Gujarat High Court
Shree Abhay Gopalak Vividh Karyakari ... vs State Of Gujarat & 6 on 15 March, 2016
Author: C.L.Soni
Bench: C.L. Soni
C/SCA/2000/2016 JUDGMENT
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 2000 of 2016
With
SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 2001 of 2016
With
SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 2159 of 2016
TO
SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 2174 of 2016
With
SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 2536 of 2016
TO
SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 2540 of 2016
With
SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 2953 of 2016
With
SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 2962 of 2016
With
SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 3178 of 2016
TO
SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 3183 of 2016
With
SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 3188 of 2016
With
SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 3189 of 2016
With
SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 3191 of 2016
With
SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 3293 of 2016
With
SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 3575 of 2016
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE C.L. SONI
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1 Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed
to see the judgment ?
2 To be referred to the Reporter or not ?
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HC-NIC Page 1 of 32 Created On Fri Mar 18 01:45:49 IST 2016
C/SCA/2000/2016 JUDGMENT
3 Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of
the judgment ?
4 Whether this case involves a substantial question of
law as to the interpretation of the Constitution of
India or any order made thereunder ?
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SHREE ABHAY GOPALAK VIVIDH KARYAKARI SAHAKARI MANDALI
LIMITED....Petitioner(s)
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT & 6....Respondent(s)
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Appearance:
MR DIPEN DESAI, ADVOCATE, for the Petitioner(s) No. 1
MR. PRAKASH K. JANI, ADDL. ADVOCATE GENERAL with MR. RONAK
RAVAL, ASSTT. G.P. for the Respondent(s) No. 1
ANIL H PATEL, ADVOCATE for the Respondent(s) No. 6 - 7
MR CHIRAG B PATEL, ADVOCATE for the Respondent(s) No. 5
NOTICE SERVED BY DS for the Respondent(s) No. 2 - 4
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CORAM: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE C.L. SONI
Date : 15/03/2016
COMMON ORAL JUDGMENT
1. Considering the nature of the common issue raised in the present group of matters, the matters are taken up for final hearing and disposal, at the notice stage with consent of the learned Advocates for the parties.
2. Though different orders are passed by the authorized officer in connection with the preparation of the voters' list for agriculturist constituency, however, as pointed out by the learned advocates, the question needs to be first answered is what meaning could be assigned to the phrase "Primary Agricultural Credit Cooperative Societies" inserted in section 11(1)(i) of the Gujarat Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1963 Page 2 of 32 HC-NIC Page 2 of 32 Created On Fri Mar 18 01:45:49 IST 2016 C/SCA/2000/2016 JUDGMENT ("the Act") by Gujarat Act 14 of 2015.
3. The authorized officer functioning as election officer has, while dealing with the claims of the petitioners and the objectors as regards inclusion or exclusion of the names of the persons in the voters' list, for election of the Agriculture Produce Market committee, Bhatiya and Sanand for the year 2015-16, passed impugned orders.
4. As per section 11(1)(i), (ii) and (iii) of the Act, election of members of Market Committee is to be held from three different electorate divisions (to be referred as constituencies). The present group of matters concerns the election of eight agriculturists under sec. 11(1)(i) of the Act which could be referred as first constituency. Section 11(1)(i) of the Act as existed originally read as under:
"11(1) (i) eight agriculturists who shall be elected by members of managing committees of cooperative societies (other than co-operative marketing societies) dispensing agricultural credit in the market area;"
5. Section 11(1)(i) of the Act as amended and substituted by Gujarat Act No.21 of 2006 then read as under:
" eight agriculturists who shall be elected by members of managing committees of cooperative societies (other than co-operative marketing societies and milk produce co-operative societies) dispensing agricultural credit in the market area."
6. After the Gujarat Agricultural Produce Markets (Amendment) Act,2015 (Gujarat Act No.14 of 2015) was brought into force, section 11(1) (i) of the Act now reads as under:
"eight agriculturists, whose names are enlisted in the voters' list published by the Election Commission of India for such market area, shall be elected by the members of managing committee of Page 3 of 32 HC-NIC Page 3 of 32 Created On Fri Mar 18 01:45:49 IST 2016 C/SCA/2000/2016 JUDGMENT the Primary Agricultural Credit Co-operative Societies dispensing agricultural credit in the market area."
7. The controversy in the present group of petitions is concerning preparation of voters list for the first constituency falling within section 11(1) (i) i.e. as regards election of eight agriculturists who will be the members of the market committee with other members to be elected and nominated as provided in section 11 to constitute the market committee.
8. As per section 11(1)(i) of the Act before it was amended by Amendment Act, 2015, except the cooperative marketing societies and milk producing cooperative societies, all cooperative societies dispensing agricultural credit were entitled to elect eight agriculturists to be the members of Market Committee. Now, by Amendment Act, 2015, clause (i) of section 11(1) is substituted by new clause (i) whereunder it is provided that eight agriculturists whose names are enlisted in the voters' list published by the Election Commission of India for the market area shall be elected by members of managing committee of the primary Agricultural Credit Cooperative Societies dispensing agricultural credit in the market area. Thus, only Primary Agricultural Credit Cooperative Societies are made entitled to elect eight agriculturists.
9. Learned Advocates for the parties pointed out that since the question as to which cooperative society could be said to be the primary agricultural credit cooperative society or what meaning could be assigned to the phrase "primary agricultural credit societies" arises for the first time, the Court may allow them to first address on such question to examine the impugned orders in the context of the meaning which may be given by this court to the phrase "primary agricultural credit Page 4 of 32 HC-NIC Page 4 of 32 Created On Fri Mar 18 01:45:49 IST 2016 C/SCA/2000/2016 JUDGMENT societies" . The Court, therefore, not only allowed the learned advocates for the parties in the present group of matters but even allowed other learned advocates to focus their views on the above said question.
10. Learned Advocate Mr. B.S. Patel, Mr. Dipen Desai, and Mr. Dhaval Vyas who appears for Ms. Hemali Soni for the petitioners in respective petitions submitted that there is no definition given to the phrase primary agricultural credit societies either in the Act or in the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act, 1961 (to be referred as "Societies Act"). They submitted that by Amendment Act, 2015, the legislature has widened the horizon so as to include all cooperative societies dispensing agricultural credit to exercise their right to vote to elect eight agriculturists and, therefore, the exception provided by Gujarat Act No. 21 of 2006 in section 11(1)(i) excluding the cooperative marketing societies and milk producing cooperative societies is taken out.
