Delhi District Court
Sh. Sardar Satwant Singh vs Sh. Lekh Raj Sehgal on 19 November, 2013
IN THE COURT OF SHRI VINOD GOEL, DISTRICT & SESSIONS
JUDGE: SHAHDARA: KARKARDOOMA COURTS: DELHI
RCA No. 13A/13
Unique Identification No. 02402C0076962013
1. Sh. Sardar Satwant Singh
S/o Late Sh. Seva Singh
Shop at H-13, Bhagat Singh Road,
Chander Nagar,
Delhi-110051
2. Sh. Vikram Singh
S/o Sh. Satwant Singh
R/o H. No. 70, Gali no.3,
Shashtri Park, Chander Nagar,
Delhi- 110051.
3. Smt. Manjeet Kaur
W/o Sh. Vikram Singh
R/o H. No. 70, Gali no.3,
Shashtri Park, Chander Nagar,
Delhi- 110051.
....Appellants
Versus
Sh. Lekh Raj Sehgal
S/o Late Sh. Ram Lal Sehgal,
R/o H-13 Bhagat Singh Road,
Chander Nagar,
Delhi-110051
(GPA holder on behalf of respondent no. 2 & 3.)
....Respondent
Date of Institution : 13.03.2013
Arguments heard on : 12.11.2013
Date of Judgment : 19.11.2013
Sardar Satwant Singh vs. Lekhraj Sehgal
RCA No. 13A/13
Dated 19.11.2013 Page 1 of 37
Appeal under Section 38 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 r/w
section 17 of the Delhi Rent Control Rules, 1959 against the
judgment dated 5.11.2012 passed by the court of Sh. Rakesh
Kumar, Ld. ARC (East) Delhi.
JUDGEMENT :
1. Feeling aggrieved by the impugned order dated 5.11.2012 passed by the Court of Sh. Rakesh Kumar-II, Additional Rent Controller, East, KKD Courts, Delhi the appellate jurisdiction of this court has been invoked by the appellants under Section 38 of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred as "DRC Act"). Shorn of unnecessary details, the facts for disposal of this appeal are that the respondent (hereinafter referred as "landlord") filed a petition u/s 14 (1) (b) of "DRC Act" for passing of order of eviction against appellant no.1 (hereinafter referred to as "tenant") for sub-letting both shops in question, measuring 15" X 7.6" each in property/premises bearing no. H-13, Bhagat Singh Road, Chander Nagar, Delhi-110051 shown in red colour in the site plan Annexure A1 (Ex.PW1/5) to appellant no.2 and 3 (hereinafter referred to as "sub-lettee"). It is inter alia alleged in the eviction petition by the "landlord" that the "tenant" has assigned and transferred his rights of tenancy and interest with possession in the said shops to "sub-lettee" who are his son and daughter-in-law vide a family settlement and compromise without his written consent and approval or that of his brothers and now the said shops are under the control of the "sub-lettee" who are running their business. It is also alleged that "sub-lettee"/appellant no.2 has installed some machines Sardar Satwant Singh vs. Lekhraj Sehgal RCA No. 13A/13 Dated 19.11.2013 Page 2 of 37 and PCO in his own name and "sub-lettee" have been carrying their business in the said shops. The "tenant" and "sub-lettee" alongwith other family members were parties to the several litigations and on 26.5.2006 they have settled their dispute by way of a family settlement in the Mediation Centre by which the "tenant" has transferred his rights and interests in the said shops to the "sub-lettee". It is also alleged that the "tenant" has been residing separately from the "sub- lettee" for a very long period.
2. In his written statement, the "tenant" has denied that he has transferred or assigned his tenancy rights in the shops in question to the "sub-lettee". He also pleaded that the alleged family settlement was never acted upon and he continues to be in possession of the shops in question and the "sub-lettee" are not in possession of the said shops or part thereof and they have no interest of any kind in the shops in question. The alleged PCO is on MCD land and not on the tenanted premises. It is also pleaded by the "tenant" that he has been residing at H. No. L-97, Gali no.21, New Mahavir Nagar, Delhi-110018 and the "sub-lettee" were not residing with him and they are on enemical terms with him and the "sub-lettee"/appellant no.3 has initiated criminal proceedings against him, his wife and other family members and in order to save themselves of such proceedings, he under pressure, threat and coercion entered into the alleged family settlement but the fact remains that such family settlement was never acted upon and he has never assigned any interest in the tenanted Sardar Satwant Singh vs. Lekhraj Sehgal RCA No. 13A/13 Dated 19.11.2013 Page 3 of 37 shops to the "sub-lettee". However, he admitted that the petitioners are the "landlords" qua him.
3. In their separate reply to the eviction petition, the "sub-lettee"
pleaded that the "tenant"/appellant no.1 is the proprietor of the M/s Satguru Press and they were using the premises in question with the permission of the proprietor of M/s Satguru Press. It is further pleaded that they are allowed to run business of M/s Satguru Press under the permission of appellant no.1 who has neither sub-let nor assigned, transferred or parted with the possession and the respondent no.1 is still a tenant in premises being proprietor of M/s Satguru Presss. It is pleaded that as per family settlement, they are only allowed to run the business of M/s Satguru Press.
4. The "landlord" filed replication to the respective written statements and reply of the "tenant" and "sub-lettee" denying their allegations and re-affirming the averments made in the eviction petition.
5. In support of his case, "landlord" examined himself as PW-1. He has also examined PW-2 Sh. Vijender Kumar, Accounts Assistant of BSES who has proved the consumer details, tenant details and consumption bills in respect of shops in question in the name of appellant no.2/"sub-lettee" Vikram Singh. This witness was further examined as PW-5 when he brought the record regarding change of electricity connection from the name of "tenant"/appellant no.1 Satwant Singh in the name of Vikram Singh ("sub-lettee"/appellant Sardar Satwant Singh vs. Lekhraj Sehgal RCA No. 13A/13 Dated 19.11.2013 Page 4 of 37 no.2) in respect of shops in question. The "landlord" also examined PW-3 Ved Prakash, Assistant Manager from Reliance Communications who brought and proved the CDR issued in the name of appellant no.2/"sub-lettee" Vikram Singh showing installation of PCO in the shops in question. PW-7 proved the site plan Ex.PW1/5. The "tenant"/"sub-lettees" stopped appearing during the stage of petitioner's evidence and they did not adduce any evidence.
