Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
1.M.Thirupathi Rao And Others vs 1.The State Of Telangana, Rep. By Its ... on 7 November, 2014
Equivalent citations: AIR 2015 (NOC) 685 (HYD.), 2015 AIR CC 557 (HYD) (2015) 2 ANDHLD 373, (2015) 2 ANDHLD 373
Author: Sanjay Kumar
Bench: Sanjay Kumar
THE HONBLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE SRI KALYAN JYOTI SENGUPTA AND THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR
WRIT PETITION No.24877 of 2014
07-11-2014
1.M.Thirupathi Rao and others. Petitioners
1.The State of Telangana, rep. by its Secretary to Government, Legal
Affairs, Legislative Affairs and Justice, Law Department, Telangana Secretariat,
Hyderabad-500 02., and others....Respondents
Counsel for the petitioners: Sri S. Satyam Reddy, Senior Counsel
for Smt. K.V. Rajasree
Counsel for the Respondents: Sri K. Ramakrishna Reddy,
Advocate General for the State of Telangana
<Gist :
>Head Note:
?Cases Referred:
AIR 1987 SC 579
2 (1985) 3 SCC 198
3 AIR 1967 SC 1305
4 (2008) 5 SCC 1
THE HONBLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE SRI KALYAN JYOTI SENGUPTA
AND
THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR
WRIT PETITION Nos.24877, 27608, 27631 & 30503 of 2014
Date: 07.11.2014
COMMON ORDER:(Per the Honble The Chief Justice Sri Kalyan Jyoti Sengupta) The above batch of writ petitions have been filed by the Chairmen of respective Agricultural Market Committees, who were appointed as Chairman and members under the provisions of Section 5 of the Andhra Pradesh (Agricultural Produce and Livestock) Markets Act, 1966 (Act No.16 of 1966) (hereinafter referred to as the said Act). By these writ petitions they have challenged the Telangana Ordinance No.1 of 2014 (hereinafter referred to as the said Ordinance) in particular clause-3 thereof as to its constitutional validity. By the said Ordinance clauses
(a), (b) & (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 5 of the said Act are amended by reducing the number of members of the committee in various categories and the term of the office of the members. By clause-3 of the said Ordinance existing members, vice-chairmen and chairmen of the market committee are terminated prematurely in view of reduction of term. All the petitioners in the above writ petitions have been duly and validly appointed chairman-cum- member in various districts in the State of Telangana in 2013 except 7th petitioner in W.P. No.24877 of 2014 who was appointed on 3.2.2012. Basically, they are the members of the committee. All the Chairmen are to remain in their offices as such, subject to the provisions of Sections 5(6), 6(A) & 6(B) of the said Act and as a member subject to provision of Section 5(7) of the Act ordinarily for a period of three years under sub-section (3) of Section 5 of the said Act. In the present writ petitions the petitioners are concerned with reduction of the term of three years as mentioned above to two years; and clause-3 of the said Ordinance in particular, by which existing members, vice-chairman and chairman of the market committee are to cease to hold office consequent upon such reduction. They are also concerned with Government Order issued on 18.8.2014 purporting to implement clause-3 of the said Ordinance for removal of the petitioners and immediate appointment of such person or persons to discharge the functions of the market committee until market committee is reconstituted.
