Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
Vidhyut Soudha Apseb Hyd And 2 Others vs Gandreti Ramandora And Another on 21 February, 2025
1
APHC010935322003
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3369]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
FRIDAY, THE TWENTY
TWENTY-FIRST DAY OF FEBRUARY
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY
TWENTY-FIVE
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T MALLIKARJUNA RAO
SECOND APPEAL NO: 826/2003
Between:
Vidhyut Soudha Apseb Hyd And 2 Others ...APPELLANT
APPELLANT
AND
Gandreti Ramandora And Another ...RESPONDENT
Counsel for the Appellant Appellants:
1. V V SATISH (SC for APEPDCL) Counsel for the Respondent Respondents:
1. C. SADA SIVA REDDY The Court made the following:
1. The Appellants/Appellant Appellants/Defendants s filed this Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, 'C.P.C.') against the judgment and decree, dated 06.11.2002 passed in A.S.No.16 of 2000 on the file of learned Additional ional District Judge's Court, Vizianagaram (for short, 'the 1st Appellate Court'), partly reversing the judgment and decree, dated 30.10.1999 passed in O.S. No. No.9 of 1992 on the file of learned Senior Civil Judge's Court, Bobbili (for short 'the Trial Court').
2. The parties to the Appeal are referred to as they are arrayed in O.S.No.9 of 1992.
23. Respondents are the Plaintiffs, who have filed the suit in O.S.No.9 of 1992, seeking a decree directing the Defendants to pay Rs.1,00,000/- along with interest at 12% per annum, as damages for the death of Gandreti Poleesu, caused by an electrical shock resulting from rash and negligent actions of the Defendants.
4. The factual matrix, necessary and germane for adjudicating the contentious issues between the parties inter se, may be delineated as follows:
The Plaintiffs, poor residents of Golladi village, lost their son, Gandreti Poleesu, due to the Defendants' negligence. Poleesu, a healthy 15-year-old, worked as a cowherd, earning Rs.10/- daily. Defendants 2 and 3 installed an electric line across fields in the village, intended to power a bore-well with no motor or shed. The line was improperly maintained, with low-hanging wires that eventually touched the ground and were covered with grass. On 08.07.1991, while Poleesu was grazing cattle, he was fatally shocked by the live wire, which also killed a she-buffalo. The Defendants failed in their duty to inspect and repair the faulty line. Despite the wire being dangerously low, they did not take precautions, exposing the live wire. The Plaintiffs lost their son, who was the family's primary support and suffered severe emotional and financial hardship. The deceased had contributed Rs.250/- per month to the family. Had Poleesu lived, he would have supported the Plaintiffs till their lifetime. A postmortem confirmed the cause of death as electric shock. The Plaintiffs incurred Rs.3,000/- in funeral expenses and claim Rs.1,00,000/- towards damages, though they estimated a total loss of Rs.1,69,800/-. Despite requesting compensation from the Defendants, no payment was made. The Defendants are jointly and severally liable for the loss sustained by the Plaintiffs.3
5. The 2nd Defendant filed a written statement adopted by Defendants 1 and 3. In the written statement, the 2nd Defendant acknowledged the occurrence of a non-departmental accident involving Gandreti Poleesu on 08.07.1991 at Golladi village agricultural fields. The Assistant Electrical Inspector, Visakhapatnam, and higher authorities submitted a detailed investigation report to the State Government. The Defendants' Board had laid electrical lines for an agricultural bore well at Girada Simhachalam, with the D.R.D.A. responsible for supplying the motor and accessories after installation. However, the motor and shed were not installed, and frequent thefts kept the lines idle. On 07.07.1991, a heavy gale and rain caused a PSC pole to lean, bringing the overhead conductors to within 5 feet of the ground. On 08.07.1991, while grazing cattle, Gandreti Satyam's umbrella touched the wires, electrocuting him. Gandreti Poleesu, along with a buffalo, also came into contact with the wires and was electrocuted. A blown fuse was found on the transformer. The accident was caused by a natural calamity, with no negligence attributed to the Defendants' Board. The 2nd Defendant asserts that the Board is not liable for compensation, emphasizing that the compensation claim is excessive and unfounded. The 2 nd Defendant prays for the suit's dismissal with costs.
6. Based on the above pleadings in O.S.No.9 of 1992, the Trial Court framed the following issues:
1) Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- with interest @ 12% p.a., as damages against the Defendants as prayed for?
2) To what relief?
