Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Agricultural Market Committee, Rep. By ... vs M.R.K. Chowdary And Anr. on 15 September, 1995
Equivalent citations: 1996(1)ALT478
Bench: P. Venkatarama Reddi, Ramesh Madhav Bapat
JUDGMENT P. Venkatarama Raddi, J.
1. This Letters Patent Appeal is preferred against the order of the learned single Judge in Appeal No. 405/85 dismissing the appeal. That appeal was preferred by the Agricultural Market Committee, Bhadrachalam which is the appellant herein questioning the enhancement of the market value of the respondent's land from Rs. 5/- to Rs. 25/- per sq. yard. The extent of land acquired from the respondent- claimant is one acre and the same is located in Survey No. 20/267 of Bhadrachalam village. It is part of the larger area of 11 1/2 acres acquired by the same notification.
2. The notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act was published on 6-1-1977. The Sub-Collector, Bhadrachalam (land Acquisition Officer) passed an award on 8-10-1979 fixing the market value of the land acquired at Rs. 5/- per sq. yard i.e., at Rs. 24,200/- per acre. Solatium at 15% and interest from the date of taking possessi on till the date of award at 4% per annum was also provided for. On reference under Section 18, the learned Additional District Judge, Khammam fixed the market value at Rs. 25/- per sq. yard and directed payment of solatium and interest at the aforementioned rates on the enhanced compensation amount. The learned Addl. District Judge relied upon Ex. X-2 (sale-deed) and Exs. X-3 and X-5 (agreements of sale). It is against this judgment and decree, the Agricultural Market Committee preferred appeal in this Court under Section 54 of the Act.
3. In the appeal, the order of the lower Court was confirmed. As the judgment of the learned single Judge is short, it is extracted hereunder:
"Notification Under Section 4(l) of the L.A. Act was published for acquiring Ac. 1-00 of land in S. No. 20/267 of Bhadrachalam town for construction of market yard at Bhadrachalam. The Land Acquisition Officer fixed the market value at Rs. 5/- per sq. yard. On reference the Civil Court enhanced the market value from Rs. 5 /- to Rs. 25 /- per sq. yard. Ex. X-3 agreement of sale is dated 29-7-1967 which is ten years prior to the date of notification where under P.W. 2 purchased 1335 sq. yards for Rs. 20,000/- which works out at Rs. 15- per sq. yard. From Ex.X-3 ten years have passed and therefore the enhancement of market value from Rs. 5/- to Rs. 25/- per sq. yard cannot be said to be arbitrary. Therefore the appeal is dismissed. No costs."
Thus, it may be seen that the learned single Judge was guided by Ex. X-3 which is an agreement of sale in respect of another plot of land allegedly entered into about ten years prior to the notification under Section 4(l).
4. In the claim petition filed before the Civil Court and in the evidence of the claimant who examined himself as P.W.6, it was made out that Bhadrachalam grew in importance after a road-bridge was constructed over Godavari river in the year 1967 and between 1969 and 1975, there was an alround development resulting in steady increase in demand for house sites. It was particularly stressed by P.W.6 that from 1976 onwards, about 500 houses were constructed every year. An industrial undertaking known as Bhadrachalam Paper Board was started in 1976. In the claim petition, it is stated that the potential value of lands "have begun to be recognised by 1969". The prices of sites were always going up. It is then stated by P.W.6 that despite the fact that Bhadrachalam is a scheduled tribal area wherein there is a prohibition of transfer of immoveable property in favour of a non-tribal, number of transactions of house site took place in and from 1976 onwards. P.W.6 gave an account of the advantageous location of the site acquired and its suitability for house sites. P.W. 6 stated that all around the site, colonies have come up from 1976 itself. He further stated that the vegetable market, R.T.C. bus stand and Panchayat Samithi Office are very close to the acquired site. He also deposed to the fact that the land acquired is a levelled one. It is seen from the plan Ex. X-1 that the acquired land is abutting the highway. In the claim petition it is stated that the land acquired cannot be less than Rs. 10/- per sq. yard. The fact that P.W. 1 purchased a site from another tribal in 1977 at the rate of Rs. 16/- per sq. yard was also adverted to P.W. 4 --the Village Patwari and P.W. 5 -- Village Sarpanch also spoke to the trends of development of the place and the favourable location of the acquired land. The Patwari (P.W. 4) stated that the purchasers obtained agreements of sale on the basis of which they seek permission for house sites from the Gram Panchayat in spite of Regulation I of 1970 prohibiting the sale by or in favour of non-tribals.
