Karnataka High Court
Smt Vijaya C Bilagi vs Bangalore Development Authority on 30 September, 2022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 30TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2022
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE E.S.INDIRESH
WRIT PETITION NO.14474 OF 2017(BDA)
C/W
WRIT PETITION NO.23504 OF 2017
&
WRIT PETITION NO.42186 OF 2017
WRIT PETITION 14474 OF 2017
BETWEEN
1. SMT. VIJAYA C BILAGI
W/O LATE BILGI CHIDANANDA,
AGED ABOUT 79 YEARS
NO.1737, 90TH CROSS,
KUMARASWAMY LAYOUT,
1ST STAGE,
BENGALURU - 560078.
2. SRI D NARAYANAPPA
S/O LATE GANDODI DASAPPA
AGED ABOUT 68 YEARS
NO.354, GANDODI NILAYA,
OLD EXTENSION,
K R PURAM
BENGALURU - 560036.
3. SRI K SARANGAPANI
S/O KUPPUSWAMY
AGED 69 YEARS,
R/A NO.11, MURUGAN NIVAS,
UDAYA NAGAR,
VIVEKANANDA STREET,
BENGALURU - 560016.
2
4. SRI G KODANDARAMAN
S/O SRI GOVINDASWAMY
AGED 63 YEARS
NO.42, NEAR CITU OFFICE,
UDAYA NAGAR
VIVEKANANDA STREET,
BENGALURU - 560016.
5. SRI M SOMASHEKAR
S/O R MAHADESHWARA RAO ,
AGED 50 YEARS,
R/A NO.2/1, 25TH CROSS,
RT STREET,
BENGALURU - 560053.
6. SRI SATHYANARAYANA M L
S/O T L NARASIMHA SHASTRY
AGED 70 YEARS,
R/A NO.82, 7TH CROSS,
VITTAL NAGAR
ISRO LAYOUT,
BENGALURU - 560078.
7. SRI VASUDEVAMURTHY
S/O LATE H SRINIVASAIAH
AGED 78 YEARS,
R/A NO.2, 2ND FLOOR, 3RD MAIN
BETWEEN 6TH AND 7TH CROSS,
KEMPEGOWDA LAYOUT,
BSK III STAGE
BENGALURU - 560085.
8. SRI K MOHAN BABU
AGED 66 YEARS,
S/O LATE KRISHNAMURTHY NAIDU,
NO.247, 6TH CROSS,
BASHYAM NAGAR,
SRIRAMPURAM
BENGALURU - 560021.
...PETITIONERS
(BY SRI K V NARASIMHAN, ADVOCATE)
3
AND
1. BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
T CHOWDAIAH ROAD
KUMARA PARK WEST
BY ITS COMMISSIONER.
2. ITI EMPLOYEES HOUSING CO-OPERATIVE
SOCIETY LTD.
BY ITS EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
DOORAVANINAGAR
BENGALURU-560 016.
3. M N SRINIVAS
AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS
S/O LATE NANJAPPA
R/AT NO.19,
'GAVI RANGANATHASWAMY NILAYA'
BEHIND HACHUTH BUILDERS
7TH MAIN ROAD, NANJAPPA GARDEN
MALLATHAHALLI
BENGALURU-560 056.
....RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI K KRISHNA, ADVOCATE FOR R1;
SRI G.L. VISHWANATH, SENIOR ADVOCATE
FOR V C RAJU, ADVOCATE A/W SMT. MANASA B RAO,
ADVOCATES FOR R2;
SRI C M NAGABHUSHAN, FOR IMPLEADING APPLICANT R3)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE IMPUGNED
MODIFIED LAYOUT PLANT AT ANNEXURE-S SANCTIONED BY THE R1;
AND ETC.
WRIT PETITION NO.23504 OF 2017
BETWEEN:
M N SRINIVAS
AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS,
S/O LATE NANJAPPA
R/AT NO.19,
4
'GAVI RANGANATHASWAMY NILAYA'
BEHIND HACHUTH BUILDERS
7TH MAIN ROAD,
NANJAPPA GARDEN,
MALLATHAHALLI
BENGALURU - 560056.
....PETITIONER
(BY SRI C M NAGABHUSHANA, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA,
DEPARTMENT OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT
BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY,
VIDHANA SOUDHA
BENGALURU- 560001.
2. THE SPECIAL DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
PODIUM BLOCK,
V V TOWER
DR AMBEDKAR VEEDHI
BANGALORE 560001.
3. THE ITI EMPLOYEES HOUSING
ITI COMPOUND,
ITI TOWNSHIP,
DOORAVANINAGAR
BENGALURU 560016
REPRESENTED BY ITS
SECRETARY.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI NITYANANDA K R, AGA FOR R1 AND R2;
SRI G.L. VISHWANATH, SENIOR ADVOCATE
FOR V C RAJU AND SMT. MANASA B RAO, ADVOCATES FOR R3)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE
PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION DATED 13.10.1986 AT ANNEXURE-A
ISSUED BY THE R1 AND THE FINAL NOTIFICATION DATED 22.10.1987
ISSUED BY THE R1 VIDE ANNEXURE B IN RESPECT OF THE
PETITIONER SCHEDULE LAND IS CONCERNED; AND ETC.
5
WRIT PETITION NO.42186 of 2017
BETWEEN:
ITI EMPLOYEES' HOUSING CO-OPERATIVE
SOCIETY LTD.,
BEING A REGISTERED SOCIETY UNDER
KARNATAKA CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES ACT
AND HAVING ITS OFFICE AT
DOORAVANINAGAR
BENGALURU-560 016
BY ITS SECRETARY
SHIVANANDA MATAPATI.
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI G.L. VISHWANATH, SENIOR ADVOCATE
FOR SRI V C RAJU AND SMT. MANASA B RAO, ADVOCATES)
AND:
1. BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
BY ITS COMMISSIONER
T CHOWDAIAH ROAD
KUMARA PARK WEST
BENGALURU.
2. TOWN PLANNING SECTION
BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
BY ITS COMMISSIONER
T CHOWDAIAH ROAD
KUMARA PARK WEST
BENGALURU.