In all the writ petitions, to challenge the aforesaid Ordinance, it is alleged that the said Ordinance is arbitrary, illegal and mala fide and also colourable exercise of power by the 1st respondent. The members qua Chairmen appointed under Section 5 of the said Act by the Government is to remain in office for a period of three years with a rider of extension which might be granted by the Government under Section 6 (2) for a period of one year subject to removal on other disability under the Act as above. According to them, the Chairmen are liable to be suspended under Section 6(A) and further they will be denuded of powers vested in them under Section 6(B). As members they are not liable to be removed nor do they cease to be members otherwise than provided in Section 5. In other words, Chairmen as well as members cannot be removed otherwise than procedure mentioned in the said Act during the period of three years and extended period. It is further alleged by clause-3, the Chairman and Vice-Chairman namely the petitioners herein are removed by the aforesaid colourable piece of legislation as punitive measure. The reduction of term of three years to two years is also impermissible constitutionally, and it cannot be applied to those who were already appointed. The said Ordinance has been issued with a political motive as in recent elections there was a change in Government and different political party has come to power and therefore the Government issued impugned Ordinance terminating all the Members, Vice-Chairman and Chairman to serve political purpose. Such power is not available to the Government under Constitution even if the same were passed by the legislature, as the amendment made, can be applied prospectively. Existing Members, Chairman and Vice-Chairman cannot be removed by giving retrospective operation thereof. The Ordinance Making Power cannot be exercised in such a manner as to deprive pre-existing rights under same very statute. The arbitrariness of the 1st respondent is palpable, and by passing above Ordinance terminating the term of the petitioners prematurely hostile discrimination has been meted out as there has been no corresponding amendment like clause-3 for premature removal of future members, vice-chairmen and chairmen, as they are protected by present procedure as to their tenure under the said Act. The petitioners and each of them have been singled out and classified in discriminatory manner for their removal summarily de hors the statutory protection and as such the same is liable to be struck down.
No counter-affidavit has been filed as it was submitted by the learned Advocate General he wants to argue without the same as it is a pure question of law.
All the learned counsel for the petitioners highlighting the grounds and facts mentioned in the respective affidavits in support of the writ petitions submit that the said Ordinance has been promulgated in order to sub-serve the political interest as the petitioners and each of them were appointed members and Chairmen by the previous Government run by different political dispensations. They and each of them are entitled to remain in office for a period of three years if not four years on extension subject to provisions of the said Act as to removal and suspension etc., from their respective dates of appointment, which took place in 2013 in case of all the petitioners except one that took place in 2012. But by virtue of clause-3 of the said Ordinance followed by the impugned Government Order they are removed prematurely ignoring procedural safeguard as provided in the Act. While passing the impugned Ordinance, unreasonable classification has been made as there has been no change as to term of office of the members of market committee for special markets as provided under Section 5-A. There is no reason to classify within the same class as both the committees under Sections 5 and 5A of the said Act discharge same function to achieve purpose of the said Act. It is not understood why, what is reasonable nexus for this amendment to achieve this object. In other words, there is no intelligible differentia for this classification.
They argue that the said Ordinance cannot be allowed to be promulgated creating unreasonable classification and furthering hostile discrimination. They also argue with the support of the Supreme Court judgment in the case of Dr. D.C. Wadhwa and others v. State of Bihar that Ordinance cannot be allowed to be perverted to serve political ends as it is contrary to all democratic norms that executive should have power to make law, but in order to meet the emergent situation the power is conferred on the Government for Ordinance to be issued by the Governor. They also submit that clause-3 of the said Ordinance clearly suggests it has been promulgated in order to get rid of the petitioners as by virtue of clause-3 the petitioners and each of them stand removed. Therefore, nothing remains to be placed before the Legislature as purpose is fait accompli. As such it is essentially an act of executive bypassing the legislature as even if the said Ordinance is placed before State Legislature and eventually disapproved, mischief committed by the executive cannot be remedied by restitutionary measure, as the petitioners stand ousted. They also submit that future appointees are not subjected to the same summary removal by legislative action, whereas the petitioners and each of them whose term even going by the amended provision expires by 2015 are sought to be removed prematurely and thereby they have been unreasonably classified and it is not understandable what is the nexus with this removal to achieve the object of the said Ordinance. It will appear from recitals of the Ordinance the object is to reconstitute market committee and for this purpose two years term has been fixed instead of three years. It is not in the said Ordinance that it will have any retrospective effect, but even then going by the amended provisions the petitioners right to continue in the office for at least two years if not three years or four years have been taken away, whereas future appointee will enjoy the benefit of two years or even three years on extension, if necessary, subject to removal or cessation by the procedure established by law viz., by the said Act. Thus, the said Ordinance particularly clause-3 thereof cannot stand to scrutiny of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
The learned Advocate General for the State of Telangana submits that the Ordinance promulgated under Article 213 is a law having the same force and effect as an Act of State Legislature. Accordingly, an Ordinance should be clothed with all the attributes of an Act of Legislature carrying with it all its incidents, immunities and limitations under the Constitution. It is for the Legislature to reduce the term of the office of members, chairmen and vice- chairmen and further number of members. It will appear from Ordinance that the objects of the Ordinance is for administrative reasons, to reconstitute the market committee dissolving present ones, and as such the term of three years has been reduced to two years; similarly number of members have also been reduced in order to achieve the better purpose to sub-serve the traders and also the public at large. There cannot be any discrimination in paving way for immediate reconstitution of market committee by cutting short the term, consequently making provision of vacation of the office. Both the Houses of State Legislature are not in session and the exigencies as spelt out in Ordinance cannot be questioned. He also submits that the scope of challenge to the Ordinance under the law is very limited only on the ground of violation of the Constitution, no other ground. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance upon Supreme Court decision in case of T. Venkata Reddy v. State of A.P. . He also submits in 1995 by the Andhra Pradesh (Agricultural Produce and Livestock) Markets (Amendment) Act, 1995, similar provision of the Ordinance No.10 of 1995 like present one was accepted and ratified. Therefore, the writ petitions must fail and they are liable to be dismissed.
