Gujarat High Court
Splendid Infrabuild Llp vs Manuben Nanubhai Bharvad on 15 October, 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/CRA/11/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 15/10/2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 11 of 2023
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE SANJEEV J.THAKER
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Approved for Reporting Yes No
Yes
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SPLENDID INFRABUILD LLP & ORS.
Versus
MANUBEN NANUBHAI BHARVAD & ORS.
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Appearance:
MR DHAVAL DAVE, SR ADV with MR DHAVAL SHAH(2354) for the Applicant(s) No. 1,1.1,1.2
MR SANJAY MEHTA, SR ADV with MR DM DEVNANI(5880) for the Opponent(s) No. 1,2,3,4,5,6
NOTICE ISSUED BY PUBLICATION for the Opponent(s) No. 10
NOTICE SERVED for the Opponent(s) No. 8
NOTICE SERVED BY DS for the Opponent(s) No. 11,12,13.1,13.2,9
PRITESH M SHAH(8405) for the Opponent(s) No. 1,2,3,4,5,6
SHRIKAR H BHATT(2573) for the Opponent(s) No. 7.1,7.2,7.3,7.4,7.5,7.6
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE SANJEEV J.THAKER
Date : 15/10/2025
ORAL JUDGMENT
TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION.....................................................................2 II. SUBMISSIONS OF THE DEFENDANT - PETITIONER.......................3 III. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PLAINTIFF - RESPONDENT......................16 IV. ANALYSIS................................................................................19 CAUSE OF ACTION..............................................................................21 Section 42(C) of the Partnership Act..............................................................21 Suit of Specific Performance by the Plaintiffs not maintainable.............................23 Illusory Cause of Action................................................................................27 BARRED BY LAW................................................................................30 Limitation to seek specific performance - Article 54...........................................30 Deemed Knowledge......................................................................................33 Plaintiff's basis of right and Section 69 of the Partnership Act.............................36 RE: PART PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACT AND ANCILLARY RELIEF.......................42 V. JUDGMENTS CITED BY THE PLAINTIFF.....................................47 VI. CONCLUSION..........................................................................51 1 Uploaded by MANOJ KR. RAI(HC01072) on Thu Oct 16 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 17 02:28:11 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CRA/11/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 15/10/2025 undefined I. INTRODUCTION
1. Rule returnable forthwith. Learned Advocates for the respective parties waive service of notice of Rule. With the consent of the parties matter is taken up for final hearing.
2. The present Revision Application has been filed to challenge the order dated 21.10.2022, passed by the 18th City Civil and Sessions Court in Civil Suit No. 220 of 2020, whereby the Ld. Trial Court rejected the application, below Exhibit 80, filed under the provisions of Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ("CPC").
3. For convenience, the parties are referred to by their status before the Ld. Trial Court.
4. The brief facts leading to the present Revision Application are as follows. The plaintiffs instituted Civil Suit No. 220 of 2020, contending that under a partnership deed dated 04.06.2003, the father of the plaintiffs and the father of defendants Nos. 1/1 to 1/6 had constituted a partnership firm under the name Tirupati Corporation. Upon the demise of both the original partners, and in terms of Clause 12 of the said partnership deed, the plaintiffs and defendants Nos. 1/1 to 1/6 became partners of the said firm. The plaintiffs filed the suit seeking a declaration that, pursuant to the agreement dated 19.12.1983, they hold an undivided share in the suit property and further prayed for a direction to be issued to the 2 Uploaded by MANOJ KR. RAI(HC01072) on Thu Oct 16 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 17 02:28:11 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CRA/11/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 15/10/2025 undefined defendants Nos. 3 and 4 to execute a sale deed in favour of the Plaintiffs in respect of the said property.
5. The Plaintiffs also sought to challenge the sale deed, dated 18.11.2003, executed by defendant No. 4, in favour of defendant No. 5, as well as the sale deed, dated 14.11.2008, executed by defendants Nos. 1 and 2, in favour of defendant No. 6. A prayer for permanent injunction in respect of the suit property was also made. Subsequently, defendants Nos. 7 and 8 were joined as parties, as defendant No. 7 had purchased a portion of the suit property on 26.07.2019, and defendant No. 8 had purchased another portion on 20.02.2021.
6. Defendant No. 7 thereafter filed an application under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, contending that the suit was not maintainable as (i) it was barred by Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, (ii) it was barred by limitation, and (iii) the plaintiffs had no cause of action to file the present suit. Upon consideration of the plaint and the documents annexed thereto, the Ld. Trial Court, by order dated 21.10.2022, dismissed the said application. Aggrieved thereby, the present Revision Application has been preferred.
II. SUBMISSIONS OF THE DEFENDANT - PETITIONER
7. Ld. Senior Advocate Mr. Dhaval Dave has submitted that the 3 Uploaded by MANOJ KR. RAI(HC01072) on Thu Oct 16 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 17 02:28:11 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CRA/11/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 15/10/2025 undefined Application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure is based on three principal grounds: (i) that the Suit is barred under Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, (ii) that the plaint is barred by the law of limitation, and
(iii) that the Plaintiffs have no legal right or locus to institute the Suit.
8. On the first submission, namely that the Suit is barred by Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, the Ld. Senior Advocate for the Defendant has advanced detailed arguments by placing reliance on the cause title of the plaint. It is pointed out that the Plaintiffs have described themselves as the legal heirs of one of the original partners, namely Nanubhai Ranchhodbhai Bharwad, whereas Defendant Nos. 1/1 to 1/6 are described as the legal heirs of the other partner, namely Manibhai Chhaganbhai Patel.
9. It is submitted that a perusal of the Partnership Deed would reveal that there were only two partners in the firm, Tirupati Corporation. The Plaintiffs in the present Suit, while asserting themselves to be the partners of the said firm, have sought reliefs arising out of the said partnership deed. The Suit, it is urged, proceeds on the footing that the Plaintiffs, as partners of Tirupati Corporation, are entitled to specific performance of the agreement dated 19.12.1983, which was executed in favour of the said firm by Defendant No. 4.
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10. It is contended that, in view of the provisions of Section 69(1) of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, the Plaintiffs, suing as partners of an unregistered firm, cannot maintain the present Suit against Defendant Nos. 1/1 to 1/6, who are also claimed to be partners of Tirupati Corporation. The Plaintiffs have sought a direction against Defendant Nos. 3 and 4 to execute a sale deed exclusively in their favour, although they possess no independent or individual right in the Suit property. Their claim, it is submitted, is founded solely on the Agreement dated 19.12.1983 entered into by the partnership firm.
11. It is further argued that, though the Plaintiffs have not sought any specific relief against the other partners, namely Defendant Nos. 1/1 to 1/6, the effect of the reliefs claimed is that the Plaintiffs seek specific performance of the Agreement in their own favour as partners of Tirupati Corporation. In view of the admitted position that the said firm is unregistered, the Suit, according to the Ld. Senior Advocate, is squarely hit by Section 69(1) of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, and is therefore not maintainable in law.
12. It is further contended by the Ld. Senior Advocate for the Defendant that the Plaintiffs have sought to enforce rights arising from the agreement dated 19.12.1983, against Defendant Nos. 2 to 8, who are admittedly not partners of the firm Tirupati Corporation and are complete strangers to the said transaction. Since the firm is unregistered, any such 5 Uploaded by MANOJ KR. RAI(HC01072) on Thu Oct 16 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 17 02:28:11 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CRA/11/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 15/10/2025 undefined attempt to enforce contractual rights on behalf of the firm is expressly barred under Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, and the Suit is therefore liable to be rejected as being barred by law.
13. Moreover, it has been urged that the Plaintiffs have also prayed for reliefs challenging the sale deed dated 14.11.2008. The said sale deed, however, was executed by the partnership firm itself through its partner, namely the father of Defendant Nos. 1/1 to 1/6. The Suit, therefore, is in essence one seeking enforcement of contractual rights arising from transactions undertaken by an unregistered firm. In view of the statutory bar contained in Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, such a Suit is not maintainable and must fail at the threshold.
14. Ld. Senior Advocate for the Defendant has relied on the decision in the case of Farooq vs. Shandhya Anthraper, (2018) 12 SCC 580 more particularly paras: 5 and 6 which read as under:
"5. Having heard the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the parties, it is clear that the plaint, read as a whole, relied upon Clause 25(d) of the partnership deed which specifically states that no partners of the firm shall without the consent in writing of the other partners be entitled to transfer immovable property belonging to the firm. The plaint then goes on to say that the suit schedule 6 Uploaded by MANOJ KR. RAI(HC01072) on Thu Oct 16 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 17 02:28:11 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CRA/11/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 15/10/2025 undefined property was purchased out of the funds of the firm for the purpose of development and sale. In Para 11, the plaintiffs discovered that a sale deed has been executed by the first defendant. It has been specifically stated that the plaintiffs had never consented to the same and the first defendant has no authority to sell any immovable property belonging to the firm.
