, as such, they have locus to file the petition. Besides that, the order passed under Section 75(5) has been issued as the respondent no. 1 and other 15 Directors were found to have failed in their duty to call a meeting of the petitioner / Sakhar Karkhana (Society). The Society is very much concerned with its management and working. In this view of the matter, the petitioners very much have locus to file the present petition.
24. In the result, Writ Petition No. 1752/2002 is allowed. The impugned order dated 19-4-2002 passed by the Secretary (Cooperation), Government of Maharashtra, Mumbai, partly allowing Revision Application No. RVA-1302/CR-16/16-C and modifying the order dated 21-12-2001 passed by the respondent no. 3, is quashed and set aside, and the order dated 21-12-2001, Exhibit A, passed by the 3rd respondent is confirmed.
Rule is made absolute in the above terms. In the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.
Writ Petition No. 2422 of 2002 is dismissed. Rule therein is discharged. In the
circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.