Delhi District Court
Divyam Juneja vs State on 14 May, 2026
IN THE COURT OF MS. SHEETAL CHAUDHARY PRADHAN
ADDL. SESSIONS JUDGE-02 : SOUTH EAST DISTRICT
SAKET COURT : NEW DELHI
Criminal Revision No.177/2026
FIR No.622/2025
PS Sarita Vihar
U/Sec. 281/106 BNS
Divyam Juneja Vs. State
In the matter of :-
Divyam Juneja
S/o Sh. Anup Juneja
R/o H.No.E-43, 2nd Floor,
Panchsheel Park, New Delhi
.... Revisionist
Versus
The State (NCT of Delhi)
Through the SHO
PS Sarita Vihar, New Delhi
......Respondent
Date of Institution : 09.04.2026
Date of Arguments : 28.04.2026
Date of Order : 14.05.2026
Decision : Revision petitions stands
dismissed. Order of Ld. Trial
Court stands upheld.
CR No.177/2026
PS Sarita Vihar
Divyam Juneja Vs. State Page No.1 of 46
ORDER
1. Revisionist namely Divyam Juneja has filed present revision petition thereby challenging impugned order dated 17.12.2025 passed by Ld. Trial Court in Criminal Case No.13774/2025 FIR No.622/2025 PS Sarita Vihar, vide which, Ld. Trial Court had taken cognizance of offences U/s 281/106(1) BNS against the revisionist who is the accused before the Ld. Trial Court.
2. In my subsequent paragraphs, parties will be referred with the same nomenclature with which they were referred before Ld. Trial Court, in order to avoid confusion.
3. It is stated by the revisionist that the present revision petition arising out of FIR No.622/2025 date 20.08.2025 registered at PS Sarita Vihar U/s 281/106 (1) BNS, which was caused to be lodged by complainant for the offence alleged to have been committed. After completion of investigation, chargesheet under Section 281/106 (1) BNS. The chargesheet was filed before the Ld. Trial Court on 17.12.2025 and vide impugned order dated 17.12.2025, the Ld. Trial Court took cognizance of offence against accused/revisionist herein.
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF REVISIONIST AND GROUNDS OF REVISION PETITION
4. It has been argued by Ld. Counsel for revisionist that the revisionist seeks setting aside of the Impugned order dated 17.12.2025, whereby CR No.177/2026 PS Sarita Vihar Divyam Juneja Vs. State Page No.2 of 46 cognizance of the offences alleged, was mechanically taken and the revisionist was erroneously summoned U/s 281/106 (1) BNS on the following grounds.
A. That the impugned order dated 17.12.2025 is cryptic, non-speaking, and has been passed in a mechanical manner without the application of judicial mind. The Ld. Trial Court did not record any reasons, however brief, for being satisfied that a prima facie case is made out against the Revisionist, thereby rendering the order illegal and unsustainable. B. That the Ld. Trial Court did not consider that there is no iota of evidence on record to even prima facie suggest that the Revisionist was driving the vehicle bearing registration no. UP 16DU 2519 in a rash and negligent manner. The prosecution has not placed any material to show any specific act of rashness or negligence attributable to the Revisionist. C. That the Ld. Trial Court completely ignored the glaring and overwhelming evidence of gross negligence on the part of the driver of the truck bearing registration no. NL 01 AJ 9169, who had illegally and dangerously parked the heavy vehicle on the right side of a high-speed road in the dead of night, creating a death trap for other commuters. D. That the evidence on record, particularly the statement of the owner of the truck, Mr. Gagandeep Singh, demolishes the purosecution's case by confirming that the truck was parked on the road in a non-working condition without any mandatory safety precautions such as blinkers, reflectors, or warning triangles, making it a hazardous and invisible obstruction.
E. That the Ld. Trial Court did not consider that the accident was a CR No.177/2026 PS Sarita Vihar Divyam Juneja Vs. State Page No.3 of 46 direct and foreseeable consequence of the illegal and hazardous parking of the truck. The material on record indicates that the Revisionist applied brakes before the impact, which negates any inference of recklessness and demonstrates an attempt to avert the collision caused by the sudden and un-indicated obstruction. F. That the Ld. Trial Court erred in taking cognizance based on a chargesheet that selectively ignores exculpatory evidence, such as the mechanical inspection report of the truck which notes damage to its rear, thereby corroborating the Revisionist's version of events that his vehicle collided with a stationary object. G. That the process of taking cognizance is not a mere formality and requires the Magistrate to meticulously scrutinize the final report and the accompanying documents to satisfy themselves that a prima facie case is made out. The impugned order reflects a complete abdication of this crucial judicial function and reduces the process to a mere rubber- stamping exercise.
H. That the allowing the prosecution to proceed against the Revisionist based on such a flawed investigation and an unsubstantiated chargesheet would amount to a gross abuse of the process of law and would subject the Revisionist to the rigors of a frivolous and vexatious trial, causing irreparable harm and prejudice. I. That the the impugned order is contrary to the facts, law, and principles of natural justice and is liable to be set aside by Hon'ble Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. J. That the initiation of criminal proceedings against the Revisionist is a CR No.177/2026 PS Sarita Vihar Divyam Juneja Vs. State Page No.4 of 46 gross abuse of the process of the court, and the impugned order, if not set aside, would lead to unnecessary harassment and prejudice to the Revisionist.
K. That the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in the matter titled "Om Prakash Vs State of NCT of Delhi" Crl. Rev. P. No. 250/2025 held and observed as under:
24. Albeit, the accused Sumit was employed at the premises and he was drunk as per allegations, however, there is no material to evidence that the Revisionist was aware of the same. Lack of care alone is insufficient to render the Revisionist culpable for the offence under Section 304A of the IPC as mens rea is a crucial element to invite such culpability, and even otherwise, the incident appears to have been motivated by the sudden animosity of the co-accused towards the victim rather than caused by any negligence on part of the Revisionist.
26 Considering the totality of circumstances, in the opinion of this Court, grave suspicion is not raised against the Revisionist and in dearth of any cogent material, the Revisionist cannot be made to suffer trial in the present case.
27. In view of the above, the impugned orders are set aside and the Revisionist is discharged of the charges framed against him in the case arising out of FIR No. 197/2018, registered at Police Station Govind Puri L. That the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in the matter titled "Manish Kumar Vs State of NCT of Delhi" Crl. Rev. P. No. 873/2022 held and observed as under:
22. As borne out from the above, to constitute an offence under Section(s) 279/304A of the IPC, the act on the part of the person who causes the death of any CR No.177/2026 PS Sarita Vihar Divyam Juneja Vs. State Page No.5 of 46 person/ or endanger human life so as to cause, or likely to cause hurt or injury has to be a "rash" and "negligent". To sustain any punishment/ conviction of any such person thereunder, it is pre-requisite that it has to be"rash" and "negligent".
25. Another vital factor for consideration is whether the Revisionist was indeed driving in a "rash and negligent" manner and which has all throughout been overlooked is that though it is the case of the prosecution/ State that the accident was caused by the Revisionist since he was driving the Car at a "high speed", it is nowhere mentioned proved as to what was the cause / reason thereof. Furthermore, most relevantly there is no whisper from any of the witnesses and/ or by the prosecution/ State about what was is meant by "high speed" and/ or what was is the "high speed", the Revisionist was actually driving at.
Therefore, no such presumption, per-se, can be drawn qua the Revisionist driving at a "high speed" merely on the basis of the testimonies of PW1 to PW4
26. In any event, merely because the Revisionist was driving at a "high speed" it cannot lead to the conclusion that there was any element of his being "rash and negligent". The Revisionist driving at a "high speed" does not cannot in itself always mean and/ or establish that he was acting in "rash and negligent" manner. Thus, even assuming that the Revisionist was driving at a "high speed", the same is not sufficient to conclude that the Revisionist was, it fact, driving the Car in a "rash and negligent" manner.
40. Since the issues/ acts involved do not fall within the precincts of Section(s) 279/304A of the IPC, the Revisionist cannot be held guilty of a "rash and negligent" act."
M. That the Ld. Trial Court did not consider the settled legal principle, as enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sushma v. Nitin CR No.177/2026 PS Sarita Vihar Divyam Juneja Vs. State Page No.6 of 46 Ganapati Rangole & Ors., that the primary and sole responsibility for an accident caused by an illegally and dangerously abandoned vehicle on a highway, without any warning signs, lies with the person in control of such vehicle. The summoning of the Revisionist, who was the victim of such circumstances, is contrary to this established law.
