Prabhu vs The State Of Karnataka on 17 March, 2025

[Cites 96, Cited by 0]

Karnataka High Court

Prabhu vs The State Of Karnataka on 17 March, 2025

ii. A certiorari is issued, the impugned order bearing No.24351/VER:11/11/2023 dated AIR 2018 SC (SUPP) 1057 NC: 2024:KHC-D:2353 07.09.2023 passed by respondent No.1 vide Annexure-K is quashed. Liberty is however reserved to respondent No.4 as aforesaid. iii. In view of disposal of the petition, pending interlocutory applications, if any, do not survive for consideration and are disposed of accordingly.

14.51. By relying on Shiddalingappa Mallappa Abbigeri's case, he submits that a Court adjudicating on an Election Petition impugning the caste certificate of the returning candidate,

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 ought to suspend the proceedings and direct the parties to approach the DCVC for necessary orders as regards the caste status of the candidate, upon which an election petition may further continue. In the event of no such election petition having been filed, the party concerned may directly approach the statutory body seized of the first appeal and Respondent No. 9 has exactly done so by filing for an appeal under the Act of 1990.

14.52. Insofar as appeal is concerned, his submission is also that even if a person who was not party to the proceeding can be permitted to file an appeal and in this regard, he relies upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Jatan Kumar Golcha v. Golcha Properties (P) Ltd.,27 more particularly para no. 3 thereof, which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference:

(1970) 3 SCC 573

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3. In the order of the High Court reference has been made to Rule 139 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959, and it has been pointed out that since the appellant had not appeared before the Company Judge she was not entitled to maintain the appeal. It was conceded that no notice had ever been sent to her either by the Official Liquidator or the Company Judge before the order appealed against relating to appellant's property was made. The High Court was of the view that the only remedy of the appellant was by way of a suit after obtaining leave of the Company Judge under Section 446 of the Act. Now an appeal lies under Section 483 of the Act from any order made or decision given in the matter of winding up of a company by the court and it lies to the same court to which, in the same manner in which, and subject to the same conditions under which, appeals lie from any order or decision of the Court in cases within its ordinary jurisdiction. There can be no manner of doubt that an appeal was competent against the order made by the Company Judge on July 21, 1969, in view of the terms of Section 483. The only question is whether because the Official Liquidator failed to discharge his duties properly by having a notice issued to the appellant, whose rights were directly affected by the order proposed to be made, the appellant was debarred from filing the appeal. In our opinion apart from Rule 130 to which reference has been made by the High Court the Official Liquidator as well as the learned Company Judge were bound by the rules of natural justice to issue a notice to the appellant and hear her before making the order appealed against. If there was default on their part not following the correct procedure it is wholly incomprehensible how the appellant could be deprived of her right to get her grievance redressed by filing an appeal against the order which had been made in her absence and without her knowledge. It would be a travesty of justice if a party is driven to file a suit which would involve long and cumbersome procedure when an order has been made directly affecting that party and redress can be had by filing an appeal

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 which is permitted by law. It is well settled that a person who is not a party to the suit may prefer an appeal with the leave of the appellate court and such leave should be granted if he would be prejudicially affected by the judgment. 14.53. By relying on the case of Jatan Kumar Golcha, his submission is that a person who is not a party to a dispute may prefer an appeal with the leave of the appellate Court so long he is an aggrieved person by such order, in that regard Respondent No.9 herein is thus entitled to file the said appeal.

14.54. His submission is that irrespective of the proceedings challenging the election, a challenge to the certificate in the 1990 Act is separately maintainable and in this regard, he relies upon the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Veeresh vs. The State Of Karnataka28, more particularly para nos. 16, 28 W.A.NOS.101469-470/2016

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 17 and 18 thereof, which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference:

16. A combined reading of Article 243-O of the Constitution of India and Sections 15 and 171 of the Karnataka Gram Swaraj and Panchayat Raj Act, 1993, makes it clear that the election to panchayat can be called in question only through an election petition, before the competent Authority. Thus, there is no ambiguity with respect to the position of law. However, what is required to be seen in the case on hand is whether the relief sought for in the writ petitions before the learned Single Judge was setting aside of the election results or challenging any election process, thus making it an election petition.

17. The prayer made in W.P.Nos. 103198-

103199/2016 (GM-CC) is as below:

" i. Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari, quashing the caste certificate dated 20.01.2016 vide No.MSC/CR/145/2015-16, issued by the respondent No.4 in favour of the respondent No.5, produced at Annexure-H."

The prayer made in W.P.No.29822/2016 is as below:

" i. Call for the records which ultimately resulted in issuing Endorsement Annexure A dated 01.03.2016 bearing No.MSC/CR/2015-16 issued by the 4th respondent.

ii. Issue an order, direction, writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the Endorsement Annexure A dated 01.03.2016 bearing No.MSC/CR/2015-16 issued by the 4th respondent.

iii. Issue an order, direction, writ in the nature of quashing the caste certificate dated 20.1.2016 vide Annexure-L issued by the respondent, as the same is illegal and without the authority of law.

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 iv. Direct the respondent to initiate criminal prosecution against the 5th respondent for making false declaration in obtaining the Caste Certificate for contesting election No.18 Dhannur Zilla Panchayat Constituency."

Neither of the above two sets of writ petitions have anyway prayed for setting aside the election or to declare the candidature of respondent No.5 as invalid. There is no element of prayer, which touches the procedural aspect of the elections held to the Zilla Panchayat. What is prayed is only the document which is called an Income-cum-Caste Certificate issued by the respondent No.4 - Tahasildar, which document, the respondent No.5 is said to have obtained fraudulently. It is very important to note at this juncture that the document challenged, which is the Income-cum-Caste Certificate dated 20.01.2016 and bearing No.MSC/CR/145/2015- 16, is not a document confining only for the use of election. It can be observed that such a certificate of income and caste was otherwise also being issued by a competent Authority, who is respondent No.4 - Tahasildar herein, under the Karnataka Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes (reservation in appointments etc.,) Rules, 1992. The said certificate can be used for different purposes. Incidentally, the same certificate could also be used as a proof of caste and income for contesting the elections to Zilla Panchayats also. Thus, it cannot be taken that the impugned Income-cum-Caste Certificate is exclusively a document for the electoral process only. Therefore, challenging the said document, though it may as one of its consequence, have impact in the process of adjudication of the election petition, by that itself it cannot be called that should be through an election petition only and not otherwise. In our view, the learned Single Judge did not make this thin distinction between an election petition as such and challenging a document or issuance of a

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 document, which has no direct bearing on the election process or its results.

18. Therefore, we are unable to agree to the main contention taken up by the respondents that the writ petitions as well the present writ appeals are not maintainable and that the appropriate course for the appellants was to challenge the impugned certificate and the process of its issuance only through an election petition.

14.55. By relying on Veeresh's case, he submits that the caste certificate of a person is not a document that is issued exclusively for the purpose of electoral process alone. A challenge to the said document may be a consequence of the electoral process and may impact the outcome of the election petition, but that by itself cannot mandate that a challenge is to be sought only by way of an election petition. In this regard Respondent No. 9 cannot be restricted to seek recourse only by way of an election petition.

14.56. Alternatively, he submits that this Court could also intervene in the matter, where ex-facie it is

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 seen that the certificate obtained by the petitioner is not sustainable and in that regard, he relies upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in K. Venkatachalam v. A. Swamickan29, more particularly para nos. 26, 27 and 28 thereof, which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference:

26. The question that arises for consideration is if in such circumstances the High Court cannot exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution declaring that the appellant is not qualified to be a Member of Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly from Lalgudi Assembly Constituency. From the finding recorded by the High Court it is clear that the appellant in his nomination form impersonated a person known as "Venkatachalam, s/o Pethu" taking advantage of the fact that such a person bears his first name. The appellant would be even criminally liable as he filed his nomination on an affidavit impersonating himself. If in such circumstances he is allowed to continue to sit and vote in the Assembly his action would be a fraud on the Constitution.

27. In view of the judgment of this Court in the case of Election Commission of India v. Saka Venkata Rao [(1953) 1 SCC 320 : AIR 1953 SC 210] it may be that action under Article 192 could not be taken as the disqualification which the appellant incurred was prior to his election.

Various decisions of this Court, which have been referred to by the appellant that jurisdiction of 29 (1999) 4 SCC 526

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 the High Court under Article 226 is barred challenging the election of a returned candidate and which we have noted above, do not appear to apply to the case of the appellant now before us. Article 226 of the Constitution is couched in the widest possible terms and unless there is a clear bar to jurisdiction of the High Court its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution can be exercised when there is any act which is against any provision of law or violative of constitutional provisions and when recourse cannot be had to the provisions of the Act for the appropriate relief. In circumstances like the present one the bar of Article 329(b) will not come into play when the case falls under Articles 191 and 193 and the whole of the election process is over. Consider the case where the person elected is not a citizen of India. Would the court allow a foreign citizen to sit and vote in the Legislative Assembly and not exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution?

28. We are, therefore, of the view that the High Court rightly exercised its jurisdiction in entertaining the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and declared that the appellant was not entitled to sit in Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly with consequent restraint order on him from functioning as a Member of the Legislative Assembly. The net effect is that the appellant ceases to be a Member of Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly. Period of the Legislative Assembly is long since over. Otherwise we would have directed Respondent 2, who is Secretary to Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, to intimate to the Election Commission that Lalgudi Assembly Constituency seat has fallen vacant and for the Election Commission to take necessary steps to hold fresh election from that Assembly constituency. Normally in a case like this the Election Commission should invariably be made a party.

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 14.57. By relying on K. Venkatachalam's case, his submission is that the High Court has a very wide array of jurisdiction under Article 226, which may even stretch to the extent of election-related matters, any action which is against any provision of law or violative of Constitutional provisions is under the scope of Article 226 for scrutiny in the widest possible terms. Hence, although the impugned notice is a result of an appeal consequent to an election, this Court may interfere and adjudicate on the said matter.

14.58. Lastly, he submits that the decision on DCVC being well-reasoned is not correct in as much as it is completely unsustainable contrary to the detailed enquiry which has been made by DRE Cell. The facts have not been taken into consideration properly, the birth certificate relied upon by DCVC was one which was issued after the commencement of proceedings. The

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 earlier facts relating to the date of birth, place of birth and place of residence of the petitioner have not been properly considered by DCVC and in this regard, he submits that any false claim of caste membership is a fraud on the Constitution availing of benefits reserved for Scheduled Caste Community by making a false certificate is also a fraud under Constitution. 14.59. In this regard, he relies upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Madhuri Patil v. Commr., Tribal Development30, more particularly para nos. 15, 16, 17 and 18 thereof, which are reproudued hereunder for easy reference:

15. The question then is whether the approach adopted by the High Court in not elaborately considering the case is vitiated by an error of law. High Court is not a court of appeal to appreciate the evidence. The Committee which is empowered to evaluate the evidence placed before it when records a finding of fact, it ought to prevail unless found vitiated by judicial review of any High Court subject to limitations of interference with findings of fact. The Committee when considers all the material facts and records 30 (1994) 6 SCC 241

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 a finding, though another view, as a court of appeal may be possible, it is not a ground to reverse the findings. The court has to see whether the Committee considered all the relevant material placed before it or has not applied its mind to relevant facts which have led the Committee ultimately record the finding. Each case must be considered in the backdrop of its own facts.

