Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Ashwani Sharma vs Gnctd on 6 November, 2025
Central Administrative Tribunal
Principal Bench,
New Delhi
O.A. No.2942 of 2025
Orders reserved on : 28.10.2025
Orders pronounced on : 06.11.2025
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ranjit More, Chairman
Hon'ble Mr. Rajinder Kashyap, Member (A)
ASHWANI SHARMA, JE (Civil), Group 'B',
Aged About 35 Years,
S/o Sh. Ramavtar Sharma,
R/o B-54/1, North Chhajjupur,
Gali No. 2, Nakul Gali,
Shahdara, Delhi- 110094.
...Applicant
(By Advocate: Shri Arun Bhardwaj, Senior Counsel assisted by
Shri Anmol Pandita)
VERSUS
1. Hon'ble Lt. Governor, Delhi
Through Its Chief Secretary
Govt. Of NCT of Delhi
6, Raj Niwas Marg, Ludlow Castle,
Civil Lines, New Delhi. Delhi- 110054
2. Municipal Corporation of Delhi,
Through its Commissioner,
Civic Centre, JLN Marg, Minto Road,
New Delhi-110002
3. The Add. Commissioner (Estt.),
Municipal Corporation of Delhi,
Civic Centre, JLN Marg, Minto Road,
New Delhi-110002.
...Respondents
(By Advocate: Dr. L.C. Singhi)
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Item No.52/C-1 2 OA No.2942/2025
ORDER
Hon'ble Mr. Rajinder Kashyap, Member (A):
By filing the present under section 19 of the Administrative Terminals Act the applicant is seeking the following relief:-
"(i) To quash and set-aside the impugned Charge Memo date 09.07.2020 (A-3), Inquiry Report as served vide letter dated 23.11.2022 (A-4) and penalty order dated 29.04.2025 (A-1).
(ii) To declare the proceedings as initiated vide RDA No.03/37/2018/erstwhile DMC as well as charge memo dated 09.07.2020 and subsequent proceedings based on said charge memo as illegal and unjustified and direct the respondents to reinstate the applicant back in service forthwith with all consequential benefits including seniority & promotion and pay & allowances.
(iii) To pass such other and further orders which their lordships of this Hon'ble Tribunal deem fit and proper in the existing facts and circumstances of the case.
(iv) To allow the OA with cost."
FACTS OF THE CASE
2. The applicant was appointed as a Junior Engineer (Civil) in the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (in short 'MCD') on 06.02.2018. On 17.04.2018, he was posted in the Building Department, Shahdara (South) Zone (then part of East Delhi Municipal Corporation). The applicant was allotted wards first time on 17.04.2018, i.e., Pandav Nagar and Patparganj. He was assigned duties related to stopping/demolishing the unauthorised construction in his jurisdiction. Thereafter the applicant was transferred from Ward on 27.09.2018, i.e., after almost about 5 and ½ months from that place.
2.1 However, subsequently in 2020, a chargesheet was issued to the applicant vide Memorandum dated 09.06.2020 (Annexure-3) 2025.11.13 RAVI KANOJIA14:36:25+05'30' Item No.52/C-1 3 OA No.2942/2025 alleging dereliction of duty in relation to unauthorised constructions carried out in 2018 at properties bearing numbers 155-A, 155-B and 156-A, Patparganj, Delhi. The following allegations have been alleged in the charge-sheet:-
"STATEMENT OF CHARGES FRAMED AGAINST ASHWANI SHARMA S/0 SHRI RAM AVTAR SHARMA, BLDG, SHAHDARA (S) ZONE, EDMC.
Shri Sharma was working as Junior Engineer in Bldg. Department Shah. (S) zone during the period 2018. He failed to maintain absolute integrity, devotion to duty and committed a gross misconduct for the following lapses:-
1. He failed to stop/demolish the U/c carried out at property bearing no. 155-A, 155-B,156-A Patparganj Village Delhi, at its initial/on-going stage of construction.
2. He also failed to book the unauthorized construction for taking action u/s 343/344ofDMCAct.
3. He also failed to initiate action for sealing the unauthorized construction u/s 345AofDMCAct.
4. He also held responsible for facilitated the owner/builder to complete the unauthorised construction on the said property.
5. He also failed to initiate action for prosecution of owner/builder of the property u/s332/461 ofDMC Act.
He, thereby, contravened Rule 3(1)(i)(ii)(iii) of CCS(conduct) Rules 1964 as madeapplicable to the employees ofMCD/EDMC." 2.1 By the aforesaid Memorandum, the applicant was given an opportunity to furnish his representation with regard to the said charge-sheet. Despite service of charge-sheet, the applicant did not submit any representation, but made a request for providing documents vide letter dated 28.07.2020, which were subsequently provided to him and the applicant was further requested to furnish his reply within 10 days of receipt of the said letter but he again failed to do so. Thereafter the erstwhile Commissioner, East DMC appointed 2025.11.13 RAVI KANOJIA14:36:25+05'30' Item No.52/C-1 4 OA No.2942/2025 Inquiry Officer and Presenting Officer for conducting the inquiry in the matter.
2.2 After completion of the inquiry proceedings, the inquiry officer returned his findings vide his report dated 23.11.2022 (Annexure-4) holding the article of charges nos.1, 3 and 4 as 'proved' and charge No.2 and 5 as 'not proved'. A copy of the said Inquiry Report was provided to the applicant by the Disciplinary Authority vide Memo dated 20.1.2023 to which the applicant has submitted his representation dated 27.02.2023.
2.3 Thereafter, the Disciplinary Authority after perusing the records of the case, findings of the Inquiry Officer's report as well as representation of the applicant proposed to impose the penalty of reduction to two lower stages in the time scale of pay for a period of two years with cumulative effect upon the applicant vide order dated 3.5.2023, which was communicated to the applicant vide order dated 14.6.2023. Thereby the applicant was given an opportunity to make representation against the proposed penalty within 10 days of the receipt the said order. The applicant submitted his representation against the aforesaid proposed penalty on 11.7.2023 along with a request for personal hearing. Accordingly, the applicant was heard in person on 21.12.2023 by the Disciplinary Authority and thereafter, the Disciplinary Authority confirmed the aforesaid proposed penalty and finally imposed the penalty of 'reduction to two lower stages in the 2025.11.13 RAVI KANOJIA14:36:25+05'30' Item No.52/C-1 5 OA No.2942/2025 time scale of pay for a period of two years with cumulative effect' upon the applicant vide order dated 13.02.2024 (Annexure-2). 2.4 Aggrieved by the aforesaid penalty order, the applicant approached the Hon'ble Lt. Governor of Delhi, i.e., the Appellate Authority by filing an appeal dated 15.05.2024 (Annexure-5 at pages 128-166 of the paperbook). After considering the said appeal, allied records of the case and after hearing the applicant in person on 15.10.2024, the Appellate Authority tentatively decided to enhance the said penalty to that of 'dismissal from service, which shall ordinarily be a disqualification for future employment' vide order dated 08.11.2024. Accordingly, the respondents vide Memo dated 12.11.2024 (Annexure-6) communicated the said tentative decision of the Appellate Authority to the applicant to enable him to furnish his representation, if any, against the proposed enhanced penalty within 7 days, failing which, it shall be presumed that he has nothing to say in the matter.