"33. These legal provisions leave no room for doubt that the person in control of the offending truck acted in sheer violation of law while abandoning the vehicle in the middle of the road and that too without taking precautionary measures like switching on the parking lights, reflectors or any other appropriate steps to warn the other vehicles travelling on the highway. Had the accident taken place during the daytime or if the place of accident was well illuminated, then perhaps, the car driver could have been held equally responsible for the accident by applying the rule of last opportunity. But the fact remains that there was no illumination at the accident site either natural or artificial. Since the offending truck was left abandoned in the middle of the road in clear violation of the applicable rules and regulations, the burden to prove that the placement of the said vehicle as such was beyond human control and that appropriate precautionary measures taken while leaving the vehicle in that position were essentially on the person in control of the offending truck. However no evidence was led by the person having control over the said truck in this regard. Thus, the entire responsibility for the negligence leading to the accident was of the truck owner-driven
34. In view of the above discussion, the view expressed by the High Court that if the driver of the car had been vigilant and would have driven the vehicle carefully by following the traffic rules, the accident may have been avoided is presumptions on CR No.177/2026 PS Sarita Vihar Divyam Juneja Vs. State Page No.7 of 46 the face of the record as the same is based purely on conjectures and surmises. Nothing on record indicates that the car was being driven at an excessively high speed or that the driver failed to follow the traffic rules. The High Court recorded an incongruous finding that if the offending truck had not been parked on the highway, the accident would not have happened even if the car was being driven at a very high speed. Therefore, the reasoning of the High Court on the issue of contributory negligence is riddled with inherent contradictions and is paradoxical.
36. In the case of Pramodkumar Rasikbhai Jhaveri v Kurmasey Kunvægi Tako, this Court while referring to a decision of the High Court of Australia in Astley v Austrust Ltd.7, went on to hold that .......where, by his negligence, if one party places another in a situation of danger which compels that other to act quickly in order to extricate himself, it does not amount to contributory negligence, if that other acts in a way which, with the benefit of hindsight is shown not to have been the best way out of the difficulty"
37. In the very same judgment, this Court also referred to and approved the view taken in Swadling v. Cooper8, as below:-
"Mere failure to avoid the collision by taking some extra ordinary precaution, does not in itself constitute negligence."
40. On a holistic analysis of the material available on record, it is established beyond the pale of doubt that the offending truck was parked in the middle of the road without any parking lights being switched on and without any markers or indicators being placed around the stationary vehicle so as to warn the incoming vehicular traffic. This omission by the person in control of the said truck was in clear violation of law. The accident took place on a highway where the CR No.177/2026 PS Sarita Vihar Divyam Juneja Vs. State Page No.8 of 46 permissible speed limits are fairly high. In such a situation, it would be imprudent to hold that the driver of a vehicle, travelling through the highway in the dead of the night in pitch dark conditions, would be able to make out a stationary vehicle lying in the middle of the road within a reasonable distance so as to apply the brakes and avoid the collision. The situation would be compounded by the headlights of the vehicles coming from the opposite direction and make the viewing of the stationary vehicle even more difficult. Thus, the conclusion drawn by the Courts below that the driver of the car could have averted the accident by applying the brakes and hence, he was equally negligent and contributed to the accident on the application of principle of last opportunity is ex-facie perverse and cannot be sustained. Hence, it is a fit case warranting exercise of this Court's powers under Article 136 of the Constitution of India to interfere with the concurrent finding of facts."
N. That the Ld. Trial Court erred in summoning the Revisionist by implicitly attributing contributory negligence, a notion which was categorically rejected by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the Sushma case (supra) under similar facts where a moving vehicle collided with a stationary one abandoned in a hazardous manner. The evidence on record clearly points to the sole negligence of the other party. O. That the Ld. Trial Court did not consider that the summoning order is based on a presumption of negligence against the Revisionist, which is legally untenable. As held in Prabhavathi & Ors. v. The Managing Director, Bangalore Metropolitan, Transport Corporation, contributory negligence cannot be presumed based solely on allegations and requires CR No.177/2026 PS Sarita Vihar Divyam Juneja Vs. State Page No.9 of 46 direct or corroborative evidence, which is completely absent in the present case.
P. That the Ld. Trial Court did not consider that the standard of proof required for summoning is the existence of a prima facie case based on credible material, not on the basis of a flawed investigation or bald allegations. The material on record, when tested on the anvil of the 'preponderance of probability', does not implicate the Revisionist in any manner.
Q. That the the impugned order is perverse as it ignores the glaring violations of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, and the Rules of Road Regulation, 1989, by the other party involved in the incident, whose actions were the sole and proximate cause of the unfortunate incident. Summoning the Revisionist in such a scenario amounts to a miscarriage of justice.
5. It has been argued that the impugned summoning order dated 17.12.2025 is patently illegal, cryptic, non-speaking, and has been passed in a mechanical manner, reflecting a complete non-application of judicial mind. It has been argued that the summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter and cannot be a mere formality. The Ld. Magistrate is duty-bound to record reasons, however brief, indicating the application of mind to the material on record to arrive at a prima facie satisfaction for proceeding against the accused. The impugned order dated 17.12.2025, which merely states, " On the basis of chargesheet and supporting documents, I hereby take cognizance of CR No.177/2026 PS Sarita Vihar Divyam Juneja Vs. State Page No.10 of 46 offence as mentioned in charge-sheet. There is sufficient prima facie material on record to proceed against the accused," is in stark violation of the settled law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India.
JUDGMENTS RELIED UPON BY THE ACCUSED/REVISIONIST
6. In support of this contention, specific reliance was placed upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the matter of JM Laboratories and Others vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Another, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 208.
7. Ld. Counsel for the accused/revisionist relied upon the judgment in the case of 1. Satinder Singh Bhasin Vs. State of NCT of Delhi CRL MC No.5127/2023 Delhi High Court dated 01.10.2024 wherein it has been held that para 18 to 25 it has been held that:-
"18. This Court is of the view that in order to issue summons and taking cognizance of an offence, the Court concerned must record its reasons behind taking such cognizance followed by issuance of summons. The same has also been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sunil Bharti Mittal v. CBI, (2015) 4 SCC 609, relevant paragraphs of which are as under:
"..51. On the other hand, Section 204 of the Code deals with the issue of process, if in the opinion of the Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence, CR No.177/2026 PS Sarita Vihar Divyam Juneja Vs. State Page No.11 of 46 there is sufficient ground for proceeding. This section relates to commencement of a criminal proceeding. If the Magistrate taking cognizance of a case (it may be the Magistrate receiving the complaint or to whom it has been transferred under Section 192), upon a consideration of the materials before him (i.e. the complaint, examination of the complainant and his witnesses, if present, or report of inquiry, if any), thinks that there is a prima facie case for proceeding in respect of an offence, he shall issue process against the accused.
***
53. However, the words "sufficient ground for proceeding" appearing in Section 204 are of immense importance. It is these words which amply suggest that an opinion is to be formed only after due application of mind that there is sufficient basis for proceeding against the said accused and formation of such an opinion is to be stated in the order itself. The order is liable to be set aside if no reason is given therein while coming to the conclusion that there is prima facie case against the accused, though the order need not contain detailed reasons. A fortiori, the order would be bad in law if the reason given turns out to be ex facie CR No.177/2026 PS Sarita Vihar Divyam Juneja Vs. State Page No.12 of 46 incorrect....."
19.The aforesaid judicial dicta has also been asserted by the petitioner herein while arguing that the learned CMM was obligated to apply judicial mind to determine whether sufficient grounds for proceeding against the petitioner/accused exists or not. The judgment namely Lalankumar Singh (Supra) which has been relied upon by the petitioner follows the observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sunil Bharti Mittal v. CBI (Supra) which has been referred to by this Court.
20. This Court has perused both the impugned orders and is of the considered view that the order passed by the learned CMM does not reflect the application of judicial mind and the said order also does not record the reasons as to why the learned CMM took the cognizance of the offence followed by issuance of summons. It is also observed by this Court that when the said order of the learned CMM was challenged under revision jurisdiction, i.e., before the learned ASJ, the concerned revisional Court made an error of law by holding that the learned CMM was not required to record the reasons in detail and the same amounts to error of law. Further, the learned ASJ went on to peruse the CR No.177/2026 PS Sarita Vihar Divyam Juneja Vs. State Page No.13 of 46 charge sheet, thereby, holding that the same is sufficient and the learned CMM has rightly passed the first impugned order.
