Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur
Chiman Lal vs State Of Rajasthan And Ors. on 18 February, 2000
Equivalent citations: AIR2000RAJ206, 2000(2)WLC1
Bench: B.S. Chauhan, Bhagwati Prasad
JUDGMENT B.J. Shethna, J.
1. This petition has been placed before us on a reference made by our learned brother Hon'ble V.G. Palshikar, J. on 14-5-1999. It is a brief order, which we would like to reproduce, which is as under :--
"Dated 14-5-1999.
S. B. WRIT PETITION NO. 1688/83 HON'BLE SHRI V. G. PALSHIKAR. J.
Mr. D.S. Shishodia for the Appellant, Mr. Vijay Vishnoi, for the Respondent.
In this petition, the order of the Collector and other authorities is challenged on several grounds. The important question, however, which arise in this case is regarding jurisdiction of the Collector to invoke revisional powers under Section 27A of the Rajasthan Panchayat Act. 1953 and the Rules made thereunder can be exercised at any time as the Section provides no limitation for such exercise. There are divergent view on the point and at least two contradictory judgments of the Single Bench including myself. I am of the view that though there is no period of limitation prescribed the reasonable period as contemplated by the residuary Article of the Indian Limitation Act would apply, conversely no limitation can apply is also a view taken by another Single Bench. Even Division Bench relying on the point may need harmonise construction for interpretation. In such circumstances I feel that authoritative pronouncement by this Hon'ble Court on this question of law is necessary as the question is repeated with regular intervals.
Therefore, place the papers before your Lordship the Chief Justice for appropriate orders in this regard.
[V. G. PALSHIKAR, J."]
2. Before answering the reference few important facts arc required to be stated, which are as under :--
Original petitioner -- Chaman Lal son of Shri Sagar Ji has challenged in this petition the impugned order dated 13-4-1983 (Annexure 5) passed by Collector, Jalore. It is the case of the original petitioner Chiman Lal that he was in possession of the land admeasuring about 3384 sq. yards adjacent to Panchayat Samiti's Seeds Godown (Beej Godam) prior to 1972, which was used by him for his cattle and storing "Chara" for the cattle and to keep his agricultural and business vehicles. In view of his old possession over the land he applied for grant of Patta for the said land and the Gram Panchayat, Raniwada Kalan respondent No. 4 issued patta in his favour and conferred title over the land by charging a nominal amount of Rs. 69.95 after making enquiry and completing all the formalities. Annexure 1 is a copy of Patta dated 30/31-7-1972.
3. On 16-2-1982 the respondent No. 3, Vikas Adhikari, Panchayat Samiti, Raniwada Kalan issued notice to the petitioner calling upon him to remove the encroachment made by him on the land and handover the possession of the same to the Panchayat Samiti. According to the petitioner the same was served upon him only on 10-5-1982. However, as per the averments made in para No. 7 of the petition itself the Panchayat Samiti took over the possession of the land from the petitioner on 15-5-1982, but it was only a paper possession and he was never dispossessed from the land in question. The said land was attached in a proceeding filed under Section 145, Cr.P.C. Prior to that he filed a suit for permanent injunction against the Panchayat Samiti and others praying that they may be restrained from forcibly dispossessing him from the land in question. The said suit was pending and order of status quo was also passed therein.
4. It is the further case of the petitioner Chiman Lal that with a view to over reach the order of competent civil Court the Vikas Adhikari of the Panchayat Samiti filed revision petition before the Collector, Jalore under Section 27A of the Rajasthan Panchayat Act, 1953 read with Rule 272 of the Rajasthan Panchayat General Rules, 1961 in the last week of March, 1982 against the order of grant of Patta passed by the Gram Panchayat on 30/31-7-1972. On a notice received from the Collector in the said revision petition, he filed his appearance on 31-5-1982 and also filed reply on 20-7-1982 (Annexure 4). The said revision petition was allowed by the Collector by his order dated 13-4-1983 (Annexure 5) and accordingly Patta No. 18 of Missal Nos. 272-73 granted in favour of petitioner by the Gram Panchayat was cancelled. This was challenged by the petitioner by way of this petition on several grounds including the ground of delay of ten years in entertaining the revision petition by the Collector, Jalore. When this petition came up for hearing before Hon'ble V.G. Palshikar. J., his Lordship was of the view that though there was no period of limitation prescribed, the reasonable period as contemplated by the residuary Article of the Indian Limitation Act would apply, conversely no limitation can apply is also a view taken by another single Bench. Even Division Bench relying on the point may need harmonise construction for interpretation. Therefore, his Lordship observed that authoritative pronouncement by this Court on this question is necessary as the question is repeated with regular intervals. Accordingly, his Lordship made reference on 14-5-1999 and directed the office to place this matter before the Hon'ble Chief Justice for appropriate orders in this regard, and as per the orders passed by the Hon'ble Chief Justice this matter was placed before us on 14-2-2000.