2.5 In response to the said Memo dated 12.11.2024, the applicant submitted his representation dated 22.11.2024 (Annexure-7). Thereafter, the Appellate Authority vide order dated 22.04.2025 confirmed the said penalty of 'dismissal from service which shall ordinarily be a disqualification for future employment', which was communicated to the applicant on 29.04.2025 (Annexure-1) by the Vigilance Department of the respondents.
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Item No.52/C-1 6 OA No.2942/2025
2.6 Feeling aggrieved, the applicant has filed the instant OA seeking
the reliefs as quoted above.
3. Pursuant to notice issued by this Tribunal respondents have filed their short affidavit as well as counter affidavit on behalf of the respondents.
CONTENTIONS OF THE APPLICANT
4. Shri Arun Bhardwaj, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Shri Anmol Pandita, appearing for the applicant, primarily contended that the charge-sheet dated 09.07.2020 (Annexure-3) issued by the respondents is not in consonance with the provisions of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. By drawing attention to the said charge Memorandum, learned Senior Counsel submitted that Annexure-III and Annexure-IV of the said charge-sheet containrf a note stating that "Prosecution reserves its right to add/delete any documents, if required, at any stage during the inquiry proceedings." He argued that such an open-ended clause is clearly violative of provisions of Rules 14(3) and 14(4) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, which mandate that all relevant documents and witness lists must be supplied along with the charge memorandum. Consequently, the charge-sheet itself is vitiated in law, and consequently, all subsequent proceedings and orders based thereon are void ab initio.
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4.1 Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the findings
recorded by the Inquiry Officer are perverse and unsustainable, as the same is not supported by any cogent evidence on record. 4.2 Learned Senior Counsel also pointed out that even the Hon'ble Lt. Governor of Delhi had observed that the applicant's superiors, namely Assistant Engineer Shri P.K. Pandey and Executive Engineer Shri Rajinder Kumar Singh, were also responsible for the lapses in question, however, no action was taken against the Assistant Engineer on the ground that he had retired from service on 31.07.2024. 4.3 Learned Senior Counsel emphasized that initiation of departmental proceedings solely against the applicant, who was merely holding the post of Junior Engineer, while sparing his higher officials in the same administrative hierarchy, is arbitrary, discriminatory, and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. He also argued that such selective targeting amounts to unequal treatment in the matter of disciplinary action, particularly when the higher officials bore greater responsibility in the alleged misconduct. In support of this contention, reliance has been placed on the following decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court:
(i) Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India, reported in (1978) 1 SCC 248;
(ii) E.P. Royappa vs. State of Tamil Nadu, reported in (1974) 4 SCC 3;
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(iii) Union of India vs. M. Bhaskaran, reported in (1995) 4 SCC 100; and
(iv) State of Punjab vs. V.K. Khanna, reported in (2001) 2 SCC 330;
(v) Ajit Kumar Nag vs. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., reported in (2005) 7 SCC 764;
4.4 Learned Senior Counsel further contended that the Charge Memorandum is illegal and unsustainable, as it contravenes the provisions of Section 95(2) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, which provides that "No such officer or other employee shall be punished under sub-section (1) unless he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him." In the present case, however, the applicant was never served with any show- cause notice affording such opportunity. Instead, a direct charge memorandum, duly signed by the Disciplinary Authority, was issued to the applicant. This sequence of action clearly demonstrates that the Disciplinary Authority had already formed a preconceived opinion holding the applicant solely responsible, and the departmental inquiry was initiated merely on the presumption of failure on the part of the Building Department, with responsibility being attributed exclusively to the applicant. Such an approach, according to the learned Senior Counsel, amounts to abuse of process and renders the entire disciplinary proceedings bad in law.
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4.5 Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that out of the five
charges framed against the applicant, the Inquiry Officer (IO) held only three charges, i.e., Charge Nos. 1, 3, and 4 as 'proved' and remaining charges, i.e., Charge Nos. 2 and 4 held as 'not proved'. 4.5.1 Referring to Charge No. 1 vide which it is alleged that the applicant failed to stop or demolish the unauthorized construction at Property Nos. 155-A, 155-B, and 156-A, Patparganj Village, Delhi during its initial or on-going stages, learned Senior Counsel argued that the finding of the Inquiry Officer with respect to this charge is self- contradictory. He pointed out that the Inquiry Officer himself recorded that the applicant had booked the said property and issued a show- cause notice to the owner on 15.05.2018, thereby acknowledging that the applicant had taken timely and appropriate action at the initial stage. However, the Inquiry Officer thereafter concluded that the applicant "failed to initiate demolition action" till 16.07.2018 (the date of first demolition attempt), and on that basis, treated the charge as proved. In this regard, learned Senior Counsel submitted that such reasoning is inconsistent and unsustainable, as once the Inquiry Officer accepted that the applicant had initiated action by booking the property and issuing the show-cause notice, it could not simultaneously be held that he failed to take demolition action. 4.5.2 Learned counsel also contended that the demolition file was duly prepared on 19.06.2018, as evident from pages 206-207 of the paper book of this OA, but the demolition/sealing programme was not 2025.11.13 RAVI KANOJIA14:36:25+05'30' Item No.52/C-1 10 OA No.2942/2025 fixed by the concerned Executive Engineer (EE), who alone was the competent authority to do so. The applicant, being a Junior Engineer, had no role or authority in scheduling the demolition programme. In support, learned Senior Counsel referred to three reminders dated 03.07.2018, 20.07.2018, and 01.08.2018, issued by the Superintending Engineer (SE) to the EE, which are placed at pages 271-273 of the paper book. However, it was only on 16.07.2018 that the concerned EE fixed the demolition programme and handed over the demolition file to the applicant, as evident from pages 244-244A of the OA, reflecting entries in the Demolition/Sealing File Aadaan-Pradaan Register. Learned Senior Counsel also highlighted that the applicant undertook a major demolition operation lasting approximately five hours in heavy rainfall, as recorded in page 208 of the official file noting and corroborated by the IO's report dated 23.11.2022 at page 123 (Q6, Q7, and corresponding answers).