5. There can be no doubt that even by the date of publication of Section 4(l) notification, the land acquired was suitable for house sites. Though title to the land could not have been conveyed by reason of the prohibition contained in Regulation 1/70, the possibility of the land being sold out for house sites without registration of sale-deeds cannot be ruled out having regard to the prevalent practice in the village.
6. Now the question is whether and to what extent Exs. X-2, X-3 and X-5 relied upon by the Civil Court and the learned single Judge can be taken into account in fixing the compensation for the land acquired?
7. Before proceeding further, it is useful to recapitulate the well known principles governing the determination of market value under Land Acquisition Act. The 'acid-test to borrow the expression of Supreme Court in Spl. Tahsildar, Land Acquisition Visakhapatnam v. A. Mangala Gown in this regard is stated to be "the price at which the property changes hands from a willing seller to a willing, but not too anxious a buyer, dealing at arm's length" (Vide AIR 1988 SC 2051).
8. Venkatachalaiah, J. (as he then was) speaking for the Supreme Court in Administrator General of W.B. v. Collector, Varanasi made the following pertinent observations:
"The determination of market value is the prediction of an economic event, viz., the price outcome of a hypothetical sale, expressed in terms of possibilities. Prices fetched for similar lands with similar advantages and potentialities under bona fide transactions of sale at or about the time of the preliminary notification are the usual and indeed the best evidences of market value. Other methods of valuation are resorted to if the evidence of sale of similar lands is not available."
9. In Chimanlal v. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer , Thakkar, J. speaking for the Bench of the Supreme Court laid down the following ten guiding principles:
"(1) The determination has to be made standing on the date line of valuation (date of publication of notification under Section 4) as if the valuer is a hypothecated purchaser willing to purchase land from the open market and is prepared to pay a reasonable price as on the day. It has also to be assumed that the vendor is willing to sell the land at a reasonable price.
(2) In doing so by the instances method, the Court has to correlate the market value reflected in the most comparable instance which provides the index of market value.
(3) Only genuine instances have to be taken into account (Sometimes instances are rigged up in anticipation of Acquisition of land).
(4) Even post-notification instances can be taken into account (1) if they are very proximate; (2) genuine and (3) the acquisition itself has not motivated the purchaser to pay a higher price on account of the resultant improvement in development prospects.
(5) The most comparable instances out of the genuine instances have to be identified on the following considerations:
(i) proximity from time angle,
(ii) proximity from situation angle.
(6) Having indentified the instances which provide the index of market value the price reflected therein may be taken as the norm and the market value of the land under acquisition may be deduced by making suitable adjustments from the plus and minus factors vis-a-vis land under acquisition by placing the two in juxtaposition.
(7) A balance-sheet of plus and minus factors may be drawn for this purpose and the relevant factors may be evaluated in terms of price variation as a prudent purchaser would do.
(8) The market value of the land under acquisition has thereafter to be deducted by loading the price reflected in the instance taken as norm for plus factors and unloading it for minor factors.
(9) The exercise indicated in clause (6) to (8) has to be undertaken in a common sense manner as a prudent man of the world of business would do.
(10) The evaluation of these factors of course depends on the facts of each case. There cannot be any hard and fast or rigid rule. Common sense is the best and most reliable guide. For instance, take the factor regarding the size. A building plot of land say 500 to 1000 sq. yds cannot be compared with a large tract or block of land of say 10000 sq. yds or more. Firstly while a smaller plot is within the reach of many, a large block of land will have to be developed by preparing a lay out, carving out roads, leaving open space, plotting out smaller plots, waiting for purchasers (meanwhile the invested money will be blocked up) and the hazards of an enterpreneur. The factor can be discounted by making a deduction by way of an allowance at an appropriate rate ranging approx between 20.% to 50% to account for land required to be set apart for carving out lands and plotting out small plots. The discounting will to some extent also depend on whether it is a rural area or urban area."