16. Whether appellants are entitled to their further continuance in the studies is the further question. Often the plea of equities or promissory estoppel would be put forth for continuance and completion of further course of studies and usually would be found favour with the courts. The courts have constitutional duty and responsibility, in exercise of the power of its judicial review, to see that constitutional goals set down in the Preamble, the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles of the Constitution, are achieved. A party that seeks equity, must come with clean hands. He who comes to the court with false claim, cannot plead equity nor the court would be justified to exercise equity jurisdiction in his favour. There is no estoppel as no promise of the social status is made by the State when a false plea was put forth for the social status recognised and declared by the Presidential Order under the Constitution as amended by the SC & ST (Amendment) Act, 1976, which is later found to be false. Therefore, the plea of promissory estoppel or equity have no application. When it is found to be a case of fraud played by the concerned, no sympathy and equitable considerations can come to his rescue. Nor the plea of estoppel is germane to the beneficial constitutional concessions and opportunities given to the genuine tribes or castes. Courts would be circumspect and vary in considering such cases.

17. We have seen that Miss Suchita rightly made an application before the competent officer

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 within whose jurisdiction her father lives in Muland and when he refused to give the certificate, she filed an appeal; approached the High Court and obtained direction and gained admission. It is not in dispute that the Additional Commissioner was delaying it; he did not decide as directed by the High Court, instead directed the Tahsildar to issue the certificate. Thus she secured a false social status certificate and orders of the court were used to gain admission. The judicial process is made use of to secure admission. She continued her studies thereafter pending scrutiny of her status certificate. No doubt there was a delay on the part of the Scrutiny Committee in the disposal of the claims and we do not find any record to scan the reasons for the delay. Suffice to state that her parents have put her under a cloud as to her social status. But as seen from the facts a course of conduct was adopted by her parents to gain admission on the claim which is now found to be false. Parents' misconduct visits the children also many a times. However, she has now completed the course of study except to appear for the final year as contended for her and nothing more is to be done in the situation for her to complete her course of study. We direct the Principal to permit her to sit for the final year examination, if she has completed the course of study as represented to us but not with the social status as a Scheduled Tribe which was claimed fraudulently and made her admission with the aid of the court's order and continue her studies. The delay in disposal facilitated her continuance in study of MBBS course.

18. The delay in the process is inevitable but that factor should neither be considered to be relevant nor be an aid to complete the course of study. But for the fact that she has completed the entire course except to appear for the final examination, we would have directed to debar her from prosecuting the studies and appearing in the examination. In this factual situation no useful purpose would be served to debar her from appearing for the examination of final year

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 MBBS. Therefore, we uphold the cancellation of the social status as Mahadeo Koli fraudulently obtained by Km Suchita Laxman Patil, but she be allowed to appear for the final year examination of MBBS course. She will not, however be entitled in future for any benefits on the basis of the fraudulent social status as Mahadeo Koli. However, this direction should not be treated and used as a precedent in future cases to give any similar directions since the same defeats constitutional goals.

14.60. By relying on Madhuri Patil's case, he submits that a party that approaches the Court seeking equity must come with clean hands, and any person who prays relief based upon a false claim or is found to play fraud on the Court, no sympathy or equitable considerations come to his rescue. The petitioner having relied on false caste claims has therefore played fraud on this Court, necessitating dismissal at the bud itself. 14.61. He relies upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Raju Ramsing Vasave v. Mahesh Deorao Bhivapurkar31, more particularly para 31 (2008) 9 SCC 54

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 nos. 30 to 38 thereof, which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference;

30. The principle of res judicata is undoubtedly a salutary principle. Even a wrong decision would attract the principle of res judicata. The said principle, however, amongst others, has some exceptions e.g. when a judgment is passed without jurisdiction, when the matter involves a pure question of law or when the judgment has been obtained by committing fraud on the court.

31. In Williams v. Lourdusamy [(2008) 5 SCC 647] this Court stated the law, thus: (SCC p. 650, para 11) "11. The principles of res judicata although provide for a salutary principle that no person shall be harassed again and again, have its own limitations. In OS No. 402 of 1987, Respondent 2 was not impleaded as a party. In his absence therefore, the issue as to whether Respondent 2 had entered into an oral agreement of sale or not could not have been adjudicated upon. The said court had no jurisdiction in that behalf. If that was decided in the said suit, the findings would have been nullities."

32. Two legal principles which would govern a case of this nature are:

(i) A decision rendered without jurisdiction being a nullity, the principle of res judicata shall not apply.

(ii) If a fraud has been committed on the court, no benefit therefrom can be claimed on the basis thereof or otherwise.

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33. In support of the first principle, we may at the outset refer to Chief Justice of A.P. v. L.V.A. Dixitulu [(1979) 2 SCC 34 : 1979 SCC (L&S) 99] wherein this Court, while discussing the effect of Section 11 CPC on a pure question of law or a decision given by a court without jurisdiction, opined: (SCC p. 42, para 24) "24. ... Moreover, this is a pure question of law depending upon the interpretation of Article 371- D. If the argument holds good, it will make the decision of the Tribunal as having been given by an authority suffering from inherent lack of jurisdiction. Such a decision cannot be sustained merely by the doctrine of res judicata or estoppel as urged in this case."

34. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. State of T.N. [(2004) 3 SCC 1] held: (SCC p. 44, para 118) "118. The principle of res judicata is a procedural provision. A jurisdictional question, if wrongly decided, would not attract the principle of res judicata. When an order is passed without jurisdiction, the same becomes a nullity. When an order is a nullity, it cannot be supported by invoking the procedural principles like estoppel, waiver or res judicata."

35. So far as the second principle, noticed by us, is concerned, there is no dearth of authority. Fraud vitiates all solemn acts. When an order has been obtained by practising fraud on the court, it would be a nullity.

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36. In Ganpatbhai Mahijibhai Solanki v. State of Gujarat [(2008) 12 SCC 353 : (2008) 3 Scale 556] this Court held:

"It is now a well-settled principle that fraud vitiates all solemn acts. If an order is obtained by reason of commission of fraud, even the principles of natural justice are not required to be complied with for setting aside the same."

It was further observed:

"In T. Vijendradas v. M. Subramanian [(2007) 8 SCC 751] this Court held: (SCC p. 766, paras 27-

28) '27. ... When a fraud is practised on a court, the same is rendered a nullity. In a case of nullity, even the principles of natural justice are not required to be complied with. (Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan v. Ajay Kumar Das [(2002) 4 SCC 503 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 582] and A. Umarani v. Registrar, Coop. Societies [(2004) 7 SCC 112 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 918] .)

28. Once it is held that by reason of commission of a fraud, a decree is rendered to be void rendering all subsequent proceedings taken pursuant thereto also nullity, in our opinion, it would be wholly inequitable to confer a benefit on a party who is a beneficiary thereunder.' "

37. In K.D. Sharma v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. [(2008) 12 SCC 481 : (2008) 10 Scale 227] this Court opined:

"Reference was also made to a recent decision of this Court in A.V. Papayya Sastry v. Govt. of A.P. [(2007) 4 SCC 221] Considering English and Indian cases, one of us (C.K. Thakker, J.) stated:

(SCC p. 231, para 22)

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 '22. It is thus settled proposition of law that a judgment, decree or order obtained by playing fraud on the court, tribunal or authority is a nullity and non est in the eye of the law. Such a judgment, decree or order--by the first court or by the final court--has to be treated as nullity by every court, superior or inferior. It can be challenged in any court, at any time, in appeal, revision, writ or even in collateral proceedings.' The Court defined fraud as an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing something by taking unfair advantage of another. In fraud one gains at the loss and cost of another. Even the most solemn proceedings stand vitiated if they are actuated by fraud. Fraud is thus an extrinsic collateral act which vitiates all judicial acts, whether in rem or in personam."

38. The order dated 11-8-1988, thus, would not operate as a res judicata so as to disable it from considering the merit of the case of Respondent 1 by the State of Maharashtra or the Maharashtra Pollution Control Board afresh. The decision of the High Court ex facie is unsustainable.

14.62. By relying on Raju Ramsing Vasave's case, he submits that it is settled law that fraud vitiates everything and an order obtained by fraud would not even attract the principles of natural justice when seeking to set aside the same.

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 14.63. He relies upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Jayashree v. Director of Collegiate Education32, more particularly para nos. 16 and 20 thereof, which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference:

16. On going through the above said paragraph, therein it has been specifically observed that, if a person obtains a false certificate and gets an appointment, it would be like allowing a thief to retain the stolen property. In that light also the contention taken up by the learned counsel for the petitioner does not hold any water. When the petitioner has taken the benefit on a false certificate, then it cannot be held that the said candidate is fit to hold the post which is reserved for the said category. Even the cancellation of the Caste Certificate has attained finality and even the said order has not been challenged.

Under the said facts and circumstances, the contention of the petitioner that she ought not to have been terminated and the benefit of the circular or an order of the appointment could have been given is not acceptable.

20. On going through, the above said paragraphs, the Hon'ble Apex Court has clearly held that where a case is based on fraud no sympathy or equity can come to the rescue of the petitioner. In that light also the contention of the petitioner is not acceptable. 14.64. By relying on Jayashree's case, he submits that a person who obtains a false caste certificate and is allowed to use its benefits 32 2018 SCC OnLine Kar 3923

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 thereunder would amount to allowing a thief to retain stolen property, and in this regard the Petitioner is fraudulently availing the benefits created for genuine SC/ST persons thereby playing fraud on the entire deprived sections. 14.65. The Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Sri Satish Choudappa Honnali vs. The State Of Karnataka33, more particularly para nos. 3 and 4 thereof, which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference:

3. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having perused the appeal papers, we decline indulgence in the matter broadly agreeing with the submission of learned AGA.

Wherever a certificate of social status is obtained in violation of law or by playing fraud or is granted by mistake, ordinarily proceedings are permissible under the provisions of the 1990 Act and the Rules promulgated thereunder, subject to all just exceptions. Learned Single Judge keeping this mind has rightly reserved liberty to the Authorities concerned.

4. The submission of learned Senior Advocate appearing for the appellant that once the Validity Certificate is issued, never there can be any enquiry in any circumstance, appears to be too broad proposition of law. One immediate example for faltering such a broad statement is 33 W.A. No.587/2023

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 the ground of fraud. The Apex Court in S.P.CHANGALAVARAYA NAIDU vs. JAGANNATH, (1994) 1 SCC 1, has observed that fraud vitiates everything. If a certificate of social status is secured by playing fraud, the same can be rescinded in an appropriate proceeding by the jurisdictional authorities. Therefore, the Validity Certificate cannot be construed as a China Wall that prevents any action being taken. 14.66. By placing reliance on Satish Choudappa Honnali's case, his submission is that despite the issuance of a validity certificate, the matter is open to scrutiny and inquiry under certain exceptional circumstances such as fraud and a caste validity certificate cannot be construed as a China Wall that prevents any further action for mala fide acts. The Petitioner having fraudulently obtained and illegally in use of reservation benefits is an essential ground to impugn the validity certificate issued by the DCVC in his favour.

