Telangana High Court
M/S. Mythrae Reddy, Hyderabad vs District Collector, Hyderabad on 26 March, 2026
Author: K.Lakshman
Bench: K.Lakshman
HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
AT HYDERABAD
THE HONOURABLESRI JUSTICE K. LAKSHMAN
AND
THE HONOURABLESRI JUSTICE VAKITI RAMAKRISHNA REDDY
CITY CIVIL COURT APPEAL No. 33 of 2005
Date: 26.03.2026
Between:
Mythrae Reddy .... Appellant
AND
The District Collector, Hyderabad District
and others ....Respondents
JUDGMENT:(Per Honourable Sri Justice Vakiti Ramakrishna Reddy) This Appeal is filed by the appellant/plaintiff assailing the Judgment and Decree dated 29.01.2005 passed in O.S.No.87 of 2001 (for short 'the impugned judgment') on the file of learned XIV Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court (for short 'the Trial Court'), whereby the suit instituted by the plaintiff against the defendants seeking declaration of title and consequential perpetual injunction in respect of suit schedule property, came to be dismissed.
2. For the sake of convenience, the parties shall hereinafter be referred to as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court.
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KL, J & VRKR, J
CCCA No.33_2005
I. BRIEF FACTS:
3. The brief facts of the case, as borne out from the record, are that the Plaintiff filed the suit seeking declaration of title and perpetual injunction in respect of the property bearing Municipal No. 8-2- 269/4/D, Road No.2, Banjara Hills, Hyderabad (hereinafter referred to as 'the Suit Schedule Property'). Initially, the plaintiff instituted a suit for bare perpetual injunction, which was subsequently amended to include the relief of declaration of title, and thereafter further amended by raising a plea of title by adverse possession.
4. The plaintiff traces her title to the suit schedule property through Mr. Shaik Ahmed, the original owner of land admeasuring Ac.7.00 guntas in Survey No.403/1 of Shaikpet Village, as reflected in the Khasra Pahani for the year 1954-55. Out of the aforesaid extent, land to an extent of Ac.5.00 guntas was sold to Smt. B. Venkatlaxmi and Vijayamani under a registered sale deed dated 15.06.1964, followed by mutation and revenue entries in their favour. Subsequently, the said purchasers effected a partition under registered partition deed dated 10.06.1965, whereunder Smt. B. Venkatalaxmi -3- KL, J & VRKR, J CCCA No.33_2005 was allotted Ac.3.00 guntas and 3680 square yards and while Smt.Vijayamani got 6000 square yards.
5. Smt. B. Venkatlaxmi thereafter, sold an extent of 2650 square yards to Smt. J.Chamanthi under a registered sale deed dated 20.09.1966. In turn, Smt. J.Chamanthi sold 2411 square yards to Sri B. Gopala Krishna Reddy under a registered sale deed dated 15.06.1967. Owing to an inadvertent mistake in mentioning Survey No.408/1 instead of 403/1, a rectification deed dated 17.11.1984 was executed. Thereafter, Sri B. Gopala Krishna Reddy, settled the said property in favour of the plaintiff, who is his daughter, by way of a registered settlement deed dated 18.01.1972. Since then, the plaintiff claims to have been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the property. According to the plaintiff, she is presently in possession of 1400 sq. yards, which constitutes the suit schedule property.
6. The plaintiff asserts that her possession has been long, continuous, and lawful, evidenced by construction of a watchman room in the year 1992 with permission of the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad, assessment of municipal taxes, assignment of house number, and payment of property tax for several years. It is further -4- KL, J & VRKR, J CCCA No.33_2005 stated that the Government issued G.O.Ms.No.779 dated 03.11.2000, proposing allotment of the land to third parties, namely, Nagarani and Rekha Rani. The said GO was challenged by the plaintiff in writ proceedings vide W.P.No.22333/2000, wherein this Court disposed of the said writ petition directing the plaintiff to establish her title before the competent civil court. Aggrieved thereby, the plaintiff preferred Writ Appeal No.1741/2000, which was disposed of vide order dated 29.12.2000 observing that the plaintiff shall work out her remedies before the civil court. Thereafter the Government kept the said G.O. in abeyance and proposed alternative allotments elsewhere.
7. The cause of action for filing the suit stated to have arisen when the defendant No.2, i.e., Mandal Revenue Officer, Shaikpet Mandal, allegedly interfered with the plaintiff's possession by obstructing the workmen and threatening dispossession without following due process of law. The plaintiff, therefore, instituted the suit seeking declaration of title and perpetual injunction, alternatively pleading that in any event, she and her predecessors have been in open, continuous, uninterrupted possession for more than 30 years, thereby perfecting title by adverse possession.
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KL, J & VRKR, J CCCA No.33_2005
8. In reply to the plaint averments, the defendants filed their written statement inter-alia denying the claim of the plaintiff. It was contended that the suit schedule property falls in Town Survey No.1/1/1, Block-B, Ward No.10, corresponding to Survey No.403 of Shaikpet Village, and is classified as Government land, of which the Government is the absolute owner and possessor. The plaintiff is alleged to have filed a speculative suit based on manipulated documents. It is pleaded that a Town Survey was conducted between 1964 and 1971 in accordance with the Andhra Pradesh Survey and Boundaries Act, 1923, and the entries published in the Government Gazette dated 06.08.1977 under Section 13 have attained finality and conclusive evidentiary value, as the plaintiff failed to challenge them within the statutory period of three years.
9. It was also pleaded that the Special Court in its decision in L.G.C. No.45 of 1991, held that the land covered by the said Town Survey vested in the Government, and that the present land forms part thereof. The Government subsequently allotted the land to Smt. C. Nagarani and Smt. G. Rekha Rani, and possession was delivered under the cover of a panchanama. The defendants therefore, -6- KL, J & VRKR, J CCCA No.33_2005 contended that the plea of adverse possession is false, malafide, and unsustainable, as, neither the plaintiff nor her predecessors were ever in possession of the suit property, which has always remained in Government possession. It was further pleaded that the suit is liable to be dismissed for non-issuance of mandatory notice under Section 80 CPC, lack of cause of action, and want of jurisdiction. The plaintiff alleged to have encroached upon Government land under the cover of interim orders and is characterized as a land grabber. Accordingly, the defendants prayed for dismissal of the suit.
II. ISSUES FRAMED BY THE TRIAL COURT:
10. Based on the above pleadings, the learned Trial Court framed the following issues for determination:
i. Whether the plaintiff has title to and possession in respect of the schedule property?
ii. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for declaration and perpetual injunction as prayed for?
iii. To what relief?
