Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Syed Sadaq Ali And Ors. vs The Government Of Andhra Pradesh, Rep. ... on 24 April, 1991
Equivalent citations: 1991(2)ALT403
Author: M. Jagannadha Rao
Bench: M. Jagannadha Rao
JUDGMENT Jagannadha Rao, J.
1. On an earlier occasion, after the publication of draft schemes Under Section 68-C of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 a batch of Writ Petitions W.P. Nos. 2763/90 etc. was filed on 6-3-1990, questioning the constitutional validity of the provisions of Chapter VI of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and for a direction that the then Minister of Transport should not be allowed ' to hear the objections. Stay of publication of the approved scheme Under Section 100 (3) of the new Act was granted and ultimately, while the validity of the Act was upheld, this Court by judgment dated 6-11-1990 partly allowed that batch permitting fresh objections to be filed and the objections considered. Thereafter, the objections were considered, and approved schemes were published on 26-2-1990 (with errata on 27-2-1990). It is these approved schemes that are again questioned in this present batch of writ petitions. This time, no stay was granted and the writ petitions themselves are being disposed of on merits after hearing both aides. Various points have been raised but the main point is regarding the period of limitation of one year prescribed in Section 100 (4) of the new Act.
2. The following are the facts: Two hundred and fifty draft schemes for taking over various routes in several districts of Andhra Pradesh were published Under Section 68-C of the Old Act by the APSRTC in the A.P. Gazette between 12-4-1989 to 26-4-1989 and objections were filed by the operators Under Section 68-D or. 10-5-1989 and 12-5-1989. While matters stood thus, the new Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 came into force with effect from 1-7-1989. Thereafter, on 7-2-1990, the Government gave notice that the objections will be heard by the Minister for Transport from 9-3-1990 to 14-3-90. On 2-3-1990, the petitioners filed further objections imputing personal and official bias to the then Minister and then filed W.P. No. 2763/1990 and batch on 6-3-1990 and subsequent dates. The petitioners challenged the validity of the provisions in Chapter VI of the New Act in relation to various provisions of the Constitution of India and in particular in Article 19. They sought a declaration that the provisions of Chapter VI were unconstitutional and also a direction that the then Minister should not be allowed to hear the objections. The first of the Writs in the abovesaid earlier batch of Writ Petitions (W.P. No. 2763/90) was admitted on 8-3-1990 and in the W.P. M.P. 3625/90 an interim direction was granted permitting the hearing of the objections by the Minister but staying the publication of the approved scheme. The hearing took place before the Minister from 9-3-1990 to 14-3-1990, and the Minister passed an Order on 26-6-1990 rejecting the objections but in view of the stay granted in W.P M.Ps, the approved schemes were not published Under Section 100 (3) of the new Act.
3. The said earlier batch of writ petitions was disposed of by M.N. Rao, J., on 6-11-1990 in the Judgment reported in P. Narsimloo v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, 1990 (3) ALT 502. The Constitutional validity of the Act was upheld and the allegations of bias were also rejected. The learned Judge, however, held that in view of Section 217 (2) (e) of the New Act, the provisions of Section 100 of that Act are attracted at the stage of disposal of the objections and that Under Section 100 (1) "any person" was entitled to file objections (as opposed to the limited classes of persons in Section 68-D (1) of the Old Act) and that therefore fresh objections should be invited by the Government Under Section 100(1) within two weeks and the same should be disposed of within two months thereafter. The learned Judge later extended the time by two more weeks upto 31-12-90 for filing objections.
4. On 26-11-1990, the Government issued a notification and got it published on 30-11-1990 in the newspapers directing that fresh objections should be filed by "any person" before 30-12-1990. The Government of Andhra Pradesh in the meantime filed Letters Patent Appeals, but the directions given by the learned Single Judge were affirmed in Government of Andhra Pradesh v. P. Narsimloo, 1991 (1) ALT 370 by a division Bench consisting of Sardar Ali Khan and Venkatarami Reddy, JJ. by judgment 4-12-1990. The Supreme Court dismissed the S.L.P. arising out of another judgment, wherein the main Judgment was followed in S.L.P. No. 668/1991 on 28-1-1991. Thus ended the first phase of litigation.
5. We have already stated that pursuant to the Judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 6-11-1990, the Government issued a paper publication on 30-11-1990 inviting objections by 30-12-1990. While the draft Schemes earlier published were 250 in number, objections were filed only in respect of 115 schemes pursuant to the fresh opportunity given. On 24-1-1991, a notice was issued that objections would be heard by the Transport Minister (who was different from the Minister who heard the objections earlier) on 11-2-1991, 13-2-1991, and on 14-2-1991. The petitioners were represented by Counsel at the hearing and they raised a fresh objection, namely, that the draft schemes published Under Section 68-C in April, 1989 have lapsed inasmuch as the one year period prescribed in Section 100 (4) for publishing the approved scheme had expired. All the objections were rejected by the Minister by an elaborate order dated 23-2-1991 covering 138 schemes, and he approved the schemes Under Section 100 (2) and directed publication thereof Under Section 100 (3). The approved schemes were published in the newspapers accordingly, stating that the Government had approved the schemes Under Section 100 (2) and that they were therefore being published in the newspapers Under Section 100 (3). However, when the approvals came to be published in the A.P. Gazette, there was a mistake by referring to Section 102 (2) and 102 (3) instead of to Section 100 (2) and 100 (3). This mistake in the Gazette was, no doubt, not there in respect of 43 approved schemes but was therein respect of the others published in the Gazette on 26-2-1991. Therefore, an Errata was issued in the Gazette on 27-2-1991 showing that instead of Section 102 (2) and 102 (3), one has to read Section 100 (2) and 100 (3) respectively. Then notices dated 27-2-1991 and 28-2-1991 were issued to the operators to stop their vehicles with effect from 1-3-1991 from which date the vehicles of the APSRTC were to ply.
6. The Writ petitions in the present batch were filed from 4-3-1991. Initially, notice was ordered, later the W.Ps. were admitted on 13-3-1991, the W.P.M.Ps. for suspension were rejected and then the Writ petitions were posted for decision before a Division Bench. That is how the matters have now come before us.