5. Learned counsel Shri O.P. Beniwal appearing for the petitioner submitted before us that he had already submitted his written argument along with authorities on which he was relying and the same may be considered and the reference be answered accordingly. Similarly, written submissions were filed by the respondent Nos. 1 to 3. In addition to that, learned counsel Shri Vijay Bishnoi appearing for the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 has also relied upon the recent Division Bench Judgment of this Court delivered by one of us (Dr. B.S. Chauhan, J.) in case of Mangilal v. State of Rajasthan reported in 1998 (1) WLC (Raj) 625 : (1998 AIHC 1818), Mr. Vijay Bishnoi has also relied upon the Division Bench Judgment of this Court in case of State of Rajasthan v. Board of Revenue reported in 1996 (3) WLC (Raj) 426 : (1997 AIHC 3619) explaining the Anandi Lal's case and the latest judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing cum Processing Service Society Ltd. reported in 1999 (3) JT SC 38 : (AIR 1999 SC 1351).
6. Similarly, Mr. Dalpat Raj Bhandari appearing for the respondent No. 3, in addition to the written submissions on behalf of respondents Nos. 1 to 3, relied upon a Judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Addl. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore v. Thakoresas, Major reported in AIR 1994 SC 2227. He also relied upon another judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Govt. of India v. The Citedal fine Pharmaceuticals, Madras reported in AIR 1989 SC 1771. He also relied upon an old judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha reported in AIR 1969 SC 1297 and another judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Mansa Ram v. S.P. Pathak, reported in AIR 1983 SC 1239.
7. We have also heard learned Advocate Shri K.N. Joshi as intervenor.
8. On behalf of the petitioner strong reliance has been placed on the following Supreme Court Judgments :--
(i) AIR 1969 SC 1297, State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha;
(ii) AIR 1973 SC 2537. Rajendra Singh v. Santa Singh;
(iii) AIR 1977 SC 282, The Kerala State Electricity Board, Trivandrum v. T.P. Kunhaliumma;
(iv) AIR 1983SC 1239, Mansa Ram v. S.P. Pathak;
(v) AIR 1989 SC 1771, Govt of India v. Citedal Fine Pharmaceutical Ltd., Madras, (which is coincidently also relied upon by Mr. Vijay Bishnoi and Mr. Bhandari, for respondent Nos. 1 to 3 );
(vi) .1997 (6) SCC 71, Mohd. Kavi v. Fatmabal Ibrahim;
9. And on the following judgments of this Court reported in;
(i) 1981 WLN (UC) 223, Mstana Ram v. State of Rajasthan;
(ii) 1996 (1) RLW396: (AIR 1996 Raj 154), Anandi Lal v. State of Rajasthan (DB);
(iii) 1996 DNJ (Raj) 1448, State of Rajasthan v. Board of Revenue.
10. However, at the time of hearing before us, learned counsel Shri Beniwal appearing for the petitioner has strongly relied upon the Division Bench Judgment of this Court in Anandi Lal's case (supra) wherein most of the Supreme Court judgments have been considered and it was submitted by learned counsel Shri Beniwal that when no period of limitation is prescribed under the provisions of Act or the Rules then the revisional powers can be exercised within a reasonable time which should not be more than one year. In this case learned Collector exercised his revisional powers after ten years of grant of Patta for canceling the same on the ground that there was a breach of statutory rules in granting patta in favour of the petitioner by the Gram Panchayat. In substance, the argument of Mr. Beniwal was that when no period of limitation is provided under the Act or the Rules then in such cases the revisional powers should be exercised within one year and not more than that, in other words, M. Beniwal wants us to fix the period of limitation for exercising the revisional powers under Rule 272 by the revisional authority in absence of provision for any period of limitation provided under the Act or the Rules.