6. Vide impugned judgment dated 5.11.2012, the Ld. ARC held that the "landlord" has proved the ingredients of Section 14 (1) (b) of the "DRC Act" and allowed the petition for recovery of possession u/s 14 (1) (b) of the "DRC Act" and passed the eviction order against the "tenant" and "sub-lettees"/appellants in respect of the shops in question as shown in red colour in the site plan.
7. Now the appellants who are "tenants" and "sub-lettee" have jointly challenged the impugned order by filing the present appeal u/s 38 of the "DRC Act" on 13.3.2013 on the ground that their counsel Sh. R.K.Sharma, Advocate, has died on 9.7.2011 and after his death nobody could appear in the matter and the possession of the shops in question was taken on 2.2.2013 when it was transpired that even the son of the deceased counsel, who is also an Advocate, did not appear in the matter and the family settlement was entered into not for the purpose of sub-letting the shops in question but to settle various disputes pending among the appellants and even this family settlement relating to shop in question was never acted upon as one GPA was yet to be executed by appellant no.1 in favour of appellant no.2 and 3. Sardar Satwant Singh vs. Lekhraj Sehgal RCA No. 13A/13 Dated 19.11.2013 Page 5 of 37
8. Alongwith the grounds of appeal, the appellants have filed an application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act r/w section 151 CPC for condonation of delay in filing appeal. Reply to this application for condonation of delay has been filed by the "landlord" contesting the said application and seeking its dismissal and that of the appeal.
9. I have heard Ld. Counsels for the parties and very carefully perused the material available on the record.
Condonation of delay
10. Before disposing of appeal u/s 38 of the "DRC Act", I propose to adjudicate upon the application of the appellants for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. It is alleged that the rent petition u/s 14 (1)
(b) of "DRC Act" was decided by the Ld. ARC by impugned judgment dated 5.11.2012 and the respondent/DH ("landlord") has taken the possession of the said shops on 2.2.2013 through Ballief. It was ascertained that son of Sh. R.K. Sharma, Advocate, who was the counsel for the appellants, did not appear and the appellants had applied for obtaining the certified copy of the impugned order. It is further alleged that after the death of Sh. R.K. Sharma, appellant could not appear and even their counsel, who is the son of their deceased counsel, also did not appear. This application is vehemently opposed by the Ld. Counsel for the "landlord"/respondent and he argued that no justifiable reason has been pleaded in the application and it requires dismissal and consequently the appeal is not maintainable.
Sardar Satwant Singh vs. Lekhraj Sehgal RCA No. 13A/13 Dated 19.11.2013 Page 6 of 37
11. Under sub-section (2) of section 38 of "DRC Act", an appeal under sub-section (1) shall be preferred within 30 days from the date of the order made by the Controller provided that the Tribunal may entertain the appeal after expiry of that period of 30 days if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by 'sufficient cause' from filing the appeal in time.
12. It is well settled principle of law that while dealing an application for condonation of delay in filing appeal, the court shall adopt liberal approach and the expression "sufficient cause" is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the live purpose for existence of the institution of the courts and in this regard the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji AIR 1987 SUPREME COURT 1353 can be referred to and para 3 of the judgment reads as under :
"The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 "Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period." of the Indian Limitation Act Sardar Satwant Singh vs. Lekhraj Sehgal RCA No. 13A/13 Dated 19.11.2013 Page 7 of 37 of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the life- purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters, instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that :-
1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.
2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated.
As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.
3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made.
Why not every hour's delay every second's delay ? The doctrine must be Sardar Satwant Singh vs. Lekhraj Sehgal RCA No. 13A/13 Dated 19.11.2013 Page 8 of 37 applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.
4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.
5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.
6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so."
13. In this regard another judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana vs. Chandra Mani AIR 1996 1623 is also relevant for reference and para no. 6 and 7 of the judgment read as under :
"6. In O. P. Kathpalia v. Lakhmir Singh (dead), (1984) 4 SCC 66 : (AIR 1984 SC 1744), a Bench of three Judges had held that if the refusal to condone the delay results in grave miscarriage of justice, it would be a ground to condone the delay.
Delay was accordingly condoned. In Collector, Sardar Satwant Singh vs. Lekhraj Sehgal RCA No. 13A/13 Dated 19.11.2013 Page 9 of 37 Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107 : (AIR 1987 SC 1353), a Bench of two Judges considered the question of the limitation in an appeal filed by the State and held that Section 5 was enacted in order to enable the Court to do substantial justice to the parties by disposing of matters on merits. The expression "sufficient cause" is adequately elastic to enable the Court to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of the justice - that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. This Court reiterated that the expression "every day's delay must be explained' does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made.
The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. There is no presumption that Sardar Satwant Singh vs. Lekhraj Sehgal RCA No. 13A/13 Dated 19.11.2013 Page 10 of 37 delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. Judiciary is not respected on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the State which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before the law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step-motherly treatment when the State is the applicant. The delay was accordingly condoned.
7. Experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note- making, file-pushing, and passing-on-the-buck Sardar Satwant Singh vs. Lekhraj Sehgal RCA No. 13A/13 Dated 19.11.2013 Page 11 of 37 ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. The State which represent collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The Courts, therefore, have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression of sufficient cause. Merit is preferred to scuttle a decision on merits in turning down the case on technicalities of delay in presenting the appeal. Delay was accordingly condoned, the order was set aside and the matter was remitted to the High Court for disposal on merits after affording opportunity of hearing to the parties. In Smt. Prabha v. Ram Parkash Kalra, (1987) Supp SCC 338 : (AIR 1987 SC 1726), this Court had held that the Court should not adopt an injustice-oriented approach in rejecting the application for condonation of delay. The appeal was allowed, the delay was condoned and the matter was remitted for expeditious disposal in accordance with law."
14. In the facts and circumstances of the case, to do substantial justice between the parties, as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sardar Satwant Singh vs. Lekhraj Sehgal RCA No. 13A/13 Dated 19.11.2013 Page 12 of 37 Mst. Katiji (supra) and Chandra Mani (supra), the delay in filing the appeal is hereby condoned.
Arguments on merit
15. It is argued by the Ld. Counsel for the appellants Sh. R.S. Juneja, Advocate that originally late Sh. Ram Lal Sehgal, who was the owner of the shops in question has rented out the said shops to the appellant no.1/"tenant" and after his death, shops in question have been inherited by Sh. Lekh Raj Sehgal (respondent) and his two brothers Sh. Sunder Sehgal and Sh. Sudhir Sehgal and the eviction petition has been filed by Sh. Lekh Raj Sehgal for himself and on behalf of Sh. Sunder Sehgal and Sh. Sudhir Sehgal as their general power of attorney which is not registered one and the said general power of attorney of Sh. Sunder Sehgal and Sh. Sudhir Sehgal dated 4.12.2002 Ex.PW1/2 has not been proved and the respondent alone could not have filed the petition for ejectment of the appellant no. 1/"tenant" in respect of the shops in question without impleading the co-owners. He also argued that the said family settlement among the appellants i.e. appellant no.1/"tenant" with his family members including appellant no.2 and 3 Ex.PW4/A (colly) dated 26.5.2006 was not acted upon relating to the shops in question as the appellant no.1 has not executed GPA in favour of the appellant no.2 and 3 as mentioned in the family settlement itself. He further argued that the legal possession of the shop in question has been retained by the appellant no.1 and the possession of the shops in question is given by appellant no.1 to appellant no.2 and 3 being his son and daughter-in- Sardar Satwant Singh vs. Lekhraj Sehgal RCA No. 13A/13 Dated 19.11.2013 Page 13 of 37 law out of natural love and affection and this does not amount to sub- letting and for this purpose he has relied upon two judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Smt. Krishnawati vs. Hans Raj 1974 RCR 163 and Jagan Nath (Deceased) through LRs vs. Chander Bhan 1988 RCR (1) 629. He has also relied upon the judgment of our Hon'ble High Court in Shyam Sunder Dania & Another vs. J.D. Kapoor and another 2007 (1) RCR 328 and a judgment of Hon'ble Calcutta High Court in Sumitra Singh vs. Nahar Singh 1984 (1) RCR 633. He further argued that PW-2 was examined on 4.7.2011 and on that day counsel for appellant Sh. R.K. Sharma could not appear being seriously ill and on his behalf Sh. Amit Kumar Sharma has appeared who requested for a date for cross-examination which was not granted. He further submitted that subsequently his counsel Sh. R.K. Sharma has died on 9.7.2011 and thereafter the appellant was under the impression that the son of their previous counsel Sh. R.K. Sharma, who is an Advocate, would be appearing in the matter and the possession of the shops in question was taken on 2.2.2013 when it was transpired that even the son of their deceased advocate also did not appear and PW-2 to PW-7 could not be cross- examined as their counsel did not appear and for doing substantial justice between the parties, the case should be remanded back to the Ld. ARC with direction to allow them to cross-examine PW-2 to PW-7 to enable it to arrive at a just conclusion.
16. Per contra it is argued by Sh. S.K. Sharma, Advocate, Ld. Counsel for the "landlord" that the General Power of Attorney of Sh. Sardar Satwant Singh vs. Lekhraj Sehgal RCA No. 13A/13 Dated 19.11.2013 Page 14 of 37 Sunder Sehgal and Sh. Sudhir Sehgal dated 4.12.2002 Ex.PW1/2 is duly notarized and even otherwise a co-owner can individually file a petition for eviction. He also argued that the arguments of Ld. Counsel for the appellant are contradictory as on one hand he has argued that family settlement Ex.PW1/4 dated 26.5.2006 was not acted upon by the parties to the settlement and on the other hand he has argued that appellant no.1 has handed over the possession of the shops in question to respondent no.2 and 3, who are his son and daughter-in-law, out of natural love and affection. He further argued that civil suit no. 804/06 and 807/06 were disposed of by the Civil Judge, KKD Courts on 26.5.2006 pursuant to the mediation settlement dated 26.5.2006 by which various disputes among the family members of the appellants were settled and that family settlement has already been acted upon between the parties to the said settlement and the actual possession of the said shops was handed over by the "tenant"/appellant no.1 to appellant no.2 and 3/"sub-lettee" which has been proved by the "landlord" by examining himself and PW-2/PW-5 Sh. Vijender Kumar from BSES and PW-3 Ved Prakash, Assistant Manager from Reliance Communications. He argued that PW-2/PW-5 proved that electricity connection which was in the name of "tenant"/Satwant Singh/appellant no.1 has been transferred in the name of "sub-lettee/appellant no.2/Vikram Singh. He submitted that PW-3 has proved installation and running of PCO in the shops in question by "sub-lettee"/appellant no.2. He has also relied upon various judgments which have been cited by the Ld. Trial Court in the impugned judgment dated 5.11.2012.