7. Sri G. Suryanarayana who made the main submissions has contended that the provisions of Chapter VI of the new Act are unconstitutional, that the draft schemes published Under Section 68-C of the Old Act are not in accordance with the provisions of Section 68-C, that the impugned approved-schemes published on 26-2-1990 are bad inasmuch as they have not been published within the period of one year as stipulated in Sub-clause (4) of Section 100, that the Minister has not and could not have applied his mind in regard to the approval of the various schemes during a hearing spread over a short period of three days, that no material was placed before the Minister by the A.P.S.R.T.C to substantiate its case for approval of the schemes, that the approved schemes are hit by Article 14 inasmuch as the exemption was granted only to certain other categories which according to petitioners, are similarly placed, that the A.P.S.R.T.C. has no financial resources to initiate so many schemes and is incapable of the approved schemes in view of the mistakes in the notification published in the Gazette, and that no proper notice of stoppage was issued to the petitioners by way of following Rule 309 of the A.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989. Sri E.P.K. Sikharaani, learned counsel for the petitioners in W.P. No. 3107/91 contended that the APSRTC has not produced any material before the Minister to obtain approval, that in the hearing for three days, the Minister could not have applied his mind and that the applications on behalf of the A.P.S.R.T.C. seeking permits were invalid as they were filed not by the Managing Director, who alone, was competent but by the concerned Divisional Manager. Sri K. Mangachari, learned counsel contended that the period of limitation of one year was absolute and that the order of the Minister dated 23-2-1991 does not deal with the objections raised. Sri Naushad Ali representing Sri Rajagopala Chari raises a special point in W.P. 3133/91 that the draft scheme as published in the newspaper was different from the one published in the Gazette. that the former was favourable to the petitioner but what was approved was the scheme as published in the gazette and this was bad. Sri Narasimha Reddy and also Sri G. Suryanarayana and Sri Sikhamani raised certain special points in relation to alleged absence of service of notice of hearing before the Minister.
8. On the other hand, Sri D. Reddappa Reddy for the A.P.S.R.T.C submitted that the petitioners are barred by principles of res judicata or constructive res judicata from questioning either the validity of Chapter VI of the new Act or that the draft schemes were not in accordance with Section 68-C of the Old Act. He also contended that the approved schemes were not bad and were not in violation of Section 100 (4) of the new Act, that the Minister heard the matter for three days and deliberated for nine days thereafter before passing the Orders relating to approval, that it is true that no material was placed before the Minister but that, as laid down by the Supreme Court in several cases, scheme is prima facie presumed to be flawless and it is for the objectors to show how it is not valid, that the approved schemes are not hit by An. 14 of the Constitution of India, and that the A.P.S.R.T.C. has the necessary finances etc., to implement the scheme. It is also contended that the publication of the scheme on 26-2-91 has to be read with the errata published on 27-2-91 and that the notices of stoppage issued to the operators are valid. It is also contended (hat the applications filed by the Divisional Managers for grant of permits to the A.P.S.R.T.C are valid. The order of the Minister dated 23-2-1991 is a reasoned Order and meets all the points raised. The notice of hearing was served on all persons who filed objections on the earlier occasion beyond time and who also did not file any objections on the second occasion were not served with notice of the hearing into objections before the Minister. The learned Government Pleader raiterated these contentions and submitted that the Writ petitions are liable to be dismissed.
9. On the basis of the above contentions, the following points arise for consideration :
(1) Whether the plea of the petitioners that Chapter VI of the new Motor Vehicles Act is unconstitutional is barred by res judicata by reason of the earlier judgment in W.P. No. 2763/90 and batch dated 6-3-90 and W.A. filed against the said Judgment ?
(2) 'Whether the plea of the petitioner that the draft Schemes published Under Section 68-C between 12-4-1989 to 26-4-1989 are not in conformity with the provisions of Section 68-C is barred by principles of constructive res judicata ?
(3) Whether the draft schemes published on 12-4-89 etc., which were approved on 26-6-1990 after rejection of the fresh objections filed pursuant to the Judgment in W.P. No. 2963/90 dated 6-11-1990 have lapsed on the ground that their publication in the A.P. Gazette was made on 26-2-91 (with errata on 27-2-91) was beyond one year from the date of publication of the draft scheme in view of Sub-clause (4) of Section 100 of the new Act?
(4) Whether the Minister of Transport can be said to have not applied his mind to the various objections as he heard the objections only for three days and passed Orders within nine days of the hearing ?
(5) Whether the A.P.S.R.T.C was justified in not placing any material before the Minister to justify the draft schemes and whether it is for the objectors to establish that the draft scheme does not conform to Section 68-C ?
(6) Whether the approved schemes are hit by Article 14 in respect of certain exemptions granted in favour of certain operators and the Devasthanam services as stated in the Note appended to the approved Scheme ?
(7) Whether, as contended in W.P. No. 3133/91 the difference in the draft schemes as published in the newspaper and in the Gazette,--the former being favourable to the petitioner-and the approval of the draft scheme as published in the Gazette, is bad ?
(8) Whether the A.P.S.R.T.Cs' resources and capacity to run the scheme can be gone into by the Court and whether, even otherwise, there is any material in favour of the A.P.S.R.T.C. in this behalf ?
(9) Whether the notices issued in regard to stoppage of the petitioner's vehicles is bad as being not in conformity with Rule 309 of the A.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 ?
(10) Whether the Government had no power to publish the Errata dr. 27-2-91 in the A.P. Gazette ?
(11) Whether in certain specific cases where notice of hearing of objections on the second occasion were not issued, there is any legal infirmity and whether the approved schemes would be bad for want of notice of hearing?
(12) Whether the applications for permits filed by the Divisional Manager of A.P.S.R.T.C. are not valid and only the Managing Director should have signed them?
10. Point No. 1--The petitioners before us had themselves filed the earlier batch of writ petitions in W.P. No. 2763/90 and batch. The prayer in the writ petitions was for declaring the provisions of Chapter VI of Act 69 of 1988 as unconstitutional and to direct the Minister for Transport, Government of Andhra Pradesh to refrain from hearing the objections to the Schemes published in the Gazette between 12-4-1989 etc. The main objection was based on Article 19 of the Constitution of India. The Contention was rejected by M.N. Rao J., after an elaborate discussion and the judgment is reported in P. Narsimloo v. Government of Andhra Pradesh (1 supra). Even the contention relating to bias on the part of the then Minister was rejected. However, on the ground that Under Section 100 of the new Act read with Section 217 (2) (e) thereof, objections could be filed by 'any person' as opposed to the three restricted categories of objections mentioned in old Section 68-D(1), the learned Judge issued certain directions that a fresh notice may be issued calling for objections from 'any person' and the existing operators could also file fresh objections and directed that the Minister will dispose of the objections in accordance with law thereafter. It is therefore clear that the relief of declaration that Chapter VI of the new Act was unconstitutional was refused. Only certain other directions were issued as stated above. It is, therefore, clear that the point relating to the unconstitutionality of the provisions of Chapter VI of the new Act is clearly barred by the principles of resjudicata.
11. It is however argued that there was only an adverse finding on the question of Constitutionality and that the Writ petitions were allowed and the petitioners could not have preferred any appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent.