14.67. Based on all the above, he submits that the appeal filed by respondent No.9 is maintainable. The notice of enquiry which has

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 been issued is proper and correct. It is for the petitioner to appear before the concerned authorities and place the necessary facts and documents on record which is considered by the Appellate Authority. On all the above gournds, he submits that the above petition is required to be dismissed.

15. Heard Sri. Ameet Kumar Deshpande, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, Sri. C. Jagadish, learned counsel appearing for respondents No.1 to 8 and Sri. Aditya Narayan, learned counsel appearing for Respondent No.9. Persued papers.

16. The points that would arise for the consideration of this Court are:

1. Can Respondent No.9 being a third-party to the earlier appeal, file an appeal under Section 4D of the Act of 1990, and a notice of enquiry be issued in furtherance thereof, in the background of the earlier appeal having been withdrawn by the earlier appellant therein?

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2. Can Respondent No. 9 be said to have locus standi to file the appeal under section 4D on the ground that he is a contestant in the election to be Member of Legislative Assembly for Aurad constituency or would he have to separately file an election petition challenging the election of the petitioner?

3. Whether the Petitioner can maintain the present writ petition challenging a show cause notice or a notice of enquiry?

4. To maintain a valid appeal under Section 4D of the Act of 1990, what is the prescribed period of limitation that would be applicable thereto?

5. On account of the earlier order passed by the DCVC, and the earlier appeal filed having been withdrawn, would the present appeal filed by Respondent No. 9 be barred by the principle of Res Judicata having attained finality, and in that regard amount to an abuse of the legal process by initiating repeated proceedings?

6. Would Respondent No.2 be regarded as Functus Officio on account of the earlier appeal having been withdrawn, and thus estopped from adjudicating on the fresh appeal?

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7. Whether a person born in a caste or community, which is not notified as a scheduled tribe or scheduled caste in the state of birth, upon migration to another state, wherein that caste or community is notified as a scheduled caste or scheduled tribe, be entitled to the benefit granted to such scheduled caste or scheduled tribe in the state to which the person has migrated to?

8. Even if an election petition were to be filed, could the election tribunal, be empowered to decide on the validity or otherwise of the caste certificate under the Karnataka Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes (Reservation of Appointments, Etc.) Act, 1990 or would it have to be done by the authorities as constituted under the Act of 1990?

9. In the present case, can this Court go into the aspect of validity or otherwise of the caste certificate of the Petitioner or would it have to be left to the concerned authority under the Act of 1990?

10. Can the High Court consider the disputed question of facts and allegations of fraud in the present writ petition or would it have to be decided by the concerned authority under the Act of 1990?

11. Whether the doctrine of merger would apply in the instant case?

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12. Whether this Court can intercede and adjudicate upon the impugned notice?

13. What order?

17. I answers above points are as under;

18. Answer to the points No.1 and 2: Can Respondent No.9 being a third-party to the earlier appeal, file an appeal under Section 4D of the Act of 1990, and a notice of enquiry be issued in furtherance thereof, in the background of the earlier appeal having been withdrawn by the earlier appellant therein? And Can Respondent No. 9 be said to have locus standi to file the appeal under Section 4D on the ground that he is a contestant in the election to be Member of Legislative Assembly for Aurad constituency or would he have to separately file an election petition challenging the election of the petitioner?

16.1 The contention of Sri. Ameet Kumar Deshpande, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners is that respondent No.9 was not a party to the earlier proceedings, more so the appeal which had been filed under Section 4D of the Act of 1990, and therefore the

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 question of the Respondent No.9 filing a fresh appeal under Section 4D would not arise. The earlier appeal filed by Sri.Shankarrao Doddi has been withdrawn, and hence no fresh appeal under Section 4D could be filed.

16.2 By relying on Section 4D, his submission is that it is only a person who is aggrieved by an order made by the Verification Committee under Section 4C that can file an appeal under Section 4D. The earlier appeal filed by Sri.Shankarrao Doddi under Section 4D having been withdrawn, he having been the aggrieved party, Respondent No.9 cannot be said to be either the aggrieved party nor could he file the present petition.

16.3 The submission of Sri. C.Jagadish, learned counsel for the State is that Sri. Shankarrao Doddi having challenged the order passed by DCVC in a Writ Petition in WP No.58264 of 2017, the said writ petition came to be

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 dismissed, reserving liberty to Sri. Shankarrao Doddi to approach the Appellate Authority under Section 4D.

16.4 He having filed the said appeal, his right to file the said appeal had been challenged by the petitioner in WP No.201341 of 2018, which came to be disposed again reserving liberty to Sri.Shankarrao Doddi to file an appeal under Section 4D. An appeal having been filed by Sri. Shankarrao Doddi under Section 4D and he withdrew the said appeal. The Appellate authority being of the considered opinion that the withdrawal was bad, imposed a cost of Rs.1,00,000/-.

16.5 Thus, the submission of Sri. C.Jagadish, learned counsel in this regard is that the mere withdrawal of the appeal would not put an end to the right of any other aggrieved person like that of Respondent No.9. The order of the DCVC dated 20.11.2017 not having stood the

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 rigour of an appeal, Respondent No.9 cannot be prevented from filing an appeal in the background of there being no finality to the proceedings which had been arrived at. 16.6 Similarly, the submission made by Sri. Aditya Narayan, learned counsel for Respondent No.9- Appellant, is that if such a contention were to be accepted, then Respondent No.9 would be left with no other option and/or remedy. It is in this background, the above points would have to be addressed.

16.7 It is not in dispute that the petitioner claiming the benefit of belonging to the Scheduled Tribe Category had contested the elections for the year 2008, 2013, 2018 and thereafter 2023, on the basis of the certificate issued by the Tahasildhar that he belonged to the Scheduled Tribe Category. When the petitioner contested the election in the year 2013, Sri.Shankarrao Doddi had contended that the certificate

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 obtained by the petitioner was not proper and as such had challenged the certificate. The matter having been referred to the DCVC, the DCVC had issued a certificate on 20.11.2017 that he belonged to the 'Lambani' caste and therefore was entitled to the Schedule Tribe Certificate. The further aspects of the challenge made thereto have been mentioned hereinabove.

16.8 It is further not in dispute that Respondent No.9 is a contestant to the Aurad Constituency of the Legislative Assembly of Karnataka. It is the very same constituency as regards which the Petitioner also had contested. Respondent No.9 is also claiming the benefit of the Schedule Caste Category. The contention of Respondent No.9 is that, if the petitioner were to be denied the benefit of the Scheduled Caste Certificate for the aforesaid reasons, the Aurad Constituency being a reserved constituency for

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 Scheduled Castes, would result in the petitioner being disentitled to contest the elections therein and as such, the same would directly and substantially affect the rights of Respondent No.9.

16.9 Sri. Ameet Kumar Deshpande, has relied upon the decision in Ayaaubkhan Narkhan Pathan's case to contend that Respondent No.9 is required to be treated as a third-party stranger by further contending that the Hon'ble Apex Court in Ayaaubkhan Narkhan Pathan's case has held that the Court must maintain a strict vigilance to ensure that there is no abuse of the process of Court and meddlesome bystanders ought not to be provided a forum to agitate their alleged grievances, when there are no such grievances. 16.10 I am unable to accept the submission of Sri. Ameet Kumar Deshpande, learned Senior Counsel in this regard, inasmuch as that was a

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 decision where the Hon'ble Apex Court held that a stranger cannot be permitted to meddle in any proceedings, unless he satisfies the Authority/Court that he falls within the category of aggrieved persons. Though the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that strangers cannot be permitted to meddle in the proceedings, an exception has also been carved out by the Hon'ble Apex Court that if a person were to satisfy that he falls within the category of an aggrieved person, he could be permitted to agitate his rights.

16.11 In the present matter, as referred to above, Respondent No.9 is also a contestant for the reserved Constituency of Aurad and as rightly contended by Sri.Aditya Narayan, learned counsel in the event of the Caste Certificate of the petitioner being set aside, then the petitioner would not be entitled to participate in the election and as such, the very act of the

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 petitioner contesting in the election would make Respondent No.9 aggrieved by such contesting. And as such, Respondent No.9 cannot be said to be a person who is not aggrieved by the validity certificate issued by the DCVC. 16.12 Looked at from another angle, if the said validity certificate had not been challenged by Sri. Shankarrao Doddi, it could not be said that Respondent No.9 did not have any grievance or was not an affected party. On the face of the record, Respondent No.9 being a co-contestant with the petitioner, such contest would not have happened if the petitioner did not have a Caste Validity Certificate indicating him to belong to the Scheduled Caste Category. 16.13 Therefore, if the petitioner were to be contesting in a reserved constituency on the basis of a false certificate obtained by him, I am of the considered opinion that Respondent No.9 could not be said to be a third-party or a

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 stranger, but would have to be considered to be an aggrieved party by the very fact of the petitioner contesting to a reserved constituency on the basis of a false reservation certificate. Thus, the decision in Ayaaubkhan Narkhan Pathan's case would not favour the petitioner but would actually favour Respondent No.9, in my considered opinion.

16.14 Sri. Ameet Kumar Deshpande has also relied upon the decision in R.S.Mahadev's case which in turn relied upon Ayaaubkhan Narkhan Pathan's case. This decision also in my considered opinion would not be attracted to the present facts. R.S. Mahadev's case was rendered in the background of the appellant not being a person who had applied to the post to which the person who had obtained the Caste Certificate had applied and in that background, the Division Bench of this Court came to a

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 conclusion that such a person was not an aggrieved party.

16.15 In the present case, at the cost of repitition, it would again have to be noticed that the Respondent No.9 is a rival contestant to the Aurad Constituency where the petitioner had applied to contest in an election. Thus, the decision in R.S.Mahadev's case would also not be applicable.

16.16 In the second round of litigation, as adverted to Supra after the withdrawal of the appeal filed by Sri. Shankarrao Doddi, Sri. Ravindraswamy and Sri. Vijayakumar had filed a Revision Petition under Section 4F of the Act of 1990, the same having been dismissed came to be challenged by Sri. Ravindraswamy in WP No.225917 of 2020, when the single judge held that the Revision Petition is maintainable, it came to be challenged by the petitioner in WA No.200031 of 2022 and

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 WA No.200032 of 2022 and the Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 13.01.2023 had held that, an appeal under Section 4D being the remedy available, a revision under Section 4F was not maintainable.

16.17 A challenge having been made before the Hon'ble Apex Court in SLP.C. No.7747 of 2023, the said SLP also came to be dismissed. The finding of the Division Bench in its order dated 13.01.2023 inWA No.200032 of 2022 is that against the DCVC's order only an appeal under Section 4D was maintainable and therefore, the attempt made by Sri.Ravindraswamy and Sri.Vijayakumar to challenge the order of the Tahasildhar dated 04.02.20213 by filing a revision was not permissible and that the Revision Petitions were not maintainable. 16.18 The Division Bench of this Court did not hold that an appeal was not maintainable but has in fact held that an appeal was maintainable and a

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 revision was not maintainable and in that background, allowed WA No.200031 of 2022 and WA No.200032 of 2022. The said order came to be challenged by Sri.Ravindraswamy, but was not challenged by the petitioner. Hence, the finding of the Division Bench of this Court, that an appeal was maintainable, continues to be applicable to the petitioner. 16.19 Be that as it may, even otherwise what was stated by the Division Bench was a reiteration of the law, in as much as an order passed by the DCVC under Section 4C could only be appealed under Section 4D and any person aggrieved thereafter could file a Revision Petition.