6. The plaint, read as a whole, leaves no manner of doubt that the basis for the suit is Section 69 of the Partnership Act read with Clause 25(d) of the partnership deed dated 29-12-1995. Para 18 of the plaint does not carry the matter further inasmuch as the only sentence which could possibly be relied upon, and which was relied upon by the High Court, is that the plaintiffs are entitled to file the suit even independently of the partnership firm. Having found that the basis of the suit is the factume of partnership and having relied upon Clause 25(d) of the partnership deed, it is clear that the trial court correctly found that the bar of Section 69 of the Act was attracted in the facts of this case."
15. Ld. Senior Advocate for the Defendant has relied on the decision reported in in the case of Sri Velji Narayan Patel vs. Sri Jayanti Lal Patel, AIR 2009 Cal. 164 more particularly, Para 9, which reads thus:
"9. Sub-section (1) of Section 69 disentitles a partner or a person on behalf of a partner to sue as a partner against the firm of a person allegedly to be a partner unless the firm is registered with the 7 Uploaded by MANOJ KR. RAI(HC01072) on Thu Oct 16 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 17 02:28:11 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CRA/11/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 15/10/2025 undefined registrar of firms. Sub-section (2) similarly disentitles the firm to institute a suit against a third party unless the firm is registered. The common feature between Sub-section (1) and Sub-section (2) is that such suit must relate to enforcement of right arising out of a contract of conferred by the Act. If a suit by a partner against a partner or firm does not relate to enforcement of a right arising out of a contract then there is no legal prohibition because the spirit of Section 69 either of Sub-section (1) or of Sub-section (2) is that such suit must be related to enforcement of the right arising from a contract. Having gone through the plaint of the suit it clearly appears that the plaintiff instituted the suit as a partner for enforcement of his right arising out of the contract. The entire narrative of the plaint is for declaration that the plaintiff is the owner of 50 per cent of the share of the partnership business and for declaration that he is entitled to enjoy 50 per cent of the said business under the name and style of M/s. Bhagat & Company, for production of books of accounts, statement of accounts, balance-sheet and other documents and for declaration that the defendant is liable to disburse and pay plaintiffs share of profit in the business. Plaintiff does not sue in his individual capacity. The prayers in the plaint are basically for enforcement of his right as embodied in the partnership deed which was executed by and between the parties on 15th of April, 2000. In such circumstances, the provision of Sub-section (1) of Section 69 appears to have hit the plaint. Order 7, Rule 11(d) contains "where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred 8 Uploaded by MANOJ KR. RAI(HC01072) on Thu Oct 16 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 17 02:28:11 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CRA/11/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 15/10/2025 undefined by any law". It is not the case in the plaint that the firm was registered with the Registrar of Firms."
16. The defendant has relied on the decision in the case of Sunkari Tirumala Rao vs. Penki Aruna Kumari, 2025 SCC Online 125, more particularly Paras 8 and 9 which read thus:
"8. It is evident from a reading of sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 69 that it assumes a mandatory character. Section 69(1) prohibits a suit amongst the partners of an unregistered partnership firm, for the enforcement of a right either arising from a contract or conferred by the Act, unless the suit amongst the partners is in the nature of dissolution of the partnership firm and/or rendition of accounts. Section 69(2) prohibits the institution of a suit by an unregistered firm against third persons for the enforcement of a right arising from a contract. As a consequence, a suit filed by an unregistered partnership firm and all proceedings arising thereunder, which fall within the ambit of Section 69 would be without jurisdiction.
9. This Court in Seth Loonkaran Sethiya and Others v. Mr. Ivan E. John and Others reported in (1977) 1 SCC 379 had categorically held that Section 69 is mandatory in character and a suit instituted by a plaintiff in respect of a right which was vested in him by virtue of a contract and entered into in his capacity as a partner of a partnership firm, would be void, if such a firm was unregistered. The relevant observations are as under:
"21. A bare glance at the section is enough to 9 Uploaded by MANOJ KR. RAI(HC01072) on Thu Oct 16 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 17 02:28:11 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CRA/11/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 15/10/2025 undefined show that it is mandatory in character and its effect is to render a suit by a plaintiff in respect of a right vested in him or acquired by him under a contract which he entered into as a partner of an unregistered firm, whether existing or dissolved, void. In other words, a partner of an erstwhile unregistered partnership firm cannot bring a suit to enforce a right arising out of a contract falling within the ambit of Section 69 of the Partnership Act. In the instant case, Seth Sugan Chand had to admit in unmistakable terms that the firm "Sethiya & Co." was not registered under the Indian Partnership Act. It cannot also be denied that the suit out of which the appeals have arisen was for enforcement of the agreement entered into by the plaintiff as partner of Sethiya & Co. which was an unregistered firm. That being so, the suit was undoubtedly a suit for the benefit and in the interest of the firm and consequently a suit on behalf of the firm. It is also to be borne in mind that it was never pleaded by the plaintiff, not even in the replication, that he was suing to recover the outstandings of a dissolved firm. Thus, the suit was clearly hit by Section 69 of the Partnership Act and was not maintainable."
17. Reliance has also been placed on the decision reported in in the case of Pathik Udayan Bhatt vs. Shakti Infotec and Others, 2024 SCC Online Guj 4221 more particularly Para 21 which reads thus:
10 Uploaded by MANOJ KR. RAI(HC01072) on Thu Oct 16 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 17 02:28:11 IST 2025NEUTRAL CITATION C/CRA/11/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 15/10/2025 undefined "21. With the help of learned advocate for the petitioner, I have perused the plaint of Regular Civil Suit No.600 of 2016 filed by the plaintiffs-
respondents, which is at Annexure-B to this petition, and upon bare perusal of the entire plaint, I am unable to find out anywhere in the plaint a single averment that the respondent No.1- is a registered firm, and as such, I find merit in the contention canvassed by the learned advocate for the applicant that in the absence of any assertion made in the plaint by the respondents that their firm is a registered firm, and in the absence of any documentary evidence being produced by them in support thereof, the suit instituted by the respondents is hit by the provisions of Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act, and when the suit is barred by any law, as per Clause 11(d) of Order VII, the same is required to be dismissed at the threshold."
18. With regard to the contention that no cause of action has arisen for the Plaintiffs to institute the present Suit, it has been submitted by the Ld. Senior Advocate for the Defendant that the Plaintiffs themselves have specifically pleaded in the plaint that there were only two partners in the partnership firm Tirupati Corporation as on 01.04.1982, each having a 50% share in the partnership property. The Plaintiffs claim to have become partners of the said firm by virtue of Clause 13 of the partnership deed dated 04.06.2003, which provides that upon the death of a partner, his legal heirs, if willing, may be 11 Uploaded by MANOJ KR. RAI(HC01072) on Thu Oct 16 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 17 02:28:11 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CRA/11/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 15/10/2025 undefined inducted as partners of the firm.
19. It is further contended that the record clearly establishes that, the father of the Plaintiffs, who was one of the two partners, expired on 23.12.2010. Consequently, it is urged that in view of there being only two partners, the partnership firm stood automatically dissolved upon the death of one of them, by operation of Section 42(c) of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932. The Ld. Senior Advocate has submitted that even if the partnership deed contains a clause permitting legal heirs to be admitted as partners, such stipulation cannot override the statutory consequence of dissolution upon the death of one of the two partners. A partnership consisting of only two partners cannot, upon the death of one, continue as a validly existing firm, nor can a third party be inducted thereafter, since there remains no subsisting contract of partnership to support such induction.
20. On that basis, it is argued that the Plaintiffs, who claim to be the legal heirs of the deceased partner, cannot assert any right as partners of Tirupati Corporation, as the firm itself ceased to exist upon the death of their father. Consequently, the Plaintiffs could not have instituted the present Suit on the footing that they are partners of the said firm or that the firm continues to subsist. It has therefore been strongly urged that the plaint discloses no cause of action in favour of the Plaintiffs and that the Suit, having been filed by persons who 12 Uploaded by MANOJ KR. RAI(HC01072) on Thu Oct 16 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 17 02:28:11 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CRA/11/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 15/10/2025 undefined have no legal capacity to sue in the name of a non-existent partnership, is liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
21. The Ld. Senior Advocate for the Defendant has further contended that the plaint is hopelessly barred by limitation. It is submitted that the Plaintiffs seek specific performance of an agreement dated 19.12.1983, along with a declaration to cancel the sale deed dated 18.11.2003 executed by Defendant No. 4 in favour of Defendant No. 5, and to set aside another sale deed dated 14.11.2008, executed by Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 in favour of Defendant No. 6. It is pointed out that a bare perusal of the sale deed dated 14.11.2008 makes it evident that it was executed by the partners of the firm Tirupati Corporation itself. Hence, it is submitted that the Plaintiffs were fully aware of the said transaction, and therefore, the plea of ignorance or discovery at a later stage cannot be sustained.