11. They submitted that by the Amendment Act,2015, the legislature in fact intended that all the primary level societies dispensing agricultural credit should exercise their right to vote to elect eight agriculturists and therefore what is now required to be considered by the authorized officer is whether the cooperative societies are dispensing agricultural credit or not. They submitted that no society is registered as primary agricultural credit cooperative and, therefore, if a cooperative society has one of its object to advance credit for agriculture purpose in its bye laws, it could be considered as primary agricultural cooperative society. They submitted that the classification given by the Registrar under the Societies Act to categorize the societies in different classes cannot apply to determine whether a particular cooperative society is primary Page 5 of 32 HC-NIC Page 5 of 32 Created On Fri Mar 18 01:45:49 IST 2016 C/SCA/2000/2016 JUDGMENT agricultural credit cooperative society or not. They submitted that the classification under the Societies Act is done as per the discretion of the Registrar and is non- statutory. They submitted that undisputably, the petitioners are primary societies with one of the objects to dispense agricultural credit to their members in the market area.
12. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. P.C. Kavina appearing with learned Advocate Mr. Dilip Rana for the petitioners in other group of petitions submitted that the Amendment Act, 2015 has not made any difference to decide as to the eligibility co- operative societies for the purpose of their inclusion in the voters' list for the first constituency. Mr. Kavina submitted that the cooperative societies at the primary level with object to advance agricultural credit if found dispensing agricultural credit in the market area, they are to be included in the voters' list to elect eight agriculturists. Mr. Kavina submitted that the words "primary agricultural credit cooperative societies" have not been defined in the Act nor are registered as such under the Societies Act and, therefore, classification done by the Registrar could not take away right of the societies to be included in the voters' list if they are dispensing the agricultural credit.
13. Learned Additional Advocate General Mr. Prakash K. Jani appearing with the learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr. Ronak B. Raval submitted that the legislature does not amend the existing provisions in any statute without any purpose. Mr. Jani submitted that the purpose behind inserting the words "Primary Agricultural Credit" is to ensure that only those societies which have main object to advance credit and classified as primary agricultural credit societies become eligible to send their representatives from first constituency for Page 6 of 32 HC-NIC Page 6 of 32 Created On Fri Mar 18 01:45:49 IST 2016 C/SCA/2000/2016 JUDGMENT constitution of the market committee. Mr. Jani submitted that the amendment in section 11(1)(i) of the Act has changed the entire scenario where the legislature now wants only those societies which have principal object of dispensing agricultural credit to their members in the market area to elect eight agriculturists and, therefore the primary agricultural credit societies as classified by the Registrar could be made entitled to be included in the voters' list. Mr. Jani submitted that the societies are classified in different categories according to their activities and one such class is Seva Sahakari Mandalis within which primary agricultural credit cooperative society falls. Mr. Jani submitted that at the time of registration of the society, such class is decided on the basis of the forms and bye-laws submitted by the society for its registration and such classification is treated as final for all purposes. Mr. Jani submitted that no society is registered by name as primary agricultural credit cooperative society nor even the phrase "primary agricultural credit cooperative societies" is defined either in the Act or under the Societies Act. Mr. Jani referred to different definitions from the Banking Regulations, Reserve Bank of India Act, National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development Act, 1981 ("NABARD Act") to give meaning to the phrase "primary agricultural credit cooperative society"
used in sec. 11(1)(i) of the Act.
14. Learned Advocate Mr. Vaghela and Mr. Ketan Shah in opposition submitted that only those societies mainly dealing in advancing agricultural credit are now intended by the legislature as eligible voters for first constituency. Mr. Vaghela submitted that the Act once amended with definite purpose, could not be generalized to frustrate the object of the amendment and, therefore, the co-operative societies not Page 7 of 32 HC-NIC Page 7 of 32 Created On Fri Mar 18 01:45:49 IST 2016 C/SCA/2000/2016 JUDGMENT falling within the category of primary agricultural credit cooperative societies cannot be included in the voters list to elect eight agriculturists.
15. Learned advocate Mr. P.S.Champaneri submitted that section 11(1)(i) of the Act lays down qualification of the societies for the purpose of election of members of the market committee from first constituency and it has nothing to do with the preparation of voters' list. Mr. Champaneri submitted that the preparation of voters' list is governed by rule 5 to rule 8 of the Gujarat Agricultural Produce Markets Rules, 1965 ("the Rules") and since the Rules are framed under sec. 59 of the Act, section 59 could be taken as complete code for the purpose of preparation of the voters' list. Mr. Champaneri submitted that there is no simultaneous amendment in the Rules when section 11 (1) of the Act was amended and, therefore, the voters' list for first constituency cannot be restricted only to the category of primary agricultural credit cooperative societies by relying on the classification done by the Registrar under the Societies Act. Mr. Champaneri submitted that for the purpose of deciding about the eligibility of the cooperative societies to be included in the voters' list, the provisions of the Societies Act cannot be looked into.