Sardar Satwant Singh vs. Lekhraj Sehgal RCA No. 13A/13 Dated 19.11.2013 Page 15 of 37 Locus standi of the co-owner
17. The "landlord" Sh. Lekhraj Sehgal has filed the petition for eviction against the "tenant" and "sub-lettee" u/s 14 (1) (b) of "DRC Act" on his behalf as well as on behalf of his brothers Sh. Sunder Sehgal and Sh. Sudhir Sehgal on the basis of General Power of Attorney Ex.PW1/2. The "landlord", while appearing as PW-1, deposed in his affidavit tendered in evidence Ex.PW1/A that he is one of the parties in the eviction petition and he has also been authorized by his brothers Sh. Sunder Sehgal and Sh. Sudhir Sehgal by General Power of Attorney in his favour which is Ex.PW1/2. A perusal of the General Power of Attorney Ex.PW1/2 dated 4.12.2002 executed by Sh.Sunder Sehgal and Sh. Sudhir Sehgal in favour of the petitioner Lekhraj Sehgal ("landlord") in respect of the shops in question shows that it was executed on 4.12.2002 before a Notary Public and section 85 of The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 provides that the court shall presume that every document purporting to be a power of attorney, and to have been executed before and, authenticated by, a Notary Public, or any court, Judge, Magistrate, Indian Counsul or Vice Counsul or representative of the Central Government was so executed and authenticated. When the said General Power of Attorney executed by Sh. Sunder Sehgal and Sh. Sudhir Sehgal dated 4.12.2002 Ex.PW1/2 is duly notarized, there is no reason why this document i.e. GPA Ex.PW1/2 executed by Sh. Sunder Sehgal and Sh. Sudhir Sehgal in favour of Lekhraj Sehgal, ("landlord") cannot be read in evidence.
Sardar Satwant Singh vs. Lekhraj Sehgal RCA No. 13A/13 Dated 19.11.2013 Page 16 of 37
18. Moreover it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s. India Umbrella Manufacturing Co. and others vs. Bhagabandei Agarwalla (Dead) by Lrs. Smt. Savitri Agarwalla 2004 (1) RCR (Rent) 154 that one of the co-owners can file a suit for eviction of a tenant in the property owned by the co-owners and the para 6 of the judgment reads as under :
".....It is well settled that one of the co- owners can file a suit for eviction of a tenant in the property generally owned by the co-owners. (See : Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath and others, 1976 R.C.R. (Rent) 832 : 1976(4) SCC 184; Dhannalal v.
Kalawatibai and others, 2002(6) SCC 16 :
2002(2) RCR (Rent) 126 (SC). This principle is based on the doctrine of agency. One co-owner filing a suit for eviction against the tenant does so on his own behalf in his own right and as an agent of the other co-owners. The consent of other co- owners is assumed as taken unless it is shown that the other co-owners were not agreeable to eject the tenant and the suit was filed in spite of their disagreement......"
19. Similar view has been taken by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sri Ram Pasricha vs. Jagannath and others AIR 1976 SC 2335 while dealing with an appeal under West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, by holding that co-owner "landlord" can file a petition for eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement of the members of Sardar Satwant Singh vs. Lekhraj Sehgal RCA No. 13A/13 Dated 19.11.2013 Page 17 of 37 the family. In another judgment under "DRC Act" titled as Smt. Kanta Goel vs. B.P. Pathak AIR 1977 SC 1599 it was held that co- heirs constituted the body of landlord and, by consent, implicit or otherwise, of the plurality of landlords, one of them representing them all, was collecting rent. In short he functioned, for all practical purposes as the landlord, and was therefore entitled to institute proceedings for eviction against the tenant qua landlord. After reiterating its judgment in Sri Ram Pasricha's case (supra), similar view has been recently taken by our Hon'ble High Court in Mohd. Aslam & ors. vs. Mohd. Ajmal & Ors. 2009 RCR 581 and Sheikh Mohd. Zakir and others vs. Shahnaz Parveen and Others 2012 (2) RCR (Rent) 235.
20. Therefore, in view of the settled proposition of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, and by our own Hon'ble High Court there is no force in the arguments of Ld. Counsel for the appellants that the Sh. Lekhraj Sehgal could not have filed the petition for eviction of the appellants in respect of the shops in question of his own.
Relevant provisions of law on sub-letting
21. Before appreciating the rival contentions of the parties, it is necessary to refer to necessary provisions of law in "DRC Act"
regarding sub-letting which reads as under:
"14. Protection of tenant against eviction : (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained Sardar Satwant Singh vs. Lekhraj Sehgal RCA No. 13A/13 Dated 19.11.2013 Page 18 of 37 in any other law or contract, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any court or Controller in favour of the landlord against a tenant :
Provided that the Controller may, on an application made to him in the prescribed manner, make an order for the recovery of possession of the premises on one or more of the following grounds only, namely :-
(a) .............
(b) that the tenant has, on or after the 9th day of June, 1952, sublet, assigned or otherwise parted with the possession of the whole or any part of the premises without obtaining the consent in writing of the landlord."
22. While interpreting this provision of law, Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vaishakhi Ram & Others vs. Sanjeev Kumar Bhatiani 2008 (1) RCR (Rent) 311 held that before an order of eviction got passed on the ground of sub-letting, the "landlord" has to prove that the tenant has sub-let or assigned or parted with possession of the whole or any part of the premises and such sub-letting or assigning or parting with possession has been done without obtaining the consent in writing of the "landlord" and para no.6 of the judgment reads as under :
"6. A plain reading of this provision would show that if a tenant has sublet or assigned or otherwise parted with the possession of the whole or any part of the premises without obtaining the consent in Sardar Satwant Singh vs. Lekhraj Sehgal RCA No. 13A/13 Dated 19.11.2013 Page 19 of 37 writing of the landlord, he would be liable to be evicted from the said premises. That is to say, the following ingredients must be satisfied before an order of eviction can be passed on the ground of subletting :-
(1) The tenant has sublet or assigned or parted with the possession of the whole or any part of the premises; (2) Such subletting or assigning or parting with the possession has been done without obtaining the consent in writing of the landlord."
