Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Rajesh Yadav vs Home Affairs on 17 July, 2025
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Item No. 9/C-2
OA 3315/2024
Central Administrative Tribunal
Principal Bench, New Delhi
OA No. 3315/2024
This the 17th day of July, 2025
Hon'ble Mr. R.N. Singh, Member (J)
Hon'ble Shri B. Anand, Member (A)
Rajesh Yadav,
Age - 32 years
S/o Sh. Shyambeer Yadav,
R/o- H. No. 37, Near Yadav Choupal,
Haiderpur, Delhi - 110088
...Applicant
(By Advocate: Mr. Sachin Chauhan with Ms. Ridhi Dua)
Versus
1. Union of India through
The Secretary,
Ministry of Home Affairs,
NDCC-II Building, Jai Singh Road,
Near Jantar Mantar, New Delhi - 110001
2. The Commissioner of Police,
Delhi Police Headquarters,
Jai Singh Road, New Delhi.
3. The Addl. Commissioner of Police,
New Delhi Range, Delhi Police,
Through the Commissioner of Police,
Jai Singh Road, New Delhi
4. The Dy. Commissioner of Police,
New Delhi Distt., New Delhi
Through the Commissioner of Police
Jai Singh Road, New Delhi.
...Respondents
[By Advocate: Mr. Pradeep Kumar Sharma, Mr. B.C. Bhatt]
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Item No. 9/C-2
OA 3315/2024
O R D E R (ORAL)
Hon'ble Mr. R.N. Singh, Member (J):
Pleadings in the matter are complete. With the consent of learned counsels for the parties, the matter is taken up for final disposal.
2. By way of the present OA, the applicant has challenged a common order dated 14.11.2023 (Annexure A-1), vide which the applicant, while working as Sub Inspector (SI) under the respondents and one Mr. Varun Chechi, who was also working at the relevant time as SI was dismissed from service by the respondents by invoking the provisions of Article 311(2)(b) under the Constitution.
The applicant has also challenged the common order dated 08.08.2024 (Annexure A-2), vide which the statutory appeal of the applicant and that of the aforesaid, Mr. Varun Chechi, was rejected by the Appellate Authority.
3. It is further undisputed that the aforesaid, Mr. Varun Chechi, SI, approached this Tribunal by way of OA No. 3316/2024 titled Varun Chechi vs. Delhi Police & Ors., which was partly allowed by this Tribunal with directions vide Order dated 22.05.2025.
3Item No. 9/C-2 OA 3315/2024
4. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that the facts and reasons behind passing the impugned orders are common and the impugned orders are also common. In these facts and circumstances, the present OA also deserves to be partly allowed in terms of the Order dated 22.05.2025 in the case of Varun Chechi (supra), learned counsel for the applicant submits.
5. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondents has argued that subsequent to the order/judgment dated 22.05.2025 in Varun Chechi (supra), this Bench of the Tribunal has passed an Order dated 03.07.2025 in OA No. 2450/2024 titled Rohitash Singh vs. Commissioner of Police & Ors., vide which the said OA has been dismissed. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that while dismissing the OA No. 2450/2024 (supra), this Tribunal has taken into consideration the seriousness of the offense/allegations levelled against the applicant, therein, in the light of the judgement of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi and that of the Hon'ble Apex Court. He further adds that as apparent from the impugned order dated 14.11.2023, while invoking their jurisdiction under Article 311 (2)(b) of the Constitution, the 4 Item No. 9/C-2 OA 3315/2024 respondents have taken into consideration the seriousness of the offense/allegations and seriousness of the allegations levelled against the officials and also the fact that the accused officials, while working in Delhi Police have been holding influential position. However, he has fairly admitted that same/common had been the situation/order in the case of Varun Chechi (supra) and as in the present case.
6. We have considered the submissions made by learned counsels for the parties.
7. Undisputedly, the facts and the reasons for dismissal of the applicant and that of co-delinquent, Varun Chechi, have been one and the same, i.e., both have been dismissed by the common order and their statutory appeal have been also rejected by the respondents by the common order. The Order dated 22.05.2025 passed by the Tribunal in the case of Varun Chechi (supra) read as under:-
"By way of this OA, the applicant has sought the following reliefs under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985:-
"1. To quash and set aside the impugned order dated 14.11.2023 whereby the extreme punishment i.e. dismissal from service has been imposed upon the applicant by invoking the power under Art. 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India and order dated 08.08.2024 5 Item No. 9/C-2 OA 3315/2024 whereby the appeal of the applicant is rejected by the respondents and To further direct the respondents to reinstate the applicant in the service with all consequential benefits including seniority & promotion and pay & allowances."
2. The brief facts of the case are that on 13.11.2023, the officials of CBI had conducted a raid in the area of PS B.K. Road on the complaint of Sh. Manoj Kumar S/o Sh. Shyam Singh, R/o Mohali Punjab. During the raid, SI (Exe.) Rajesh Yadav No.D-6547 was caught red handed while handling bribe of Rs.4.5 lac at the instance of SI(Exe.) Varun Chechi - applicant, from the complainant as part payment of the total demand of Rs.25 Lac. Further, as per the information SI(Ex.) Varun Chechi No.D-5790 was also involved in this case and his voice recording regarding demand of bribe is available with CBI officials. Verification proceedings were conducted on 11 and 12 November - 2023. The applicant was absconding and his mobile phones were switched off. He was marked absent on 13.11.2023 PS BK Road and accordingly, an FIR was registered on 13.11.2023 u/s 7 of PC Act, 1988, PS, CBI, ACB, New Delhi and on the very same day, he was placed under suspension. It is submitted that on the very next day, the Disciplinary Authority (DA) issued an order dated 14.11.2023 whereby the applicant was dismissed from service by invoking the power under Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India that too without conducting a departmental enquiry. It is submitted that the applicant denies each and every allegations as being alleged in FIR and present dismissal order dated 14.11.2023 on which basis the extreme punishment, i.e. dismissal from service is being imposed by invoking Article 311(2)(b) of Constitution of India.
3. It is submitted that the reasons recorded by the DA for dispensing with the departmental enquiry are vague based on suspicions and surmises as the allegation made against the applicant are presumed to be true by the DA and the applicant is yet to be subjected to trial. The applicant has also not been given any opportunity in respect of the allegation made in the order of DA by virtue of disciplinary enquiry. The DA presumes on the basis of a Preliminary Enquiry and SHO report that the allegations made against the applicant are proved. The reasons recorded by the DA that the applicant is in custody and for that reason, the applicant cannot be subjected to a departmental enquiry again shows non- application of mind of DA.
4. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that the power under Article 311(2)(b) has been used only as a short 6 Item No. 9/C-2 OA 3315/2024 cut method so as to avoid the applicant from being subjected to a departmental enquiry and for that reason such vague, evasive reasons are being recorded to dispense with the DE.