11. The following additional issue was also framed on 16.6.2004:
Whether the plaintiff has perfected his title by adverse possession?-7-
KL, J & VRKR, J CCCA No.33_2005 III. EVIDENCE ON RECORD:
12. During the course of trial, PWs 1 and 2 were examined and got marked Exhibits A1 to A19 on behalf of the plaintiff. On the other hand, DWs 1 and 2 were examined and Exhibits B1 to B20 were marked on behalf of defendants.
IV. FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT:
13. Upon consideration of the rival pleadings and the evidence on record, the learned Trial Court, by judgment and decree dated 29.01.2005, dismissed the suit holding that the plaintiff failed to establish either valid title or lawful possession over the suit schedule property and that the land forms part of Survey No.403/1 which stands classified as Government land under final Town Survey entries and as declared by the Special Court under the A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 (for short 'the Act, 1982'). The learned Trial Court further observed that the plaintiff could not prove the foundational documents tracing title from Shaik Ahmed and that the plea of adverse possession was not made out as the plaintiff failed to establish open, continuous, and hostile possession for over 30 years. Consequently, the learned Trial Court held that plaintiff was not -8- KL, J & VRKR, J CCCA No.33_2005 entitled to declaration of title or perpetual injunction, resulting in dismissal of the suit with costs.
14. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the Plaintiff has preferred the present Appeal seeking to set aside the impugned judgment and decree.
15. Heard Sri J.V. Prasad, learned counsel representing Sri K. Krishna, learned counsel for the appellant, Sri Pottigari Sridhar Reddy, learned Special Government Pleader for official respondents and Sri E. Venkata Siddhartha, learned counsel for the unofficial respondent.
V. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES: a) Submissions on behalf of the Appellant/Plaintiff:
16. Learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff submits that the impugned Judgment and Decree passed by the learned Trial Court are contrary to law, facts, and the material evidence on record. It was contended that the learned Trial Court failed to appreciate the long, continuous, and settled possession and enjoyment of the appellant over the suit schedule property, which stands established through documentary evidence and admissions on record. It is further -9- KL, J & VRKR, J CCCA No.33_2005 submitted that the finding of the learned Trial Court that the Government was in possession of the suit property, particularly by applying the principle that possession follows title in respect of vacant land, is erroneous, especially when the surrounding properties are occupied by private individuals, who have raised permanent constructions.
17. It is further contended that the learned Trial Court committed a grave error in discarding Ex. A15, being the proceedings of the District Revenue Officer, without assigning valid reasons, despite the same having been passed after due enquiry and notice to the Government authorities. It is also submitted that the Defendants had knowledge of the possession of private parties over the land since 1991. The learned Trial Court also failed to consider Ex. A19 i.e., the Judgment of the erstwhile High Court of Composite State of Andhra Pradesh in its proper perspective, particularly when the said judgment was confirmed by the Honourable Supreme Court.
18. The learned counsel further submits that the learned Trial Court erred in holding that Exs. A1 to A4 were not proved, despite the fact that the defendants did not dispute the execution of the said -10- KL, J & VRKR, J CCCA No.33_2005 documents. The learned Trial Court failed to appreciate that once execution is not in dispute, the evidentiary burden stands substantially discharged. The learned Trial Court further failed to consider that the title history of the plaintiff is identical to that of the writ petitioners in W.P. No.22323 of 1996, which was decided under Ex. A19, and therefore, the learned Trial Court ought to have concluded that the appellant is in possession of the suit schedule property. It is further urged by the learned counsel for the plaintiff that the Government, having admitted possession of several other plot holders in the same survey number by initiating land-grabbing proceedings, is estopped from denying the possession of the Appellant/Plaintiff.
19. It is also contended that the learned Trial Court failed to appreciate that the appellant has perfected title by adverse possession, having been in continuous, uninterrupted, open, and hostile possession along with her predecessors for more than 30 years, as supported by Exs.A1 to A12. The learned counsel further submits that even assuming that the declaration of title could not be granted, the learned Trial Court ought to have granted at least the relief of perpetual injunction, as the possession of the appellant/plaintiff stood clearly -11- KL, J & VRKR, J CCCA No.33_2005 established through municipal records, tax receipts, electricity bills, and Government Orders under Exs.A5 to A14. It is also contended that the learned Trial Court failed to appreciate the settled legal principle that an injunction can be granted independently of a declaration of title, where possession is established. It is further submitted that the learned Trial Court also erred in ignoring the statutory presumption available under Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 in respect of documents more than 30 years old.
20. The learned counsel for the Appellant further contends that the Trial Court committed a grave error in ignoring the settled legal position that revenue records such as Khasra Pahani, Faisal Patti, Vasool Baki Register, mutation orders, and tax receipts carry presumptive evidentiary value unless specifically rebutted by cogent evidence.
21. In support of the said submissions, reliance is placed on the decisions in Kasturchand and another v. Harbilash and others 1, State of A.P. v. Pratap Karan 2, The Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District 1 (2000) 7 SCC 611 2 (2016) 2 SCC 82 -12- KL, J & VRKR, J CCCA No.33_2005 and another v. D. Narsingh Rao and others3, and Shikharchand Jain v. Digamber Jain Prabhanand Kharini Sabha and others4, wherein it was held that entries in Khasra Pahani constitute a record of rights carrying presumptive evidentiary value, akin to the Telangana Record of Rights, and therefore, the learned Trial Court ought to have given due weight to such documents while adjudicating the question of title and possession.
22. The learned counsel for the Appellant further contends that the learned Trial Court gravely erred in treating the TSLR entries as conclusive proof of ownership, contrary to the settled position of law. It is submitted that a consistent line of judicial precedents, including Sogra Begum and another v. State of AP, Revenue Dept. and ors.5, Hyderabad Potteries Private Limited v. Collector, Hyderabad District and another 6 and State of Andhra Pradesh v. Hyderabad Potteries Private Limited 7 unequivocally hold that TSLR entries are not documents of title and cannot be regarded as conclusive proof of ownership.
3 (2015) 3 SCC 695 4 (1974) SCC 675 5 2001 SCC Online AP 1255 6 2001 (3) ALT 200 (APHC) 7 (2010) 5 SCC 382 -13- KL, J & VRKR, J CCCA No.33_2005
b) Submissions on behalf of the Respondents/Defendants:
23. Per Contra, the learned Special Government Pleader appearing for the defendants contends that the plaintiff failed to establish either title or lawful possession over the suit schedule property. The land in question forms part of Survey No.403/1 of Shaikpet Village, which stands classified as Government land under final Town Survey entries published under the Andhra Pradesh Survey and Boundaries Act, 1923. The appellant never challenged the said entries within the statutory period, and therefore they attained finality.