Request for remand of case
23. A perusal of the record of Ld. ARC reveal that prior to 9.3.2011 Sh. L.C. Singhla, Advocate was appearing for the "tenant" and "sub- lettee" and on 9.3.2011 Sh. L.C. Singhla, Advocate was discharged from the case on his request by the Ld. ARC on the ground that the "tenant" and "sub-lettee" have engaged another counsel and on that day itself Sh. Priyanshu, Advocate appeared for all the appellants i.e. the "tenant" and "sub-lettee" and he filed Vakalatnama which is in favour of Sh. R.K. Sharma, Sh. Priyanshu and Sh. N.A. Deswal, Advocates. On 5.4.2011 Sh. R.K. Sharma appeared for the "tenant" and "sub-lettee" and cross-examined PW-1 Sh. Lekhraj Sehgal. On the next date i.e. on 4.7.2011 Sh. Amit Kumar Sharma, Advocate Sardar Satwant Singh vs. Lekhraj Sehgal RCA No. 13A/13 Dated 19.11.2013 Page 20 of 37 appeared as proxy counsel for the appellants and despite opportunity he did not cross-examine PW-2. Order sheet dated 4.7.2011 and statement of PW-2 reflect that no request was tendered to the Ld. ARC for adjournment. Thereafter three more witnesses (PW-3, PW-4 and PW-5) were examined on 9.9.2011 when none appeared for appellants and on the next date i.e. 29.10.2011 "landlord" has filed an application u/o XVI rule 1 and 2 CPC on which notice was ordered to be issued to "tenant" and "sub-lettee" and pursuant to the notice of application, on 15.11.2011 a joint Vakalatnama was filed for all the appellants/ "tenants"/"sub-lettee" in favour of Sh. Priyanshu Sharma and two other advocates and on that day after hearing the arguments, application u/o XVI rule 1 and 2 CPC was allowed subject to payment of Rs.300/- as cost which was accepted and the matter was adjourned for further evidence of the "landlord". On 6.3.2012 PW-6 Sh. Hira Ballabh was examined but none has appeared on behalf of appellants/ "tenant"/"sub-lettee". Similarly on 25.5.2012 two more witnesses were examined and Ld. Counsel closed evidence of "landlord". The appellants have wrongly and falsely mentioned in para no.4 of their Grounds of Appeal that after death of Sh. R.K. Sharma i.e. on 9.7.2011, no counsel appeared for them and in fact record reveals itself that on 15.11.2011 Vakalatnama was filed on behalf of the appellants in favour of Sh. Priyanshu Sharma and two other advocates and even the cost imposed while disposing of the application of the "landlord" u/o XVI rule 1 and 2 was accepted by them. The appellants have failed to show any reason what to talk of justifiable reason as to why they have not appeared after 15.11.2011. Moreover Sardar Satwant Singh vs. Lekhraj Sehgal RCA No. 13A/13 Dated 19.11.2013 Page 21 of 37 the relevant witnesses PW-2/PW-5 Sh. Vijender Kumar of BSES and PW-3 Sh. Ved Prakash of Reliance Communications have filed the relevant record from their office, authenticity of which has not been disputed by the Ld. Counsel either in the grounds of appeal or during the course of his arguments. As such, there is no justification for remanding the case back to the Ld. ARC.
Family Settlement of appellants
24. Admittedly, the relevant clause in the family settlement dated 26.5.2006 Ex.PW4/A regarding shops in question reads as under :
"Whereas it is agreed between the parties that the firm namely Satguru Press situated at H-13, Shaheed Bhagat Singh Road, Chander Nagar, Delhi -110051 shall be run by party no.III and IV and the party no. III and IV having every right, interest and entitlement to enjoy and earn profit from the earning of the firm. The party no.III and IV undertake that they shall pay rent, electricity charges or any other incidental charges for using the said tenanted premises. The party no.I and II shall not be liable for anything. The party no.I and II shall have no objection in future in this regard whatsoever. For this purpose the first party shall execute a GPA in favour of the party no.III and IV after the withdrawal of the all cases, applications, Sardar Satwant Singh vs. Lekhraj Sehgal RCA No. 13A/13 Dated 19.11.2013 Page 22 of 37 filed before the court of law and any other authority and after the quashing/withdrawal of the aforesaid FIR and complaint filed by party no.III to VI against the party no.I, II and their relatives."
In the said family settlement, party no. I is appellant no.1, party no. II is his wife, party no. III is appellant no.2 and party no. IV is appellant no.3.
25. It is argued by the Ld. Counsel for the appellants that the family settlement dated 26.5.2006 Ex.PW4/A relating to the shops in question was not acted upon in as much as appellant no.1 has not executed GPA in favour of appellant no.2 and 3 as required by the relevant clause of the family settlement and mentioned in para no.8 of the Grounds of Appeal. Family settlement dated 26.5.2006 Ex.PW4/A shows that the appellants no.1 to 3, wife of appellant no.1 and other son of appellant no.1 Sh. Narender Pal Singh and his wife were party to it and there were other civil and criminal litigations going on and there are several terms and conditions of settlement. It is not the case of the appellants that other terms and conditions of the said family settlement dated 26.5.2006 Ex.PW4/A have not been acted upon or followed by the parties. As per the said family settlement dated 26.5.2006, the appellant no.2 and 3/"sub-lettees" were residing at house no.F-12/32, Krishna Nagar, Delhi and as per the terms and conditions of the family settlement it is also provided that wife of appellant no.1 shall relinquish her all rights in favour of her son i.e. appellant no.2 Sh. Vikram Singh in respect of property no. 70, Gali Sardar Satwant Singh vs. Lekhraj Sehgal RCA No. 13A/13 Dated 19.11.2013 Page 23 of 37 no.3, Shashtri Park, Chander Nagar, Delhi by executing a proper deed but after withdrawal of all cases, applications, quashing of FIR and in the Grounds of Appeal, the appellant no.2 and 3 mentioned their new address as H. No. 70, Gali no.3, Shashatri Park, Chander Nagar, Delhi-51 which shows that the terms and conditions of the said family settlement have been acted upon by the parties to the family settlement dated 26.5.2006 Ex.PW4/A. Moreover, u/s 106 of The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 when any fact is specially within the knowledge of any person, the burden to prove that fact is upon him. The "landlord" has discharged his burden by examining himself as PW-1 stating all the facts pleaded in the petition and by examining other witnesses i.e. PW-2/PW-5 Sh. Vijender Kumar from BSES who has proved change of name with regard to the electricity connection installed in the shops in question from the name of appellant no.1 in the name of appellant no.2, and PW-3 Ved Prakash has proved installation of a PCO in the shops in question in the name of appellant no.2. It was for the appellants to prove their defence within their knowledge u/s 106 of Indian Evidence Act by reliable evidence and to rebut evidence adduced by the "landlord" which the appellants have failed to discharge. Therefore, the appellants have failed to prove their defence that the said family settlement was not acted upon by the parties to the family settlement. The "landlord" has proved that pursuant to said family settlement, the appellant no. 1/"tenant" has given physical possession of the shops in question to appellant no.2 and 3.