5. Learned counsel for the applicant submitted that appeal preferred against the order of the DA was also rejected by the Appellate Authority, vide order dated 08.08.2024 with the following directions:-
"I have carefully gone through the appeals filed by the appellant Si (Exe.) Rajesh Yadav, No. D-6547 (PIS No. 16190404) and SI (Exe.) Varún Chechi, No. D-5790 (PIS No. 16140192), as well as relevant record available on file and also heard them in O.R. on 29.07.2024, during which they reiterated the same pleas which they have already mentioned in their written appeals. In their appeals, they have submitted various court judgment/order in support of their version. As per rule 15 of Delhi Police (Punishment & Appeal) Rules-1980, the PE is a fact finding enquiry and as per point No. 3 of the rule, the suspected police officer may or may not be present at a PE but when present he shall not cross- examine the witness. Further, SI Rajesh Yadav was in the custody of ACB, CBI and SI Varun Chechi was absconding and as such it was not possible to give reasonable opportunity to both for being heard in the enquiry. The case/matter was decided after completion of the PE. In compliance of the circular issued from PHO vide No. 5545-645/P.Cell/Vig. Dated 11.09.2007 and 2513-2612/P.Cell/(P.Misc.)/Vigilance dated 18.04.2018, the P.E. report was forwarded to Spl.CP/L&O(Zone-II), Delhi for necessary concurrence to dismiss the appellants under article 311(2)(b) of the constitution of India and the same was approved by the Competent Authority. Further, the PE concluded the demand of an illegal gratification of Rs. 25 Lac from Sh. Manoj Kumar for not arresting family members of accused Nirmal Singh Bhangu. The act and circumstances of the case were so serious that it was not reasonably practicable to conduct a regular DE against the appellants as there is reasonable belief that the witnesses may not come forward to depose against them owing to their influential positions. The contents of FIR No. RC-0032023A0043 dated 13.11.2023 u/s 7 of P.C. Act 1988, PS CBI, New Delhi, Delhi and the PE conducted into the matter had proved the involvement of the appellants in this case. The act committed by them had not only tarnished the image and brought disgrace to the organization but also demoralized other police personnel and such misconduct cannot be tolerated in any disciplined organization. Therefore, I am of opinion that the decision of the Disciplinary 7 Item No. 9/C-2 OA 3315/2024 Authority for invoking article 311(2) (b) of Constitution of India is fully justified and I find no reason to interfere with the punishment of dismissal awarded to the appellants by the Disciplinary Authority vide order No. 4476-4576/HAP(D-1)/NDD dated 14.11.2023. Hence, the appeals submitted by SI (Exe.) Rajesh Yadav, No. D-6547 (PIS No. 16190404) and SI (Exe.) Varun Chechi, No. D-5790 (PIS No. 16140192) are, hereby rejected after due consideration."
6. Learned counsel for the applicant contends that the impugned order dated 14.11.2023 whereby the extreme punishment i.e. dismissal from service has been imposed upon the applicant by invoking the power under Art. 311 (2)
(b) of the Constitution of India and the impugned order dated 08.08.2024 whereby the appeal of the applicant is rejected by the respondents is wrong, illegal and arbitrary.
7. In support of their claim, learned counsel the applicant is placing reliance on the following recent judgment qua the same respondents on the issue of invoking the Article 311(2)(b) being dealt by the different judicial forums:
a Dushyant Kumar CAT- OA/1019/2023 - Para No.- 9 & 10, HC-W.P. No. 2407/2024 - Para No.-14 & 16;. b. Deepak CAT- OA/542/2023 with OA/591/2023- Para No.- 16 to 20 c. Manjeet HC- W.P. - 1258/2023 - Para No.- 11 to 13 d. Jagmal Singh HC- W.P. - 4201/2024-Para No.- 10 & 11, Supreme Court- SLP No.- 11681/2024 e. Sant Ram-HC- W.P. ©-5562/2024 & 11, Re- instatement order 16.07.2024 Para No.-10
8. The learned counsel for the applicant has also brought on record the recent Circular Dated 13.05.2024 issued by DCP Legal Division/PHQ Delhi in pursuance of the Judgment of the Hon'ble High court but still the impugned orders are being passed in a stereotyped manner without due application of mind.
9. Learned counsel for the applicant along with the present OA is filing the list of witnesses filed by the prosecution along with the challan before the Hon'ble trial court so as to establish that majority of the witnesses in the list of witnesses are official witnesses and further is annexing the deposition of the sixth witness which has 8 Item No. 9/C-2 OA 3315/2024 already taken place before the trial court so as to establish that the reasons which are recorded by the authorities to invoke Article 311(2)(b) in the present case of the applicant are nearly based on suspicion and surmises; in fact, the trial is taking place in the court and the witnesses are coming and deposing and rest of the witnesses are official witnesses.
10. Learned counsel also submits that the order of the Disciplinary Authority of invoking the power under Art. 311(2)
(b) is absolutely arbitrary, unwarranted and unconstitutional. The reasons recorded by the Disciplinary Authority to dispense with the Departmental Enquiry by stating that the same is not reasonably practical are based on a surmise that the allegation made against the applicant are presumed to be true by the Disciplinary Authority. The applicant is yet to be subjected to trial and further the applicant has not been given any opportunity in respect of allegation made in the order of Disciplinary Authority by virtue of DE but still the Disciplinary Authority presumes on the basis of a Preliminary Enquiry and SHO report (done at the back of applicant), that the allegation made against the applicant are proved. The perusal of Art. 311(2)(b) will establish that to invoke the power under Art. 311(2)(b), the authorities are to record why the DE is not reasonably practical, but here in the present case, DA is recorded as per material and investigation it has been presumed that the allegation against the applicant are proved. This is not a pre-condition to invoke the power under Art. 311(2)(b) hence there is absolute non-application of mind.
11. Learned counsel for the applicant also submits that the Disciplinary Authority is totally overlooking the fact, the applicant is only a Sub-Inspector in Delhi' police and the witnesses against the applicant would be CBI officials and thus there cannot be any chance of influencing any witness by the applicant. The Disciplinary Authority's reasons have to be based on some material placed on record before the authorities and the same cannot be proved on the basis of probabilities and assumptions. It is a matter of record that within 24hours of registration of FIR, the order of dismissal order is being passed. In such circumstances, the reasons that there is a possibility of influencing of witness of case is absolutely absurd and untenable in the eyes of law. The same reasoning is not supported by any material on record. It is pure assumption. Such reasoning by the DA to invoke the power under Art. 311(2)(b) has been dealt with by Hon'ble Tribunal (PB) in various cases and a few cases are quoted within the body of present statutory appeal.
12. Learned counsel for the applicant states that the reasons recorded by the Disciplinary Authority that the applicant is in custody and for that reason the applicant cannot be subjected to a Departmental Enquiry, again shows 9 Item No. 9/C-2 OA 3315/2024 non-application of mind of Disciplinary Authority. The power under Art. 311(2)(b) has been used only as a short cut method so in order to avoid the applicant to a Departmental Enquiry and for that reason such vague, evasive reasons are being recorded to dispense with the DE. The applicant was on duty (office work in his office at PS Barakhamba Road) when the so called alleged raid took place in the afternoon (13.11.2023) and on the next day the dismissal from service order is being passed by the Disciplinary Authority. The applicant was arrested on 14.11.2023 and was in police custody for 2 days and finally granted regular bail on 4.12.2023, the order is annexed alongwith the present statutory appeal.
13. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that to presume the applicant is holding an influential position is totally unwarranted and false. The applicant is SI in Delhi Police; the witnesses against the applicant would be CBI officials and other officials of Delhi Police who are higher in rank, the so called complainant is a stooge of a high profile financial criminal who has managed to siphon thousands of crores of Rupees from millions of investors. On the contrary, the applicant is pitted against high 'profile complainant who is well connected with influential peoples in the society.
14. Learned counsel is also placing reliance on the very latest judgment of Hon'ble Tribunal in case of Kuldeep Singh (OA No. 3058/2011), decided on 28.07.2023 to contend that in this case also, the DA, without conducting the departmental inquiry against the grave offence committed by the applicant therein, came to the conclusion that it will not be reasonably practicable to conduct a regular departmental enquiry against the applicant.