16.20 This Court in Vageesh's case, has also held that if a person is an aggrieved person, then he would come within the ambit of Section 4D. The Hon'ble Apex Court in M.V. Dabholkar's case (Supra), has held that the meaning of the

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 words a person aggrieved may vary according to the context of the statute, that a more liberal approach is required in the background of statutes which do not deal with property rights but deal with professional conduct and morality, the Hon'ble Apex Court while dealing with the meaning of the word 'person aggrieved' under Section 37 and 38 of the Bar Council of India Act, came to a conclusion that a meaning of wide import should be given and no restricted interpretation should be given to those words. It further held that a person who has a genuine grievance because an order has been made which prejudicially affects his interest would make such person an aggrieved person. 16.21 The Hon'ble Apex Court again in A. Subash Babu's case held that the concept of an aggrieved person is an elastic and an elusive concept which cannot be confined within the bounds of rigid, exact and comprehensive

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 definition, and meaning should be given to the words in such a way as to provide a remedy to an aggrieved person.

16.22 If these factors are taken into consideration, it cannot be said that Respondent No.9 is a third- party in the true sense of the term. Though Respondent No.9 was not a party to the earlier appeal or the earlier proceedings filed by Sri. Shankarrao Doddi and Sri. Ravindraswamy as also Sri. Vijaykumar, Respondent No.9 is now a rival contestant for the reserved assembly seat of Aurad.

16.23 The fact of withdrawal of the earlier appeal by Sri.Shankarrao Doddi has been dealt with briefly above. The said withdrawal happened in the third round of litigation inasmuch as the certificate having been issued by Tahasildhar was challenged by Sri.Shankarrao Doddi in a writ petition when this Court reserved liberty to Sri.Shankarrao Doddi to file an appeal under

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 Section 4D. Sri.Shankarrao Doddi having filed an appeal under Section 4D in pursuance which liberty was reserved, on account of the petitioner himself contending that a writ petition is not maintainable but an appeal under Section 4D was to be filed.

16.24 Shockingly, the petitioner challenged the filing of the appeal by filing a writ petition contending that the appeal under Section 4D was not maintainable, that writ petition came to be dismissed and thereafter an appeal had been filed by Sri.Shankarrao Doddi he withdrew the same as regards which cost of Rs.1,00,000/- (one lakh) was imposed.

16.25 The sequence of events which has been narrated above, would indicate that the stand of the petitioner has been completely mala fide. On one ground or the other, the petitioner had sought to thwart the actions on part of Sri. Shankarrao Doddi. Finally, Sri. Shankarrao

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 Doddi is stated to have withdrawn the appeal filed under Section 4D, despite a cost of Rs.1,00,000/- having been imposed, which to my mind does not inspire any confidence as regards the conduct of the petitioner. It appears that the petitioner has filed various proceedings to thwart the legal remedies of Sri. Shankarrao Doddi and finally prevailed upon Sri. Shankarrao Doddi to withdraw the appeal filed under Section 4D.

16.26 Thus, the challenge made to the Caste Certificate was not addressed or answered either in the writ petition or the appeal under Section 4D. The challenge made was withdrawn by Sri. Shankarrao Doddi, merely because Sri. Shankarrao Doddi who is a third party insofar as Respondent No.9 is concerned having withdrawn the appeal, the same cannot come in the way of Respondent No.9 agitating his own rights. As such, the withdrawal of the appeal by

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 Sri. Shankarrao Doddi cannot be said to come in the way of Respondent No.9 filing an appeal under Section 4D or affect his independent rights accrued on the ground of being a co- contestant to the elections against the petitioner.

16.27 The further contention urged by Sri.Ameet Kumar Deshpande, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner is that no notice of enquiry could be issued on an appeal having been filed under Section 4D. Section 4D has been reproduced hereinabove which would categorically indicate that any person aggrieved by an order passed by the Verification Committee under Section 4C, may within 30 days from the date of receipt of the order, file an appeal before the concerned authority and in terms of Sub-section (2) of Section 4D the Appellate Authority shall after giving to both

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 the parties an opportunity of being heard, pass such orders in appeal as it deems fit. 16.28 Thus, it is in pursuance of the powers vested in the Appellate Authority that a notice for enquiry has been issued by the Appellate Authority. Having held that the appeal filed by Respondent No.9 under 4D is maintainable the powers of the Appellate Authority are those that are provided for under the statute more particularly in Section 4E, wherein the Tahasildhar and Verification Committee enjoy the powers of a Civil Court. Therefore, in my considered opinion the notice of enquiry which has been issued by the Appellate Authority in pursuance of the validly instituted appeal by Respondent No.9 cannot be found fault with.

16.29 In that view of the matter, I answer PointNos.1 and 2 by holding that Respondent No.9 being a rival contestant to a reserved constituency cannot be said to be a third-party to the

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 dispute relating to the Caste Certificate of one other contestant to the same constituency like the petitioner herein.

16.30 An earlier appeal challenging such a Caste Certificate having been withdrawn would not bar the claim of the present contestant like Respondent No.9 on validly having instituted an appeal under Section 4D of the Act of 1990, and hence the Appellate Authority is well within its rights to issue a 'notice of enquiry'.

19. Answer to point No.3: Whether the Petitioner can maintain the present writ petition challenging a show cause notice or a notice of enquiry?

19.1. The submission of Sri. Ameet Kumar Deshpande, learned Senior Counsel is that there being several rounds of litigation earlier filed by certain other parties, the Caste Certificate issued in favour of the petitioner having been challenged in an appeal filed under Section 4D, the said appeal having been

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 withdrawn, no show cause notice or notice of enquiry could be issued to the Petitioner. 19.2. In this regard, he relies upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Vicco Laboratories's case to contend that the show cause notice is issued without jurisdiction or is an abuse of the process of the Court, and in that the writ petition would be maintainable. The operative words of the said judgement of the Hon'ble Apex Court is that the show cause notice is required to be issued without jurisdiction or is an abuse of the process of law.

19.3. Insofar as jurisdiction is concerned, Section 4D which has been reproduced hereinabove clearly and categorically provides for the power of the Appellate Authority to issue notice, provide an opportunity of being heard to both the parties and thereafter pass an order. Thus, the Appellate Authority who has issued the

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 impugned notice has the jurisdiction to do so and it is for the concerned to reply to the same. 19.4. Insofar as the abuse of the process of law is concerned, in this regard, the submission of Sri. Ameet Kumar Deshpande, learned Senior Cousnel is that the earlier appeal under Section 4D having been withdrawn, another appeal under Section 4D filed by Respondent No.9 would not be maintainable , Appellate Authority ought not to have issued a show cause notice in that regard, the filing of the appeal in itself is an abuse of law which ought not to have been entertained by the Appellate Authority. 19.5. This aspect of whether Respondent No.9 could maintain an appeal under Section 4D will be dealt with in detail subsequently, suffice it to say that if an appeal is filed by an aggrieved party, then it cannot be said to be an abuse of the process of law under Section 4D.

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 19.6. The other decision relied upon by Sri. Ameet Kumar Deshpande, learned Senior Counsel is that of Whirlpool Corporation by relying on which he submits that the present writ petition is maintainable, since the same is filed for protection of the fundamental right of the petitioner in contesting the elections, and in that regard the impugned proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction.

19.7. Insofar as jurisdiction is concerned, I have dealt with it above while dealing with the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Vicco Laboratories' case. The Appellate Authority therefore would have jurisdiction and would not come under the mischief sought to be prevented by the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Whirlpool Corporation's case.

19.8. As regards fundamental rights, the petitioner does not have a fundamental right to contest, the said right is a right created under a statute

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 and it is the rights as per the statute which could be exercised by the petitioner and not otherwise.

19.9. The statutes among others which would be applicable are the Representation of the People Act, 1950 and the Karnataka Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes (Reservation of Appointment etc.) Act, 1990 and as such the petitioner would have to comply with the requirements under those enactments. Thus, the right to contest an election cannot be traced to Part-III of the Constitution of India and as such the claim in this regard made by Sri.Ameet Kumar Deshpande, learned Senior counsel would also have to be rejected.

19.10. In that view of the matter, I answer point No.3 by holding that the Appellate Authority having the right to issue a show cause notice, it is but required for the petitioner to reply to the same

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 and stand the rigour of the appeal under Section 4D.

20. Answer to Point No.4: To maintain a valid appeal under Section 4D of the Act of 1990, what is the prescribed period of limitation that would be applicable thereto?

20.1. The submission of Sri. Ameet Kumar Deshpande, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner is that in terms of Sub-section (1) of Section 4D, any aggrieved person of an order passed under Section 4C is required to file an appeal within 30 days from the date of receipt of the order. Thus, he submits that the order under challenged being an order passed under Section 4C dated 20.11.2017 an appeal ought to have been filed by 19.12.2017. The present proceedings have been initiated on 06.11.2023 by Respondent No.9 is hopelessly barred by limitation. There being a lapse of more than six years from the date on which the order was passed, the First Appellate Authority

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 ought to have rejected the appeal in limine without causing any notice on the petitioner. 20.2. His further submission in this regard is that even a challenge made to the said order by Sri.Shankarrao Doddi was withdrawn on 07.05.2018, if Respondent No.9 was aggrieved by such withdrawal, Respondent No.9 ought to have filed an appeal within 30 days from 07.05.2018 that is by 06.06.2018. The same also not having been done, the present proceedings having been filed 5 years thereafter is barred by limitation. 20.3. Lastly, he submits that one Sri. Ravindraswamy and Sri. Vijay Kumar having filed a Revision Petition under Section 4F of the Act of 1990, the said Revision Petition having been allowed by the writ Court by a single judge came to be set aside by the Hon'ble Division Bench on 13.01.2023 and confirmed by the Hon'ble Apex Court on 01.05.2023.The present proceedings

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 having been filed much thereafter are also barred by the law of limitation.

20.4. The submission of Sri. C. Jagdish, learned counsel is that though Section 4D contemplates an appeal to be filed within 30 days, the same would have to be taken into consideration from the date of knowledge of the order and not from the date of the order itself and apart therefrom, he submits that it is only when a person is aggrieved by an order could the same be challenged.

20.5. Insofar as knowledge, he submits that that is for Respondent No.9 to establish. However, insofar as Respondent No.9 being aggrieved he submits that Respondent No.9 having contested the elections only in the year 2023 as a rival candidate to the petitioner, it is only then could Respondent No.9 be said to be aggrieved by a false or fraudulent Caste Certificate issued to the petitioner. Thus, he submits that the

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 appeal filed by Respondent No.9 from the date of knowledge can be said to be within time. 20.6. His further submission as a special counsel to protect the interest of persons belonging to Schedule Caste and Schedule Tribe category is that if there is any fraud perpetuated by a person claiming to belong to the Schedule Caste or Schedule Tribe category and a challenge is made thereto, this Court ought to be liberal in condoning any delay since it is in the interest of the depressed category, more particularly the Schedule Caste or Schedule Tribe Category which is required to be protected both internally and externally. 20.7. Internally in as much as from persons who falsely claim to belong to the said category and corner the benefits and externally against persons who do not belong to the category but seek to oppress persons belonging to the aforesaid categories.