24. Learned counsel for the respondents/defendants further submits that the plaintiff failed to establish the root of the title. It is contended that none of the foundational documents such as the Khasra Pahani, the alleged sale deed in favour of Smt. B. Venkatlaxmi and Vijayamani, the partition deed, or the mutation records, have been duly proved. It is further submitted that the Special Court under the A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 in L.G.C. No.45 of 1991, categorically held that Shaik Ahmed had no title and that the purchasers tracing title through him were land grabbers. It is also -14- KL, J & VRKR, J CCCA No.33_2005 urged that the proceedings of the District Revenue Officer dated 25.05.1991 (Ex. A15), were declared irregular and devoid of legal sanctity by the Special Court.
25. It is further submitted that the plaintiff has misconstrued Ex. A-19 being the judgment of the erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh. It is submitted that the High Court never declared title in favour of the purchasers; on the contrary, it affirmed the title of the Government and merely directed regularization of possession of certain parties upon payment of compensation, having regard to the conduct of the State. It is further submitted that the dismissal of the Special Leave Petition does not amount to affirmation of title in favour of the plaintiff.
26. It is further contended that the plea of adverse possession set up by the plaintiff is wholly untenable and self-contradictory. According to the respondents, a party claiming title through registered conveyances, cannot simultaneously assert hostile possession against the true owner, namely, the Government. It is further contended that the plaintiff failed to prove open, continuous, uninterrupted, and hostile possession for the statutory period of over 30 years, -15- KL, J & VRKR, J CCCA No.33_2005 particularly when the alleged constructions were made only after 1990 and were repeatedly removed by the Government authorities.
27. Learned Special Government Pleader further submits that the suit was liable to be dismissed in limine for non-compliance with Section 79 of the Code of Civil Procedure, inasmuch as the State has not been properly impleaded as a party. It is contended that the District Collector or revenue authorities cannot be treated as the "State" for the purpose of institution of a suit, and in the absence of proper impleadment of the State Government, the suit is not maintainable. In support of this contention, reliance is placed upon the decisions in Chief Conservator of Forest, Government of A.P. v. Collector 8, Jagtu v. Suraj Mal and Others9, Secretary, Ministry of Works and Housing Government of India v. Mohinder Singh Jagdev and Others10, and District Collector, Srikakulam v. Bagathi Krishna Rao and another11, wherein it has been held by the Honourable Supreme Court that a suit against the Government must strictly comply with Section 79 of the Code of Civil Procedure and that the 8 2003 SCC Online SC 243 9 2010 SCC Online SC 846 10 1996 Supreme (SC) 1263 11 (2010) 6 SCC 427 -16- KL, J & VRKR, J CCCA No.33_2005 proper party representing the State must be impleaded, failing which the suit is liable to be rejected.
28. It is further submitted that the suit is also barred for want of mandatory notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure. According to the respondents, issuance of prior statutory notice is a condition precedent for institution of a suit against the Government or its officers and that non-compliance thereof renders the proceedings void. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the decisions in Odisha State Financial Corporation v. Vigyan Chemical Industries 12, Bihari Chowdhary and another v. State of Bihar13, State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v. Pioneer Builders A.P. 14 and R. Hanumaiah and another v. The Secretary to Karnataka 15, wherein the Honourable Supreme Court consistently held that Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure is mandatory in nature and that even a decree passed without compliance of the said provision is a nullity in the eye of law.
29. It is further submitted that the plaintiff is not entitled even to the relief of perpetual injunction, as possession has not been established 12 2025 SCC Online SC 1609 13 1984 SCC Online SC 77 14 2006 (12) 119 15 2010 (5) SCC 203 -17- KL, J & VRKR, J CCCA No.33_2005 independently. It is contended that Municipal tax receipts, electricity bills, or assessment records do not confer title or lawful possession against the true owner, namely the Government. It is further submitted that the principle that possession follows title squarely applies in the case of vacant Government land, and the plaintiff cannot claim presumption of possession merely because adjoining plots are occupied by private individuals.
VI. POINTS FOR DETERMINATION:
30. In view of the rival submissions and upon consideration of the material available on record, the following points arise for determination in this appeal:
1. Whether the plaintiff has succeeded in establishing title to the suit schedule property on the strength of Exs. A1 to A4 and the accompanying revenue records including Khasra Pahani?
2. Whether the learned Trial Court was justified in rejecting the plaintiff's claim of title by disbelieving the chain of registered conveyances and by placing reliance on the Town Survey/TSLR entries and the findings of the Special Court in LGC No.45 of 1991?
3. Whether the plaintiff has established lawful or settled possession over the suit schedule property, -18- KL, J & VRKR, J CCCA No.33_2005 and if so, whether she is entitled to the relief of perpetual injunction even in the absence of declaration of title?
4. Whether the plea of adverse possession set up by the plaintiff is legally sustainable and duly proved by establishing open, continuous, uninterrupted and hostile possession for the statutory period?
5. Whether the suit is liable to be dismissed on the ground of non-joinder of necessary party under Section 79 of the Code of Civil Procedure and /or for non-compliance with the mandatory requirement of notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure?
6. What is the legal effect of the earlier proceedings, including the decision of the special Court in LGC No. 45 of 1991 and the Judgment of the High Court (Ex.A19), on the claim of the plaintiff?
7. Whether the impugned Judgment and Decree dated 29.01.2005 passed by the learned Trial Court warrants interference by this Court?
31. The aforesaid points are interrelated and arise out of the same set of facts and evidence. They are, therefore, taken up together for consideration and are being dealt with issue-wise, to the extent necessary, in the ensuing Analysis.
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KL, J & VRKR, J CCCA No.33_2005 VII. ANALYSIS:
Point No.1: Whether the plaintiff established title through a valid and continuous chain of registered conveyances?
32. This Court has carefully considered the rival submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff and the learned Special Government Pleader appearing for the respondents/defendants. The material on record, including the pleadings, oral and documentary evidence and the impugned judgment dated 29.01.2005 passed in O.S.No.87 of 2001 on the file of XIV Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court have been thoroughly examined.
33. The core issue that falls for consideration is the possession and the plea of adverse possession by the plaintiff. The plaintiff traces her title to the suit schedule property through Exs. A-1 to A-4, which constitute registered conveyances forming an unbroken chain of title commencing from the original pattadar, Sri Shaik Ahmed, who was shown as pattadar of land admeasuring Ac.7.00 guntas in Survey No.403/1 of Shaikpet Village as per the Khasra Pahani for the year 1954-55. Out of the said extent, Ac.5.00 guntas was conveyed in -20- KL, J & VRKR, J CCCA No.33_2005 favour of Smt. B. Venkatlaxmi and Vijayamani under a registered sale deed dated 15.06.1964. Thereafter, Smt. B. Venkatlaxmi sold an extent of 2650 square yards to Smt. J. Chamanthi under a registered sale deed dated 20.09.1966. Subsequently, Smt. J. Chamanthi conveyed 2411 square yards to Sri B. Gopala Krishna Reddy, who in turn settled the said property in favour of his daughter i.e., the plaintiff by way of a registered settlement/gift deed dated 18.01.1972. Thus, Exs. A-1 to A-4 constitute a continuous and unbroken chain of registered conveyances spanning from 1964 to 1984, culminating in the title of the plaintiff.
