Allahabad High Court
Basu Dev Singh vs State Of U.P. And Others on 15 October, 2025
Author: Irshad Ali
Bench: Irshad Ali
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC-LKO:64886
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
LUCKNOW
WRIT - C No. - 1002511 of 1998
Basu Dev Singh
.....Petitioner(s)
Versus
State of U.P. and Others
.....Respondent(s)
Counsel for Petitioner(s)
:
A.Kalra, P.V.Chaudhary
Counsel for Respondent(s)
:
C.S.C.
Court No. - 4
HON'BLE IRSHAD ALI, J.
A.F.R.
1. Heard Sri P.V. Chaudhary, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Shatrughan Chaudhary, learned Additional CSC for the respondent - State.
2. Notice was issued after death of Sri R.N. Gupta, Advocate to respondent No.5, which has been found deemed to be sufficient in view of provisions contained under Chapter VIII Rule 12 Explanation II of High Court Rules.
3. The petitioner has filed the present writ petition on following prayer :
"i) issue a writ order or direction or writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the order dated 29.8.89 passed by Additional Collector (Finance and Revenue) Raebareli in case No.48/88-89 (Annexure No.10 to the writ petition).
ii) issue writ, order or direction in the nature of a writ of certiorari quashing the order dated 5.5.1998 passed by Additional Commissioner (Administration) Lucknow in revision No.420/1988-89 and order dated 3.9.98 passed in review petition as contained in Annexure No.1 and 2 respectively.
iii) issue writ, order or direction or writ in the nature of mandamus forebearing the respondents from evicting the petitioner from the plots in question pursuant to the impugned orders.
iv) ..........................
v) ............................
vi) ............................"
4. Factual matrix of the case is that the Government of India, as an appreciation in lieu of Yeoman Services, rendered by the Defence Services Personnel, during war operation, granted certain concession to such personnel, which also included grant of land for cultivation, lying / available at their native places.
5. Ministry of Defense, Government of India, issued letter on 15.06.1964 to all State Government / Administrator reminding them regarding such allotment and requesting to consider favorably the applications from such defense personnel for allotment of land. The State Government notified a revised upto date list of concessions and other assistances admissible to Defense Service Personnel on 21.09.1965.
6. The Secretary, State Soldier's, Sailors and Airman Board U.P. issued letter on 12.10.1965 along with copy of Government Order dated 21.09.1965 attached with a copy of revised upto date list of concessions and other assistances. Ministry of Defense, Government of India again issued letter to all the State Government / Administrators for taking appropriate steps for removal of difficulties being faced by such personnel in allotment of land on 25.04.1964.
7. The Revenue Secretary, Government of U.P. issued letter on 07.08.1970 to all Collectors in the State that suo moto proceedings may not be initiated for cancellation of irregular lease made in favour of Defense Services Personnel or thier families.
8. The petitioner joined Indian Air Force as Airman on 27.11.1964. He participated in Indo -Pak War of 1971. He remained in service of nation till 30.11.1984. He submitted his application for allotment of land in 1965 through proper channel.
9. The L.M.C. - Land Management Committee passed a resolution on 03.12.1967 for allotment of land - Plot No.865 = 1-8-4 and 1125 = 0-5-11 in favour of the petitioner, specifically stating that he is an army personnel. There was another application moved by one Sri Shiv Narayan. No other application by any other including any landless labourer was there to be considered.
10. The Collector, Raebarely issued a letter on 03.02.1968 to the State Welfare Officer regarding enquiry made by the Tehsildar with respect to the genuineness of the resolution of L.M.C. and permitting the petitioner to get the lease executed. The S.D.O. on the report of the Tehsildar passed an order on 22.03.1969 and accorded permission for grant of lease of 2 plots. On 12.12.1968, lease was executed in favour of the petitioner. On 16.02.1970, the name of the petitioner was also mutated. Thus, the lease was granted in favour of the petitioner under a valid grant and valid concessions which were in force at the relevant time.
