Afr Dillip Kumar Ray .... Election vs Sarada Prasad Nayak on 6 February, 2026

[Cites 42, Cited by 0]

Orissa High Court

Afr Dillip Kumar Ray .... Election vs Sarada Prasad Nayak on 6 February, 2026

The present application has been filed by the sole Respondent of Election Petition No. 2 of 2024 invoking Page 1 of 32 the provisions of Section 86 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 read with Order VI Rule 16, Order VII Rule 11 and Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In this application, the Respondent has prayed for striking out the pleadings contained in Paragraphs 8(A) to 8(I) of the Election Petition and for dismissal of the Election Petition at the threshold. It is the contention of the Respondent that the said pleadings are wholly irrelevant, frivolous and scandalous, and amount to a gross abuse of the process of this Court. It is further urged that the Election Petition suffers from absence of essential material facts and particulars, fails to disclose a complete cause of action, and does not raise any triable issue, thereby rendering it liable to be dismissed at the preliminary stage itself.

2. Written objection has been filed by the Election Petitioner opposing the present application. It is contended that all material facts constituting a valid cause of action raising triable issues have been duly and substantially pleaded in the Election Petition. Accordingly, it is urged that the provisions of Order VI Rule 16 and Order VII Rule Page 2 of 32 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure are not attracted and the Election Petition cannot be dismissed at the threshold.

3. The Election Petition has been instituted by the Election Petitioner seeking the following reliefs: a) to declare the election of the sole Respondent, Sarada Prasad Nayak to 12-Rourkela Assembly Constituency as void; b) To direct a re-election/fresh poll in respect of the said Constituency; and c) to declare that the affidavit filed by the Respondent in Form-26 did not disclose complete and true information with regard to his criminal antecedents as well as details of immovable properties. The election of the Respondent has been questioned principally on grounds referable to Sections 100, 33A and 125A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. It is specifically alleged that the Returning Officer improperly accepted the nomination of the returned candidate which is a ground under Section 100(1)(d)(i) of the Act, inasmuch as:

i) The Respondent, while filing his nomination papers, failed to disclose material particulars in the affidavit in Form-26, namely:

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(a) non-disclosure of certain pending criminal cases, and

b) non-disclosure of joint property holdings;

ii) such non-disclosure and suppression of material facts are stated to constitute violations of the mandatory requirements under Section 33A of the Act read with Rule 4A of the Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961, thereby rendering the acceptance of the nomination papers by the Returning Officer improper and invalid.

4. Pursuant to issuance of notice, the sole Respondent entered appearance and filed his written statement. Along with the same, the Respondent has also filed the present interlocutory application, the specific grounds of which shall be adverted to in the succeeding paragraphs. The Election Petitioner, on the other hand, has filed a detailed objection traversing and controverting the averments made therein.

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5. For convenience, the parties are referred to as per their original status in the Election Petition.

6. Heard Mr. U.K Samal, learned counsel for the sole Respondent/Petitioner in the I.A and Mr. Samvit Mohanty, learned counsel for the Election Petitioner/Opp. Party in I.A.

7. At the outset, Mr. Samal, submitted that paragraphs 1 to 7, paragraphs 9 to 12 and paragraphs 8-A to 8-I of the Election Petition merely narrate the issuance of statutory notifications, filing of nominations, declaration of result, and a general background leading to the institution of the petition. Except for references to official notifications and election results, the remaining averments are stated to be vague, bald and unsupported by any documentary material. According to him, such unfounded and sweeping allegations are unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous and vexatious, and amount to an abuse of the process of this Court. It is further urged that in the absence of specific material facts, the Election Petitioner cannot be said to have made out any case for relief, and hence, the pleadings are liable to be struck off.

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8. Per contra, Mr. Mohanty, submitted that the pleadings contained in Paragraphs 1 to 7, 9 to 12, as well as 8(A) to 8(I) of the Election Petition clearly disclose all necessary material facts constituting a complete cause of action. It is urged that the Election Petitioner has set out a concise statement of material facts and particulars as required in law, without entering into the realm of evidence, in conformity with the settled principles governing election pleadings. The objections raised on behalf of the Respondent are contended to be premature and misconceived. According to him, the pleadings are neither vague, unnecessary, scandalous or vexatious, nor do they amount to an abuse of the process of Court. Hence, it is submitted that the present application is devoid of merit and liable to be dismissed.