34. These documents, being registered instruments, carry a statutory presumption of validity under the Registration Act. Recently, the Honourable Supreme Court in Hemalatha (D) per LRs v. Tukaram (D) per LRs and others 16, held that a registered sale deed creates a presumption of validity and genuineness. The Honourable Supreme Court observed at paragraph Nos.31 and 33 as under:
"31. It is a settled position of law that a registered Sale Deed carries with it a formidable presumption of validity and genuineness. Registration is not a mere procedural formality but a solemn act that imparts high degree of sanctity to the document. Consequently, a Court must not lightly or casually declare a registered instrument as a "sham". Adopting the principles enunciated in Prem Singh and 16 2026 (1) ALD 278 (SC) -21- KL, J & VRKR, J CCCA No.33_2005 Ors. vs. Birbal and Ors., (2006) 5 SCC 3531, Jamila Begum (Dead) Through Lrs. vs. Shami Mohd. (Dead) Through Lrs. and Anr., (2019) 2 SCC 7272, and Rattan Singh and Ors. v. Nirmal Gill & Ors., (2021) 15 SCC 3003, this Court reiterates that the burden of proof to displace this presumption rests heavily upon the challenger.
Such a challenge can only be sustained if the party provides material particulars and cogent evidence to demonstrate that the Deed was never intended to operate as a bona fide transfer of title.
33. While the aforementioned grounds are illustrative and not exhaustive, this Court must caution against the growing tendency to challenge registered instruments 'at the drop of a hat'. If the sanctity of registered documents is diluted, it would erode public confidence in property transactions and jeopardize the security of titles. In a society governed by the Rule of Law, registered documents must inspire certainty; they cannot be rendered precarious by frivolous litigation."
35. Notably, no specific suggestion was put to PW-1 or PW-2 during cross-examination disputing their execution, validity, or genuineness. In the absence of any challenge to the execution or validity of the registered conveyances, the learned Trial Court erred in discarding the entire chain of title merely on the ground that the original pattadar did not possess a registered sale deed. When the root of title is supported by Khasra Pahani carrying presumptive value and all subsequent transactions are evidenced by registered sale deeds, rejection of title on such speculative reasoning is legally unsustainable.
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36. Accordingly, this Court holds that the plaintiff has successfully established her title through a valid and continuous chain of registered conveyances.
Point No.2: Evidentiary value of Khasra Pahani and Revenue Records:
37. It is well settled that Khasra Pahani is a foundational record of rights carrying presumptive evidentiary value with respect to title and possession, unless rebutted by cogent evidence. In the present case, the defendants did not produce any contemporaneous record disproving the entries in the Khasra Pahani nor did they establish that the said entries were fabricated. The learned Trial Court, however, failed to assign due weight to this foundational revenue record and instead treated the Town Survey and Land Register entries (TSLR) as conclusive proof of title, which is contrary to settled principles of law.
38. In D. Narsing Rao's case (supra) the Honourable Supreme Court observed as follows:
"13. Consequent to the merger of Hyderabad State with India in 1948 the jagirs were abolished by the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area (Abolition of Jagirs) Regulation, 1358 Fasli. 'Khasra pahani' is the basic record-of-rights prepared by the Board of Revenue Andhra Pradesh in the year 1954-1955. It was -23- KL, J & VRKR, J CCCA No.33_2005 gazetted under Regulation 4 of the A.P. (Telangana Area Record- of-Rights in Land Regulation, 1358 F. As per Regulation 13 any entry in the said record-of-rights shall be presumed to be true until the contrary is proved. The said Regulation of 1358 F was in vogue till it was repealed by the A.P. Rights in Land and Pattadar Passbooks Act, 1971, which came into force on 15-8-1978. In the 2nd Edn. (1997) of The Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar (at p. 1053) 'Khasra" is described as follows:
'Khasra --Khasra is a register recording the incidents of a tenure and is a historical record. Khasra would serve the purpose of a deed of title, when there is no other title deed.'
39. The Honourable Supreme Court in Kasturchand's case (supra), while considering the evidentiary value of annual village paper it was observed as follows:
"16. The entries in the annual village papers create a presumption albeit rebuttable in favour of a person whose name is recorded. We find that a procedure is prescribed to challenge the entries made in the annual village papers. The procedure is contained in the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act of 1950 (for short "the Land Revenue Act"). Section 45 of that Land Revenue Act specifies that khasra, jamabandi or khatauni and such other village papers as the Government may from time to time prescribe shall be annual village papers. Section 46 enjoins preparation of annual village papers each year for each village of a district in accordance with rules made under the Act. Section 52 embodies the presumption that all entries made under that chapter in the annual village papers shall be presumed to be -24- KL, J & VRKR, J CCCA No.33_2005 correct until the contrary is proved and Section 50 prescribes the method or procedure for correction of wrong entries in the annual village papers by superior officers. Thus, it is clear that in the event of wrong entries in the annual village papers the same is liable to be corrected under Section 50 and unless they are so corrected the presumption under Section 52 will govern the position."
40. In Shikharchand Jain's case (supra) the High Court for the State of Madhya Pradesh held that Khasra is a record of rights under Section 45(2) of the Central Provinces Land Revenue Act, and under Section 80(3), entries therein carry a statutory presumption of correctness unless rebutted. The burden to disprove such entries lies on the person asserting otherwise. It was observed as under:
"4. It is now to be seen whether the first appellate Court's finding really falls within the grip of Section 100(1)(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure. In his written statement Shikharchand has admitted Smt. Rajrani's ownership of the land. But he has pleaded that he has become the owner of the land on account of the adverse possession for more than 12 years from 1937. The burden of proving the acquisition of ownership by adverse possession lay on him. The Khasra entries from 1937-38 to 1941-42 and 1943-44 to 1951-52 are all in favour of Smt. Rajrani. They show that she was in possession over the land during those years. Khasra is a record of right according to Section 45(2) of the Central Provinces Land Revenue Act, I9T7. Section 80(3) of that Act provides that entries in a record of right shall be presumed to -25- KL, J & VRKR, J CCCA No.33_2005 be correct unless the contrary is shown. This provision raises a presumption of correctness of the aforesaid Khasra entries...."
41. Therefore, the Khasra Pahani and allied revenue records substantially support both the title and possession of the plaintiff.
