Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
M/S. Chowdary Brothers, vs The Joint Commissioner Ct on 9 December, 2022
Author: C. Praveen Kumar
Bench: C. Praveen Kumar
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI
****
WRIT PETITION No.4103 OF 2021
Between:
M/s. Chowdary Brothers, N.H.5,
Near Sai Baba Temple,
Kovur, SPSR Nellore District,
Rep. by its Managing Partner
P. Ravi Kumar. --- Petitioner.
And
1. The Joint Commissioner (CT), Legal,
O/o.The Commissioner of Commercial Taxes,
D.No.5-59, R.K.Spring Valley Apartments,
Bandar Road, Edupugallu Village,
Kankipadu Mandal,
Vijayawada - 521151, A.P.
2. The Joint Commissioner (ST),
Nellore 15/505, CT Complex,
R.R. Street, Nellore-1, Nellore District, A.P.
3. The Deputy Commercial Tax Officer
No.II, Kavali, Vaddipalem, Kavali-524201,
Nellore District, A.P.
4. The Commercial Tax Officer,
Kavali Circle, Vaddipalem,
Kavali - 524201, Nellore District, A.P.
5. The State of Andhra Pradesh,
Rep. by the Principal Secretary to the
Government, Revenue (CT) Department,
A.P. Secretariat Buildings, Velagapudi,
Guntur District A.P. --- Respondents.
DATE OF ORDER PRONOUNCED : 09.12.2022
SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE C. PRAVEEN KUMAR
AND
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE A.V.RAVINDRA BABU
1. Whether Reporters of Local Newspapers
may be allowed to see the order? Yes/No
2
2. Whether the copy of order may be
marked to Law Reporters/Journals? Yes/No
3. Whether Their Lordships wish to
see the fair copy of the order? Yes/No
__________________________
C. PRAVEEN KUMAR, J
_________________________
A.V.RAVINDRA BABU, J
3
* HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE C. PRAVEEN KUMAR
AND
* HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE A.V.RAVINDRA BABU
+ WRIT PETITION No.4103 OF 2021
% 09.12.2022
# Between:
M/s. Chowdary Brothers, N.H.5,
Near Sai Baba Temple,
Kovur, SPSR Nellore District,
Rep. by its Managing Partner
P. Ravi Kumar. --- Petitioner.
And
1. The Joint Commissioner (CT), Legal,
O/o.The Commissioner of Commercial Taxes,
D.No.5-59, R.K.Spring Valley Apartments,
Bandar Road, Edupugallu Village,
Kankipadu Mandal,
Vijayawada - 521151, A.P.
2. The Joint Commissioner (ST),
Nellore 15/505, CT Complex,
R.R. Street, Nellore-1, Nellore District, A.P.
3. The Deputy Commercial Tax Officer,
No.II, Kavali, Vaddipalem, Kavali-524201,
Nellore District, A.P.
4. The Commercial Tax Officer,
Kavali Circle, Vaddipalem,
Kavali - 524 201, Nellore District, A.P.
5. The State of Andhra Pradesh,
Rep. By the Principal Secretary to the
Government, Revenue (CT) Department,
A.P. Secretariat Buildings, Velagapudi,
Guntur District A.P. --- Respondents.
! Counsel for the Petitioner : Sri G. Narendra Chetty
^ Counsel for Respondents : Sri Y.N.Vivekananda
4
< Gist:
> Head Note:
? Cases referred:
1) AIR 1960 AP 171:1959 10 STC 524 AP
2) (2013) 56 APSTJ 175 (AP)
3) AIR 2006 SC 1383:2006 (S) STR 161 SC
4) (1990) 77 STC 182 (AP)
5) (2009) 22 VST 70 (Gau)
6) (2008) 16 VST 381 (All)
7) (2015) 82 VST 560 (Bom)
8) WP No.44908/2016, Dt.06.04.2017
9) AIR 2003 SC 2736
This Court made the following :
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HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE C. PRAVEEN KUMAR
AND
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE A.V.RAVINDRA BABU
WRIT PETITION No.4103 OF 2021
ORDER:(Per Hon'ble Sri Justice A.V.Ravindra Babu) This Writ Petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, came to be filed by the petitioner for the following relief:
".......... to issue an appropriate Writ, Order or Direction, more in the nature of Writ, Order or Direction, more particularly in the nature of MANDAMUS holding that the impugned Suo Motu Revision Order passed by the First Respondent vide CTD Order No.JCO866, dated 13-02-2020, for the Tax Periods 2011-12 to 2014-15, when the suo motu revision powers were already exercised by the Second Respondent, is without jurisdiction, partly barred by limitation, and even on merits contrary to law and not sustainable and illegal and consequently set aside the same and pass other order or orders ............"