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 20.8. Sri. Aditya Narayan, learned counsel appearing for Respondent No.9, would also reiterate the submission made by, Sri. C. Jagdish and submit that Respondent No.9 came to know of the earlier proceedings only when Respondent No.9 contested in the said elections. Even otherwise, it is only when the petitioner contested against Respondent No.9 on the basis of a false certificate issued, that Respondent No.9 became an aggrieved party. Thus, the limitation period of 30 days prescribed under Sub-section (1) of Section 4D would have to be taken into consideration from the date on which the aggrieved person had knowledge of the said impugned order, as also from the date on which the aggrieved person can be said to be aggrieved, so without a person being aggrieved an appeal under Section 4D is not maintainable. 20.9. In this regard, he relies upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Madan Lal's case to

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 contend that a remedy cannot be lost for no fault of a person. It is a fundamental principle of justice that a party whose rights are affected by an order must have notice of it and thus it is from the date of notice that the limitation period ought to commence.

20.10. He also relies upon the decision in Alamelu Ammal's case and submits that for the purpose of computing limitation as regards an appeal or revision, the date of communication of a copy of the order would have to be taken into consideration, Respondent No.9 not being a party to the earlier proceedings was never communicated with the said decision. Therefore, the date of the decision ought not to be taken into consideration.

20.11. By relying on P. Sundarmurthy's case, he submits that the date of the knowledge being much later than the date of the order, the

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 limitation would have to be considered from the date of knowledge.

20.12. If the date of knowledge were to be disputed by the other party, it is for the other party to establish that the person had knowledge much prior to the claimed date. In the present case, the matter being at the stage of issuance of show cause notice, these aspects would be dealt with by the Appellate Authority. These being the broad arguments which have been advanced, have to be considered in respect of the above point.

20.13. It is clear that Respondent No.9 was not a party to the proceedings filed by Sri. Shankarrao Doddi. He was also not a party to the proceedings filed by Sri.Vijay Kumar and Sri. Ravindraswamy. It is also clear that it is only in the year 2023 that Respondent No.9 contested the elections for the Aurad Reserve Constituency, where the petitioner had also

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 contested. Prior to 2023, there is nothing on record to indicate that Respondent No.9 had contested any elections against the petitioner. 20.14. Thus, the knowledge of the order on part of Respondent No.9, in my considered opinion would be irrelevant inasmuch as even if an order had been passed earlier and even if the same were to have come to the knowledge of Respondent No.9, Respondent No.9 could not have contested or challenged the said order, since Respondent No.9 would not have qualified to the status of an 'aggrieved person'. 20.15. Much arguments have been advanced as regards who is an aggrieved person, which has been considered in answer to point nos. 1&2 above, Sri. Ameet Kumar Deshpande, learned Senior Counsel having argued that Respondent No.9 is not an aggrieved person and therefore cannot maintain an appeal. The same would be equally applicable to the aspect of consideration

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 of limitation, inasmuch as, even if Respondent No.9 had knowledge about the order. 20.16. Respondent No.9 could not have challenged the said order, since he was not aggrieved until he had contested the election as a rival contestant against the petitioner, this having occurred in the year 2023, I am of the considered opinion that, irrespective of the date of the order under Section 4C or date of knowledge of the order on the part of Respondent No.9, Respondent No.9 being aggrieved only at the time of the electoral contest, it is thereafter that the limitation period would have to be considered. 20.17. In the present case, it has also been contended by Sri. Aditya Narayan, that it is only after the electoral contest that Respondent No.9 came to know about the earlier proceedings. Thus, this aspect would also have to be considered by the Appellate Authority while considering the aspect of limitation. It cannot ex-facie be said that the

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 appeal filed by Respondent No.9 is barred by the law of limitation. Limitation, as is trite law, being a mixed question of law and fact would have to be decided upon by the Appellate Authority in accordance with law, more so in view of the above observations made. 20.18. Thus, I answer Point No.4 by holding that a valid appeal under Section 4D of the Act of 1990 would have to be filed within a period of 30 days from the date of the order. However, the same would also have to be qualified by holding that without the knowledge of the order, no person could challenge the order. Thus, it would be from the date of knowledge of the order that the limitation period would have to be taken into account.

20.19. There being a specific restriction under Section 4D, that is only an aggrieved party who can file an appeal, the period of limitation would have to be calculated from the date on which a

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 person became aggrieved and the relevant factors in relation thereto would be required to be considered.

20.20. In the event of there being no knowledge of the order prior to being aggrieved and the date of knowledge of the order came to the aggrieved party after being aggrieved upon contesting the election, it was on the date on which the aggrieved party came to know about the earlier order, which would have to be then taken into consideration for the purpose of calculation of limitation.

20.21. This being the case, I'm of the considered opinion that Respondent No.9 being aggrieved by contesting elections against the Petitioner, and knowledge of the order of the DCVC having come to light in that background, the limitation period under section 4D of the Act of 1990 would thus run from that date thereon and therefore Respondent No. 9 cannot be said to

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 be ex facie barred by limitation in filing an appeal against the order of the DCVC under section 4D.

21. Answer to point No.5: On account of the earlier order passed by the DCVC, and the earlier appeal filed having been withdrawn, would the present appeal filed by respondent No.9 be barred by the principle of Res Judicata having attained finality, and in that regard amount to an abuse of legal process by initiating repeated proceedings?

21.1. Sri. Ameet Kumar Deshpande, learned Senior Counsel has very strenuously contended that the earlier appealby Sri.Shankarrao Doddi under Section 4D being withdrawn, the said withdrawal would constitute res judicata and the filing of the present appeal by Respondent No.9 is an abuse of the legal process. His submission is also that the petitioner has faced repeated enquiries. First, on account of the proceedings initiated by Sri.Shankarrao Doddi , secondly, on the basis of the proceedings initiated by Sri.Ravindraswamy and Sri.Vijay

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 Kumar and now for the third time, by Respondent No.9.

21.2. His submission is that the petitioner is a victim of all these actions, the petitioner cannot be forced to answer this issue about Caste Certificate on multiple occasions. The Caste Certificate has been held to be valid by the DCVC, the subsequent challenge made by Sri. Shankarrao Doddi has been withdrawn. The Revision Petition filed by Sri. Ravindraswamy and Sri.Vijay Kumar having been dismissed and confirmed by the Hon'ble Apex Court, Respondent No.9 could not have filed the present proceedings.

21.3. In this regard, he refers to the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Gulabchand Parikh's case and submits that Section 11 of the CPC is not exhaustive with respect to an earlier decision. An earlier decision operating as a res judicata between the same parties on the same

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 matter in controversy, a subsequent suit would be governed under the general principle of res judicata.

21.4. However, any previous decision on a matter in controversy decided after full contest, or affording fair opportunity to parties to prove their case will operate as res judicata in respect of persons who are not parties to the earlier proceedings also. They said principle of res judicata would apply to proceedings under Article 226 or 32 of the Constitution of India and hence, he submits that the proceedings which came to an end by virtue of Sri. Shankarrao Doddi withdrawing the appeal would operate as res judicata. The dismissal of the revision petition filed by Sri.Ravind Swami and Sri.Vijay Kumar as regards the very same Caste Certificate would also operate as res judicata.

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 21.5. He relies upon the decision of this Court in Sri.A. Chandrasekhar case (Supra) and submits that there is a duty cast upon this Court to ensure that there is no abuse of the process of the Court. An issue of law can be overruled later on, but a question of fact cannot be reopened once it has been finally sealed in a proceedings inter se between the parties. His submission is that the doctrine of finality would have to be applied in a strict legal sense and reopening of concluded judgments of the Court would amount to an abuse of the process of the Court, and have far-reaching adverse effect on the administration of justice.

21.6. On that basis, he submits that the Appellate Authority ought to have taken into consideration that the claim made now by Respondent No.9 having already been decided earlier was not maintainable and ought to have

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 rejected the appeal filed by the Respondent No.9 as being barred by the res judicata. 21.7. The submission of Sri. C.Jagadish, learned counsel is that there is never any decision which has been rendered by any authority, the caste validation certificate having been issued by the DCVC had been challenged in a writ petition by Sri.Shankarrao Doddi. The petitioner contended that writ petition is not maintainable liberty is reserved for Sri.Shankarrao Doddi to file an appeal under Section 4D, the same came to be challenged by the petitioner by filing WP No.201341 of 2018 by contending that an appeal under Section 4D was not maintainable. The said petition came to be dismissed on 20.4.2018 in pursuance of which Sri. Shankarrao Doddi had filed an appeal under Section 4D. The said appeal was withdrawn by Sri.Shankarrao Doddi on 07.05.2018 when a cost of Rs.1,00,000/- was imposed on him.

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 21.8. Thus, he submits that these facts would indicate that the validity certificate which has been challenged by Sri.Shankarrao Doddi came to be withdrawn by him and there is no finding rendered by any authority under the Act of 1990 in relation thereto.

21.9. Insofar as the proceedings filed by Sri. Ravindraswamy and Sri.Vijay Kumar are concerned, he submits that they had filed a Revision Petition under Section 4F which was not accepted. Hence, a writ petition was filed by them before this Court which was accepted, challenging which a writ appeal was filed by the petitioner when the writ appeal Court held that a Revision Petition was not maintainable but an appeal under section 4D was maintainable. Thus, even in those proceedings filed by Sri.Ravindraswamy and Sri. Vijay Kumar, no finding has been rendered as regards the validity of the Caste Certificate relied upon by

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 the petitioner. Thus, he submits that there is no finding, final or otherwise, which has been rendered, therefore, the principles of res judicata would not apply. Similar is the submission made by Sri.Aditya Narayan, learned counsel for respondent No.9. 21.10. When these submissions and the records are considered, it is seen that though there are various proceedings which have been filed, firstly a writ petition by Sri. Shankarrao Doddi, then an appeal under Section 4D by Sri. Shankarrao Doddi, a writ petition by the petitioner, a Revision Petition by Sri. Ravindraswamy and Sri. Vijay Kumar, another writ petition before this Court by them, writ appeal by the petitioner and thereafter a special leave petition by Sri.Ravindraswamy and Sri.Vijay Kumar which came to be dismissed. The fact remains that in none of these proceedings any finding is given by any

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 authority or Court, as regards the validity or invalidity of the Caste Certificate relied upon by the petitioner.

21.11. The petitioner has been successful in thwarting an inquiry into the Caste Certificate, during this entire process, and it is for this reason that the conduct of the petitioner would also have to be taken into consideration. When Sri. Shankarrao Doddi had wrongly filed a writ petition challenging the validity of the Caste Certificate, the petitioner took a stand that a writ petition was not maintainable, but an appeal under Section 4D was maintainable. When Sri. Shankarrao Doddi filed an appeal under Section 4D, the petitioner took up a stand by filing a writ petition before this Court in WP No. 201341 of 2018 that the appeal under Section 4D was not maintainable.