Whether TSLR entries constitute conclusive proof of title:
42. With regard to the TSLR entries, this Court finds that the learned Trial Court has committed a manifest error in holding that the entries in the Town Survey Land Register constitute conclusive proof of ownership. It is trite law that TSLR is only a revenue record prepared for fiscal and survey purposes and does not, by itself, confer, create, extinguish, or transfer title. Title to immovable property must be established through lawful conveyances or other legally recognized modes, and not merely on the basis of survey entries.
43. It is an admitted position that no notice was issued either to the plaintiff or to her predecessors-in-title prior to the conduct of the Town Survey between 1964 and 1971. The defendants neither pleaded nor proved compliance with the mandatory procedure under the Survey and Boundaries Act before finalization of the entries. In spite of this, the learned Trial Court treated the Gazette publication dated -26- KL, J & VRKR, J CCCA No.33_2005 06.08.1977 rendering the entries as final and conclusive. Such an approach overlooks the settled principle that TSLR is only a survey and revenue record prepared for fiscal purposes and does not confer any title. In Sogra Begum's case (supra) this Court categorically held that TSLR entries are not conclusive proof of title. It was further observed that where survey entries are made without issuance of notice to the affected pattedar or interested party, such recording is vitiated in law. The relevant portion of the judgment is being extracted hereunder:
"14....It is thus clear that an entry in TSLR itself cannot be the conclusive proof of title or lack of it, and the decision either to grant or refuse permission cannot be taken solely on the basis of an entry made in TSLR. IT may be one of the factors that may have to be taken into consideration along with the other material available on record. An entry made in TSLR per se could not create any doubt or cloud on the right, title and interest of a person in respect of any land."
44. Similarly, in Hyderabad Potteries Private Limited's case (supra) this Court held that an entry in the TSLR cannot, by itself, be treated as conclusive proof of title or lack thereof. It was further held that revenue entries are only an evidence of possession for fiscal -27- KL, J & VRKR, J CCCA No.33_2005 purposes and cannot override the substantive title established through registered documents.
45. In view of the settled legal principles discussed above, this Court is of the opinion that the learned Trial Court committed an error in treating the TSLR entries as conclusive proof of title, while at the same time ignoring the Appellant's registered sale deeds and revenue records which carry presumptive value. The approach adopted by the learned Trial Court is contrary to established legal position and therefore cannot be sustained in law.
Point No.3: Whether the plaintiff has established long, open and continuous possession?
46. It is further evident from the record that the plaintiff and her predecessors-in-title have been asserting rights over the suit land for several decades. The plaintiff produced municipal permissions, tax assessments, electricity bills and other public records evidencing her enjoyment and possession over the subject property. Even assuming that the title of the original vendor was imperfect or clouded, the material on record establishes long, open and continuous assertion of ownership, adverse to the State. The Government, despite being aware -28- KL, J & VRKR, J CCCA No.33_2005 of such possession as reflected in earlier proceedings, did not take effective steps against such possession for several decades. The repeated demolitions alleged by the defendants themselves reinforce that the plaintiff was exercising physical control and asserting dominion over the property.
Point No.4: Whether the plea of adverse possession is made out?
And Point No.6: Effect of Land Grabbing Proceedings (Land Grabbing Case No.45 of 1991)
47. With regard to the Khasra Pahani, Exhibit A-15, being the order of the District Revenue Officer, Hyderabad, dated 25-11-1991, it is a matter of record that the said order emanated from statutory suo motu proceedings initiated under Section 15(2) of the Record of Rights Act, 1358 Fasli, upon a complaint made by the Deputy Director, Survey & Land Records, wherein due notice was issued to all concerned parties and a detailed enquiry was conducted; and though the Khasra Pahani itself was not formally marked as an exhibit, the District Revenue Officer, upon due verification of the official records, categorically held that Sri Shaik Ahmed was the pattadar and title holder, whose -29- KL, J & VRKR, J CCCA No.33_2005 name was duly reflected in the Khasra Pahani for the year 1954-55 in respect of Sy. No. 403/1 of Shaikpet Village admeasuring Ac. 7-00 guntas. Against the said order of the DRO, proceedings in L.G.C. No. 45 of 1991 were initiated, and aggrieved thereby, W.P. Nos. 22323 of 1996 and batch were filed before this Court, wherein this Court, categorically held that the documents produced by the petitioners therein, namely Khasra Pahani, Faisala Patti, Vasool Baqui Register, mutation orders and municipal tax receipts, clearly established that the constructions made by them were not unauthorized and that they were in possession of the schedule property not as land grabbers but as lawful owners. Further, it was held that the entries contained in the said revenue records carry presumptive value, which had not been rebutted by the State by adducing any evidence in contrary, and in the absence of such rebuttal, the said entries must be given due evidentiary weight. This Court also observed that despite alleging land grabbing, the State had remained silent for several decades without initiating any action and failed to establish that the petitioners had illegally taken possession or were in occupation without lawful entitlement, and consequently, taking note of the conduct of the Government, this Court adopted a balanced approach by permitting -30- KL, J & VRKR, J CCCA No.33_2005 the petitioners to continue in possession and enjoyment of the property while safeguarding the interest of the State by directing payment of compensation.
48. At this juncture, it is necessary to examine the legal tenability of the plaintiff raising a plea of adverse possession alongside a claim of title.
49. It is true that, in strict legal theory, a plea of adverse possession proceeds on the footing that the claimant does not derive title from lawful origin but asserts ownership against the true owner by reason of long, continuous and hostile possession. In that sense, a plea of adverse possession is conceptually inconsistent with a plea of lawful title. However, civil jurisprudence has consistently recognized that alternative and even inconsistent pleas are permissible, provided they are not mutually destructive in a manner that renders the case inherently contradictory. The purpose of such pleading is to enable the Court to adjudicate the real controversy between the parties in the event the primary plea is not accepted.
-31-
KL, J & VRKR, J CCCA No.33_2005
50. In cases where the defendant disputes the very title of the plaintiff, it is open to the plaintiff to assert, firstly, that she has valid title based on lawful conveyances, and secondly, in the alternative, that even assuming any defect in title, her long, open and uninterrupted possession has matured into ownership by adverse possession. What is crucial is not the theoretical inconsistency of the pleas, but whether the factual foundation exists for each plea and whether such pleas are clearly structured as alternatives and not as simultaneous assertions of the same legal character.
51. In A. Krishnappa v. Thimmaraayappa and others 17 the High Court for the State of Karnataka held as under:
"5. The Counsel for the appellant, relied on the ruling of Division Bench of this Court in Karnataka Wakf Board, Bangalore v. State of Karnataka and Ors., wherein this Court has held thus:
"The plaintiff has taken up an alternative plea that it has perfected its title to the suit property by adverse possession also. It is well-settled that the plaintiff can take an alternative plea. The plea regarding the title and the plea of adverse possession pleaded by the plaintiff in this case, cannot be said to be inconsistent with one another. Since the defendants have been putting forward a claim to the suit property since ancient times, the possession of the plaintiff is necessarily hostile to the claim of title made by the defendants and is to their knowledge. The period of plaintiffs possession being well over the statutory period 17 MANU/KA/0432/2001 -32- KL, J & VRKR, J CCCA No.33_2005 under Article 64 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the learned Trial Judge has rightly held that the plaintiff has established its title to the suit property by adverse possession".