10. In Bhagwathula v. Special Tahsildar & L.A. Officer, Visakhapatnam Municipality it was observed:
"It is useful to consider the value paid for similar land at the material time under genuine transactions. The market value envisages the prince which a willing purchaser may pay under bona fide transaction to a willing seller. The land value can differ depending upon the extent and nature of the land sold. A fully developed small plot in an important locality may fetch a higher value than a larger area in an under-developed condition and situated in a remote locality. By comparing the price shown in the transactions all variables have to be taken into consideration."
11. In the light of these will established principles, we shall now proceed to consider the sale transactions relied upon by the Civil Court and the learned single Judge of this Court. Ex. X-3 is an unregistered agreement of sale dated 29-7-67 and P.W. 2 was examined to prove this agreement under which he porportedly purchased 1335 sq. yards for Rs. 20,000/-. That means, the rate per sq. yard works out to Rs. 15/- per sq. yard. Curiously, only a certified copy of this document is available on record. The original agreement of sale is not on record. The endorsement on Ex. X-3 shows that on the very day of which P.W. 2 was examined, a certified copy of Ex.X-3 was applied for and the copy was delivered on 22-2-1983. It is this certified copy that is now on record. It is not known whether the original agreement of sale was taken return of after substituting a certified copy. Whatever it may be, the appellate Court is deprived of the opportunity to look at the original document. A perusal or the agreement (Ex. X-3) shows that the site was purchased by P.W. 2 for the purpose of constructing a hospital. It is recited in the agreement that the vendor received Rs. 4,000/-out of the agreed price of Rs. 20,000/- and delivered possession of the site on the date of agreement it self. It is further stated that the vendor undertook to get the sale deed registered at the request of the vendee. There is an endorsement on 20-7-1970 to the effect that the vendor received Rs. 2,000/-more towards balance sale consideration and the agreement having been extended upto 1-7-71. There is a further endorsement on 25-5-1977 acknowledging the receipt of the balance sale consideration of Rs. 14,000/- and undertaking to execute a sale-deed and register the same soon after the restrictions on transfer are lifted. Curiously, Ex. X-3 bears the signature of respondent-claimant at the end of the agreement and also beneath the endorsements of payments though he is neither vendor nor vendee. P.W. 2 did not state the reason for keeping the transaction pending for so long, especially when there was no prohibition against transfer upto the year 1970. P.W. 2 also could not spell out the reason why he did not proceed with the construction upto 1978. He stated that he constructed the nursing home in the year 1978-79. It is significant to notice that even after a lapse of nine years, P.W. 2 paid only the agreed price without any interest thereon eventhough the agreement provides for payment of interest in case the registration was not done within 12 months from the date of agreement. These are the various unexplained and suspicious features that surround this agreement -- Ex. X-3. Above all, the gap between Ex. X-3 and the date of notification under Section 4(l) of the Act is nearly ten years. A transaction which is so remote in point of time should not ordinarily be taken into account unless the Court is assured of its genuineness and authenticity. Excepting the ipsi dixit of P.W. 2, the various facts and circumstances adverted to above casts any amount of doubt on the credibility of Ex. X-3. Both the Civil Court as well as the learned single Judge, without any discussion, have proceeded on the basis that Ex. X-3 is a genuine transaction. This, in our view, is an erroneous approach to the problem and amounts to failure to direct attention to the crux of the matter which has to be necessarily decided.
12. As pointed out by K. Ramaswamy, J. speaking for the Division Bench of the Supreme Court in Periyar and Pareekanni Rubbers Ltd. v. State of Kerala :
"It is the paramount duty of the Courts of facts to subject the evidence to close scrutiny, objectively assess the evidence tendered by the parties on proper consideration thereof in correct perspective to arrive at reasonable market value."