9. This Court, upon a careful consideration of the pleadings and the averments contained in the Election Petition, finds that the challenge to the election of the Respondent has been principally founded on the ground of improper acceptance of his nomination papers by the Returning Officer, on account of alleged non-disclosure of Page 6 of 32 assets and criminal antecedents. Having examined the pleadings, particularly Paragraphs 8(A) to 8(I), this Court deems it appropriate to consider those pleadings collectively rather than individually, since all of them pertain to the same issue and require to be appreciated in a wholesome manner.

10. Paragraphs 1 to 7 (except Paragraph 4) of the Election Petition are formal in nature. They set out general averments concerning the subject matter of the election petition, namely, 12-Rourkela Assembly Constituency, the schedule of General Election, 2024, the names of the candidates who contested from the said Constituency, the dates of nomination, their respective party affiliations and allotted symbols, the declaration of the election results, and the reliefs claimed by the Election Petitioner.

11. Paragraph-4 primarily outlines a general summary of the allegations, which are elaborated in detail under the various sub-paragraphs of paragraph-8. Therefore, to avoid unnecessary repetition, this Court finds it appropriate to address and examine those aspects at the relevant stage.

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12. As regards the averments contained in Paragraphs 8(A) to 8(I) of the Election Petition, Mr. Samal submits that the pleadings therein are wholly deficient and do not disclose the material facts necessary to constitute a complete cause of action. It is urged that the Election Petitioner has neither produced nor even referred to the Form-26 affidavit of the Respondent, nor has he specified with clarity the particulars allegedly suppressed in relation to criminal antecedents or immovable properties. No source of information has been disclosed, nor have any supporting documents such as certified copies of order sheets or records of pending criminal cases been filed. According to him, the petition is equally silent as to whether any objection was raised before the Returning Officer at the stage of scrutiny of nominations, the number of nomination papers filed, or the orders, if any, passed by the Returning Officer.

It is further contended that serious allegations have been levelled against the Returning Officer without impleading him as a party, and without specifying which provisions of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 or Page 8 of 32 of the Constitution were allegedly violated. The pleadings, it is argued, do not disclose in what manner the acceptance of the Respondent's nomination was improper, why the affidavit is alleged to be false, how the electorate was misled, or in what way the result of the election was materially affected. No distinction has been drawn between curable and incurable defects, or between defects of substantial and non-substantial character.

Reliance is placed by Mr. Samal on Udhav Singh v. Madhav Rao Scindia1, wherein the Supreme Court held that 'all primary facts which must be proved at trial by a party to establish the existence of a cause of action or defence are material facts, and must be pleaded fully and specifically.' Mr. Samal further relies on Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi2, where it was held that an election petition lacking material facts is liable to be dismissed under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Reference is also made to Hari Shanker Jain v. Sonia Gandhi3, where the Court reiterated that 1 (1977) 1 SCC 511 2 (1986) Supp SCC 315 3 (2001) 8 SCC 233 Page 9 of 32 vague or bald allegations without proper factual foundation cannot sustain an election petition.

In the absence of such foundational pleadings, it is submitted, no legal basis is made out for declaring the election void under Section 100(1) of the Act, and hence, the impugned averments are liable to be struck off as vague, frivolous, and untenable in law.

13. Per contra, Mr. Mohanty, submits that the present application is wholly misconceived. It is specifically urged that the Respondent's nomination was liable for rejection on account of a false and incomplete affidavit in Form-26 dated 01.05.2024. The Election Petitioner has categorically pleaded that the Respondent deliberately suppressed his involvement in G.R. Case No. 1760 of 2002 arising out of Sector-7, Rourkela P.S. Case No. 130(16), wherein charges under Sections 147, 341, 332, 336, 337 and 149 IPC were framed and are pending trial. Significantly, while the same case was disclosed by the Respondent in the 2019 General Election, its omission in 2024 demonstrates deliberate suppression. Page 10 of 32

It is further pleaded that the Respondent failed to disclose his joint ownership interests in several immovable properties situated in Mouzas Sankilo, Gaudabishi, Tentalpur and Pithapada in Tahasil Nischintakoili, District Cuttack, as reflected in the Bhulekh land records. The Election Petitioner has already placed the details of such properties, jointly recorded in the names of the Respondent and his family members, on record. According to Note 1 to Column 7(B) of Form-26, disclosure of such joint ownership is mandatory, and intentional non- disclosure constitutes a false affidavit of substantial character.