2. The facts, which are germane to deal with the present Writ Petition, are as follows:
The petitioner is a Registered Dealer on the rolls of the fourth respondent doing business in Petrol, Diesel and Lubricants. The petitioner is engaged in another business viz., providing service of transportation of oils and fuels for Oil 6 Marketing Companies such as M/s. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited (M/s.HPCL), Mumbai by utilizing the petitioner's own fleet of vehicles and also by engaging other vehicles. As the amounts received as consideration for the services rendered are not liable to tax, they came to be recorded in the books of accounts while disclosing in Profit and Loss account of the Corporation. While so, relating to the tax period from April, 2011 to November, 2015, third respondent, on an authorization given by the Deputy Commissioner (Commercial Tax), Nellore conducted audit on the petitioner and passed an assessment order on 19.02.2016, which has become final.
However, the second respondent, in exercise of suo motu powers of Revision, under Section 32(2) of the Andhra Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2005 (for short, 'the VAT Act'), issued pre- revision show-cause notice, dated 03.11.2006, proposing to impose VAT on 'Lorry Hire Charges' as revealed in the Profit and Loss account of the petitioner under Section 4(8) of the VAT Act, at the rate of 14.5%. However, after considering the objections filed by the petitioner, the Joint Commissioner (ST), Nellore dropped the proceedings. The said order of dropping the proceedings came to be passed on 20.10.2017. After the said order is passed by the Joint Commissioner (ST) Nellore, the first 7 respondent herein who is the Joint Commissioner (CT), Legal, Vijayawada, in exercise of suo motu powers under Section 32(2) of the VAT Act, issued pre-revision show-cause notice, dated 11.12.2018, proposing to revise the proceedings of the second respondent. After considering the objections raised by the petitioner, an order came to be passed on 13.02.2020 imposing tax from the years 2011-12 to 2014-15. Challenging the said order, the present Writ Petition came to be filed.
3. None of the respondents filed any counter but opposed the same on instructions received.
4. Now the point that arises for consideration is, whether the impugned order, dated 13.02.2020, passed by the first respondent is liable to be set-aside as without jurisdiction, barred by limitation, not sustainable and illegal under the law and facts?
5. Sri G. Narendra Chetty, learned counsel for the petitioner, would contend that the impugned order passed by the Joint Commissioner (CT), Legal is illegal and it cannot stand to the test of legal scrutiny. The said Authority has no power under Section 32 of the VAT Act to pass the impugned order, for the reason that there cannot be an order passed by two Officers 8 invoking the same provision, in respect of the same transaction. According to him, when there was an order already passed by the second respondent, dated 20.10.2017, under the purported exercise of the powers of Revision, the impugned order, dated 13.02.2020, to revise the earlier order passed under same provision is not valid in the eye of law. In support of his plea, he would rely upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Mannepalli Venkatanarayana v. The State of Andhra Pradesh and others1. He would further contend that the Joint Commissioner (ST), Nellore by virtue of the order, dated 20.10.2017, after issuing revision show-cause notice and after considering the objections raised by the petitioner, dropped further proceedings by relying upon the two memos issued by the Government. The Joint Commissioner (CT), Legal who passed the impugned order did not consider the said two memos issued by the Government. The petitioner was paying salary to his helpers and taxes etc., in respect of the bills and in the absence of any material to show that the rights of the vehicles have been transferred, it cannot be held that there was any transfer of right to use the vehicles by M/s.HPCL. 1 AIR 1960 AP 171:1959 10 STC 524 AP 9
6. He would further contend that the impugned order was passed beyond the period of limitation. It is urged that when the original assessment order was passed on 19.02.2016, basing on the Profit and Loss account of M/s.HPCL, a revision show-cause notice was issued and, considering the objections raised by the petitioner, further proceedings were dropped. Under the guise of Revision in the impugned order, the first respondent evidently made an assessment afresh as such it is barred by limitation.