22. The Ld. Senior Advocate for the Defendant has also submitted that a plain reading of the plaint would reveal that the Plaintiffs are challenging sale deeds executed as far back as the year 2003, while the present Suit has been instituted only in the year 2020. It is emphasised that the plaint is entirely silent as to when the Plaintiffs first acquired knowledge of the impugned transactions. The record further indicates that the father of the Plaintiffs passed away in the 13 Uploaded by MANOJ KR. RAI(HC01072) on Thu Oct 16 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 17 02:28:11 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CRA/11/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 15/10/2025 undefined year 2010, and even during his lifetime, he had not sought specific performance of the agreement dated 15.12.1983.
23. It is urged that the Plaintiffs have, with a view to circumvent the bar of limitation, inserted vague and general averments in the plaint without any specific or concrete disclosure of dates or events. Such vague assertions, it is contended, are insufficient to extend or save limitation under law. In the absence of specific pleadings disclosing how and when the cause of action arose, or when the Plaintiffs allegedly came to know of the impugned transactions, the Suit cannot be treated as within limitation. Hence, it is submitted that the plaint is liable to be rejected as being barred by the law of limitation.
24. Tirupati Corporation, the firm, had jointly instituted Civil Suit No. 1435 of 2003, in which Defendant No. 5 was also impleaded. That Suit sought injunctive relief but did not include any prayer for specific performance of the agreement dated 19.12.1983. This, according to the Ld. Senior Advocate, clearly establishes that even as early as the year 2003, the parties were aware of the execution of the sale deeds and the transactions concerning the suit property.
25. It has also been contended that the entire case of the Plaintiffs is founded upon the agreement dated 19.12.1983, entered into between Defendant No. 3 and the partnership firm. However, Defendant No. 3 himself was not the owner of the suit 14 Uploaded by MANOJ KR. RAI(HC01072) on Thu Oct 16 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 17 02:28:11 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CRA/11/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 15/10/2025 undefined property and had independently instituted Civil Suit No. 2231 of 2003 seeking specific performance of the said agreement, which was ultimately dismissed for default. Therefore, the cause of action, if any, for seeking specific performance arose in favour of the partnership firm as far back as 15.12.1983. The present Suit having been instituted only in the year 2020, after an inordinate lapse of nearly thirty-seven years, is clearly barred by limitation, and the plaint deserves to be rejected on that ground alone.
26. In that view of the matter it has been argued that as the main relief sought in the plaint being barred under the provision of Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1832 and the ancillary relief with respect to challenge to sale deed is also barred by law of limitation and in view of the death of original partners i.e., father of plaintiff and the father of defendant no.1/1/ to 1/6, no cause of action has arisen for the plaintiff to file the suit, the order that has been passed by trial Court is not reasoned order and the trial Court has not dealt with arguments as to how the plaint is maintainable in view of Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1832 and Limitation Act and in view of facts stated in the application, the plaintiff has no cause of action to file the suit, the trial Court could not have rejected the application and the present Civil Revision Application is required to be allowed and the plaint is required to be rejected.
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27. Per Contra, Ld. Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjay Mehta, appearing for the Plaintiffs, has submitted that while considering an Application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Court is required to confine its examination to the averments made in the Plaint and the documents annexed thereto. It is only upon such consideration that the Court can determine whether the plaint is barred by law.
28. It is submitted that, in the present case, there is no dispute that both the original partners namely, the father of the Plaintiffs and the father of Defendant Nos. 1/1 to 1/6 have passed away, resulting in the dissolution of the partnership firm. The Plaintiffs, being the legal heirs of one of the partners, have instituted the present Suit seeking reliefs in respect of the property belonging to the dissolved firm. Therefore, the bar under Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, would not apply to the present case, as the Suit does not concern the enforcement of contractual rights arising out of a subsisting partnership, but rather relates to the division and distribution of assets belonging to the dissolved firm. Hence, the present property will have to be divided between the Partners.
29. Mr. Mehta has further drawn my attention to Paragraph 4 of 16 Uploaded by MANOJ KR. RAI(HC01072) on Thu Oct 16 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 17 02:28:11 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CRA/11/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 15/10/2025 undefined the Plaint, wherein it has been specifically averred that by an Agreement dated 15.12.1983, Defendant No. 3 entered into an Agreement with the Plaintiff. It is pointed out that Defendant No. 4, being the owner of the suit property, had earlier entered into an agreement with Defendant No. 3 on 12.02.1982. Relying upon the terms and conditions of the Agreement dated 15.12.1983, it is submitted that the said agreement expressly records that Defendant No. 3, as the signatory, was under an obligation to execute a sale deed in favour of the Plaintiff and/or his nominee.
30. Further, placing reliance on the Agreement dated 19.12.1983 (entered into between the Plaintiff and Defendant No. 3), it is submitted that an additional sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- was paid by the Plaintiff to Defendant No. 3. Consequently, possession of the suit property was handed over to the Plaintiff in pursuance thereof. On the basis of these recitals, it is contended that possession of the suit property continues to remain with the Plaintiff, and hence, the reliefs sought in the Suit are also for protection of such lawful possession in addition to the other consequential declarations.
31. The Ld. Senior Advocate for the Plaintiff has further invited the attention of this Court to Civil Suit No. 1435 of 2003, which was instituted by the partners of the firm, Tirupati Corporation, seeking a decree of permanent injunction. It is submitted that although the said Suit was filed jointly by both 17 Uploaded by MANOJ KR. RAI(HC01072) on Thu Oct 16 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 17 02:28:11 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CRA/11/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 15/10/2025 undefined partners, the surviving partner subsequently withdrew the same on 03.08.2012, without impleading or joining the legal heirs of the deceased partner. The Plaintiffs, contended that there were neither aware of the filing of the said Suit nor of its subsequent withdrawal, and they first came to know of these facts only at a later stage. It is therefore submitted that the Plaintiffs cannot be non-suited on the basis of proceedings of which they had no knowledge or participation.
32. The Ld. Senior Advocate for the Plaintiff has further drawn the attention of this Court to Civil Suit No. 2231 of 2003, which had been instituted by Defendant No. 3, the executor of the agreement dated 15.12.1983. It is submitted that the said Suit was one for specific performance of the contract executed by the original owner, Defendant No. 4, in favour of Defendant No. 3. The said Suit, however, came to be dismissed for default, and an Application for its restoration is presently pending adjudication.
33. The Ld. Senior Advocate has also invited attention to the sale deed dated 14.11.2008, which was executed by the father of Defendant Nos. 1/1 to 1/6, in his capacity as a partner of Tirupati Corporation, jointly with one Rajnikant Becharbhai Patel (HUF), in respect of the partnership property. It is contended that, in view of Section 19 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, such a transaction could not have been lawfully executed by a single partner without the consent of 18 Uploaded by MANOJ KR. RAI(HC01072) on Thu Oct 16 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 17 02:28:11 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CRA/11/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 15/10/2025 undefined the other partner(s). Hence, the present Suit has been filed to challenge the said sale deed, being an unauthorised and invalid act in law.
34. Placing reliance on the aforesaid judgments and in view of the submissions made, it has been urged that no error has been committed by the Ld. Trial Court and the present Civil Revision Application is required to be rejected.