15. Learned counsel for the respondents opposed the submissions made by the applicant by filing the reply in which it is clearly submitted that the applicant was absconding at the time of conducing PE and it was not possible to hear him in person during the P.E. Further, there was a possibility that the applicant could have influenced witnesses with his official position, not to appear during the DE proceedings if initiated. Therefore, the provision of Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India were invoked in the present case.
16. Learned counsel for the respondents also submits that on 13.11.2023. a raid was conducted by ACB, CBI at PS Barakhamba Road where in on the instructions of applicant, SI Rajesh Yadav accepted the bribe amount of Rs. 4.5 Lac from the complainant and was caught red handed by the CBI team. The tainted money was also recovered from his possession. The other alleged applicant was found 10 Item No. 9/C-2 OA 3315/2024 absconding and could not be apprehended. During the course of investigation. SI Rajesh Yadav was arrested in the above RC and on 14.11.2023 2 days P.C. remand was granted by the Special Court, Rouse Avenue. Delhi.
17. Learned counsel for the respondents also submitted that from the above facts and perusal of the RC and the report of SHO/B.K.Road, it was established that applicant had demanded a bribe of Rs.25 Lac from Sh. Manoj Kumar for not arresting the daughter and son-in-law of accused Nirmal Singh Bhangu in FIR No. 16 dated 09.02.2018 u/s 406/420 IPC PS Barakhamba Road being investigated by him. The alleged demand was also found established in the recorded conversations held between SI Varun Chechi (applicant) and the complainant. Further, SI Rajesh Yadav also found involved in accepting the bribe amount of Rs. 4.5 Lac from the complainant on the instructions of St Varun Chechi (applicant) and was caught red handed with the bribe money.
18. Learned counsel for the respondents also submitted that it was also evident that there are several incriminating evidences against St Varun Chechi (applicant) and St Rajesh Yadav for their involvement in the illegal act of demand and acceptance of bribe amount from complainant Sh. Manoj Kumar for not arresting the relatives of accused Nirmal Singh Bhangu. Moreover, alleged SI Varun Chechi (applicant) was also found absconding and was marked absent.
19. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that while the SI Rajesh Yadav was in the custody of ACB, CBI and SI Varun Chechi (applicant) was absconding and as such it was not possible to give reasonable opportunity to both for being heard in the enquiry. Accordingly. SI Rajesh Yadav and SI Varun Chechi (applicant) were placed under suspension on 13.11.2023. Moreover, there was a possibility of influencing the witnesses of the case by SI Rajesh Yadav and SI Varun Chechi (applicant).
20. It is further submitted that Preliminary Enquiry concluded that by demanding an illegal gratification of Rs. 25 Lac from Sh. Manoj Kumar for not arresting family members of accused Nirmal Singh Bhangu in FIR No. 16/2018 PS B.K. Road and by aécepting the bribe amount of Rs. 4.5 Lac from Sh. Manoj Kumar, SI Varun Chechi (applicant) and Sl Rajesh Yadav had shown gross misconduct in the discharge of their official duties. The allegations against SI Rajesh Yadav and S.I. Varun Chechi (applicant) were serious in nature, which rendered them in unbecoming of a police officer.
21. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the act committed by the applicant had not only tarnished the 11 Item No. 9/C-2 OA 3315/2024 image and brought disgrace to the organization but also demoralized other police personnel. The misconduct committed by them has put the entire police force to shame. Such misconduct cannot be tolerated in any disciplined organization like Delhi Police, whose basic duty is to protect the life and property of the citizen of the society apart from upholding law of land.
22. Learned counsel for the respondents also averred that the act and circumstances of the case were so serious that it would not be reasonably practicable to conduct a regular departmental enquiry against the SI Rajesh Yadav and SI Varun Chechi (applicant) as there was reasonable belief that the witnesses might not come forward to depose against them owing to their influential positions. It also calls for great courage to depose against the desperate persons and the task become more acute and difficult where the police personnel could use their job to influence the statement of the witnesses. It was highly probable that during the entire process of departmental proceedings, the complainant and witnesses would be put under constant fear or threat to their person and property from SI Rajesh Yadav and SI Varun Chechi (applicant). Under these circumstances, the then disciplinary authority was personally satisfied that conducting a regular D.E. against SI Rajesh Yadav and St Varun Chechi (applicant) was not practicably possible.
23 Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that after having committed above gravest conduct, if the above named police officials were allowed to continue in the police force, it would be detrimental to public interest and further tarnish the image of police force in society. Therefore, in order to send a clear message to such undesirable elements in the police force and to maintain discipline as well as to prevent recurrence of such incidents, it had become absolutely necessary to dismiss Sl Rajesh Yadav No. D-6547 and SI Varun Chechi No. D-5790 (applicant) from service as they were completely unfit to continue further in police service. The contents of case FIR No. RC-0032023A0043, dated 13.11.2023 u/s 7 of P.C. Act. 1988. P.S. CBI. ACB, New Delhi, Delhi and the Preliminary Enquiry conducted into the matter had proved their involvement in this case, and therefore, they both deserve to be dismissed under Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India and the same was approved by the Disciplinary Authority.
24. Learned counsel for the respondents also submitted that SI..(Exe.) Rajesh Yadav, No.D/6547 & applicant were dismissed from the service under Article 311(2) (b) of the Constitution of India vide order dated 14.11.2023 and their suspension period from 13.11.2023 to the date of issue of 12 Item No. 9/C-2 OA 3315/2024 dismissal order was decided as period "Not spent on duty" for all intents and purposes.
25. Learned counsel for the respondents also submitted that the indulgence of a police official in such a criminal act would destroy the faith of the people in the law enforcement system and no witness would come forward for any enquiry. The involvement of the applicant in such criminal act was not only undesirable but it also amounted to serious misconduct and indiscipline. It is under these given set of compelling circumstances, the rules under Article 311(2)(b) of Constitution of India were invoked in this case. S.1.(Exe.) Rajesh Yadav. No.D 6547 and the applicant were not to be allowed to continue in police service and was to be dismissed immediately without following the procedure of regular Departmental Proceedings, although purpose of the fact finding was really not needed as the contents of the case FIR and the Preliminary Enquiry conducted into the matter had proved their involvement in this case. As such the punishment under appeal was inflicted upon the applicant by passing a speaking and reasoned order which is legal and justified.
26. Learned counsel for the respondents further contended that as per Rule 15 of Delhi Police (Punishment & Appeal) Rules, 1980, the Preliminary Enquiry is a fact finding enquiry and according to Point No.3 of the Rule, the suspected police officer may or may not be present at a Preliminary Enquiry but when present he shall not cross-examine the witness. Whereas in DE, the presence of delinquent is essential. As such there is a difference between PE & D.E. Since the applicant was absconding, it was not practicably possible to conduct the DE in the present case. Hence, the PE was conducted.
27. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that after completion of the Preliminary Enquiry, in compliance of the Circulars issued from PIIQ vide Nos. 5545- 645/P.Cell/Vig., dated 11.09.2007 and 2513-2612/P. Cell (P. Misc.)/Vigilance, dated 18.04.2018. the P.E. report was forwarded to Spl. CP/L&O/Zone-11. Delhi for seeking necessary concurrence to dismiss Sl (Exe.) Rajesh Yadav No. D-6547 and Sl (Exe.) Varun Chechi No. D-5790 (applicant) under article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India and the same was approved by the Competent Authority.