21. Taking into consideration the aforesaid facts and circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that the observations made by the learned ASJ in the revision application is not sufficient and is in contravention to the settled law. The learned ASJ has merely perused the charge sheet and in terms of the settled position of law, merely considering the contents of the charge sheet is not sufficient to take cognizance of the offence and for issuance of summons.
22. It is observed by this Court that while taking cognizance of the offence and issuance of summons, the learned CMM failed to apply its judicial mind. Furthermore, the reliance placed by the respondent no. 2/complainant upon paragraph no. 22 of the second impugned order is misplaced for the reason that the scope of a revisional Court is limited to the contents of the order challenged before it. Under no circumstance, the learned ASJ was required to peruse the documents and other material available on record while exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 of the Cr.P.C., as the scope of CR No.177/2026 PS Sarita Vihar Divyam Juneja Vs. State Page No.14 of 46 interference under the said provision is limited. As discussed herein above, under the revisional jurisdiction, the Courts are empowered to merely look into the errors of law or illegality committed by the Court concerned in the order which has been assailed before the revisional Court.
23. Summarily stated, the 1st impugned order of summoning/taking cognizance of offence is liable to be set aside as no reason is given therein while coming to the conclusion that there is a prime facie case against the petitioner/accused. Furthermore, in the 2nd impugned order as well, the learned ASJ has taken into consideration the charge sheet etc. and despite recording the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court made in Sunil Bharti Mittal v. CBI (Supra), the learned ASJ has failed to acknowledge the law that application of judicial mind and satisfaction of allegations are sina qua non for taking cognizance of the offence and issuance of summons.
24. Thus, the learned CMM erred by failing to record reasons for issuing summons/taking cognizance of offence and the learned ASJ erred as well by failing to consider the errors of law committed by the learned CMM.
25. In light of the observations made by this Court in CR No.177/2026 PS Sarita Vihar Divyam Juneja Vs. State Page No.15 of 46 the preceding paragraphs, this Court is inclined to allow the instant petition and set aside the impugned orders dated 23rd January, 2021 and 1st February, 2023 passed by the learned CMM and the learned ASJ, respectively, and to remand back the matter to the learned CMM to pass an order after taking into consideration the observations made by this Court hereinabove."
8. Reliance is also placed in the case of Krishna Kumar & Ors. State of UP and Ors. No.677/2023 Allahabad High Court dated 24.01.2023.
9. It has been further argued that in the case of Rasiklal Mohanlal Gangani Vs. State & Anr. CRL MC No.6012/2019 Delhi High Court dated 23.06.2025 (para no.21, 24, 26, 33).
"21. As opined in the aforesaid cases and noted above, the test is whether the uncontroverted allegations in the FIR prima facie disclose commission of a cognizable offence. However, the Court ought to look into the complaint with care and a little more closely in case it finds that the proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or are instituted with the ulterior motive of wreaking vengeance. In such circumstances, the Court can look into the attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case and can read between the lines.......
24. The learned Trial Court has noted in the impugned order that a prima facie case under Section 420 of the CR No.177/2026 PS Sarita Vihar Divyam Juneja Vs. State Page No.16 of 46 IPC is made out against the petitioner by placing reliance on the judgment in the case of R. Kalyani v. Janak C Mehta & Ors. : Criminal Appeal No. 1694 of 2008. In that case, the accused had maintained an account in the name of the complainant without her consent. The accused had further promised to take over the liabilities of the company's account, pay the balance in the account as well as the value of the purchased shares that had been bought earlier, but neglected to do so. In these circumstances, the Hon'ble Apex Court had refused to quash the FIR against the accused noting that the accused had traded shares of the complainant without her consent. ..........
26. Issuance of summons is a serious issue and it is thus imperative that the summoning order shows due application of mind and examination of the facts of the case as well as the evidence on record. In the case of Pepsi Foods Ltd. and Another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and Others : (1998) 5 SCC 749, the Hon'ble Apex Court had observed as under:
"28. Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. It is not that the complainant has to bring only two witnesses to support his allegations in the complaint to have the criminal law set into motion. The order of the Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. He has to examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint and the evidence both oral and documentary in support thereof and would that be sufficient for the complainant to succeed in bringing charge home to the accused. It is not that the Magistrate is a silent spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence before summoning of the accused. The Magistrate has to carefully scrutinise the evidence brought on record and may even himself put questions CR No.177/2026 PS Sarita Vihar Divyam Juneja Vs. State Page No.17 of 46 to the complainant and his witnesses to elicit answers to find out the truthfulness of the allegations or otherwise and then examine if any offence is prima facie committed by all or any of the accused. 29. No doubt the Magistrate can discharge the accused at any stage of the trial if he considers the charge to be groundless, but that does not mean that the accused cannot approach the High Court under Section 482 of the Code or Article 227 of the Constitution to have the proceeding quashed against him when the complaint does not make out any case against him and still he must undergo the agony of a criminal trial...."
33. Prima facie, the allegations taken at their face value, do not disclose an element of criminality and commission of a cognizable offence. In such circumstances, continuation of proceedings against the petitioner, who is a senior citizen, would be an abuse of the process of law and merit the exercise of the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 of the CrPC. ........
10.Further in the case of Mehmood Ul Rehman Vs. Khazir Mohd. Tunda and Ors. Crl Appeal No.1347/2010 Supreme Court dated 31.03.2015 (para no.7 to 24).
7. The question is: how does a Magistrate, while taking cognizance of an offence on complaint, indicate his satisfaction regarding the ground for proceeding against the accused.
8. In Pepsi Foods Limited and another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and others1, this Court has held that exercise under Section 204 of CrPC of summoning an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter and that the process of criminal law cannot be set into motion in a mechanical manner. It was also held that the order of the Magistrate CR No.177/2026 PS Sarita Vihar Divyam Juneja Vs. State Page No.18 of 46 summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law governing the issue. To quote:
"28. Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. It is not that the complainant has to bring only two witnesses to support his allegations in the complaint to have the criminal law set into motion. The order of the Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. He has to examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint and the evidence both oral and documentary in support thereof and would that be sufficient for the complainant to succeed in bringing charge home to the accused. It is not that the Magistrate is a silent spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence before summoning of the accused. The Magistrate has to carefully scrutinise the evidence brought on record and may even himself put questions to the complainant and his witnesses to elicit answers to find out the truthfulness of the allegations or otherwise and then examine if any offence is prima facie committed by all or any of the accused."
9. In taking recourse to such a serious process, this Court has consistently held that the Magistrate must apply his mind on the allegations on commission of the offence. In Darshan Singh Ram Kishan v. State of Maharashtra2, it was held that the process of taking cognizance does not involve any formal action, but it occurs as soon as the Magistrate applies his mind to the allegations and thereafter takes judicial notice of the offence. To quote:
"8. As provided by Section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a Magistrate may take cognizance of an offence either, (a) upon receiving a complaint, or (b) upon a police report, or (c) upon information received from a person other than a police officer or even upon his own information or suspicion that such an offence has been committed. As has often been held, taking cognizance does CR No.177/2026 PS Sarita Vihar Divyam Juneja Vs. State Page No.19 of 46 not involve any formal action or indeed action of any kind but occurs as soon as a Magistrate applies his mind to the suspected commission of an offence. Cognizance, therefore, takes place at a point when a Magistrate first takes judicial notice of an offence. This is the position whether the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence on a complaint, or on a police report, or upon information of a person other than a police officer. Therefore, when a Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence upon a police report, prima facie he does so of the offence or offences disclosed in such report."
10. In one of the early decisions, Emperor v. Sourindra Mohan Chuckerbutty3, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court has taken the same view ... "taking cognizance does not involve any formal action, or indeed action of any kind, but occurs as soon as a Magistrate, as such, applies his mind to the suspected commission of an offence".
11. In Smt. Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi and others4, this Court took the view that in the process of taking cognizance and issue of process to the accused, Magistrate has to form an opinion that a prima facie case is made out against the accused. At that stage, the Magistrate is also competent to consider whether there are inherent improbabilities appearing on the face of the complaint or in the evidence led by the complainant. To quote:
"5. ... It is true that in coming to a decision as to whether a process should be issued the Magistrate can take into consideration inherent improbabilities appearing on the face of the complaint or in the evidence led by the complainant in support of the allegations but there appears to be a very thin line of demarcation between a probability of conviction of the accused and establishment of a prima facie case against him. The Magistrate has been given an undoubted discretion in the matter and the discretion has to be judicially exercised by him. Once the Magistrate has exercised his discretion it is not for the High Court, or even this Court, to substitute its own discretion for that of the Magistrate or to examine the case on merits with a view CR No.177/2026 PS Sarita Vihar Divyam Juneja Vs. State Page No.20 of 46 to find out whether or not the allegations in the complaint, if proved, would ultimately end in conviction of the accused. ..."