Sardar Satwant Singh vs. Lekhraj Sehgal RCA No. 13A/13 Dated 19.11.2013 Page 24 of 37 Handing over possession of demised shops to son or family member if amounts to sub-letting
26. It is argued by the Ld. Counsel for the appellant that even otherwise the possession of the said shops was given by the appellant no.1/"tenant" to his son appellant no.2 Vikram Singh and appellant no. 3 daughter-in-law out of natural love and affection, and action of appellant no.1 in his old age and out of love and affection cannot be said to be sub-letting in the eyes of law and has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Krishnawati (supra) and Jagan Nath (supra) and of Hon'ble Calcutta High Court in Sumitra Singh (supra).
27. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kailash Chander vs. Om Prakash and another 2003 (12) SCC 728 that merely because the respondent no.1 (tenant) is father of respondent no.2 (sub-lettee) there cannot be any justification to say that it was not a case of sub-letting. Facts of this case are detailed in para no.4 of the judgment which reads as under :
"4. The facts found are: Respondent 2 is the son of Respondent 1. In the premises in question there has been a partition by wooden frame/plank. Respondent 2 has been using the rear portion to carry on his activities as UTI agent and Respondent 1 was carrying on cloth business in the front portion of the premises. Respondent 2 Sardar Satwant Singh vs. Lekhraj Sehgal RCA No. 13A/13 Dated 19.11.2013 Page 25 of 37 has nothing to do with the cloth business in any capacity whatsoever. The respondents did not explain the nature of the possession of Respondent 2 in the premises in their written statement but denied his possession. During the trial, the possession of Respondent 2 was sought to be justified stating that Respondent 1 did not part with the possession of any portion of the premises so as to place Respondent 2 in exclusive possession and that Respondent 2 was in permissive possession of the premises in question having close relation with Respondent 1. The Rent Controller, as already noticed above, on appreciation of the evidence held that Respondent 1 had sub-let the portion of the premises to Respondent 2."
28. Likewise, in the present case, in his written statement the "tenant"/appellant no.1 has denied possession of "sub-lettee"/appellant no.2 and 3 on the shops in question and pleaded that the family settlement was not acted upon whereas "sub-lettee"/appellant no.2 and 3 in their reply to eviction petition admitted their possession with permission of "tenant" who is proprietor of M/s Satguru Press to run its business.
Sardar Satwant Singh vs. Lekhraj Sehgal RCA No. 13A/13 Dated 19.11.2013 Page 26 of 37
29. It is settled law that in case a son or family member does not reside with the landlord and possession of the tenanted premises is handed over to such son or family member, it will amount to sub- letting. Now, I intend to refer and discuss all these relevant judgments.
30. In one such case under Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 titled as Kailasbhai Shukaram Tiwari vs. Jostna Laxmidas Pujara and another 2006 (1) SCC 524 plea of the tenant/respondent no.1 was that she was residing in the premises since 1975 and respondent no.2, who happens to be the son of the brother of the father of her husband, came to reside with them in the same premises since he was a member of their family. The tenant/respondent no.1 alongwith her husband acquired another residential premises at Borivili and the premises in question has been in occupation of respondent no.2. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that it is futile to attempt to lay down a straitjacket formula as to who can be considered to be the member of the family of the tenant, particularly in the absence of definition of 'family' in the Act. Having regard to relevant considerations, the question must be decided on the facts and circumstances of each case. The Hon'ble Supreme Court after going through the facts and evidence on record found that respondent no.2 joined respondent no.1 in the year 1980 and he was having his own separate business and there was nothing to show that they ever resided together at any point of time or their fathers ever lived together and it was held that respondent no.2 cannot be a Sardar Satwant Singh vs. Lekhraj Sehgal RCA No. 13A/13 Dated 19.11.2013 Page 27 of 37 member of the family of respondent no.1 and the courts below were justified in holding on the basis of evidence on record that the premises in question was let out to respondent no.1 which was occupied by her and her husband and she acquired another premises in Borivili where she shifted in the year 1981 and before that in the year 1980 respondent no.2 had come to reside with them and he continued to occupy the demised premises even after respondent o.1 and her husband shifted to another accommodation at Borivili and respondent no.1 cannot be said to be a member of the family of respondent no.1. The relevant para 14 of the judgment reads as under:
"The question as to whether a person is a member of the family of the tenant must be decided on the facts and circumstances of the case and apart from the parents, spouse, brothers, sisters, sons and daughters, if any other relative claims to be a member of the tenant's family, some more evidence is necessary to prove that they have always resided together as members of one family over a period of time and the mere fact that a relative has chosen to reside with the tenant for the sake of convenience, will not make him a member of the family of the tenant in the context of rent control legislation."