21.12. The stand taken by the petitioner as regards both these proceedings filed by Sri. Shankarrao

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 Doddi clearly, categorically and unimpeachably establishes the contradictory stand on part of the petitioner, if not the malafide stand on part of the petitioner.

21.13. After dismissal of WP No. 201341 of 2018 when Sri.Shankarrao Doddi filed an appeal, the appeal was not prosecuted by Sri.Shankarrao Doddi but was withdrawn as regards which cost of Rs. 1,00,000 was imposed. The Withdrawal of the Appeal having occurred despite such cost having been imposed does not inspire confidence.

21.14. Now coming to the proceedings filed by Sri.Ravindraswamy and Sri.Vijay Kumar, for some reason, instead of filing an appeal under Section 4D, they chose to file a Revision under Section 4F which came to be rejected challenging which they had filed a writ petition before this Court, which came to be allowed and the matter remitted to the Revision Court.

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 21.15. This order was challenged by the petitioner in W.A.Nos.200031/2022 and WA No.200032/2022, the Division Bench of this Court came to a conclusion that a Revision Petition was not maintainable challenging a validity certificate, and it is only an appeal which is maintainable. That order having been challenged before the Hon'ble Apex Court, the Apex Court dismissed the appeal. Thus again, in those proceedings also, there is no finding either given by the Revisional authority , by a Single Judge of this Court, by the Division Bench of this Court or the Hon'ble Apex Court, as regards the validity or otherwise of the Caste Certificate of the petitioner.

21.16. Thus, in both the set of proceedings initiated by Sri.Shankarrao Doddi and that initiated by Sri.Ravind Swami and Sri.Vijay Kumar, the validity or invalidity of the Caste Certificate of the petitioner has not been decided.

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 21.17. Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure is reproduced hereunder for easy reference; Section 11: Res judicata.

No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court. Explanation I.-- The expression former suit shall denote a suit which has been decided prior to a suit in question whether or not it was instituted prior thereto.

Explanation II.-- For the purposes of this section, the competence of a Court shall be determined irrespective of any provisions as to a right of appeal from the decision of such Court. Explanation III.--The matter above referred to must in the former suit have been alleged by one party and either denied or admitted, expressly or impliedly, by the other.

Explanation IV.-- Any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit.

Explanation V.-- Any relief claimed in the plaint, which is not expressly granted by the decree, shall for the purposes of this section, be deemed to have been refused.

Explanation VI.-- Where persons litigate bona fide in respect of a public right or of a private right claimed in common for themselves and others, all persons interested in such right shall, for the

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 purposes of this section, be deemed to claim under the persons so litigating .

[Explanation VII.-- The provisions of this section shall apply to a proceeding for the execution of a decree and references in this section to any suit, issue or former suit shall be construed as references, respectively, to a proceeding for the execution of the decree, question arising in such proceeding and a former proceeding for the execution of that decree.

Explanation VIII.-- An issue heard and finally decided by a Court of limited jurisdiction, competent to decide such issue, shall operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit, notwithstanding that such Court of limited jurisdiction was not competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised.] 21.18. A reading of Section 11 would indicate that no Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between the parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit and/or the suit in which such issue has been

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 subsequently raised, has been heard and finally decided by such Court.

21.19. Applying Section 11 to the present facts, it is clear that the issue involved in all the proceedings is as regards the validity or invalidity of the Caste Certificate of the petitioner.

21.20. However, there are no proceedings between the same parties i.e., petitioner and respondent No.9 earlier, inasmuch as the first set of proceedings was between the petitioner and Sri. Shankarrao Doddi, the second set of proceedings were between the petitioner and Sri. Ravindraswamy and Sri. Vijay Kumar, respondent No.9 was not a party to either set of proceedings .

21.21. Insofar as the phrase litigating under the same title, the aspect of the certificate does not relate to title, it is only the petitioner who claims under the same validity certificate to

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 that extent, it could probably be said that the issue being the same and claiming under the same validity certificate. Thus, the aspect of res judicata could be considered. But however, all these aspects are qualified by the phrase "and has been heard and finally decided by such Court". Thus, the issue should have been heard and finally decided by a Court.

21.22. In the present matter, as indicated supra, though the issue relates to the validity or invalidity of the Caste Certificate of the petitioner, such validity or invalidity has neither been heard nor been decided. All the earlier litigations have been fought on technicalities, and on the fringes, none of the litigations touching upon the merits of the validity or invalidity of the Caste Certificate. 21.23. Once again, the petitioner seeks to take up a technical argument of res judicata so as to thwart the present proceedings. I am of the

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 considered opinion that such an attempt cannot once again be allowed to be permitted. More so, as rightly contended by Sri. C. Jagdish, learned counsel, the Act of 1990 and the Rules of 1992 and the Reservation Contemplated under Article 15 and 16 of the Constitution are required to be protected in its true sense of the word inasmuch as this Court is vested with a duty to ensure that the persons who are entitled to the benefit of such reservation, receives such benefits without any interference from anyone whether private or governmental authority.

21.24. There is also a duty imposed on this Court to ensure that a person who is not entitled to a benefit of reservation under Article 15 or 16 in terms of the Rules and Procedures prescribed under the Act of 1990 and the Rules of 1992 does not get any such benefit which he or she is not entitled to.

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 21.25. Thus, the obligation and duty imposed on this Court is two fold one to ensure that the person who is entitled to get the benefit gets such benefit. The other to ensure that the person who is not entitled to the benefit, does not abuse the benefit and action is taken in relation thereto.

21.26. In that view of the matter, I am of the clear and categorical opinion that the principles of res judicata would not be applicable to the present case.

21.27. I answer point No.5 by holding that the earlier order passed by DCVC being challenged in a writ petition and subsequently in appeal and thereafter in a Revision Petition, there is no order passed on merits on the validity or invalidity of the said Caste Certificate. Therefore, the same would not attract the principles of res judicata and as such, the appeal now filed by respondent No.9 under

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 Section 4D challenging the validity of the Caste Certificate issued to the petitioner cannot be said to be an abuse of the legal process, nor can it be said to be repeated proceedings. It is for the appellate authority to verify and ascertain the validity or invalidity of the caste certificate.

22. Answer to point No.6: Would respondent No.2 be regarded as Functus Officio on account of the earlier appeal having been withdrawn, and thus estopped from adjudicating on the fresh appeal?

22.1. The submission of Sri. Ameet Kumar Deshpande is that respondent No.2-Appellate Authority has been rendered Functus Officio on account of having heard the earlier appeal, and the same having been withdrawn and as such, no appeal could be filed by respondent No.9 before respondent No.2.

22.2. This argument is again an argument in futility in as much as the appeal filed by Sri.Shankarrao Doddi had been withdrawn and the Appellate

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 Authority having imposed costs on Sri.Shankarrao Doddi, the order had been extracted hereinabove. It is clear that the withdrawal of the appeal was made even before a finding on merits had been rendered by Respondent No.2.

22.3. Thus, there being no order passed by Respondent No.2 on merits and the lis between the parties not having been considered. I am of the considered opinion that the appeal has not been decided, the appeal has only been permitted to be withdrawn. It is only after an Appellate Authority performs its duties in terms of the applicable law that the Respondent No.2 would become 'Functus Officio'. 22.4. In the present matter, no order has been passed on merits. The appellate powers not having been exercised and the appellate duties not having been discharged, I am of the considered opinion that Respondent No.2

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 cannot be said to be the 'Functus Officio', so as to contend that Respondent No.2 is estopped from adjudicating on a fresh appeal filed by Respondent No.9.

22.5. Hence, I answer point No.6 by holding that an Appellate Authority can only be regarded as 'Functus Officio' after an order on merits is passed, if no order on merits is passed and the appeal is withdrawn, it cannot be said that the Appellate Authority is rendered 'Functus Officio' more so when the earlier appeal had been filed by one other person and the present appeal is filed by a completely different person.

23. Answer to Point No.7: Whether a person born in a caste or community which is not notified as a scheduled tribe or scheduled caste in the State of birth, upon migration to another State, wherein the Caste or community is notified as a scheduled caste or scheduled tribe, be entitled to the benefit granted to such scheduled caste or scheduled tribe in the State to which the person has migrated to?

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 23.1. The submission of Sri. Ameet Kumar Deshpande, learned Senior Counsel is that the petitioner was born within the State of Karnataka, and within the State of Karnataka the petitioner qualifies to be a member of the Scheduled 'Lambani' Caste and as such the certificate issued by the Thasildar in the State of Karnataka would suffice.

23.2. The submission of Sri. Adithya Narayan, learned counsel appaering for Respondent No.9 is that the petitioner was not born within the State of Karnataka and a certificate issued for a caste scheduled within the State of Karnataka to the petitioner would not suffice.

23.3. In the State of Maharashtra, his father and grandfather were residents of Tondchir Village, Udgir Taluk, Latur Distrct in Maharashtra State belonging to Lambani, (Banjara community), which is denotified nomadic tribe in Maharashtra under Article 154 and 164 of the

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 Constitution of India. Thus, his submission is that the 'Lambani' caste not being a scheduled caste in Maharashtra State, the petitioner would not be entitled to the benefits of the 'Lambani caste' being a Scheduled Caste in the State of Karnataka.

23.4. He further contends that the family of the petitioners are not residents of Karnataka, the father of the petitioner, Mr. Bambla had married Mrs. Moti Bai of Gamsabai Tanda, Bonti village, Aurad Taluk, Bidar District and after their marriage they were residing in Maharashtra State. The petitioner is the fifth son of the said Sri. Bhamla and Smt. Moti Bai. He having completed 1st to 12th standard in Pratibha Devi Ashrama School, Silvani Border Tanda, Degalur Taluk, Nanded District, Maharashtra State.

23.5. His further submission is that the petitioner married one Smt. Sakkubai of Gumsubai Tanda,

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 Bidar District and they had two children. The children are studying in Thane District of Maharashtra State and the petitioner also has a residence in Thane. On that basis, he submits that the petitioner not belonging to a scheduled caste in the State of his birth cannot claim the benefit of his caste being a Scheduled Caste in the State of Karnataka.

23.6. The aspect of migration and its impact on caste has been considered on several earlier occasions. Scheduled caste has been defined under Clause 24 of Article 366, which reads as under:

(24) "Scheduled Castes" means such castes, races or tribes or parts of or groups within such castes, races or tribes as are deemed under article 341 to be Scheduled Castes for the purposes of this Constitution;

23.7. Article 341 lays down the procedure in which a caste may be specified as a Schedule Caste by the Parliament, the said Article 341, reads as under:

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023

341. Scheduled Castes (1)The President may with respect to any State or Union territory, and where it is a State after consultation with the Governor thereof, by public notification,specify the castes, races or tribes or parts of or group within castes, races or tribes which shall for the purposes of this Constitution be deemed to be Scheduled Castes in relation to that State or Union territory, as the case may be.

(2)Parliament may by law include in or exclude from the list of Scheduled Castes specified in a notification issued under clause (1) any caste, race or tribe or part of or group within any caste, race or tribe, but save as aforesaid a notification issued under the said clause shall not be varied by any subsequent notification.