6. In view of the ruling of the Division Bench of this Court, it is well-within the right of the party in a suit to set up title on one part and also can take up plea of adverse possession in alternative. Both the pleas are held to be alternative and permissible. In view of the law laid down by the Division Bench, the law laid down in Danappa Revappa Kolli's case, supra, by the learned Single Judge is no longer good law and so also the law laid down in Prakash's case, supra, being contrary to the Division Bench decision is not a good law. Therefore, it was improper on the part of the Trial Court in holding that the defendant was not entitled to take up plea of adverse possession and thus, the rejection of the plea at the threshold without scrutiny of the evidence was improper. Thus the finding on Issue No. 4 is erroneous."
52. In the case of Ravinder Kaur Grewal v. Manjit Kaur 18, the Honourable Supreme Court of India has clarified that title acquired by adverse possession under the Limitation Act, 1963 can be used both as a defence and as a basis to file a suit, thereby settling the law on the doctrine. The Relevant Para is being extracted hereunder:
59. We hold that a person in possession cannot be ousted by another person except by due procedure of law and once 12 years' period of adverse possession is over, even owner's right to eject him is lost and the possessory owner acquires right, title and interest possessed by the outgoing person/owner as the case may be against whom he has prescribed. In our opinion, consequence is that once the right, title or interest is acquired it can be used as a sword by the plaintiff as well as a shield by the defendant within ken of Article 65 of the Act and any person who has perfected title by way of adverse possession, can file a suit for restoration of possession in case of dispossession.18
(2019) 8 SCC 729 -33- KL, J & VRKR, J CCCA No.33_2005
53. Further, in N.S. Spance v. D.S. Kanagarajan19, the High Court of Madras, held that a plaintiff can raise alternative pleas of title and adverse possession, and such pleas are not impermissible merely on the ground of inconsistency. The relevant paragraph is reproduced hereunder:
"19. In the plaint, the plaintiff claimed title to the suit property not only on the basis of the document dated 30.10.1972 (A.11), but also on the basis of adverse possession. The learned counsel for the respondents submitted, that a person, who claimed title in himself, under a document cannot claim adverse possession also, since both the pleas are inconsistent, which will prove the absence of animus to enjoy the property, hostile to the true owner.
20. As an answer to the above said contention, the learned counsel for the appellant relying upon a decision of the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in Karnataka Wakf Board v. State of Karnataka (AIR 1996 Karnataka 55) contended that this kind of plea cannot be described as inconsistent and the same is available to a party. In the case involved in the above decision, the plaintiff therein as taken up an alternative plea, as if they had perfected his title to the suit property by adverse possession. While considering, whether such a plea is available or not, the division bench has ruled:
"The plaintiff has taken an alternative plea that it has perfected its title to the suit property by adverse possession also. In the appeal memo, in para 10 at page No.7, it is contended that the said plea is inconsistent with the plea of title under Issue No.1. It is not possible to accept this contention. It is well settled that the plaintiff can take an alternative plea. The plea regarding title and the plea of adverse possession pleaded by the plaintiff in this case, cannot be said to be inconsistent with one another."19
2005-2-L.W.470 -34- KL, J & VRKR, J CCCA No.33_2005
54. In Rame Gowda v. M. Varadappa Naidu20, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the person, who failed in proving his title to the suit property, can succeeded in securing a decree for possession on the basis of his prior possession and the relevant portion reads:
"8. It is thus clear that so far as the Indian law is concerned, the person in peaceful possession is entitled to retain his possession and in order to protect such possession he may even use reasonable force to keep out a trespasser. A rightful owner who has been wrongfully dispossessed of land may retake possession if he can do so peacefully and without the use of unreasonable force. If the trespasser is in settled possession of the property belonging to the rightful owner, the rightful owner shall have to take recourse to law; he cannot take the law in his own hands and evict the trespasser or interfere with his possession. The law will come to the aid of a person in peaceful and settled possession by injuncting even a rightful owner from using force or taking the law in his own hands, and also by restoring him in possession even from the rightful owner (of course subject to the law of limitation), if the latter has dispossessed the prior possessor by use of force. In the absence of proof of better title, possession or prior peaceful settled possession is itself evidence of title. Law presumes the possession to go with the title unless rebutted. The owner of any property may prevent even by using reasonable force a trespasser from an attempted trespass, when it is in the process of being committed, or is of a flimsy character, or recurring, intermittent, stray or casual in nature, or has just been committed, while the rightful owner did not have enough time to have recourse to law. In the last of the cases, the possession of the trespasser, just entered into would not be called as one acquiesced to by the true owner.
9. It is the settled possession or effective possession of a person without title which would entitle him to protect his possession even as against the true owner."20
(2004) 1 SCC 769 -35- KL, J & VRKR, J CCCA No.33_2005
55. In the present case, the plaintiff has primarily established her claim of title through a continuous chain of registered conveyances supported by revenue records. These documents demonstrate lawful devolution of interest and constitute a strong foundation for asserting ownership. Independently of the said title, the evidence on record also discloses that the plaintiff and her predecessors have been in long, continuous, open and uninterrupted possession of the suit schedule property for several decades. Such possession is not clandestine but is supported by public documents, revenue entries and conduct of the parties, including the initiation of proceedings by the State itself, which necessarily presupposes knowledge of such possession.
56. The possession of the plaintiff is therefore:
i. Open and notorious, visible to the true owner;
ii. Continuous and uninterrupted, extending over the statutory period;
iii. Hostile in character, inasmuch as it is asserted against the State without acknowledgment of superior title. Thus, even assuming that the plaintiff's title was to be -36- KL, J & VRKR, J CCCA No.33_2005 doubted, the cumulative effect of the evidence clearly satisfies the legal requirements of adverse possession.
57. In that view of the matter, the plea of adverse possession, having been taken in the alternative and supported by cogent evidence, does not detract from the plaintiff's primary claim of title but rather fortifies her claim to the property from an independent legal standpoint.
58. Adverse possession requires proof of open, continuous, hostile and uninterrupted possession for the statutory period. The evidence placed on record on behalf of plaintiff, particularly the revenue entries commencing from the Khasra Pahani of the year 1954-55 and the subsequent chain of registered transactions, clearly demonstrates that possession of the plaintiff over the subject land was neither clandestine nor sporadic, but traceable, continuous and documented.