7. He would further rely upon the letter issued by M/s.HPCL to the effect that there was payment of service tax on the consideration received. Learned counsel for the petitioner would further rely upon a Division Bench judgment of the Composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Agarwal Industries Limited v. The Commissioner of Commercial Taxes2 to contend that the impugned order is barred by limitation.
8. He would rely upon a decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited and others v. Union of India and others3 to contend that once the petitioner paid Service Tax, he cannot be again subjected to VAT also. 2 (2013) 56 APSTJ 175 (AP) 3 AIR 2006 SC 1383: 2006 (S) STR 161 SC 10
9. He would further rely upon a Division Bench decision of the Composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited v. Commercial Tax Officer, Company Circle, Visakhapatnam4, a decision of High Court of Gauhati in Indian Oil Corporation Limited v. Commissioner of Taxes, Assam and others5, a decision of High Court of Allahabad in Commissioner, Trade Tax, U.P. Lucknow v. Nand Transport Company6, a decision of High Court of Bombay in The Commissioner of Sales Tax Maharashtra State v. General Cranes Near Pitroda Lautomobiles Works7 to contend that as the petitioner utilized his own fleet of vehicles and also by engaging other vehicles in providing service of transportation of oil and fuels for oil marketing companies and paid service tax, it cannot be inferred that there was any transfer of right in favour of the oil companies to use the goods. He would further rely upon a Division Bench decision of the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of Telanga and the State of Andhra Pradesh in Transcocean Offshore, International Ventures Limited v. Union of India and 4 (1990) 77 STC 182 (AP) 5 (2009) 22 VST 70 (Gau) 6 (2008) 16 VST 381 (All) 7 (2015) 82 VST 560 (Bom) 11 others8 in support of his contention that Section 4(8) of the VAT Act cannot be made applicable to the case on hand. It is for the revisional authority to substantiate applicability of Section 4(8) of VAT Act to the case of the petitioner, which the respondents failed to do so. At any rate, the impugned order cannot stand to the test of legal scrutiny as such Writ Petition is liable to be allowed.
10. Sri Y.N.Vivekananda, learned Government Pleader for Commercial Tax, appearing for the respondents, would contend that the scheme of Section 32 of the VAT Act, clearly postulates on its plain reading that the order passed in exercise of the powers under Section 32 of the VAT Act can be revised by a superior officer. Section 32(1) of the VAT Act contemplates exercise of power of revision by the Commissioner insofar as the order passed by his subordinates is concerned. Section 32(2) of the VAT Act contemplates conferring even such powers on the subordinates of the Commissioner and even under Section 32(2) of the VAT Act, the subordinates to the Commissioner can as well exercise the powers under Section 32(1) of the VAT Act. So, the contention of the petitioner that there cannot be any revision against the orders of revision cannot stand in view of 8 WP No.44908/2016, Dt.06.04.2017 12 Section 32 of the VAT Act. The decision of this Court in Mannepalli Venkatanarayana (first supra), stood on a different footing, where the vires of Rule 31(5) of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Rules, 1957 was challenged, which came in conflict with Sections 19 and 20 of the APGST Act. He would further submit that the contention of the petitioner that the impugned order is barred by limitation cannot stand to any reason because within four years, as contemplated under Section 32(3) of the VAT Act, the impugned order was passed. The very exercise of powers under the revisional authorities were to scrutinize the assessment file and the impugned order shows that the Joint Commissioner (CT), Legal having looked into the assessment file and having scrutinized the file, passed the said order. Even on factual aspects it cannot be concluded that the impugned order is hit under limitation. The petitioner is also raising disputed question of facts, which cannot be gone into in this Writ Petition. Having undertaken to produce the original agreements or copies of agreements before the Joint Commissioner (CT), Legal, he failed to substantiate his contentions and it is not a case where there is any violation of the principles of natural justice or where the powers were exercised without any provision of law by the Joint 13 Commissioner (CT), Legal and in such a scenario the Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not maintainable. It is further urged that the petitioner has alternative remedy of Appeal even under the VAT Act as such the Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed on that score as well.