11. Record shows that in 1977 an enquiry was made regarding the lease of the petitioner by the Tehsildar. The Tehsildar submitted his report on 17.11.1977 to the SDO. The SDO forwarded the said report to Additional Collector on 19.11.1977. On 19/21.11.1977 the Additional Collector directed the DGC (R) for initiating the proceeding under Section 198 (4) of the Act against the petitioner, however, no proceeding was initiated by the DGC (R).
12. On 06.12.1985, one Asha Ram moved a complaint and notices under Section 198(4) were issued and case No.260/1985-86 Asha Ram Vs. Basu Dev Singh was registered. The L.M.C. was also party. The petitioner submitted his objection.
13. The Additional Collector, Raebareli dismissed the said case on 31.01.1986. No appeal was filed by anybody and the order became final. On 15.03.1986 one Shyam Lal, member of L.M.C. filed complaint for cancellation of lease. Case No.123/1986-87 was registered and notices were issued to the petitioner.
14. On 31.08.1987 after ten years from the direction of the Additional Collector, the DGC (R) moved simple application and sought permission from the Collector for initiation of proceeding against the petitioner. The Collector permitted and case No.48/1988-89 was registered against the petitioner.
15. The petitioner appeared and filed his objection taking pleas of - res judicata, notices were defective, bar of limitation, as the lease was granted under valid Government orders as existed in 1967, therefore, the subsequent amendment cannot come into play.
16. On 26.08.1989 the Additional Collector ordered for cancellation of lease holding that the same was illegal. The Additional Collector was of the view that the LMC - Land Management Committee did not consider the case of other eligible land less labourers who were residing in circle.
17. Against the order passed by the Additional Collector, a revision was preferred by the petitioner, which has been dismissed vide order ated 05.05.1998. The petitioner filed review application which has also been dismissed on 03.09.1998, against which the present writ petition has been filed.
18. Submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Additional Collector completely failed to consider that there were no other such persons, who had applied for allotment of lease. The original resolution clearly shows that except the application of the petitioner, there was only one person - Shiv Narayan, who had applied for lease and he was allotted other land.
19. He next submitted that in the resolution of Land Management Committee, it was specifically stated that the case of land less persons will be considered subsequently. He submitted that the Additional Collector has failed to consider the crucial aspect of the matter that when it came to the knowledge of the State Government that on the basis of amended provision, action was being initiated for cancellation of lease made in favour of Defense personnel / their families, the Government had to issue Government Order No.453; 13-8-2270 dated 7th August, 1970 directing the Collectors to refrain from initiating proceedings for cancellation of such leases.
20. He lastly submitted that the Additional Collector also erred in taking into consideration the provisions prevailing at the time of the order and discarding the provisions prevailing at the time of grant of lease. He also submitted that the revisional court has also failed to consider the aforesaid aspect of the matter and dismissed the revision.
21. On the other hand, learned Additional CSC submitted that there is no illegality in the order of Additional Collector dated 26.08.1989 as well as order dated 05.05.1998 and 03.09.1998 and the orders are just and valid. He submitted that the Government Order does not over ride the statutory provisions given under Section 198, therefore, no error has been committed by both the authorities while passing the impugned orders. He submitted that the impugned orders do not suffer from any infirmity or illegality and are just and valid.
22. I have considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on record as well as law report annexed along with rejoinder affidavit.
23. For disposal of the case, relevant provisions of Rule 173 of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Rules, 1952 as well as Rule 174 are being quoted below:
"173. Sections 195, 197 and 198: Admission to land. -Whenever the Land Management Committee intends to admit any person to land under Section 195 or 197, it shall announce by beat of drum in the circle of the Gaon Sabha in which the land is situate at least seven days before the date of meeting for ad-mission of land, the numbers of plots, their areas and the date on which admis-sion thereto is to be made.
1. Certificate of Admission.- At this juncture it would also be relevant to point out that Rule 177(1) provides that a certificate of admissions to land under Sections 195 to 197 may be attested by any Revenue Officer not below the rank of a Supervisor Kanoongo. Here also, the word "may" has been used. Both in Rule 138 as well as in Rule 177 the registration of the instrument of lease in respect of land yielding a rent of more than Rs. 100/- has been made compulsory while the attestation of any such instrument in respect of land fetching a rent below Rs. 100/- by any Revenue Court or Revenue Officer is optional. The provisions of such instruments being attested by revenue officers as pro-vided under the aforesaid rule is only directory and not mandatory.