4.5.3 Referring to Charge No.3 vide which it is alleged that the applicant also failed to initiate action for sealing the unauthorised construction u/s 345A of DMC Act, learned Senior Counsel by drawing attention to IO's finding in his report to the said Charge submitted that the said property was booked by the applicant on 15.05.2018 and Show Cause Notice was issued to the owner/builder but the same was sent to him through speed post vide dated 21.06.2018, i.e., almost after one month later which shows that the applicant given enough time to the owner/builder to complete unauthorised construction before sealing 2025.11.13 RAVI KANOJIA14:36:25+05'30' Item No.52/C-1 11 OA No.2942/2025 action. However, the Inquiry Officer and the authorities deliberately overlooked the fact that the sealing file was initiated by the applicant within time on 23.5.2018 and the same was duly sent to the superior officer for further order. Further, the said property was booked by the applicant on 15.05.2018 and show cause notice for the same was issued on the same very day, i.e., 15.05.2018, which was duly signed by the then AE, as is evident from page 198 of the paperbook. However, the Inquiry Officer deliberately misinterpreted date of sealing show cause notice dated 15.05.2018 to prove the charge against the applicant, duly signed by AE, EE, SE and DC.
4.5.4 Referring to Charge No.4 vide that the applicant was also held responsible for facilitated the owner/builder to complete the unauthorised construction on the said property, learned Senior Counsel submitted that the charge No.4 is nothing but the repetition of charge No.3 so the reply of the charge No.4 is same as charge No.3. However, learned senior counsel placed reliance on Office Order dated 27.12.2017 relates to working of the Building Department and submitted that the said Office Order provides the procedures and responsibility of the authorities working in the Building Department. Paras 2 and 3 of the said Office Order provide as under:-
"2. The Junior Engineer will put up FIR (First Information Report) relating to unauthorised construction with photographs to Assistant Engineer. The Assistant Engineer will issue the show cause notice u/s 343, 344 (1) to the Owner/builder/occupier. The Assistant Engineer will also send letter to SHO, Delhi Police u/s 344(2) to get the unauthorized construction stopped. Simultaneously, the Junior Engineer will also put up the file for issuance of show cause notice for sealing the unauthorized construction u/s 345A of DMC Act under the 2025.11.13 RAVI KANOJIA14:36:25+05'30' Item No.52/C-1 12 OA No.2942/2025 signature of Deputy Commissioner. The service of show cause notices will be ensured by Junior Engineer under the provisions of section 144 of DMC Act. The test check of40% cases will be conducted by Assistant Engineer and test check of 20%caseswill be carried out by Executive Engineer on monthly basis and the findings will be recorded in unauthorised construction file and missal band register.
3. In case, no reply is received in response of show cause notice u/s 343, 344 (1)within 3 working days after service of show cause notice or the reply is not found satisfactory, the Assistant Engineer will issue the demolition notice to the owner/ builder/occupier to demolish the unauthorized construction within 6 days accordingly. The Junior Engineer will inspect the site after 6 days and if the unauthorized construction is not found, demolished, the Assistant Engineer will accord demolition orders to demolish the unauthorized construction through departmental resources and will send the file to OI(B). The Executive Engineer will fix up the demolition/sealing programme in consultation with the concerned Assistant Engineer and OI(B) as per priority. The Junior Engineer will take demolition action and record the action taken in UC file. The OI (B) will update the Missal Band Register accordingly. After demolition of the unauthorized construction, the letter to SHO will be sent to keep watch on the property so that the owner/builder/occupier cannot carry out re- construction. In case, any application for regularization of unauthorized construction or deviations against sanctioned building plan is received, the same shall be disposed off by the Junior Engineer with approval of concerned Assistant Engineer and Executive Engineer within 30 days.
4.5.5 By referring to the said paras, learned Senior Counsel submitted that the charges which have been proved by the IO has no basis keeping in view the duties and responsibilities of the applicant as a Junior Engineer as evident from the above.
4.5.6 In support of the above contentions, learned senior counsel placed reliance on the following judgements:
(i) Kuldeep Singh vs. Commissioner of Police, reported in (1999) 2 SCC 10;
(ii) Roop Singh Negi vs. PNB, reported in (2009) 2 SCC 570;
(iii) Union of India vs. H.C. Goel, reported in AIR 1964 SC 364;
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(iv) Sher Bahadur vs. Union of India, reported in (2002) 7 SCC 142; and
(vi) Narinder Mohan Arya vs. United India Insurance Co.
Ltd., reported in (2006) 4 SCC 713.
4.6 Learned senior counsel also argued that above aspects of the matter has not been taken care of by the Disciplinary Authority as well as the Appellate Authority while passing the orders and, therefore, the said orders are non-speaking and passed in a mechanical manner without application of mind to the defence adduced by the applicant and the mitigating factors. To buttress the above contention, reliance has been placed on the following decisions:-
(i) G.V. Mahadevan vs. State of Kerala, reported in (2001) 1 SCC 581;
(ii) Punjab National Bank vs. Kunj Behari Misra, reported in (1998) 7 SCC 84;
(iii) Balbir Chand vs. Food Corporation of India, reported in (1997) 4 SCC 457;
(iv) Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar vs. Union of India, reported in (1999) 7 SCC 409; and
(v) Union of India vs. J. Ahmed, reported in (1979) 2 SCC 286.
4.7 Learned senior counsel also submitted that in view of above submissions, the punishment enhanced by the Appellate Authority is also disproportionate to the gravity of the charges levelled against the applicant. In support of this contention, reliance has been placed on the following decisions:
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(i) Ranjit Thakur vs. Union of India, reported in (1987) 4 SCC 611;
(ii) Kailash Nath Gupta vs. Enquiry Officer, reported in (2003) 9 SCC 480;
(iii) Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. vs. N.B. Narawade, reported in (2005) 3 SCC 134;
(iv) Coimbatore District Central Coop. Bank vs. Employees Assn., reported in (2007) 4 SCC 669; and
(v) Union of India vs. J. Ahmed, reported in (1979) 2 SCC 286.
4.8 Learned Senior counsel for the applicant also placed reliance on the decision of coordinate Bench of this Tribunal in OA No.3212/2015, titled Sunil Chawla vs. DDA and another decided on 15.03.2013 in which this Tribunal adjudicated the similar issue and the same was decided in favour of the said applicant. Further the said decision of this Tribunal was challenged by the DDA before the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi by way of Writ Petition (Civil) No.16472/2023, titled Delhi Development Authority vs. Sunil Chawla, which was upheld by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court vide order/judgment dated 12.09.2025.
4.9 Lastly, learned senior counsel submitted that the charge sheet dated 9.7.2020, Inquiry Officer's report dated 23.11.2022 and order passed by the Appellate Authority dated 29.04.2025 deserve to be quashed by this Tribunal.