11. Firstly, we will take up as to whether the contention of petitioner that as second respondent has already exercised the suo motu powers of revision under Section 32(2) of the VAT Act, exercise of such powers again by the first respondent, is permissible under law?
12. Section 32 of the VAT Act reads as follows:
"32. Revision by Commissioner and other prescribed authorities:- (1) The Commissioner may suo moto call for and examine the record of any order passed ;or proceeding recorded by any authority, officer or person subordinate to him under the provisions of the Act, including sub-section (2) and if such order or proceeding recorded is prejudicial to the interests of revenue, may make such enquiry, or cause such enquiry to be made and subject to the provisions of the Act, may initiate proceedings to revise, modify or set aside such order or proceeding and may pass such order in reference thereto as he thinks fit. (2) Powers of the nature referred to in sub-section (1) may also be exercised by the Additional Commissioner, Joint Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner and Assistant 14 Commissioner in the case of orders passed or proceedings recorded by the authorities, officers or persons subordinate to them:
Provided that the power under sub-section (1) or (s) shall not be exercised by the authority specified therein in respect of any issue or question, which is the subject matter of an appeal before or which was decided on appeal by the Appellate Tribunal under Section 33:
Provided further that this restriction is not applicable in respect of other issues or questions, which are not the subject matter of an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal. (3) In relation to an order of assessment passed under the Act, the powers conferred by sub-sections (1) and (2) shall be exercisable only within a period of four years from the date on which the order was served on the dealer."
,
13. A plain reading of Section 32(1) of the VAT Act shows that the Commissioner may suo moto call for and examine the record of any order passed or proceeding recorded by any authority, officer or person subordinate to him under the provisions of the Act, including sub-section (2), if such order or proceeding is prejudicial to the interests of the revenue. Further, a reading of same also shows that in Section 32(2) of the VAT Act, the powers of revision are also conferred on Additional Commissioner, Joint Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner and Assistant Commissioner in case of orders passed or proceedings 15 recorded by the authorities, officers or persons subordinate to them. The powers under Section 32(2) are to be exercised by the subordinates to the Commissioner. The exercise of powers under Section 32(2) are no other than the revisional powers akin to the powers conferred on the Commissioner. There is no denial of the fact that the authorities under the VAT Act are vested with the powers to make assessment etc., So, the word used in Section 32(1) 'including sub-section (2)' substantially contemplates the revisional powers conferred on the authorities under Section 32(2) of the VAT Act. So, it goes without saying that the Commissioner is empowered to revise the orders passed under Section 32(2), which are no other than the revisional powers conferred on the subordinates. Apart from these, insofar as Section 32(2) is concerned, the authorities mentioned therein are empowered to exercise the powers of revision under Section 32(1) of the VAT Act. So, when the Commissioner is vested with the power under Section 32(1), to revise the orders under Section 32(2), the same powers are conferred on the authorities mentioned in Section 32(2) to revise the orders passed by the subordinates to them. So, the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that when the second respondent has already exercised the powers of revision, the first respondent has no 16 power again to revise the said order cannot stand to the prima- facie scrutiny. It is not the case of the petitioner that the Joint Commissioner (CT), Legal, Office of the Commissioner, Commercial Taxes is not superior to the Joint Commissioner (ST). Having regard to the above, the very contention raised by the petitioner that the first respondent cannot revise the order of the second respondent cannot stand to any reason.