16. The Court, having heard the learned advocates for the parties, finds that the legislature has provided for constitution of market committee by representatives of different classes. First amongst them is selection of eight agriculturists by election as per section 11(1)(i) of the Act by the cooperative societies of the type provided in section 11(1) (i) of the Act. Section 11(1)(i) as it originally stood permitted all cooperative societies dispensing agricultural credit, to elect eight agriculturists and for such purpose, the members of their Page 8 of 32 HC-NIC Page 8 of 32 Created On Fri Mar 18 01:45:49 IST 2016 C/SCA/2000/2016 JUDGMENT managing committee formed electorate on their inclusion in the voters' list prepared as provided in the Rules. In the year 2006, the legislature debarred the cooperative marketing societies and Milk Produce Co-operative Societies from being part of the electorate to elect eight agriculturists. It appears that at the time of election of Agriculture Produce Market Committee, Siddhpur somewhere in the year 2010, dispute had arisen as to whether the Milk Producing Co-operative Societies could be included in the voters' list of agriculturists' constituency on exclusion of animal husbandry and animal husbandry products from the schedule of agriculture produce. The objector whose application was turned down against inclusion of Milk Producing Societies in voters' list had preferred special civil application no.13689 of 2009 before this Court and Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court held that since the animal husbandry and animal husbandry products were taken out from the schedule of agricultural produce, the societies dealing with the animal husbandry and animal husbandry products could not form part of the electorate. The matter was carried before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and on remand by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the matter was again decided by this Court. In para 8 to 9 of its judgment dated 6th October,2010 in Special Civil Application No.13689 of 2009 in the case of Rameshbhai Ganeshbhai Chaudhari versus State of Gujarat & 22 and allied matters, Hon'ble Division Bench has held and observed as under:
"8. It may be pertinent to note here that, as stated on oath by the Authorized and Co-operative Officer (Market) for APMC, Sidhpur, by-laws of the societies in question specifically provided for dispensing agricultural credit and such societies had in fact advanced/dispensed agricultural credit to their members. The Page 9 of 32 HC-NIC Page 9 of 32 Created On Fri Mar 18 01:45:49 IST 2016 C/SCA/2000/2016 JUDGMENT Secretary of APMC, Sidhpur has averred that milk producing societies were registered only for procuring milk and to aid cattle breeders, whereas the societies in question were Vividh Karyakari Sahakari Mandlies, i.e. multi-purpose co-operative societies. Even the petitioner, objecting to inclusion of the MMCs of such cattle-breeders' societies, has averred that as per instructions dated 14.08.2003 issued by the Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Gopalak Multi- purpose Co-operative Societies were required to be established to settle the 'gopalaks' who were moving from one place to another along with their cattle, by establishing a society and giving them lands on which they could settle. It is clearly mentioned in the circular dated 21.09.2004 of the Registrar, Co-operative Societies that different multi-purpose co-operative societies are established with the main objective of extending agricultural credit, wherein persons of any cattle-breeding community could be members; while other milk producing co-operative societies were also registered in large numbers. Thus, there is a clear and discernible difference between multi- purpose co-operative societies extending agricultural credit and the co-operative societies exclusively dealing in milk produce or constituted for producing or procuring milk, which may be known as milk producers' society. However, there is no well-defined class of milk produce co-operative societies, in fact or in law and no society is even alleged to be specially registered as such or to whom the above epithet could be applied.
9. Considering the rival submissions in light of the statutory provisions, effect of the amendment and the precedents, none of which directly applies, it was seen that exclusion of animal husbandry products from the Schedule and from the definition of agricultural produce appears to have been intended to see that buying and selling of animal husbandry products was no longer to be regulated by the provisions of the Act. On the other hand, in the matter of constitution of the Market Committee, while representatives of co- operative marketing societies formed a distinct and separate constituency, no representation is intended or reserved for milk produce co- operative societies. By virtue of the exceptions Page 10 of 32 HC-NIC Page 10 of 32 Created On Fri Mar 18 01:45:49 IST 2016 C/SCA/2000/2016 JUDGMENT carved in the constituency for agriculturists by bracketing two classes of co-operative societies in Section 11 (1) (i), the constituency is made to consist of all kinds of co-operative societies, howsoever named, described or registered, if they are dispensing agricultural credit in the market area. While co-operative marketing society is defined in section 2 (v), the words co-operative societies or milk produce co-operative societies are not defined in the Act. Therefore, strictly interpreting the exception and exclusion, it has to be inferred that whichever co-operative society is dispensing agricultural credit in the market area is intended to be included in the constituency. That proposition finds indirect support from perusal of the definition of co-operative marketing society insofar as it is defined to be a society registered or deemed to be registered as such under the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act and engaged in the business of buying and selling agricultural produce or of possessing agricultural produce and holding a licence. The words as such in the definition are of special significance because co-operative marketing society, even if it were having various objects and activities including extending agricultural credit, it would be distinguished by its birth- mark of having been registered as a co-operative marketing society. Instead of defining another class of co-operative societies by such birth- mark or some other essential indicator, the legislature has left the phrase milk produce co- operative societies undefined and left their identification to the authorities and the courts in case of dispute. Thus, the only legislative guidance provided in the provision is by indicating the society's activity of dispensing agricultural credit in the market area. Under such circumstances, the authorized officers were justified in holding a factual enquiry into the actual activities of the co-operative societies in question and they have found that such societies were genuinely dispensing agricultural credit in the market area."
17. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. P.C. Kavina while relying on the observations made in paragraph 9 would submit that in fact, even while considering the exception carved out in Page 11 of 32 HC-NIC Page 11 of 32 Created On Fri Mar 18 01:45:49 IST 2016 C/SCA/2000/2016 JUDGMENT section 11(1)(i) of the Act, the Court held that whichever cooperative societies dispensing the agricultural credit howsoever named, described or registered is intended to be included in the agriculturists' constituency and what is done by the Amendment Act, 2015 is even to give go bye to the exceptions carved out whereby all cooperative societies dispensing agricultural credit are now made entitled to be included in the voters' list to elect 8 agriculturists from first constituencies and thus the law declared by the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court holds the field as on today and the classification by the Registrar cannot decide the question of eligibility of the cooperative societies for the purpose of their inclusion in the voters' list.
18. It appears to the Court that by Amendment Act of 2015, the legislature now intends that except the Primary Agricultural Credit Cooperative Societies, no other cooperative societies though dispensing agricultural credit should be made entitled to elect 8 agriculturists. The insertion of the word 'primary' would suggest that the societies at the grass root level dealing mainly in advancing agricultural credit are intended to be entitled to elect 8 agriculturists whose names are enlisted in the voters' list published by the Election Commission of India for the market area. However, the question still remains that when the registration of society is not done as primary agricultural credit co-operative society, or that when there is no definition given in the Act or in the Societies Act as to which cooperative society could be said to be the primary agricultural credit cooperative society, what could be the criteria to decide whether a particular society is primary agricultural cooperative society for the purpose of Page 12 of 32 HC-NIC Page 12 of 32 Created On Fri Mar 18 01:45:49 IST 2016 C/SCA/2000/2016 JUDGMENT election of members of market committee under section 11(1)
(i) of the Act. Learned Additional Advocate General Mr. Jani submitted that in absence of the definition of primary agricultural credit cooperative society either in the Act or in the Societies Act, help from the other Acts where such definition is provided or indication is given to reach to the meaning of primary agricultural credit cooperative society could be taken. He also submitted that now after amendment, the classification done by the Registrar of the cooperative societies could be relied as per which, the primary agricultural credit cooperative society falls within the class of Seva Sahakari Mandali. Learned Advocates for the petitioners however submitted that the definition from the other Acts could be relied only when there is any ambiguity in the language of the provision which is being construed but when the language of the Amendment Act, 2015 is clear, interpretation is to be done in the context of the objects and purpose of the Act and no external help can be taken. The Court however finds that when the cooperative societies registered under the Societies Act are given right to elect members of the market committee, not only reference to the provisions of the Societies Act but the other Acts like NABARD Act, Reserve Bank of India Act, Banking Regulations Act would not be out of place to decide the issue involved. As per the explanation given in rule 12 of the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Rules, 1965 ("Societies Rules"), Seva Sahakari Mandali includes Multi Purpose Society and Primary Agricultural Credit Society. However, class Seva Sahakari Mandali also includes different service societies. Therefore, inclusion of a particular society in class of Seva Sahakari Mandali may not be determinative factor to decide as to Page 13 of 32 HC-NIC Page 13 of 32 Created On Fri Mar 18 01:45:49 IST 2016 C/SCA/2000/2016 JUDGMENT whether the cooperative society is primary agricultural credit society. In any case, as held and observed in the case of Gunvantrai Manibhai Desai v. B. Narsinhan & Ors.,reported in 1984 (1) GLR 603 and by the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in the case of Rameshbhai Ganeshbhai Chaudhari (supra), the classification made under the Societies Act cannot decide status of society for the purpose of the Act.