28. The learned counsel for the respondents contends that the Preliminary Enquiry proved that by demanding an illegal gratification of Rs. 25 Lac from Sh. Manoj Kumar for not arresting family members of accused Nirmal Singh Bhangu in FIR No. 16/2018 PS B.K. Road and by accepting the bribe amount of Rs. 4.5 Lac from Sh. Manoj Kumar. Sl Varun Chechi and SI Rajesh Yadav(applicant) had shown gross 13 Item No. 9/C-2 OA 3315/2024 misconduct in the discharge of their official duties. The allegations against S.I.(Exe.) Rajesh Yadavand SI (Exe.) Varun Chechi (applicant) were serious in nature, which rendered them unfit to be retained in service.
29. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and with their assistance, perused the pleadings available on record.
30. It is seen that the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority have come to the decision on the presumption that alleged offence has been committed by the applicant, so there is no need to conduct the departmental enquiry, these reasons cannot stand to the scrutiny of law for invoking the power under provision of Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India. It needs to be tested whether the reasons recorded in the impugned order for imposition of Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India are justifiable or the provisions of above mentioned Article of the Constitution of India are invoked only to avoid the disciplinary enquiry and get rid of the applicant in convenient manner. The Disciplinary Authority did not mention the reasonable grounds even when Preliminary Enquiry was ordered against the applicant. It could be seen from the appellate order that Appellate Authority had rejected the appeal in a mechanical manner without addressing specific submissions of the applicant and merely on presumptions that the allegation against the applicant is presumed to be proved and the witness might not have come forward to depose against the applicant. The Appellate Authority is simply assuming that the allegations against the applicant stands proved and this justification is good enough to invoke the Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India and dismiss the applicant. The Appellate Authority did not take into consideration that in the present case, that majority of the witnesses are official witnesses. If preliminary enquiry is possible, then the departmental enquiry is also possible. Similarly, if the trial is possible then the departmental enquiry is also possible. Moreover, 11 out of the 19 witnesses were either personnel of the Delhi Police or officers of the CBI and two are from Pvt. Telecom agencies and they can early be called to participating in the enquiry. However, both disciplinary authority and appellate authority did not make any efforts to conduct departmental enquiry and resorted to invocation of provision of Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India to impose the penalty of dismissal. This could be construed as strong bias of respondents towards the applicant and their disdain approach to uphold Rule of Law. The respondents being senior police officer holding high position are required to run the administrative decision making lawfully. Earlier also while deciding other matters, we have pointed out that a serious course correction is needed in the respondent Department while handling such cases and it is for their 14 Item No. 9/C-2 OA 3315/2024 betterment if they take effective steps in that direction. We need not further ponder upon this point and leave it here.
31. In the recent matter decided on 14.08.2024 by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in W.P. (C) No.11276/2024 and CM Appl. 46705/2024. CM Appl. 46706/2024 in the matter of The Commissioner of Police & Ors. vs OM Prakash &anr., wherein the Commissioner of Police has been directed by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi to look into the matters where Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India has been invoked by the police authorities and police personnel have been removed from the service. Only on presumptions and assumptions without any material, coming to the conclusion or that it was not reasonably practicable to conduct regular departmental enquiry as witness might not come forward to decide the case and Appellate Authority depose against a police officer respondents have rejected the appeal which could be construed as bad in law.
32. It is apparent that the Disciplinary Authority has assumed as if the allegations made in criminal case (FIR) already stand proved and thus with this presumptions, the present impugned order has been issued. Once the order of Disciplinary Authority is based on assumption as if the allegations made against the applicant already stand proved that too on the content of FIR, the same act is enough to vitiate the order of Disciplinary Authority as the same being bad in law and being based on assumptions, suspicion and surmises. Further, the Disciplinary Authority is assuming that the offence has been committed by the applicant and under this assumption, the present order of Disciplinary Authority is being passed invoking Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India. There are circulars, judgment of judicial forums which clearly states that if the allegations are grave then more opportunity should be provided to the delinquent official to put forward his defense. The applicant has not been subjected to a departmental enquiry and merely on assumptions the disciplinary authority adopting a short cut and has invoked the power under Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India. The reasoning recorded by Disciplinary Authority is based on suspicion and surmises. The reasoning recorded by Disciplinary Authority for dispensing away the departmental enquiry has been dealt by this Tribunal in various OAs qua the same department i.e. Delhi Police. It is observed that most of witnesses are official witness in criminal case; once the criminal trial and preliminary enquiry are possible, then departmental enquiry is also possible.
33. As stated above, the applicant is only Sub Inspector in Delhi Police, if as per the allegations, the case of the department is so good on merit then come what may the applicant should be given a chance to put forward his defense in disciplinary enquiry. The preliminary enquiry was conducted by the respondents in order to construe that the allegations are true against the applicant that 15 Item No. 9/C-2 OA 3315/2024 too at the back of the applicant. This fact clearly shows that Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India has been adopted as a convenient method in the present case. The impugned order is passed with the presumption that the allegations are proved against the applicant. In such a situation, Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India cannot be invoked on the same as it amounts to abuse of process of law.
34. In the public interest and even as per Rule of law, it was incumbent upon the respondent authorities not to put to use Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India in present case and to give opportunity to the applicant to put forward his defence in the departmental enquiry. The gravity of misconduct alleged in the present case cannot be a ground to invoke the power under Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India. The applicant as per rule of law must be given opportunity to put forward his defence in regular Departmental Enquiry until and unless the same is not reasonably practical. The reasons recorded in present impugned order dispensing away with the Departmental Enquiry are just not tenable in the eyes of law. Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India has been used as a short cut method. Admittedly in the present case a Preliminary Enquiry was conducted through ACP/B. K. Road/NDD, the order of dismissal from service was passed by Disciplinary Authority, if preliminary enquiry is possible then disciplinary enquiry is also possible. This Tribunal in various judgments has allowed many petitions in respect of use of Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India, on the same ground that if PE is possible then DE is also possible.
35. The reasoning to dispense away with the departmental enquiry cannot be based on suspicion and surmises and probability. Once the Disciplinary Authority records that there is a probability that complainant and witness are put on constant fear and threat as a reason to dispense away with departmental enquiry, the onus to establish that such situation prevails is based on the efforts made by them to conduct departmental enquiry and imminent failure to hold the said departmental enquiry due to such actions of the applicant. Therefore, on the one hand taking no action to conduct disciplinary enquiry and while on the other citing the imaginary reasons of giving threat to witnesses etc., are the reasoning based on mere probability, suspicion and surmises and cannot be attached any credence. No material is placed before the authority to come to the conclusion that Departmental Enquiry is not possible and invocation of Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India is the only solution available to the respondents.
36. It is also observed that the power under Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India has been invoked subsequent to a preliminary enquiry. No such material even through preliminary enquiry was conducted is being placed before any of the 16 Item No. 9/C-2 OA 3315/2024 authorities on the basis of which the conclusion would be drawn that the departmental enquiry is not practicable or even remotely supports the vague reasons recorded to dispense with the departmental enquiry. The cases in which preliminary enquiry is being conducted but in absolute violation of circular dated 11.09.2007 and straightaway the Disciplinary Authority passed an order under Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India, is in violation of circular dated 11.9.2007 which was framed by department in pursuance of judgment of Hon'ble Tribunal in case of Suresh Kumar Vs. GNCTD in O.A. No. 2500/2006.