2025.11.13 RAVI KANOJIA14:36:25+05'30' Item No.52/C-1 15 OA No.2942/2025 CONTENTIONS OF RESPONDENTS' COUNSEL
5. Learned counsel for the respondents by referring to the counter affidavit submitted that the departmental inquiry against the applicant has been conducted as per rule. The applicant was given proper and full opportunity to defend himself before the Inquiry Officer, the Disciplinary Authority as well as the Appellate Authority and no principle of natural justice has been violated by the respondents. Hence, the OA is not maintainable and liable to be dismissed. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in a catena of the judgments held that the Courts/Tribunals should not go into the correctness of the charges, re- appreciate the evidences, step into the shoes of the Disciplinary Authority and the employee must establish that what prejudice has been caused to him. Further, the Apex Court has held that Disciplinary Authority and on appeal the Appellate Authority are the sole fact finding authorities. The relevant part of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra, reported in (1999) 1 SCC 759, reads as under:-
"16. The High Court appears to have overlooked the settled position that in departmental proceedings, the disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts and in case an appeal is presented to the appellate authority, the appellate authority has also the power/and jurisdiction to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion, on facts, being the sole fact-finding authorities..."
5.1 The learned counsel for the respondents also placed reliance on the following judgments:
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(i) State Bank of Patiala Vs S.K. Sharma, reported 1996 SCC (L&S) 717;
(ii) Govt. of T.N. Vs A. Rajapandian, reported in 1995 SCC (L&S) 292;
(iii) State of Punjab & Ors. Vs. Dr. Harbhajan Singh Greasy, reported in JT- 1996(5) SC-403;
(iv) Union ofIndia Vs Alok Kumar & Ors., reported in 2010 (3) SCSLS.
5.2 Learned counsel submitted that in this case the Disciplinary and Appellate Authorities have appreciated the entire evidence on record and arrived to a just and fair conclusion. As such, the correctness of the charges and facts of the disciplinary proceedings cannot be gone into by this Tribunal in judicial review, taking over the functions of the Disciplinary and Appellate Authorities. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has categorically viewed that the Ld. Tribunal cannot go into correctness of the fact. Paras 6 & 7 of the judgment in the case of Union of India v. Upendra Singh, reported in (1994) 3 SCC 357, read as under:
"6. In the case of charges framed in a disciplinary inquiry the tribunal or court can interfere only if on the charges framed (read with imputation or particulars of the charges, if any) no misconduct or other irregularity alleged can be said to have been made out or the charges framed are contrary to any law. At this stage, the tribunal has no jurisdiction to go into the correctness or truth of the charges. The tribunal cannot take over the functions of the disciplinary authority. The truth or otherwise of the charges is a matter for the disciplinary authority to go into. Indeed, even after the conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings, if the matter comes to court or tribunal, they have no jurisdiction to look into the truth of the charges or into the correctness of the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority as the case may be. The function of the court/tribunal is one of judicial review, the parameters of which are 2025.11.13 RAVI KANOJIA14:36:25+05'30' Item No.52/C-1 17 OA No.2942/2025 repeatedly laid down by this Court. It would be sufficient to quote the decision in H.B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority, Karnal v. Gopi Nath & Sons [1992 Supp (2) SCC 312] . The Bench comprising M.N. Venkatachaliah, J. (as he then was) and A.M. Ahmadi, J., affirmed the principle thus : (SCC p. 317, para 8) "Judicial review, it is trite, is not directed against the decision but is confined to the decision-making process. Judicial review cannot extend to the examination of the correctness or reasonableness of a decision as a matter of fact. The purpose of judicial review is to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the authority after according fair treatment reaches, on a matter which it is authorised by law to decide, a conclusion which is correct in the eyes of the Court. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. It will be erroneous to think that the Court sits in judgment not only on the correctness of the decision making process but also on the correctness of the decision itself."
7. Now, if a court cannot interfere with the truth or correctness of the charges even in a proceeding against the final order, it is ununderstandable how can that be done by the tribunal at the stage of framing of charges? In this case, the Tribunal has held that the charges are not sustainable (the finding that no culpability is alleged and no corrupt motive attributed), not on the basis of the articles of charges and the statement of imputations but mainly on the basis of the material produced by the respondent before it, as we shall presently indicate.
5.3 Learned counsel also emphasised that the inquiry was conducted as per settled principles of law and procedure prescribed under the DMC Services [Control & Appeal] Regulations. It is settled position of law that in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the court does not interfere with the factual findings and restrain itself from re-appreciating evidence while exercising powers of judicial review. As the objective of judicial review is to ascertain that a person received a fair treatment and objective and it is not to re-appreciate the entire pleas and evidences and draw inferences again. Observing this, the Hon'ble Court dismissed the 2025.11.13 RAVI KANOJIA14:36:25+05'30' Item No.52/C-1 18 OA No.2942/2025 WP(C) No.3623/2008 titled D.K. Gupta vs. MCD. In State of UP vs. Man Mohan Nath Sinha, reported in 2009 (8) SCC 310 (Re- appreciate or Re- apprise the evidence led before Inquiry Officer, a court of appeal cannot reach its own conclusion.). Likewise, the Hon'ble Supreme Court further held in the case of State Bank of India Vs Ram Lal Bhaskar & Anr., reported in 2012 (1) SCSLJ 109 that in a proceeding under Article 226 of Constitution, the High Court cannot sit in appeal over decision of the authorities. In the case of Raj Singh Vs K.V.S. & Ors, reported in 2013 (2) AISLJ 246, the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi has held as under:
"It is settled law that in so far as the disciplinary proceedings areconcerned, neither the Tribunal nor this court enters into re-appreciation of evidence. If there is some evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by the Inquiry Officer and the Disciplinary Authority, neither the Tribunal nor this Court would return its finding in place of that of lower authorities. This is clearly not a case of no evidence and, therefore, no interference is called for."
5.4 Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Karnataka and another vs. Umesh, reported in (2022) 6 SCC 563, emphasized about the scope of judicial review by the Courts/Tribunal in the matter of disciplinary departmental inquiry and held that :-
"22. In the exercise of judicial review, the Court does not act as an appellate forum over the findings of the disciplinary authority. The court does not reappreciate the evidence on the basis of which the finding of misconduct has been arrived at in the course of a disciplinary enquiry."
5.5 Learned counsel also submitted that the prosecution examined prosecution witnesses and documentary evidence to prove its case. The defence has cross examined the PWs. All the exhibit documents of the 2025.11.13 RAVI KANOJIA14:36:25+05'30' Item No.52/C-1 19 OA No.2942/2025 prosecution as well as the witnesses corroborated the lapses on the part of the applicant.
5.6 Learned Counsel also submitted that the Hon'ble Lt. Governor of Delhi was also of the view that applicant's superior, i.e., Assistant Engineer, namely, P.K. Pandey and Executive Engineer, namely, Shri Rajinder Kumar Singh, were also responsible, since the said Assistant Engineer stood retired from service, therefore, no action was taken against the said Assistant Engineer. However, major penalty proceedings were initiated against the said Executive Engineer and the same are under process against him.
6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and also carefully perused the pleadings as well as the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the parties.