2. Grant of lease - Provisions not followed. In respect of resolution of Gaon Panchayat only 83 pattas were granted, complaints were made and inquiry conducted. It was found that pattas were granted on back date and in an irregular manner. Rule 173 of Rules was not followed. The Parganadhikari found that 25 pattas were granted against the rules to the persons who were not eligible. Hence pattas were cancelled.
3. Mode for Public Announcement- The provision for a proclamation or public announcement through beat of drums is prescribed under Rule 173 quoted herein above. The rule however, never, does not prescribe any other mode for public announcement. Needless to mention that this rule was framed in the year 1952 about 60 years ago when the population of the villages were low and there was a very close interaction amongst the villagers. The method of beat of drums was also readily available as such professionals by virtue of tradition continued to perform such duties and were readily available. Today, standing at the threshold of 21st Century an easy access to print media and other forms of information is available in rural areas and in almost every village. This is a facility which is not only available to individuals on subscription but also on tea tables of the road-side shops either in most of the villages or nearby places in proximity to remote villages as well as in the State of U.P.
4. Non-following of Rules-- Effect of---As per findings recorded by Additional Collector, the provisions of Rules 173 and 174 of the Rules, framed under the Act, were not followed, neither there was any beat announcement nor list of landless persons was prepared nor provisions under Rules 174, 175, 176 were followed, hence such allotment was wholly illegal.
5. Non-compliance of Rule---Renders allotment invalid---This Court in a couple of decisions has held that non-compliance of the said rule renders the allotment invalid. The said decisions are Shobha Ram v. State of U.P., 2004 (2) RD 178; and Moinuddin v. Board of Revenue, U.P. Allahabad, 2002 (93) RD 648 (HC).
6. Procedure for Admission--- Rule 173 provides the procedure for admission to land by providing that the Land Management Committee when it intends to admit any person to land shall announce by beat of drums in the circle of Gaon Sabha in which the land is situate at least seven days before the date of meeting for admission of land, the number of plots, their areas and the date on which the admission thereto has to be made.
174. On the said date, a meeting of the committee shall be held to select persons for admission to land as sirdar or asami as the case may be. A list of all the persons who are present and who express their desire to be admitted to the land shall be prepared in Z. A. Form 57-A. The list shall be drawn up separately in respect of the land to be settled to a sirdar and land to be settled to an asami. The names of the persons shall be arranged in the list in the order of preference laid down in Section 198."
24. To resolve the controversy involved in the matter, relevant paragraphs of the judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner are being quoted below:
a) Smt. Shanti Devi and Another Vs. Board of Revenue and others; Writ B No.14704 of 2023 decided on 10.02.2025:
"3. This Court entertained the matter on 8.4.2013 and passed the following order:?
?The submission is that with respect to lease granted in the year 1976, proceeding was initiated by a private individual in the year 1991. The lease was cancelled on the ground that the petitioners are not resident of the concerned gaon sabha and reside in Aligarh city. The petitioners have filed revision taking two main grounds (i) the proceeding itself is barred by time in view of Sub-section (6) of Section 198 of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (in short ?the Act?) (ii) the petitioners' house is situated in the concerned gaon sabha. The Commissioner made a reference to the Board of Revenue stating that the proceeding is highly time barred, therefore the same should be set aside. Learned Member Board of Revenue has rejected the reference on the ground that the petitioners are residing in Aligarh city without adverting to the fact as to whether the proceeding is barred by time or not, it is nowhere stated in the judgment either of the Commissioner or the Collector that the petitioners are residing in a particular house in the Aligarh city and their house are not situated in the concerned gaon sabha. This Court in the case of Suresh Giri v. Board of Revenue, U.P. at Allahabad, (2010) 109 RD 566 and Jiya Ram v. State of U.P., (2012) 115 RD 372. has held that limitation for cancellation of lease granted under Sub-section 4 of Section 198 as provided under Section 6 of Section 198 of the Act are identical. However in a suo motu proceeding, the period of limitation can be relaxed but only in the circumstance where there is some preliminary inquiry holding that the fraud has been played during the course of allotment. In the latest judgment of Jiya Ram (supra), this Court has led emphasis that efforts should be made to attach the finality to the litigation and not to dig out the matter after long lapse of time.