IV. ANALYSIS
35. Having heard the Ld. Senior Advocates for the respective parties and upon a perusal of the Plaint in the present Suit along with its documents, the following position emerges on record:
i. The Suit has been instituted by the partners of Tirupati Corporation, and a categorical assertion is made in Paragraph 2 of the Plaint that the Plaintiffs are partners of the said firm. Defendant No. 1 has been impleaded in the Suit in the capacity of being a partner of Tirupati Corporation.
ii. It is further stated in the Plaint that the partnership firm Tirupati Corporation has not been dissolved.
iii. Though the Agreement of 1983 was entered into 19 Uploaded by MANOJ KR. RAI(HC01072) on Thu Oct 16 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 17 02:28:11 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CRA/11/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 15/10/2025 undefined with the Partnership Firm, the reliefs prayed for in the Plaint include a decree for specific performance of the agreement dated 19.12.1983, claimed exclusively in favour of the Plaintiffs.
iv. The Plaint itself records that Tirupati Corporation consisted of only two partners, namely, Nanubhai Ranchhodbhai Bharvad, the predecessor of the Plaintiffs, and Manilal Chhaganlal Patel, the predecessor of Defendant No. 1, and that both the said partners have since expired.
v. The Plaint also discloses that Defendant Nos. 1/1 to 1/6 have been joined in the present proceedings in their capacity as partners of the firm, having succeeded to the interest of the deceased partner, Manibhai Chhaganbhai Patel.
vi. The Plaintiffs have instituted the present Suit as the legal heirs of Nanubhai Ranchhodbhai Bharvad. The reliefs claimed, however, are not for specific performance of the agreement dated 19.12.1983 either in favour of the partnership firm Tirupati Corporation or jointly in favour of the legal heirs of both deceased partners, but solely in favour of the Plaintiffs.
vii. The Suit pertains to enforcement of the Agreement dated 19.12.1983, which was executed by Defendant 20 Uploaded by MANOJ KR. RAI(HC01072) on Thu Oct 16 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 17 02:28:11 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CRA/11/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 15/10/2025 undefined No. 3 in favour of the Plaintiffs. The record further indicates that Defendant No. 3 had earlier filed a separate Suit for specific performance of the agreement executed in his favour by Defendant Nos. 4 and 5, which came to be dismissed (Restoration Application for which, is pending).
viii. It is also an admitted position that a separate Civil Suit, being Civil Suit No. 1435 of 2003, had been instituted by the partnership firm Tirupati Corporation seeking injunctive relief. However, even at that stage, no relief for specific performance of the agreement dated 19.12.1983 had been sought for and on behalf of the partnership firm and the said Suit was subsequently withdrawn on 03.08.2012.
36. The Plaintiff asserts his right of possession over the suit property on the basis of the agreement executed on 19.12.1983, claiming that such possession flows from and is protected under the terms of the said Agreement.
Cause of Action Section 42(C) of the Partnership Act
37. First and foremost, under the provisions of Section 42(c) of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, a partnership stands dissolved by the death of a partner unless there exists a specific contract to the contrary. The statute proceeds on the 21 Uploaded by MANOJ KR. RAI(HC01072) on Thu Oct 16 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 17 02:28:11 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CRA/11/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 15/10/2025 undefined principle that a partnership is founded upon mutual trust, confidence, and personal consent among the partners. Consequently, when one of the partners dies, the relationship of mutual agency, which is the essence of a partnership, ceases to exist. In the absence of a clear agreement permitting continuation after the death of a partner, the dissolution occurs automatically by operation of law.
38. In the present case, the partnership firm Tirupati Corporation consisted of only two partners, namely Nanubhai Ranchhodbhai Bharvad, the predecessor of the Plaintiffs, and Manilal Chhaganlal Patel, the predecessor of Defendant No.
1. Upon the death of either partner, the firm could not legally continue to exist because a partnership requires at least two living persons to constitute its foundation. The clause in the partnership deed permitting induction of legal heirs upon the death of a partner cannot revive or reconstitute a partnership that has already stood dissolved. Such induction can only occur where the partnership continues to exist.
39. Therefore, upon the death of either partner, the firm stood dissolved under Section 42(c) of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932. Once dissolved, the partnership firm ceased to have any legal existence, and no partner or legal heir could maintain or defend any proceedings in the name of that firm. The Plaintiffs' claim, therefore, proceeds from a non-existent entity and cannot be sustained in law.
22 Uploaded by MANOJ KR. RAI(HC01072) on Thu Oct 16 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 17 02:28:11 IST 2025NEUTRAL CITATION C/CRA/11/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 15/10/2025 undefined Suit of Specific Performance by the Plaintiffs not maintainable
40. Considering the aforesaid undisputed facts, it is evident that the dispute in the present proceedings arises out of claims advanced by the partners of the firm Tirupati Corporation, who have filed the Suit asserting rights derived from the Firm. The Firm has a Contract/Agreement with Defendant No. 3.
41. The Plaintiffs further seek to assert possession and ownership by invoking the principle of part performance under the supplementary agreement dated 19.12.1983, which too was executed by Defendant No. 3. Consequently, the Plaintiffs have sought specific performance of the agreement dated 19.12.1983 in their favour.
42. It further appears from the record that the Plaintiffs have instituted the present Suit in their capacity as partners of the firm Tirupati Corporation, yet the relief sought is for specific performance of the agreement dated 19.12.1983 exclusively in their own favour. The agreement, however, was executed with the partnership firm and not with the individual partners. Therefore, while the Plaintiffs claim to represent the firm, the reliefs prayed for are personal in nature and not on behalf of the firm, thereby creating an inconsistency between the capacity in which the Suit is filed and the nature of the reliefs 23 Uploaded by MANOJ KR. RAI(HC01072) on Thu Oct 16 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 17 02:28:11 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CRA/11/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 15/10/2025 undefined sought.
43. At the present juncture, it is apposite to refer to Section 15 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963:
15. Who may obtain specific performance. --
Except as otherwise provided by this Chapter, the specific performance of a contract may be obtained by--
(a) any party thereto;
(b) the representative in interest or the principal, of any party thereto:
Provided that where the learning, skill, solvency or any personal quality of such party is a material ingredient in the contract, or where the contract provides that his interest shall not be assigned, his representative in interest or his principal shall not be entitled to specific performance of the contract, unless such party has already performed his part of the contract, or the performance thereof by his representative in interest, or his principal, has been accepted by the other party;
(c) where the contract is a settlement on marriage, or a compromise of doubtful rights between members of the same family, any person beneficially entitled thereunder;
(d) where the contract has been entered into by a tenant for life in due exercise of a power, the remainderman;
(e) a reversioner in possession, where the agreement 24 Uploaded by MANOJ KR. RAI(HC01072) on Thu Oct 16 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 17 02:28:11 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CRA/11/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 15/10/2025 undefined is a covenant entered into with his predecessor in title and the reversioner is entitled to the benefit of such covenant;
..."
44. However, the record makes it abundantly clear that the partnership firm Tirupati Corporation is no longer in existence, having stood dissolved upon the death of its two partners. There is no dispute between the parties on this. Since there were only two partners, the demise of one resulted in the automatic dissolution of the firm.
45. That having dissolved, there is no disclosure of any cause of action for the Plaintiff to seek specific performance of the Contract. That too, only qua the Plaintiffs. Therefore, in essence, it is not even a specific performance of the said Contract. This is because, there is no Contract with the Plaintiff, of which the Plaintiff can seek performance.
46. In Round the Clock Stores Ltd. v. Aggarwal Entertainment Pvt. Ltd., 2008 SCC Online Del 1786, the Delhi High Court on interpretation of Section 15 of the 1963 Act held as under:
7. So far as adjudication in the present application is concerned, it becomes necessary to examine the necessary provisions which stipulate as to who would be a proper party in a suit for specific performance. Section 15 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 clearly stipulates that only the two persons who have entered into the alleged 25 Uploaded by MANOJ KR. RAI(HC01072) on Thu Oct 16 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 17 02:28:11 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CRA/11/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 15/10/2025 undefined contract/agreement, specific performance whereof is sought, are necessary and proper parties in a suit for specific performance. By virtue of Section 15 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, specific performance of a contract can be obtained by any party thereto or by the representative in interest or the principal, of any party thereto or by the persons who have been set out in Section 15 of the statute.
47. However, the term "representative in interest" has been interpreted by the Hon'ble Apex Court in several judgments and the present Plaintiffs do not fall in the said category [see:
Kapilaben and Ors. v. Ashok kumar Jayantilal Sheth, (2020) 20 SCC 648 Para 24]. It does not even appear to be the Plaintiff's case that they are representatives in interest of the Firm. Had that been so, even the Defendant Nos. 1/1 to 1/6 would stand on a similar footing.
48. One other strange relief as sought for in the Plaint is to grant specific performance of the Contract qua the Plaintiffs only. Therefore also, the prayer in effect, is not of specific performance of the Contract. This is because, the Contract as entered into between the parties is required to be enforced. The Plaintiff cannot seek enforcement of the said Agreement in its favour alone. Therefore also, the present suit does not disclose any cause of action.
49. Therefore, there cannot be specific performance or enforcement of a Contract unless it is sought for in the same 26 Uploaded by MANOJ KR. RAI(HC01072) on Thu Oct 16 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 17 02:28:11 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CRA/11/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 15/10/2025 undefined form as it was entered into. There is no manner in which the specific performance of the Contract can be sought qua the Plaintiffs alone.