Sardar Satwant Singh vs. Lekhraj Sehgal RCA No. 13A/13 Dated 19.11.2013 Page 28 of 37
31. Similarly in a case under East Punjab Urban Rent Control Act, 1949, titled as Joginder Singh Sodhi vs. Amar Kaur 2004 (2) RCR (Rent) 493 the appellant no.2 was found to be in exclusive possession of the property and he was staying separately and not with his father and he was doing independent business of photography and not with his father/tenant and the tenant/father explained that lease was obtained by him for his son respondent no.2 and the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that in deciding whether the tenant had created sub-tenancy, the relationship between the tenant and sub-tenant is not material and there is no privity of contract between the landlady and appellant no.2 and he was therefore a stranger for the landlady who has let out the property to appellant no.1 and the appellant no.1 was bound to occupy the property as per the rent note executed by him wherein he has given undertaking that he would not part with the possession or allow any other person to occupy the property and inspite of rent note, the tenant had inducted appellant no.2 as his tenant or had parted with possession in favour of the appellant no.2 who was residing separately and yet found to be in exclusive possession of the demise shop and as such the sub-tenancy was established.
32. In another case under "DRC Act" in Vaishakhi Ram (Supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has relied upon its previous judgment in Kailasbhai Shukaram Tiwari (supra) which was under Bombay Rent, Hotels and Lodge Houses Rates Control Act, 1947 and relevant Sardar Satwant Singh vs. Lekhraj Sehgal RCA No. 13A/13 Dated 19.11.2013 Page 29 of 37 extract from para 7 and 8 of the judgment in Vaishakhi Ram (supra) reads as under :
"7. According to Mr. Aggarwal, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, since the appellant Nos. 2 to 4 are the family members of the appellant No. 1, it cannot be said that the appellant Nos. 2 to 4 were inducted as sub- tenants under the appellant No. 1. In Kailasbhai Shukaram Tiwari v. Jostna Laxmidas Pujara & Anr., 2006(1) RCR(Rent) 27 : [(2006)1 SCC 524], while dealing with a case of subletting under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (57 of 1947), this Court observed that the question as to whether a person is a member of the family of the tenant must be decided on the facts and circumstances of the case. It observed in paragraph 14 as follows :
"Apart from the parents, spouse, brothers, sisters, sons and daughters, if any other relative claims to be a member of the tenant's family, some more evidence is necessary to prove that they have always resided together as members of one family over a Sardar Satwant Singh vs. Lekhraj Sehgal RCA No. 13A/13 Dated 19.11.2013 Page 30 of 37 period of time. The mere fact that a relative has chosen to reside with the tenant for the sake of convenience, will not make him a member of the family of the tenant in the context of rent control legislation."
8. Admittedly, in this case, the appellant Nos. 2 to 4 are neither the spouse, brothers, sisters, sons or daughters of the appellant No. 1. Although they are related to the appellant No.1, there is nothing on record to show that the appellant Nos. 2 to 4 were residing with the appellant No. 1 for a considerable period of time as members of the family of the appellant No. 1. Therefore, only because they were related to the appellant No. 1, in the absence of the appellant Nos. 2 to 4 being residing with the appellant No. 1, it cannot be said in the context of rent control legislation that they were residing as family members of the appellant No. 1 and therefore, the question of subletting would not arise at all."
33. Therefore it was held in Vaishakhi Ram's case (supra) that the appellant no.2 and 4 are neither the spouse, brothers, sisters, sons or daughters of appellant no.1 and although they were related to Sardar Satwant Singh vs. Lekhraj Sehgal RCA No. 13A/13 Dated 19.11.2013 Page 31 of 37 appellant no.1, there is nothing on record to show that appellant no.2 to 4 were residing with appellant no.1 for a considerable period of time as members of the family of the appellant no.1 and therefore only because they were related to appellant no.1, in absence of appellant no.2 and 4 being residing with appellant, it could not be said in the context of rent control legilation that they were residing as family members of appellant no.1 and therefore, question of sub-letting would not arise at all.
34. In the present case, appellants no.2 and 3 have admitted their possession on the shops in question in their joint reply to eviction petition and the "landlord" has proved the possession of the appellant no.2 and 3 on the demised shops by his own deposition and from statement of PW-2/PW-5 of BSES and PW-3 of Reliance Communications and it was for appellant no.2 and 3 to rebut the evidence adduced by the "landlord" as to in what capacity appellant no.2 and 3 have occupied the demised shops. It is the actual physical and exclusive possession of the person, instead of the tenant, which ultimately reveals to the "landlord" that the tenant to whom the property was let out has put some other person into possession of that property. It would be difficult for the "landlord" to prove by direct evidence that the person to whom the property has been sub-let has paid monetory considerations to the tenant. This was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that in M/s Bharat Sales Vs. Life Insurance of India, 1998 RCR (Rent) 272 and para no.4 of the judgment is as under :
Sardar Satwant Singh vs. Lekhraj Sehgal RCA No. 13A/13 Dated 19.11.2013 Page 32 of 37 "Sub-tenancy or subletting comes into existence when the tenant gives up possession of the tenanted accommodation, wholly or in part, and puts another person in exclusive possession thereof. This arrangement comes about obviously under a mutual agreement or understanding between the tenant and the person to whom the possession is so delivered. In this process, the landlord is kept out of the scene. Rather, the scene is enacted behind the back of the landlord, concealing the overt acts and transferring possession clandestinely to a person who is an utter stranger to the landlord, in the sense that the landlord had not let out the premises to that person nor had he allowed or consented to his entering into possession over the demised property.