59. It is significant that the Government itself filed L.G.C. No. 45 of 1991 before the Special Court under the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982, alleging that the plaintiff and others were land grabbers in respect of the subject Town Survey land. The -37- KL, J & VRKR, J CCCA No.33_2005 very institution of such proceedings necessarily presupposes that the persons proceeded against were in actual possession of the land; otherwise, the question of "land grabbing" would not arise. Thus, by initiating L.G.C. No. 45 of 1991, the Government implicitly acknowledged the plaintiff's possession, which materially supports her plea of continuous possession in respect of suit schedule property and is relevant while considering the claim of adverse possession.
Effect of Registered Documents - Constructive Notice:
60. It is further significant to note that, this Court finds that the chain of registered conveyances forming the basis of her claim were duly registered under the Registration Act, thereby operating as constructive notice to the whole world, including the Government. Registration itself amounts to public notice of the plaintiff's assertion of rights over the suit schedule property. In Jayesh Dinesh Kadam and Another v. Andrew David Fernandes 21, it was held by the Bombay High Court that in accordance with Section 50 of the Registration Act read with section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act the very registration of a document constitutes a notice to the public. The effect of registration of a sale deed is a notice to the whole world 21 2024 SCC OnLine Bom 2549 -38- KL, J & VRKR, J CCCA No.33_2005 in respect of the property, which is the subject matter of the deed of conveyance or sale or transfer, mortgage etc., as the case may be. Despite such public and open assertion of title over the suit schedule property, the Government did not initiate any effective proceedings to recover possession from the plaintiff for decades. On the contrary, proceedings under L.G.C. No.45 of 1991 were instituted alleging that the plaintiff and others were land grabbers, which itself is an admission that plaintiff along with others were in possession of the subject lands.
61. Furthermore, in Suraj Lamp & Industries (P) Ld.Tr.Dir v. State of Haryana & Another 22, the Honourable Supreme Court has held that:
"Section 49 of The Transfer of Property Act, 1882 provides that no document required by Section 17 to be registered shall, affect any immovable property comprised therein or received as evidence of any transaction affected such property, unless it has been registered. Registration of a document gives notice to the world that such a document has been executed."
62. The learned Trial Court erred in holding that adverse possession cannot be claimed in respect of vacant land in the absence of 22 AIR 2012 SC 206 -39- KL, J & VRKR, J CCCA No.33_2005 permanent construction. It is also well settled that possession over open land may also mature into adverse possession, provided the acts of ownership are open and hostile. The plaintiff's documentary evidence, read cumulatively, establishes continuity of possession beyond the statutory period. Accordingly, the plea of adverse possession also stands established.
Point No.5: Objection under Sections 79 and 80 of the CPC
63. It is pertinent to note that the contention of the respondents/defendants regarding non-compliance with Section 79 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is wholly misconceived. The District Collector, Hyderabad, was arrayed as a defendant in the suit. In matters concerning Government land, the District Collector functions as the principal administrative authority and custodian of Government land records within the district and represent the State in such matters. By necessary implication, he acts as an instrumentality and limb of the State. Further, being an authority discharging sovereign and statutory functions, the District Collector squarely falls within the meaning of "State" under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, suing -40- KL, J & VRKR, J CCCA No.33_2005 the District Collector in matters relating to Government land substantially amounts to suing the State itself. -41-
KL, J & VRKR, J CCCA No.33_2005
64. Section 79 of the CPC reads as under:
"79. Suits by or against Government. --In a suit by or against the Government, the authority to be named as plaintiff or defendant, as the case may be, shall be
(a) in the case of a suit by or against the Central Government, [the Union of India], and
(b) in the case of a suit by or against a State Government, the State.]
65. It is significant that in their written statement, the respondents/defendants themselves asserted that the suit schedule property belongs to the Government and further raised a plea regarding non-issuance of notice under Section 80 of the CPC, thereby clearly acknowledging that the District Collector was sued in his representative capacity. Throughout the suit proceedings as well as in the present appeal, the respondents/defendants have been represented by the learned Government Pleader, which unmistakably establishes that the Government was effectively before the Court. Hence, the objection under Section 79 of the CPC is purely technical in nature and, at the highest, amounts only to misdescription of the party.
66. Moreover, this objection was not raised at any stage during the trial, either in the written statement, evidence, or cross-examination, and has been urged for the first time at the stage of final arguments in -42- KL, J & VRKR, J CCCA No.33_2005 appeal. The plea is therefore clearly an afterthought and devoid of merit. The Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Mohinder Singh Jagdev's case (supra) held that wrong description of a government authority in the cause title does not invalidate proceedings when the Government is in substance before the Court. The nomenclature is not decisive; what is material is effective representation. At best, the present case involves a mere mis-description and not non-joinder of a necessary party. In view of Order I Rule 9 of the CPC, no suit shall be defeated by reason of mis-joinder or non-joinder of parties, and therefore, the objection under Section 79 of the CPC is liable to be rejected. The relevant para reads as below:
"Having given due consideration to the contentions of the counsel and having gone through the facts and circumstances of the case, first question that arises is whether the appeal has been competently laid?
It is not disputed and cannot be disputed that the Union of India can lay the suit and be sued under article 300 of the Constitution in relation to its affairs. Under Section 79 read with order 27 Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure, in a suit, by or against the Centra Government, the authority to be named as plaintiff/defendant shall be Union of India. Secretary, authority to be named as plaintiff/defendant shall be Union of India. The Secretary, Ministry of works and Housing is a limb of Union of India transacting its functions on behalf of the Government under the concerned Department as per the business rules framed under article 77 of the -43- KL, J & VRKR, J CCCA No.33_2005 Constitution. Therefore, the appeal came to be filed the secretary instead of Union of India, is not conclusive. The meat of the matter is that the secretary representing the Government of India had filed the appeal obviously on behalf of Union of India. Accordingly, we reject the first contention."
67. Another significant aspect relating to Section 80 of the CPC is that the said contention of the respondents /defendants is wholly untenable both on facts and in law. The record reveals that the original suit for bare injunction was subsequently amended pursuant to the orders passed by the Court in W.A. No.1741 of 2000, whereby the plaintiff was granted liberty to seek declaration of title before the competent Civil Court. Consequent thereto, the plaint was amended incorporating the relief of declaration and the suit was renumbered as O.S. No.87 of 2001 and made over to the Court of the Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. Thus, the present proceedings are not an independent fresh institution but a continuation of earlier litigation arising out of urgent circumstances.