12. In our view, this submission is not correct. The petitioners sought for a specific relief of declaration that the provisions were unconstitutional and the said relief was refused. In fact the entire relief relating to the declaration of unconstitutionality and the other relief that the Minister should not be permitted to hear the objections were both refused. As the Court, in a Writ petition, can grant even other relief which the Court deems fit, certain other directions based on Section 100 were issued. Therefore, the petitioners could and should have filed a Letters Patent Appeal against the relief refused and hence the bar of resjudicata is clearly attracted. The attempt to equate a refusal of relief sought for with a case of grant of the entire relief in spite of certain adverse findings, cannot be allowed. Point No. 1 is decided against the petitioners.
13. Point No. 2 :--When the petitioners filed the earlier writ petitions the draft schemes had already been published and the matter was at the stage of hearing of objections by the Minister. The petitioners approached the Court and raised various contentions in the batch of writ petitions. If they did not take out a plea that the draft notifications were not in conformity with Section 68-C of the Old Act, the said plea is, in our view, surely barred by the principles of constructive res judicata. Point No. 2 is also decided against the petitioners.
14. Point No. 3 :--This is the main point that has been raised in this batch. Under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, Section 68-C provided for preparing and publishing of draft schemes by the S.T.U. while Section 68-D provided for objections to be filed, heard by the Government and disposed of and also for publication of the approved scheme. No period of limitation for approving and publishing was made in that Act. However, several cases had come before the Supreme Court where the objections to the Draft schemes were kept pending from 10 to 15 years and the Supreme Court held that the old Schemes would have, in several respects, become irrelevant or 'liable to be modified due to drastic changes in traffic conditions and they, therefore, quashed these draft schemes. It is not necessary to refer to these rulings but it is sufficient to say that presumably because of these rulings, Parliament thought of prescribing a period of limitation within which a proposal should be finalised. It is also to be noted that while Under Section 68-C of the old Act, the draft scheme was to be prepared and published by the STU, the position Under Section 99 of the new Act is that the proposal is to be prepared and published by the State Government.
15. In the present batch of cases, the position also is that the draft schemes were prepared and published by the A.P.S.R.T.C. before 1-7-1989, on which date the new Act of 1988 came into force. However, Section 217(2)(e) of the new Act has clearly provided that pending schemes have to be disposed of under the provisions of Section 100 of the new Act. The provisions say :
Section 217 (2) : Notwithstanding the repeal by Sub-section (1) of the repealed enactment........
(a) .... .... (b) .... .... (c) .... .... (d) .... ....
(e) any scheme made Under Section 68-C of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 or under the corresponding law, if any, in force in any State and pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of Section 100 of this Act ;
(f) .... ...."
16. In P. Nursimloo v. Government of A.P. (I supra) and on appeal in Government of A.P. v. P. Narsimloo (2 supra) it has already been decided that in view of Section 217 (2) (e) of the new Act, the pending schemes have to be disposed of in accordance with Section 100 of the new Act. That brings us to consider Section 100 of the new Act. It contains four Sub-clauses. It reads as follows :
"Section 100 : Objection to proposal -
(1) On the publication of any proposal regarding a scheme in the official Gazette and in not less than one newspaper in the regional language circulating in the area or route which is to be covered by such proposal any person may, within thirty days from the date of its publication in the Official Gazette, file objections to it before State Government.
(2) The State Government may, after considering the objections and alter giving an opportunity to the objector or his representatives and the representatives of the State Transport undertaking to be heard in the matter. if they so desire, approve or modify 'such proposal.
(3) The scheme relating to the proposal as approved or modified under Sub-section (2) shall then be published in the Official Gazette by the State Government making such scheme and in not less than one newspaper in the regional language circulating in the area or route covered by such scheme and the same shall thereupon become final on the date of its publication in the official Gazette and shall be called the approved scheme and the area or route to which it relates shall be called the notified area IT notified route :
Provided that no such scheme which relates to any inter-State route shall be deemed to be an approved scheme unless it has the previous approval of the Central Government.
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Section, where a scheme is not published as an approved scheme under Sub-section(3) in the Official Gazette within a period of One year from the date of publication of the proposal regarding the scheme in the official Gazette under Sub-section (1) the proposal shall be deemed to have lapsed.
Explanation:-- In computing the period of one year referred to in this Sub-section , any period or periods during which the publication of the approved scheme under Sub-section (3) was held up on account of any stay or injunction by the Order of any Court shall be excluded."
17. It will be noticed that Sub-clause (1) of Section 100 provides for filing of objections by 'any person'. Sub-clause (2) provides for giving the objectors an opportunity to be heard, approve or modify such proposal. Sub-clause (3) then provides for the schemes being published in a specific manner and thereafter, it becomes final from the date of publication in the Official Gazette. Sub-clause (4) provides for one year period of limitation and says that if the approved scheme is nut published in the official Gazette within one year from the dale of publication of the proposal in the Gazette, the proposal shall be deemed to have lapsed. The Explanation provides the manner of computation of the one year in the event of any stay or injunction granted by any Court.
18. Let us first examine the various dates. The draft schemes were published in the A.P. Gazette Under Section 68-C, between 12-4-1989 and 26-4-1989. Objections were filed between 10-5-1989 and 12-5-1989. The new Act came into force on 1-7-1989. The first of the writ petitions in the earlier batch was tiled on 6-3-1990 and interim stay was granted on 8-3-1990 in respect only of the publication of the approved scheme and no stay of the hearing before the then Minister was granted. After the writs were so filed, the then Minister gave a hearing between 9-3-1990 and 14-3-1990 and he passed orders on 26-6-1990 approving the schemes. The Writ petitions were allowed on 6-11-1990 permitting fresh objections and directing fresh hearing. Notice was given of fresh hearing on 24-1-1991, hearing was given on 11-2-91, 13-2-1991 and 14-2-1991, the schemes were approved on 23-2-1991. The approved schemes were published on 26-2-1991 and Errata with regard to the sections-was published on 27-2-1991.
19. If we look into the dates of publication of the draft schemes i. e., 12-4-1989 to 20-4-1989 and the date of publication of approved schemes i.e., 26-2-1991, it is, no doubt true, that the period exceeds one year as provided in Sub-clause (4) of Section 100. The question is whether the draft schemes can be said to have lapsed.