3. M N SRINIVAS
AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS
S/O LATE NANJAPPA
R/AT NO.19,
'GAVI RANGANATHASWAMY NILAYA'
6
BEHIND HACHUTH BUILDERS
7TH MAIN ROAD, NANJAPPA GARDEN
MALLATHAHALLI
BENGALURU-560 056.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI K KRISHNA, ADVOCATE FOR R1 AND 2;
SRI K S UDAY, ADVOCATE FOR IMPLEADING APPLICANT)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE LETTER
DATED 11.04.2017 VIDE ANNEXURE-L; AND ETC.
IN TH ESE PETITIONS AGUMENTS BEING HEARD,
JUDGMENT RESERVED, COMING ON FOR "PRONOUNCEMENT OF
ORDERS", THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:
ORDER
In Writ Petition No.14474 of 2017, petitioners have challenged the Modified Layout Plan (Annexure-S) issued by the respondent-Bangalore Development Authority (for brevity hereinafter referred to as "BDA"), interalia sought for direction to the respondent not to interfere with the petitioners peaceful possession and enjoyment of the schedule lands. Petitioners claim to be the allottees of site by the respondent-ITI Employees Housing Co-operative Society Limited (for brevity hereinafter referred to as "Society"). It is the grievance of the petitioners that the schedule properties have been carved out in the layout formed by the respondent-Society pursuant to the Preliminary 7 Notification dated 13th October, 1986 followed by the Final Notification dated 22nd October, 1987 and thereafter, award has been passed on 29th April, 1998. After allotment of the sites, respondent-BDA modified the layout plan as per Annexure-S, enlarging the relevant portion of the original layout plan and feeling aggrieved by the same, petitioner-allottees have presented this petition.
3. In Writ Petition No.23504 of 2017, the petitioner claims to be the owner of land bearing Survey No.11 measuring 9.17 acres at Mallathahalli village, Bangalore North Taluk, and challenge has been made to the Preliminary Notification dated 13th October, 1986 issued by the respondent-Government under Section 4(1) followed by Final Notification dated 22nd October, 1987 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short hereinafter referred to as "LA Act'), urging that the impugned notifications have lapsed on account of abandoning of scheme by the respondents.
4. Writ Petition No.42186 of 2017 is filed by the Society, challenging the letter dated 11th April, 2017 and also sought for 8 direction to the respondent-BDA to approve the modification to the modified layout plan submitted by the Society at Annexure- G.
5. Since the issues involved in the aforementioned writ petitions are related to each other, writ petitions are heard together and are disposed of by common order. In order to dispose of these writ petitions, the rank of the parties and averments made in WP No.23504 of 2017 is taken up for easy reference.
6. The relevant factual matrix of the case are that, the petitioner in Writ Petition No.23504 of 2017 claims to be the owner in possession of the land bearing Survey No.11 measuring 9.17 acres situate at Mallathahalli village, Bangalore North Taluk (hereinafter referred to as schedule property). It is averred in the petition that, originally the schedule property belonged to one Hanumaiah-great-grandfather of the petitioner. Hanumaiah died leaving behind three sons, viz. Karihanumaiah, Nanjundappa and Venkataramanppa. After the death of Hanumaiah, revenue records got transferred into the name of 9 Karihanumaiah. The said Karihanumaiah died issueless. Thereafter, the revenue records transferred into the name of Nanjundappa, (second son of Hanumaiah) who is the karta of the joint family. Thereafter, partition took place, in their family and schedule property allotted in favour of Nanjundappa. The said Nanjundappa had three sons, namely, Hanumanthappa, Rangappa and Nanjappa. During the lifetime of the Nanjundappa, partition took place between himself and his children and the Nanjundappa retained 3.20 acres in the schedule property and remaining property was allotted to the share of Nanjappa. After the death of Nanjappa, schedule property was inherited by his children, namely, M.N.Kumar, M.N.Srinivas (petitioner herein) and M.N. Chandrashekar. It is further submitted that petitioner and other co-owners of the schedule property had formed a layout carving residential sites and have sold sites in favour of the purchasers who have also constructed houses in survey No. 11 of Malathahalli villlage. It is further stated that petitioner and his brothers have partitioned their joint family properties and revenue entries have been changed accordingly. In the meanwhile, petitioner has received 10 notice in RA(BN).239 of 2014-15 from the office of the Assistant Commissioner, North Division, Bengaluru with regard to change of mutation and thereafter, the petitioner filed Original Suit No. 904 of 2015 before the City Civil Court, Bangalore, and also filed Regular Appeal under Section 136(2) of Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 (for brevity hereinafter referred to as "KLR Act") challenging the entries made by the Tahasildar in favour of respondent-Society in Survey No.11. Thereafter, the petitioner came to know that the respondent-Government had issued notification dated 12th October, 1986 under Section 4(1) of the LA Act notifying several lands, including the land belonging to the petitioner, for the purpose of allotment of residential sites in favour of members of respondent-Society. In the meanwhile, the respondents tried to interfere with the petitioner's possession in respect of the schedule property and as such, petitioner has filed Original Suit No.9044 of 2015 before the City Civil Court and also filed Regular Appeal before the Assistant Commissioner under Section 136 of the KLR Act, challenging the entries by the Tahsildar in respect of entries made in favour of respondent- Society. The petitioners have also stated that the respondent 11 have issued Final Notification under Section 6(1) of the LA Act on 22nd October, 1987 and challenged the same on the ground that the middleman like one Balaji Associates had entered into an agreement with respondent-Society for negotiating and getting the lands including the land belonging to the petitioner for the benefit of the respondent-Society and further the petitioner has questioned the legality of the action of middleman/agent in the proceedings. The petitioner contended that respondent-State can acquire the land for the benefit of the respondent-Society only under the purview of Section 3(f)(vi) of LA Act and therefore, presented the writ petition challenging the impugned Notifications. The petitioner has also claimed relief under Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation in Land Acquisition Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (for brevity hereinafter referred to as "2013 Act") and submitted that the proceedings shall deem to have lapsed on account of abandoning the scheme by the respondent-authorities as the possession of the property in question is with the petitioner. 12
7. The respondent-Society has filed detailed statement of objection whereby raised the preliminary objection relating to maintainability of writ petition on the ground of delay and laches in questioning the impugned notifications and also with regard to invoking Section 24(2) of 2013 Act. It is also contended that the predecessor-in-title of the petitioner-land owners have consented for passing consent award and accordingly urged that the writ petitions are not maintainable. It is further contended that pursuant to issuance of Preliminary and Final Notifications, possession of the land in question was taken on 02nd August, 1993 and Notification under Section 16(2) of the LA Act was issued on 09th September, 1993 and thereafter respondent- Society filed Writ petition before this Court seeking direction to the Government to hand over the possession of land in survey No.11, which came to be allowed by this Court and pursuant to the same, official memorandum dated 02nd February, 1995 was issued by the Government handing over the possession of land to the respondent-Society. The subject land in the petition is the part of the larger extent of land to an extent of 61.10 acres of Mallatahalli village, wherein the Government has initiated 13 acquisition proceedings for the benefit of the members of the respondent-Society. It is further contended that the agreement dated 22nd September, 1982 (Annexure-C) refers to the agreement between the land owners and developer agreeing to sell their lands and the family members of the petitioner including his father has executed the agreement with the Developer and thereby negated the contention raised by the petitioner-land owners with regard to middlemen/agent. In view of vesting of the land in terms of the Notification passed under Section 16(2) of the LA Act, the land vest with the Government and therefore, it is contended that the writ petition deserves to the dismissed. The respondent No.3 also referred to various writ petitions filed by the family members of the petitioner as stated at paragraphs 17 and 18 of the statement of objection, which concludes the challenge made to the acquisition proceedings. It is further stated that the layout plan was approved by the respondent-BDA by resolution dated 07th November, 1992 and thereafter, the respondent-BDA modified the layout plan on 09th June, 2000 including certain lands in favour of the respondent- 14 Society, and accordingly, sought for dismissal of the petition filed by the land owner.