Reliance is placed by Mr. Mohanty on the judgments of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms4, People's Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) v. Union of India5 and Krishnamoorthy v. Sivakumar6 to submit that disclosure of criminal antecedents, assets, and liabilities is a mandatory requirement flowing from the voters' "right to know" under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. Non- 4 (2002) 5 SCC 294 5 (2003) 4 SCC 399 6 (2015) 3 SCC 467 Page 11 of 32 disclosure amounts to a false declaration, which is a defect of substantial character rendering the nomination invalid in law.

It is accordingly contended that the Election Petitioner has clearly set out a complete cause of action supported by material facts and necessary particulars. At this stage, there is no requirement to furnish evidence, which will be adduced during trial. Therefore, the pleadings cannot be described as vague, frivolous, or scandalous, nor can the Election Petition be rejected at the threshold.

14. At the outset, this Court finds that it is not in dispute that the object and purpose of requiring candidates to file a complete and truthful affidavit in Form-26 is to secure the fundamental 'right to know' of the electorate, which has been judicially recognized as part of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. The Supreme Court in Resurgence India v. Election Commission of India7 emphatically held that any suppression or omission in such affidavit frustrates the voters' right to information and amounts to a direct infringement of constitutional guarantees. The Court clarified that the filing of an affidavit 7 AIR 2014 SC 344 Page 12 of 32 with blanks or incomplete particulars is impermissible, and that the Returning Officer is duty-bound to ensure that all disclosures relating to assets, liabilities, educational qualifications, and criminal antecedents are properly furnished.

15. In the present case, the Election Petitioner has specifically alleged that the Respondent failed to disclose his joint ownership interests in immovable properties situated in Mouzas Sankilo, Gaudabishi, Tentalpur, and Pithapada in Tahasil Nischintakoili, District Cuttack, as reflected in Bhulekh records, and that he also withheld details of certain movable assets and pending criminal cases. These allegations have been pleaded with particulars, including the nature of the properties and documentary references relied upon by the Petitioner. Such allegations clearly raise triable issues in the election petition.

16. The ratio decided in Lok Prahari v. Union of India 8 and Krishnamoorthy (Supra) is relevant to the present case, wherein, the Supreme Court reiterated the constitutional and statutory imperative of truthful 8 (2018) 4 SCC 699 Page 13 of 32 disclosure of assets, income sources, and criminal antecedents of a candidate, as well as those of his spouse and dependents. The rationale is, suppression of such information misleads the electorate and undermines the purity of elections. The allegations in the present petition are of the same character and cannot be brushed aside at the threshold.

17. As regards the objection raised by the Respondent that the Election Petitioner has not filed a separate affidavit in Form-25 in support of allegations relating to corrupt practices, this Court finds it appropriate to first refer to the judgments of the Supreme Court in G.M. Siddeshwar v. Prasanna Kumar9, Thangjam Arunkumar v. Yumkham Erabot Singh10 and A. Manju v. Prajwal Revanna11, which state that the requirement under the proviso to Section 83(1)(c) of the Act to file an affidavit in Form-25 is directory and not mandatory. Substantial compliance in the form of a sworn affidavit and verification clause accompanying the petition, affirming the truthfulness of allegations, including those relating to 9 (2013) 4 SCC 776 10 (2023) 17 SCC 500 11 (2022) 3 SCC 269 Page 14 of 32 corrupt practices, is sufficient. Therefore, whether the Election Petitioner has made substantial compliance is required to be determined.