11. However, learned counsel Shri Bishnoi for the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and Mr. Bhandari for respondent No. 3 vehemently submitted that it is not the function of the Court to prescribe the limitation where the legislature, in its wisdom had thought it fit not to prescribe any period. Relying upon the observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ajaib Singh's case (supra) it was submitted that personal view of the Judges presiding the Court cannot be stretched to authorise them to interpret the law in such a manner which would amount to legislation intentionally left over by the legislature. They also submitted that even in Anandi Lal's case (supra) the Division Bench of this Court has never laid down a law that reasonable period means one year and if the powers are exercised after one year then such exercise of powers was bad. Their submission was that reasonable period goes with the facts and circumstances of each case which is pending consideration before the Court. Even in Anandi Lal's case the Division Bench itself clarified that in case fraud is alleged and public interest is shown to be suffering on account of collusion between the public officers and the private party, then revisional power may be exercised even after a period of one year. Thus, no hard and fast rule can be laid down regarding period during which revisional powers can be exercised, when no limitation is provided.
12. Before appreciating the rival contentions of the parties , we would like to state few facts of Anandi Lal's case (supra). In that case the dispute pertains to a land which was originally in the name of Pujari, Laxmi Narain Temple, who died somewhere in 1951 and the said land was ordered to be resumed and confiscated to the State as per the order dated 20-1-1955 passed by the Commissioner, Kota. In other words, the land was "Maufi" land, inasmuch as after death of the Pujari of Laxminarain Temple, no one was there to claim the land. By way of escheat, it was ordered to be resumed by the State. On October 14, 1955, the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 came into force. Thereafter, the petitioner Anandi Lal filed suit on May 19, 1957 under the said Act for a declaration that he be declared "khatedar" of the land on the ground that on October 14, 1955, the day on which the Act came into force, he was in possession of the land in question. His suit was decreed on Oct. 12, 1957. The State Govt. of Rajasthan was party to the suit and no appeal was filed against the said order. Consequently, in the revenue record. Mutation entry No. 334 was made on 22-9-1958 and the petitioner continued to be in possession of the land and enjoyed the fruits of the same. However, on the report submitted by Tehsildar on 27-12-1983, the Addl. Collector, Baran made a reference after 25 years to the Board of Revenue under Section 232 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act and under Section 82 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 and it was prayed that decree passed by the Assistant Collector, Baran on 12-10- 1957 in favour of the petitioner Anandt Lal and mutation entry No. 334 dated 22-9- 1958 be cancelled. The Board of Revenue accepted the reference by its order dated 21-5-1986 and quashed the decree passed by the. Assistant Collector, Baran on 12-10-1957 and order for cancellation of mutation entry No. 334 made on 22-9-1958 and to restore the earlier position and the land was ordered to be entered in the name of "Mandi Maufi".
13. In the background of the aforesaid facts the Division Bench of this Court in Anandi Lal's case considered the various Supreme Court judgments :--
(i) AIR 1969 SC 1297, State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha;
(ii) AIR 1983 SC 1239, Mansa Ram v. .P. Pathak;
(iii) AIR 1989 SC 1771 Govt. of India v. The Citedal Fine Pharmaceuticals Ltd. Madras.
14. After considering the aforesaid judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court the Division Bench in Anandi Lal's case held that (at page 161) :---
"Once the cases of such tenants/ khatedars are decided and their rights have been concluded and pursuant to the same they are in possession of the land. Ordinarily the revisional power under Section 82, of the Act, 1956 and under Section 232 of the Act, 1955, cannot be exercised after a period of one year from the date of the order sought to be revised. Once a tenant/khatedar acquires tenancy/khatedari rights and continues to be in possession of the land, his rights cannot be called fn question after unreasonable delay Such tenants/ khatedars are required to be treated at par, for all purpose , with all other tenants/khatedars who acquired tenancy/khatedari rights over the land. To permit the exercise of revisional powers under Section 82 of the Act, 1956 and/or under Section 232 of the Act of the Act, 1956 after unreasonable delay, would amount to putting imprimatur of the Courts on the unreasonable and arbitrary exercise of power. Within a period of one year the tenant/khatedar of the land would have spent merely for the improvement of the land, he would have arranged his affairs of life on the basis that he is in occupation of the land, he would have entered into several transactions on this basis and made many commitments. Therefore, ordinarily revisional powers under Section 82 of the Act of 1956 and under Section 232 of the Act of 1955, cannot be exercised after a period of one year. If this requirement of reasonable length of time is not read into the aforesaid provisions the provisions would become unconstitutional."