7. During the trial, P.Ws.1 to 3 were examined and marked Exs.A.1 to A.4 on behalf of the Plaintiffs. On behalf of the Defendants, D.W.1 was examined and marked Exs.B.1 and B.2.
8. After the trial concluded and both sides presented their arguments, the learned Trial Court decreed the suit in favour of the Plaintiffs, awarding 4 compensation/damages of Rs.66,840/- along with subsequent interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the suit, i.e., 0212.1991, until the realization of the awarded amount.
9. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree in O.S.No.9 of 1992, the Defendants filed A.S.No.16 of 2000. The 1st Appellate Court, being the final fact-finding Court, framed the following point for consideration:
Whether the Plaintiffs/Respondents are entitled to damages, and if so, to what amount?
10. The 1st Appellate Court, on scrutiny of oral and documentary evidence adduced on behalf of both sides, partly allowed the Appeal through its judgment dated 06.11.2002, The 1st Appellate Court modified the compensation amount awarded by the Trial Court in O.S.No.9 of 1992, dated 30.10.1999, reducing it from Rs.66,840/- to Rs.61,080/- in favour of the Plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the 1st Appellate Court's Judgment passed in A.S.No.16 of 2000, the Appellants/Defendants have preferred the present Second Appeal.
11. I heard Sri V.V. Satish, learned Standing Counsel for APEPDCL, representing the Appellants / Defendants, but none represented the Respondents / Plaintiffs.
12. Despite being granted several adjournments, no representation has been made on behalf of the Respondents / Plaintiffs. Therefore, the matter is deemed to have been heard on behalf of the Respondents.
13. Based on the Appellants' contentions, the following substantial questions of law are involved in this Second Appeal:
1. Whether the Courts below are justified in a proper appreciation of the evidence of PW.2.
2. Whether the Courts below are justified in concluding that the Appellants herein failed to establish that there is no negligence on their part for the death of the deceased.5
3. Whether the Courts below are justified in deciding the quantum of compensation.
4. Whether the 1st Appellate Court was justified in allowing the Appeal only in part.
5. Whether the Trial Court was justified in passing the judgment and decree in favour of the Plaintiffs.
14. Before delving into the matter, since the Appeal is filed under Sec.100 CPC, this Court must see the scope of Section 100 of C.P.C.
15. In H.P.Pyarejan V. Dasappa (dead) by L.Rs. and others 1 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that:
"Under Section 100 of the Code (as amended in 1976), the jurisdiction of the High Court to interfere with the judgments of the courts below is confined to hearing on substantial questions of law. Interference with the finding of fact by the High Court is not warranted if it involves re-appreciation of evidence (see Panchugopal Barua v. Umesh Chandra Goswami (1997) 4 SCC
713) and Kshitish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh Kumar Purkait (1997) 5 SCC 438)......"
16. Considerations in Section 100 of C.P.C. arise only when there is a substantial question of law and not mere such questions of law or one based on facts. However, it has to be borne in mind that in case of misapplication of law and improper appreciation of evidence on record, particularly the documentary evidence, it is the bounden duty of the High Court sitting in Second Appeal to consider such questions which are substantial in nature in terms of law.
17. In the second Appeal, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 100 of the C.P.C., this Court must confine itself to the substantial question of law involved in the Appeal. This Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence and interfere with the findings of the Courts below, where the Courts below recorded the findings judicially by appreciating both oral and documentary 1 2006 (3) ALT 41 (SC) 6 evidence. Further, the existence of a substantial question of law is the sine qua non for the exercise of jurisdiction. This Court cannot substitute its own opinion unless the findings of the Courts below are manifestly perverse and contrary to the evidence on record.
18. The Plaintiffs are the parents of Gandreti Poleesu. The 2nd Plaintiff, as PW.1, testified that Defendants 2 and 3 installed an electric line across the fields of G.Simhachalam and others, and the wires of the electric line became loosened and came into contact with the ground; as a result, Poleesu encountered the live electrical wire and died due to electrocution. The department does not dispute that Poleesu's death was caused by electrocution.
19. On behalf of the Defendants, DW.1, L.Dyvaprasad was examined. He testified that upon receiving a complaint from the Village electric worker, he immediately rushed to the scene of offence and found the dead body of Gandreti Poleesu, a 12-year-old boy in the fields. DW.1 further testified that on 08.07.1991, he also found the dead body of she-buffalo at the same location.