37. The Appellate Authority records that Preliminary Enquiry into the matter was conducted. The facts and circumstance of the case were such that it was not reasonably practicable to conduct a regular departmental enquiry, cannot be a ground to invoke the Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India. The copy of preliminary enquiry report is not supplied to the applicant nor the applicant has been part of the preliminary enquiry but on the contrary the law is that Preliminary Enquiry is possible then even the departmental enquiry is also possible and in such cases the Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India is not invoked. The applicant is placing its reliance on the judgment of Hon'ble Tribunal decided on 23.04.2018 whereby the Hon'ble Tribunal after relying the judgment of Tarsem Singh, Hon'ble Apex Court whereby the Hon'ble Tribunal clearly stating "29. In Tarsem Singh's case Apex Court while allowing the appeals categorically observed " if a preliminary enquiry could be conducted, we fail to see any reason as to why a formal departmental enquiry could not have been initiated against the applicant. Reliance placed upon such a preliminary enquiry without complying with the minimal requirements of the principle of natural justice is against all canons of fair play and justice'. Accordingly, in the facts of the present OAs, we hold the issue in favour of the applicant. 30. In the circumstances and for the aforesaid reasons, all the OAs are allowed and the impugned orders are set aside with all consequential benefits. Since the applicant was under suspension as on the date of passing of the impugned orders, they would thus remain under suspension and the respondents shall take an appropriate decision regarding revocation or continuation of the same. The respondents shall proceed against the applicant departmentally, as per rules and the treatment of suspension period shall be dependent on the same. No costs. "
38. In the present case, when a Preliminary Enquiry is possible then even a Departmental Enquiry is also possible and thus the 17 Item No. 9/C-2 OA 3315/2024 reasoning recorded by the Disciplinary Authority for dispensing away with the Departmental Enquiry is bad in law. As also stated above, the disciplinary authority did not even make the slightest possible effort to initiate a departmental inquiry as only after initiating a departmental inquiry a disciplinary authority can come to the conclusion that departmental inquiry is not reasonably practicable. Without making any efforts and only acting on the presumption and surmises, the disciplinary authority on its own, came to the conclusion that departmental inquiry is not practicable. No order for initiating the Departmental Enquiry was made by the department thus it is wrong to say that the present Departmental Enquiry is not reasonably practicable.
39. The disciplinary authority is not able to apply its mind that the power under Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India has to be exercised with a pre-condition. The pre-condition is that if a disciplinary enquiry is not reasonably practical and to arrive at such conclusions, the Disciplinary Authority has to record reasons. The present reasoning is based on the assumption that the applicant has committed the alleged crime and thus departmental enquiry is not required. The Disciplinary Authority on the presumption that the act committed by the applicant is so grave that it is practically not feasible to conduct enquiry, has hence, came to conclusion that there is no need to conduct the departmental enquiry the scrutiny of law for invoking the power under Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India. The law on the subject is that graver are the allegation then more opportunities should be provided to the delinquent official to submit the defence. The gravity of the charge will never be an imminent factor in deciding whether power under Art 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India is to be invoked or not.
40. The present case is a case of absolute misuse of power vested in the Disciplinary Authority under Article 311 (2) (b) of Constitution of India and hence bad in law. The reasons recorded by the authorities to dispense away with the departmental enquiry do not withstand the scrutiny of law. The so called reasons recorded by the authorities in the impugned order to invoke the power under the Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India as being mentioned are only to avoid the departmental enquiry. It is a well settled law that without conducting any departmental enquiry, if the finding of guilt against the applicant has been arrived on to, the same act is enough to vitiate the order of the disciplinary authority. There is a finding of guilt against the applicant without conducting the Departmental Enquiry and further not even giving the opportunity to the applicant to put forward his defence and the same is enough to vitiate the order of the disciplinary authority. The authorities failed to consider that no substantial material has been collected to come on to a conclusion that witness will be discouraged to appear in a D.E. Thus the order of the authorities establishes non-application of 18 Item No. 9/C-2 OA 3315/2024 mind, bias, arbitrariness and to adopt a short cut method of dismissing the applicant by invoking the power under Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India only keeping in mind the gravity of the allegations.
41. The applicant preferred an appeal against the punishment order of dismissal dated 14.11.2023 (Annexure-A/1). The Appellate Authority rejected the appeal on 08.08.2024 (Annexure-
A/2) by an absolutely non-speaking and mechanical order. The Appellate Authority failed to apply its mind that the law quoted by the applicant in the statutory appeal clearly establishes that the reasons recorded for dispensing with the DE are not legally tenable in the eyes of law. The Appellate Authority has merely stated in his order dated 08.08.2024 that "In their appeals, they have submitted various court judgments/order in support of their ground and has not proceeded to discuss these judgments. The present case is not a case for invoking the power under Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India. The Hon'ble Apex court has laid down clearly that the gravity of the charge will not be a tilting factor in deciding whether a Departmental Enquiry is a reasonably practicable or not. The graver the charge the opportunity to defend him should be more.
42. On this subject invocation of provision of Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India, this Tribunal has decided a number of cases. We examine the law laid down on this subject in some of the decided cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant.
43. The first judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant is the order dated 13.12.2023 of this Tribunal passed in OA No. 1019/20223 in the matter of Dushyant Kumar Vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors.. The relevant paras of the same are reproduced below:-
"8. A catena of cases of the Orders/Judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, Hon'ble High Court of Delhi and of this Tribunal on the issue as involved in the present case were also considered by the Division Bench (consisting one of us) while deciding the case of Ct. Sumit Sharma (supra).
9. Having regard to the above, we have carefully perused the impugned order(s), we find that nothing has been recorded in the impugned order(s) or shown to us that the applicant had ever threatened or harassed any of the witness (es) and/or the prospective witness (es). From the impugned orders, it is also evident that neither any effort was made by them to conduct an enquiry, nor there is any evidence that despite their best efforts, the respondents would 19 Item No. 9/C-2 OA 3315/2024 not have been able to produce the witness (es) to lead evidence against the applicant. Further 18 OA No.1019/2023 nothing is brought on record that witness (es) has/have been threatened by the applicant or they were too scared of the applicant to come forward in the regular enquiry proceedings. It is also found that the disciplinary authority while passing the impugned order has very casually come to the conclusion that it would not be possible to conduct the departmental enquiry against the applicant, as no reason at all has been recorded in this regard and the applicant is guilty of committing grave misconduct and was involved in the aforesaid offences.
10. Having regard to the above, we are of the considered view that impugned orders passed by the respondents are not only in violation of the settled law but also of their own circular dated 11.9.2007. The reasons given by the respondents for dispensing with the enquiry are not in consonance with the law settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and Hon'ble High Courts and followed by this Tribunal in a catena of cases, including in one referred to hereinabove.
11. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the present case, we are of the considered view that the instant OA is squarely covered by the common 19 OA No.1019/2023 Order/Judgment dated 10.2.2022 in Ct. Sumit Sharma (supra) and a batch of cases. Therefore, the present OA deserves to be partly allowed and hence, the same is partly allowed with the following directions:- (i) Orders dated 03.10.2022 (Annexure A/1) and dated 10.3.2023 (Annexure A/2) passed by the disciplinary and appellate authorities respectively are set aside; (ii) The applicant shall be entitled to all consequential benefits in accordance with the relevant rules and law on the subject; (iii) The respondents shall implement the aforesaid directions within eight weeks of receipt of a copy of this order; and (iv) However, the respondents shall be at liberty to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the applicant in accordance with the law.
12. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs."