15. With greatest respect of the Hon'ble Judges of the Division Bench, we do not agree with the view taken by them that within a period of one year the tenant/ khatedar of the land would have spent money for the improvement of land and he would have arranged his affairs of life on the basis that he is in occupation of the land, he would have entered into several transactions on this basis and made many commitments. Because, it was nothing but mere presumption on the part of the Hon'ble Judges of the Division Bench and matters can never be decided on the basis of assumption and presumption. We do not also agree with the view taken by the Hon'ble Judges of the Division Bench in Anandi Lal's case (supra) that ordinarily revisional powers under Section 82 of the Act of 1956 and Section 232 of the Act of 1955 cannot be exercised after a period of one year. If this requirement of reasonable length of time is not read into the aforesaid provisions, the provisions would become unconstitutional.
16. In our considered view by holding that ordinarily the powers cannot be exercised after a period of one year under Section 82 of the Act of 1955 and under Section 232 of the Act of 1955 the Hon'ble Judges of the Division Bench in Anandi Lal's case (supra) stretched their personal views to authorise them to interpret law in such a manner which amounts to legislation which is not the function of the Court. This view of the Hon'ble Judges of the Division Bench stands overruled by the later Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ajaib Singh's case (supra), wherein, the Supreme Court has observed that (at page 1355) :--
"It is not the function of the Court to prescribe the limitation where the legislature in its wisdom had thought it fit not to prescribe any period. The Courts admittedly interpret law and do not make laws. Personal views of the Judges presiding the Court cannot be stretched to authorise them to interpret law in such a manner which would amount to legislation intentionally left over by the Legislature."
17. We may add that having gone through all the aforesaid judgments of the Supreme Court in Patel Raghav Natha's case (supra), Mansa Ram's case (supra) and Citedal Fine Pharmaceuticals case (supra) which were considered and relied upon by the Division Bench of this Court in Anandi Lal's case, we do not find in any of those judgments that Supreme Court has laid down a law that the revisional powers cannot be exercised after a period of one year.
18. In Patel Raghav Nath's case (supra) there was a specific provision under the Bombay Land Revenue Code that where the Collector fails to inform the applicant of his decision on the application within a period of three months then the permission applied for shall be treated as deemed to have been granted. In view of such specific provision the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that under Section 65 of the Code if the Collector does not inform the applicant of his decision on the application within a period of three months, the permission applied for shall be deemed to have been granted. This section shows that a period of three months was ample for the Collector to make up his mind and beyond that the Legislature thinks that the matter is so urgent that permission shall be treated as deemed to have been granted. Reading Sections 211 and 65 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code together, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the Commissioner himself exercised the revisional powers within few months of the order of Collector. This was considered to be a reasonable time because after the grant of permission for building purpose the occupant was likely to spend money for starting building operation at least within a few months from the date of permission. In that case, the Commissioner set aside the order of Collector after a period of more than a year of passing of order, therefore, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that order was passed too late.
19. Mansa Rani's case (supra) was arising out of the C.P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order (1949), wherein, the eviction of a tenant was ordered after 22 years and considering the powers under clause 28 the Hon'ble Supreme Court said that it should be done within a reasonable period. In Mansa Rani's case (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has never laid down that powers to be exercised within one year and if such powers are not exercised within one year then same is bad.
20. In Citedal Pharmaceuticals case (supra) the company was manufacturing various Medicinal preparations and in that process they use tincture containing alcohol. On the enforcement of the Medicinal and Toilet Preparation (Excise Duties) Act. 1955 they became liable to pay duty in accordance with Section 3 of the Act read with Schedule to the Act and also became liable to obtain licence, but they neither paid duty nor obtained licence under the circumstances, the Commercial Taxes Officers issued notice to them in exercise of powers under Rule 12 of the Rules, 1956. In fact, the said recovery was objected before the Hon'ble Supreme Court on the ground of gross delay by the respondent company in an appeal filed by the Govt. of India before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. While rejecting the arguments of the company that Rule 12 is in violation of the Art. 14 of the Constitution the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that (at page 1774) :--
"While it is true that Rule 12 does not prescribe any period within which recovery of any duty as contemplated by the Rule is to be made, but that by itself does not render the rule unreasonable or violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. In the absence of any period of limitation it is settled that every authority is to exercise the power within a reasonable period. What would be reasonable period would depend upon the facts of each case. Whenever a question regarding the inordinate delay in issuance of notice of demand is raised, it would be open to the assessee to contend that it is bad on the ground of delay and it will be for the relevant officer to consider the question whether in the facts and circumstances of the case notice or demand for recovery was made within reasonable period. No hard and fast rules can be laid down in this regard as the determination of the question will depend upon the facts of each case."