19. The Court finds from the schedule-A attached with Societies Rules providing for audit rate of cooperative societies under rule 38A and Schedule B under rule 31 for rate of contribution to the education fund, the societies are classified into different types and categories like agricultural credit cooperative society which includes service credit cooperative society, multi purpose credit cooperative society etc. and also includes District Cooperative Bank, State Cooperative Bank and other Central Cooperative Institutions doing credit business as well as the Gujarat State Land Development Bank and also types of agricultural non credit societies.
20. Section 2(7-A) of the Societies Act defines the Co- operative Credit Structure to mean the Primary Agricultural Credit Co-operative Society, Central Co-operative Banks and the State Co-operative Banks. As per this definition, only Primary Agricultural Credit Cooperative Societies are part of three tyre co-operative structure and not other cooperative societies which dispense agricultural credit as one of its many businesses. Primary agricultural credit cooperative society is a basic unit working at the grass root, village level and only the members of such societies are entitled to have facility of loan from such societies. Short term cooperative banking structure Page 14 of 32 HC-NIC Page 14 of 32 Created On Fri Mar 18 01:45:49 IST 2016 C/SCA/2000/2016 JUDGMENT is three tyre structure which consists of State Cooperative Banks at the State level, District Central Cooperative Banks at District Level and Primary agricultural cooperative societies at the village level. Section 22(4) of the Societies Act provides that all the depositors having deposits of rupees ten thousand or above for a minimum period of one year and the borrowers shall be compulsorily made members in the Primary Agricultural Credit Co-operative Societies. The purpose appears to be to enhance credit structure of such society. Section 44-A of the Societies Act gives freedom to the managing committee of every society in co-operative credit structure to decide its function and internal administrative matters notwithstanding anything contained in the Societies Act, Rules or the bye-laws. Such freedom on the matters like interest rates on deposit and loans, subject to guidelines from the Reserve Bank of India and on the matters relating to borrowing, investing, depositing its surplus funds, loaning policies and other business policies, appointment of auditors and the borrowing from any financial institutions regulated by the Reserve Bank of India are not available to other societies not primarily functioning for advancing credit. If such freedom is available to the societies which are formed for many objects and purposes, the provisions of section 44-A of the Societies Act may be misused by many societies by simply providing for a object, amongst other objects to dispense agricultural credit though principal business may not be to advance finances for agricultural purposes or for the purposes connected with agricultural activities and they may successfully violate the regulatory and controlling provisions as regards borrowing, investing, deposit of their surplus funds, recruitment of the employees, appointment of auditors, interest rates on deposit Page 15 of 32 HC-NIC Page 15 of 32 Created On Fri Mar 18 01:45:49 IST 2016 C/SCA/2000/2016 JUDGMENT and loan etc. Section 51 of the Societies Act which comes under Chapter V for State Aid to the Societies, provides that the State Government may subscribe directly to the share capital of a society with limited liability. However, as per the proviso, the State Government shall not subscribe for more than twenty five per cent of the total share capital and the State Government or the society shall have the option to reduce the share capital contributed by the State Government. This distinguishes the Primary Agricultural Credit Cooperative Society from the other Co-operative Societies not falling in co- operative credit structure. Section 57 of the Societies Act provides for restriction on amount of dividend to be paid by the societies not exceeding the rate prescribed by the State Government. However, in the case of cooperative credit structure, dividend payable is subject to the guidelines of the Reserve Bank of India or the National Bank. Section 73-A of the Societies Act provides that notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or the Rules for the time being in force, the societies in the co-operative credit structure shall be at liberty to affiliate or disaffiliate with any federal society of its choice provided a resolution approving such affiliation or disaffiliation with a federal society is passed in the annual general meeting held for the purpose with three-fourth majority of total members and subject to the rules as may be prescribed and the guidelines issued by the Reserve Bank of India. The above provisions would show that the primary agricultural credit cooperative society is to function purely and mainly for the purpose of advancing agricultural credit in consonance with the guidelines issued by the Reserve Bank of India. Section 80 of the Societies Act provides for Power to appoint Government nominee. Sub-section (3) thereof provides Page 16 of 32 HC-NIC Page 16 of 32 Created On Fri Mar 18 01:45:49 IST 2016 C/SCA/2000/2016 JUDGMENT that notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or the rules or in the bye-laws, there shall be only one nominee of the State Government in the committee of the State Co-operative Bank or the Central Co-operative Banks where the State Government has subscribed to the share capital of such co- operative banks and no such nomination shall be made where the State Government has not subscribed to the share capital of such co-operative banks. However, no such nomination is permitted on the committee of a Primary Agricultural Credit Co-operative Society even if the State Government has subscribed to the share capital of such society. This provision shows the intention of the legislature to minimize the State Control so far as the Primary Agricultural Credit Co-Operative Societies are concerned. Section 81-A(2) of the Societies Act provides that the Committee of a Primary Agricultural Credit Co-operative Society shall be removed by the Registrar only under the three circumstances namely (1) if a society incurs losses for three consecutive years; or (ii) if serious financial irregularities or frauds have been identified; or (iii) if there is perpetual lack of quorum over a period of three months. Therefore, unlike the provisions under section 81 of the Societies Act, for super-cession of the Committee, removal of the committee of Primary Agricultural Credit Co-Operative Society is contemplated only on the above three grounds which shows that the legislature does not want the committee of such society to continue if found involved in financial irregularities or fraud or to incur losses so as to be away from its main object of advancing agricultural credit. Section 84(7) of the Societies Act cast duty upon the Registrar to prescribe prudential norms including capital to risk weighed assets ratio for Primary Agricultural Credit Cooperative Societies, in Page 17 of 32 HC-NIC Page 17 of 32 Created On Fri Mar 18 01:45:49 IST 2016 C/SCA/2000/2016 JUDGMENT consultation with the National Bank. Above such provisions would show that since the primary agricultural credit cooperative society is distinctly registered, it has to have its main object or principal business to advance financial accommodation to its members for agricultural purposes or for the purposes connected with the agricultural activities and such society has to comply with the guidelines of the Reserve Bank of India though is enjoying the freedom as stated above.