50. If the argument of the Plaintiff is that the Contract had stipulated that sale deed can be executed qua anyone that the proposed vendee stipulates, it cannot be countenanced because, the Plaintiff is not the proposed vendee in its individual capacity, but the Firm.
Illusory Cause of Action
51. A further aspect that merits consideration is the conduct of the Plaintiffs, which reflects clear approbation and reprobation. On one hand, for the purpose of overcoming the statutory bar under Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act, the Plaintiffs seek to disown the existence of the firm Tirupati Corporation, contending that the firm stood dissolved upon the death of its partners and that the present Suit is filed in their individual capacity. On the other hand, for the purpose of asserting cause of action and claiming rights under the agreements dated 15.12.1983 and 19.12.1983, the Plaintiffs project themselves as partners of the same firm and seek specific performance of contracts executed in favour of that firm.
52. Such contradictory pleas cannot be permitted in law. A party cannot be allowed to approbate and reprobate in the same 27 Uploaded by MANOJ KR. RAI(HC01072) on Thu Oct 16 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 17 02:28:11 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CRA/11/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 15/10/2025 undefined breath, to deny the existence of the firm when faced with the bar of Section 69, yet affirm its existence when asserting rights allegedly flowing from its agreements. The principle of consistency and fairness demands that a litigant cannot take mutually destructive stands in order to derive advantage from both. Once the Plaintiffs themselves admit that the partnership firm has ceased to exist, they cannot simultaneously claim contractual rights in its name or through its agreements.
53. This inconsistent approach clearly demonstrates that the Suit is based on contradictory and self-defeating pleadings, creating no enforceable right in law. Such litigation, founded on shifting stands and mutually irreconcilable contentions, falls squarely within the mischief of Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure and deserves rejection at the threshold.
54. The Plaint, on a plain reading, discloses no real or subsisting cause of action. The Plaintiffs have sought to assert a right on the basis of an agreement allegedly entered into by the partnership firm Tirupati Corporation on 15.12.1983 and 19.12.1983. However, the firm itself stands dissolved upon the death of its partners, and the Suit has been filed many decades thereafter. The claim founded upon such extinguished rights is ex facie barred under Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act as well as under the provisions of the 28 Uploaded by MANOJ KR. RAI(HC01072) on Thu Oct 16 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 17 02:28:11 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CRA/11/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 15/10/2025 undefined Limitation Act. Even if the averments made in the Plaint are taken at their highest value, the cause of action so pleaded is illusory, and does not create any enforceable right in law.
55. In the present case, it is evident from the averments in the Plaint that the Suit is hopelessly barred by limitation. The Plaintiffs and their predecessors were aware of all material facts, including the agreements of 1983 and the subsequent sale deeds executed in 2003 and 2008. The record also reflects that the erstwhile partners themselves filed a Civil Suit in 2003, but did not claim specific performance at that time. It is, therefore, clear that the present Plaint has been drafted merely to create an artificial and non-existent cause of action in an attempt to overcome the statutory bar. Such a fictitious or illusory cause of action cannot confer jurisdiction upon the Court to entertain the Suit.
56. The legislative intent behind Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure is to prevent the abuse of the judicial process and to protect litigants from being subjected to needless trials in cases where the plaint, on its face, is barred by law. When the plaint itself reveals that the claim is legally untenable, it becomes the duty of the Court to reject it at the threshold. Courts must not permit litigants to engage in speculative or vexatious litigation, which only serves to prolong proceedings and harass the opposite party.
29 Uploaded by MANOJ KR. RAI(HC01072) on Thu Oct 16 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 17 02:28:11 IST 2025NEUTRAL CITATION C/CRA/11/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 15/10/2025 undefined
57. In this context, it has been repeatedly emphasised by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the power under Order VII Rule 11(d) is intended to strike down sham, frivolous and vexatious claims at inception. To allow such suits to proceed despite clear legal bars would defeat the very object of the provision and burden the judicial system with unnecessary trials. The Court is not expected to permit a litigant to rely upon a hollow or illusory cause of action to gain entry into the judicial process. In the present case, therefore, the plaint being barred by limitation and by the provisions of Section 69 of the Partnership Act, and disclosing no legally sustainable cause of action, deserves to be rejected at the threshold.
Barred by Law Limitation to seek specific performance - Article 54
58. Apart from the fact that the there was no cause of action for the Plaintiff to sue the Defendants seeking specific performance of the Contract qua the Plaintiffs alone, such an action is also barred by limitation on the following count.
59. As on today, the Partnership Firm does not exist. This has been admitted by both the parties. This is in view of Section 49(C) of the Partnership Act. By operation of law, this Partnership stood dissolved. Once the Partnership stood dissolved, there is no manner in which a dissolved entity can seek any specific performance of the said Contract.
30 Uploaded by MANOJ KR. RAI(HC01072) on Thu Oct 16 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 17 02:28:11 IST 2025NEUTRAL CITATION C/CRA/11/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 15/10/2025 undefined
60. However, even during the subsistence of the Partnership Firm, a Suit had been instituted as Civil Suit No. 1435 of 2003 by Tirupati Corporation, represented by the predecessors of the Plaintiffs and Defendant No. 1. In that Suit, Defendant Nos. 3 to 5 were also parties, yet no relief for specific performance of the agreement was sought. This circumstance indicates that even during the lifetime of the original partners, the partnership firm did not claim any enforceable right arising from the agreement dated 19.12.1983.
61. Therefore, it is clear that at least in the year 2003, the Partnership Firm (through its partners) was aware and had knowledge of the Agreement and fact that the same was not specifically enforced.
62. Article 54 of the Limitation Act is reproduced hereinunder for ready reference:
Particulars Period Time from which the period commences to run For specific Three years The date fixed for the performance of performance, or, if no such a Contract date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused.
63. Naturally, when the Firm had filed the suit in the year 2003, it 31 Uploaded by MANOJ KR. RAI(HC01072) on Thu Oct 16 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 17 02:28:11 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CRA/11/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 15/10/2025 undefined was aware that there was no sale deed has been executed by the Defendant No. 3 in its favour. Having known the same and being aware of it, the Firm at the relevant time did not seek specific performance of the Agreement of 1983.
64. Though the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that cause of action for filing a suit for injunction and specific relief is separate and distinct, Order II Rule 2 may not apply to bar a later suit for specific performance. However, the limitation to file such a suit for specific performance cannot be stopped by any of the parties.
65. The said previous Suit was instituted by the Firm only for the purpose of seeking an injunction and was ultimately withdrawn on 03.08.2012. This clearly establishes that the fact of execution of the agreement was well within the knowledge of the erstwhile partners of the firm Tirupati Corporation. Despite such knowledge, no Suit for specific performance was instituted by them within the prescribed period of limitation as contemplated under Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
66. In view of these facts, it cannot be accepted that the Plaintiffs were unaware of the existence or execution of the agreements dated 15.12.1983 and 19.12.1983 or of the refusal by Defendant No. 4 to execute the sale deed. The cause of action for seeking specific performance, therefore, clearly accrued in 32 Uploaded by MANOJ KR. RAI(HC01072) on Thu Oct 16 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 17 02:28:11 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CRA/11/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 15/10/2025 undefined the year 1983 itself and, at the latest, in the year 2003 when the earlier Suit was filed. Hence, the ratio laid down in Bardoli Shreerang Exhibitors Private Limited (supra) would not assist the Plaintiffs, as the plea of lack of knowledge is not supported by the record or the conduct of the erstwhile partners of the firm.
Deemed Knowledge
67. In the present case, if the distinct causes of action pleaded in the Plaint are considered, two aspects emerge clearly: (i) the relief for specific performance of the agreement executed in the year 1983 is ex facie barred by limitation. From the facts stated hereinabove, it is evident that the Plaintiff was, at all times, aware that the original owner, Defendant No. 4, had refused to execute the sale deed pursuant to the said agreement, at least by the year 2003, when the erstwhile partners of the firm Tirupati Corporation had filed a Civil Suit concerning the same property.