20. To establish that Poleesu's death was caused by electrocution, the Plaintiffs also examined PW.2, Sri T.Ramarao, head constable and PW.3, V.Suryanarayana Murthy, Medical officer. PW.2 testified that based on a report from the Village Administrative Officer (VAO) of Golladhi, he registered a case in Cr. No.32 of 1991. PW.3, the Medical Officer, testified that he conducted the postmortem examination on the body of the deceased Poleesu. According to his evidence, the deceased appeared to have died from electric contact, and the injuries found on the dead body are antemortem in nature, likely caused by coming into contact with a live electrical wire. To support this, the Plaintiffs relied on Ex.A.1, copy of the F.I.R., Ex.A.2, copy of the postmortem certificate of Gandreti Poleesu, Ex.A.3 - death extract of the deceased G.Poleesu and Ex.A.4, true copy of the inquest report.
721. After a thorough evaluation of the evidence on record, both Courts concurrently concluded that on 08.07.1991, at 2.00 PM, while Poleesu was grazing cattle, he came into contact with a live electrical wire and died due to electrocution. In contrast, the Defendants disputed the Plaintiff's case, asserting that the department's negligence did not cause the death.
22. The 1st Appellate Court relied on the decision reported in 1998 (1) ALT 67 (Motukuri Bheemavva and others V. A.P.S.E.B through its Chairman, Hyderabad and another), wherein the composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh held that the burden is on the electricity board to prove want of negligence and not on the claimants.
23. In light of these facts, the matter at hand pertains to whether the Defendants' negligence led to the occurrence of the death of the deceased, consequently warranting consideration for compensation to be granted to the Plaintiffs.
24. In Prafulla Kumar Rout v. State of Orissa2, the Apex Court has held that negligence is an omission to do something which a reasonable man guided upon these considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.
25. In Ramesh Kumar Nayak v. Union of India 3 , the Apex Court considered the meaning of negligence and held that negligence means failure to exercise the required degree of care and caution expected of a prudent driver.
26. In Chatra and another v. Imrat Lal and others4, the Apex Court, while defining the meaning of negligence, has stated that negligence means the breach of the provisions of law as also the breach of the duty caused by 2 1995 Cri LJ 1277 3 1995 ACJ 443 : (AIR 1994 Ori 279) 4 1998 (1) Civ. LJ 670 : 1997 AIHC 3631 (MP) 8 omission to do something which a reasonable man guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. The negligence or the rashness would depend upon the facts of each case.
27. In Shail Kumari vs. M.P. Electricity Board5, the High Court of Madhya Pradesh observed thus:
"8. xxx The standard of care required of a body like the Electricity Board is high due to the dangerous nature of electricity. It is negligence on its part to omit to use all reasonable known means to keep the electricity harmless. There is no burden on the Plaintiff to prove negligence. If the Defendant produces no material evidence of negative negligence, negligence will be presumed.
....The Board is expected to do whatever is required to avoid an accident. Its negligence cannot be equated with the negligence of an individual or situational negligence. There is a presumption of negligence when an accident of this nature occurs. The heavy onus is cast on the Board. It is required to discharge the onus....."
28. According to DW.1's testimony, the Defendants' stand is that on 07.07.1991, a heavy gale and rain, due to one of the PSC poles with 3 phase 4 wires intended for agricultural pump set was leaned due to heavy logging of water and that due to leaning of poles, the L T overhead conductor has got sagged to 5 feet to the ground level; on 08.07.1991, when G.Poleesu and G.Satyam were passing through their fields, G.Satyam, who was holding an umbrella, accidentally made contact with the sagged wire and he was thrown away about 5 to 6 feet due to electric shock. However, the 1st Appellate Court noted that in cross-examination, DW.1 admitted that the Defendants had not inspected the line before the accident.