The matter requires scrutiny.
Issue notice.
Notices on behalf of respondent nos. 1 and 2 have been accepted by the office of learned Chief Standing Counsel, whereas Sri. D.D. Chauhan has put in appearance on behalf of respondent no. 3, therefore, notices need not be served again to respondents no. 1 to 3.
Issue notice to respondents no. 4 to 11 through registered post returnable at an early date.
Steps be taken within two weeks.
As an interim measure without prejudice to the right and contention of the parties, subject to further order passed by this Court, in case the petitioners have yet not been evicted from the land in dispute, they will not be evicted provided (i) The petitioners deposit Rs. 5,000/- (Rupees five thousands only) within a period of two months from today before the Tehsildar, District Aligarh, (ii) the above amount shall be deposited every year in the same month in which the first deposit is made, (iii) the condition of deposit will not apply in case the State Government declares the area under drought or flood, (iv) the amount so deposited shall be kept in a separate account, (v) in case the writ petition is allowed, the amount so deposited shall be returned to the petitioners with interest and in case the writ petition is dismissed, the amount so deposited shall go to the Gaon Sabha and (vi) in case of default of any of the conditions, the interim protection granted today shall stand vacated (vii) In the meantime, neither any third party right shall be created nor the land shall be used for other than agricultural purpose.?
b) Ram Kumar v. State of U.P., 2016 SCC OnLine All 3994 :
9. From the bare reading of the said provisions, the position which emerged out that the Collector may of his own motion on an application of any person aggrieved initiate proceeding in respect to grant of patta.
10. Thus, if any person who moves an application for cancellation of patta which is granted in favour of another person then he has to satisfy that whether he comes within the ambit and scope of person aggrieved in order to enable him to initiate the proceedings for cancellation of patta.
11. In the present case, the ground taken by the petitioner for initiating proceeding under section 198(4) of the Act that he is resident of the said village by virtue of the same, he does not come within the ambit and scope of the word ?person aggrieved? rather he is stranger person.
12. It is settled legal proposition that stranger cannot be permitted to meddle in any proceeding, unless he satisfies the Authority/Court, that he falls within the category of aggrieved person.
And person means only person who has suffered, or suffers from legal injury can challenge the act/action/order etc. in. Court of law. writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable either for the purpose of enforcing statutory or legal right, or when there is complaint by the appellant that there has been breach of statutory duty on the part of the Authorities. Therefore, there must be judicially enforceable right available for enforcement, on the basis of which writ jurisdiction is resorted to. The Court can of course, enforce the performance of statutory duty by public body, using its writ jurisdiction at the behest of person, provided that such person satisfies the Court that he has legal right to insist on such performance. The existence of such right is condition precedent for invoking the writ jurisdiction of the courts. It is implicit in the exercise of such extraordinary jurisdiction that, the relief prayed for must be one to enforce legal right.
15. Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of Anand Sharadchandra Oka v. University of Mumbai,1 has observed that if person claiming relief is not eligible as per requirement, then he cannot be said to be person aggrieved.
16. Accordingly, the petitioner cannot said to be person aggrieved in the instant matter as at the time when the patta was granted in the year 1954 to respondent No. 5, petitioner was not even born."
c) Jiya Ram v. State of U.P., 2011 SCC OnLine All 2073:
"The scheme of the Act clearly provides that in case any proceeding has been initiated by the Assistant Collector either on a complaint or suo motu the period of limitation in both the case is circumscribed by Section 198(6). It does not make any distinction in respect of where the proceedings have been initiated on a complaint or by Collector suo motu. All the grounds available for cancellation of the lease or allotment are to be circumscribed by period of limitation provided therein. Power to cancel the lease under Section 198(4) of the Act does not carve out any special category which can be excluded from the purview of the limitation. The ground on which the lease of the petitioner is cancelled relates to non approval granted by the Collector at the time of allotment. This can be a issue for the purpose of cancellation of allotment provided same can be raised within period of limitation provided under the Act. Once the period of limitation has expired the Collector cannot cancel the lease on the ground that there was no prior approval granted as contemplated by Section 195 of the Act.
A Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Suresh Girs v. Board of Revenue, UP, Allahabad reported in 2010 (109) Rd 566 has held in paragraph 12, 13 & 17 as under:-
?12. The provisions of sub-section (4), (5) and (6) of Section 198 of the Act are to be construed in conjunction with one another and cannot be read in-isolation. The aforesaid provisions are unambiguous and the language used therein is plain and simple which makes no distinction between proceedings for cancellation of allotment initiated suo motu or on the application of a person aggrieved. Therefore, they have to be construed in the ordinary sense and in no other way. Sub-Section (4) of Section 198 of the Act provides for cancellation of allotment/lease by the Collector on his own motion as well as on the application of the person aggrieved. In both the cases, allotment/lease can not be cancelled without affording an opportunity of hearing to the allottee or the person concerned, as otherwise the action of cancellation would be termed arbitrary and violative of principles of natural justice. Sub-section (6) of Section 198 of the Act follows Section 198(4) of the Act which as such covers both the types of proceedings for cancellation viz. suo motu as well as on application of person aggrieved.
13. Accordingly, in my opinion, the inevitable conclusion is that the time frame prescribed for issuing notice before cancelling the allotment/lease of a land provided under subsection (6) of Section 198 of the Act is applicable to both suo motu proceedings as well as proceedings on the application of the person aggrieved.
17. Moreover, allowing the Collector to initiate suo motu proceedings for cancellation of allotment/lease at any time would mean that the allotment would never be final and there would always be danger of its cancellation. This perhaps could never be the intention of the legislator. The limitation of three years as contained in Appendix III of the Rules and five years provided under Section 198(6) of the Act is a well thought of as the aforesaid period of time is sufficient enough either for the person aggrieved to make a complaint against the irregular allotment or for the authorities to examine and verify the record and to take action for cancellation suo motu, if necessary.?
d) Jitendra Kumar v. State of U.P., 2018 SCC OnLine All 8861 :
"Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the view that the impugned orders cannot be sustained. First of all, the notice was barred by limitation. Secondly, the petitioner by an order of the State had been declared a bhumidhar with transferable rights and the cancellation of the patta was of no consequence and thirdly the ground taken for the cancellation of the patta was also not in existence. If the period of limitation as is prescribed under the Act of 1950 expires then no notice can be issued even if there are irregularities in the patta. Further even if a suo motu notice is to be issued by the Collector then also the question of limitation would arise and notices have to be issued well within the time prescribed by the 1950 Act."
e) Nirmala Devi v. State of U.P., 2023 SCC OnLine All 4067 :
"45. In any case, the long period of 39 years to initiate suo moto proceeding for cancellation of allotment and lease, without any genuine reason; cannot by any stretch of imagination be considered as a ?reasonable period?. Furthermore, the proceedings in question for the cancellation of allotment and lease cast an adverse impact directly on the valuable rights of the petitioner, who has been admitted as ?bhumidhar with transferable right?. As such, the impugned suo moto proceeding initiated under Section 128 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006, adversely effecting the valuable rights of the petitioner who is recorded as ?bhumidhar with transferable right? is unwarranted and unsustainable.
46. That apart, the impugned proceedings for cancellation of the allotment and lease is solely based on the allegation that the allottee was not a resident of the Gram Sabha concerned at the time of allotment which was made way back in the year 1979, the said alleged ineligibility is admittedly neither a fraud nor a charge of such a magnitude that warrants suo moto cognizance under section 128 of U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 after a lapse of about 39 years, that too when the person has attained the legal status of ?bhumidhar with transferable right?. It would not be out of place to note that this Court in the case of Smt. Shakuntla v. State of U.P., (2019) 5 AWC 5007, has held that leases without observing the prescribed statutory provisions cannot be termed as fraudulent and even if there is an allegation that the lease is obtained through fraud, the recourse for cancellation should be within a ?reasonable time?. For a ready reference, excerpts from Paragraph 22 of the said judgment is extracted hereinbelow, ?22. Thus, even the Supreme Court has held that even in cases of fraud, the action should be taken within a reasonable time. In the present case, the action has been taken after a period of 12 years which cannot be termed as reasonable tome and thus, I hold that even in the cases of fraud action has to be taken within the period of limitation. Thus, I summarise the findings in response to the questions framed as under:
?