17.1. Mr. Samal, referring to the format of the affidavit in Form-25 as appended to the Conduct of Elections Rules, submits that the affidavit appended to the Election Petition does not in the least satisfy the said requirements. He contends that it is necessary to specify which alleged corrupt practices are based on the Petitioner's own knowledge and which are based on information received by him. The affidavit specifies neither.

Elaborating his argument, Mr. Samal argues that it has been generally stated in the affidavit that the same is based on the Election Petitioner's knowledge and belief. This does not at all satisfy the requirements of Form-25. Since the Election Petitioner has not segregated as to which allegations are based on his knowledge and which are based on information received by him, it cannot be said that there has been substantial compliance with the requirement of Form-25.

Page 15 of 32 17.2. Per contra, Mr. Mohanty emphatically argues that the Election Petitioner has alleged that the Respondent's nomination was liable to be rejected on account of a false and incomplete affidavit in Form-26. He further submits that the facts pleaded in Paragraphs 8(A) to 8(I) are verified by the affidavit accompanying the Election Petition, wherein the Petitioner has clearly stated that the said facts have been pleaded being based on his knowledge and belief.

17.3. This Court finds that the pleadings in Paragraphs 8(A) to 8(I) involve allegations relating to corrupt practices. Hence, it is deemed proper to examine whether, in the absence of Form-25, the affidavit appended to the Election Petition substantially complies with the requirement as laid down in G.M. Siddeshwar (supra), Thangjam Arunkumar (supra) and A. Manju (supra) or not.

Before proceeding further, it would be apposite to reproduce Form-25:

"FORM 25 (See Rule 94A) Affidavit I, ......................, the petitioner in the accompanying election petition calling in question the election of Page 16 of 32 Shri/Shrimati .................. (respondent No. ......... in the said petition), make solemn affirmation/oath and say--

(a) that the statements made in paragraphs ..................... of the accompanying election petition about the commission of the corrupt practice of* ..................... and the particulars of such corrupt practice mentioned in paragraphs ..................... of the same petition and in paragraphs ..................... of the Schedule annexed thereto are true to my knowledge;

(b) that the statements made in paragraphs ..................... of the said petition about the commission of the corrupt practice of* .....................

and the particulars of such corrupt practice given in paragraphs ..................... of the said petition and in paragraphs ..................... of the Schedule annexed thereto are true to my information;

(c)

(d) etc. Signature of the deponent Solemnly affirmed/sworn by Shri/Shrimati ..................... at ..................... on this ..................... day of ..................... 20...... Before me, Magistrate of the First Class / Notary / Commissioner of Oaths Here specify the name of the corrupt practice." Thus, the requirement appears to be three-fold:

(i) To specify the corrupt practices;

(ii) To further specify which of the corrupt practices are true to the knowledge of the Petitioner; and

(iii) which are true to his information.

In order to test whether the affidavit accompanying the Election Petition is in line with the above requirements of Form-25 or not, it would be profitable to reproduce the affidavit accompanying the Election Petition: Page 17 of 32

"AFFIDAVIT IN THE MATTER OF:

1. Name -- Dilip Kumar Ray, aged about 71 years, R/o Hrusikesh Bhawan, Daily Market. Rourkela- 769001, P.S-Plantsite, Dist-Sundargarh

2. Father's Name- Late Hrusikesh Ray

3. Occupation-Business

4. Number of proceedings pending in the High Court or would be instituted - None

5. Statement of facts - As stated in the aforementioned Election Petition.

6. That the facts stated above are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

DECLARATION I, Dilip Kumar Ray, aged about 71 years, S/o Late Hrusikesh Ray, R/o Hrushikesh Bhawan, Daily Market, Rourkela-769001, P.S-Plantsite, Dist- Sundargarh do hereby solemnly affirm and verify as follows:

1. That I am the Election Petitioner in this Election Petition.

2. The statements made in Paragraphs 1 to 6 of the Election Petition relate to facts regarding the schedule of the election, description of electors, nomination scrutiny, and statements of facts regarding events in chronology up to the date of counting, which are true to the best of my knowledge, based on information gathered from statutory notifications and official records, and I believe the same to be true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

3. That the statements made in Paragraph 7 are about the substantive reliefs sought with regard to various irregularities, and the statements made therein are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

4. That the averments made in Paragraphs 8(A) to 8(I) are a concise statement of material facts on which the Election Petitioner relies and the law operating in the said field. These statements are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

5. That the averments made in Paragraphs 9, 10, 11 and 12 are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

[Emphasis Added]"

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17.4. The Election Petition also contains a verification.