The order of this Tribunal was challenged in the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in W.P. (C) 2407/2024 in the matter of Govt. of Delhi and Ors. Vs. Dushyant Kumar, The Hon'ble High of Delhi 20 Item No. 9/C-2 OA 3315/2024 dismissed the Writ Petition being meritless. The relevant portion of the said judgment is as under:-
"14. In the light of the aforesaid, we have no hesitation in concurring with the Tribunal that the petitioners' decision to dispense with the enquiry was wholly unsustainable. The petitioners appear to have proceeded on an erroneous presumption that merely because a criminal case has been registered against the respondent, he was to be treated as guilty of the misconduct. No doubt, the respondent is a police officer, whose misconduct can never be condoned, but this would not imply that the principles of natural justice should be given a complete go by. As noted hereinabove, the petitioners have not given any valid reason for dispensing with the enquiry except for repeatedly stating that the respondent is guilty of serious misconduct. This course of action, in our view, is completely impermissible.
15. Before we conclude, we may also consider the decision in Ajit Kumar Nag (supra) relied upon by the petitioners. We, however, find that instead of forwarding the case of the petitioners, the said decision supports the case of the respondent. It would, therefore, be apposite to refer to paragraph no.44 of the said decision, which reads as under:-
"44. We are aware of the normal rule that a person must have a fair trial and a fair appeal and he cannot be asked to be satisfied with an unfair trial and a fair appeal. We are also conscious of the general principle that pre- decisional hearing is better and should always be preferred to post-decisional hearing. We are further aware that it has been stated that apart from Laws of Men, Laws of God also observe the rule of audi alteram partem. It has been stated that the first hearing in human history was given in the Garden of Eden. God did not pass sentence upon Adam and Even before giving an opportunity to show cause as to why they had eaten the forbidden fruit. (See R. v. University of Cambridge [(1723) 1 Str 557:93 ER 698] .) But we are also aware that the principles of natural justice are not rigid or immutable and hence they cannot be imprisoned in a straitjacket. They must yield to and change with exigencies of situations. They must be confined within their limits and cannot be allowed to run wild. It has been stated:" „To do a great 21 Item No. 9/C-2 OA 3315/2024 right‟ after all, it is permissible sometimes „to do a little wrong‟." [Per Mukharji, C.J. in Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India [(1990) 1 SCC 613] (Bhopal Gas Disaster), SCC p. 705, para 124.] While interpreting legal provisions, a court of law cannot be unmindful of the hard realities of life. In our opinion, the approach of the Court in dealing with such cases should be pragmatic rather than pedantic, realistic rather than doctrinaire, functional rather than formal and practical rather than "precedential"."
16. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the petitioners have not only ignored the decisions of the Apex Court laying down the parameters for applicability of Article 311(2)(b) of Constitution of India, but have also ignored their own circulars dated 21.12.1993 and 11.09.2007. We, therefore, find no infirmity with the impugned order.
17. The writ petition being meritless is, accordingly, dismissed with all pending applications."
44. The second judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant is the order dated 16.04.2024 of this Tribunal passed in OA Nos. 542/2023 & 591/2023 in the case of Deepak vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors by this Tribunal wherein the Tribunal held as under:-
"20. In the present case, as apparent from the reasons recorded by the respondents in the impugned order, it is apparent that the respondents have arrived at the conclusion for dispensing with the regular inquiry due to the involvement of the applicants in a grave and serious case. The respondents have jumped to the conclusion that on account of serious allegations, the applicants have become ineligible to be continued in police force. There is no finding that the 24 applicants and/or anybody on their behalf have at any point of time even attempted to influence or coerce any of the witness. Even there is no finding that the applicants in the captioned OAs who are very junior officers under the respondents were in a position to influence the witnesses who are generally senior officials working in the Government of India and particularly in CBI. It is also nowhere recorded by the respondents as to how if not only preliminary inquiry was found possible, but also the criminal trial is possible in the said case FIR with the support of more than nineteen witnesses and at no point of time the prosecution has even felt that 22 Item No. 9/C-2 OA 3315/2024 those witnesses are not likely to turn up and regular inquiry was not possible in the matter. It is undisputed that regular inquiry is a Rule whereas dispensing with the same is only an exception. Though the respondents have recorded that if regular inquiry is initiated, the same is liable to take a long time, however, no reason has been given for the same and it is apparent that such reasoning and finding is based on surmises and conjectures.
21. In view of the aforesaid, we find that the impugned orders are not sustainable in the eyes of law. Accordingly, the OAs are allowed with the following order(s) :- (i) impugned orders dated 10.08.2022 and 25.01.2023 are set aside. The applicants shall be reinstated in service forthwith. (ii) the applicants shall be entitled for all consequential benefits in accordance with relevant rules and instructions on the subject. (iii) the aforesaid directions shall be complied with by the respondents as expeditiously as possible and preferably within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. (iv) the respondents shall be at liberty to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the applicants if they are so advised, of course in accordance with rules and instructions on the subject.
22. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs."
45. The third judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant is the Writ Petition (C) No. 1258/2023 & CM App. No.4759/2023 in the case of Commissioner of Police Delhi Police & Ors. Vs. Manjeet wherein the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi vide its judgement dated 22.04.2024 has held as under: -
"9. A bare perusal of the aforesaid reasons contained in the dismissal order makes it clear that the primary reason for the petitioners not holding any enquiry against the respondent was that due to seriousness of the offence alleged to have been committed by him it would not be reasonably practicable to conduct a regular departmental enquiry. It also emerges that on the basis of the allegations levelled against the respondent in the FIR coupled with the findings of the preliminary enquiry, the petitioners presumed that the respondent was guilty of a serious offence and therefore deserve to be dismissed at the earliest. This in our considered view, as has been rightly held by the learned Tribunal, could not be treated as a ground to reach a conclusion that it was not reasonably 23 Item No. 9/C-2 OA 3315/2024 practicable to hold an enquiry against the respondent. The petitioners have sought to dispense with the enquiry in such a casual manner and that too only on the basis of a perceived notion that the respondent being a police personnel, an enquiry against him was likely to be difficult on account of his influence. This course of action is clearly violative of Article 311(2)
(b) of the Constitution of India.
10. We have also considered the decision in Dushyant Kumar (Supra) and find that in the said case, this Court had rejected a similar challenge by the petitioners to the Tribunal's quashing of a dismissal order passed after dispensing with the enquiry. In fact, this Court after considering the circulars dated 21.12.1993 and 11.09.2007 issued by the petitioners themselves, observed that despite there being a requirement to record cogent reasons to dispense with the enquiry, the petitioners were passing cryptic orders dispensing with the enquiry in the most mechanical manner.
11. No doubt, the respondent is a police personnel and any misconduct on his part is liable to be dealt with appropriately. This, however, does not imply that the petitioners could, on the basis of the gravity of the charges levelled against him, with an enquiry on absolutely vague grounds. As noted hereinabove, the petitioners have given no reason whatsoever in the impugned order for dispensing with the inquiry. The impugned order of dismissal proceeds on the basis that the respondent's guilt had already been proved in the preliminary enquiry. Furthermore, it is not as if the respondent has been let off without any departmental action being taken against him, as the learned Tribunal has already granted time to the petitioners to initiate departmental proceedings against him as per law.
12. For the aforesaid reasons, we find no reason to interfere with the impugned order. The writ petition being meritless is dismissed along with all applications.