20. In this context, three alternative arguments have been urged for the A.P.S.R.T.C and the Government. (A): It is argued relying on India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Meshra (Smt.), that whenever an amendment is made or a statute is repealed and re-enacted, introducing a new period or a shorter period of limitation, the same is not to be treated as retrospective unless the new statute is retrospective. It is stated that in view of the Division Bench Judgment of Jeevan Reddy, J. (as he then was) and Quadri, J., in A.P.S.R.T.C. v. Habibuddin Ahmed, 1990 (1) ALT 484 the limitation of one year is prospective and the one year period has to be reckoned only from 1-7-1989 in respect of pending schemes published earlier Under Section 68-C of the old Act. It is further contended relying in I.T. Officer, Mangalore v. Damodar, that whenever a Statute is repealed and re-enacted, the corresponding provisions of the new act are to be applied-"as far as they are applicable" or "so far as may be" and therefore only Sub-clauses (1) to (3) dealing with 'disposal' of the objections were intended by Section 217 (2)(e) to apply and not Sub-section (4) of Section 100. (B) : Alternatively, it is argued for the A.P.S.R.T.C. relying on Director of Inspection, I. T. v. Pooran Mall and sons, and Grind-lays-Bank v. I.T. Officer, Calcutta, that the petitioners having obtained the advantage or benefit of filing fresh objections and a re-hearing of objections by the Judgment of M.N. Rao, J. dated 6-11-1990, are estopped from raising any question of limitation, even though the remission of the matter afresh to the Government was not by consent; (C). Yet another alternative argument for the A.P.S.R.T.C. is that in any event, as per the Explanation to Sub-section (4) of Section 100, the period of 4 weeks (2 weeks plus extended 2 weeks) for filing objections and the further period of two months for disposal of objections granted by M.N. Rao, J. on 6-11-1990 are to be treated as periods implying an order in the nature of a stay or injunction. On that basis the period which can be counted against the respondents will be from 12-4-1989 to 7-3-1990. i.e., 10 months 23 days, (we have stay from 8-3-1990 to 6-11-1990 and again 4 weeks plus 2 months the final publication being on 26-2-1991) which is less than one year.
21. It is, however, argued by Sri G. Suryanarayana vehemently that the above alternative contentions for the respondents cannot be accepted and that, in any event, the stay granted on 8-3-1990 being only in regard to publication of approved notification, it would come into operation only after the date of the approval i.e., 26-6-1990, and that the stay would not count from 12-4-1989 to 7-3-90 nor for the period from 8-3-1990 to 25-12-1990 and that the period from 12-4-1989 to 25-2-1991 is to be treated as a period of 'no-stay' and is in itself more than one year.
22. We deal with these alternative contentions one alter the other.
23. (A) : Now, the proceeding before the Government Under Section 100 (corresponding to old Section 68-D) is, as stated by the Supreme Court in Gullapalli Nageswara Rao v. A.P.S.R.T.C., a quasi-Judicial Proceeding.
"..........Closely approximated to that obtaining in Courts of Justice. There are two parties to the dispute .............There is ............a proposal and an opposition and the third party, the State Government is to decide that lis and prima facie it must do so judicially."
For deciding the lis, there was no limitation of time imposed under the old Act while a period of one year is fixed under Sub-section (4) of Section 100 of the new Act. It is well-settled that, unless there is anything in an amending law or a law as re-enacted, a period of limitation freshly introduced is not to be treated as retrospective, so as to affect a pending action. If, therefore, a draft scheme had been published a few months before 1-7-1989, when the new Act came into force, surely the commencement of the period of one year could not be reckoned from any date anterior to 1-7-1989. So far as proposals initiated on or after 1-7-1989 arc concerned, there is no doubt that they have to be finalised within one year as provided in Sub-section (4) of Section 100 of the new Act. But, if the draft schemes had been published before 1-7-1989 and were pending before the Government and the one year prescription is not to be retrospective, can it be said that the said draft schemes could be finalised at any time without any time limit ? If such a contention is to be accepted then there will be an anomaly, namely, that proposals initiated on or after 1-7-1989 would lapse if they are not finalised within one year while draft schemes initiated before 1-7-1989 would not lapse even after one year from the date of publication or even one year from 1-7-1989, unless of course they are struck down by the Courts on the ground of extraordinary delay. It is this anomaly that has to be resolved.
24. One way of resolving the anomaly is, as done by Jeevan Reddy, J, (as he then was) & Quadri, J, in A.P.S.R.T.C. v. Habibuddin Ahmed(4Supra) by reckoning the period of one year from 1-7-1989 for finalising the draft schemes published before 1-7-1989 Under Section 68-C of the old Act. Jeevan Reddy, J. (as he then was) observed, after referring to Section 217 (2) (e) of the new Act as follows :
"It is true that, according to Section 217 (2) (e), any scheme made Under Section 68-C of the old Act and pending immediately before the commencement of the new Act shall have to be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of Section 100 of the new Act ; but that happens only on 1-7-1989 and not any date earlier. The old Act did not prescribe any such time limit, though, it is true, draft schemes kept pending for an unreasonably long period have been quashed by Courts. It is equally true that the time limit contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 100 is a very salutary provision since, it goes without saying, if draft schemes are kept pending for a long time, the very factual basis of such schemes gets altered and overtaken by lapse of time."
Then the learned Judge posed the question :
"But, all this has no relevance on the question from which date should the period of one year, mentioned in Section 100 (4), be computed?".
After posing the said question, it was stated :
"If we compute the said period from the actual date of draft scheme Under Section 68-C, it would amount to giving retrospective effect to Sub-section (4) of Section 100. It would also result in lapsing of several draft schemes pending immediately before the commencement of the new Act. When the old Act did not provide any time limit, and when the new Act for the first time provides such time limit, it must be reckoned only from the date of coming into force of the new Act. Taking the other view would not be reasonable."
The Division Bench, on a consideration of the provisions in Section 217 (2) (e) and Section 100 (4) therefore thought that if the period of one year is reckoned from 1-7-1989, so far as schemes initiated Under Section 68-C of the Old Act are concerned, it will satisfy the test of reasonableness and would also fit into the principles of the provisions as to limitation is not intended to be retrospective from any date anterior to 1-7-1989.
25. It is, however, argued for the petitioners that the learned Judges have introduced a new date of commencement while Section 100 (4) required commencement from the date of the publication of the proposal in the gazette Under Section 100 (1). In our view, this contention of the writ petitioners ignores the fact that the period of limitation introduced in Section 100 (4) cannot be reckoned from any date anterior to 1-7-1989. We shall therefore approach the problem slightly differently and ultimately reach the same conclusion as arrived at by the abovesaid Division Bench.