ANALYSIS
7. Since the matter pertains to disciplinary proceedings, although the learned counsel for the respondents has drewn our attention to the scope and ambit of this Tribunal to interfere in such matters, however, we deem it apt to observe that it is settled principle of law that in departmental proceedings, the Disciplinary Authority is the sole judge of facts. Once findings of fact, based on appreciation of evidence are recorded by the Disciplinary Authority and Appellate Authority, normally the Court/Tribunal may not interfere with those factual findings unless it finds that the recorded findings were based on either no evidence or that the findings were wholly perverse and/or legally 2025.11.13 RAVI KANOJIA14:36:25+05'30' Item No.52/C-1 20 OA No.2942/2025 untenable. The adequacy or inadequacy of the evidence is not permitted to be canvassed before the High Court/Tribunal, since the High Court/Tribunal does not sit as an Appellate Authority, over the factual findings recorded during departmental proceedings, while exercising the power of judicial review. The Tribunal cannot, normally speaking, substitute its own conclusion, with regard to the guilt of the delinquent, for that of the departmental authorities. 7.1 In this regard, it is profitable to mention that by referring to catena of judgments on the point of scope of judicial review by the Courts/Tribunals, the Three Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India [(1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80] wherein it has been held as under:
"13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary enquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the court/tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel [Union of India v. H.C. Goel, (1964) 4 SCR 718 : AIR 1964 SC 364] this Court held at SCR p. 728 (AIR p. 369, para 20) that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued."
(emphasis supplied) 7.2 In another case in the matter of Union of India vs. P. Gunasekaran reported in (2015) 2 SCC 610, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that while re-appreciating evidence, the High Court cannot act as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings. The Court held the parameters as to when the High 2025.11.13 RAVI KANOJIA14:36:25+05'30' Item No.52/C-1 21 OA No.2942/2025 Court shall not interfere in the disciplinary proceedings are as under:-
"13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not:
(i) reappreciate the evidence;
(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law;
(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based.
(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;
(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience."
7.3 In another judgment rendered by the Three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of SBI vs. Ajay Kumar Srivastava, reported in (2021) 2 SCC 612: (2021) 1 SCC (L&S) 457, by referring the law laid down in B.C. Chaturvedi (supra) and catena of other judgments, the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under:-
"22. The power of judicial review in the matters of disciplinary inquiries, exercised by the departmental/appellate authorities discharged by constitutional courts under Article 226 or Article 32 or Article 136 of the Constitution of India is circumscribed by limits of correcting errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice and it is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an appellate authority............"
23. It has been consistently followed in the later decision of this Court in H.P. SEB v. Mahesh Dahiya [H.P. SEB v. Mahesh Dahiya, (2017) 1 SCC 768 : (2017) 1 SCC (L&S) 297] and recently by the three-Judge Bench of this Court in Pravin Kumar v. Union of India [Pravin Kumar v. Union of India, (2020) 9 SCC 471 : (2021) 1 SCC (L&S) 103] .
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24. It is thus settled that the power of judicial review, of the constitutional courts, is an evaluation of the decision-making process and not the merits of the decision itself. It is to ensure fairness in treatment and not to ensure fairness of conclusion. The court/tribunal may interfere in the proceedings held against the delinquent if it is, in any manner, inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached or where the conclusions upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority are perverse or suffer from patent error on the face of record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued. To sum up, the scope of judicial review cannot be extended to the examination of correctness or reasonableness of a decision of authority as a matter of fact.
25. When the disciplinary enquiry is conducted for the alleged misconduct against the public servant, the court is to examine and determine:
(i) whether the enquiry was held by the competent authority;
(ii) whether rules of natural justice are complied with;
(iii) whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence and authority has power and jurisdiction to reach finding of fact or conclusion.
26. It is well settled that where the enquiry officer is not the disciplinary authority, on receiving the report of enquiry, the disciplinary authority may or may not agree with the findings recorded by the former, in case of disagreement, the disciplinary authority has to record the reasons for disagreement and after affording an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent may record his own findings if the evidence available on record be sufficient for such exercise or else to remit the case to the enquiry officer for further enquiry.
27. It is true that strict rules of evidence are not applicable to departmental enquiry proceedings. However, the only requirement of law is that the allegation against the delinquent must be established by such evidence acting upon which a reasonable person acting reasonably and with objectivity may arrive at a finding upholding the gravity of the charge against the delinquent employee. It is true that mere conjecture or surmises cannot sustain the finding of guilt even in the departmental enquiry proceedings.
28. The constitutional court while exercising its jurisdiction of judicial review under Article 226 or Article 136 of the Constitution would not interfere with the findings of fact arrived at in the departmental enquiry proceedings except in a case of mala fides or perversity i.e. where there is no evidence to support a finding or where a finding is such that no man acting reasonably and with objectivity could have arrived at 2025.11.13 RAVI KANOJIA14:36:25+05'30' Item No.52/C-1 23 OA No.2942/2025 those findings and so long as there is some evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by the departmental authority, the same has to be sustained."
(emphasis supplied) 7.4 Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the State of Karnataka & Anr. vs. Umesh (2022) 6 SCC 563: (2022) 2 SCC (L&S) 321, emphasised about the scope of judicial review by the Courts/Tribunal in the matter of disciplinary/departmental inquiry and held that: -
"22. In the exercise of judicial review, the Court does not act as an appellate forum over the findings of the disciplinary authority. The court does not re-appreciate the evidence on the basis of which the finding of misconduct has been arrived at in the course of a disciplinary enquiry. The Court in the exercise of judicial review must restrict its review to determine whether: (i) the rules of natural justice have been complied with; (ii) the finding of misconduct is based on some evidence; (iii) the statutory rules governing the conduct of the disciplinary enquiry have been observed; and (iv) whether the findings of the disciplinary authority suffer from perversity; and (vi) the penalty is disproportionate to the proven misconduct."
8. Having regard to the facts of the case, the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, and keeping in view guiding principles as mentioned above on the limited scope of judicial review available to this Tribunal in matters concerning disciplinary proceedings, we are of the considered view that the following issues arise for adjudication in this case:
(i) Whether the Charge Memorandum dated 09.07.2020 stands vitiated for non-compliance with Rules 14 (3) and 14 (4) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, and for containing an impermissible 2025.11.13 RAVI KANOJIA14:36:25+05'30' Item No.52/C-1 24 OA No.2942/2025 open-ended clause stating that "prosecution reserves its right to add/delete documents at any stage"?
(ii) Whether the disciplinary proceedings violated Section 95 (2) of the DMC Act and the principles of natural justice by not issuing a mandatory show-cause notice prior to initiation of the punishment proceedings?
(iii) Whether the Inquiry Officer's findings are perverse, inconsistent, and unsustainable in law, particularly where the acts imputed to the Junior Engineer were, in fact, within the authority or responsibility of higher officers?