The learned Judge warned: "Misplaced sympathies or undue emphasis solely on the claimants' right to compensation would place heavy burden on the public exchequer to which everyone contributes by direct or indirect taxes." Bearing these considerations in mind, it was incumbent on the part of the reference Court as well as the learned appellate Judge to scan the alleged agreement evidenced by Ex. X-3 carefully and to assess its evidentiary value notwithstanding the fact that there was no effective cross-examination of P. W. 3. When P.W.2 was in the box, the Govenrment Pleader merely put to him that he was interested in the claimant and therefore giving evidence favourable to him. The other suggestion made was that the site purchased by P.W. 3 was more centrally located than the acquired site. But the omission to elicit material points by proper cross-examination will not absolve the Court of its duty to subject the document and the oral evidence to critical scrutiny and analysis. In this context, the observations of Hegde, J. in Chaturbhuj Pande v. Collector, Raigarh are quite apposite. That was also a case of determination of market value under the Land Acquisition Act. It was observed:
"It is true that the witnesses examined on behalf of the appellants have not been effectively cross-examined. It is also true that the Collector had not adduced any evidence in rebuttal; but that does not mean that the Court is bound to accept their evidence. The Judges are not computers. In assessing the value to be attached to oral evidence, they are bound to call into aid their experience of life. As Judge of fact it was open to the appellate Judes to test the evidence placed before them on the basis of probabilities."
13. In Tahsildar, Land Acquisition, Visakhapatnam v. P. Narasingh Rao(1985 (2) ALT 492 = 1985 (1) APLJ 99 )a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Seetharam Reddy and K. Ramaswamy, JJ. indicated that in the task of assessing the true market value, the Courts are not mere umpires but they have "to take intelligent participation and to see whether the counsel on either side are directing towards this goal or the Court itself to intervene in this regard". There observations were referred to by the Supreme Court in Periyar and Pareekanni Rubbers Ltd. case (4 supra).
14. It is in this background we have to look into Ex. X-3 without being fettered by the fact that there was no effective cross-examination of P.W. 2 and Ex. X-3 was not doubted by the learned single Judge of this Court or the Civil Court. We have already adverted to certain suspicious features of Ex. X-3. Assuming mat the transaction evidenced by Ex. X-3 is a genuine one, there are other relevant aspects which ought to be taken note of. It is seen from the evidence that the site was purchased by P.W. 2 for the purpose of constructinga hospital. P.W.2 stated in his deposition that he constructed the nursing home in the year 1978. Thus, the land in question covered by Ex. X-3 was purchased not for housing purpose but for a professional purpose. Obviously the site was found to possess a specially advantageous location. As far as the acquired parcel of land is concerned, by the date of notification, it had the potentialities of being sold out for house-sites only but not for commercial or other purposes. As to the location of the site covered by Ex. X-3, though P.W. 2 stated that it is within one furlong from the acquired site, Ex. X-1 plan shows that the site of P.W. 2 is more centrally located. This again is a pointer that the site alleged to have been purchased by P.W. 2 in 1967 had a special locational advantage; otherwise P.W. 2 would not have purchased the site at such a high price - (Rs. 15/- per sq. yard) when admittedly Bhadrachalam was in an undeveloped state or it was only at the threshold of development. Another important factor to be noticed is that P.W. 2 himself stated that mere was rapid growth of the area from 1976 onwards. This is what the claimant (P.W. 6) also stated. However, P.W. 6 further stated that Bhadrachalam started developing from 1969 onwards. At the same time, P.W. 6 stated that the housing activity picked up tempo only from 1976 onwards. This is what P.W. 6 stated:
"Between 1964 and 1975, there were only 1800 or 2200 houses in the Gram Panchayat. But now there are about 6,000 houses......Sale agreements were brought into existence and by virtue of them permission was sought from Gram Panchayat for construction of houses. From 1976 onwards, about 500 houses were constructed every year........All around the site acquired, colonies have come up by 1976 itself."