8. I have heard Sri C.M. Nagabhushan, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-land owner; Sri Nitish, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of Sri K.V. Narasimhan for allottees; Sri Nityananda K.R., learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for respondent-State and Sri K. Krishna, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-BDA; Sri G.L. Vishwanath, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Sri V.C. Raju, appearing for beneficiary of land-Society.
9. Sri C.M. Nagabhushan, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-land owners, argued that the land in question belongs to the petitioner and the respondent-authorities acquired the same for the benefit of respondent-Society. He contended that the petitioner and other co-owners of the land have formed layout in Survey No.11 of Mallathahalli village and have sold several sites. The petitioner-land owners and the purchasers of the sites are in possession of the schedule property. The petitioner came to know about the acquisition 15 proceedings after receiving Notice from the office of the Assistant Commissioner, Bangalore North Sub-Division in a proceeding under Section 136(2) of KLR Act. He further contended that Original Suit No.9044 of 2015 was filed by the petitioner against the Society seeking relief of permanent injunction. The principal submission of Sri Nagabhushan that, the entire schedule property in Survey No.11 measuring 9.17 acres of Mallathahalli village, is in possession of the petitioner- land owners and co-owners and the acquisition proceedings was initiated by the respondent-authorities at the instance of the agreement (Annexure-C) entered into by the developer-Balaji Associates with the respondent-Society, Notifications were issued in the name of the parents of the petitioner and no award came to be passed nor possession taken by the respondent- authorities. Referring to the possession taken by the respondent-authority, learned Counsel referred to Annexure-R5 and argued that award was passed by the respondent-authorities showing the name of the village as Srigandhada Kavalu and thereafter, it was rectified as Mallathahalli village by way of corrigendum and the said Notifications have not been served to 16 the petitioner-land owners. He further contended that even insofar as Survey No.11 of Mallathahalli village is concerned, possession is alleged to have been taken in the year 1993 as per Annexure-E and therefore, contended that the acquisition proceedings lapses on account of not taking possession and for not having passed the award. Further, the learned counsel contended that as per Section 3(f)(vi) of the LA Act, respondent- authorities have not framed scheme for the benefit of the respondent-Society and the entire thing was managed through the middleman and in this regard he referred to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of H.M.T. HOUSE BUILDING CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY v. SYED KHADER AND OTHERS reported in (1995)2 SCC 677 and in the case of B. ANJANAPPA AND OTHERS v. VYALIKAVAL HOUSE BUILDING CO- OPERATIVE SOCIETY AND OTHERS reported in (2012)10 SCC
184. Further emphasis was placed on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of R. RAJASHEKAR AND OTHERS v. TRINITY HOUSE BUILDING CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY AND OTHERS reported in AIR 2016 SC 4329. Sri Nagabhushan, further contended that the Society and the Government have 17 committed a fraud by acquiring the property belonging to the petitioner-land owners without taking possession and at the instance of the middleman. In this regard, he referred to the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of PARTAP SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB reported in AIR 1964 SC 72. Referring to Annexure-E2 to the writ petition, he contended that one N.R. Shivakumar claims to be the GPA holder of the ancestors of the petitioner-land owners herein, appears to have taken award amount and he being a middleman, is not entitled to get the compensation from the respondent-authorities and accordingly, he sought for allowing of the writ petition filed by the land owners. Insofar as the writ petitions filed by the allottees of the third respondent-Society, he argued that since the acquisition proceedings vitiates on account of fraud, allottees are not entitled for benefit under the acquisition proceedings.