23.8. In terms of Sub-article (1) of Article 341, the President of India has issued the Schedule Caste Order 1950, which is amended from time to time. In view of Sub-article (2) of Article 341, the list having been issued, the same cannot be amended and altered by anyone apart from the Parliament. The aspect of residence is of paramount importance insofar as determination of whether a person is a person belonging to the Schedule Caste or not .

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 23.9. Reference is required to be drawn to the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Marri Chandra Shekar Rao vs Dean, Seth G.S. Medical College & Ors.34 more particularly para nos. 13 & 14 thereof, which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference:

13. It is trite knowledge that the statutory and constitutional provisions should be interpreted broadly and harmoniously. It is trite saying that where there is conflict between two provisions, these should be so interpreted as to give effect to both. Nothing is surplus in a Constitution and no part should be made nugatory. This is well settled. See the observations of this Court in Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore [1958 SCR 895, 918 : AIR 1958 SC 255] , where Venkatarama Aiyer, J. reiterated that the rule of construction is well settled and where there are in an enactment two provisions which cannot be reconciled with each other, these should be so interpreted that, if possible, effect could be given to both. It, however, appears to us that the expression 'for the purposes of this Constitution' in Article 341 as well as in Article 342 do imply that the Scheduled Caste and the Scheduled Tribes so specified would be entitled to enjoy all the constitutional rights that are enjoyable by all the citizens as such.

Constitutional right, e.g., it has been argued that right to migration or right to move from one part to another is a right given to all -- to Scheduled Castes or Tribes and to non- scheduled castes or tribes. But when a 34 (1990) 3 SCC 130

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 Scheduled Caste or Tribe migrates, there is no inhibition in migrating but when he migrates, he does not and cannot carry any special rights or privileges attributed to him or granted to him in the original State specified for that State or area or part thereof. If that right is not given in the migrated State it does not interfere with his constitutional right of equality or of migration or of carrying on his trade, business or profession. Neither Article 14 , 16 , 19 nor Article 21 is denuded by migration but he must enjoy those rights in accordance with the law if they are otherwise followed in the place where he migrates. There should be harmonious construction, harmonious in the sense that both parts or all parts of a constitutional provision should be so read that one part does not become nugatory to the other or denuded to the other but all parts must be read in the context in which these are used. It was contended that the only way in which the fundamental rights of the petitioner under Articles 14 , 19(1)(d), 19(1)(e) and 19(1)(f) could be given effect to is by construing Article 342 in a manner by which a member of a Scheduled Tribe gets the benefit of that status for the purposes of the Constitution throughout the territory of India. It was submitted that the words "for the purposes of this Constitution" must be given full effect. There is no dispute about that. The words "for the purposes of this Constitution" must mean that a Scheduled Caste so designated must have right under Articles 14 , 19(1)(d), 19(1)(e) and 19(1)(f) inasmuch as these are applicable to him in his area where he migrates or where he goes. The expression "in relation to that State"

would become nugatory if in all States the special privileges or the rights granted to Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes are carried forward. It will also be inconsistent with the whole purpose of the scheme of reservation. In Andhra Pradesh, a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe may require protection because a boy or a child who grows in that area is inhibited or is at disadvantage. In Maharashtra that caste or that tribe may not be so inhibited

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 but other castes or tribes might be. If a boy or a child goes to that atmosphere of Maharashtra as a young boy or a child and goes in a completely different atmosphere or Maharashtra where this inhibition or this disadvantage is not there, then he cannot be said to have that reservation which will denude the children or the people of Maharashtra belonging to any segment of that State who may still require that protection. After all, it has to be borne in mind that the protection is necessary for the disadvantaged castes or tribes of Maharashtra as well as disadvantaged castes or tribes of Andhra Pradesh. Thus, balancing must be done as between those who need protection and those who need no protection, i.e., who belong to advantaged castes or tribes and who do not. Treating the determination under Articles 341 and 342 of the Constitution to be valid for all over the country would be in negation to the very purpose and scheme and language of Article 341 read with Article 15(4) of the Constitution.

14. Our attention was drawn to certain observations in Elizabeth Warburton v. James Loveland [1832 HL 499] . It is true that all provisions should be read harmoniously. It is also true that no provision should be so read as to make other provisions nugatory or restricted. But having regard to the purpose, it appears to us that harmonious construction enjoins that we should give to each expression --"in relation to that State" or "for the purposes of this Constitution" -- its full meaning and give their full effect. This must be so construed that one must not negate the other. The construction that reservation made in respect of the Scheduled Caste or Tribe of that State is so determined to be entitled to all the privileges and rights under the Constitution in that State would be the most correct way of reading, consistent with the language, purpose and scheme of the Constitution. Otherwise, one has to bear in mind that if reservations to those who are treated as Scheduled Caste or Tribe in Andhra Pradesh are

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 also given to a boy or a girl who migrates and gets deducted (sic inducted) in the State of Maharashtra or other States where that caste or tribe is not treated as Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe then either reservation will have the effect of depriving the percentage to the member of that caste or tribe in Maharashtra who would be entitled to protection or it would denude the other non-Scheduled Castes or non- Scheduled Tribes in Maharashtra to the proportion that they are entitled to. This cannot be logical or correct result designed by the Constitution.

23.10. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Marri Chandra Shekhar's case has held that the expression in relation to State would become negatory, if in all States the special privileges of the rights granted to Schedule Caste or Schedule Tribes are carried forward. It will be inconsistent with the whole purpose of the scheme of reservation.

23.11. In one State, a particular Caste or Tribe may be at a disadvantage, while in the other it may not be. The preparation of the list as indicated above, it is on the basis of the residence in that particular State. At

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 para 23, the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under:

23. Having construed the provisions of Articles 341 and 342 of the Constitution in the manner we have done, the next question that falls for consideration, is, the question of the fate of those Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe students who get the protection of being classed as Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe in the States of origin when, because of transfer or movement of their father or guardian's business or service, they move to other States as a matter of voluntary (sic involuntary) transfer, will they be entitled to some sort of protective treatment so that they may continue or pursue their education. Having considered the facts and circumstances of such situation, it appears to us that where the migration from one State to another is involuntary, by force of circumstances either of employment or of profession, in such cases if students or persons apply in the migrated State where without affecting prejudicially the rights of the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes in those States or areas, any facility or protection for continuance of study or admission can be given to one who has or migrated then some consideration is desirable to be made on that ground. It would, therefore, be necessary and perhaps desirable for the legislatures or the Parliament to consider appropriate legislations bearing this aspect in mind so that proper effect is given to the rights given to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes by virtue of the provisions under Articles 341 and 342 of the Constitution. This is a matter which the State legislatures or the Parliament may appropriately take into consideration.

23.12. Thus from the perusal of para 23, it is clear that the Hon'ble Apex Court has suggested

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 to the Parliament to consider the manner in which migration could be considered and enact a proper law in relation thereto. 23.13. Where a person belonging to caste or tribe specified for the purpose of being constitutionally Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe in relation to State-A migrates to State-B will that person be entitled to claim the privileges when it is admissible to the persons belonging to Schedule Caste and or Schedule Tribes in State-B, is answered in the above decision in the negative.

23.14. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Ranjana Kumari vs State of Uttarakhand35 at para nos. 4 and 5, has observed as under:

4. Two Constitution Bench judgments of this Court in Marri Chandra Shekhar Rao v. Seth G.S. Medical College [Marri Chandra Shekhar Rao v. Seth G.S. Medical College, (1990) 3 SCC 35 (2019) 15 SCC 664

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 130 : 1 SCEC 382] and Action Committee on Issue of Caste Certificate to SCs/STs v. Union of India [Action Committee on Issue of Caste Certificate to SCs/STs v. Union of India, (1994) 5 SCC 244] have taken the view that merely because in the migrant State the same caste is recognised as Scheduled Caste, the migrant cannot be recognised as Scheduled Caste of the migrant State. The issuance of a caste certificate by the State of Uttarakhand, as in the present case, cannot dilute the rigours of the Constitution Bench judgments in Marri Chandra Shekhar Rao [Marri Chandra Shekhar Rao v. Seth G.S. Medical College, (1990) 3 SCC 130 : 1 SCEC 382] and Action Committee [Action Committee on Issue of Caste Certificate to SCs/STs v. Union of India, (1994) 5 SCC 244] .

5. We, therefore, find no error in the order of the High Court to justify any interference. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. 23.15. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Action Committee vs Union of India36 at para nos. 3 and 16 has observed as under:

3. On a plain reading of clause (1) of Articles 341 and 342 it is manifest that the power of the President is limited to specifying the castes or tribes which shall, for the purposes of the Constitution, be deemed to be Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes in relation to a State or a Union Territory, as the case may be. Once a notification is issued under clause (1) of Articles 341 and 342 of the Constitution, Parliament can by law include in or exclude from the list of Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes, specified in the notification, any caste or tribe but save for that limited purpose the notification issued under 36 (1994) 5 SCC 244

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 clause (1), shall not be varied by any subsequent notification. What is important to notice is that the castes or tribes have to be specified in relation to a given State or Union Territory. That means a given caste or tribe can be a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in relation to the State or Union Territory for which it is specified. These are the relevant provisions with which we shall be concerned while dealing with the grievance made in this petition.

16. We may add that considerations for specifying a particular caste or tribe or class for inclusion in the list of Scheduled Castes/Schedule Tribes or backward classes in a given State would depend on the nature and extent of disadvantages and social hardships suffered by that caste, tribe or class in that State which may be totally non est in another State to which persons belonging thereto may migrate. Coincidentally it may be that a caste or tribe bearing the same nomenclature is specified in two States but the considerations on the basis of which they have been specified may be totally different. So also the degree of disadvantages of various elements which constitute the input for specification may also be totally different. Therefore, merely because a given caste is specified in State A as a Scheduled Caste does not necessarily mean that if there be another caste bearing the same nomenclature in another State the person belonging to the former would be entitled to the rights, privileges and benefits admissible to a member of the Scheduled Caste of the latter State "for the purposes of this Constitution". This is an aspect which has to be kept in mind and which was very much in the minds of the Constitution-makers as is evident from the choice of language of Articles 341 and 342 of the Constitution. That is why in answer to

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 a question by Mr Jaipal Singh, Dr Ambedkar answered as under:

"He asked me another question and it was this. Supposing a member of a Scheduled Tribe living in a tribal area migrates to another part of the territory of India, which is outside both the scheduled area and the tribal area, will he be able to claim from the local Government, within whose jurisdiction he may be residing the same privileges which he would be entitled to when he is residing within the scheduled area or within the tribal area? It is a difficult question for me to answer. If that matter is agitated in quarters where a decision on a matter like this would lie, we would certainly be able to give some answer to the question in the form of some clause in this Constitution. But so far as the present Constitution stands, a member of a Scheduled Tribe going outside the scheduled area or tribal area would certainly not be entitled to carry with him the privileges that he is entitled to when he is residing in a scheduled area or a tribal area. So far as I can see, it will be practicably impossible to enforce the provisions that apply to tribal areas or scheduled areas, in areas other than those which are covered by them...."

Relying on this statement the Constitution Bench ruled that the petitioner was not entitled to admission to the medical college on the basis that he belonged to a Scheduled Tribe in the State of his origin.