68. It is specifically pleaded in paragraph 10 of the amended plaint that the plaintiff was facing imminent threat of dispossession at the hands of the revenue authorities and, therefore, sought urgent relief. In view of such urgency, an interlocutory application under Section 80(2) -44- KL, J & VRKR, J CCCA No.33_2005 of the CPC was filed seeking leave of the Court to dispense with the mandatory notice of two months as contemplated under Section 80(1) of the CPC. This aspect is also recorded in paragraph 5 of the impugned judgment passed by the learned Trial Court. Once such leave is sought and the Court entertains the plaint without returning it under the proviso to Section 80(2) of the CPC, it necessarily implies judicial satisfaction regarding the existence of urgency. Further, interim injunction was granted in favour of the plaintiff, which clearly demonstrates that the Court was satisfied about the immediate threat and the need for urgent adjudication.
69. Section 80 of the CPC deals with the Notice reads as under:
"Section 80(2): A suit to obtain an urgent or immediate relief against the Government (including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir) or any public officer in respect of any act purporting to be done by such public officer in his official capacity, may be instituted, with the leave of the Court, without serving any notice as required by sub-section (I); but the Court shall not grant relief in the suit, whether interim or otherwise, except after giving to the Government or public officer, as the case may be, a reasonable opportunity of showing cause in respect of the relief prayed for in the suit.
Provided that the Court shall, if it is satisfied, after hearing the parties, that no urgent or immediate relief need be granted in the -45- KL, J & VRKR, J CCCA No.33_2005 suit, return the plaint for presentation to it after complying with the requirements of sub-section (1)."
70. Significantly, the respondents/defendants neither pleaded in their written statement that leave under Section 80(2) of the CPC was not granted nor raised any such objection during trial. Further, no suggestion was put to PW-1 in cross-examination disputing the grant of leave. The objection has been raised only at the stage of final arguments in the present appeal, which clearly indicates that it is an afterthought. It is well settled that the requirement under Section 80 of the CPC, though mandatory in ordinary circumstances, stands satisfied when leave under sub-section (2) is sought and the Court proceeds to entertain the suit. The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Yashod Kumari and Another v. MCD & Others23, held that once urgent relief is claimed and the Court grants leave under Section 80(2) of the CPC, the suit cannot be dismissed on the ground of absence of prior notice. The relevant para is being extracted hereunder:
"10. In the present case there is no dispute that appellants had filed an application for grant of leave under Section 80(2) which was not dealt with and considered by the Court. On the contrary the Court had proceeded to frame a preliminary issue on the preliminary objection taken by 23 AIR 2004 Del 225 -46- KL, J & VRKR, J CCCA No.33_2005 respondents in their written statement and dismissed the suit for want of service of notice under Section 80. This, in our view, could not have been done, because once the Court was seized of appellant's application under Section 80(2) it ought to have disposed of this application first by either granting leave or refusing it in which case it was to return the plaint to them which they could refile after service of two months' notice. It would not have dismissed the suit without doing and this renders the impugned dismissal order straightaway unsustainable. The order warrants setting aside on this ground alone."
71. Therefore, in the facts of the present case, where urgency was specifically pleaded, leave under Section 80(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure was invoked, the plaint was entertained, and interim relief was granted, the objection regarding non-issuance of notice under Section 80 CPC is without substance and liable to be rejected. The conduct of the defendants in not raising such objection at the appropriate stage and in participating in the proceedings through the learned Government Pleader clearly establishes absence of prejudice. Point No.7: Whether the impugned judgment warrants any interference:
72. This Court holds that the impugned judgment and decree warrants interference. The learned Trial Court has misdirected itself both on facts and in law by disregarding material evidence, -47- KL, J & VRKR, J CCCA No.33_2005 misapplying settled legal principles relating to title and possession and treating TSLR entries as conclusive proof of title. The findings are unsustainable and are accordingly set aside. The point is answered in favour of plaintiff/appellant.
VIII. CONCLUSION:
73. Having regard to the aforesaid discussion on all the Points, this Court is of the considered view that the learned Trial Court has committed manifest errors both on facts and in law.
74. The learned Trial Court erred in discarding the registered chain of title under Exs. A-1 to A-4 despite there being no substantive challenge to their execution or genuineness. It further failed to appreciate the presumptive value attached to revenue records and erroneously treated TSLR entries as conclusive proof of title, contrary to settled legal principles.
75. Insofar as the plea of adverse possession is concerned, the contention of the respondents that the plaintiff cannot simultaneously claim title and adverse possession cannot be accepted in the facts of the present case. Though such pleas are conceptually inconsistent, it is -48- KL, J & VRKR, J CCCA No.33_2005 well settled that a party is entitled to raise them in the alternative, particularly where the title is disputed by the defendants. What is required is that the plea of adverse possession must be specifically pleaded and established by cogent evidence of open, continuous and hostile possession to the knowledge of the true owner.
76. In the present case, the evidence on record, when read cumulatively, clearly establishes long, continuous and hostile possession of the plaintiff over the suit schedule property. Significantly, the institution of proceedings by the Government alleging land grabbing necessarily presupposes that the plaintiff was in possession of the property. Such conduct on the part of the State constitutes a clear acknowledgment of possession and materially supports the plaintiff's plea.
77. Thus, the plea of adverse possession, though taken in the alternative, stands duly established. The rejection of the said plea by the learned Trial Court is therefore unsustainable.
78. Equally, the objection raised by the respondents regarding non- compliance with Sections 79 and 80 of the CPC is untenable. Though -49- KL, J & VRKR, J CCCA No.33_2005 the State ought to have been formally described in accordance with Section 79 of the CPC, the impleadment of the District Collector, who is the principal officer representing the State in matters relating to Government land, coupled with continuous representation of the defendants through the learned Government Pleader, clearly establishes that the State was effectively before the Court throughout the proceedings.
79. In such circumstances, the objection, at best, relates to a technical defect in description and does not amount to non-joinder of a necessary party. No prejudice having been demonstrated, the said contention cannot defeat substantive rights and is liable to be rejected. Accordingly, upon a cumulative consideration of the entire material on record and the settled legal principles governing title, adverse possession and evidentiary value of revenue records, this Court holds that the impugned judgment and decree dated 29.01.2005 passed in O.S. No.87 of 2001 by the learned XIV Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, suffer from perversity, illegality and material irregularity warranting interference. The findings recorded by the learned Trial Court are unsustainable in law and are hereby set aside. -50-
KL, J & VRKR, J CCCA No.33_2005 IX. RESULT:
80. In the result, the Appeal is allowed. The impugned Judgment and Decree dated 29.01.2005 passed in O.S. No.87 of 2001 by the learned XIV Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, are set aside. Consequently, the suit in O.S. No.87 of 2001 shall stand decreed.
81. The plaintiff is declared as the owner of the suit schedule property. The defendants are permanently restrained from interfering with plaintiff's peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property except in accordance with due process of law. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
As a necessary corollary, all pending miscellaneous/ interlocutory applications, if any, shall also stand closed.
_________________ K. LAKSHMAN, J _________________________________ VAKITI RAMAKRISHNA REDDY, J Date: 26.03.2026 AS