12. In Kishun Singh and Others v. State of Bihar5, this Court reiterated the position that where, on application of mind, the allegations in the complaint, according to the Magistrate, if proved, would constitute an offence, cognizance is to be is taken of the offence so as to proceed further against the accused. To quote:
"7. ... Even though the expression 'take cognizance' is not defined, it is well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that when the Magistrate takes notice of the accusations and applies his mind to the allegations made in the complaint or police report or information and on being satisfied that the allegations, if proved, would constitute an offence decides to initiate judicial proceedings against the alleged offender he is said to have taken cognizance of the offence. It is essential to bear in mind the fact that cognizance is in regard to the offence and not the offender. Mere application of mind does not amount to taking cognizance unless the Magistrate does so for proceeding under Sections 200/204 of the Code ..."
13. In State of W.B. and another v. Mohd. Khalid and others6, it has been held by this Court that while exercising the power to take cognizance, a Magistrate has to see whether there is any basis for initiating judicial proceedings. At paragraph-43, it has been held as follows:
"43. ... Section 190 of the Code talks of cognizance of offences by Magistrates. This expression has not been defined in the Code. In its broad and literal sense, it means taking notice of an offence. This would include the intention of initiating judicial proceedings against the offender in respect of that offence or taking steps to see whether there is any basis for initiating judicial proceedings or for other purposes. The word 'cognizance' indicates the point when a Magistrate or a Judge first takes judicial notice of an offence. It is entirely a different thing from initiation of proceedings; rather it is the condition CR No.177/2026 PS Sarita Vihar Divyam Juneja Vs. State Page No.21 of 46 precedent to the initiation of proceedings by the Magistrate or the Judge. Cognizance is taken of cases and not of persons."
14. In Kanti Bhadra Shah and another v. State of W.B.7, this Court has taken the view that it is quite unnecessary to write detailed orders at the stage of issuing process.
15. In U.P. Pollution Control Board v. Mohan Meakins Limited and others8, the position was further clarified that it was not necessary to pass a speaking order at the stage of taking cognizance.
16. In Deputy Chief Controller of Imports and Exports v. Roshanlal Agarwal and others9, this Court considered the situation where the impugned order passed by the Magistrate read as follows: "Cognizance taken. Register the case. Issue summons to the accused". It was held that "at the stage of issuing the process to the accused, Magistrate is not required to record reasons". Kanti Bhadra Shah (supra) and U.P. Pollution Control Board (supra) were also referred to in the said decision.
17. In Jagdish Ram v. State of Rajasthan and another10, the law was restated holding that at the stage of issuing process to the accused, the Magistrate is not required to record reasons. However, he has to be satisfied that there is sufficient ground for proceeding and such satisfaction is not whether there is sufficient ground for conviction. To quote:
"10. ... The taking of cognizance of the offence is an area exclusively within the domain of a Magistrate. At this stage, the Magistrate has to be satisfied whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding and not whether there is sufficient ground for conviction. Whether the evidence is adequate for supporting the conviction, can be determined only at the trial and not at the stage of inquiry. At the stage of issuing the process to the accused, the Magistrate is not required to record reasons."
18. In S.K. Sinha, Chief Enforcement Officer v. Videocon International Limited and others11, this Court held that CR No.177/2026 PS Sarita Vihar Divyam Juneja Vs. State Page No.22 of 46 taking cognizance has no esoteric or mystic significance in criminal law and it connotes that a judicial notice is taken of an offence, after application of mind. To quote: "19. The expression "cognizance" has not been defined in the Code. But the word (cognizance) is of indefinite import. It has no esoteric or mystic significance in criminal law. It merely means "become aware of" and when used with reference to a court or a Judge, it connotes "to take notice of judicially". It indicates the point when a court or a Magistrate takes judicial notice of an offence with a view to initiating proceedings in respect of such offence said to have been committed by someone.
20. "Taking cognizance" does not involve any formal action of any kind. It occurs as soon as a Magistrate applies his mind to the suspected commission of an offence. Cognizance is taken prior to commencement of criminal proceedings. Taking of cognizance is thus a sine qua non or condition precedent for holding a valid trial. Cognizance is taken of an offence and not of an offender. Whether or not a Magistrate has taken cognizance of an offence depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and no rule of universal application can be laid down as to when a Magistrate can be said to have taken cognizance."
19. In U.P. Pollution Control Board v. Dr. Bhupendra Kumar Modi and another12, at paragraph-23, the position has been discussed as follows:
"23. It is a settled legal position that at the stage of issuing process, the Magistrate is mainly concerned with the allegations made in the complaint or the evidence led in support of the same and he is only to be prima facie satisfied whether there are sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused."
20. In Bhushan Kumar and another v. State (NCT of Delhi) and another13, the requirement of application of mind in the process of taking cognizance was reiterated. It was further held that summons is issued to notify an individual of his legal obligation to appear before the Magistrate as a response to the alleged violation of law. It was further held CR No.177/2026 PS Sarita Vihar Divyam Juneja Vs. State Page No.23 of 46 that in the process thus issued, the Magistrate need not explicitly state the reasons. Paragraphs-11 to 13 contain the relevant discussion, which read as follows:
"11. In Chief Enforcement Officer v. Videocon International Ltd.3
19) the expression "cognizance" was explained by this Court as "it merely means 'become aware of' and when used with reference to a court or a Judge, it connotes 'to take notice of judicially'. It indicates the point when a court or a Magistrate takes judicial notice of an offence with a view to initiating proceedings in respect of such offence said to have been committed by someone." It is entirely a different thing from initiation of proceedings;
rather it is the condition precedent to the initiation of proceedings by the Magistrate or the Judge. Cognizance is taken of cases and not of persons. Under Section 190 of the Code, it is the application of judicial mind to the averments in the complaint that constitutes cognizance. At this stage, the Magistrate has to be satisfied whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding and not whether there is sufficient ground for conviction. Whether the evidence is adequate for supporting the conviction can be determined only at the trial and not at the stage of enquiry. If there is sufficient ground for proceeding then the Magistrate is empowered for issuance of process under Section 204 of the Code.
12. A "summons" is a process issued by a court calling upon a person to appear before a Magistrate. It is used for the purpose of notifying an individual of his legal obligation to appear before the Magistrate as a response to violation of law. In other words, the summons will announce to the person to whom it is directed that a legal proceeding has been started against that person and the date and time on which the person must appear in court. A person who is summoned is legally bound to appear before the court on the given date and time. Wilful disobedience is liable to be punished under Section 174 IPC. It is a ground for contempt of court.
CR No.177/2026
PS Sarita Vihar
Divyam Juneja Vs. State Page No.24 of 46
13. Section 204 of the Code does not mandate the Magistrate to explicitly state the reasons for issuance of summons. It clearly states that if in the opinion of a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence, there is sufficient ground for proceeding, then the summons may be issued. This section mandates the Magistrate to form an opinion as to whether there exists a sufficient ground for summons to be issued but it is nowhere mentioned in the section that the explicit narration of the same is mandatory, meaning thereby that it is not a prerequisite for deciding the validity of the summons issued."
21. The extensive reference to the case law would clearly show that cognizance of an offence on complaint is taken for the purpose of issuing process to the accused. Since it is a process of taking judicial notice of certain facts which constitute an offence, there has to be application of mind as to whether the allegations in the complaint, when considered along with the statements recorded or the inquiry conducted thereon, would constitute violation of law so as to call a person to appear before the criminal court. It is not a mechanical process or matter of course. As held by this Court in Pepsi Foods Limited (supra), to set in motion the process of criminal law against a person is a serious matter.
22. Under Section 190(1)(b) of CrPC, the Magistrate has the advantage of a police report and under Section 190(1)
(c) of CrPC, he has the information or knowledge of commission of an offence. But under Section 190(1)(a) of CrPC, he has only a complaint before him. The Code hence specifies that ... "a complaint of facts which constitute such offence". Therefore, if the complaint, on the face of it, does not disclose the commission of any offence, the Magistrate shall not take cognizance under Section 190(1)
(a) of CrPC. The complaint is simply to be rejected.