68. Moreover, cause of action pertains to the challenge of the sale deeds executed by Defendant No. 4 in favour of Defendant No. 5, and by Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 in favour of Defendant No. 6, in the year 2008. The fact remains that the sale deed executed by Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 in favour of Defendant No. 6 was executed in their capacity as partners of the partnership firm Tirupati Corporation, and being a registered 33 Uploaded by MANOJ KR. RAI(HC01072) on Thu Oct 16 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 17 02:28:11 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CRA/11/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 15/10/2025 undefined document, it carries deemed notice to the Plaintiffs. Therefore, the Plaintiff could not have filed the Suit beyond the period of limitation prescribed under Article 59 of the Limitation Act. Moreover, the sale deed executed by Defendant No. 4 in favour of Defendant No. 5 in the year 2003 is also a registered document, constituting deemed knowledge in law, and hence, the Plaintiff cannot be heard to say that the cause of action to file the present Suit has subsequently arisen
69. This Court in M/s. Vraj Developers v. Rameshbhai Gopalbhai Patel and ors., CRA 26 of 2017 has held as follows:
Genesis of this doctrine or proposition seems to lay in the fact that a person cannot after an indefinite period of time rise to challenge everything or every document which has been executed while that person was in a slumber. Therefore, some questions which can legitimately arise such a situation are (i) Whether the Plaintiff could have reasonably known about a transaction? (ii) Could that factum of execution of the transaction be discovered by the Plaintiff by due diligence? (iii) What is the nature of right that the Plaintiff claims to hold over the property? (iv) Is his claim of belated knowledge consistent with such right that the Plaintiff professes to have?, etc. ...34 Uploaded by MANOJ KR. RAI(HC01072) on Thu Oct 16 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 17 02:28:11 IST 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION C/CRA/11/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 15/10/2025 undefined Having noticed the aforesaid position of law on the aspect of 'deemed knowledge' the following principles can be culled out:
1) Prima Facie, there is a presumption that a registered document has been validly executed [Prem Singh (supra)].
2) Registration of a document, (unless rebutting the presumption of knowledge) gives notice to public about such registration [Suraj Lamps (supra) Para 17].
3) Whenever a document is registered the date of registration becomes the date of deemed knowledge. In other cases where a fact could be discovered by due diligence then deemed knowledge would be attributed to the Plaintiff [Dilboo (supra)].
4) After this stage, two outcomes may occur.
i. The Plaintiff has validly pleaded material and exact dates of acquiring knowledge, etc. and has pleaded a cause of action which is triable [cases to the likes of Daliben, Chhotanben, etc.] ii. The Plaintiff has made vague averments, pleaded illusory cause, inasmuch as has pleaded such averments which outright show that the date of knowledge as pleaded by the Plaintiff is a false contention by way of clever drafting.35 Uploaded by MANOJ KR. RAI(HC01072) on Thu Oct 16 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 17 02:28:11 IST 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION C/CRA/11/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 15/10/2025 undefined
5) Therefore, at this juncture, under Order VII Rule 11, it is important to examine and scrutinize the cause of action so pleaded. If the cause of action is illusory, vexatious or frivolous as being outright sham.
70. In the present case, the plea of the Plaintiffs that they were unaware of the execution of the sale deeds cannot be accepted. The sale deed executed by Defendant No. 4 in favour of Defendant No. 5 in the year 2003 and the subsequent sale deed executed by Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 in favour of Defendant No. 6 in the year 2008 are both registered documents, forming part of the public record. Under settled law, registration of a document constitutes deemed notice to all persons claiming any interest in the property. The Plaintiffs, being successors of the original partners of Tirupati Corporation, were bound to be aware of transactions affecting the property that formed part of the firm's assets. The record further shows that even in the year 2003, a Civil Suit was filed by the erstwhile partners concerning the same property, thereby affirming their knowledge of the transactions. Hence, the Plaintiffs cannot now claim ignorance or seek to revive their right after decades. The deemed knowledge of the registered instruments squarely bars the present Suit under Articles 54 and 59 of the Limitation Act.
Plaintiff's basis of right and Section 69 of the Partnership 36 Uploaded by MANOJ KR. RAI(HC01072) on Thu Oct 16 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 17 02:28:11 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CRA/11/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 15/10/2025 undefined Act
71. Another relevant aspect that requires consideration is that the present Suit has been instituted by the Plaintiffs claiming rights on behalf of the partnership firm. A reading of the averments in the Plaint makes it evident that the Plaintiffs assert their entitlement to the suit property by virtue of the Partnership Deed, under which they claim to have become partners upon the demise of their father.
72. Reliance has been placed on Clause 12 of the said partnership deed to contend that, as the legal heirs of the deceased partner, the Plaintiffs have stepped into his shoes and thereby acquired the rights and interests of a partner in respect of the suit property.
73. If the partnership deed and the existence of the partnership firm are excluded from consideration in the Suit, the Plaintiffs would have no independent or individual right in the suit property. Their entire claim is founded upon the rights allegedly flowing from the partnership firm and the partnership deed. In the absence of such partnership or any contractual nexus directly conferring ownership or possessory rights upon the Plaintiffs, no personal or separate entitlement in the suit property can be said to exist in their favour.
74. When the partnership firm itself has ceased to exist, no individual partner can maintain a claim for specific 37 Uploaded by MANOJ KR. RAI(HC01072) on Thu Oct 16 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 17 02:28:11 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CRA/11/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 15/10/2025 undefined performance in his personal favour in respect of a contract executed with the firm. The rights and obligations under such an agreement vest in the firm as a collective entity, and once the firm stands dissolved, those rights cannot be individually enforced by a former partner, especially qua themselves alone. Any attempt by a partner to seek specific performance in a personal capacity, in relation to a contract entered into with the firm, is impermissible.
75. In this background, it is apposite to consider Section 69 of the Partnership Act into account:
"69. Effect of non-registration. --(1) No suit to enforce a right arising from a contract or conferred by this Act shall be institutes in any Court by or on behalf of any person suing as a partner in a firm against the firm or any person alleged to be or to have been a partner in the firm unless the firm is registered and the person suing is or has been shown in the Register of Firms as a partner in the firm.
(2) No suit to enforce a tight arising from a contract shall be instituted in any Court by or on behalf of a firm against any third party unless the firm is registered and the persons suing are or have been shown in the Register of Firms as partners in the firm.
(3) The provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) shall apply also to a claim of set-off or other proceeding to enforce a right arising from a contract, but shall 38 Uploaded by MANOJ KR. RAI(HC01072) on Thu Oct 16 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 17 02:28:11 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CRA/11/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 15/10/2025 undefined not affect--
(a) the enforcement of any right to sue for the dissolution of a firm or for accounts of a dissolved firm, or a ay right or power to realise the property of a dissolved firm, or
(b) the powers of an official assignee, receiver or Court under the Presidency-towns Insolvency Act, 1909 (2 of 1909), or the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920 (5 of 1920), to realise the property of an insolvent partner.
..."
76. The fact remains that the present Suit has been instituted to enforce rights arising out of a contractual obligation and has been filed by persons suing in the capacity of partners of the firm. However, such a Suit is not maintainable unless the partnership firm is duly registered and the persons suing are shown as partners in the Register of Firms, as contemplated under the Indian Partnership Act, 1932. In the present case, the Plaintiffs are admittedly not recorded as partners in the Register of Firms, and since the firm itself is unregistered, the Suit could not have been instituted in law.
77. Moreover, in view of sub-section (2) of Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, the Plaintiffs are seeking to enforce a right arising out of a contract against Defendant Nos. 2 to 8. As the firm in question is unregistered, such enforcement is expressly barred under the said provision.
39 Uploaded by MANOJ KR. RAI(HC01072) on Thu Oct 16 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 17 02:28:11 IST 2025NEUTRAL CITATION C/CRA/11/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 15/10/2025 undefined Hence, the Suit is barred by law, as consistently held by the Courts in similar circumstances.
78. In Farooq v. Sandhya Antraper, 2018 (12) SCC 580, it has been held at paragraph No. 5 and 6 as under:
"5. Having heard the learned Senior counsel appearing for the parties, it is clear that the plaint, read as a whole, relied upon clause 25 (d) of the Partnership Deed which specifically states that no partners of the firm shall without the consent in writing of the other partners be entitled to transfer immovable property belonging to the firm. The plaint then goes on to say that the suit schedule property was purchased out of the funds of the firm for the purpose of development and sale. In paragraph 11, the plaintiffs discovered that a sale deed has been executed by the first defendant. It has been specifcally stated that the plaintiffs had never consented to the same and the first defendant has no authority to sell any immovable property belonging to the firm.
6. The plaint, read as a whole, leaves no manner of doubt that the basis of the suit is Section 69 of the Partnership Act read with clause 25 (d) of the Partnership Deed dated 29th December, 1995. Paragraph 18 of the plaint does not carry the matter further inasmuch as the only sentence which could possibly be relied upon, and which was relied upon by the High Court, is that the plaintiffs are entitled to file the suit even independently of the partnership firm. Having found that the basis of the suit is the 40 Uploaded by MANOJ KR. RAI(HC01072) on Thu Oct 16 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 17 02:28:11 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CRA/11/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 15/10/2025 undefined factum of partnership and having relied upon clause 25 (d) of the Partnership Deed, it is clear that the Trial Court correctly found that the bar of Section 69 of the Act was attracted in the facts of this case.