10. Sri G.L. Vishwanath, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent-Society argued that the survey No.11 of Mallathahalli village measuring 9.17 acres is a part of larger tract of land and the petitioner herein has challenged the preliminary 18 and final Notifications after lapse of 34 years and therefore, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. In this regard, learned Senior Counsel referred to the judgments in the case of S. JAGANNATH AND OTHERS v. BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY AND OTHERS AIR 2008 SC 1494; and in the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of R. PRAKASH v. THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER AND OTHERS made in Writ Appeal No.8130 of 2012 and connected appeal decided on 12th March, 2020. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent-Society, further contended that the possession of the land in question was handed over to the respondent-Society on 02nd February, 1995, the respondent-Society has formed a Layout and in furtherance of the same, Layout plan was approved by the respondent-BDA and in this regard registered Sale Deeds have been executed in favour of the allottees and already many constructions have come up in the schedule land and therefore, writ petition deserves to be dismissed. Further, Sri G.L. Vishwanath, learned Senior Counsel, contended that the members of the family of the petitioners claiming to be owners of the land in Survey No.10/1, 19 12, 13 and 6/1, have challenged the acquisition proceeding in Writ Petition No.9429 of 1992 and 9554 of 1992, which came to be dismissed by this Court on 07th September, 2012 and being aggrieved by the same Writ Appeal was preferred, which also came to be dismissed on 12th March, 2020 and therefore, the petitioners have no locus standi to challenge the same. The learned Senior Counsel further contended that consent award was made by respondent-authorities pursuant to the General Power of Attorney executed in respect of the land in question by uncle of the petitioner as a kartha of the family and therefore, as the agreement culminated between the Society and the Developer and thereafter, consent award was passed and therefore, he argued that the petitioner-land owners are estopped from raising the said plea. Learned Senior Counsel further contended that the respondent-Society has formed sites and sold the same to various allottes by registered Sale Deeds and they are in possession of the schedule land and therefore, the petition deserves to be dismissed. Sri G.L. Vishwanath, learned Senior Counsel further contended that the petitions deserve to be rejected on the ground of suppression of material 20 facts by the petitioners and also for non-joinder of necessary parties and further contended that the petitioners are not entitled for relief under Section 24(2) of 2013 Act and as such, sought for dismissal of writ petitions preferred by the land owners.
11. In respect of writ petition No.42186 of 2017, Sri G.L. Vishwanath, learned Senior Counsel contended that, the Society has left out the land ear-marked for the purpose of civic amenity as per the Layout plan approved by the respondent-BDA and therefore, argued that the letter dated 11th April, 2017 issued by the Respondent-BDA requires to be set aside by issuing direction to the respondent-BDA to approve the modification to the modified layout plan submitted by the Society dated 13.02.2015.
12. Sri Nitish, learned counsel appearing for allottees, argued that the writ petition filed by the land owners is not maintainable on the ground of delay and laches and he further submits that the allottees are in possession of the sites in question and therefore, sought for dismissal of the petition preferred by land owners. In respect of Writ Petition No.14474 21 of 2017, Sri Nitish, appearing for the petitioners, argued that the sale deeds have been executed by the respondent-Society in favour of the allottees and possession is also delivered to the petitioners, however, the petitioners could not put up construction in view of challenge to the land acquisition made by some of the land owners and as such, he further contended that after the litigations came to an end, the respondent-BDA restrained the petitioners to put up construction on the ground that the said land is earmarked for civic amenity and thereafter, the petitioners came to know about the issuance of the Modified Layout Plan and therefore, he contended that the said Modified Layout Plan is contrary to law and requires to be set aside.
13. Sri K. Krishna, learned counsel appearing for respondent-BDA submitted that the land owners have not made a case for interference challenging the acquisition proceedings as the petitions are filed at the belated stage and accordingly sought for dismissal of the petition filed by the land owners. With respect to the writ petition preferred by the respondent- Society, Sri K Krishna contended that the respondent-Society 22 has not ear-marked the land for the purpose of civic amenity and therefore, justifies the action of the respondent-BDA with regard to issuing letter dated 11th April, 2017 and accordingly, sought for dismissal all the writ petitions.
14. Sri K.R. Nityananda, learned Additional Government Advocate for respondent-State argued that since possession has been taken under Section 16(2) of the LA Act, no interference can be called for at the belated stage. Learned Additional Government Advocate produced the records and further submitted that some of the original records are produced in different writ petitions before this Court and in respect of the same, true copies in the file are produced and as such, he argued that the petitioner-land owners have not made out a case for interference challenging the acquisition proceedings in view of inordinate delay in filing the writ petitions.
15. In the light of the submission made by the learned counsel appearing for the parties, the question for consideration in this petition would be:
23
(i) Whether the petitioner/land owners have made out a case for interference in their petition?
(ii) Whether the allottees are entitled for sites, sold by the respondent-Society in view of the objection raised by the respondent-BDA?
16. It is an undisputed fact that on 13th October, 1986, the Government issued Notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, proposing to acquire the larger extent of land including the land belonging to the petitioner for the purpose of the members of the respondent-Society. Final Notification under Section 6(1) of the LA Act came to be issued on 22nd October, 1987. Award was passed on 15th October, 1988. Some of the land owners have entered into consent award on 29th April, 1987 and possession of the land was handed over to the Society on 26th April, 1989. The respondent authorities have issued notification dated 09th September, 1993 under Section 16(2) of the LA Act in respect of the land in question indicating the date of taking possession as on 02nd August, 1993. In that view of the matter, the land vested with 24 the Government free from all encumbrances. This Court, by order dated 15th December, 1994 in writ petition No.31104 of 1994, directed the State Government to deliver possession of survey No.11 to the respondent-Society. It is also not in dispute that the entire compensation has been deposited by the respondent-Society with the Government. By Official Memorandum dated 02nd February, 1995, Government has handed over the possession of the land to the respondent- Society. The careful examination of writ papers would indicate that an agreement dated 22nd September, 1982 has been entered into between the General Power of Attorney holder of the land owners and the respondent-Society in respect of the subject land by one N.R. Shivakumar (Annexure-R8) by the respondent-Society in Writ petition No.23504 of 2017). The family members of the petitioner-land owners have filed Writ petitions No.9429 of 1992 and 9554 of 1992 in respect of the land bearing survey No.10/1, 12, 13 and 6/1 of Mallthahalli village, which came to be dismissed by this Court by order dated 07th September, 2012, which order came to be confirmed by the Division Bench of this Court in Writ Appeal No.8131 of 2012 25 decided on 12th March, 2020. Several writ petitions, challenging the notifications, came to be rejected and one such petition filed by the Aunt of the petitioner in Writ Petition No.6071 of 1992, came to be rejected which was confirmed by this Court in Writ Appeal. Taking into consideration these aspects, though the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-land owners urged several grounds including the ground that approval has not been taken as required under Section 3(f)(vi) of the LA Act, the respondent-BDA and the Government have produced the records including the agreement entered into between the land owners and the Society inter alia the permission granted by the Government to allot sites in favour of the members of the respondent-Society through respondent-BDA and in that view of the matter, I do not find any acceptable ground to interfere with the arguments advanced by Sri C.M. Nagabhushan. That apart, learned counsel appearing for the respondents in Writ Petition No.23504 of 2017, seriously contended with regard to delay and laches in challenging the acquisition proceedings. In this regard, it is apt to refer to the dictum of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of BANDA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, BANDA v. MOTI LAL 26 AGARWAL AND OTHERS reported in (2011)5 SCC 394, wherein at paragraphs 15 to 27 of the judgment, it is observed thus:
"15. The above extracted portions of the plaint unmistakably show that respondent No.1 had no complaint against the acquisition of land or taking of possession by the State Government and delivery thereof to the BDA and the only prayer made by him was that the defendants be directed to undertake fresh acquisition proceedings after sub-dividing plot No. 795 so that he may get his share of compensation. He filed writ petition questioning the acquisition proceedings after almost 9 years of publication of the declaration issued under Section 6(1) and about six years of the pronouncement of award by the Special Land Acquisition Officer. During this interregnum, the BDA took possession of the acquired land after depositing 80% of the compensation in terms of Section 17(3A), prepared the layout, developed the acquired land, carved out plots, constructed flats for economically weaker sections of the society, invited applications and allotted plots and flats to the eligible persons belonging to economically weaker sections as also LIG, MIG and HIG categories. Unfortunately, the High Court ignored all this and allowed the writ petition on the specious ground that the acquired land did not vest in the State Government because physical possession of the land belonging to respondent No.1 was not taken till 31.7.2002 and the award was not 27 passed within two years as per the mandate of Section 11A.