Turning briefly to the pleadings, this Court finds that, insofar as allegations relating to corrupt practices are concerned, Paragraphs 8(B) and 8(C) contain references to certain pending criminal cases said to have been registered against the Respondent, and Paragraph 8(D) refers to the alleged non-disclosure of assets by the Respondent.

Despite such pleadings in relation to criminal cases and non-disclosure of assets, when the Election Petition is read as a whole, the Election Petitioner has nowhere specified the same as corrupt practices.

17.5. Thus, this Court shall first proceed to determine whether the affidavit already on record substantially complies with the requirement of Form-25 or not. As already seen, the requirement is to specify the corrupt practices and to further specify which allegations are based on the personal knowledge of the Petitioner and which are based on information. Paragraph 4 of the affidavit filed along with the Election Petition, and reproduced hereinabove, shows that although not Page 19 of 32 specifying each corrupt practice as such, the Petitioner has referred to Paragraphs 8(A) to 8(I). The allegations of corrupt practice, as already stated, are contained in Paragraphs 8(B) to 8(D). Therefore, Paragraph 4 of the affidavit can be said to relate to the said allegations as well.

It has been generally stated that the said allegations are 'based on law' and the Petitioner's 'knowledge and belief'.

17.6. As pointed out by Mr. Samal, there is in fact no segregation as to which allegations are based on the personal knowledge of the Petitioner and which are based on information received by him. This Court finds the argument of Mr. Samal valid; however, on that score alone, the Election Petition cannot be dismissed at the threshold.

The said defect would amount to a defect in the Election Petition which is curable, as the pleadings contained therein raise a cause of action and triable issues, as held by the Supreme Court in the recent case of Kimneo Haokip Hangshing v. Kenn Raikhan12, wherein the Supreme Court held as follows-

"7. Over the years, Election Petitions have been filed invariably on the grounds which are similar to the ones raised before this Court.

2024 SCC OnLine SC 2548 Page 20 of 32 The only question is whether the Court can dismiss such a petition at the very threshold on an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC or that the petition needs a detailed consideration by the Court. The answer to this will depend upon what kind of statutory compliances have been made in the Election Petition. The case of the present appellant before this Court is that if the provisions as referred above, wherein material details have to be given by the respondent and particularly the details of corrupt practices etc., has to be strictly construed and any deviation by the respondent on this requirement shall make the petition liable to be dismissed at the very threshold.

All the same, this is not what is the requirement of law. Rather the settled position of law here is that an Election Petition should not be rejected at the very threshold where there is a "substantial compliance" of the provisions.

8. Thus, we will have to see whether "substantial compliance" of Section 83(1)(a) and 83(1)(b) has been done by the respondent.

In para 15 of the Election Petition, the respondent has pleaded that construction worth approx. Rs. 2 crores has taken place on agricultural land of the appellant, however, the column for investment in land through construction has been left empty by the appellant. Thereafter, the respondent has also pleaded that the appellant was serving as a Committee Officer in the Assembly Secretariat, Manipur Legislative Assembly till 31.12.2021, yet, she has shown her income for FY 2021- 2022 as Rs. 0/-, which is untrue.

In para 16 of the Election Petition, the respondent has referred to Section 33 of RPA and alleged non-compliance with the requirement of furnishing true and correct information by candidates. Further, in ground A (as reproduced above) it is asserted that since the appellant has concealed her investment of Rs. 2 crores in her land, her nomination papers ought to have been rejected. On a perusal of the petition as a whole, including the averments reproduced above, it is clear that a cause of action has been disclosed by the respondent. Whether the appellant has concealed her investments and her income, and thus her nomination has been improperly accepted, is a triable issue.