79. In the present case, the Plaintiffs have not instituted the Suit in their individual capacity but have done so in their capacity as partners of the firm Tirupati Corporation. This position is evident from the averments made in the Plaint, which clearly state that the Suit has been filed by the Plaintiffs as partners of the said firm. Consequently, in view of the admitted fact that the partnership firm stands dissolved upon the death of the original partners, the Plaintiffs could not have maintained the present Suit in law.
80. This is also because, if the Plaintiffs do not claim through the Firm, they do not obtain any right to sue. Hence, it is done only with the reason to
81. Moreover, the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Gujarat High Court in Pathik Udayan Bhatt v. Sakti Infotech and Others, 2024 SCC OnLine Guj 4221, applies in the present case.
"21. With the help of learned advocate for the petitioner, I have perused the plaint of Regular Civil Suit NO.600 of 2016 filed by the plaintiffs- respondents, which is at Annexure-B to this petition, and upon bare perusal of the entire plaint, I am unable to find out anywhere in the plaint a single 41 Uploaded by MANOJ KR. RAI(HC01072) on Thu Oct 16 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 17 02:28:11 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CRA/11/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 15/10/2025 undefined averment that the respondent No.1-is a registered firm, and as such, I find merit in the contention canvassed by the learned advocate for the applicant that in the absence of any assertion made in the plaint by the respondents that their firm is a registered firm, and in the absence of any documentary evidence being produced by them in support thereof, the suit instituted by the respondents is hit by the provisions of Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act, and when the suit is barred by any law, as per Clause 11(d) of Order VII, the same is required to be dismissed at the threshold."
82. Therefore also, as there are no averments in the Plaint that the suit is filed by the firm which has been registered under the Partnership Act, the plaint ought to have been rejected by the trial Court even on this count.
83. Therefore, in the absence of any averment in the Plaint to the effect that the Suit has been instituted by a firm duly registered under the provisions of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, the Suit is rendered not maintainable in law. The Ld. Trial Court ought to have rejected the Plaint on this ground alone, as the statutory bar under Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act operates squarely against the maintainability of a Suit filed by or on behalf of an unregistered firm.
Re: Part performance of Contract and Ancillary Relief
84. In the present case, the principal and substantive relief sought 42 Uploaded by MANOJ KR. RAI(HC01072) on Thu Oct 16 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 17 02:28:11 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CRA/11/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 15/10/2025 undefined by the Plaintiff is one for specific performance of the agreement dated 19.12.1983. The relief relating to protection of possession over the suit property, as pleaded in the Plaint, is merely incidental or ancillary to the claim for specific performance. Once it is held that the primary relief for specific performance is barred by limitation, any consequential or ancillary relief which is dependent upon the success of that principal claim cannot independently survive. The law is well settled that where the main relief is barred, the ancillary or consequential relief automatically falls.
85. It further appears from the record that the Plaintiff seeks to protect his possession over the suit property by invoking the doctrine of part performance under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The Plaintiff's case is that possession was handed over to him pursuant to the supplementary agreement dated 19.12.1983, and therefore, his continued possession deserves protection. However, Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act does not confer ownership or any enforceable title; it merely protects the possession of a transferee who has acted in part performance of a contract.
86. The scope of Section 53A has been judicially defined by the Hon'ble Supreme Court to mean that the provision operates only as a shield and not as a sword. It can be used as a defence to resist dispossession but cannot be invoked as a 43 Uploaded by MANOJ KR. RAI(HC01072) on Thu Oct 16 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 17 02:28:11 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CRA/11/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 15/10/2025 undefined basis to assert ownership or to seek affirmative relief such as specific performance or declaration of title. The Plaintiff, therefore, cannot rely on Section 53A to found a cause of action for enforcement of any contractual right.
87. This is for a simple reason. If the Plaintiff is seeking a relief of protection of possession on the strength of an Agreement to Sell, it is claiming the benefit by operation of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 ("TP Act"). However, the benefit of Section 53A of the TP Act is not available to an Unregistered Agreement to sell holder. Albeit it is true that since the document has been executed before 2001, according to Section 17A the same is not required to be registered.
88. In light of the above settled position, the Plaintiff's reliance on Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act to sustain his claim or protect his possession is legally untenable. Once the primary claim for specific performance is barred by limitation, the ancillary plea for protection of possession under Section 53A must also fail.
89. The Plaintiffs however, have tried to come out of the rigours of section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, by stating that since there are other reliefs regarding protection possession of the suit property. However, when the main relief of declaration and cancellation of the sale deed itself is not maintainable, it cannot be said that the Plaintiff had any cause 44 Uploaded by MANOJ KR. RAI(HC01072) on Thu Oct 16 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 17 02:28:11 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CRA/11/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 15/10/2025 undefined of action for seeking other reliefs namely, injunction.
90. It is pertinent to note that when the main relief of specific performance is not available to the Plaintiff on account of non-disclosure and non-existence of cause of action, for the same, the consequential relief of injunction cannot be said to be available to the Plaintiff on similar count. Therefore, when the relief of injunction is not an independent relief, there is no question of rejection of the Plaint, since the main relief itself is not maintainable in the present case.
91. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Padhiyar Prahladji Chenaji (Deceased) through L.Rs. vs. Maniben Jagmalbhai (Deceased) through L.Rs. and Ors. MANU/SC/0272/2022 held as follows:
11. From the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court, it appears that the High Court has not properly appreciated the distinction between a substantive relief and a consequential relief. The High Court has observed that in the instant case the relief of permanent injunction can be said to be a substantive relief, which is clearly an erroneous view. It is to be noted that the main reliefs sought by the Plaintiff in the suit were cancellation of the sale deed and declaration and the prayer of permanent injunction restraining Defendant No. 1 from disturbing her possession can be said to be a consequential relief. Therefore, the title to the property was the basis of the relief of possession. If that be so, in the present case, the relief for 45 Uploaded by MANOJ KR. RAI(HC01072) on Thu Oct 16 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 17 02:28:11 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CRA/11/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 15/10/2025 undefined permanent injunction can be said to be a consequential relief and not a substantive relief as observed and held by the High Court. Therefore, once the Plaintiff has failed to get any substantive relief of cancellation of the sale deed and failed to get any declaratory relief, and as observed hereinabove, relief of injunction can be said to be a consequential relief. Therefore, the prayer for permanent injunction must fail. In the instant case as the Plaintiff cannot be said to be in lawful possession of the suit land, i.e., the possession of the Plaintiff is "not legal or authorised by the law", the Plaintiff shall not be entitled to any permanent injunction.
11.1 An injunction is a consequential relief and in a suit for declaration with a consequential relief of injunction, it is not a suit for declaration simpliciter, it is a suit for declaration with a further relief.
Whether the further relief claimed has, in a particular case as consequential upon a declaration is adequate must always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Where once a suit is held not maintainable, no relief of injunction can be granted. Injunction may be granted even against the true owner of the property, only when the person seeking the relief is in lawful possession and enjoyment of the property and also legally entitled to be in possession, not to disposes him, except in due process of law.
92. Therefore, it is clear that the Plaintiff has sought relief of injunction as a mere consequential relief, which cannot 46 Uploaded by MANOJ KR. RAI(HC01072) on Thu Oct 16 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 17 02:28:11 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CRA/11/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 15/10/2025 undefined sustain once the main relief of cancellation of sale deed has been held to be not maintainable. Therefore, there is no question of the suit being sent for trial when there was no cause of action to seek the main relief of cancellation of the sale deed.
V. JUDGMENTS CITED BY THE PLAINTIFF
93. The Plaintiffs have relied on the following judgments (i) (1965) 57 ITR 510 in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax, MP, Nagur and Bhanda v. Seth Gonvindram Sugarmills, (ii) (2010) 2 SCC 407 in the case of Mohamad Liaquiddin & Anr. v. Kamladevi Misra, (iii) 2021 SCC OnLine GUJ 3285 in the case of Bardoli Shreerang Exhibitors Private Limited v. Maheshbhai Babubhai Hirapara, (iv) Civil Appeal No.785 of 2022 in the case of Shive Developers throgh its Partner Sunibhai Somabhai Ajmeri v. Aksharay Devlopers & Ors., (v) 2024 INSC 1049 in the case of Daliben Valjibhai & Ors. v. Prajapati Kodarbhai Kacharabhai & Anr., (vi) Civil Appeal No.5622 of 2025 (2025 INSC 598) in the case of P. Kumarakurubaran v. P. Narayanan & Ors., (vii) Civil Appeal No.7019 of 2025( 2025 INSC 772) in the case of Vinod Infra Developers Ltd. v. Mahavir Lunia & Ors., wherein also it has been held that when there are two surviving partners and on death of one partner, the 47 Uploaded by MANOJ KR. RAI(HC01072) on Thu Oct 16 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 17 02:28:11 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CRA/11/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 15/10/2025 undefined partnership would come to an end.