21. By section 56 of the Banking Regulations Act, 1949, the definition of primary agricultural credit society added in section 5 reads as under:
"(cciv) 'primary agricultural credit society' means a co-operative society, -
(1) the primary object or principal business of which is to provide financial accommodation to its members for agricultural purposes or for purposes connected with agricultural activities (including the marketing of crops); and (2) the bye-laws of which do not permit admission of any other co-operative society as member:
Provided that this sub-clause shall not apply to the admission of a cooperative bank as a member by reason of such cooperative bank subscribing to the share capital of such co-operative society out of funds provided by the State Government for the purpose;"
22. Section 2(i) of the Reserve Bank of India Act provides that the cooperative bank, cooperative credit society, director, primary agricultural credit society, primary cooperative bank and primary credit society shall have the meaning respectively assigned to them as per the Banking Regulations Act, 1949. NABARD Act has no definition of primary agricultural credit cooperative society. However,it has definition of primary rural credit society in section 2(n) which reads as under:
Page 18 of 32HC-NIC Page 18 of 32 Created On Fri Mar 18 01:45:49 IST 2016 C/SCA/2000/2016 JUDGMENT "(n) 'primary rural credit society' means a cooperative society, by whatever name called (1) which has as its object or business the provision of financial accommodation to its members for agriculture or agricultural operation or for the marketing of crops, or for rural development; and (2) the bye-laws of which do not permit admission of any other co-operative society as member;"
23. The common element appears in the definition of primary agricultural credit society in Banking Regulations and definition of primary rural credit society in the NABARD Act is that the object of such society has to be to provide financial accommodation to its members for agricultural purposes, for agricultural operations or for the purpose connected with the agricultural activities including marketing of crop and the bye laws of which do not permit admission of any other cooperative society as a member.
24. The above definitions could be a guiding factor in absence of definition provided in the Act to reach to the meaning of Primary Agricultural Credit Co-operative Societies for the purpose of the Act. Mr. Patel however relied on following observations from the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd. reported in (2001) 4 SCC 139 "When the question arises as to the meaning of a certain provision in a statute it is not only legitimate but proper to read that provision in its context. The context means the statute as a whole, the previous state of law, other statutes in pari materia, the general scope of the statute and the mischief that it was intended to remedy."
In Tata Power Co. Ltd. v. Reliance Energy Ltd., reported in 200(16) SCC page 659, Hon'ble the Supreme Court Page 19 of 32 HC-NIC Page 19 of 32 Created On Fri Mar 18 01:45:49 IST 2016 C/SCA/2000/2016 JUDGMENT has observed in paragraph 84 as under:
"If delicensing of the generation is the prime object of the Act, the courts while interpreting the provisions of the statute must guard itself from doing so in such a manner which would defeat the purpose thereof. It must bear in mind that licensing provisions are not brought back through the side- door of regulations.
25. In the context of the Act, it appears that the insertion of primary agricultural credit by Amendment Act of 2015 in section 11(1)(i) is to make clear the intention of the legislature that it is only the societies which have their main object to do principal business of providing financial assistance to their members for agricultural purpose or for the activities connected with the agriculture will be entitled to elect 8 agriculturists from the agriculturists constituency and to make such intention more clear, the words 'agricultural credit' are repeated in the phrase "primary agricultural credit'. As rightly submitted by the learned Addl. A.G. Mr. Jani that the Amendment Act of 2015 has changed entire scenario. The Court finds that in view of the Amendment Act, 2015, judgment rendered in the case of Rameshbhai Ganeshbhai Chaudhari (supra) could not be of any help to the petitioners. Therefore, even if the classification done by the Registrar is not to be resorted to determine whether a particular society is primary agricultural credit society or not, the intention of the societies could be well gathered from their bye laws whether their main object is to do principal business of providing financial accommodation for agricultural purposes or for the purposes connected with the agriculture activities.
26. In Indian Handicrafts Emporium and others versus Page 20 of 32 HC-NIC Page 20 of 32 Created On Fri Mar 18 01:45:49 IST 2016 C/SCA/2000/2016 JUDGMENT Union of India and others, reported in 2003 (7) SCC 589, Hon'ble the Supreme Court has observed in paragraph 98 to 104 as under:
"98. It is now well-settled that for the purpose of interpretation of statute the entire statute is to be read in entirety. The purport and object of the Act must be given its full effect.
99. Furthermore, in a case of this nature, principles of purposive construction must come into play.
100.In Chief Justice of A.P. Vs. L.V.A. Dikshitulu this Court observed: (scc P.53,PARA 66) "The primary principle of interpretation is that a Constitutional or statutory provision should be construed "according to the intent of they that made it" (Coke). Normally, such intent is gathered from the language of the provision. If the language or the phraseology employed by the legislation is precise and plain and thus by itself proclaims the legislative intent in unequivocal terms, the same must be given effect to, regardless of the consequences that may follow. But if the words used in the provision are imprecise, protean or evocative or can reasonably bear meanings more than one, the rule of strict grammatical construction ceases to be a sure guide to reach at the real legislative intent. In such a case, in order to ascertain the true meaning of the terms and phrases employed, it is legitimate for the Court to go beyond the arid literal confines of the provision and to call in aid other well-recognised rules of construction, such as its legislative history, the basic scheme and framework of the statute as a whole, each portion throwing light, on the rest, the purpose of the legislation, the object sought to be achieved, and the consequences that may flow from the adoption of one in preference to the other possible interpretation."