13. Before we conclude, we are constrained to observe that in a large number of petitions filed by the Commissioner of Police which are coming up before this Court, we are finding termination orders are being passed by the petitioners by dispensing with departmental enquiries in a most mechanical manner without recording any valid reasons. We, therefore, direct that a copy of this order be placed before the 24 Item No. 9/C-2 OA 3315/2024 Commissioner, Delhi Police to ensure that in future, enquiries are not dispensed with without assigning justifiable reasons."
46. The fourth judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant is Writ Petition (C) No.4201/2024 on 20.03.2024 in case of Commissioner of Police and Anr. Vs. Jagmal Singh. The Hon'ble High Court of Delhi has held as under:-
"10. From a perusal of the aforesaid, we find that the petitioners have proceeded to dispense with the enquiry against the respondent only because of the grave nature of allegations levelled against him and have simply observed that since the respondent had lowered the image of the police department and goodwill of a uniformed organisation, an exemplary punishment of dismissal ought to be imposed upon him so as to send a clear message to undesirable persons and to prevent reoccurrence of such crimes. In the light of the aforesaid, we find absolutely no reason to differ with the conclusion arrived at by the learned Tribunal that the dismissal order passed by the petitioners did not contain any justifiable reason whatsoever for dispensing with the enquiry. What clearly emerges is that the petitioners have proceeded on the premise that such police officers, who are charged with serious misconduct, should be immediately dismissed from service. This approach, in our view to dispense with an enquiry, would not meet the parameters laid down under Article 311(2) (b) of the Constitution of India.
11. At the cost of repetition, we may reiterate that merely because the respondent was a police personnel, would not entitle the petitioners to give a complete go- bye to the requirement of holding a departmental enquiry against him without recording any justifiable reasons as to why departmental enquiry could not be held against him.
12. For the aforesaid reasons, we find no infirmity with the impugned order. The writ petition, being meritless, is along with accompanying application, dismissed."
In the Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 11681/2024 filed by the Commissioner of Police & Anr. Vs. Jagmal Singh, the Hon'ble Supreme Court vide its judgment on 10.07.2024 has dismissed the said SLP and the judgment of Hon'ble Court of Delhi attained finality.
47. The fifth and last judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant is decision of the Hon'ble High Court of 25 Item No. 9/C-2 OA 3315/2024 Delhi dated 23.04.2024 in W.P. (C) No. 5562/2024, CAV 181 /2024 CM Appl. 22929/2024 in the case of Commissioner of Police and Ors. Vs. Sant Ram in which Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in paras 9 to 12 has held as under:-
"9. A bare perusal of the aforesaid reasons contained in the dismissal order makes it clear that the primary reason for the petitioners not holding any enquiry against the respondent was their presumption that the respondent would threaten or intimidate the complainant and other witnesses. The petitioners were further of the view that a prolonged enquiry would cause more trauma to the complainant. It is also evident from the dismissal order that the petitioners had, on the basis of the evidence led in the preliminary enquiry, already made up their mind that the respondent was guilty of serious misconduct and had lowered the image of the police force in the eyes of the public.
10. In our considered view, even though the charges against the respondent are very serious and the interest of the complainant deserves to be protected, it does not imply that the principles of natural justice as also the provisions of section 11 of The Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 should be given a complete go by on the basis of mere presumptions. Only because the respondent is a police personnel, would in our view, not be a ground either to presume that the witnesses will not come forward to depose against him in a regular enquiry or to hold him guilty without conducting the statutorily prescribed departmental enquiry and that too in a matter like the present where the complainant and the witnesses are also police personnel. In fact, what emerges is that on the basis of the report of the preliminary enquiry itself, the petitioners presumed that the respondent was guilty of serious misconduct and therefore deserved to be dismissed at the earliest. This in our considered view, as has been rightly held by the learned Tribunal, could not be treated as a ground to reach a conclusion that it was not reasonably practicable to hold an enquiry against the respondent. This course of action, in our considered opinion, was clearly violative of Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India.
11. No doubt, the respondent is a police personnel and any misconduct on his part is liable to be dealt with appropriately. This, however, does not imply that the petitioners could, on the basis of the gravity of the 26 Item No. 9/C-2 OA 3315/2024 charges levelled against him, dispense with the requirement of an enquiry on absolutely vague grounds. As noted hereinabove, the petitioners have given no reason whatsoever in the impugned order for dispensing with the inquiry. The impugned order of dismissal proceeds on the basis that the respondent's guilt had already been proved in the preliminary enquiry and had also been admitted by him. We therefore have no hesitation in agreeing with the learned Tribunal that the petitioners have dispensed with the enquiry only on the basis of a perceived notion that the respondent being a police personnel, would threaten the witnesses and holding of an enquiry would cause trauma to the complainant. Furthermore, we find that it is not as if the respondent has been let off without any departmental action being taken against him. As is evident from the impugned order, the learned Tribunal, while setting aside the dismissal order, has granted time to the petitioners to initiate departmental proceedings against him as per law.
12. For the aforesaid reasons, we find no reason to interfere with the impugned order. The writ petition being meritless is dismissed along with all accompanying applications.
48. In pursuance to the order of this Tribunal in OA No. 14/2018 titled as Sant Ram vs. Commissioner of Police and the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in W.P. (C) 5562/2024, CAV 181/2024 CM Appl. No.22929/2024, the respondents reinstated the services of the applicant Shri Sant Ram in that case. The order dated 26.07.2024 is reproduced as under:-
"In pursuance of judgment dated 06.02.2024 passed by the Principal Bench of Hon'ble Mr. R.N. Singh, Member (J) & Hon'ble Mr. Sanjeeva Kumar, Member (A), Central Administrative Tribunal, New Delhi in 0.A. No.14/2018 titled Sant Ram Vs. Commissioner of Police, Delhi & Ors.
and judgment dated 23.04.2024 passed by the Hon'ble Ms. Justice Rekha Palli & Hon'ble Mr. Justice Saurabh Banerjee, High Court Delhi in W.P.(C) No.5562/2024, CAV 181/2024, CM Appl.22929/2024 - Stay, CM Appl. 22930/2024 - Ex./LLOD titled Commissioner of Police & Ors. Vs. Sant Ram as well as opinion of Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, Ld. Addl. Solicitor General of India that "this is not a fit case for filing of SLP", the order of the disciplinary authority passed vide No.1833- 1900/HAP/PTC (P-II) dated 01.08.2017 vide which 27 Item No. 9/C-2 OA 3315/2024 Const. (Exe.) Sant Ram, No.324PTC (PIS No.28060573) was dismissed from the Delhi Police force under Article311(2(b) of Constitution of India deciding his suspension period as period not spent on duty and the order passed by the Appellate Authority vide No.106- 66/SO/Jt.C.P/Trg, dated 03.11.2017 rejecting his appeal, are set aside. Accordingly, Const. (Exe.) Sant Ram, No.324/PTC (PIS No.28060573) is hereby re- instated in service from dismissal with immediate effect without prejudice to the further departmental action to be taken against him in accordance with the law.
He is deemed to be under suspension from the date of his dismissal as he had already been placed under suspension vide D.D.No.29-A/PTC/JK dated 22.07.2017 and formal issued vide order No.1738- 70/HAP/PTC (DA-II) dated 26.07.2017. His dismissal/suspension period will be decided later on.
Let Const. (Exe.) Sant Ram, No.324/PTC (PIS No.28060573) be informed accordingly.
49. The learned counsel for the applicant has also drawn our attention to the following circular issued by the Office of Commissioner of Police in judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Writ Petition (C) No.1258/2023 & CM Appl. No. 4759/2023 in case of Commissioner of Police, Delhi vs. Manjeet, the "No. 174/C/HC/24 5110-60 DA-III/Court Cell/PHQ dated 13.05.2024 To The Deputy Commissioner of Police, All District including Units, New Delhi.