Accordingly the appeal was accepted by the Supreme Court.
21. We are surprised that this judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Citedal's case (supra) was used by the Division Bench in Anandi Lal's case (supra) as if it is laying down a law that revisional powers should ordinarily be exercised within one year which is on the contrary.
22. Similarly, we may state that we have carefully gone through other judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner reported in AIR 1973 SC 2537 and 1997 (6) SCC 71, Mohd. Kavi Mohd. Amin v. Fatmabi Ibrahim and in both these judgments the Hon'ble Supreme Court has never laid down a law that what should be the period of limitation. In the aforesaid cases also the Hon'ble Supreme Court has only observed that where no time limit is prescribed for exercise of powers under statute, it does not mean that it can be exercised at any time and such type of powers has to be exercised within reasonable time. However, the Supreme Court has never held in any of its aforesaid judgments that the revisional powers cannot be exercised after a period of one year where no period of limitation is prescribed under the Rules or the Act. The Supreme Court has only held that it should be exercised within a reasonable time. At the cost of repetition, we may say that in the latest judgment of Ajaib Singh's case (supra) Hon'ble Supreme Court has warned the Judges presiding the Court not to stretch their personal views so as to authorise them to interpret law in such a manner which would amount to legislation intentionally left over by the legislature. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ajaib Singh's case (supra) the Courts only interpret law and do not make law.
23. In all the aforesaid Judgments the Hon'ble Supreme Court has only held that reasonable period depends upon the facts of each case and there cannot be any hard and fast rules for the same.
24. In view of the above discussion, we are of the opinion that it is not the function of the Court to prescribe the limitation where the legislature in its wisdom had thought it fit not to prescribe any period. As held by the Supreme Court in Ajaib Singh's case (supra) the Courts only interpret law and do not make laws. Personal views of the Judges presiding the Court cannot be stretched to authorise them to interpret law in such a manner which would amount to legislation intentionally left over by the legislature. Hence, we are of the opinion that when no period of limitation under Rule 272 of the Rules 1961 is prescribed by the legislature then we cannot prescribe any period of limitation that in what time the revisional powers can be exercised by the authority under Rule 272 of the 1961 Rules. When no period of limitation is provided then in our opinion the same has to be exercised within a reasonable time and that will depend upon facts and circumstances of each case like; (i) when there is fraud played by the parties; (ii) the orders are obtained by mis-representation of collusion with public officers by the private parties; (iii) Orders are against the public interest; (iv) the orders are passed by the authorities who have no jurisdiction; (v) the orders are passed in clear violation of rules or the provisions of the Act by the authorities, and (vi) Void orders or the orders are void ab initio being against the public policy or otherwise. The common law doctrine of public policy can be enforced wherever an action affects/offends the public interest or where harmful result of permitting the injury to the public at large is evident. In such type of cases, revisional powers can be exercised by the authority at any time either suo moto or as and when such orders are brought to their notice.
25. In view of the above, we are of the opinion that the view taken by the Division Bench of this Court in Anandi Lal's case (supra) namely that, "Ordinarily the revisional powers cannot be exercised after a period of one year. If this requirement of reasonable length of time is not read into the aforesaid provision, the provision would become unconstitutional", is not a correct law in view of the latest Supreme Court Judgment in Ajaib Singh's case (supra).