(iv) Whether the departmental authorities misapplied the prescribed scheme of duties contained in Office Order dated 27.12.2017, thereby unfairly attributing to the Junior Engineer responsibilities that statutorily and administratively rested with the AE/EE?
(v) Whether the proceedings reflect selective or discriminatory prosecution by targeting the Junior Engineer while exonerating or not proceeding against senior officers equally or primarily responsible, thus amounting to arbitrariness in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India?
(vi) Whether the orders passed by the Disciplinary and Appellate Authorities are non-speaking or mechanical, reflecting lack of 2025.11.13 RAVI KANOJIA14:36:25+05'30' Item No.52/C-1 25 OA No.2942/2025 application of mind and failure to consider the defence submissions and mitigating circumstances?
(vii) Whether the enhancement of penalty by the Appellate Authority to dismissal from service is grossly disproportionate to the alleged misconduct and, therefore, liable to interference?
9. On issue (i) as mentioned in para 8 above, regarding non- compliance with the provisions of Rules 14(3) and 14(4) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, the same are reproduced above:-
"14. Procedure for imposing major penalties .....
(3) Where it is proposed to hold an inquiry against a Government servant under this rule and rule 15, the disciplinary authority shall draw up or cause to be drawn up-
(i) the substance of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour into definite and distinct articles of charge;
(ii) a statement of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour in support of each article of charge, which shall contain-
(a) a statement of all relevant facts including any admission or confession made by the Government servant;
(b) a list of documents by which, and a list of witnesses by whom, the articles of charge are proposed to be sustained.
(4) (a) The Disciplinary Authority shall deliver or cause to be delivered to the Government servant a copy of the articles of charge, the statement of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour and a list of documents and witnesses by which each article or charges is proposed to be sustained.
(b) On receipt of the articles of charge, the Government servant shall be required to submit his written statement of defence, if he so desires, and also state whether he desires to be heard in person, within a period of fifteen days, which may be further extended for a period not exceeding fifteen days at a time for reasons to be recorded in writing by the Disciplinary Authority or any other Authority authorised by the Disciplinary Authority on his behalf:
2025.11.13 RAVI KANOJIA14:36:25+05'30' Item No.52/C-1 26 OA No.2942/2025 Provided that under no circumstances, the extension of time for filing written statement of defence shall exceed forty-five days from the date of receipt of articles of charge."
9.1 It is well-settled that a charge memorandum must contain all relevant particulars, including the list of relied-upon documents and witnesses, so as to enable the charged officer to effectively defend himself. The inclusion of an open-ended clause--"Prosecution reserves its right to add/delete any documents at any stage"--defeats this purpose. Such a clause renders the charge indefinite and deprives the delinquent of the right to a fair opportunity to meet the case against him. A charge-sheet must present the allegations in a final and stable form; otherwise, the inquiry stands vitiated as inherently unfair. Accordingly, the Charge Memorandum dated 09.07.2020 is invalid, and the inquiry proceedings consequential thereto are unsustainable in law.
10. On issue (ii) as mentioned in para 8 above, Section 95(2) of the DMC Act mandates affording a reasonable opportunity to show cause before imposition of punishment. In the present case, it is an admitted position that no such show-cause notice was issued to the applicant prior to initiation of disciplinary proceedings. The issuance of a charge memorandum directly signed by the Disciplinary Authority, without prior opportunity to the applicant, evidences predetermination of guilt. Such omission constitutes a violation of the statutory safeguard under Section 95(2) of the Act ibid and breaches the fundamental principles of natural justice. Therefore, the disciplinary proceedings and the 2025.11.13 RAVI KANOJIA14:36:25+05'30' Item No.52/C-1 27 OA No.2942/2025 punishment order founded on such defective initiation are liable to be quashed.
11. On issue (iii) as mentioned in para 8 above, concerning perversity and inconsistency in the Inquiry Officer's findings, it is trite that while the Tribunal ordinarily does not re-appreciate evidence, interference is warranted where the findings are perverse or unsupported by material on record. To appreciate this we have carefully perused the IO's report. The Inquiry Officer's report records that the applicant (JE) had booked the property and issued a show- cause notice on 15.05.2018, yet paradoxically concludes that he failed to initiate timely action until 16.07.2018. Such contradictory reasoning is untenable. Further, as per procedure, the demolition programme was to be fixed by the Executive Engineer (EE), not by the JE. The JE's role was confined to preparing the file and executing orders once approved. The evidence also shows that the JE (applicant) participated in extensive demolition work despite adverse conditions. The findings, therefore, lack evidentiary support and are perverse. 11.1 The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police, reported in (1999) 2 SCC 10, observed as under:-
"6. It is no doubt true that the High Court under Article 226 or this Court under Article 32 would not interfere with the findings recorded at the departmental enquiry by the disciplinary authority or the enquiry officer as a matter of course. The Court cannot sit in appeal over those findings and assume the role of the appellate authority. But this does not mean that in no circumstance can the Court interfere. The power of judicial review available to the High Court as also to this Court under the Constitution takes in its stride the 2025.11.13 RAVI KANOJIA14:36:25+05'30' Item No.52/C-1 28 OA No.2942/2025 domestic enquiry as well and it can interfere with the conclusions reached therein if there was no evidence to support the findings or the findings recorded were such as could not have been reached by an ordinary prudent man or the findings were perverse or made at the dictates of the superior authority.
7. In Nand Kishore Prasad v. State of Bihar [(1978) 3 SCC 366 :
1978 SCC (L&S) 458 : AIR 1978 SC 1277 : (1978) 3 SCR 708] it was held that the disciplinary proceedings before a domestic tribunal are of quasi-judicial character and, therefore, it is necessary that the Tribunal should arrive at its conclusions on the basis of some evidence, that is to say, such evidence which and that too, with some degree of definiteness, points to the guilt of the delinquent and does not leave the matter in a suspicious state as mere suspicion cannot take the place of proof even in domestic enquiries. If, therefore, there is no evidence to sustain the charges framed against the delinquent, he cannot be held to be guilty as in that event, the findings recorded by the enquiry officer would be perverse.
8. The findings recorded in a domestic enquiry can be characterised as perverse if it is shown that such findings are not supported by any evidence on record or are not based on the evidence adduced by the parties or no reasonable person could have come to those findings on the basis of that evidence. This principle was laid down by this Court in State of A.P. v. Rama Rao [(1964) 2 LLJ 150 :
AIR 1963 SC 1723 : (1964) 3 SCR 25] in which the question was whether the High Court under Article 226 could interfere with the findings recorded at the departmental enquiry. This decision was followed in Central Bank of India Ltd. v. Prakash Chand Jain [(1969) 2 LLJ 377 : AIR 1969 SC 983] and Bharat Iron Works v. Bhagubhai Balubhai Patel [(1976) 1 SCC 518 : 1976 SCC (L&S) 92 : 1976 Lab IC 4 :
AIR 1976 SC 98 : (1976) 2 SCR 280]. In Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Admn. [(1984) 4 SCC 635 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 131 : AIR 1984 SC 1805 : (1985) 1 SCR 866] it was laid down that where the findings of misconduct are based on no legal evidence and the conclusion is one to which no reasonable man could come, the findings can be rejected as perverse. It was also laid down that where a quasi- judicial tribunal records findings based on no legal evidence and the findings are its mere ipse dixit or based on conjectures and surmises, the enquiry suffers from the additional infirmity of non-application of mind and stands vitiated.