Sub: W.P. (C) No. 1258/2023 & CM Appl. No. 4759/2023 in the matter of Commissioner of Police, Delhi vs. Manjeet.
Memo Enclosed please find here with a copy of letter No. 10264/W/DHC/ Writs/D-9/2023 dated 26.04.2024 received from the Registrar General, Delhi High Court alongwith copy of the order dated 22.04.2024 wherein 28 Item No. 9/C-2 OA 3315/2024 the Hon'ble has observed that " in large number of petitions filed by the Commissioner of Police which are coming up before the this Court, we are finding termination orders are being passed b y the petitioners by dispensing with departmental enquiries in a most mechanical manner without recording any valid reasons. We, therefore, direct that a copy of this order be placed before the Commissioner of Police, Delhi to ensure that in future, enquiries are not dispensed with without assigning justifiable reasons.
It is, therefore, requested that the aforementioned directions of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi shall be taken into consideration before passing termination orders by dispensing with the departmental enquiries in future.
This issues with the approval of Commissioner of Police, Delhi.
(Hareesh H.P) Deputy Commissioner of Police Legal Division/ PHQ, Delhi"
Relying upon the circular issued on 11.09.2002, a similar order was passed by the respondents in the OA No. 1088/2021 as under:-
"The respondents, after considering the provisions of Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India and the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Tulsiram Patel (supra) and the Order(s)/Judgment(s) passed by this Tribunal have issued another circular dated 11.9.2007 (Annexure A/13 of the rejoinder filed in OA 467/2020). In the said circular, they have emphasized that the disciplinary authority should pass a speaking order(s) based and supported by material/facts on record for dispensing with prior inquiry and before passing such order(s), the disciplinary authority should be satisfied that it is not practicable to hold an inquiry in view of threat, inducement, intimidation, affiliation with criminals etc. and the disciplinary authority has no option but to resort to Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India. The said circular dated 11.9.2007 reads as under:-
29 Item No. 9/C-2 OA 3315/2024 "CIRCULAR No. /2007 An analysis has been done by PHQ in 38 cases
pertaining to the period between 1.1.2000 to 31.12.05 where action under Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India was taken against the defaulters. The analysis shows that out of the 38 cases, the action of the department has been upheld by CAT only in two cases and out of these two cases and only one case action was upheld by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi and most of these cases have been remanded back in the Department by the Tribunal for initiating departmental inquiry.
Though some cases are still pending in the Hon'ble High Court for decision, in a majority of cases, Disciplinary Authorities have resorted to Article 311 (2)
(b) on assumptions and conjectures. No speaking orders were passed based on and supported by material/facts on record for dispensing with prior enquiry. Orders for dismissal were passed arbitrarily violating Article 311 and the principles of natural justice.
Henceforth, it has been decided that whenever any Disciplinary Authority intends to invoke Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India, he must keep in mind the judgment in the case of UOI v. Tulsi Ram Patel, AIR 1985 SC 1416. Only in cases where Disciplinary Authority is personally satisfied on the basis of material available on file that the case is of such a nature that it is not practicable to hold an enquiry in view of threat, inducement, intimidation, affiliation with criminals etc. and keeping in view of specific circumstances of the case it is not possible that PWs will depose against the defaulter and disciplinary authority has no option but to resort to Article 311 (2) (b) should such an action be taken. Prior to such an order, a PE has to be conducted and it is essential to bring on record all such facts. It has also been decided that before passing on order under Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India, Disciplinary Authority has to take prior concurrence of Spl. CP/Admn.
This has the approval of C.P., Delhi.
Sd/-
30Item No. 9/C-2 OA 3315/2024 (S.N. SRIVASTAVA) JT. COMMISSIONER OF POLICCE:
HDQRS,: DELHI""
50. The Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in WP(C )No. 11276/2024 and CM Appl. No.46705/2024, CM Appl. No. 46706/2024 in the matter of The Commissioner of Police & Ors. vs. Om Prakash & Anr. decided on 14.08.2024 has taken a serious cognizance of the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority resorting to invocation of Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India. For facility of reference, the relevant portion of above-mentioned judgment is as follow:-
"20. Accordingly, finding no error in the impugned order passed by the learned Tribunal, the present petition is dismissed.
21. Before parting with this matter, we hereby direct the Commission of Police Delhi to personally look into such matters and take proper decision so that Courts/Tribunals are not burdened with a case where departmental inquiries can be initiated. We hereby make it clear that if such like petitions are filed in future wherein dismissal or suspension orders are passed without holding any enquiry without any plausible reasoning, certainly heavy cost will be imposed and that too, will be recovered from the Officer, who takes such type of unwarranted decision.
22. A copy of this order be transmitted to the Commissioner of Delhi Police for information and compliance."
51. Having regard to the above, we are of the considered view that impugned orders passed by the respondents are in violation of the settled law. The reasons given by the respondents to dispense away with the enquiry are not in consonance with the law settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and Hon'ble High Court(s) and followed by this Tribunal in a catena of cases, a few of which are referred to hereinabove.
52. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances in the present case, we are of the considered view that the instant OA deserves to be partly allowed and the same is partly allowed with the following directions: -
(i) Orders dated 14.11.2023 (Annexure-A/1) of the Disciplinary Authority and dated 08.08.2024 (Annexure-
A/2) of the Appellate Authority, are set aside;
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(ii) The applicant is reinstated in service and shall be entitled to all consequential benefits in accordance with the relevant rules and instructions on the subject;
(iii) The respondents shall implement the aforesaid directions within eight weeks of receipt of a copy of this order; and
(iv) However, the respondents shall be at liberty to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the applicant in accordance with the law. No order to cost."
8. From the aforesaid order, it is apparent that the binding precedents, i.e., the judgements of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi and those of the Hon'ble Apex Court have been taken into consideration, while passing the said order dated 22.05.2025. In the case of Rohitash Singh (supra), this Tribunal has recorded that the Appellate Authority applied its mind to the case and in particular, such authority has also kept in mind, the order of the Hon'ble High Court in W.P. (C) No. 1258/2023 vide order dated 22.04.2024. In this background and being satisfied by the application of mind of the Appellate Authority to the extent that in the given facts and circumstances, ordinarily, a regular inquiry was not possible, the Tribunal has dismissed the said OA. This would be evident from para 13, 17 and 18 of the Order dated 03.07.2025 in the case of Rohitash Singh (supra).
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9. However, admittedly, the background of the present case and reasoning for dispensing with the regular inquiry are one and the same in both the case, i.e., in the case of Varun Chechi (supra) and that of the applicant in the present OA. Thus, the judgment in the case of Rohitash Singh (supra) is found to be not applicable in the present case.
10. In the light of the aforesaid, the present OA is partly allowed with the following directions:-
(i) Orders dated 14.11.2023 (Annexure A-1) of the Disciplinary Authority and dated 08.08.2024 (Annexure A-2) of the Appellate Authority, are set aside;
(ii) The applicant is reinstated in service and shall be entitled to all consequential benefits in accordance with the relevant rules and instructions on the subject;
(iii) The respondents shall implement the aforesaid directions within eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order; and
(iv) However, the respondents shall be at liberty to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the applicant in accordance with the law.33
Item No. 9/C-2 OA 3315/2024
11. In the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.
(B. Anand) (R.N. Singh) Member (A) Member (J) /akshaya/