16. In our view, even if the objection of delay and laches had not been raised in the affidavits filed on behalf of the BDA and the State Government, the High Court was duty bound to take cognizance of the long time gap of 9 years between the issue of declaration under Section 6(1) and filing of the writ petition and declined relief to respondent No.1 on the ground that he was guilty of laches because the acquired land had been utilized for implementing the residential scheme and third party rights had been created. The unexplained delay of about six years between the passing of award and filing of writ petition was also sufficient for refusing to entertain the prayer made in the writ petition.
17. It is true that no limitation has been prescribed for filing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution but one of the several rules of self imposed restraint evolved by the superior courts is that the High Court will not entertain petitions filed after long lapse of time because that may adversely affect the settled/crystallized rights of the parties. If the writ petition is filed beyond the period of limitation prescribed for filing a civil suit for similar cause, the High Court will treat the delay unreasonable and decline to entertain the grievance of the petitioner on merits.28
18. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhailal Bhai AIR 1964 SC 1006, the Constitution Bench considered the effect of delay in filing writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and held (paras 17 and 21):
"17....It has been made clear more than once that the power to give relief under Article 226 is a discretionary power. This is specially true in the case of power to issue writs in the nature of mandamus. Among the several matters which the High Courts rightly take into consideration in the exercise of that discretion is the delay made by the aggrieved party in seeking this special remedy and what excuse there is for it........... It is not easy nor is it desirable to lay down any Rule for universal application. It may however be stated as a general Rule that if there has been unreasonable delay the court ought not ordinarily to lend its aid to a party by this extraordinary remedy of mandamus.
21. Learned counsel is right in his submission that the provisions of the Limitation Act do not as such apply to the granting of relief under Art 226. It appears to us however that the maximum period fixed by the legislature as the time within which the relief by a suit in a Civil Court must be brought may ordinarily be taken to be a reasonable standard by which delay in seeking remedy under Article 226 can be measured. The court may consider the delay unreasonable even if it is less than the period of limitation prescribed for a civil action for the remedy but where the delay is more than this period, it will almost always be proper for the court to hold that it is unreasonable."
19. In matters involving challenge to the acquisition of land for public purpose, this Court has consistently held that delay in filing the writ petition 29 should be viewed seriously and relief denied to the petitioner if he fails to offer plausible explanation for the delay. The Court has also held that the delay of even few years would be fatal to the cause of the petitioner, if the acquired land has been partly or wholly utilised for the public purpose.
20. In Ajodhya Bhagat v. State of Bihar (1974) 2 SCC 501, this Court approved dismissal by the High Court of the writ petition filed by the appellant for quashing the acquisition of his land and observed:
"23. The High Court held that the appellants were guilty of delay and laches. The High Court relied on two important facts. First, that there was delivery of possession. The appellants alleged that it was a paper transaction. The High Court rightly rejected that contention. Secondly, the High Court said that the Trust invested several lakhs of rupees for the construction of roads and material for development purposes. The appellants were in full knowledge of the same. The appellants did not take any steps. The High Court rightly said that to allow this type of challenge to an acquisition of large block of land piecemeal by the owners of some of the plots in succession would not be proper. If this type of challenge is encouraged the various owners of small plots will come up with writ petitions and hold up the acquisition proceedings for more than a generation. The High Court rightly exercised discretion against the appellants. We do not see any reason to take a contrary view to the discretion exercised by the High Court."30
21. In State of Rajasthan v. D.R. Laxmi (1996) 6 SCC 445, this Court referred to Administrative Law H.W.R. Wade (7th Ed.) at pages 342-43 and observed:
"10. The order or action, if ultra vires the power, becomes void and it does not confer any right. But the action need not necessarily be set at naught in all events. Though the order may be void, if the party does not approach the Court within reasonable time, which is always a question of fact and have the order invalidated or acquiesced or waived, the discretion of the Court has to be exercised in a reasonable manner. When the discretion has been conferred on the Court, the Court may in appropriate case decline to grant the relief, even if it holds that the order was void. The net result is that extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court may not be exercised in such circumstances."
22. In Girdharan Prasad Missir v. State of Bihar (1980) 2 SCC 83, the delay of 17 months was considered as a good ground for declining relief to the petitioner. In Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Industrial Development Investment Co. Pvt. Ltd. (1996) 11 SCC 501, this Court held:
"9....It is thus well-settled law that when there is inordinate delay in filing the writ petition and when all steps taken in the acquisition proceedings have become final, the Court should be loath to quash the notifications. The High Court has, no doubt, discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the notification under Section 4(1) and declaration under Section 6. But it should be exercised taking all relevant factors into pragmatic consideration. When the award was passed and possession was taken, the Court should not have exercised its power to quash the award which is a material factor to be taken into 31 consideration before exercising the power under Article 226. The fact that no third party rights were created in the case is hardly a ground for interference. The Division Bench of the High Court was not right in interfering with the discretion exercised by the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition on the ground of laches."