Thus, the evidence of P.Ws. 2 and 6 reveals that the demand for house sites had picked up only in or about the year 1976 but not earlier, though there was some sort or development of the village between 1969 and 1975. If so, it cannot be taken for granted that the site purchased under Ex. X-3 in 1967 could have gone up to Rs. 25/- or more by January 1977 when the notification was issued. There is no evidence to the effect nor it can be predicated for certain that every year beginning from 1968, there was increase in the price of house sites. Even if it could be said that the price of the site could have risen to the level of Rs. 25 /- by the beginning of 1977, it may not help the claimant much because we have to give due allowance to the fact that P.W. 2's site is more centrally located and moreover some deduction has to be provided for in the case of acquisition of large parcel of land. Thus, viewed from any angle, we are unable to conclude that the market value of the acquired land as on 6-1-1977 could be legitimately fixed at Rs. 25/- per sq. yard based on Ex. X-3.
15. Now we proceed to consider the other two transactions relied upon by the trial Court. Ex. X-5 is another agreement of sale relied upon by the Court. According to Ex. X-5, the original of which was filed into Court by P.W. 3, P.W. 3 purchased 400 sq. yards in survey number 20/65 for Rs. 12,000/- on 30-6-1978. He stated that he constructed a house in 1979. He further stated that his site is located on the same road opposite to the market-yard. He denied the suggestion that he boosted up the price to help the claimant. A perusal of the unregistered agreement -- Ex. X-5 shows that the vendor received Rs. 1,000/- out of the total sale consideration of Rs.12,000/- and the vendor agreed to handover vacant possession by 18-9-78 and then receive the balance sale consideration. He further undertook to register the sale-deed after the restrictions on transfer were removed. Surprisingly, P.W. 3 did not speak to the factum of payment of balance sale consideration and as to when the transaction was completed. Thus, his evidence is conspicuously silent about the material facts that are expected to be stated by the vendee. Though he stated that he obtained permission from the Gram Panchayat for construction of the house in the year 1979, the order granting permission was not filed. In this state of evidence, it is difficult to place reliance on the alleged agreement of sale evidenced by Ex. X-5. Even assuming that it is a genuine transaction, three relevant factors have to be kept in view. Firstly, the transaction took place 1/2 years after the date of notification. The land value would have certainly gone up within this time span. The rising trend pf prices from 1976 onwards is disclosed by the evidence of P.Ws. themselves. Secondly, it is seen from Ex. X-1 plan that the site covered by Ex. X-5 is in the midst of residential colonies, very close to cinema hall, petrol bunks and Government offices. It seems to us that the site has a better location than the acquired land. Considering these two aspects, we can safely conclude that even if the transaction covered by Ex. X-5 can be treated as a genuine comparable sale, the acquired land, if sold as house sites, would have fetched about Rs.20/- per sq. yard without providing for any deduction. The third aspect to be taken note of is that Ex. X-5 evidences sale of small plot of land of 400 sq. yards. Naturally, a fairly large extent of one acre of land cannot be expected to fetch the same rate if sold as house-sites. Some deduction has to be provided for towards roads and 3 other development. In view of the fact that the acquired land belonging to the respondent is a levelled land abutting the main road on one side, we consider it reasonable to deduct 25% only. It is to be noted that in 1977, Bhadrachalam was only a village within the limits or Gram Panchayat and it is common knowledge that the area to be left out for roads and cost of providing other amenities will be much less than in urban area. For these reasons, we feel that deduction over and above 25% is not warranted. There is no hard and fast rule in regard to the percentage of deduction in order to arrive at the market value of a large extent of land based on the small plots in the vicinity (vide Bhagwa thula v. Special Tahsildar & L.A.O., Visakhapatnam Municipality (3-A supra). In Spl. Tahsildar, Land Acquisition, Visakhapatnam v. A. Mangala Goxori (1 supra), it was indicated that in rural areas where land is acquired for housing schemes, 1/4th may be deducted.