14. The decision in Mannepalli Venkatanarayana (first supra) shows that, initially, while Sections 19 and 20 of the APGST Act deals with the powers of Appeal and Revision, the Government introduced Rule 31(5) conferring wider power on the revisional authority which could be exercised by Officer prescribed in the notification. The above Rule 31(5) was said to be in conflict with Sections 19 and 20(2) of the APGST Act. So, accordingly the vires of Rule 31(5) was challenged before the Hon'ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh. Dealing with the same, the Hon'ble High Court held that Rule 31(5) is ultra vires of the rule making power of the Government and is therefore invalid as such any action taken in exercise of that Rule cannot be sustained.
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15. The factual matrix in the above case is that in the year 1954-55 the petitioners therein submitted returns which was assessed to tax. Later, the concerned Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes issued notice to them proposing for reassessment on the premise of escaped turnover under Rule 31(1) R/w. Rule 31(5) of A.P. General Sales Tax Rules for which the petitioners filed their objections questioning the jurisdiction of the Officer and later filed the Writ Petition before the Hon'ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh. Literally, the factual matrix, as narrated in the above said citation, does not reveal that there was any re-assessment by the revisional authorities in exercise of the powers of Revision and again that was sought to be revised. Even the facts thereof are distinguishable from the present scenario.
16. It is the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that, as per the said decision, there is no power for the authorities to exercise the revisional jurisdiction more than once. At this juncture, we would like to make it clear that Section 20 Sub-sections (1) and (2) of APGST Act is akin to Section 32(1) and (2) of AP VAT Act. The Hon'ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Mannepalli Venkatanarayana (first supra) dealing with the contention raised by the petitioner that the 18 assessment was already revised by the competent authority and that it was not contested by the learned Government Pleader, made an observation that the said contention need not detain them any further as they held that Rule 31(5) is ultra vires of the Rule making power of the Government. In our considered view, the petitioner cannot claim any strength basing on the above said decision. Further, as dealt with earlier, a reading of Section 32(1) and (2) shows that the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner in this regard is untenable.
17. Turning to the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order is barred by limitation in view of Agarwal Industries (second supra), we are not persuaded to accept same for the reason that in the above authority, the order of assessment by the Deputy Commissioner (CT), Legal was passed on 15.03.2003 and then show-cause notice proposing revision was issued on 11.05.2009 i.e. after six years from the date of order of assessment.
18. Coming to the case on hand, the original assessment order made by the third respondent was on 19.02.2016. The order of second respondent after revisional show-cause notice was on 20.10.2017. The impugned order under challenge, which 19 is dated 13.02.2020, is undoubtedly within the period of four years from 19.02.2016. Learned counsel for the petitioner would contend strenuously that as the original assessment order passed by the third respondent did not deal with the transportation charges, the impugned order would amount to making fresh assessment which is barred by limitation. It is very difficult to accept such contention for the reason that the second respondent after perusing the proceedings recorded by the first respondent, scrutinized the assessment file and found that the dealer disclosed lorry charges in the Profit and Loss account for the years 2011-12 to 2014-15 and issued show- cause notice proposing revision. It is altogether a different aspect when the second respondent had closed the proceedings on considering the objections filed by the dealer. Later, the first respondent revised the said order of the second respondent. So, the very object of looking into the assessment file is only to find out whether such an order is prejudicial to the interests of revenue. In that view of the matter, the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order would amount to fresh assessment, which is barred by limitation, is untenable.
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19. In Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited (third supra), the question before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was the nature of transaction by which mobile phone connections are enjoyed as to whether is it a sale or is it a service or is it both? The facts in the above decision are distinguishable from the present case on hand. In A.P. VAT Act, Section 4(8) reads as follows:
"Every VAT dealer who transfers the right to use goods taxable under the Act for any purpose whatsoever, whether or not for a specified period, to any lessee or licensee for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration, in the course of his business shall, on the total amount realized or realizable by him by way of payment in cash or otherwise on such transfer of right to use such goods from the lessee or licensee pay a tax for such goods at the rates specified in the Schedules."