101.In Kehar Singh Vs. State (Delhi Admn.) this Court held: (scc PP. 717-18, PARA 231) "During the last several years, the 'golden rule' has been given a go-by. We now look for the "intention" of the legislature or the 'purpose' of the statute. First, we examine the words of the Page 21 of 32 HC-NIC Page 21 of 32 Created On Fri Mar 18 01:45:49 IST 2016 C/SCA/2000/2016 JUDGMENT statute. If the words are precise and cover the situation on hand, we do not go further. We expound those words in the natural and ordinary sense of the words. But, if the words are ambiguous, uncertain or any doubt arises as to the terms employed, we deem it as our paramount duty to put upon the language of the legislature rational meaning. We then examine every word, every section and every provision. We examine the Act as a whole. We examine the necessity which gave rise to the Act. We look at the mischiefs which the legislature intended to redress. We look at the whole situation and not just one-to-one relation. We will not consider any provision out of the framework of the statute. We will not view the provisions as abstract principles separated from the motive force behind. We will consider the provisions in the circumstances to which they owe their origin. We will consider the provisions to ensure coherence and consistency within the law as a whole and to avoid undesirable consequences."
102. In District Mining Officer Vs. Tata Iron & Steel Co.this Court stated:(scc PP.382-83, PARA 18) "A statute is an edict of the legislature and in construing a statute, it is necessary, to seek the intention of its maker. A statute has to be construed according to the intent of them that make it and the duty of the court is to act upon the true intention of the legislature. If a statutory provision is open to more than one interpretation, the court has to choose that interpretation which represents the true intention of the legislature. This task very often raises difficulties because of various reasons, inasmuch as the words used may not be scientific symbols having any precise or definite meaning and the language may be an imperfect medium to convey one's thought or that the assembly of legislatures consisting of persons of various shades of opinion purport to convey a meaning which may be obscure. It is impossible even for the most imaginative legislature to forestall exhaustively situations and circumstances that may emerge after enacting a statute where its application may be called for. Nonetheless, the function of the courts is only to expound and not to legislate. Legislation in a modern State is actuated with some policy to curb some public evil or to effectuate some public benefit. The legislation is primarily directed to the problems Page 22 of 32 HC-NIC Page 22 of 32 Created On Fri Mar 18 01:45:49 IST 2016 C/SCA/2000/2016 JUDGMENT before the legislature based on information derived from past and present experience. It may also be designed by use of general words to cover similar problems arising in future. But, from the very nature of things, it is impossible to anticipate fully in the varied situations arising in future in which the application of the legislation in hand may be called for and words chosen to communicate such indefinite referents are bound to be in many cases, lacking in clarity and precision and thus giving rise to controversial questions of construction. The process of construction combines both literal and purposive approaches. In other words, the legislative intention i.e. the true or legal meaning of an enactment is derived by considering the meaning of the words used in the enactment in the light of any discernible purpose or object which comprehends the mischief and its remedy to which the enactment is directed."
103.In State of A.P. Vs. Mc. Dowell Company this Court held: (scc P. 738, PARA 43) "An enactment cannot be struck down on the ground that Court thinks it unjustified. The Parliament and the Legislatures, composed as they are of the representatives of the people, are supposed to know and be aware of the need of the people and what is good and bad for them. The Court cannot sit in judgment over their wisdom. In this connection, it should be remembered that even in the case of administrative action, the scope of judicial review is limited to three grounds viz.,
(i)unreasonableness, which can more appropriately be called irrationality, (ii) illegality and (iii) procedural impropriety (See Council of Civil Services Union Vs. Minister for the Civil Services (1985 AC 374), which decision has been accepted by this Court as well). The applicability of doctrine of proportionality even in administrative law sphere is yet a debatable issue. (See the opinions of Lords Lowry and Ackner in R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex-parte Brind, (1991 AC 696 at 766-67 and 762). It would be rather odd if an enactment were to be struck down by applying the said principle when its applicability even in administrative law sphere is not fully and finally settled."
104.In High Court of Gujarat and Another Vs. Gujarat Kishan Mazdoor Page 23 of 32 HC-NIC Page 23 of 32 Created On Fri Mar 18 01:45:49 IST 2016 C/SCA/2000/2016 JUDGMENT Panchayat and Others this Court noticed: (SCC pp. 734-37) "37.In Reserve Bank of India vs. Peerless Co. reported in 1987(1) SCC 424, this Court said:-
"Interpretation must depend on the text and the context. They are the basis of interpretation. One may well say if the text is the texture, context is what gives the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. That interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted. With this knowledge, the statute must be read, first a whole and then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word. If a statute is looked at, in the context of its enactment, with the glasses of the statute maker, provided by such context, its scheme, the sections clauses, phrases and words may take colour and appear different than when the statute is looked at without the glasses provided by the context. With these glasses we must look at the Act as a whole and discover what each section, each clause, each phrase and each word is meant and designed to any as to fit into the scheme of the entire Act. No part of a statute and no word of a statute can be construed in isolation, Statutes have to be construed so that every word has a place and everything is in its place..."
38. In "The Interpretation and Application of Statutes" by Reed Dickersen, the author at page 135 has discussed the subject while dealing with the importance of context of the statute in the following terms:-
"...The essence of the language is to reflect, express, and perhaps even effect the conceptual matrix of established ideas and values that identifies the culture to which it belongs. For this reason, language has been called 'conceptual map of human experience'."
39. The purport and object of the Statute is to see that a Tribunal becomes functional and as such the endeavors of the Court would be to see that to achieve the same, an interpretation of Section 10 of the Act be made in such a manner so that appointment of a President would be possible even at the initial constitution thereof.
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40 Such a construction is permissible by taking recourse to the doctrine of strained construction, as has been succinctly dealt with by Francis Bennion in his Statutory Interpretation. At Section 304, of the treatise; purposive construction has been described in the following manner:-
"A purposive construction of an enactment is one which gives effect to the legislative purpose by -
(a) following the literal meaning of the enactment where that meaning is in accordance with the legislative purpose (in this Code called a purposive-and-literal construction), or
(b) applying a strained meaning where the literal meaning is not in accordance with the legislative purpose (in the Code called a purposive-and-
strained construction).
41. In DPP vs. Schildkamp , it was held that severance may be effected even where the 'blue pencil' technique is impracticable.