29. The Hon'ble Apex Court in M.P. Electricity Board v. Shail Kumari6 held that the facts of that case are akin to those of this case. That was a case where the deceased was riding a bicycle at night and returning from his 5 2001 LawSuit (MP) 329 6 (2002) 2 SCC 162: A.I.R. 2002 SC 551 9 factory. There had been rain, and the road was partially inundated with water. The cyclist did not notice the live wire on the road, and hence, he rode the vehicle over the wire, which twitched and snatched him, and he was instantaneously electrocuted. The main defence raised by the Defendant was that the wire in question had been used by somebody to siphon energy for his use and said the act was done clandestinely behind the back of the Electricity Board. The line got unfastened from the hook, and it fell on the road over which the cycle driven by the deceased slid, resulting in instantaneous electrocution. In those facts, the Supreme Court held as follows:
"7. It is admitted that the responsibility to supply electric energy in a particular locality was statutorily conferred on the Board. If the energy so transmitted causes injury or death of a human being who gets unknowingly trapped in it, the primary liability to compensate the sufferer is that of the electric energy supplier. So long as the voltage of electricity transmitted through the wires is potentially of dangerous dimension the managers of its supply have the added duty to take all safety measures to prevent escape of such energy or to see that the wire snapped would not remain live on the road as users of such road would be under peril. It is no defence on the part of the management of the Board that somebody committed mischief by siphoning such energy to his private property and that the electrocution was from such a diverted line. It is the responsibility of the managers of the supply system to prevent such pilferage by installing the necessary devices. At any rate, if any live wire got snapped and fell on the public road, the electric current thereon should automatically have been disrupted. Authorities manning such dangerous commodities have an extra duty to chalk out measures to prevent such mishaps.
8. Even assuming that all such measures have been adopted, a person undertaking an activity involving hazardous or risky exposure to human life is liable under the law of torts to compensate for the injury suffered by any other person, irrespective of any negligence or carelessness on the part of the managers of such undertakings. The basis of such liability is the foreseeable risk inherent in the very nature of such activity. In law, the liability cast on such a person is known as 'strict liability'. It differs from the liability that arises on account of the negligence or fault in this way, i.e. the concept of negligence comprehends that 10 the foreseeable harm could be avoided by taking reasonable precautions. If the Defendant did all that could be done to avoid the harm, he cannot be held liable when the action is based on any negligence attributed. However, such consideration is not relevant in strict liability cases where the Defendant is held responsible irrespective of whether he could have avoided the particular harm by taking precautions.
30. The doctrine of strict liability had its origin in English Common Law when it was propounded in the celebrated case of Rylands v. Fletcher 7 ; Justice Blackburn had observed thus:
"The rule of law is that the person who, for his purpose, brings on his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes must keep it at his peril, and if he does so, he is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape."
The rule of strict liability has been approved and followed in many subsequent decisions in England, and decisions of the apex Court are legion to that effect. A Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1990 SC 1480 and a Division Bench in Gujarat State Road Transport Corpn. V. RamanbhaiPrabhatbhai, A.I.R. 1987 SC 1690, had followed the principle in Rylands (supra) with approval. The same principle was reiterated in Kaushnuma Begum v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., A.I.R. 2001 SC 485."
31. The cause of the deceased's death is shock due to electrocution. All injuries are ante-mortem. The death occurred due to an electric wire that came into contact with the deceased. The APSE Board must maintain the electricity lines without causing any injuries or harm to the general public and protect the life of the general public passing under it. Considering the material on record, negligence on the part of the Electricity Board is presumed. Live broken electric wires or hanging electric wires carrying high-tension energy are generally not found. If such a thing happens, a prima facie inference can be drawn that there has been some carelessness on the part of the Appellant in transmitting electric energy or adequately maintaining the transmission lines.
71868 Law Reports (3) HL 330 11
32. In Saleema Begum and others vs. State of J.K. and others 8, the High Court of J & K followed the Apex Court's Judgment in M. C. Mehta v. Union of India9, has gone even beyond the principle laid down in "Rylands v. Fletcher" by holding as follows:
"We are of the view that an enterprise which is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous industry which poses a potential threat to the health and safety of the persons working in the factory and residing in the surrounding areas owes an absolute and non-delegable duty to the community to ensure that no harm results to anyone on account of hazardous or inherently dangerous nature of the activity which it has undertaken. The enterprise must be held to be under an obligation to provide that the hazardous or inherently dangerous activity in which it is engaged must be conducted with the highest standards of safety and if any harm results on account of such activity, the enterprise must be absolutely liable to compensate for such harm and it should be no answer to the enterprise to say that it had taken all reasonable care and that the harm occurred without any negligence on its part. Since the persons harmed on account of the hazardous or inherently dangerous activity carried on by the enterprise would not be in a position to isolate the process of operation from the hazardous preparation of substance or any other related element that caused the harm must be held strictly liable for causing such harm as a part of the social cost for carrying on the hazardous or inherently dangerous activity."