23. The steps taken by the Magistrate under Section 190(1)
(a) of CrPC followed by Section 204 of CrPC should reflect that the Magistrate has applied his mind to the facts and the statements and he is satisfied that there is ground CR No.177/2026 PS Sarita Vihar Divyam Juneja Vs. State Page No.25 of 46 for proceeding further in the matter by asking the person against whom the violation of law is alleged, to appear before the court. The satisfaction on the ground for proceeding would mean that the facts alleged in the complaint would constitute an offence, and when considered along with the statements recorded, would, prima facie, make the accused answerable before the court. No doubt, no formal order or a speaking order is required to be passed at that stage. The Code of Criminal Procedure requires speaking order to be passed under Section 203 of CrPC when the complaint is dismissed and that too the reasons need to be stated only briefly. In other words, the Magistrate is not to act as a post office in taking cognizance of each and every complaint filed before him and issue process as a matter of course. There must be sufficient indication in the order passed by the Magistrate that he is satisfied that the allegations in the complaint constitute an offence and when considered along with the statements recorded and the result of inquiry or report of investigation under Section 202 of CrPC, if any, the accused is answerable before the criminal court, there is ground for proceeding against the accused under Section 204 of CrPC, by issuing process for appearance. Application of mind is best demonstrated by disclosure of mind on the satisfaction. If there is no such indication in a case where the Magistrate proceeds under Sections 190/204 of CrPC, the High Court under Section 482 of CrPC is bound to invoke its inherent power in order to prevent abuse of the power of the criminal court. To be called to appear before criminal court as an accused is serious matter affecting one's dignity, self respect and image in society. Hence, the process of criminal court shall not be made a weapon of harassment.
24. Having gone through the order passed by the Magistrate, we are satisfied that there is no indication on the application of mind by the learned Magistrate in taking cognizance and issuing process to the appellants. The contention that the application of mind has to be inferred cannot be appreciated. The further contention that without application of mind, the process will not be issued cannot CR No.177/2026 PS Sarita Vihar Divyam Juneja Vs. State Page No.26 of 46 also be appreciated. Though no formal or speaking or reasoned orders are required at the stage of Section 190/204 CrPC, there must be sufficient indication on the application of mind by the Magistrate to the facts constituting commission of an offence and the statements recorded under Section 200 of CrPC so as to proceed against the offender. No doubt, the High Court is right in holding that the veracity of the allegations is a question of evidence. Question is not about veracity of the allegations; but whether the respondents are answerable at all before the criminal court. There is no indication in that regard in the order passed by the learned Magistrate. We, hence, set aside the order dated 03.04.2007 passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Srinagar and the impugned order passed by the High Court. The matter is remitted to the Magistrate for fresh consideration and further action, if required to be taken in accordance with law."
11.Further in the case of Mahavir Singh Charan Vs. The State of Maharashtra WP No.1716/2025 Bombay High Court dated 23.03.2026 (para no.10 to 12, 14 to 19)
10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mahmood Ul Rehman v. Khazir Mohammad Tunda and Ors. in paragraph Nos 8 to 20 has made the following observations: -
8. The question is: how does a Magistrate, while taking cognizance of an offence on complaint, indicate his satisfaction regarding the ground for proceeding against the accused?
9. In Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Judicial Magistrate [Pepsi Foods Ltd.
v. Judicial Magistrate, (1998) 5 SCC 749 1998 SCC (Cri) 1400], this Court has held that exercise under Section 204 CrPC of summoning an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter and that the process of criminal law cannot be set into CR No.177/2026 PS Sarita Vihar Divyam Juneja Vs. State Page No.27 of 46 motion in a mechanical manner. It was also held that the order of the Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law governing the issue. To quote: (SCC p. 760, para 28) "28. Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. It is not that the complainant has to bring only two witnesses to support his allegations in the complaint to have the criminal law set into motion. The order of the Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto He has to examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint and the evidence both oral and documentary in support thereof and would that be sufficient for the complainant to succeed in bringing charge home to the accused. It is not that the Magistrate is a silent spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence before summoning of the accused. The Magistrate has to carefully scrutinise the evidence brought on record and may even himself put questions to the complainant and his witnesses to elicit answers to find out the truthfulness of the allegations or otherwise and then examine if any offence is prima facie committed by all or any of the accused."
10. In taking recourse to such a serious process, this Court has consistently held that the Magistrate must apply his mind on the allegations on commission of the offence. In Darshan Singh Ram Kishan v. State of Maharashtra [Darshan Singh Ram Kishan v. State of Maharashtra, (1971) 2 SCC 654 1971 SCC (Cri) 628], it was held that the process of taking cognizance does not involve any formal action, but it occurs as soon as the Magistrate applies his mind to the allegations and thereafter takes judicial notice of the offence. To quote: (SCC p. 656, para 8) "8. As provided by Section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a Magistrate may take cognizance of an offence either, (a) upon receiving a complaint, or (b) upon a police report, or (e) upon information received from a person other than a police officer or even upon his own information suspicion that such an offence has been committed. As has often been held, taking cognizance does not involve any CR No.177/2026 PS Sarita Vihar Divyam Juneja Vs. State Page No.28 of 46 formal action or indeed action of any kind but occurs as soon as a Magistrate applies his mind to the suspected commission of an offence. Cognizance, therefore, takes place at a point when a Magistrate first takes judicial notice of an offence. This is the position whether the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence on a complaint, or on a police report, or upon information of a person other than a police officer. Therefore, when a Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence upon a police report, prima facie he does so of the offence or offences disclosed in such report."
11.In one of the early decisions, Emperor v Sourindr[Emperor v. Souri, ILR (1910) 37 Cal 412), a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court has taken the same view: (ILR p. 417) "... taking cognizance does not involve any formal action, or indeed action of any kind, but occurs as soon as a Magistrate, as such, applies his mind to the suspected commission of an offence."
12. In Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi [Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi, (1976) 3 SCC 736: 1976 SCC (Cri) 507], this Court took the view that in the process of taking cognizance and issue of process to the accused, the Magistrate has to form an opinion that a prima facie case is made out against the accused. At that stage, the Magistrate is also competent to consider whether there are inherent improbabilities appearing on the face of the complaint or in the evidence led by the complainant. To quote: (SCC p. 741, para 5) "5.... It is true that in coming to a decision as to whether a process should be issued the Magistrate can take into consideration inherent improbabilities appearing on the face of the complaint or in the evidence led by the complainant in support of the allegations but there appears to be a very thin line of demarcation between a probability of conviction of the accused and establishment of a prima facie case against him. The Magistrate has been given an undoubted discretion in the matter and the discretion has to be judicially exercised by him. Once the Magistrate has exercised his discretion it is not for the High Court, or even this Court, to substitute its own CR No.177/2026 PS Sarita Vihar Divyam Juneja Vs. State Page No.29 of 46 discretion for that of the Magistrate or to examine the case on merits with a view to find out whether or not the allegations in the complaint, if proved, would ultimately end in conviction of the accused."
13. In Kishun Singh v. State of Bihar [Kishun Singh v. State of Bihar, (1993) 2 SCC 16: 1993 SCC (Cri) 470], this Court reiterated the position that where, on application of mind, the allegations in the complaint, according to the Magistrate, if proved, would constitute an offence, cognizance is to be taken of the offence so as to proceed further against the accused. To quote: (SCC p. 23, para 7) "7.... Even though the expression 'take cognizance' is not defined, it is well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that when the Magistrate takes notice of the accusations and applies his mind to the allegations made in the complaint or police report or information and on being satisfied that the allegations, if proved, would constitute an offence decides to initiate judicial proceedings against the alleged offender he is said to have taken cognizance of the offence. It is essential to bear in mind the fact that cognizance is in regard to the offence and not the offender. Mere application of mind does not amount to taking cognizance unless the Magistrate does so for proceeding under Sections 200/204 of the Code...."