9. Secondly, the affidavit, which is required as per the proviso to Section 83(1)(c) of RPA has to be given in Form 25 as per the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961, where Rule 94A reads as under:

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"94A. Form of affidavit to be filed with election petition.-- The affidavit referred to in the proviso to subsection (1) of section 83 shall be sworn before a magistrate of the first class or a notary or a commissioner of oaths and shall be in Form 25."

xx xx xx

10. A question had come up before a three Judge Bench of this Court in G.M. Siddeshwar v. Prasanna Kumar, (2013) 4 SCC 776 as to whether an Election Petition is liable to be dismissed at the very threshold even if the allegations of corrupt practices of a returned candidate have not been given by a petitioner in terms of the proviso in Section 83(1)(c) of RPA. The finding of this Court was that this cannot be done even if an affidavit is not filed in terms of the proviso. What is mandatory, however, is that there should be substantial compliance. In other words, if substantial compliance in terms of furnishing all that is required under the law has been given, the petition cannot be summarily dismissed.

11. In a more recent case also from Manipur (Thangjam Arunkumar v. Yumkham Erabot Singh, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1058), this Court upheld the dismissal of the returning candidate's Order VII Rule 11 application by the Manipur High Court in an Election Petition. The Court after referring to and applying the test laid down in Siddeshwar (supra) held as follows: "14. The position of law that emerges for the above referred cases is clear. The requirement to file an affidavit under the proviso to Section 83(1)(c) is not mandatory. It is sufficient if there is substantial compliance. As the defect is curable, an opportunity may be granted to file the necessary affidavit."

12. In view of the reasons stated above, we see no reason to interfere with the finding of the High Court of Manipur that the Election Petition discloses a cause of action and that there is substantial compliance of the requirements provided under provisions of RPA and thus the petition cannot be dismissed under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.

13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed."

[Emphasis added] It is also apposite to refer to the observations made by the Supreme Court in A. Manju (supra), wherein it was held as follows: -

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"We must begin at the inception by stating that intrinsically, election law is technical in nature. In the present matter, an election conducted under an independent body like the Election Commission is sought to be assailed, where the mandate of the public has gone in a particular way. The allegations must strictly fall within the parameters of the manner in which such a mandate can be overturned. The primary plea taken by the appellant is largely that success in the elections was obtained by concealment of material, which would have been germane in determining the opinion of the electorate. In effect, were such material to be available with the electorate, they would have exercised another option on the basis of it. However, while the requirements to be met in the election petition may be technical in nature, they are not hypertechnical, as observed in Ponnala Lakshmaiah case [Ponnala Lakshmaiah v. Kommuri Pratap Reddy, (2012) 7 SCC 788] . We have considered the aforesaid aspect by quoting the observations made therein which have received the imprimatur of a larger Bench."

[Emphasis added] 17.7. Moreover, it is not necessary always for the candidate to state which of the allegation is based on information received by him if it is his case that the same is based on his knowledge as is in the case at hand. He has specified the allegations by referring to the relevant paragraphs of his pleadings and stated on oath that the same are based on his knowledge which he believes to be true. This, in the considered view of this Court substantially satisfies the requirement of Form-25. Page 23 of 32 It would be profitable to refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Thangjam Arunkumar (supra), wherein it was observed as follows:

16. The position of law that emerges from the above referred cases is clear. The requirement to file an affidavit under the proviso to Section 83(1)(c) is not mandatory. It is sufficient if there is substantial compliance. As the defect is curable, an opportunity may be granted to file the necessary affidavit.

17. In the instant case, the election petition contained an affidavit and also a verification. In this very affidavit, the election petitioner has sworn on oath that the paragraphs where he has raised allegations of corrupt practice are true to the best of his knowledge. Though there is no separate and an independent affidavit with respect to the allegations of corrupt practice, there is substantial compliance of the requirements under Section 83(1)(c) of the Act.

18. We are in agreement with the conclusion of the High Court that there is substantial compliance of the requirements under Section 83(1)(c) of the Act and this finding satisfies the test laid down by this Court in Siddeshwar [G.M. Siddeshwar v. Prasanna Kumar, (2013) 4 SCC 776 : (2013) 2 SCC (Civ) 715] . Even the subsequent decision of this Court in Revanna [A. Manju v.