23. In Urban Improvement Trust, Udaipur v. Bheru Lal (2002) 7 SCC 712, this Court reversed the order of the Rajasthan High Court and held that the writ petition filed for quashing of acquisition of land for a residential scheme framed by the appellant-Urban Improvement Trust was liable to be dismissed on the ground that the same was filed after two years.
24. In Ganpatibai v. State of M.P (2006) 7 SCC 508, the delay of 5 years was considered unreasonable and the order passed by the High Court refusing to entertain the writ petition was confirmed. In that case also the petitioner had initially filed suit challenging the acquisition of land. The suit was dismissed in 2001. Thereafter, the writ petition was filed. This Court referred to an earlier judgment in State of Bihar v. Dhirendra Kumar (1995)4 SCC 229 and observed:
"9. In State of Bihar v. Dhirendra Kumar this Court had observed that civil suit was not maintainable and the remedy to question notification under Section 4 and the declaration under Section 6 of the Act was by filing a writ petition. Even thereafter the appellant, as noted above, pursued the suit in the civil court. The stand 32 that five years after the filing of the suit, the decision was rendered does not in any way help the appellant. Even after the decision of this Court, the appellant continued to prosecute the suit till 2001, when the decision of this Court in 1995 had held that suit was not maintainable."
25. In Sawaran Lata v. State of Harayana (2010) 4 SCC 532, the dismissal of writ petition filed after seven years of the publication of declaration and five years of the award passed by the Collector was upheld by the Court and it was observed:
"11. In the instant case, it is not the case of the petitioners that they had not been aware of the acquisition proceedings as the only ground taken in the writ petition has been that substance of the notification under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6 of the 1894 Act had been published in the newspapers having no wide circulation. Even if the submission made by the petitioners is accepted, it cannot be presumed that they could not be aware of the acquisition proceedings for the reason that a very huge chunk of land belonging to a large number of tenure- holders had been notified for acquisition. Therefore, it should have been the talk of the town. Thus, it cannot be presumed that the petitioners could not have knowledge of the acquisition proceedings."
26. In the instance case, the acquired land was utilized for implementing Tulsi Nagar Residential Scheme inasmuch as after carrying out necessary development i.e. construction of roads, laying electricity, water and sewer lines etc. the BDA carved out plots, constructed flats for economically weaker sections and lower income group, invited applications for allotment of the plots and 33 flats from general as well as reserved categories and allotted the same to eligible persons. In the process, the BDA not only incurred huge expenditure but also created third party rights. In this scenario, the delay of nine years from the date of publication of the declaration issued under Section 6(1) and almost six years from the date of passing of award should have been treated by the High Court as more than sufficient for denying equitable relief to respondent No.1.
27. The two judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for respondent No.1 are not helpful to the cause of his client. In Vyalikaval House Building Co-op. Society v. V. Chandrappa (2007) 9 SCC 304, this Court held that where the acquisition was found to be vitiated by fraud and mala fide, the delay in filing the writ petition cannot be made a ground for denying relief to the affected person. In Babu Ram v. State of Haryana (supra), this Court held that the appellant cannot be denied relief merely because there was some delay in filing the writ petition. The facts of that case were that 34 kanals 2 marlas of land situated at Jind (Haryana) was acquired by the State Government under Section 4 read with Section 17(2)(c) and 17(4) for construction of sewage treatment plant. Notification under Section 4 was issued on 23.11.2005 and declaration under Section 6 was issued on 2.1.2006. Mitaso Educational Society, Narwana, filed suit for injuncting the State from constructing sewage treatment plant in front of the school. On 15.2.2006, the 34 trial Court passed an order of injunction. In another suit filed by one Jagroop similar order was passed by the trial Court. After some time, the appellant filed writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. Before this Court it was argued that relief should be denied to the appellant because there was delay in filing the writ petition. Rejecting this argument, the Court observed:
"32. Since Section 5-A of the LA Act had been dispensed with, the stage under Section 9 was arrived at within six months from the date of the notice issued under Sections 4 and 17(2)(c) of the LA Act. While such notice was issued on 23-11- 2005, the award under Section 11 was made on 23-5-2006. During this period, the appellants filed a suit and thereafter, withdrew the same and filed a writ petition in an attempt to protect their constitutional right to the property. It cannot, therefore, be said that there was either any negligence or lapse or delay on the part of the appellants.""
17. Following the judgment referred to above, as the petitioner herein not having challenged the Notification under Section 16(2) of the LA Act, so also, in view of inordinate delay and laches in approaching this Court, in my considered view, the arguments advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-land owner cannot be accepted.
35
18. In respect of the arguments advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that the respondent No.1- BDA has abandoned the scheme in respect of the subject land in question, the Division Bench of this Court in the case of KRISHNAMURTHY v. BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY reported in ILR 1996 KAR. 1258, at paragraphs 4 and 5 of the judgment, has observed thus:
"4. On the scope of Section 27 BDA Act, a Division Bench of this Court has considered the same and explained to the effect that for the scheme to lapse under Section 27 , there must be dereliction of duty or failure on the part of the authority to execute the scheme specifically within 5 years from the date of publication in the official Gazette and a declaration under Section 19(1) of the Act. The two conditions to be fulfilled to attract the provisions of this Section are, there must be failure to execute the scheme i.e., there must be dereliction of statutory duties without justification and not a mere delay in execution of the scheme. Secondly, substantial execution in the context depends on the magnitude of the scheme and the nature of the work to be executed. Though burden is upon the BDA to furnish material to the Court to show that there is substantial execution on the matter, it is for the appellant to place necessary material before the Court to show that there 36 has been dereliction of statutory duties and not mere delay in implementing the scheme. No such foundation has been laid out on that aspect except to point out there is delay on the part of the BDA.
