Punjab-Haryana High Court
Ram Kishore Goyal And Others vs State Of Punjab And Others on 4 April, 2012
Author: Hemant Gupta
Bench: Hemant Gupta, A.N.Jindal
CWP No. 6436 of 2012 (
1)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
Date of decision: 4.4.2012
CWP No. 6436 of 2012
Ram Kishore Goyal and others ......Petitioners
vs.
State of Punjab and Others .....Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HEMANT GUPTA HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.N.JINDAL
1. Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
2. To be referred to the Reporters or not?
3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest? Present: - Shri Sanjay Majithia, Senior Advocate, with Shri Shailender Sharma, Advocate, for the petitioners. HEMANT GUPTA, J The challenge in the present writ petition is to the extension to the Municipal limits of the Municipal Council, Sunam vide notification dated 30.12.2009 (Annexure P.7).
The petitioners have averred that the they have agricultural land in the village outside the Municipal limits of Municipal Committee Sunam, wherein they have constructed godowns in pursuance of the Rural Godown Scheme framed by the Punjab State Warehousing Corporation. It was on 12.10.2006, a notification was published intending to extend the Municipal limits of the Municipal Committee, Sunam under Section 5(2) of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911. The CWP No. 6436 of 2012 (
2) objections to such extension of the Municipal limits were required to be submitted within four weeks. The petitioners submitted their objections and the Principal Secretary to Government of Punjab, issued a notice calling upon the petitioners to appear before him on 27.7.2007 at 11.30 a.m. It is asserted by the petitioners that on that day, no hearing took place and thereafter, the notification has been published on 30.12.2009.
The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that no opportunity of hearing was granted and that objections were not decided. Still further, it has been argued that name of the Gram Panchayat was not mentioned in the draft or final notification. It has been further argued that the boundaries have been extended five times and the house tax would be imposed without facility and negates the mandate of the Constitution, establishing the Panchayats under Part IX of the Constitution. The learned counsel for the Petitioner relies upon Division Bench judgments of this court reported as Harjinder Singh and others v. State of Punjab, 2002(1) RCR (Civil) 610; Kamaljeet Singh v. State of Punjab through Principal Secretary to Government of Punjab, Local Government Department, 2002(3) RCR (Civil) 438 and Sewa Singh v. State of Punjab, 2001(3) RCR (Civil) 292.
Similar issue came up for hearing before us in CWP No. 17225 of 2008 Gram Panchayat, Manne Majra and others v. State of Punjab decided on 2.4.2012, wherein it has been held that constitution extension of the Municipality is a legislative function and that the ground to challenge an administrative order are not available to challenge a legislative function after considering the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners.
The argument raised that the petitioners was not afforded opportunity of personal hearing, is not tenable. The petitioners were given notice of presentation in person. Simply to state that no CWP No. 6436 of 2012 (
3) opportunity of hearing has taken place is not sufficient as the personal hearing is not the requirement of the Statute. Even in respect of opportunity of hearing, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India and another v. Cynamide India Ltd. and another, 1987 (2) SCC 720 has held that such hearing is an enabling provisions intended to facilitate the subordinate legislating body to obtain relevant information from all and whatever source and not intended to vest any right in anyone other than the subordinate legislating body. It was held to the following effect:-
"6. Occasionally, the legislature directs the subordinate legislating body to make "such enquiry as it thinks fit" before making the subordinate legislation. In such a situation, while such enquiry by the subordinate legislating body as it deems fit is a condition precedent to the subordinate legislation, the nature and the extent of the enquiry is in the discretion of the subordinate legislating body and the subordinate legislation is not open to question on the ground that the enquiry was not as full as it might have been. The provision for "such enquiry as it thinks fit" is generally an enabling provision, intended to facilitate the subordinate legislating body to obtain relevant information from all and whatever source and not intended to vest any right in anyone other than the subordinate legislating body. It is the sort of enquiry which the legislature itself may cause to be made before legislating, an enquiry which will not confer any right on anyone.
A Division Bench of this Court in Bhupinder Singh v. Union of India, 1997(3) PLR 334s, while considering similar issue, has held to the following effect:-
"22. It is well known that the principles of natural justice cannot be extended to an extent whereby the legislative function would be rendered illusory. Making of a law is not an end in itself but means to an end which the Legislature desires to secure. In the legislative history and by tradition CWP No. 6436 of 2012 (
4) as well, the principles of natural justice cannot be imbibed in the legislative functions unless the legislatures themselves, expressly or impliedly, provide for the same. One cannot set aside the State action of a particular character for not imbibing the principles of natural justice in it. The nature of individual's rights is one of the considerations. Applicability of principles of natural justice cannot be left at large. Its applicability is to be tested on the touchstone of public interest, convenience, necessity etc. We can say that incidentally legislatures are in fact, delegatories of the people. As observed earlier, Hon'ble Supreme Court in R.K.Porwal v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1981 SC 1127 observed that in case of legislative activity or making a legislative instrument, declaration by government notification that a certain place shall be principal market yard, upon which declaration certain statutory provisions spring into action and certain consequences prescribed by statute, follow forthwith, which implies the observance of the principles of natural justice is neither called for nor it is obligatory for the legislative function to discharge."
We find that the petitioners have submitted objections and was called upon to appear in person, though there is no requirement to give opportunity of personal hearing. Thus, we find that the action of publication of the notification extending the municipal limits cannot be said to un-justified only on the bald allegation that no hearing was granted to the petitioner. There is nothing on record that the procedure provided in Section 5 of the Act has not been followed before the publication of the notification extending the municipal limits. The argument in respect of extension of boundaries five times and imposition of house tax without any facilities is again not tenable. The scope of power to declare the constitution of the Municipality or extend its limits has been discussed in detail by this Court in Gram Panchayat, Manne CWP No. 6436 of 2012 (
5) Majra's case (supra). The petitioners have not set up the grounds to impugn the notification as a legislative activity. The grounds to challenge a legislative action are different. Therefore, we do not find that such reasons can be a ground to annul a legislative action.
The petitioners have filed objections to the draft notification. Therefore, omission of the name of the Gram Panchayat from the draft or final notification is wholly inconsequential as the petitioners were aware of the intention of the State Government to extend the Municipal limits. The petitioners have suffered no prejudice.
In view of the above, we do not find any merit in the present petition. Hence, the same is dismissed.
(Hemant Gupta) Judge (A.N. Jindal) 4.4.2012 Judge ds