23.16. In Ranjana Kumari's case, by referring to Mari Chandra and Action Committee's case, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 merely because in the migrating State the same caste is recognised as scheduled caste, the migrant cannot be recognised as Scheduled Caste of a migrant State. 23.17. Thus, holding that a person of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe can take benefit of that caste or tribe only in the State of birth if the caste or tribe to which he belongs is a Schedule Caste or Schedule Tribe in the state of Birth.

23.18. If the caste or tribe in the state of Birth is not a Schedule Caste or Schedule Tribe, such person cannot take advantage of the caste being a Schedule Caste or Schedule Tribe in the state of migration.

23.19. In that view of the matter, I answer point No.7 by holding that a person born in a caste or community which is not notified as a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Caste in the State of birth, upon migration to

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 another State wherein that caste or community is notified as a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe, will not be entitled to the benefit granted to, such Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe in the State to which the person has migrated to.

24. Answer to point No.8: Even if an election petition were to be filed, could the election tribunal, be empowered to decide on the validity or otherwise of the caste certificate under the Karnataka Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes (Reservation of Appointments, Etc.) Act, 1990 or would it have to be done by the authorities as constituted under the Act of 1990? 24.1. The submission of Sri. Ameet Kumar Deshpande, learned Senior Counsel is that respondent No.9 could not have filed an appeal under Section 4D, if at all respondent No.9 has any grievance as regards the validity of the Caste Certificate of the petitioner, Respondent No.9 ought to have filed an election petition under the Representation of People's Act and in this regard, he submits that all the aspects and

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 contentions would have been considered in the election petition.

24.2. The submission of Sri.Aditya Narayan, learned counsel for respondent No.9 is that even though respondent No.9 has an option to file an election petition in the State of Karnataka. The aspect of validity or otherwise of a Caste Certificate would have to be determined, in accordance with the Act of 1990 and the Rules of 1992 thereunder, and the same cannot be determined by the Court seized of the election petition.

24.3. In this regard, he relies upon Bhagwati Prasad Dixit's case and submits that even if an election petition were to be preferred, the said Court seized of the election petition would be guided by the authority constituted under the 1990 Act to determine matters on the said question as regard to the validity of the caste certificate of a person/candidate

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 24.4. The authority is established under the 1990 Act, which is a special enactment being competent and empowered to do so having requisite specialized knowledge in relation thereto. 24.5. He also relies upon the decision of the Hon'ble Andhra Pradesh High Court in Durga Singh's case and submits that the election tribunal cannot go into the matters of legality and validity of the Caste Certificate of a returned candidate and the same is not a ground by itself to set aside the election of a returned candidate. The Act of 1990 providing a comprehensive framework to ascertain the validity or otherwise of the caste certificate, the same would have to be done in terms of the legal process under the Act of 1990. 24.6. By relying on Sri. Shiddalingappa Mallappa Abbigeri's case, he submits that even a Court adjudicating an election petition where a Caste Certificate has been impugned, is required to

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 suspend the proceedings and direct the parties to approach the DCVC for necessary orders. In the present case, the DCVC having already issued a validity certificate which is impugned, it is only the Appellate Authority under Section 4D which can consider the matter. As such, neither the Court seized of the election petition nor the DCVC can look into the matter and it is in that background that in Sri. Shiddalingappa Mallappa Abbigeri's case, that an appeal under Section 4D was filed. 24.7. As indicated supra, the classification of Schedule Caste and Schedule Tribes is made under the Constitution of India by the President. Once the classification is made, it cannot be changed except by the Parliament. This aspect would clearly and categorically establish the rigour through which, the classification of Schedule Caste and Schedule Tribes in each State has been made and any

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 changes thereof requiring the Parliament to do so. The sanctity of the list prepared is paramount.

24.8. There being no particular mechanism for upholding the sanctity, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Madhuri Patil's case laid down certain directions at para nos. 15, 16, 17 and 18 (supra) 24.9. It is in furtherance of the observation, guidelines and recommendations of the Hon'ble Apex Court that a complete overhaul of the Act of 1990 and the Rules of 1992 were made. The aspects relating to the same have been dealt with by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Madhuri Patil's case, where it came to a conclusion that an enquiry into the caste status would require an enquiry to be made in respect of the traditions, customs, etc., followed by such person in order to determine whether those customs and traditions are in accordance with

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 the customs and traditions of that particular caste or tribe. For this purpose, the Hon'ble Apex Court had directed the establishment of specialised agencies and as afore observed, Sub-section (2) of Section 4 and the various Rules were brought into effect from the year 2000, in furtherance of the recommendation made by the Hon'ble Apex Court.

24.10. The Act of 1990 and the Rules of 1992 are comprehensive ones which provide for the rights which could be exercised as also the grievance which could be redressed. It is in furtherance of that the District Caste Validation Committee has also been established and the manner in which the committee is to function has also been detailed out.

24.11. Suffice it to say, that the procedure prescribed under the Act of 1990 and Rules of 1992 are comprehensive in nature and the actions which could be taken by the authorities being in the

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 nature of fact-finding can be better done by those Authorities under the Act and the Rules. It is for that reason that in the various decisions referred to supra, the Hon'ble Apex Court and other Courts and this Court have categorically held that if a challenge to an election has been made where the Caste Certificate is impugned, the validity or otherwise would have to be ascertained in terms of the Act of 1990 as per the Rules of 1992.

24.12. Thus, the Court seized of the election petition, being a District Court or the like, would not have the wherewithal to conduct the detailed inquiry as required, at least at the first instance and as such, all aspects relating thereto would have to be referred to the properly constituted fora in that regard, namely the 'District Caste Verification Committee'.

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 24.13. Thus, I answer point No.8, by holding that even if an election petition were to be filed, the election tribunal would not be empowered to decide on the validity or otherwise of the caste certificate, the same would have to be determined by the authorities constituted under the Karnataka Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes (Reservation of Appointment etc.) Act, 1990 in terms of the Act of 1990 as also the Rules of 1992, taking into consideration all the relevant factors by causing a local inquiry in that regard.

25. Answer to point No.9: In the present case, can this Court go into the aspect of validity or otherwise of the caste certificate of the petitioner or would it have to be left to the concerned authority under the Act of 1990? 25.1. In view of my answer to point No.8, I answer point No.9 by holding that this Court or the court seized of the election petition can though ofcourse, determine the validity of the orders passed by the authorities under Section 4. Any

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 fact-finding would have to be made by the authorities under Section 4 and not by this Court or the Court seized of the election petition and hence all fact-finding tasks would have to be left to the authorities constituted under the Act of 1990.

26. Answer to point No.10: Can the High Court consider the disputed question of facts and allegations of fraud in the present writ petition or would it have to be decided by the concerned authority under the Act of 1990?

26.1. The aspect of fraud which is sought to be pleaded by Respondent No.9 is that the petitioner was born in Maharashtra. In the State of Maharashtra, his caste is not a Scheduled Caste, merely because his caste is a Scheduled Caste in the State of Karnataka, the petitioner cannot be entitled to the benefits granted to Scheduled Caste in the State of Karnataka.

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 26.2. Insofar as the point of law is concerned, the same has been answered hereinabove as regards the entitlement. But what would have to be considered is where was the petitioner born and then apply the law accordingly. The aspect of birth and the location of birth are all questions of fact, which would have to be established by both the parties before the Appellate Authority and it would not be proper for this Court to appreciate the evidence in this regard in a writ petition.

27. Answer to point No.11: Whether the doctrine of merger would apply in the instant case? 27.1. The aspect of Doctrine of Merger has been invoked by Sri. Ameet Kumar Deshpande, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner on the ground that the challenge made by Sri. Ravindraswamy and Sri. Vijay Kumar having been rejected, the Single Judge having remanded the matter on challenge, the Division

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 Bench having set aside the finding of the single judge and holding that a Revision Petition under section 4F was not maintainable. The same having been confirmed by the Hon'ble Apex Court, it would be applicable even to this matter.

27.2. This aspect has also been dealt with hereinabove and I have come to a conclusion that the subject matter of these proceedings have not been dealt with and decided in those proceedings.

27.3. Irrespective of whether Doctrine of Merger would apply to the challenge made by Sri. Ravindraswamy and Sri. Vijay Kumar leading up to the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court, the fact remains that what was considered there was the applicability of Section 4F, namely whether a Revision Petition was maintainable challenging the validity certificate issued by DCVC and the Division Bench on the

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 Hon'ble Apex Court came to a conclusion, that the same was not maintainable.

27.4. The order passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court therefore would be binding insofar as proceedings under Section 4F are concerned. As dealt with supra, the issue in question in the present matter is as regards an appeal filed under Section 4D and not a Revision under Section 4F. The maintainability of an appeal under Section 4D has also been dealt with hereinabove.

27.5. Thus, irrespective of the Doctrine of Merger being applicable to the proceedings initiated by Sri.Ravindranath Swami and Sri.Vijay Kumar, I am of the considered opinion that the orders passed therein would not have a bearing on an appeal filed under Section 4D, which would have to be dealt with independently.

28. Answer to point No.12: Whether this Court can intercede and adjudicate upon the impunged notice?

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 28.1. In view of my findings above, the challenge which has been made to the show cause notice calling upon the enquiry to be made, I am of the considered opinion that no grounds having been made out, this court need not intercede as regards the said show cause notice. 28.2. All the other arguments which have been addressed by Sri. Ameet Kumar Deshpande, Sri C. Jagdish and Sri.Aditya Narayan, have been considered and dealt with in this order. Thus, it would be for the petitioner to appear before the Appellate Authority and submit his say in the matter, which would have to be considered by the Appellate Authority and necessary orders passed in accordance with law.

29. General Direction:

29.1. Much has been argued in the present matter as regards the proceedings which have been filed, and that they have attained finality on behalf of

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 the petitioner. Much has been argued on the part of Respondent No.9, that Respondent No.9 did not have knowledge of any of those proceedings and as such could not have challenged it earlier, apart from the contention that Respondent No.9 became an aggrieved party only subsequently.

29.2. In this regard, I am of the considered opinion that the candidate while making a declaration would also have to make a declaration as regards any challenge made to any certificate of his, be it caste, education or the like. So the same could be considered by the election authorities, as also come to the knowledge of the general populace and other candidates to take any objection if they desire to do so. 29.3. Thus, I am of the opinion that the Law Commission would have to look into this aspect insofar as elections which are conducted under

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023 the provisions of the Right to Representation Act 1951.

29.4. Insofar as the other matters, it would be for the State to prepare appropriate guidelines indicating that the contestant will have to furnish details of all the litigations pending and decided that the candidate is/was involved in both civil and criminal matters before judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative authorities so that the information is available to one and all including the voting populace, as also the rival candidates. Transparency would require all material details as regards the election to be placed for consideration before all the concerned.

29.5. A report to this effect to be filed by learned AGA within a period of six weeks from now i.e., on or before 28.04.2025

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NC: 2025:KHC-K:1739 WP No. 203394 of 2023

30. Answer to point No.15: What order?

30.1. No grounds being made out, the petition stands dismissed.

30.2. Though the above petition is dismissed, relist on 28.04.2025 to report compliance.

Sd/-

(SURAJ GOVINDARAJ) JUDGE SR/-

List No.: 48 Sl No.: 1

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Karnataka High Court