16. Ex.X-2 is a registered sale-deed dated 22-9-77executed by a tribal woman in favour of another tribal lady ho is examined as P.W. 1. The land covered by Ex.X-2 is 700 sq. yards and the sale-consideration is Rs. 7,500/-. That means the rate per sq. yard works out to Rs. 11/-. Though P.W.I stated that she purchased the site at Rs. 16/- per sq. yard, as rightly pointed out by the trial Court, the document discloses the sale-price of Rs.11/- only. Though it is a post notification sale, it is quite proximate in point of time to the date of notification. As far as the location is concerned, P.W.I stated in the cross-examination that the site under Ex. X-2 is in the midst of Bhadrachalam and the site of the claimant is on the outskirts of Bhadrachalam, though she denied the suggestion that the land in Ex.X-2 is costlier than the land of the claimant. It is noticed from the plan Ex. X-1 that the site purchased by P.W. 1 is not too far from the acquired land. In fact the site sold under Ex.X-2 is also in Survey No. 20. The trial Court was inclined to place reliance on this transaction as the sale being in favour of a Tribal, is not hit by law prohibiting transfers in the agency area. As already stated, the claimant himself relied upon this sale transaction even in the claim petition. It is pointed out by the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the Market Committee that Ex.X-2 which was in fact relied upon by the Civil Court furnishes proper guide for fixation of market value of the land in question and if the price mentioned in Ex. X-2 is to be taken into account, the claimant will get less than Rs. 10/- per sq. yard and there is no justification at all to award Rs. 25/- per sq. yard. As against this contention, the learned Counsel for the respondent, Mr. J.V. Suryanarayana submitted that in view of the peculiar circumstances in which the tribals are placed, the price in Ex. X-2 is quite low andmoreover, when there is other evidence -- such as Exs. X-3 and X-5 revealing higher prices paid for similar plots, the higher price has to be applied. He cited the decision in Ranee of Vuyyur v. Collector of Madras (1969 (1) An. W.R. 45 (SC)) As far as the latter argument of Mr. Suryanarayana is concerned, we have to necessarily reject the same as, in our view, neither Ex. X-3 nor Ex. X-5 can be relied upon for the reasons stated supra. In fact, as far as Ex. X-3 is concerned, there is no scope to invoke the above principle as the price stipulated is only Rs. 15/-. Even if Ex. X-5 which is a post-notification sale is to be taken into account, the market value of the acquired land cannot be as much as Rs. 25/-persq.yard, as already pointed out. At the same time, we consider it unjust and inappropriate to fix the market value of the acquired land at the same rate at which the land covered by Ex. X-2 was purportedly sold. We agree with the trial Court that P.W. 1 who is a tribal would have paidless than the prevailing market rate. Though it is not borne out by the contents in the sale-deed, P.W. 1 asserted that she purchased the site at Rs. 16/- per sq. yard. Be that as it may, we are inclined to think that a transaction between one tribal and another which is something rare, may not furnish a true and correct index of the market value of similar or approximately similar lands. We can take judicial notice of the fact that the purchasing capacity of a tribal person is limited. Though P.W. 1 is a politically advanced lady-in the sense that she is an Ex. MLA and Zilla Parishad Chairman, there is no evidence about her financial capacity and properties owned by her. Moreover, the recitals in Ex. X-2 would show that the vendor --- another tribal woman was dictated by sheer necessity to sell the plot. In these circumstnaces, it is reasonable to estimate the market value for the plot covered by Ex. X-2 at Rs. 20/- per sq. yard -- i.e., almost at double the rate mentioned in Ex. X-2. From this a deduction of 25% has to be provided for, as already discussed above, while estimating the market value of the acquired land which is a fairly large extent of one acre. Thus, the market value of the acquired land as on the date of notification i.e., 6-1-1977, has to be determined at Rs. 15/- per sq.yard and accordingly we do so. We do not say that this is the acurate price which the acquired land could fetch on the relevant date. We are aware that certain amount of guess work is involved in arriving at the market value as above. It is recognised by a long line of precedents that such guess work is implicit in the process of evaluation of the market value. As pointed out by Gopal Rao, J., speaking for the Division Bench in a recent case - in Special Dy. Collecto (L.A.) v. P. Vidya Sagar Rao (1985 (1) ALT 649) - "where evidence is not coming forth directly as to the price of large areas of land in the area of acquisition and the Courts are called upon to determine the valuation on the basis of evidence which is inadequate, necessarily an element of best-judgment-assessment is involved to make the evaluation."