Prajwal Revanna, (2022) 3 SCC 269 : (2022) 2 SCC (Civ) 95] supports the final conclusion arrived at by the High Court.

[Emphasis Added] Therefore, this cannot be equated with a complete absence of an affidavit, in which case it would amount to a defect of form and not of substance. As such, the defect being one of form and not of substance, the Petitioner can be permitted to file the requisite affidavit at a later stage.

Page 24 of 32 17.8. On the issue of curability, it was argued by both sides that, assuming the Court finds such defect, as to whether it would attract limitation if Form-25 is permitted to be filed at a later stage, and whether the Court possesses the power to allow the same at a later stage. 17.9. On this point, Mr. Samal argues that such an affidavit, if filed subsequently, must be treated as barred by limitation.

17.10. Per contra, Mr. Mohanty argues that the provision under Section 86(1), which empowers the Court to dismiss an Election Petition at the threshold for non- compliance of certain provisions, does not refer to Section

83. Therefore, any violation of Section 83 cannot be a ground to invoke the power under Section 86(1). Mr. Mohanty further argues that even otherwise, Section 86(5) permits amendment of pleadings by way of furnishing further particulars of corrupt practice. Therefore, this being a curable defect, the law of limitation would not apply. 17.11. Admittedly, a period of 45 days is prescribed for filing an Election Petition, to be reckoned from the date of publication of the election result. There is no provision Page 25 of 32 whatsoever to extend the period of limitation under any circumstances. There is no dispute that the Election Petition was filed within the period of limitation. The question now is whether, after the expiry of the period of limitation, the Petitioner can be permitted to file a supplementary affidavit.

17.12. This Court has already held that the defect of non-filing of Form-25 is a curable defect, being a defect of form and not of substance in view of the settled position of law. Had it been a defect of substance, it would have rendered the defect incurable and in such situation, it would not have been permissible to file any supplementary affidavit as it would amount to extending the period of limitation. The defect however, being of form and therefore, curable, the question of limitation would not apply as otherwise, the very doctrine of curability would be redundant. In such event, the affidavit subsequently filed would relate back to the date of presentation of the election petition. The question of extending the period of limitation therefore, does not arise. In the case of Vidyawati Gupta Page 26 of 32 v. Bhakti Hari Nayak, (2006) 2 SCC 777, the Supreme Court observed as follows:

"In this regard we are inclined to agree with the consistent view of the three Chartered High Courts in the different decisions cited by Mr Mitra that the requirements of Order 6 and Order 7 of the Code, being procedural in nature, any omission in respect thereof will not render the plaint invalid and that such defect or omission will not only be curable but will also date back to the presentation of the plaint. We are also of the view that the reference to the provisions of the Code in Rule 1 of Chapter 7 of the Original Side Rules cannot be interpreted to limit the scope of such reference to only the provisions of the Code as were existing on the date of such incorporation. It was clearly the intention of the High Court when it framed the Original Side Rules that the plaint should be in conformity with the provisions of Order 6 and Order 7 of the Code. By necessary implication reference will also have to be made to Section 26 and Order 4 of the Code which, along with Order 6 and Order 7, concerns the institution of suits. We are ad idem with Mr Pradip Ghosh (sic) on this score. The provisions of sub-rule (3) of Rule 1 Order 4 of the Code, upon which the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court had placed strong reliance, will also have to be read and understood in that context. The expression "duly" used in sub-rule (3) of Rule 1 Order 4 of the Code implies that the plaint must be filed in accordance with law. In our view, as has been repeatedly expressed by this Court in various decisions, rules of procedure are made to further the cause of justice and not to prove a hindrance thereto. Both in Khayumsab [(2006) 1 SCC 46 : JT (2005) 10 SC 1] and Kailash [(2005) 4 SCC 480] although dealing with the amended provisions of Order 8 Rule 1 of the Code, this Court gave expression to the salubrious principle that procedural enactments ought not to be construed in a manner which would prevent the Court from meeting the ends of justice in different situations."