42. In Jones vs. Wrotham Park Settled Estates, AC 74 at page 105, the law is stated in the following terms:-
"..I am not reluctant to adopt a purposive construction where to apply the literal meaning of the legislative language used would lead to results which would clearly defeat the purposes of the Act. But in doing so the task on which a court of justice is engaged remains one of construction, even where this involves reading into the Act words which are not expressly included in it. Kammins Ballrooms Co. Ltd. vs. Zenith Investments (Torquay) Ltd. provides an instance of this; but in that case the three conditions that must be fulfilled in order to justify this course were satisfied. First, it was possible to determine from a consideration of the provisions of the Act read as a whole precisely what the mischief was that it was the purpose of the Act to remedy; secondly, it was apparent that the draftsman and Parliament had by inadvertence overlooked, and so omitted to deal with an eventuality that required to be dealt with if the purpose of the Act was to be achieved; and thirdly, it was possible to state with certainty what were the additional words that would have been inserted by the draftsman and approved by Parliament had their attention been drawn to the omission before the Bill passed into law. Unless this third condition is fulfilled any attempt by a Page 25 of 32 HC-NIC Page 25 of 32 Created On Fri Mar 18 01:45:49 IST 2016 C/SCA/2000/2016 JUDGMENT court of justice to repair the omission in the Act cannot be justified as an exercise of its jurisdiction to determine what is the meaning of a written law which Parliament has passed."
43. In Principles of Statutory Interpretation of Justice G.P. Singh, 5th Edition, 1992, it is stated:
"The Supreme Court in Bangalore Water Supply vs. A. Rajappa (AIR 1978 SC 548) approved the rule of construction stated by DENNING, L.J. while dealing with the definition of 'Industry in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The definition is so general and ambiguous that BEG, C.J. said that the situation called for "some judicial heroics to cope with the difficulties raised". K. IYER, J., who delivered the leading majority judgment in that case referred with approbation the passage extracted above from the judgment of DENNING,L.J. in Seaford Court Estates Ltd. vs. Asher. But in the same continuation he also cited a passage from the speech of LORD SIMONDS in the case of Magor & St. Mellons R.D.C. vs. Newport Corporation, 1951(2) All ER 839 as if it also found a part of the judgment of DENNING, L.J. This passage reads: "The duty of the court is to interpret the words that the legislature has used. Those words may be ambiguous, but, even if they are, the power and duty of the Court to travel outside them on a voyage of discovery are strictly limited." As earlier noticed LORD SIMONDS and other Law Lords in Magor and St. Mellon's case were highly critical of the views of DENNING, L.J. However, as submitted above, the criticism is more because of the unconventional manner in which the rule of construction was stated by him. In this connection it is pertinent to remember that although a court cannot supply a real casus omissus it is equally clear that it should not so interpret a statute as to create a casus omissus when there is really none."
44. In Hameedia Hardware Stores vs. B. Mohan Lal Sowcar m SCC at o,524, para 10, the rule of addition of word had been held to be permissible in the following words:-
"We are of the view that having regard to the pattern in which clause (a) of sub-section (3) of Section 10 of the Act is enacted and also the context, the words 'if the landlord required it for his own use or for the use of any member of his Page 26 of 32 HC-NIC Page 26 of 32 Created On Fri Mar 18 01:45:49 IST 2016 C/SCA/2000/2016 JUDGMENT family' which are found in sub-clause (ii) of Section 10(3)(a) of the Act have to be read also into sub-clause (iii) of Section 10(3)(a) of the Act. Sub-clauses (ii)and (iii) both deal with the non-residential buildings. They could have been enacted as one sub-clauses by adding a conjunction 'and' between the said two sub-clauses, in which event the clause would have read thus : 'in case it is a non-residential building which is used for the purpose of keeping a vehicle or adapted for such use if the landlord required it for his own use or for the use of any member of his family and if he or any member of his family is not occupying any such building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own; and in case it is any other nonresidential building, if the landlord or member of his family is carrying on, a non- residential building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own'. If the two sub-clauses are not so read, it would lead to an absurd result."
45. In Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd., Chandigarh vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Chandigarh, this Court held:(SCC pp 720-21, para 79) "79.The court has to interpret a statute and apply it to the facts. Hans Kelsen in his Pure Theory of Law. (p. 355) makes a distinction between interpretation by the science of law or jurisprudence on the one hand and interpretation by a law-applying organ (especially the court) on the other. According to him "jurisprudential interpretation is purely cognitive ascertainment of the meaning of legal norms. In contradistinction to the interpretation by legal organs, jurisprudential interpretation does not create law". "The purely cognitive interpretation by jurisprudence is therefore unable to fill alleged gaps in the law. The filling of a socalled gap in the law is a law- creating function that can only be performed by a law applying organ; and the function of creating law is not performed by jurisprudence interpreting law. Jurisprudential interpretation can do no more than exhibit all possible meanings of a legal norm. Jurisprudence as cognition of law cannot decide between the possibilities exhibited by it, but must leave the decision to the legal organ who, according to the legal order, is authorized to apply the law". According to the author if law is Page 27 of 32 HC-NIC Page 27 of 32 Created On Fri Mar 18 01:45:49 IST 2016 C/SCA/2000/2016 JUDGMENT to be applied by a legal organ, he must determine the meaning of the norms to be applied : he must 'interpret' those norms (p. 348). Interpretation therefore is an intellectual activity which accompanies the process of law application in its advance from a higher level to a lower level. According to him, the law to be applied is a frame.
"There are cases of intended or unintended indefiniteness at the lower level and several possibilities are open to the application of law."
The traditional theory believes that the statute, applied to a concrete case, can always supply only one correct decision and that the positive-legal 'correctness' of this decision is based on the statute itself. This theory describes the interpretive procedure as if it consisted merely in an intellectual act of clarifying or understanding; as if the law applying organ had to use only his reason but not his will, and as if by a purely intellectual activity, among the various existing possibilities only one correct choice could be made in accordance with positive law. According to the author : "The legal act applying a legal norm may be performed in such a way that it conforms (a) with the one or the other of the different meanings of the legal norm, (b) with the will of the norm- creating authority that is to be determined somehow, (c) with the expression which the norm- creating authority has chosen, (d) with the one or the other of the contradictory norms; or (e) the concrete case to which the two contradictory norms refer may be decided under the assumption that the two contradictory norms annul each other. In all these cases, the law to be applied constitutes only a frame within which several applications are possible, whereby every act is legal that stays within the frame."