It is the actual, physical and exclusive possession of that person, instead of the tenant, which ultimately reveals to the landlord that the tenant to whom the property was let out has put some other person into possession of that property. In such a situation, it would be difficult for the landlord to prove, by direct evidence, the contract or agreement or understanding between the tenant and the sub- tenant. It would also be difficult for the landlord Sardar Satwant Singh vs. Lekhraj Sehgal RCA No. 13A/13 Dated 19.11.2013 Page 33 of 37 to prove, by direct evidence, that the person to whom the property had been sublet had paid monetary consideration to the tenant. Payment of rent, undoubtedly, is an essential element of lease or sub-lease. It may be paid in cash or in kind or may have been paid or promised to be said. It may have been paid in lump-sum in advance covering the period for which the premises is let out or sublet or it may have been paid or promised to be paid periodically. Since payment of rent or monetary consideration may have been made secretly, the law does not require such payment to be proved by affirmative evidence and the court is permitted to draw its own inference upon the facts of the case proved at the trial, including the delivery of exclusive possession to infer that the premises were sublet."
35. Similar view has been taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vinaykishore Puramchand Mundhade vs. Bhumi Kalpataru 2010 (2) RLR 337 (para 15).
36. In its judgment in M/s Bharat Sales (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has also distinguished its previous judgment in Jagan Nath's Case (supra) and Smt. Krishnawati (supra) relied upon by appellants and the relevant paragraph no.7 of the judgment reads as under :
Sardar Satwant Singh vs. Lekhraj Sehgal RCA No. 13A/13 Dated 19.11.2013 Page 34 of 37 "The case of Jagan Nath v. Chander Bhan & Ors., 1988(1) RCR 629 is also distinguishable on facts as in that case it was found that the father was carrying on business with his sons and the family was joint Hindu family and, therefore, it was difficult to presume that the father had parted with possession to attract the mischief of Section 14(1)
(b) of the Act. Reliance for this purpose was placed on an earlier decision of this Court in Smt. Krishnavati v. Hans Raj, 1974 RCR 163, in which two persons lived in a house as husband and wife and one of them who was the tenant of the premises allowed the other to carry on business in a part of it. The contention that it amounted to subletting was rejected and it was observed that it would be a rash inference to draw that the husband had sublet the house to the wife."
37. In the present case, the appellant no.1 ("tenant") has pleaded in sub-para (vi) of the para no.18 of written statement (parawise) that he has been residing at H. No. L-97, Gali no.21, New Mahavir Nagar, New Delhi-110018 and the appellant no.2 and 3 ("sub-lettee) have not been residing with him and they were on enemical terms with him and appellant no.3 had initiated criminal proceedings against him, his wife and other family members and in order to save himself of such proceedings, appellant no.1 under pressure, threat and coercion Sardar Satwant Singh vs. Lekhraj Sehgal RCA No. 13A/13 Dated 19.11.2013 Page 35 of 37 entered into a family settlement dated 26.5.2006. He pleaded that the family settlement was not acted upon and he has been in possession of the shops in question and he denied having given the possession thereof to appellant no.2 and 3/"sub-lettee". On the other hand, the appellant no.2 and 3/"sub-lettee" pleaded in their reply to eviction petition that they are in permissive possession on the shops in question to run M/s Satguru Press of which appellant no.1 is proprietor. Present appeal has been filed jointly by "tenant" and "sub-lettee" and it is pleaded in the Grounds of Appeal that the said family settlement relating to the shops in question has not been acted upon as GPA was not executed by appellant no.1. As discussed in para 25 of this judgment, the "landlord" has proved by his deposition and statement of PW-2/PW-5 and PW-3 that the "sub-lettee"/appellant no.2 and 3 have been in possession of the shops in question and this fact has also been admitted by appellant no.2 and 3/"sub-lettee" in their joint reply to eviction petition. There has been litigation between "tenant" and "sub-lettee" and other son and daughter-in-law of appellant no.1 and "tenant" and "sub-lettee" have always been residing separately and there has never been any love and affection between the "tenant" and "sub-lettee". The matter was settled on 26.5.2006 before the Ld. Mediator and pursuant to the mediation settlement, suit was dismissed by the Ld. Civil Judge on 26.5.2006 and this mediation settlement was made a part of the decree. In reply to the ejectment petition filed by appellant no.2 and 3 as supported by their separate affidavits in which they have shown their residence as F-12/32, Krishna Nagar, Delhi. It is obvious that the appellant no.1 was separately residing from Sardar Satwant Singh vs. Lekhraj Sehgal RCA No. 13A/13 Dated 19.11.2013 Page 36 of 37 appellant no.2 and 3 at the time of filing of present petition. In the family settlement Ex.PW4/A dated 26.5.2006 the address of appellant no.1 is shown as L-97, Gali no.21, New Mahavir Nagar, New Delhi and that of appellant no.2 and 3 is shown as F-12/32, Krishna Nagar, Delhi. In his written statement to eviction petition, the "tenant" has also mentioned his address as L-97, Gali no.21, New Mahavir Nagar, New Delhi. In the Grounds of Appeal the appellant no.2 and 3 have mentioned their new residential address as H. No. 70, Gali no.3, Shashtri Park, Chander Nagar, Delhi-51. Since the appellant no.1 was residing separately from appellant no.2 and 3 who are his son and daughter-in-law and due to litigations between them, there was no love and affection and it has to be held that the Ld. ARC has rightly came to the conclusion that the "tenant"/appellant no.1 has sub-let the demised shops to the "sub-lettee"/appellant no.2 and 3 without obtaining the written consent of the "landlord" and Ld. ARC has rightly passed the eviction order dated 5.11.2012 against the appellants and in favour of the "landlord"/respondent in respect of the shops in question. Appeal is devoid of any merit and same is hereby dismissed with no order as to cost. Trial court record be sent back alongwith an attested copy of instant order. Appeal file be consigned to record room.
Announced in open court (Vinod Goel) on 19th November, 2013. District & Sessions Judge Shahdara/KKD Courts, Delhi.
Sardar Satwant Singh vs. Lekhraj Sehgal RCA No. 13A/13 Dated 19.11.2013 Page 37 of 37