26. On this case, we may state that learned Advocate Shri K.N. Joshi has intervened in the matter and submitted that this Court should fix the time limit for exercising such revisional powers by the revisional authority because after allotment of land and Patta the person might have put up the construction over it and spent lot of money on it and one fine day if such order is challenged after lapse of several years and if revisional authority accepts such challenge then such persons will suffer irreparable loss and great hardship. Hence, this Court should keep in mind the equity also and it must be held that the Division Bench of this Court in Anandi Lal's case (supra) has rightly held that within one year the revisional authority can exercise its revisional powers. In our opinion, this submission has no substance. One who manages to get the allotment of land or Patta illegally, against the provisions of law and the Rules by dishonest means with the connivance of the authority and managed to hide it from public, such person cannot plead equity in his favour. If this argument is accepted by the Court then it amounts to giving premium to dishonest persons. In fact, it should be a lesson to others not to indulge in such type of activities and get the orders of allotment of land or Patta in dishonest and fraudulent manner. We are sure that this will have deterrent effect on others, who are indulging themselves in such type of activities .
27. Accordingly, we answer the reference that when no period of limitation is provided either under the Act or the Rules then the same has to be exercised within a reasonable time and reasonable time will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case.
28. We would have rested here, but we were also taken to the facts of the case by the learned counsel for the parties. Shri D.R. Bhandari appearing for the respondent No. 3 drew our attention to the statement of original petitioner Chiman Lal (Annexure R/ 1) to the reply affidavit filed by the respondent No. 3. From the statement of petitioner Chiman Lal at Annexure R/1, it is clear that he had never applied for Patta and he had no knowledge whatsoever that an Patta of disputed land was issued in his name. He has also denied the fact that he ever contested the matter before the Collelctor, Jalore. At the same time, he has also stated that he had already sold the land to one Ramdev Singh and he had no interest in the land in question. This shows that it is not the real Chiman Lal, who is contesting this litigation, but on his name somebody else is contesting this litigation which is also apparent from the record of the case. We have compared the signatures of Chimanlal in his statement at Annexure R/1 at page 61 where he has signed fpeuyky whereas, in this petition at every page he has signed as fpeuyky, whereas, on Vakalatnama of this petition he has signed as fpeuyky lkejth- Bare look at the aforesaid signatures, it is clear that it does not seem-not seem to be the signature of real Chimanlal and somebody else, who is interested in the land has filed this writ petition in the name of Chiman Lal by forging his signature.
29. We are justified in arriving at this conclusion because from the earlier statement made by Chiman Lal at Annexure R/1 way back in 1981 he has in no uncertain terms stated that he sold the said land to one Ramdev Singh and he had no interest in the land anymore. It may also be stated that sole original petitioner Chiman Lal died on 29-7-1986 and application dated 18-9-1986 to bring his L.Rs. was filed by the learned counsel for the petitioner. From that application it appears that petitioner Chiman Lal died leaving behind him his three major sons, one widow daughter, two minor daughters who were represented by their mother i.e. widow of Chiman Lal. Thus, application was filed under Order 22, Rule 3, C.P.C. to bring in all seven Legal representatives of deceased sole petitioner Chiman Lal on record of this petition to prosecute this petition further. The said application is supported on oath by Ramesh Kumar son of Chiman Lal. However, surprisingly there are two separate Vakalatnama filed, one signed by Ramesh Kumar--Legal representative No. 1 and one jointly signed by Dinesh Kumar, Smt. Savita Devi and Shanti Devi in her individual capacity, but we do not find any Vakalatnama signed by Shanti Devi oh behalf of her minor daughters Sangeeta and Anjana in her capacity as guardian and close relative and major son Ashok Kumar.
30. From the order sheet dated 14-10-1986, we find that on an application to bring legal representatives of deceased sole petitioner Chiman Lal on record, the learned single Judge of this Court ordered to issue notice to the respondents, but thereafter, no further order has been passed on that application. We have carefully gone through the subsequent order sheet drawn in this petition, but we do not find any order passed by any Court granting such application to bring legal representatives of sole original petitioner deceased Chiman Lal on record and even learned counsel for the petitioner was also not able to point out that his application to bring legal representatives of sole petitioner deceased Chiman Lal was ever granted by this Court. When an application to bring the L.Rs. of the original deceased is filed on behalf of seven persons and out of which three have not even signed their vakalatnama, then in such circumstances, after a period of 14 years, there is no question of granting such application to bring L.Rs. of deceased Chiman Lal. Hence, we reject tat application for bringing L.Rs. of Chiman Lal on record.
31. In that view of the matter, on the death of sole original petitioner deceased Chiman Lal, who died on 29-7-1986 this petition stands dismissed as having been abated with no orders as to costs.