9. Normally the High Court and this Court would not interfere with the findings of fact recorded at the domestic enquiry but if the finding of "guilt" is based on no evidence, it would be a perverse finding and would be amenable to judicial scrutiny.
10. A broad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained between the decisions which are perverse and those which are not. If a decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever compendious it may be, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with."
2025.11.13 RAVI KANOJIA14:36:25+05'30' Item No.52/C-1 29 OA No.2942/2025 11.2 Further in the case of Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank, reported in (2009) 2 SCC 570, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that :
"16. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel [AIR 1964 SC 364 : (1964) 4 SCR 718] it was held: (AIR pp. 369-70, paras 22-23) "22. ... The two infirmities are separate and distinct though, conceivably, in some cases both may be present. There may be cases of no evidence even where the Government is acting bona fide; the said infirmity may also exist where the Government is acting mala fide and in that case, the conclusion of the Government not supported by any evidence may be the result of mala fides but that does not mean that if it is proved that there is no evidence to support the conclusion of the Government, a writ of certiorari will not issue without further proof of mala fides. That is why we are not prepared to accept the learned Attorney General's argument that since no mala fides are alleged against the appellant in the present case, no writ of certiorari can be issued in favour of the respondent.
23. That takes us to the merits of the respondent's contention that the conclusion of the appellant that the third charge framed against the respondent had been proved, is based on no evidence. The learned Attorney General has stressed before us that in dealing with this question, we ought to bear in mind the fact that the appellant is acting with the determination to root out corruption, and so, if it is shown that the view taken by the appellant is a reasonably possible view this Court should not sit in appeal over that decision and seek to decide whether this Court would have taken the same view or not. This contention is no doubt absolutely sound. The only test which we can legitimately apply in dealing with this part of the respondent's case is, is there any evidence on which a finding can be made against the respondent that Charge 3 was proved against him? In exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 on such a plea, the High Court cannot consider the question about the sufficiency or adequacy of evidence in support of a particular conclusion. That is a matter which is within the competence of the authority which deals with the question; but the High Court can and must enquire whether there is any evidence at all in support of the impugned conclusion. In other words, if the whole of the evidence led in the enquiry is accepted as true, does the conclusion follow that the charge in question is proved against the respondent? This approach will avoid weighing the evidence. It will take the evidence as it stands and only examine whether on that evidence legally the impugned conclusion follows or not. Applying this test, we are inclined to hold that the respondent's grievance is well founded, because, in our opinion, the finding which is implicit in the appellant's order dismissing the respondent that Charge 3 is proved against him is based on no evidence."
17. In Moni Shankar v. Union of India [(2008) 3 SCC 484 : (2008) 1 SCC (L&S) 819] this Court held: (SCC p. 492, para 17) 2025.11.13 RAVI KANOJIA14:36:25+05'30' Item No.52/C-1 30 OA No.2942/2025 "17. The departmental proceeding is a quasi-judicial one. Although the provisions of the Evidence Act are not applicable in the said proceeding, principles of natural justice are required to be complied with. The courts exercising power of judicial review are entitled to consider as to whether while inferring commission of misconduct on the part of a delinquent officer relevant piece of evidence has been taken into consideration and irrelevant facts have been excluded therefrom. Inference on facts must be based on evidence which meet the requirements of legal principles. The Tribunal was, thus, entitled to arrive at its own conclusion on the premise that the evidence adduced by the Department, even if it is taken on its face value to be correct in its entirety, meet the requirements of burden of proof, namely, preponderance of probability. If on such evidences, the test of the doctrine of proportionality has not been satisfied, the Tribunal was within its domain to interfere. We must place on record that the doctrine of unreasonableness is giving way to the doctrine of proportionality."
18. In Narinder Mohan Arya v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. [(2006) 4 SCC 713 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 840] whereupon both the learned counsel relied, this Court held: (SCC p. 724, para 26) "26. In our opinion the learned Single Judge and consequently the Division Bench of the High Court did not pose unto themselves the correct question. The matter can be viewed from two angles. Despite limited jurisdiction a civil court, it was entitled to interfere in a case where the report of the enquiry officer is based on no evidence. In a suit filed by a delinquent employee in a civil court as also a writ court, in the event the findings arrived at in the departmental proceedings are questioned before it, it should keep in mind the following: (1) the enquiry officer is not permitted to collect any material from outside sources during the conduct of the enquiry. (See State of Assam v. Mahendra Kumar Das [(1970) 1 SCC 709] .) (2) In a domestic enquiry fairness in the procedure is a part of the principles of natural justice. (See Khem Chand v. Union of India [AIR 1958 SC 300 : 1958 SCR 1080] and State of U.P. v. Om Prakash Gupta [(1969) 3 SCC 775] .) (3) Exercise of discretionary power involves two elements--(i) objective, and (ii) subjective and existence of the exercise of an objective element is a condition precedent for exercise of the subjective element. (See K.L. Tripathi v. SBI [(1984) 1 SCC 43 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 62] .) (4) It is not possible to lay down any rigid rules of the principles of natural justice which depend on the facts and circumstances of each case but the concept of fair play in action is the basis. (See Sawai Singh v. State of Rajasthan [(1986) 3 SCC 454 : 1986 SCC (L&S) 662] .) (5) The enquiry officer is not permitted to travel beyond the charges and any punishment imposed on the basis of a finding which was not the subject-matter of the charges is wholly illegal. (See Export Inspection Council of India v. Kalyan Kumar Mitra [(1987) 2 Cal LJ 344] .) (6) Suspicion or presumption cannot take the place of proof even in a domestic enquiry. The writ court is entitled to interfere with the findings of the fact of any tribunal or authority in certain circumstances. (See Central Bank of India Ltd. v. Prakash Chand Jain [AIR 1969 SC 983 : (1969) 1 SCR 735] and Kuldeep Singh v. Commr. of Police [(1999) 2 SCC 10 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 429] .)"
2025.11.13 RAVI KANOJIA14:36:25+05'30' Item No.52/C-1 31 OA No.2942/2025 11.3 Further the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sher Bahadur v. Union of India reported in (2002) 7 SCC 142, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that perverse or contradictory findings are liable to be set aside, the relevant portion of which reads as under:-
"7. It may be observed that the expression "sufficiency of evidence"
postulates existence of some evidence which links the charged officer with the misconduct alleged against him. Evidence, however voluminous it may be, which is neither relevant in a broad sense nor establishes any nexus between the alleged misconduct and the charged officer, is no evidence in law. The mere fact that the enquiry officer has noted in his report, "in view of oral, documentary and circumstantial evidence as adduced in the enquiry", would not in principle satisfy the rule of sufficiency of evidence...."