14. In State of W.B. v. Mohd. Khalid [State of W.B. v. Mohd. Khalid, (1995) 1 SCC 684: 1995 SCC (Cri) 266), it has been held by this Court that while exercising the power to take cognizance, a Magistrate has to see whether there is any basis for initiating judicial proceedings. At para 43, it has been held as follows: (SCC p. 696) "43.... Section 190 of the Code talks of cognizance of offences by Magistrates. This expression has not been defined in the Code. In its broad and literal sense, it means taking notice of an offence. This would include the intention of initiating judicial proceedings against the offender in respect of that offence or taking steps to see whether there is any basis for initiating judicial proceedings or for other purposes. The word 'cognizance' indicates the point when a Magistrate or a Judge first takes judicial notice of an offence. It is entirely a different CR No.177/2026 PS Sarita Vihar Divyam Juneja Vs. State Page No.30 of 46 thing from initiation of proceedings; rather it is the condition precedent to the initiation of proceedings by the Magistrate or the Judge. Cognizance is taken of cases and not of persons."
15. In Kanti Bhadra Shah v. State of WB. [Kanti Bhadra Shah v. State of WB., (2000) 1 SCC 722: 2000 SCC (Cri) 303), this Court has taken the view that it is quite unnecessary to write detailed orders at the stage of issuing process. In U.P. Pollution Control Board v. Mohan Meakins Ltd. [U.P. Pollution Control Board v. Mohan Meakins Ltd., (2000) 3 SCC 745), the position was further clarified that it was not necessary to pass a speaking order at the stage of taking cognizance. In Chief Controller of Imports and Exports v. Roshanlal Agarwal (Chief Controller of Imports and Exports v. Roshanlal Agarwal, (2003) 4 SCC 139: 2003 SCC (Cri) 788], this Court considered the situation where the impugned order passed by the Magistrate reads as follows: (SCC р. 145, para 8) "8. 'Cognizance taken. Register the case. Issue summons to the accused."
It was held that: (SCC p. 145, para 9) "9 At the stage of issuing the process to the accused, Magistrate is not required to record reasons." Kanti Bhadra Shah [Kanti Bhadra Shah v. State of WB., (2000) 1 SCC 722: 2000 SCC (Cri) 303] and U.P. Pollution Control Board [U.P. Pollution Control Board v. Mohan Meakins Ltd., (2000) 3 SCC 745) were also referred to in the said decision.
16. In Jagdish Ram v. State of Rajasthan [Jagdish Ram v. State of Rajasthan, (2004) 4 SCC 432: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1294], the law was restated holding that at the stage of issuing process to the accused, the Magistrate is not required to record reasons. However, he has to be satisfied that there is sufficient ground for proceeding and such satisfaction is not whether there is sufficient ground for conviction. To quote: (SCC p. 436, para
10) "10.... The taking of cognizance of the offence is an area exclusively within the domain of a Magistrate. At this stage, CR No.177/2026 PS Sarita Vihar Divyam Juneja Vs. State Page No.31 of 46 the Magistrate has to be satisfied whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding and not whether there is sufficient ground for conviction. Whether the evidence is adequate for supporting the conviction, can be determined only at the trial and not at the stage of inquiry At the stage of issuing the process to the accused, the Magistrate is not required to record reasons."
17. In Chief International Enforcement Officer v. Videocon Enforcement Ltd. [Chief Officer v. Videocon International Ltd., (2008) 2 SCC 492: (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 471], this Court held that taking cognizance has no esoteric or mystic significance in criminal law and it connotes that a judicial notice is taken of an offence, after application of mind. To quote: (SCC p. 499, paras 19-20) "19. The expression 'cognizance' has not been defined in the Code. But the word (cognizance) is of indefinite import. It has no esoteric or mystic significance in criminal law. It merely means 'become aware of and when used with reference to a court or a Judge, it connotes 'to take notice of judicially'. It indicates the point when a court or a Magistrate takes judicial notice of an offence with a view to initiating proceedings in respect of such offence said to have been committed by someone
20. "Taking cognizance' does not involve any formal action of any kind. It occurs as soon as a Magistrate applies his mind to the suspected commission of an offence. Cognizance is taken prior to commencement of criminal proceedings. Taking of cognizance is thus a sine qua non or condition precedent for holding a valid trial. Cognizance is taken of an offence and not of an offender. Whether or not a Magistrate has taken cognizance of an offence depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and no rule of universal application can be laid down as to when a Magistrate can be said to have taken cognizance."
18. In U.P. Pollution Control Board v. Bhupendra Kumar Control Modi [U.P. Pollution Board v. Bhupendra Kumar Modi, (2009) 2 SCC 147: (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 679], at para 23, the position has been discussed as follows: (SCC p. 154) CR No.177/2026 PS Sarita Vihar Divyam Juneja Vs. State Page No.32 of 46 "23. It is a settled legal position that at the stage of issuing process, the Magistrate is mainly concerned with the allegations made in the complaint or the evidence led in support of the same and he is only to be prima facie satisfied whether there are sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused."
19. In Bhushan Kumar v. State (NCT Delhi) [Bhushan Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2012) 5 SCC 424: (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 872], the requirement of application of mind in the process of taking cognizance was reiterated. It was further held that summons is issued to notify an individual of his legal obligation to appear before the Magistrate as a response to the alleged violation of law. It was further held that in the process thus issued, the Magistrate need not explicitly state the reasons. Paras 11 to 13 contain the relevant discussion, which read as follows: (SCC pp. 428-29) "11. In Chief Enforcement Ltd. [Chief International Officer v. Videocon Enforcement Officer v. Videocon International Ltd., (2008) 2 SCC 492: (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 471] (SCC p. 499, para
19) the expression 'cognizance' was explained by this Court as 'it merely means "become aware of" and when used with reference to a court or a Judge, it connotes "to take notice of judicially". It indicates the point when a court or a Magistrate takes judicial notice of an offence with a view to initiating proceedings in respect of such offence said to have been committed by someone.' It is entirely a different thing from initiation of proceedings; rather it is the condition precedent to the initiation of proceedings by the Magistrate or the Judge. Cognizance is taken of cases and not of persons. Under Section 190 of the Code, it is the application of judicial mind to the averments in the complaint that constitutes cognizance. At this stage, the Magistrate has to be satisfied whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding and not whether there is sufficient ground for conviction. Whether the evidence is adequate for supporting the conviction can be determined only at the trial and not at the stage of enquiry. If there is sufficient ground for proceeding then the Magistrate is empowered for issuance of process under Section 204 of the Code.
12. A 'summons' is a process issued by a court calling upon a CR No.177/2026 PS Sarita Vihar Divyam Juneja Vs. State Page No.33 of 46 person to appear before a Magistrate. It is used for the purpose of notifying an individual of his legal obligation to appear before the Magistrate as a response to violation of law. In other words, the summons will announce to the person to whom it is directed that a legal proceeding has been started against that person and the date and time on which the person must appear in court. A person who is summoned is legally bound to appear before the court on the given date and time. Wilful disobedience is liable to be punished under Section 174 IPC. It is a ground for contempt of court.
13. Section 204 of the Code does not mandate the Magistrate to explicitly state the reasons for issuance of summons. It clearly states that if in the opinion of a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence, there is sufficient ground for proceeding, then the summons may be issued. This section mandates the Magistrate to form an opinion as to whether there exists a sufficient ground for summons to be issued but it is nowhere mentioned in the section that the explicit narration of the same is mandatory, meaning thereby that it is not a prerequisite for deciding the validity of the summons issued."
20. The extensive reference to the case law would clearly show that cognizance of an offence on complaint is taken for the purpose of issuing process to the accused. Since it is a process of taking judicial notice of certain facts which constitute an offence, there has to be application of mind as to whether the allegations in the complaint, when considered along with the statements recorded or the inquiry conducted thereon, would constitute violation of lave so as to call a person to appear before the criminal court. It is not a mechanical process of matter of course. As held by this Court in Pepsi Foods Ltd. [Pepsi Foods Ltd. v Judicial Magistrate, (1998) 5 SCC 749: 1998 SCC (Cri) 1400) to set in motion the process of criminal law against a person is a serious matter.
11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Pawan Kumar Sharma v/s. State of Uttaranchal, in paragraphs 3, has held as under:-
"3. A distinction exists between an order taking cognizance and an order issuing process. Before process is issued, the CR No.177/2026 PS Sarita Vihar Divyam Juneja Vs. State Page No.34 of 46 Court concerned must apply its judicial mind. It may, not only apply its mind as to whether on the basis of the allegations made in the complaint petition and the statements made by the complainant and his witnesses, a prima facie case has been made out for issuing processes but also must consider as to whether a case has been made out in terms of proper provisions of the Penal Statute for issuance of process for alleged commission of the offences vis-a-vis, the allegations made. 12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Karnataka V. Pastor P Rajır, in paragraph 13, has held as under:- "13. It is necessary to mention here that taking cognizance of an offence is not the same thing as issuance of process. Cognizance is taken at the initial stage when the Magistrate applies his judicial mind to the facts mentioned in a complaint or to a police report or upon information received from any other person that an offence has been committed. The issuance of process is at a subsequent stage when after considering the material placed before it the court decides to proceed against the offenders against whom a prima facie case is made out."