26. Under Section 100(4), the period of one year is applicable to proposals(sic) inn Under Section 100(1). The question is whether by virtue of the provis (sic) in Section 217 (2) (e), it was at all intended that the one year period sho be attracted to pending schemes issued Under Section 68-C. For that purpo (sic) is necessary to examine the language of Section 217 (2) (e) closely. 1 Sub-section says that pending schemes issued Under Section 68-C of the old Act, 'shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of Section 100 of the new Act. The procedure relating to 'disposal' is, in our view, contained mainly in Section 100 (1) to (3) namely by way of Section 100(1) rather than by restricting the objections to the three classes of persons mentioned in the said Section 68-D(1). The word 'disposal' relates to the method and manner of disposal of the quasi-judicial proceeding before the Government. So far as Sub-section (4) of Section 100 is concerned, it deals with a "Statutory lapsing" of the proposal without any order as to lapsing having to be passed by the Government. The provision in Section 100 (4) is something which works itself out by force of the language of the statute and therefore does not come within the scope of word 'dispose'. The word 'dispose' necessarily refers to the positive act of adjudication of the quasi' judicial proceeding. Therefore, Sub-section (4) of Section 100 was not, in our view, intended to apply to schemes issued Under Section 68-C and pending immediately before 1-7-1989.
27. It is then pointed out that Section 217(2) (e) refers to Section 100 in its entirety and not merely to Sub-sections (1) to (3) of Section 100. In our view, a similar contention raised with reference to Section 297 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (corresponding to Section 217 of the New Motor Vehicles Act), was rejected by the Supreme Court in I.T. Officer, Mangalore v. Damodar (5 supra). There Ramaswamy, J., observed (at P. 412) :
"It is true that the group of sections from Section 220 to Section 232 of the new Act are placed under the heading 'collection and recovery'. But in a case falling within Section 297(2) (j) of the new Act, for example in a proceeding for recovery of tax and penalty imposed under the old Act. It is not required that all the Sections of the new Act relating to recovery and collection should be literally applied but only such of the sections will apply as are appropriate in the particular case and subject, if necessary, to suitable modifications."
Following the above-said observations of the Supreme Court, we hold that though Under Section 217(2) (e), the schemes Under Section 68-C of the Old Act are to be disposed of Under Section 100 of the New Act, the Sub-sections (1) to (3) of Section 100 which alone deal with 'disposal' are attracted and that Sub-section (4) of Section 100 which deals with a 'Statutory lapsing' of a proposal is not attracted. Therefore, pending schemes issued Under Section 68-C are not governed by Section 100(4) though they may be struck down by Courts for other reasons, such as when they are kept pending for a long time during which period the traffic conditions might have changed substantially. But, this conclusion of ours still leaves the anomaly pointed out by us earlier unsolved, namely, that while fresh proposals issued on or after 1-7-1989 would lapse automatically after 1-7-1989, the old schemes issued Under Section 68-C would continue for more than one year or even for more than one year after 1-7-1989.
28. It is to resolve the abovesaid anomaly that we would import the standard of 'reasonableness.' adopted by Jeevan Reddy. J. (as he then was) and Quadri, J. in A.P.S.R.T.C. v. Habibuddin Ahmed (4 supra). The anomaly would stand removed if, as a matter of time, it is held that schemes pending Under Section 68-C as on 1-7-1989, are, subject to the benefit of the principle in Explanation to Section 100(4), not allowed to be proceeded with in one year after 1-7-1989.
29. We accordingly hold that Section 100(4) is not applicable to schemes issued Under Section 68-C and pending by 1-7-1989 but that the schemes must be finalised as per Section 100 Sub-sections (1) to (3), within one year from 1-7-1989, subject however to the benefit of the principle of computation as envisaged by the explanation to Section 100(4). So construed, there would be no anomaly between draft schemes issued prior to 1-7-1989 and those issued after that date.
30. Therefore, instead of introducing any new date of commencement of the period of limitation as was done in A.P.S.R.TC v. Habiubuddin Ahmed (4 supra), we arrive at the same result by a construction of the word 'disposal' in Section 217 (2) (e) of the new Act and at the same time applying a test of reasonableness rather than a period of limitation for resolving the anomaly. Therefore, draft schemes issued Under Section 68-C of the old Act before 1-7-1989 if they have not resulted in the publication of an approved scheme within one year from 1-7-1989, such schemes cannot, subject to the benefit of the Explanation to Section 100 (4), be allowed to be finalised after the period of one year from 1-7-1989 and any action taken thereafter is to be ignored as invalid.
31. It is true that in the Motor Vehicles Bill, 1987 Clause (d) of Sub-section 2 of Section 218 said that pending Schemes issued Under Section 68-C of the Old act are to be disposed of in accordance with Sub-section (4) of Section 100 of the new Act and thereafter the provisions of Chapter VI of the new Act were to apply and that when it came to Section 217(2) (e) as put in the Act, Sec 100 was mentioned. But in our view, that does not lead to the inference that Sub-section (4) of Section 100 also is a Clause relating to disposal of the scheme. This is our first approach to the problem. Alternative 'A' is disposed of accordingly.
32. (B): Even assuming for a moment that the above interpretation of ours is not correct, the contention 'B' for the A.P.S.R.T.C. referred to earlier, being an alternative contention, is liable to be considered.. In this discussion under (B), we shall assume that the period of limitation of one year is retrospective and can be reckoned from a date anterior to 1-7-1989.
33. It will be noticed that in the cases before us, the draft schemes Under Section 68-C of the old Act were published between 12-4-89 and 26-4-1989. The new Act came into force on 1-7-1989 and the period of one year, even if it could be counted from the respective dates of the publication of these draft schemes, has not elapsed by 1-7-1989 nor by 6-3-1990 when the previous batch of writ petitions was filed and stay of publication of the approved notification was granted on 8-3-1990. The one year would elapse, in all cases, only after 8-3-1990.
34. If, at that juncture, writ petitions were filed and the Government was prevented from publishing the approved notification and the writ petitions were allowed permitting the petitioners and 'any person' to file fresh objections, can the petitioners be permitted to raise any question of limitation later? The writ petitions were disposed of on 6-11-1990 partly allowing the same and the petitioners acquired the benefit of a fresh opportunity to file objections and, in fact, by the date of judgment on 6-11-1990, the one year had elapsed from the respective dates of publication of the draft schemes in April, 1989. There was also stay right from 8-3-1990.