46. In S. Gopal Reddy vs. State of Andhra Pradesh this Court observed : (SCC p.607,para 12) "12.It is a well-known rule of interpretation of statutes that the text and the context of the entire Act must be looked into while interpreting any of the expressions used in a statute. The courts must look to the object which the statute seeks to achieve while interpreting any of the provisions of the Act. A purposive approach for interpreting the Act is necessary."
(See also M/s. DLF Qutab Enclave Complex Edu.
Page 28 of 32 HC-NIC Page 28 of 32 Created On Fri Mar 18 01:45:49 IST 2016 C/SCA/2000/2016 JUDGMENT Charit. Trust Vs. State of Haryana)"
27. Learned advocate Mr. B.S.Patel therefore submitted that definition from other Acts cannot be borrowed to define primary agricultural credit cooperative society under the Act. He submitted that if any help is required, it could be the meaning derived from the definition of primary rural credit society under section 2(l) of the NABARD Act which provides as one of the objects for agricultural and rural development for providing credit or promotion of agriculture. As per the definition of primary rural credit society under sec. 2(l), primary rural credit society means cooperative society by whatever name called which has its object of financial accommodation to its members for agricultural operations or for the marketing of the crops or rural development and bye laws of which do not permit admission of any other cooperative societies. In fact, when in the definition of primary rural credit society, the object or business of financial accommodation to its members for agricultural purposes or for marketing crops is given importance, it is by its main object or principal business to provide financial accommodation for agricultural purposes or for the purposes connected with the agricultural activities, a society could be known as Primary Agriculture Credit Co-operative Society.
28. When sec. 11(1)(i) now requires only primary agricultural credit cooperative societies dispensing credit in the market area to elect 8 agriculturists for the purpose of constitution of market area, it is in furtherance of the object of the Act and, therefore, only those societies with prime object of providing agricultural credit could be said to be eligible to be Page 29 of 32 HC-NIC Page 29 of 32 Created On Fri Mar 18 01:45:49 IST 2016 C/SCA/2000/2016 JUDGMENT included in the voters list. It is therefore not possible to accept the argument of the learned advocates for the petitioners societies that the Amendment Act 2015 has widened horizon to include all agricultural cooperative societies dispensing agricultural credits. If all societies with one of the objects of dispensing agricultural credit are intended to be included without any exception, there was no need to incorporate the words" primary, agricultural, credit" before the words "cooperative societies" in section 11(1)(i) of the Act. The words "primary agriculture credit" therefore do not meant to be read as a simple adjective noun without any meaning. The legislature do not amend the laws just to beautify the language. Use of the words "agriculture credit" once again while amending section 11(1)(i) of the Act by Amendment Act of 2015, and prefixing word "primary" before the words, "agricultural credit" makes the intention of the legislature more clear to give unequivocal indication that none except the societies which have prime object to do principal business of advancing finance for agricultural purpose and for the purposes connected with the agriculture activities could be included in the voters' list for first constituency.
29. In view of the above, the Court finds that that considering the phrase used by the legislature while amending section 11(1)(i) of the Act, only those societies which have their main object to do business of advancing agricultural credit activities would be considered to be the primary agricultural credit cooperative societies for the purpose of section 11(1)(i) of the Act.
30. The contention that section 59 of the Act is self contained Page 30 of 32 HC-NIC Page 30 of 32 Created On Fri Mar 18 01:45:49 IST 2016 C/SCA/2000/2016 JUDGMENT Code and, therefore, voters' list is to be prepared only by looking at the Rules cannot be accepted as section 59 enables the State to frame the rules to serve the purpose of the Act. It cannot be read in isolation. For the constitution of the market committee, election for above said three categories of the members is must and election could be held by formation of the electorate for which preparation of voters' list is required. Section 11 (1)(i) lays down who can form electorate and in consonance with the same, voters' list is to be prepared as per the procedure prescribed in the Rules. Electorate comprised in the voters list elect members from amongst persons qualified to be elected as provided in section 11(1)(i) of the Act. Therefore, it is not correct to say that sec. 11(1)(i) of the Act has nothing to do with section 59 and the Rule for preparation of the voters' list. If the preparation of the voters' list is to be in consonance with section 11(1)(i), the voters' list shall be required to be prepared as per the existing provisions of section 11 which would include the amended provisions of section 11(1)(i) of the Act. Therefore, the contention that the voters' list is to be prepared as per the existing Rules wherein no amendment is brought in cannot be accepted, as it would run contrary to the main provisions. Sec. 59 provides for framing of the Rules for the purpose of the Act and not in derogation of the Act. Rule 5 also starts with the phrase "for the purpose of sec. 11 of the Act". The authorized officer is functioning as election officer under the Rules framed under the Act. Framing of the Rules is to achieve the objects of the Act, therefore, even if after Amendment of 2015, rules for the purpose of preparation of voters list have remained unamended, the authorized officer will be required to prepare voters' list of the persons eligible to vote under the existing Page 31 of 32 HC-NIC Page 31 of 32 Created On Fri Mar 18 01:45:49 IST 2016 C/SCA/2000/2016 JUDGMENT provisions of section 11(1) of the Act.
In light of the above and considering the provisions of section 59 read with section 11(1) of the Act, it is not possible to accept the contention that the authorized officer is to prepare voters' list on the basis of the unamended Rules so as to include all cooperative societies dispensing agricultural credit irrespective of or ignoring the amended provisions of section 11(1)(i) of the Act.
31. Having taken the above view, the Court finds that it is not the case of any of the petitioners - societies that it has the main object of advancing financial assistance for agricultural purposes or for the purposes connected with the agricultural activities but it is stated to be one of the objects with other objects.
32. In some matters, though the authorized officer has on fact stated that the petitioners societies cannot be said to be dispensing agricultural credit which is sought to be assailed by the petitioners. However, such aspects need not be gone into at this stage since the Court finds that none of the petitioners - societies has come with the case that its main object or the principal business is to dispense financial accommodation for agricultural purpose or for the purposes connected with agricultural activities.
33. For the reasons stated above, the petitions are rejected. Notice in each of the petitions shall stand discharged.
(C.L.SONI, J.) anvyas Page 32 of 32 HC-NIC Page 32 of 32 Created On Fri Mar 18 01:45:49 IST 2016