(C) The leases without observing the statutory provisions prescribed for grant of lease cannot be termed as fraudulent, and (D) Even if fraud is alleged the recourse for cancellation should be taken within a reasonable time.?
47. At this stage, it is appropriate to flag that even though this Court finds the lapse of about 39 years being not at all a ?reasonable time? to initiate suo moto proceeding by the Collector under section 128 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006, but at the same time, this Court refrains itself from prescribing time limit for the same, in the light of the observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court from time to time. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum-Processing Service Society Limited, (1999) 6 SCC 82, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has been pleased to observe that, ?11? It is not the function of the court to prescribe the limitation where the Legislature in its wisdom had though it fit not to prescribe any period. The courts admittedly interpret law and do not make laws. Personal views of the Judges presiding the court cannot be stretched to authorise them to interpret law in such a manner which would amount to legislation intentionally left over by the Legislature??
48. Moreover, the judgment of this Court in the case of Kishnu v. Sheesh Pal, (2011) 7 ADJ 684, which has been relied upon by the learned counsels for the respondents is a case wherein this Court on noticing the fact that the Gram Pradhan himself usurped the property by distributing the same to his father, son, nephew etc., categorised it as a classic case of the ?fence eating the crop? and a fraud of highest order and held that the allotment was not only illegal and void but also of a fraud of the highest degree. For brevity the relevant paragraph of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced below:
?6. In the instant case the Pradhan who is custodian of Gaon Sabha property has himself usurped the property by distributing the same to his father, son, nephew etc. It is a classical case of the ?fence eating the crop? (a Hindi proverb). It was a fraud of highest order which was played by the Pradhan and petitioners allottees. The allotment was not only irregular and illegal but also void and result of fraud of the highest degree. Section 198(4) deals with irregularity of the allotment, hence, the limitation will be relevant only when there is some irregularity in the allotment. However, if the allotment is utterly void and fraudulent then even formal proceedings under Section 198(4) are not required. In case of stark usurpation of Gaon Sabha property Collector is entitled to take corrective measures. Proceedings may be justified under Section 33/39 of U.P. Land Revenue Act also. Under somewhat similar circumstances (expiry of period of assami lease) it was so held In Hari Ram v. Collector, Dist. Saharanpur/Additional Collector, 2004 SCC OnLine All 838 : (2004) 2 RD 360 : (2005) 1 AWC 758. The power to evict in case of void allotment which is tantamount to usurpation of Gaon Shaba property like the present one may also be traced to Section 122B of U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. However opportunity of hearing was utmost essential which was fully provided.?
25. the Government of India, as an appreciation in lieu of Yeoman Services, rendered by the Defence Services Personnel, during war operation, granted certain concession to such personnel, which also included grant of land for cultivation, lying / available at their native places.
26. Ministry of Defense, Government of India, issued letter on 15.06.1964 to all State Government / Administrator reminding them regarding such allotment and requesting to consider favorably the applications from such defense personnel for allotment of land. The State Government notified a revised upto date list of concessions and other assistances admissible to Defense Service Personnel on 21.09.1965.
27. The Secretary, State Soldier's, Sailors and Airman Board U.P. issued letter on 12.10.1965 along with copy of Government Order dated 21.09.1965 attached with a copy of revised upto date list of concessions and other assistances. Ministry of Defense, Government of India again issued letter to all the State Government / Administrators for taking appropriate steps for removal of difficulties being faced by such personnel in allotment of land on 25.04.1964.
28. The Revenue Secretary, Government of U.P. issued letter on 07.08.1970 to all Collectors in the State that suo moto proceedings may not be initiated for cancellation of irregular lease made in favour of Defense Services Personnel or thier families.