14. The impugned order in the case at hand merely states that the Magistrate perused the report submitted by the Police and the verification statement of Respondent No. 2, which led to the issuance of process. The impugned order does not reflect that the Magistrate has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law governing the issue. There is no indication in the impugned order that the Magistrate examined the nature of the allegations in the complaint or the supporting evidence, oral or documentary. The issuance of the process is done mechanically without the application of the mind. Thus, the Magistrate failed to exercise judicious discretion.".........
17. Since the process of issuing the impugned order against the Petitioners does not meet the legal requirements and suffers from the vice of non-application of mind, the impugned order is illegal and warrants interference.
18. Issuance of process is within the domain of a Magistrate. Since the impugned order is found to be illegal, the matter must be reconsidered by the Magistrate. It is appropriate for the Magistrate to carefully assess the case in accordance with CR No.177/2026 PS Sarita Vihar Divyam Juneja Vs. State Page No.35 of 46 the law. The scheme of BNSS provides effective remedies to the aggrieved party against the order-issuing process. Therefore, the request by Ms. Tasmiya Taleha for this Court to examine the merits of the case in its writ jurisdiction and/or to dismiss C.C. No. 06/SW/2022 is rejected.
19. In view of the above, the impugned order dated 19.04.2024, passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, 71 Court, Bandra, Mumbai in C.C. No. 06/SW/2022 is quashed and set aside. The matter is remitted to the Metropolitan Magistrate, 71 Court, Bandra, for fresh consideration and further action, if required to be taken in accordance with law.
12. Further in the case of Birla Corporation Ltd. Vs. Adventz Ltd. & Holding Crl No.875/2019 Supreme Court dated 09.05.2019 para no.34 wherein it has been held that: .
"34. The order of the Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. The application of mind has to be indicated by disclosure of mind on the satisfaction. Considering the duties on the part of the Magistrate for issuance of summons to accused in a complaint case and that there must be sufficient indication as to the application of mind and observing that the Magistrate is not to act as a post office in taking cognizance of the complaint, in Mehmood Ul Rehman, this Court held as under:-
"22. ....the Code of Criminal Procedure requires speaking order to be passed under Section 203 Cr.P.C. when the complaint is dismissed and that too the reasons need to be stated only briefly. In other words, the Magistrate is not to act as a post office in taking cognizance of each and every complaint filed before him and issue process as a matter of course. There must be sufficient indication in the order passed by the Magistrate that he is satisfied that the allegations in the complaint constitute an offence and when considered along with the statements recorded and the result of inquiry or report CR No.177/2026 PS Sarita Vihar Divyam Juneja Vs. State Page No.36 of 46 of investigation under Section 202 Cr.P.C., if any, the accused is answerable before the criminal court, there is ground for proceeding against the accused under Section 204 Cr.P.C., by issuing process for appearance. The application of mind is best demonstrated by disclosure of mind on the satisfaction. If there is no such indication in a case where the Magistrate proceeds under Sections 190/204 Cr.P.C., the High Court under Section 482 Cr.PC. is bound to invoke its inherent power in order to prevent abuse of the power of the criminal court. To be called to appear before the criminal court as an accused is serious matter affecting one's dignity, self-respect and image in society. Hence, the process of criminal court shall not be made a weapon of harassment."
13. Further in the case of Sunil Bharti Mittal Vs. CBI CRA No.34/2015 SC 2015 dated 09.01.2015 para no.40 to 42 & 45 to 49)
40. It is stated at the cost of repetition that in the present case, while issuing summons against the appellants, the Special Magistrate has taken shelter under a so-called legal principle, which has turned out to be incorrect in law. He has not recorded his satisfaction by mentioning the role played by the appellants which would bring them within criminal net. In this behalf, it would be apt to note that the following observations of this Court in the case of GHCL Employees Stock Option Trust v. India Infoline Ltd.[19]:
"19. In the order issuing summons, the learned Magistrate has not recorded his satisfaction about the prima facie case as against Respondents 2 to 7 and the role played by them in the capacity of Managing Director, Company Secretary or Directors which is sine qua non for initiating criminal action against them. (Thermax Ltd. v. K.M. Johny followed) xx xx xx xx xx
21. In the instant case the High Court has correctly noted that issuance of summons against Respondents 2 to 7 is illegal and amounts to abuse of process of law. The order of the High Court, therefore, needs no interference by this Court."
41. We have already mentioned above that even if the CBI CR No.177/2026 PS Sarita Vihar Divyam Juneja Vs. State Page No.37 of 46 did not implicate the appellants, if there was/is sufficient material on record to proceed against these persons as well, the Special Judge is duly empowered to take cognizance against these persons as well. Under Section 190 of the Code, any Magistrate of first class (and in those cases where Magistrate of the second class is specially empowered to do so) may take cognizance of any offence under the following three eventualities:
(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence;
(b) upon a police report of such facts; and upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge, that such offence has been committed.
42. This Section which is the starting section of Chapter XIV is subject to the provisions of the said Chapter. The expression "taking cognizance" has not been defined in the Code. However, when the Magistrate applies his mind for proceeding under Sections 200-203 of the Code, he is said to have taken cognizance of an offence. This legal position is explained by this Court in S.K. Sinha, Chief Enforcement Officer v. Videocon International Ltd & Ors. [20] in the following words:
"19. The expression "cognizance" has not been defined in the Code. But the word (cognizance) is of indefinite import. It has no esoteric or mystic significance in criminal law. It merely means "become aware of: and when used with reference to a court or a Judge, it connoted "to take notice of judicially". It indicates the point when a court or a Magistrate takes judicial notice of an offence with a view to initiating proceedings in respect of such offence said to have been committed by someone.
20. "Taking Cognizance" does not involve any formal action of any kind. It occurs as soon as a Magistrate applies his mind to the suspected commission of an offence...."
Sine Qua Non for taking cognizance of the offence is the application of mind by the Magistrate and his satisfaction that the allegations, if proved, would constitute an offence. It is, therefore, imperative that on a complaint or on a police report, the Magistrate is bound to consider the CR No.177/2026 PS Sarita Vihar Divyam Juneja Vs. State Page No.38 of 46 question as to whether the same discloses commission of an offence and is required to form such an opinion in this respect. When he does so and decides to issue process, he shall be said to have taken cognizance. At the stage of taking cognizance, the only consideration before the Court remains to consider judiciously whether the material on which the prosecution proposes to prosecute the accused brings out a prima facie case or not."
43. On the other hand, Section 204 of the Code deals with the issue of process, if in the opinion of the Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence, there is sufficient ground for proceeding. This Section relates to commencement of a criminal proceeding. If the Magistrate taking cognizance of a case (it may be the Magistrate receiving the complaint or to whom it has been transferred under Section 192), upon a consideration of the materials before him (i.e., the complaint, examination of the complainant and his witnesses if present, or report of inquiry, if any), thinks that there is a prima facie case for proceeding in respect of an offence, he shall issue process against the accused.
46. A wide discretion has been given as to grant or refusal of process and it must be judicially exercised. A person ought not to be dragged into Court merely because a complaint has been filed. If a prima facie case has been made out, the Magistrate ought to issue process and it cannot be refused merely because he thinks that it is unlikely to result in a conviction.
47. However, the words "sufficient grounds for proceeding" appearing in the Section are of immense importance. It is these words which amply suggest that an opinion is to be formed only after due application of mind that there is sufficient basis for proceeding against the said accused and formation of such an opinion is to be stated in the order itself. The order is liable to be set aside if no reason is given therein while coming to the conclusion that there is prima facie case against accused, though the order need not contain detailed reasons. A fortiori, the order would be bad in law if the reason given turns out to be ex facie incorrect.