(Emphasis supplied)
33. In Superintending Engineer (Elec.) Operation Circle, Medak vs Jangiti Bhommamma 10 , wherein the Composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh held as under:
"14.4 Dealing with the principle enshrined in the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and the contention that the initial onus of proof is on the Defendants and that the defence is untenable given the principle of strict liability, it is necessary to refer to the decision of this Court in Motukuri Bheemavvas case (supra).
34. The Privy Council has observed in Quebec Railway, Light Heat and Power Company Ltd. v. Vandry and others11 that the electricity company is 8 2022 LawSuit (J&K) 888 9 1987 AIR(SC) 1086 10 2019(0) ACJ 2160 11 1920 Law Reports Appeal Cases 662 12 liable for the damage without proof that they had been negligent. Even the defence that the cables were disrupted on account of a violent wind and high tension current found its way through the low tension cable into the premises of the respondents was held to be not a justifiable defence. Thus, merely because the illegal act could be attributed to a stranger is not enough to absolve the liability of the Board regarding the live wire lying on the road.
35. Undoubtedly, the authorities bear a public duty to inspect and ensure the proper maintenance of electricity lines. This verification or inspection is anticipated to occur in areas accessible to the general public. This Court holds the perspective that during conditions of heavy gale and rain, it was the responsibility of the Defendants' department to promptly halt the power supply. Unfortunately, they failed to take this action. If they had been vigilant in stopping the power supply, the death of the deceased could likely have been prevented. While the deceased was hastening back home, he could not have anticipated the falling of a live wire. Under such circumstances, noticing a live wire touched on the ground would have been a difficult task.
36. The reading of the documents placed before the Court clearly shows that the incident occurred due to the negligence of the A.P.S.E.B. officials. When it contends that the incident happened due to the negligence of the deceased, the Defendants have to place necessary evidence before the Court, based on which it is expected to give its conclusion. As contended, the Defendants placed no material to show the incident occurred due to the deceased's negligence.
37. Taking this perspective into account, this Court deems it appropriate to affirm that Defendants 1 to 3 bear joint and several liable to provide compensation to the Respondents/Plaintiffs, taking into consideration the loss incurred due to their negligent conduct.
38. As evident from the record, the Trial Court awarded damages of Rs.66,840/- to the Plaintiffs. However, the 1st Appellate Court modified this 13 amount, reducing the compensation from Rs.66,840/- to 61,080/-. Both Courts considered that the deceased was working as a coolie and earned Rs.10/- per day as a cowherd. Based on the testimony of the deceased's mother, PW.1, both Courts concurrently concluded that the deceased was earning Rs.10/- per day.
39. The 1st Appellate Court relied on the decision reported in 1998 (1) ALT 67, cited supra, wherein it was held that in case of death occurred on account of the deceased coming into contact with a live wire, the compensation to be awarded as in fatal accident case under the Motor Vehicles Act.
40. The First Appellate Court awarded a sum of Rs. 46,080/- towards loss of dependency and Rs. 15,000/- for the loss to the estate of the deceased, Poleesu. This amount was determined after deducting the anticipated expenses that would have been incurred by the deceased personally and by applying the multiplier of '16' as stipulated in the Second Schedule of the Motor Vehicles Act. Consequently, the First Appellate Court concluded that the Plaintiffs were entitled to a total of Rs. 61,080/- in damages. This award was based on the precedent set in 1998 (1) ALT 67 (cited above), in accordance with the provisions outlined in the Second Schedule of the Motor Vehicles Act.
41. For the reasons aforesaid, this Court discerns no infirmity, much less perversity or illegality, in the judgment rendered by the learned 1st Appellate Court. The findings and reasoning provided by the 1st Appellate Court are consistent with established legal principles. The 1st Appellate Court meticulously reviewed all the evidence on record, omitting nothing pertinent, nor did it consider any extraneous material. Consequently, the findings of the 1st Appellate Court do not call for interference by this Court. The Second Appeal lacks merit in its entirety.
42. In these circumstances, finding no such questions that require consideration in the Second Appeal, which is a much less substantial question 14 of law as pointed out for the Appellants, this Second Appeal has to be dismissed.
43. As a consequence, this Second Appeal is dismissed without costs. The judgment and decree dated 06.11.2002 of learned Additional District Judge, Vizianagaram, A.S.No.16 of 2000 stands confirmed.
Miscellaneous pending applications, if any, shall stand cancelled.
_____________________________ JUSTICE T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO Date: 21.02.2025 SAK 15 THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO SECOND APPEAL NO.826 OF 2003 Date: 21.02.2025 SAK