29. The petitioner joined Indian Air Force as Airman on 27.11.1964. He participated in Indo -Pak War of 1971. He remained in service of nation till 30.11.1984. He submitted his application for allotment of land in 1965 through proper channel.
30. THe L.M.C. passed a resolution on 03.12.1967 for allotment of land - Plot No.865 = 1-8-4 and 1125 = 0-5-11 in favour of the petitioner, specifically stating that he is an army personnel. There was another application moved by one Sri Shiv Narayan. No other application by any other including any landless labourer was there to be considered.
31. The Collector, Raebarely issued a letter on 03.02.1968 to the State Welfare Officer regarding enquiry made by the Tehsildar with respect to the genuineness of the resolution of L.M.C. and permitting the petitioner to get the lease executed. The S.D.O. on the report of the Tehsildar passed an order on 22.03.1969 and accorded permission for grant of lease of 2 plots. On 12.12.1968, lease was executed in favour of the petitioner. On 16.02.1970, the name of the petitioner was also mutated. Thus, the lease was granted in favour of the petitioner under a valid grant and valid concessions which were in force at the relevant time.
32. Record shows that in 1977 an enquiry was made regarding the lease of the petitioner by the Tehsildar. The Tehsildar submitted his report on 17.11.1977 to the SDO. The SDO forwarded the said report to Additional Collector on 19.11.1977. On 19/21.11.1977 the Additional Collector directed the DGC (R) for initiating the proceeding under Section 198 (4) of the Act against the petitioner, however, no proceeding was initiated by the DGC (R).
33. On 06.12.1985, one Asha Ram moved a complaint and notices under Section 198(4) were issued and case No.260/1985-86 Asha Ram Vs. Basu Dev Singh was registered. The L.M.C. was also party. The petitioner submitted his objection.
34. The Additional Collector, Raebareli dismissed the said case on 31.01.1986. No appeal was filed by anybody and the order became final. On 15.03.1986 one Shyam Lal, member of L.M.C. filed complaint for cancellation of lease. Case No.123/1986-87 was registered and notices were issued to the petitioner.
35. On 31.08.1987 after ten years from the direction of the Additional Collector, the DGC (R) moved simple application and sought permission from the Collector for initiation of proceeding against the petitioner. The Collector permitted and case No.48/1988-89 was registered against the petitioner.
36. The petitioner appeared and filed his objection taking pleas of - res judicata, notices were defective, bar of limitation, as the lease was granted under valid Government orders as existed in 1967, therefore, the subsequent amendment cannot come into play.
37. On 26.08.1989 the Additional Collector ordered for cancellation of lease holding that the same was illegal. The Additional Collector was of the view that the LMC - Land Management Committee did not consider the case of other eligible land less labourers who were residing in circle.
38. Against the order passed by the Additional Collector, a revision was preferred by the petitioner, which has been dismissed vide order ated 05.05.1998. The petitioner filed review application which has also been dismissed on 03.09.1998. Against the order passed by the Additional Collector, a revision was preferred by the petitioner, which has been dismissed vide order ated 05.05.1998. The petitioner filed review application which has also been dismissed on 03.09.1998. The Additional Collector completely failed to consider that there were no other such person, who had applied for allotment of lease. The original resolution clearly shows that except application of the petitioner, there was only one person Shiv Narayan, who applied for lease and was allotted other land. Due to non consideration of this aspect of the matter, the orders impugned vitiate in law and are liable to be set aside.
39. In the resolution of Land Management Committee, it was specifically stated that the case of landless person will be considered subsequently. The Additional Collector has failed to consider the crucial aspect of the matter that when it came to the knowledge of the State Government that on the basis of amended provision, action was being initiated for cancellation of lease made in favour of Defense personnel / their families, the Government had to issue Government Order No.453; 13-8-2270 dated 7th August, 1970 directing the Collectors to refrain from initiating proceedings for cancellation of such leases, therefore, the orders impugned in the present writ petition vitiate in law and are liable to be set aside.