35. In this context, two important decisions of the Supreme Court rendered under the Income Tax Act, 1961 are, extremely relevant. The first one is the case in Director of Inspection I.T. v. Pooran Mall & Sous (6 supra) and the second one is the one in Grindlays Bank v. I.T. Office, Calcutta (7 supra) already referred to. In the first case, the question was as to the effect of certain directions given by the High Court to the I.T.O. to give a fresh opportunity to the assessee and pass an order . afresh under the Act which would obviously be barred by limitation as provided in Section 132(5) of the Act. It was held that having obtained a benefit under the Order of the High Court and a fresh opportunity, the assessee could not later put forward a plea of limitation. There was a search and seizure on 15/16th October, 1971 and books of account, documents and . some jewellery were seized. Silver bars were attached Under Section 132(3). The I.T.O. made a summary inquiry as required by Section 132(5) after issuing notice and passed an order on 12-1-1972 stating that some of the assets seized are to be appropriated against tax, subject to regular assessment and re-assessment. The constitutional validity of Section 132 and the legality of the search and seizure were questioned initially and the Supreme Court had upheld the same. At that stage, another firm of which the assessee abovementioned was a partner, filed a writ petition claiming title to the jewellery, and questioning the order of the I.T.O. dated 12-1-1972. Therein, there was a consent order on 6-4-1972 to give the writ petitioner an opportunity. In that writ petition, the assessee from when the jewellery was seized, supported the case of the partnership firm which was claiming title. The I.T.O. conducted fresh inquiry and passed orders on 5-6-1972 rejecting the claim of the firm and holding that the jewellery belonged to the assessee from whom they were seized. Then the said assessee filed a writ petition contending the fresh order passed on 5-6-72 was barred by limitation of 90 days as provided in Section 132 (5). This contention was rejected by the Supreme Court. The first order dated 12-1-72 was made in time and when it was quashed and sent back with fresh directions as to disposal, the period of limitation would not apply. The reason was that a contrary view "would make the powers of Courts under Article 226 wholly ineffective .. .. If in a particular case, a Court takes the view that the Income-tax Officer while passing an Order Under Section 132 (5) did not give an adequate opportunity to the party concerned, it should be left with the only option of quashing it and putting the party at an advantage .. .. "
Section 132 also contained Explanation-I for exclusion of only periods covered by stay or injunction. Even so, the Supreme Court held as above for, otherwise the High Court would be precluded from passing necessary Orders under Article 226. The Supreme Court noticed that there was 'no equity' against limitation.
36. It is however argued that in the above case the order of the I.T.O. was set aside by consent and the matter was also remitted by consent. It is true that the Order was by consent but this was not the basis of the Judgment. In fact, the above decision was followed by Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank v. I.T. Officer, Calcutta (7 supra) and that case was not a case of consent. There the assessee questioned a notice issued by the I.T.O. Under Section 142 (1) requiring him to produce account books and documents. A learned single Judge while not accepting the assessee's construction of the notice directed the assessee to comply with the notice. The assessee preferred an appeal to a Division Bench. Meanwhile, pursuant to the direction of the learned Single Judge, the I.T.O. passed an assessment order on 31-3-1977. The Division Bench allowed the appeal on 8/12 May, 1978 and, the notice Under Section 142 (1) and the consequent assesssment Order were quashed. But the Bench directed the I.T.O. to make fresh assessment. The assessee contended that because of limitation, he had acquired a valuable right "not to be assessed". The Supreme Court held that the Order of the Bench was an order necessary for doing complete justice between the parties. Further, the first assessment order was passed within limitation and the provision as to limitation would not be applied to the second order passed pursuant to directions of the Court. The High Court has powers not only to quash an order but also to issue further orders 'which the justice of the case requires'. Pathak, J. (as he then was) observed:
"The interests of justice require that any undeserved or unfair advantage gained by a party invoking the jurisdiction of the Court, by the mere circumstances that it has initiated a proceeding in the Court, must be neutralised. The simple fact of institution of litigation by itself should not be permitted to confer an advantage on the party responsible for it."
37. In the present case before us, by 6-3-1990 when the previous batch of writ petitions was filed and by 8-3-1990. the date when stay of publication of the approved notification Under Section 100 (2) was obtained, the period of one year (or one year read with Explanation to Section 100(4))had not expired and by contending that Under Section 100 (1), 'any person' was entitled to file objections, the petitioners who had in fact filed objections, gained an advantage by obtaining a direction that any person as also the writ petitioners, should be allowed to file fresh objections and the Minister should again give a fresh hearing and dispose of the objections. Having obtained an advantage in their own favour (and, in fact, tiled fresh objections), the petitioners cannot be allowed to plead limitation. Following the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court, we hold that the petitioners cannot be permitted to raise any plea of limitation with reference to Section 100 (4).
38. (C) : The next submission of the counsel for the A.P.S R.T.C. will be yet another alternative answer to the contention of the writ petitioners. This will hold good even if our findings under alternative submissions (a) and (b) are not conect.
39. The draft schemes Under Section 68-C were published in the Gazette between 12-4-1989 and 24-4-1989. The previous batch of writ petitions was filed on 6-3-1990. Stay of publishing approved notification in gazette was granted on 8-3-1990. The writ petitions were allowed on 6-11-1990 giving two weeks (later extended to four weeks) for filing objections and two months for disposal of objections and publication of the approved scheme. By 8-3-1990, the one year period even if retrospective had not expired and on 8-3-1990 stay of publishing the approved notification was granted. It continued till 6-11-1990 giving the 4 weeks time plus 2 months time as stated above. The Government was bound to obey the directions of the High Court. Now, the stay or injunction contemplated by the Explanation to Section 100(4) could be stay or injunction granted not only pending a litigation but also at the conclusion of it. Therefore, we have to take into account not only the stay orders dated 8-3-1990 but also the periods prescribed by the ultimate orders on 6-11-1990, namely, 4 weeks plus two-months. That would mean that the entire period from 8-3-1990 till 4-12-1990 (4 weeks from 6-11-1990) and again upto 4-2-1990 (another 2 months) have to be excluded. By 8-3-1990, 12 months had not expired from 12-4-1989. Therefore the period to be counted would be
(i) 12-4-1989 to 7-3-1990: 10 months 23 days
(ii) 5-2-1991 to 26-2-1991: 22 days i.e., in all, 11 months 15 days, which is less than one year.
40. This is the position even if we count the one year period from the dates of the publication of the draft scheme anterior to 1-7-1989. If the period of one year is to be counted - in respect of these draft schemes under old Section 68-C-from 1-7-1989-the respondents would have further benefit of the period from 12-4-1989 to 30-6-1989 i.e., another 2 months 18 days in addition to 15 days remaining as per earlier calculation, i.e., in all, still another 3 months 3 days. On that basis, the gazette publication of the approved scheme could be made before 29-5-1991 (i.e., 26-2-91 plus 3 months 3 days).
41. Thus on the basis of this alternative submission 'C and going only by the Explanation to Section 100 (4) and treating Section 100 (4) as applicable and also as retrospective, the final publication is within time either by 3 months 3 days or atieast- by 15 days. This disposes of the alternative 'C',
42. It is, however, argued for the respondents by Sri G. Suryanarayana, that the stay granted on 8-3-1990 in the previous batch of writ petitions was only in respect of publication of the approved scheme in the gazette and that the question of pubication arises only after the approval by the then Minister on 26 6-1990 and hence the exclusion of the period on account of stay would be only from 26-6-1990 and not from 8-3-1990.