48. However, there has to be a proper satisfaction in this CR No.177/2026 PS Sarita Vihar Divyam Juneja Vs. State Page No.39 of 46 behalf which should be duly recorded by the Special Judge on the basis of material on record. No such exercise is done. In this scenario, having regard to the aforesaid aspects coupled with the legal position explained above, it is difficult to sustain the impugned order dated 19.03.2013 in its present form insofar as it relates to implicating the appellants and summoning them as accused persons. The appeals arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 2961 of 2013 and SLP (Crl.) No. 3161 of 2013 filed by Mr. Sunil Bharti Mittal and Ravi Ruia respectively are, accordingly, allowed and order summoning these appellants is set aside. The appeals arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos. 3326-3327 of 2013 filed by Telecom Watchdog are dismissed.
Epilogue
49. While parting, we make it clear that since on an erroneous presumption in law, the Special Magistrate has issued the summons to the appellants, it will always be open to the Special Magistrate to undertake the exercise of going through the material on record and on that basis, if he is satisfied that there is enough incriminating material on record to proceed against the appellants as well, he may pass appropriate orders in this behalf. We also make it clear that even if at this stage, no such prima facie material is found, but during the trial, sufficient incriminating material against these appellants surfaces in the form of evidence, the Special Judge shall be at liberty to exercise his powers under Section 319 of the Code to rope in the appellants by passing appropriate orders in accordance with law at that stage."
14.Ld. Addl. PP for State submits that the impugned order has been correctly passed and does not require any interference and the defence of the accused persons cannot be looked into at the stage of cognizance and therefore, the revision petitions filed on behalf of the accused persons are liable to be dismissed.
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Divyam Juneja Vs. State Page No.40 of 46
FINDINGS
15.I have heard Ld. Counsel for accused/ revisionist and also Ld. Addl PP for State and have carefully gone through the record.
16.In the present matter, the chargesheet was filed before the Ld. Trial Court on 17.12.2025, and thereafter, the Ld. Trial Court took cognizance of offence against the accused / revisionist.
17.Impugned order was passed by Ld. Trial Court on 17.12.2025 and present revision petition was filed by revisionists/accused on 09.04.2026. Accused upon being summoned for the first time appeared before Ld. Trial Court on 15.04.2026 through counsel. The present revision petition was filed within limitation period and the impugned order was not an interlocutory order and therefore, present revision petition is maintainable before this court.
18.The question which needs adjudication in present revision petition, is whether impugned order of cognizance taken by Ld. Trial Court dated 17.12.2025 is perverse, illegal or arbitrary in nature?
LAW PERTAINING TO SUMMONING
19.What are the considerations, which a criminal court has to bear in mind, while summoning accused in criminal matters, are properly explained by Hon'ble Apex Court. In the case law titled as Pepsi Foods Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Special Judicial Magistrate & Ors., (1998) 5 SCC 749 , CR No.177/2026 PS Sarita Vihar Divyam Juneja Vs. State Page No.41 of 46 wherein following observations were made :-
"Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. It is not that the complainant has to bring only two witnesses to support his allegations in the complaint to have the criminal law set into motion. The order of the Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. He has to examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint and the evidence both oral and documentary in support thereof and would that be sufficient for the complainant to succeed in bringing charge home to the accused. It is not that the Magistrate is a silent spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence before summoning of the accused. The Magistrate has to carefully scrutinize the evidence brought on record any may even himself put questions to the complainant and his witnesses to elicit answers to find out the truthfulness of the allegations or otherwise and then examine if any offence is prima facie committed by all or any of the accused."
20.The extent of scrutiny of evidence at the stage of taking cognizance or passing summoning order in criminal cases is mainly concerned with the chargesheet filed u/s 173 Cr.P.C. and the evidence annexed with it led in support of the same and he is only to be prima facie satisfied whether there are sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused. It is not the province of the magistrate to enter into a detailed discussion CR No.177/2026 PS Sarita Vihar Divyam Juneja Vs. State Page No.42 of 46 of the merits or the demerits of the case.
21.Further, in the case of Rakesh Kumar Gulati Vs. Directorate of Enforcement CRL REV P 249/2025 dated 24.12.2025 of Hon'ble High Court of Delhi it has been held that (in para no.9, 17, 18, 20).
"9. He emphasised that the term 'cognizance' is not defined either under the CrPC or the BNSS. Reliance was placed on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Chief Enforcement Officer v. Videocon International Ltd.: (2008) 2 SCC 492 to argue that the term cognizance only connotes 'to become aware of and when used with reference to a Court, it implies 'to take notice of judicially.'......
17. It is well settled that taking cognizance does not involve any formal action and the Magistrate is not even required to pass a speaking order at the stage of taking cognizance [Ref. U.P. Pollution Control Board v. Mohan Meakins Limited and Ors.: (2000) 3 SCC 745]. Cognizance is taken when the Magistrate first takes judicial notice of an offence. In the case of Darshan Singh Ram Kishan v. State of Maharashtra: (1971) 2 SCC 654, the Hon'ble Apex Court had held as under:
"8. As provided by Section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a Magistrate may take cognizance of an offence either, (a) upon receiving a complaint, or (b) upon a police report, or (c) upon information received from a person other than a police officer or even upon his own information or suspicion that such an offence has been committed. As has often been held, taking cognizance does not involve any formal action or indeed action of any kind but occurs as soon as a Magistrate CR No.177/2026 PS Sarita Vihar Divyam Juneja Vs. State Page No.43 of 46 applies his mind to the suspected commission of an offence. Cognizance, therefore, takes place at a point when a Magistrate first takes judicial notice of an offence. This is the position whether the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence on a complaint, or on a police report, or upon information of a person other than a police officer. Therefore, when a Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence upon a police report, prima facie he does so of the offence or offences disclosed in such report" (emphasis supplied)
18. In the case of Chief Enforcement Officer v. Videocon International Ltd. (supra), it was observed that no universal rule can be laid for when a Magistrate is stated to have taken cognizance and observed as under: "19. The expression "cognizance" has not been defined in the Code. But the word (cognizance) is of indefinite import. It has no esoteric or mystic significance in criminal law. It merely means "become aware of" and when used with reference to a court or a Judge, it connotes "to take notice of judicially". It indicates the point when a court or a Magistrate takes judicial notice of an offence with a view to initiating proceedings in respect of such offence said to have been committed by someone.
20. "Taking cognizance" does not involve any formal action of any kind. It occurs as soon as a Magistrate applies his mind to the suspected commission of an offence. Cognizance is taken prior to commencement of criminal proceedings. Taking of cognizance is thus a sine qua non or condition precedent for holding a valid trial. Cognizance is taken of an offence and not of an offender. Whether or not a Magistrate has taken cognizance of an offence depends on the facts and circumstances of each CR No.177/2026 PS Sarita Vihar Divyam Juneja Vs. State Page No.44 of 46 case and no rule of universal application and be laid down as to when a Magistrate can be said to have taken cognizance."
20. As adumbrated above, the term 'cognizance' merely denotes to take notice of an offence with a view to initiate proceedings in respect of an offence. Further, the term 'cognizance' does not entail any formal action and occurs as soon the Magistrate applies his mind to the suspected commission of the offence. In the present case, as noted above, the only contention pressed before this Court by the petitioner is whether the impugned order can be sustained considering that the petitioner was not afforded an opportunity of being heard.
22.In view of the aforesaid discussion, the Ld. Trial Court in its impugned order has categorically mentioned that she had heard the submissions made by IO and perused the chagesheet and had found sufficient material, available on record for proceeding for the offences u/s U/Sec. 281/106 (1) BNS, and thereafter, took cognizance of the offence and thereafter, summoned all accused persons in column no.11. The aforesaid order categorically mentions and shows that the same was not passed mechanically but the Ld. Trial Court had applied mind before passing the same and the same was not cryptic. More so, the submissions made on behalf of revisionists cannot be looked into at the stage of cognizance and the revisionists are at liberty to raise all the contentions before Ld. Trial Court at the stage of charge.
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23.In view of the aforesaid appreciation and observations, I find no infirmity in the impugned order dated 17.12.2025 passed by Ld. Trial Court and the same stands upheld. Accordingly, present revision petition stands dismissed.
24.TCR be sent back alongwith copy of this order to the Ld. Trial Court for information and compliance.
Copy of the order Dasti to the parties.
Digitally signed by SheetalSheetal chaudhary chaudhary Date:
2026.05.14 15:15:29 +0530 Announced (Sheetal Chaudhary Pradhan) in the open court ASJ-02 (South-East), on 14.05.2026 Saket Courts, Delhi (vk) CR No.177/2026 PS Sarita Vihar Divyam Juneja Vs. State Page No.46 of 46