20. Whether the VAT dealer transferred the right to use the vehicles of him to the oil company or not is a question of fact and if the petitioner has suffered with any adverse findings in the impugned order, he ought to have challenged these factual aspects by filing an Appeal before the appellate authority but not by way of this Writ Petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India. Apart from that, the first respondent in the impugned order opined that the self serving certificate issued by the Oil Company, as regards collection of service tax 21 cannot be taken as a valid document, when the same is disputed by the respondents. Hence, the petitioner cannot rely upon the above to support his contention.
21. In Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited (fourth supra), it was held that the agreement has to be read as a whole in order to determine the nature of the transaction to ascertain the effective control of the machinery was in the use of the contractor or that of the company.
22. In Indian Oil Corporation Limited (fifth supra), it was held that the question relating to the transfer of right to use any goods is essentially a question of fact which has to be determined having regard to the terms of contract wherein the transfer is made.
23. In Commissioner, Trade Tax, U.P. Lucknow (sixth supra), the Transport Company owned tankers entered into an agreement with the Indian Oil Corporation for transportation of petroleum products from one place to another and the assessing authority levied tax on the ground that there was transfer of right to use the tankers.
24. In Commissioner of Sales Tax Maharashtra State (seventh supra), the Tribunal dealing with Sections 2(4) and 22 2(10) of Maharashtra Sales on Transfer of Right to Use Any Goods for Any Purpose Act, 1985 looked into the agreement and elaborately dealt with the issue and the Appeal filed by the Commissioner of Sales Tax, Maharashtra was dismissed.
25. In Transocean Offshore, International Ventures Limited (eighth supra), there was a copy of the agreement, dated 16.04.2010, entered into by the petitioner and it shows that the contract was for charter hire of 'jack up rigs'
26. As evident from the impugned order, when the first respondent issued a show-cause notice to revise the order of the second respondent, the petitioner filed objections and he was given opportunity of personal hearing twice. It shows that the agreement entered into by the Dealer with the Oil Companies for supply of fleet to determine the nature of the transaction was not submitted for verification. Further, as per the objections filed by the petitioner, he claimed to have submitted copies of the agreement but they are not available on record. Further, on 18.02.2019, at the time of hearing, the petitioner agreed to submit the agreement copies along with the payment receipts but, in spite of opportunity given, the dealer failed to do so. 23 Ultimately, the first respondent passed an order, confirming the revision proposals in part and dropping the proceedings in part.
27. As pointed out earlier, various authorities relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner show that in those particular cases the dealers relied upon agreements in writing and submitted the same. Now, according to the writ petitioner, there was no transfer of right to use the goods as contemplated under Section 4(8) of the A.P. VAT Act. Except questioning the authority of the first respondent to revise the order of the second respondent and the plea that order is barred by limitation, the rest of the points raised are disputed question of facts. Hence, the proper remedy for the petitioner would be to avail the remedy of Appeal in terms of Section 33 of the VAT Act. The material on record shows that the petitioner did not file the Appeal on the ground that filing of Appeal would make him to deposit 25% of the disputed tax. This cannot be a ground to file a Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, before this Court.
28. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Chand Ratan v. Durga Prasad and others9, while dealing with scope of Article 226 of 9 AIR 2003 SC 2736 24 the Constitution of India held that when a right or liability is created by a statue, which itself prescribes the remedy or procedure for enforcing the right or liability, resort must be had to that particular statutory remedy before seeking the discretionary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution. This rule of exhaustion of statutory remedies is no doubt a rule of policy, convenience and discretion and the Court may in exceptional cases issue a discretionary writ of certiorari, where there is complete lack of jurisdiction for the officer or authority or Tribunal to take the action or there has been a contravention of fundamental rights or there has been a violation of principles of natural justice or where the Tribunal acted under a provision of law, which are ultra vires. Then notwithstanding the existence of an alternative remedy, the High Court can exercise its jurisdiction to grant relief.
29. For the aforesaid reasons, we see no merit in the Writ Petition and the same is liable to be rejected.
30. In the result, the Writ Petition is dismissed. No order as to costs.
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As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.
_______________________________ JUSTICE C. PRAVEEN KUMAR _______________________________ JUSTICE A.V.RAVINDRA BABU Date: 09.12.2022 Dsh