43. In our view, this subimssion does not fall for consideration of our conclusion under alternative (A) or (B) is correct or even if under alternative 'C', the period of one year is to be reckoned from 1-7-1989. It arises only if under alternative (C), the period commences on 12-4-1989 or other dates of publication of draft schemes.
44. This submission of the petitioners, though vehemently made, has, in our view, no merit. The stay of publication of the approved notification was granted on 8-3-1990 and under the Explanation to Section 100 (4), the period to be excluded is the period-
"during which the publication of the approved scheme under Sub-section (3) was held up on account of any stay or injunction by the order of any Court."
In our view, the words 'during which' means the actual period of stay as per the order of stay and is not restricted to the period after the actual approval by the Minister. Another contention would require reading words into the Explanation. In fact, on 6-11-1990, the Court permitted a fresh filing of objections and a fresh hearing by the Minister, thus by implication setting aside the earlier approval dated 26-6-1990 of the then Minister made on the first occasion - and therefore the period of limitation cannot be said to have started on 26-6-1990. In fact the Order dated 6-11-1990 granted 4 weeks for filing objections and 2 months for disposal and publication. Therefore there is absolutely no merit in the contention that the limitation started on 26-6-1990 and not on 8-3-1990.
45. Thus on a consideration of the three alternatives (A), (B) and (C) above referred to, we hold that the publication in the gazette cannot be said to be barred by the period of limitation prescribed in Section 100 (4). Point No. 3 is decided accordingly against the petitioners.
46. Point No. 4 : The Minister who heard the objections had, no doubt, heard them only for 3 days on 11th, 12th, 14th February, 1991 but the orders approving 138 schemes were passed after 9 day6 on 23-2-1991. A reading of the objections of the various operators shows that the main objections were almost all the same and the individual cases were few. In any event, 12 days in all was a sufficient period for considering all the objections raised in the cases. It is also "important to notice that the Minister had to complete the cases and have the approval published within the time fixed by the Court and subject to any further pleas regarding limitation that may be raised. Further, the lengthy order of the Minister running to fifteen pages summarises the objections raised and the submissions in defence made by the counsel for the Corporation and the discussion reveals sufficiently clearly that the Minister applied his mind to the scheme and to the objections thereto. Point No. 4 is held against the petitioners.
47. Point No. 5: -The submission for the petitioners is that the A.P.S.R.T.C. has submitted in the counter affidavit that it has not placed any material before the Minister and the latter could not have decided in favour of the A.P.S.R.T.C. which, being in the position of a plaintiff, has not filed any material to substantiate its case before the Minister. This plea by the A.P.S.R.T.C. in the counter appears to us, to have been taken to not only because it is a fact but also to obviate any contention by the petitioners that material placed before the Minister was not furnished to the objectors.
48. This submission is, no doubt, on its face very attractive but on a consideration of the law as laid down by the Supreme Court, it is, in our opinion, liable to be rejected. In one of the earliest cases on the subject, namely, CMP. Co-op. Societies v. State of M.P., , Wanchoo, J. (as he then was) clearly observed (at p. 1822 Col. 2):
"But unless the scheme is shown not to be efficient, adequate, economical and properly co-ordinated, it will in our opinion generally follow that it is in the public interest. We do not think therefore that the comparative merits of the corporation as against individual operators requires to be judged under Chapter IV-A in the Public interest".
This passage is accepted as 'correct' in the Judgment of a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Saraswati Devi v. State of U.P., . In Sarjoo Prasad v. State of Bihar, it has been held that the authority approving the scheme need not give any specific findings. In the Full Bench decision of this Court in H. Pattabhirami Reddy v. Secy. to Government, Transport & R & B Department, AIR 1988 AP 120 it is stated (in Para 20) that:
"It is evident, therefore, that once the Minister approved the draft schemes, he was satisfied that the schemes were properly prepared and that they could and should be implemented in public interest. It is open to the objectors to produce evidence to establish that the schemes were not inadequate, economical and well-integrated transport service".
49. From the abovesaid decisions, it is clear that the material before the Government is the scheme prepared by the statutory corporation Under Section 68-C and the preparation of the said schemes is, as stated by the Supreme Court, to be generally treated as in public interest unless the contrary is proved by the objectors, namely, that the scheme is not efficient, adequate, economical or properly co-ordinated. The analogy of the A.P.S.R.T.C. being in the position of the plaintiff, even if correct, there are always cases where the initial burden is thrown on a defendant depending upon various primary facts or provisions of the Evidence Act. Therefore, the schemes as approved, cannot be said to be bad, merely because the A.P.S.R.T.C. did not place the material in support of it before the Government. The point No. 5 is answered accordingly.
50. Point No. 6 :--The approved schemes are said to be hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of India inasmuch as certain exemptions were shown in the approved scheme by way of Foot Notes. The main objection is with regard to the general exemption granted in favour of services rendered by Devasthanams.
51. In the State of Andhra Pradesh, the Tirumala-Tirupati Devasthanam and the Srisallam Devasthanam have certain bus services but they have already been taken over by the A.P.S.R.T.C. and not covered by the exemptions. That leaves one or two other smaller devasthanams to be covered by the exemption.
52. The argument for the petitioners is that in view of Article 19 (6) of the Constitution of India, the exemption could be partly or wholly in favour of a State Transport undertaking as against all other types of operators. The Devasthanam, it is said, is like any other private operator.
53. It is to be noticed that the provision in Article 19 (6) relates to the restrictions (or exemptions) which could be created by the law made by the legislature. Under Article 19 (6), the law that is well settled, means law made by the legislature or rule-making authority. But, here we are concerned with a scheme made by the Government under the law. The scheme is to be therefore independently tested under Article 14 and Article 19 (6) has no application to the act of Government in that context. Therefore the argument based on Article 19 (6) is not correct. Further, a Devasthatam service is a class by itself because it is run by a public religious trust covered by the A.P. Charitable and Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987 and gene-rally without any profit-motive and also for the purpose of convenience of pilgrims and not the convenience of the ordinary type of passengers. The so vices and timings are to be in tune with the needs of the particular Devasthanam. There is therefore every justification for treating the devasthanam services on a separate footing and granting exemption. Our view is similar to the view of the Division Bench in M. Gangappa v. State, . Another Division Bench in W.P. No. 15088 of 88 dated 14-10-1988 consisting of K. Jayachandra Reddy, J., (as he then was) and A. Venkatarami Reddy. J. has taken the same view. In fact, the observations of the Supreme Court in Kondala Rao v. A. P. S. R. T., , CM, H.M.T. Co-op. Society v. State of Rajatthon, and Ramnath Verma v. State of Rajasthan, .