5. More over, that period of 5 years lapsed in the year 1985. As to why the petitioner-appellant kept quiet for 7 years is un-understandable. However, the learned Counsel for the appellant sought to urge that there being no immediate threat of dispossession of the land, he did not approach this Court. That explanation will not carry the appellant far because there was acquisition of the land and steps were being taken in that regard. Appellant cannot merely state that the acquisition Notification issued seeking to acquire the land in question can be wished away by urging that by lapse of time it will disappear while he should have attacked the same within a reasonable time after the lapse of 5 years. We do not think 7 years delay in that regard would be appropriate or reasonable. Therefore, the view taken by leaned Single Judge in our opinion, is perfectly justified. Therefore, this Appeal could be dismissed on laches alone. Apart from that, we have pointed out that there is no material forthcoming in this case to show that there is dereliction of duty on the part of the BDA in not implementing the scheme to attract the provisions of Section 27 of the Act. The next ground urged on behalf of the appellant that Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act is applicable to the facts of the case is not at all tenable in view of the 37 Decision of this Court in WA 321-322/1989 disposed of on 6.10.1989, G. Narayanaswamy Reddy v. State of Karnataka and Ors. wherein it was held that Section 36 does not enable to hold that Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act which was introduced into that Act in 1984 would govern the acquisition under the BDA Act. Identical view has been taken by the Supreme Court in STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANR. v. SANT JOGINDER SINGH KISHAN SINGH AND ORS., AIR 1995 SC 2188. It is stated therein that the plea that since the award has not been made within 2 years from the date of publication under the Maharashtra Act under Section 126(2) thereof by operation of Section 11A of the Central Act, the Notification published under Section 125 of the Act shall be deemed to have been lapsed and the authorities are devoid of jurisdiction to proceed further is not tenable. The rationale adopted by Their Lordships is that wherever the Legislature intended to apply specific procedure or the fetters in exercising the power under the Central Act, it did no specifically. After the Central Act 68/1984 came into force no steps had been taken by the State Legislature to amend the Act introducing or incorporating Section 11A of the Central Act as part of the Act. Since the Legislature has incorporated specific provisions of the Central Act, the necessary conclusion is that Legislature did not intend to unspecify the provisions of the Central Act for exercise of power under the Act- If the Legislature would have merely adopted the Central Act, subsequent amendment to that Act made under 38 68/1984 Act would have been applicable per se. That is not the position in this case, In that view of the matter, we find the other contentions also untenable. We find absolutely no merit in this Appeal."
19. It is also relevant to cite the dictum of the Division Bench of this court in the case of MYSURU URBAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. CHIKKABORAIAH in Writ Appeal No.5961 of 2003 decided on 12th January, 2011 wherein at paragraph 9 of the judgment, it is observed thus:
"9. The material on record would clearly show that final Notification was passed on 25.6.1988. Section 27 of the Act reads as follows:
"27. Authority to execute the scheme within five years: where within a period of five years from the date of publication in the Official Gazette of the declaration under sub-Section (1) of Section 19, the Authority fails to execute the scheme substantially, the scheme shall lapse and the provisions of Section 36 shall become inoperative."
It is clear on perusal of the above said provisions of Section 27 of the Act that entire scheme will lapse if there is no substantial compliance in executing the scheme and the order passed by the Learned Single Judge to the effect that scheme has lapsed only insofar as it relates to the land of the petitioner is clearly contrary to the provisions of Section 27 of the Act. It is well settled that 39 in view of the decision of this Court in K. Sathyanarayana, Since Dead by his LRs. v. State of Karnataka1, merely because there is dispute about taking possession and implementing the scheme insofar as the land of the Writ Petitioner is concerned, scheme will not lapse as the scheme would lapse when there is no substantial implementation of the scheme. Having regard to the particulars filed along with the affidavit of the Commissioner of the Appellant -- Authority and having regard to the allotment register which is produced, we are satisfied that there is substantial compliance with the scheme as the layout has been formed, allotment of civic amenity sites have been made and sites of various dimensions have been formed in an area of 240 acres out of 260 acres."
20. Following the dictum referred to above, I do not find merit in the arguments of Sri Nagabhushan that the respondent- authroities abandoned the scheme.
21. Nextly, in order to answer the query raised by Sri C.M. Nagabhusuan, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner/land owners with regard to non-approval of the scheme, the Division Bench of this Court in respect of the land bearing Survey No.10/1 of Mallathahalli village acquired by respondent- Government, for the benefit of the Society, has upheld the same 40 in Writ Appeal No.8130 of 2012 and connected appeal decided on 12th March, 2020 made in R. PRAKASH v. SLAO AND OTHERS, at paragraphs 11 and 12 of the judgment has observed thus:
"11. In the backdrop of aforesaid well settled legal principles, the facts of the case in hand may be examined. From perusal of the original record, it is evident that the State government on 7.2.1985 had conveyed the approval to acquire 65 acres of land including the land measuring 7 acres7 guntas of Sy.No.10/1 situated at Malathalli. It is pertinent to note that the wife of the appellant No.1 viz., Rangaswamy had filed a petition viz., Narasamma W.P.No.6071/1992, in which this court declined to interfere and relegated the wife of the petitioner to the remedy prescribed under Section 30 of the Act. It is pertinent to note that against the aforesaid order no appeal was preferred. Thereafter, the appellants filed the petition on 19.03.1992 inter alia on the ground that they were not aware of the proceedings under the Act and had never executed the power of attorney. From the close scrutiny of the award, it is evident that appellant No.1 had appeared before the Special Land Acquisition Officer and had filed objections on 17.12.1986 and had appeared before the Special Land Acquisition Officer on 22.12.1986, which is evident from the order sheet of the proceedings which contain the signature of appellant No.1. From perusal of the record it is also 41 evident that a covering letter dated 27.03.1987 was sent by GPA holder to the Special Land Acquisition Officer on 27.03.1987. An agreement dated 04.02.1982 between Rangaswamy and his sons as well as respondent No.3 viz., Power of attorney was executed on 04.2.1982 and under the aforesaid agreement a sum of Rs.75,000/- was paid to the appellants. From perusal of the agreement dated 22.9.1982 it is evident that respondent No.3 had entered into an agreement in respect of land measuring 7 acres 7 guntas of Sy.No.10/1 and each and every page of the aforesaid agreement was signed by Rangaswamy viz., appellant No.1. The special Land Acquisition Officer had also filed para wise reply in the writ petition in which para 4 and 5 it was stated that the proceedings under the Act have been completed and the possession has been handed over to the Society on 26.04.1989. It is pertinent to note that NOC was also issued by the State government in favour of the society to release the sites which is evident from the order dated 25.05.1995.