17. Incidentally it may be mentioned that the reference Court fixed the market value at Rs. 10/- per sq. yard in regard to adjacent lands and that is the subject matter of L.P. Appeal Nos. 13 and 14 of 1990.
18. The learned Counsel for the respondent-Mr. J.V. Suryanarayana contended that the deduction need not be provided for as there is no evidence nor even a contention to the effect that any further development has to be undertaken. As the land is in a developed locality and is meant for location of market yard, the usual principle of deduction of certain percentage need not be followed in the instant case. It is difficult to agree with this contention. There is a plethora of case law in which some deduction was provided for while calculating the market value of large extents. We may refer to the judgments of the Supreme Court in Tribeni Devi v. Collector of Ranchi ; Vijay Kumar v. State of Maharastra ; Kausalya Devi v. Land Acquisition Officer, Aurangabad ; Administrator General of W.B. v. Collector, Varanasi (2 supra) and Special Tahsildar, Land Acquisition, Visakhapatnam v. A. Mangala Gowri (1 supra), Chimanlal v. Spl. L.A.O., Poona (3 supra) and the Division Bench decision of this Court in the Tahsildar, Land Acquisition v. P. Narasing Rao (6 supra) and Spl. Dy. Collector (L.A.) v. P. Vidya Sagar Rao (8 supra).
19. No doubt, in Bhagwathula v. Special Tahsildar & L.A. Officer, Visakhapatnam Municipality (3-A supra), the Supreme Court pointed out:
"The proposition that large area of land cannot possibly fetch a price at the same rate at which small plots are sold is not absolute proposition and in given circumstances, it would be permissible to take into account the price fetched by the small plots of land. If the larger tract of land because of advantageous position is capable of being used for the purpose for which the smaller plots are used and is also situated in a developed area with little or no requirement of further development, the principle of deduction of the value for purpose of comparison is not warranted."
Earlier, the learned Judges observed:
"In fixing the market value of a large property on the basis of a sale transaction for smaller property, generally a deduction is given taking into consideration the expenses required for development of the larger tract to make smaller plots within that area in order to compare with the small plots dealt with, under the sale transaction."
Thus, even in this case, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle adopted in a catena of decisions cited above though it was made clear that deduction need not always be given. On the facts of that particular case, the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that no deduction was warranted because the land acquired did not require any further development and it has the same advantages such as roads, etc., possessed by the smaller plots. The same conclusion is not possible in so far as the land which is the subject-matter of this appeal. It is not the case of the respondent-claimant that roads have already been formed on the land in question and the land was already subjected to development. In the absence of specific evidence to that effect, the general principle of deduction while comparing the transactions relating to small extents of land should be adopted, It is difficult to accept the argument of the learned Counsel for the respondent that for the purpose of setting up a market yard, no development of this one acre of land was required.
20. We are, therefore, of the view that the reasonable market value to be awarded for the acquired land should be at Rs. 15/- per sq. yard. The judgment of the learned single Judge affirming the award of the Civil Court, is, therefore, liable to be set aside.
21. It is necessary to refer to one more aspect before parting with the case. The learned single Judge declared that the claimant was entitled to all the benefits under the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act subject to the result of the decision of the Supreme Court. It is not in dispute that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Raghubir Singh , K.S. Paripurnan v. State of Kerala and Mir Fazeelath Hussain v. Spl. Dy. Collector, Hyderabad , the petitioner (sic. claimant) is not entitled to solatium and interest at the enhanced rate as per the Amendment Act of 1984 because the award in the instant case was not passed by the Collector or the Civil Court between 30-4-1982 and 24-9-1984, which are the two crucial dates specified in Sub-section (2) of Section 30 of the Amendment Act. He is also not entitled to additional amount under Section .23(1-A). However, in view of the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Y. Venkanna Chowdary v. Spl Dy. Collector, LA. (General) , the claimant shall be entitled to interest at 6% instead of 4% awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer. The interest at the rate of 6% shall, therefore, be paid on the compensation amount as determined by us in this appeal.
22. The appeal is thus partly allowed. We make no order as to costs.