54. it is also argued in W. P. No. 3471/91 by Mr. Sikhamani that in view of the absence of any exemption in favour of the Devasthanam in the Draft scheme, grant of exemption under the approved schemes is bad. It is also argued that only a fresh proposal Under Section 102 is the remedy. We arc unable to agree. As Mated above, the approval under Section 100 (3) may be subject to modifications Section 102 comes into play only after an approved notification is published in the Gazette and not earlier.
55. For the aferesaid reasons, we hold that the exemption granted in favour of the Devasthanams is valid and does not offend Article 14. Point No. 6 is decided against the petitioners.
56. Point No. 7 :--In W.P. No. 3133/91 the point raised is that there is some difference in the draft scheme as published in the newspapers and as published in the Gazette. The approved scheme was an approval of the draft as published in the Gazette. In Scheme 79/88, the draft scheme in newspaper dated 26-2-89 exempted private operators and Ors. while in the draft scheme in the Gazette, there was no such exemption'. In the approved scheme STU Services and Devasthanam services alone were exempted. We are unable to find anything irregular. So far as the petitioner is concerned, he had notice of both the versions--the draft scheme in the newspapers and the one in the Gazette and filed his objections alright to both versions by way of abundant caution, and never entertained any doubts nor sought for any clarification before filing objections. No prejudice whatsoever in respect of filing objections or for the hearing has been caused. In any event, the Act provides that the approval may be with or without modifications. We therefore do not find any substance in the contention in Point No. 7.
57. Point No. 8 :--Regarding the resources and capacity of A. P. S. R.T.C. to run their services us per the approved schemes, it has been held by the Supreme Court in CMF Co-op. Societies v. -State of M.P. (9 supra) (P. 1821, Para 14) that there is no question of summoning any document to prove or disprove the capacity of the Corporation or its past record. Both these questions really do not arise in the context of a scheme of nationalisation envisaged in Ch. IV-A of the Act. The services as pointed out by the Supreme Court are to be run by-STD or the Central or State Government and it is clear that the 'resources of the Government' are behind them and the question of enquiry into the capacity to run, does not arise.
58. Even otherwise, the A.P.S.R.T.C. has filed Tabular Statements of actual service-minimum and maximum--in the various routes and showed that the services in the STU are comparable if not much more. We do not think it necessary to go into these various details. Point No. 8 is therefore held against the petitioners.
59. Point Nos. 9 and 10 :--The point raised is that in the notices dated 27-2-1991 and 28-2-1991 for stoppage issued to the Petitioner mentioned that the approved scheme is published on 26-2-1991. It is pointed out that in the publication in the newspapers it is stated that the scheme is approved Under Section 100(2) and published Under Section 100(3). But when it came to the publication in the Gazette in respect of 95 schemes, S 102(2) and Section 102(3) were mentioned instead of Sections 100(2) and 100(3). In respect of 43 schemes the Gazette, publication rightly refers Section 100(2) and Section 100(3). It is therefore argued that the notices of stoppage of vehicles given on 27-2-1991 and 28-2-1991 are bad. No doubt, in the errata issued in the A. P. Gazette on 27-2-1991, it was Mated that one has to read Section 100(2) and 100(3) for Section 102(2) and 102(3) but it is argued that there is no power to issue an errata.
60. Our factual verification shows that 138 approval orders of the Minister contain the correct reference to Section 100(2) and 100(3) and so do the newspaper publications. The Gazette too in the case of 43 schemes refers to the sections correctly. In regard to the others, there is therefore only a printer's mistake in the Gazette dt. 26-2-91. The same is corrected by way of errata dt. 27-2-91. The power to publish in the Gazette implied the power to correct printer's mistake. In any event, when the power to approve and to publish in the Gazette exist Under Section 100(2) and Section 100(3), the wrong reference to Section 102(2) and Section 102(3) does not lead to any illegality. There is, therefore, nothing wrong in the notices to stop even if they are treated to be under Rule 309. Point Nos. 9 and 10 are without substance and are decided against the petitioners.
61. Point No. 11 :--So far as W.Ps. 3374/91, 3181/91, 3182/91, 3415/91, it is true, no notice of hearing before the Minister on the second occasion was given. From the counters filed and the records, it is clear that the objections filed on the first occasion soon after the publication of the draft scheme were beyond time and in all these cases, no fresh objections were filed in spite of opportunity given by M. N. Rao, J. in the earlier batch. The earlier objections were barred by time and there were no fresh objections. The respondents cannot be said to have acted illegally in not giving notice of hearing on the second occasion.
62. In W. P. No. 3471/91, the difference is that the objections filed on the first occasion are in time and the petitioner did not file any fresh objections pursuant to Justice M. N. Rao's Judgment. No notice of hearing, was served on the petitioner for the hearing before the Minister on the second occasion. It is however pointed out for the respondents that Sri E. P. K. Sikhamani was the counsel for the petitioner and he was served with notice of hearing. It is pointed out that he appeared and made submissions. Further we have perused the objections filed by the petitioner on the first occasion and they are all general and stero-typed ones similar to the objections raised against the various schemes in all these cases. We therefore find that there was substantial compliance by service on counsel. The observation in the Order of the Minister that no objections were filed by the petitioner is obviously referable to the fresh objections that could have been filed after judgment of M. N. Rao, J. We do not think that the Order of approval is in any way vitiated by non-observance of principles of natural justice. Point No. 11 is answered accordingly.
63. Point No. 12 :--At the outset, we may state that once the approved Schemes are upheld, the former private operators have normally no locus standi to question that the application for permits filed by the A.P.S.R.T.C. are defective. (Kalyan Singh v. State of U P.), AIR 1962 SC 1183 In fact, they cannot object even otherwise the applications for the STU are to be filed as provided in Rule 306 of the A. P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 read with Form STUSCA and Column 2 thereof speaks of the 'department' in charge of operations. Column 8 is also relevant. Therefore the Divisional Manager is not without authority to file the applications. The eference by the petitioners to Section 12 of the Road Transport Corporation Act is therefore not relevant. Point No. 12 is decided against the petitioners.
64. For all the above reasons, all the writ petitions are dismissed but, n the cirumstances, without costs. G. P. fee Rs. 300/- in each case.
ORAL S.C.L.P.
65. An oral application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of India is requested by the learned Counsel for the petitioners in all these cases. In our opinion, no substantial question of law of general importance arises in the cases which should be decided by the Supreme Court of India. The Oral application is accordingly rejected.