[Emphasis added] Thus, this Court holds that the Election Petitioner can be permitted to file supplementary affidavit complying with the requirement of Form-25 after filing of Page 27 of 32 the Election Petition or at least before commencement of trial, so that the other side is not taken by surprise. It is relevant to mention that in the instant case issues have not yet been settled and therefore, the question of the other side being prejudiced does not arise.

18. This Court, on a careful scrutiny of the pleadings in this case is satisfied that the petitioner has indeed pleaded material facts, including the nature and details of the alleged suppression of assets and antecedents, together with reference to records and particulars, which cannot, by any stretch of imagination be treated as bald or vague.

19. As regards the contention that no copy of Form- 26 affidavit was annexed to the Election Petition and that the source of information relating to alleged suppression of facts has not been disclosed, this Court finds said objections untenable. It is well settled that an election petition is not required to annex every document in original or certified form at the stage of pleadings. What is essential is that the material facts are to be pleaded in sufficient detail to disclose a cause of action, and supporting Page 28 of 32 documents, if relied upon, may be produced and proved during trial.

The pleadings in the present petition clearly specify the particulars of the properties allegedly suppressed, including their description, location, and reference to revenue records available in the Bhulekh portal. Likewise, the allegations relating to non-disclosure of criminal antecedents refer to G.R. Case No. 1760 of 2002 arising out of Sector-7, Rourkela P.S. Case No. 130(16). These pleadings, when read as a whole, are sufficient to put the Respondent to notice the precise case he has to meet.

In Sahodrabai Rai v. Ram Singh Aharwar13 the Supreme Court clarified that an election petition cannot be dismissed merely for want of annexures or certified copies, so long as the pleadings disclose a triable issue. Similarly, in F.A. Sapa and others vs. Singora and others14 it was held that omission to annex documents does not vitiate the petition when material facts are otherwise pleaded.

1968 SCC OnLine SC 216 14 (1991)3 SCC 375 Page 29 of 32 Accordingly, this Court is of the view that the absence of Form-26, or non-disclosure of the precise source of information, does not render the petition defective or liable for summary dismissal.

20. As regards the contention that the Election Petition is liable to be dismissed for non-impleadment of the Returning Officer, this Court is of the considered view that such objection is without merit. Section 82 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, exhaustively specifies the parties who are to be joined in an election petition, namely: (i) all contesting candidates, and (ii) any other candidate against whom allegations of corrupt practice are made. The Returning Officer does not fall within either category, nor is he contemplated by the statute as a necessary or proper party.

The Supreme Court in Jyoti Basu v. Debi Ghosal 15 categorically held that the category of parties under Section 82 is exhaustive, and that no person beyond those expressly mentioned therein can be joined as a respondent to an election petition. Following the above 15 (1982) 1 SCC 691 Page 30 of 32 ratio, this Court holds that the Returning Officer is not a necessary party to the present petition, and his non- impleadment cannot be a ground to dismiss the petition.

21. Thus, from a conspectus of the analysis of facts, the settled position of law, and the rival contentions advanced, this Court is of the considered view that no ground is made out by the Respondent to warrant exercise of jurisdiction either under Order VI Rule 16 CPC to strike out the pleadings, or under Order VII Rule 11 CPC to reject the Election Petition at the threshold, or under Section 83 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, to dismiss the same for want of material facts.

22. On the contrary, this Court holds that the Election Petition, as framed and presented, discloses a clear cause of action and raises substantial triable issues touching the purity of the electoral process. It would, therefore, be impermissible in law as well as inequitable in principle to reject the Election Petitioner at the preliminary stage without a full trial.

23. In the result, the I.A. stands dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.

Page 31 of 32

24. The Election Petitioner is directed to file affidavit in Form-25 in support of his allegations relating to corrupt practice within two weeks from today, failing which appropriate orders shall be passed with regard to maintainability of the Election Petition.

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Sashikanta Mishra, Judge Orissa High Court, Cuttack The 6th February, 2026/A.K. Rana/P.A. Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: AJAYA KUMAR RANA Designation: P.A. Reason: Authentication Location: HIGH COURT OF ORISSA, CUTTACK Page 32 of 32 Date: 09-Feb-2026 17:15:48

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Orissa High Court