12. Thus, from the above narration of facts, it is evident that the appellant No.1 was aware about the proceedings under the Act and had filed objections before the special Land Acquisition Officer on 17.12.1986 and had subsequently appeared before Land Acquisition Officer on 22.12.1986. The Special Land Acquisition Officer had conducted an enquiry under Section 5A of the Act and had adjudicated the objections preferred by 42 appellant No.1. Thus, the contention of the appellants that they were not aware of the land acquisition proceedings is factually incorrect and is misleading. Thus, we have no hesitation in holding that the appellants have not approached this court with clean hands. Despite being aware about the proceedings under the Act and having participated in the proceeding before the special Land Acquisition Officer, the appellants waited till 19.03.1992 to file the writ petition. The conduct of the appellants disentitles them to any discretionary relief. Besides that, the writ petition which was filed by the appellants was filed after a period of six years after coming to know about the proceeding under the Act and was filed respectively after approximately four years and three years after the award was passed and the possession was taken. Thus, the writ petition suffered from the delay and latches. It is also pertinent to mention here that the writ petition was filed by one of the land owners viz., Surendra filed writ petition 327/1996 in which challenge was made to the proceedings under the Act. The aforesaid writ petition was dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide order dated 26.11.1988 and the aforesaid order was upheld by a division bench of this court in W.A.No.435/1999. The learned Single Judge declined to make interference with the land acquisition proceedings especially in view of the fact that the appellants had the notice of the land acquisition proceedings and an award was passed and the possession was taken. Even assuming the contention of the appellant 43 to be correct and that they had neither executed the Power of Attorney in favour of respondent No.3 nor had appeared any proceedings before the Land Acquisition Officer is accepted, then also suffice it to say that same cannot be adjudicated by this court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The issues raised by the appellants before the learned Single Judge as well as this court fall within the purview of the disputed question of facts, which otherwise could not have been determined in exercise of powers by the learned Single Judge under Article 226 of the Constitution of India."
21. The aforementioned dictum of the Division Bench of this Court was confirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Special Leave Petition No.14885 of 2020 decided on 08th January, 2021. Following the declaration of law referred to above, I am of the view that the judgments referred to by the learned Counsel for the petitioners-land owners with regard to H.M.T. HOUSE BUILDING CO-OERATE SOCIETY; VYALIKAVAL HOUSE BUILDING CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY AND OTHERS; and TRINITY HOUSE BUILDING CO-OERATIVE SOCIETY (supra) are not applicable to the factual aspects of the case on hand 44 including the arguments advanced that the middleman/agent has interfered with the acquisition proceedings.
22. Yet another ground raised by the learned counsel appearing for the land owner is with regard to the pending suits between the petitioner-land owners and the respondent-Society is concerned, it is well-established principle that the Civil Court cannot adjudicate the acquisition proceedings in the Suit and therefore, the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner-land owners relying upon the pending suits, cannot be accepted. The respondent-Society has also produced the General Power of Attorney executed by N.R. Shivakumar on behalf of the land owners in land bearing survey No.6/1, 10, 11, 12 and 13 to an extent of 7.26 acres (Annexure-R4 in writ petition No.23504 of 2017) and therefore, I do not find any acceptable ground as urged by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-land owners. Therefore, I am of the opinion that the petitioner-land owners have not made a case for interference in the acquisition proceedings said to have been made for the 45 benefit of members of respondent-Society by the respondent- authorities.
23. In respect of the contentions raised by Sri C.M. Nagabhushan, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner- land owners relating to Section 24(2) of 2013 Act is concerned, the Division Bench of this Court in Writ Appeal No.1415 of 2018 disposed of on 01st December, 2020 in the case of L. RAMAREDDY v. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND OTHERS at paragraph 44 of the judgment, held thus:
"44. In the circumstances, it is concluded and held that Section 24 does not take within its scope nor does it apply to acquisitions which have been initiated under the provisions of any other enactment particularly, State enactment, such as, BDA Act. The said Section is restricted to only those acquisitions which have been initiated under the provisions of the LA Act, 1894 only. Subject to compliance of the conditions mentioned under sub-section (2) of Section 24, the land owner would be entitled to the deeming provision regarding lapse of acquisition and not otherwise."
24. The aforementioned judgment was confirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeals No.7661-7663 of 2018 46 (supra). Incidentally, in view of the judgment of this Court in the case of L RAMAREDDY (supra), which came to be confirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforementioned Civil Appeals, the contentions raised by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-land owners with regard to applicability of Section 24(2) of 2013 Act cannot be accepted.
25. For the reasons stated above, since the writ petiitons filed by the petitioner-land owners is liable to be dismissed, I am of the opinion that the modified layout plan produced at Annexure-S in writ petition No.14474 of 2017 and letter dated 11th April, 2017 produced as Annexure-L in Writ petition No.41286 of 2017 are liable to be quashed. It is the duty of the respondent-Society to provide sites to its members in accordance with law, ensuring that the Society shall adhere to the guidelines issued by respondent-BDA to ear-mark the specific land for the purpose of civic amenity, etc. as well as in accordance with the provisions contained under the BDA Act and relevant Rules made therein. In this regard, the respondent- BDA shall consider the observation made by this Court in Writ 47 petition no.34009 of 2017 and connected petitions decided on 23rd July, 2021 made in the case of SUBBALAKSHMAMMA AND OTHERS v. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND OTHERS. Therefore, writ petition No.14474 of 2017 filed by the allottees is liable to be allowed. Taking into consideration the observation made above, the respondent-BDA shall re-consider the issue afresh in pursuance of letter dated 11th April, 2017 impugned as Annexure-L in writ petition No.41286 of 2017 and accordingly take appropriate decision in the matter in accordance with law, after affording opportunity to the respondent-Society. In the result, I pass the following:
ORDER (1) Writ petition No. 14474 of 2017 is allowed by quashing the modified layout plan produced at Annexure-S to the writ petition;
(2) Writ petition No.23504 of 2017 is dismissed;
(3) Writ petition No.42186 of 2017 is allowed.
Letter dated 11th April 2017 (Annexure-L) is quashed. Matter is remanded to the respondent-BDA to reconsider the issue afresh 48 taking into consideration the observation made after affording opportunity to the respondent- Society.
Sd/-
JUDGE lnn