Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur
Piyush vs State Of Rajasthan on 27 May, 2019
Author: Arun Bhansali
Bench: Arun Bhansali
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5085/2019
Piyush S/o Shri Birbal Singh Kaswan, Aged About 26 Years, B/c
Jat, Sirsali, Tehsil And District Churu.
----Petitioner
Versus
1. State Of Rajasthan, Through The Secretary, Home
Department, Government Of Rajasthan, Secretariat,
Jaipur.
2. Director General Of Police, Rajasthan, Jaipur.
3. Inspector General Of Police (Recruitment), Rajasthan,
Jaipur.
4. Superintendent Of Police, Churu.
----Respondents
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Sanjay Kumar Poonia.
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Kailash Choudhary for Mr. Manish
Vyas, AAG
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN BHANSALI
Order 27/05/2019 It is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that the issue raised in the present writ petition is squarely covered by judgment of this Court in Kuldeep Bhakar v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. : S.B.C.W.P. No. 19166/2018, decided on 13.03.2019, whereby this Court following the judgment in Lokesh Meena v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. : S.B.C.W.P. No. 18212/2018, decided on 20.02.2019, allowed the writ petition.
In the case of Lokesh Meena (supra), this Court, inter-alia, came to the following conclusion :-
"A perusal of Circular dated 28.02.2017 reveals that the respondents have indicated the categories, in which, (Downloaded on 28/06/2019 at 06:43:03 AM) (2 of 3) [CW-5085/2019] the candidates would be eligible for appointment, which includes acquittal by the Court on according benefit of doubt and acquittal based on compromise between the parties.
In view thereof, as in both the cases the petitioner has been given benefit of doubt/acquitted based on compromise, the case of the petitioner would be covered by the said Circular.
So far as the observations made by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Avtar Singh (supra) are concerned, the relevant portion of the directions, read as under:-
"(c) If acquittal had already been recorded in a case involving moral turpitude or offence of heinous/serious nature, on technical ground and it is not a case of clean acquittal, or benefit of reasonable doubt has been given, the employer may consider all relevant facts available as to antecedents, and may take appropriate decision as to the continuance of the employee."
(emphasis supplied) A perusal of the above direction would reveal that Hon'ble Court directed that if acquittal had already been recorded in a case involving mortal turpitude or offence of heinous/serious nature, on technical ground and it is not a case of clean acquittal or benefit of doubt has been given, the employer may consider all relevant facts available as to antecedents, and may take appropriate decision as to the continuance of the employee.
A perusal of the order impugned i.e. 29.11.2018, whereby, the candidature of the petitioner has been rejected, the respondents have observed as under:-
"2- vkids fo:) pkyku la[;k 16@2015 /kkjk 147]149]341]323]427 Hkknl esa U;k;ky; fu.kZ; fnukad 02-07-18 }kjk /kkjk 147 Hkknl esa lansg dk ykHk nsdj nks"keqDr fd;k x;k ,oa 341]323]427]149 Hkknl esa jkthukek ds vk/kkj ij nks"keqDr fd;k x;kA 3- fcUnq la[;k 2 esa mYysf[kr izdj.k esa vkidks U;k;ky; fu.kZ; fnukad 02-07-2018 }kjk /kkjk 147 Hkknl esa lansg dk ykHk nsdj nks"keqDr fd;k x;k ,oa 341]323]427]149 Hkknl esa jkthukek ds vk/kkj ij nks"keqDr fd;k x;k gSA tks llEeku cjh ugha gSA vr% vki fu;ekuqlkj fu;qfDr ds ik= ugha gSA"
(emphasis supplied) As noticed hereinbefore, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that even in a case where acquittal is not clean or benefit of doubt has been given, the employer is required to consider all relevant facts available as to the antecedents and take an appropriate decision. However, in the order passed by the respondents the same has been passed mechanically by merely indicating that the acquittal is not clean neither the antecedents nor the relevant facts with regard to acquittal of the petitioner have been considered by the respondents and, therefore, the order dated 29.11.2018 (Annexure-10) passed by the respondents cannot be sustained."
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(3 of 3) [CW-5085/2019] In the present case, the operative portion of the order impugned reads as under :-
"vr% mijksDr fcUnqvksa ds vk/kkj ij bl ftys esa dkfu- HkrhZ 2018 esa p;fur fdUrq vkijkf/kd izdj.k ds dkj.k fu;qfDr ls oafpr vH;kFkhZ Jh fi;q"k iq= Jh fcjcy flag dLoka jksy uEcj 3122563 xzke iksLV fljlyh rglhy o ftyk pq: dks vkijkf/kd izdj.k esa llEeku cjh ugha gksus ds dkj.k fu;ekuqlkj fu;qfDr ds fy;s vik= fd;k tkrk gSA "
A perusal of the above reasons indicated in the order clearly indicates that the same has been passed mechanically by merely indicating that the acquittal is not clean.
In view of the above fact situation, as the issue raised in the present writ petition is squarely covered by the judgment of this Court in Lokesh Meena (supra), the writ petition filed by the petitioner is allowed. The impugned order dated 27.11.2018 (Annex.8) passed by the respondents is quashed and set aside. The respondents are directed to accord appointment to the petitioner pursuant to his selection, if he is otherwise eligible. The petitioner would be entitled to notional benefits from the date appointment has been accorded to the candidates lower in merit to the petitioner. However, actual monetary benefits would be paid to the petitioner from the date of appointment.
Needful be done within a period of four weeks.
(ARUN BHANSALI),J 56-Rmathur/-
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