11.4 Accordingly, the findings returned by the IO in instant case on Charges 1, 3, and 4 cannot be sustained.
12. On issue (iv), concerning misapplication of the departmental Office Order dated 27.12.2017, it is evident that the said order delineates distinct responsibilities, as JEs are to prepare First Information Reports in relevant register prescribed by the respondents for the purpose/files and serve notices, AEs to issue show-cause notices and communicate with the SHO, and EEs to schedule demolition or sealing programmes. Holding the JE responsible for acts statutorily entrusted to the AE/EE is contrary to law and administrative propriety. Ignoring this functional hierarchy and imputing violation of higher-level duties assigned to senior officials to a subordinate officer (applicant) amount to jurisdictional error and non-application of mind. It is a settled principle that an employee cannot be punished for acts outside the scope of his duties. Hence, the 2025.11.13 RAVI KANOJIA14:36:25+05'30' Item No.52/C-1 32 OA No.2942/2025 charges based on such mis-attribution of responsibility are unsustainable and liable to be quashed.
13. On issue (v) as mentioned in para 8 above, regarding arbitrariness and discrimination, selective initiation of proceedings against a junior officer while ignoring senior officers who shared or bore primary responsibility violates the equality clauses under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The record shows that the Hon'ble Lt. Governor himself noted that the AE and EE were also responsible; yet, no action was taken against the AE although the said AE was retired, and proceedings against the EE remain pending. The respondents are well aware that the disbursement of pension of the official is subject to good conduct and the respondents have allowed such a person to retire and claim wisdom. Such selective targeted treatment constitutes arbitrariness as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, reported in 1974 4 SCC 3; in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (supra) and State Of Madhya Pradesh & Ors vs Nandlal Jaiswal & Ors., reported in 1987 AIR 251. As such Administrative fairness demands uniform accountability, and its absence renders the proceedings vitiated. 13.1 At this stage it is apt to mention that the said issue has been adjudicated by this Tribunal while deciding OA No.3212/2015 vide Order/Judgment dated 15.03.2023, the relevant para of the same reads as under:-
2025.11.13 RAVI KANOJIA14:36:25+05'30' Item No.52/C-1 33 OA No.2942/2025 "15. In the circumstances, we are of the considered view that JE performed the limited role assigned to him adequately. Though the AA and the Revisional Authorities both have mentioned in the impugned order that the demolition process could have been planned and executed after ensuring adequate time available for it and AE was more responsible for such act but JE could have advised accordingly.
16. On perusal of record, no such lapse can be assigned to JE to our mind as he dutifully reported that the property in question is left out due to paucity of time. Therefore, we do not find any dereliction of duty on his part."
13.2 The aforesaid order/judgment of this Tribunal was challenged by the DDA before the Hon'ble Delhi High Court by way of Writ Petition (C) No.16472/2023, titled Delhi Development Authority vs. Sunil Chawla and the Hon'ble Delhi High Court vide Order/Judgment dated 12.09.2025 while upholding the said Order/Judgment of this Tribunal dismissed the said Writ Petition, the relevant portion of which reads as under:-
"23. In so far as Charge 1 is concerned, the allegation was that the respondent failed to take timely action to prevent or demolish unauthorized construction. The Disciplinary Authority relied on inspection reports and the Building Watch Register to infer negligence. However, as the learned Tribunal has rightly noted, these documents, though suggestive of construction activity, do not by themselves establish deliberate dereliction of duty. The respondent had placed on record contemporaneous office notings to demonstrate that action was initiated and further decisions were contingent on the superior officers, particularly the AE.
24. With regard to Charge 2, which is about non-booking of the property, the learned Tribunal found that such act of omission or commission does not pertain to the period 30.06.2003 to 10.09.2003 and the respondent, during the period 15.07.2002 to 07.03.2003, had booked the ground floor of the property in question during his earlier period of deputation; he took charge of the post in the same year on 30.06.2003 and remained there till 10.09.2003. Since the property was already booked and demolition orders were passed, as proved from the record, question of not booking the property again for unauthorized construction for taking demolition action does not arise.
25. The material relied upon by the Disciplinary Authority does not withstand scrutiny. The reliance on inspection reports without correlating them to the respondent's role, the omission to consider contemporaneous office notings, and the fact that the property was already booked, demonstrate that the findings on Charges 1 and 2 2025.11.13 RAVI KANOJIA14:36:25+05'30' Item No.52/C-1 34 OA No.2942/2025 suffer from the vice of being based on no evidence. The learned Tribunal was therefore correct in setting aside the punishment."
14. On issue (vi) as mentioned in para 8 above, regarding non- speaking or mechanical orders, it is well-established that disciplinary and appellate authorities must pass reasoned and speaking orders demonstrating application of mind, as they have wide power to appreciate/re-appreciate evidence in a fair and just manner. The authorities in this case failed to consider crucial defence submissions, namely: (i) issuance of show-cause notice on 15.05.2018; (ii) preparation of demolition file and pendency due to EE's inaction; (iii) JE's actual participation in demolition; and (iv) reminders by SE to EE. Orders that merely adopt the Inquiry Officer's conclusions without addressing these defences lack reasoning and are invalid.
15. On issue (vii), concerning proportionality of punishment, it is settled law that the penalty must correspond to the gravity of proven misconduct. The Appellate Authority's enhancement of penalty to dismissal is disproportionate, especially when the Inquiry Officer himself found only some charges proved and others unsubstantiated. The alleged lapses, even if assumed, are administrative in nature and do not justify the extreme penalty of dismissal. The mitigating circumstances such as timely booking of the property, issuance of show-cause notice, preparation of file, and active participation in demolition were ignored. Accordingly, the penalty imposed is shockingly disproportionate and liable to be set aside.
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16. In the result, for the foregoing reasons and findings on all issues, the Original Application deserves to be allowed. Accordingly, the OA is allowed with the following directions:
(i) The orders of the Disciplinary Authority dated 13.02.2024 and the Appellate Authority dated 22.04.2025 are quashed and set aside;
(ii) The applicant shall be reinstated forthwith in service with continuity of service, seniority, and all consequential benefits, including pay and allowances, within eight weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order.
17. There shall be no order as to costs.
18. Pending MA(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
19. The original record was called for and has been examined by this Tribunal. The concerned officer of the Registry is directed to return the record to the authorized officer of the respondents' department forthwith, after obtaining proper receipt.
(RajinderKashyap) (Justice Ranjit More)
Member (A) Chairman
/ravi/
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