40. The Additional Collector also erred in taking into consideration the provisions prevailing at the time of the order and discarding the provisions prevailing at the time of grant of lease. The revisional court has also failed to consider the aforesaid aspect of the matter and dismissed the revision, therefore, the orders impugned are per se illegal and are liable to be quashed.
41. The objection raised by the petitioner of res judicata, notices were defective, bar of limitation, as the lease was granted in favour of the petitioner on 16.02.1970. As per provisions contained under Section 198(6), the limitation of initiation of proceeding is 7 years and the proceeding was initiated against the petitioner after lapse of 7 years, therefore, no such proceeding can be initiated against the petitioner due to bar of limitation under the statutory provisions. Accordingly, in my opinion, the inevitable conclusion is that the time frame prescribed for issuing notice before cancelling the allotment/lease of a land provided under subsection (6) of Section 198 of the Act is applicable to both suo motu proceedings as well as proceedings on the application of the person aggrieved.
42. Moreover, allowing the Collector to initiate suo motu proceedings for cancellation of allotment/lease at any time would mean that the allotment would never be final and there would always be danger of its cancellation. This perhaps could never be the intention of the legislator. The limitation of three years as contained in Appendix III of the Rules and five years provided under Section 198(6) of the Act is a well thought of as the aforesaid period of time is sufficient enough either for the person aggrieved to make a complaint against the irregular allotment or for the authorities to examine and verify the record and to take action for cancellation suo motu, if necessary. Due to non consideration of this aspect of the matter, which has already been raised by the petitioner, the orders impugned are per se illegal and liable to be set aside by this Court.
43. The petitioner was granted lease under special category being defense personnel and a proceeding was initiated by making inquiry regarding the lease of the petitioner by the Tehsildar. The Tehsildar submitted his report on 17.11.1997 to S.D.O.. The S.D.O. forwarded the said report to the Additional Collector on 19.11.77. On 19/21.11.1977 the Additional Collector directed the DGC (R) for initiating the proceeding under Section 198 (4) of the Act against the petitioner, however, no proceeding was initiated by the DGC (R), therefore, there is no res judicata on the proceeding initiated on the complaint lodged by the DGC (R) as well as on the application moved by Asharam on 06.12.1985 and the same was time barred, therefore, it was not considerable in law.
44. After lapse of 10 years DGC (R) moved on the direction of Additional Collector moved simple application and sought permission from the Collector for initiation of proceeding against the petitioner, which was not to be registered being time barred while after 7 years. The allotment was not only regular and legal but also valid. Section 198 (4) deals with the procedure prescribed under the aforesaid provisions after issuance of notification by the Central Government as well as by the State of U.P. The allotment to the petitioner was made being defense personnel, which is special category and proper intimation was also given to the landless persons and the Land Management Committee has considered the application of the petitioner and one other person, who were allotted lease, which does not suffer from any infirmity or illegality.
45. The resolution also takes notice that with regard to landless persons consideration shall be made in another meeting. The proceeding of allotment of lease taken by the Land Management Committee is justifiable in law and do not suffer from any infirmity or illegality. The proceeding initiated against the petitioner on the application of DGC (R) on 31.08.1987 is time barred, therefore, the application was liable to be dismissed being time barred and was not liable to be registered at case No. 48/1988-89 despite of specific objection raised by the petitioner that the application is time barred for initiation of proceeding. The same was not taken into consideration by the respondents and they proceeded to pass the impugned orders. The impugned orders due to non consideration of aforesaid aspect of the matter are per se illegal and are liable to be quashed.
46. In totality of facts and circumstances of the case, the writ petition deserves to be allowed.
47. Accordingly, the impugned orders dated 29.8.89 passed by Additional Collector (Finance and Revenue) Raebareli in case No.48/88-89 (Annexure No.10 to the writ petition), order dated 05.05.1998 passed by Additional Commissioner (Administration) Lucknow in revision No.420/1988-89 and order dated 03.09.1998 passed in review petition as contained in Annexure No.1 and 2 respectively, are hereby quashed.
48. The writ petition succeeds and is allowed.
(Irshad Ali,J.) October 15, 2025 Adarsh K Singh