94. Learned Senior Advocate for the Plaintiff has also placed reliance on the judgment reported in 2021 SCC OnLine Guj 3285 in the case of Bardoli Shreerang Exhibitors Private Limited v. Maheshbhai Babubhai Hirapara, wherein the Hon'ble Court held that when there is a specific case pleaded by the Plaintiff that he became aware of the impugned deeds only upon the filing of the Written Statement in the earlier Suit, then, though such averment may or may not ultimately be proved, the issue of limitation cannot, at the threshold, be pressed against the Plaintiff.
95. However, in the present case, the Plaintiffs are asserting rights as alleged partners of the dissolved firm Tirupati Corporation and are seeking to derive title and possession on the strength of agreements dated 15.12.1983 and 19.12.1983. It is an admitted position that the original partners of Tirupati Corporation had already asserted their alleged rights under the same agreements, and even at that point of time, they had not sought specific performance. The Civil Suit No. 1435 of 2003 filed by the partnership firm was only for injunction, and no relief for specific performance was claimed. This clearly indicates that the original partners were fully aware of the execution of the agreements as well as the conduct of the original owner, Defendant No. 4, who was not a signatory to either of the agreements and had never agreed to execute a 48 Uploaded by MANOJ KR. RAI(HC01072) on Thu Oct 16 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 17 02:28:11 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CRA/11/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 15/10/2025 undefined sale deed in favour of Tirupati Corporation.
96. With respect to the judgment relied upon by the learned Senior Advocate for the Plaintiff in the case of Shiv Developers through its Partner Sunilbhai Somabhai Ajmeri v. Aksharay Developers and Others, the same will not be applicable to the facts of the present case. The Suit filed by the Plaintiff is for enforcement of rights arising from a contract and not based on any allegation of fraud or misrepresentation. In Shive Developers (supra), the Court was dealing with a situation where the Suit was grounded on allegations of fraud, concealment and deceit, which is not the position in the present matter. The Plaintiff's claim is purely contractual and, therefore, the said decision does not assist the Plaintiff.
97. The judgment relied upon in the case of Daliben Valjibhai and Others v. Prajapati Kodarbhai Kacharabhai and Another is also not applicable. In that case, the Plaintiff had specifically contended that she became aware of the impugned sale deed only in the year 2004, and it was her case that the document contained forged signatures and thumb impressions. The issue there related to the computation of limitation in cases involving fraud under Section 17 of the Limitation Act. In the present case, however, the erstwhile partners of Tirupati Corporation were fully aware of the agreements dated 15.12.1983 and 19.12.1983 and had even 49 Uploaded by MANOJ KR. RAI(HC01072) on Thu Oct 16 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 17 02:28:11 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CRA/11/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 15/10/2025 undefined filed Civil Suit No. 1435 of 2003 for injunction, which was later withdrawn. Therefore, the Plaintiffs, claiming through the same partners, cannot assert lack of knowledge. The right to sue arose much earlier, and the Suit filed in 2020 is clearly barred by limitation.
98. Reliance placed on P. Kumarakurubaran v. P. Narayanan and Others is also misplaced. The said case concerned a challenge to a General Power of Attorney alleged to have been fraudulently executed. The Court examined limitation in that factual background. In the present case, the original owner, Defendant No. 4, was not a signatory to the agreements entered into between Defendant No. 3 and the partnership firm in 1983. The erstwhile partners never sought specific performance of those agreements despite being aware of the refusal of Defendant No. 4. The record shows that the partners had knowledge of such refusal at least since the year 2003. Therefore, the said judgment does not assist the Plaintiffs.
99. As regards reliance on Vinod Infra Developers Ltd. v.
Mahavir Lunia and Others, where the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that a plaint can only be rejected if it is manifestly vexatious or discloses no cause of action, the principle does not help the Plaintiffs. In the present case, there are two distinct causes of action: one for specific performance of the 1983 agreement, and another challenging sale deeds executed 50 Uploaded by MANOJ KR. RAI(HC01072) on Thu Oct 16 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 17 02:28:11 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CRA/11/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 15/10/2025 undefined in 2003 and 2008. Both causes of action are barred by limitation. The registered sale deeds of 2003 and 2008 are public documents, and the Plaintiffs are deemed to have knowledge of their execution. The sale deed of 14.11.2008 was executed by Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 in their capacity as partners of Tirupati Corporation, which imputes constructive notice to the Plaintiffs. Similarly, the sale deed executed by Defendant No. 4 in favour of Defendant No. 5 in 1983 was a registered document, creating deemed knowledge under law. Therefore, the Plaintiffs cannot claim ignorance or a fresh cause of action. The Suit is clearly barred by limitation under Article 59 of the Limitation Act and discloses no existing right to sue.
VI. CONCLUSION
100. Upon careful consideration of the pleadings, documents, and reliefs sought in the Plaint, this Court finds that the Suit suffers from fundamental legal infirmities and discloses no genuine cause of action. The summary reasoning for the same may be set out as follows:
101. Firstly, the Suit is based on agreements dated 15.12.1983 and 19.12.1983, which were entered into not with the Plaintiffs in their individual capacity but with the partnership firm Tirupati Corporation. The Plaintiffs, however, have sought specific performance of those agreements in their personal 51 Uploaded by MANOJ KR. RAI(HC01072) on Thu Oct 16 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 17 02:28:11 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CRA/11/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 15/10/2025 undefined favour. Such a pleading reflects an inherent inconsistency. The Plaintiffs cannot claim rights under agreements executed with the firm and simultaneously sue in their own names. This conduct amounts to clear approbation and reprobation seeking to rely on the firm when it suits their purpose and to disown its existence to avoid the statutory bar under Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932. Such mutually destructive pleas cannot stand together and render the cause of action wholly illusory.
102. Secondly, the partnership firm Tirupati Corporation stood dissolved upon the death of its two partners, in terms of Section 42(c) of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932. Once the firm was dissolved, no legal relationship survived between the erstwhile partners, nor could any rights or liabilities be enforced in the name of the firm. The Plaintiffs, claiming through the deceased partners, cannot maintain a Suit on behalf of a non-existent entity or claim personal reliefs flowing from contracts executed in its name.
103. Thirdly, even assuming the agreements to be validly executed, the Suit is hopelessly barred by limitation under Article 54 of the Limitation Act. The right to seek specific performance accrued in 1983 when the agreements were executed, and, at the latest, in 2003 when the erstwhile partners filed Civil Suit No. 1435 of 2003 without seeking such relief. The subsequent sale deeds executed in 2003 and 52 Uploaded by MANOJ KR. RAI(HC01072) on Thu Oct 16 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 17 02:28:11 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CRA/11/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 15/10/2025 undefined 2008 are registered public documents, and the Plaintiffs are deemed to have had constructive notice of their execution. Hence, the plea of lack of knowledge or recent discovery is untenable.
104. Fourthly, the Suit is expressly barred under Section 69(1) and (2) of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, since the partnership firm was unregistered and the Plaintiffs are not shown in the Register of Firms as partners. The statutory bar is absolute and goes to the root of the maintainability of the Suit.
105. Fifthly, the cause of action, as pleaded, is artificial and illusory. The Plaintiffs have attempted to resurrect stale and extinguished rights (that too of the dissolved firm) through vague averments. The Suit, therefore, represents a clear instance of an illusory cause of action. Allowing such a Suit to proceed would amount to permitting abuse of the judicial process.
106. In view of the above, this Court finds that the Plaint is devoid of merit and discloses no legally enforceable right. The Suit is barred both by limitation and by the provisions of Section 69 of the Partnership Act, 1932. The cause of action being illusory and inconsistent, the Plaint deserves to be rejected at the threshold under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
53 Uploaded by MANOJ KR. RAI(HC01072) on Thu Oct 16 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 17 02:28:11 IST 2025NEUTRAL CITATION C/CRA/11/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 15/10/2025 undefined
107. Accordingly, the Civil Revision Application is allowed. The impugned order passed by the Learned Trial Court below Exhibit 80 is quashed and set aside. The application under Order VII Rule 11 is allowed, and the Plaint in Civil Suit No. 220 of 2020 stands rejected. No order as to costs.
(SANJEEV J.THAKER,J) Manoj Kumar Rai 54 Uploaded by MANOJ KR. RAI(HC01072) on Thu Oct 16 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 17 02:28:11 IST 2025