We have heard the learned counsel for the parties.
After considering their contentions, we think that the only question that has fallen for consideration is whether said Ordinance is constitutionally valid or not.
We, therefore, reproduce the text of the said Ordinance. TELANGANA ORDINANCE No.1 OF 2014 Promulgated by the Governor in the Sixty-fifth Year of the Republic of India.
AN ORDINANCE TO AMEND THE TELANGANA (AGICULTURAL PRODUCE AND LIVESTOCK) MARKETS ACT, 1966.
Whereas, consequent upon the adaptation of the Andhra Pradesh (Agricultural Produce and Livestock) Markets Act, 1966 in the State of Telangana it has been considered necessary to change the composition of the Market Committees and to constitute the said Market Committees afresh so as to suit to the requirements of the State;
And whereas, the Legislature of the State is not in session and the Governor of Telangana is satisfied that circumstances exist which render it necessary for him to take immediate action;
Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (1) of Article 213 of the Constitution of India, the Governor hereby promulgates the following Ordinance:-
Short title and commencement.
1. (1) This Ordinance may be called the Telangana (Agricultural Produce and Livestock) Markets (Amendment) Ordinance, 2014.
(2) It shall come into force at once.
Amendment of Section 5 (Act No.16 of 1966)
2. In the Telangana (Agricultural Produce and Livestock) Markets Act, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as the principal Act) in section 5, (1) in sub-section (1),-
(a) in the opening paragraph, for the words eighteen members, the word fourteen members shall be substituted;
(b) in clause (i),- for the words eleven members, the words eight members shall be substituted;
(c) in the second proviso, for the words five members, the words three members shall be substituted;
(d) in clause (ii) for the words three members, the words two members shall be substituted;
(2) in sub-section (3) for the words three years, the words two years shall be substituted.
3. Existing Members, Vice-Chairman and Chairman of the Market Committee to cease hold Office:-
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the principal Act, all the members, Vice-Chairman and Chairman of every Market Committee holding office at the commencement of the Telangana (Agricultural Produce and Livestock) Markets (Amendment) Ordinance No.2014 shall cease to hold office as such and thereupon it shall be competent for the Government to appoint a person or persons to exercise the powers and perform the functions of the Market Committee until the Market Committee is re-constituted in accordance with the provisions of section 5 of the principal Act as amended by this Ordinance.
(2) The person or persons so appointed shall subject to control of the Government and to such instructions and directions as may be issued, from time to time, exercise the powers, discharge the duties and perform the functions of the Market Committee and take all such actions as may be required in the interests of the Market Committee.
(3) The Government may fix the remuneration payable to the person or persons so appointed. The amount of such remuneration and other costs, if any, incurred in the management of the Committee shall be payable out of the Market Committee Fund.
The learned Advocate General has rightly argued that the challenge to the Ordinance would be on the same ground as regular legislation can be done. It is settled position of law that the legislation can be challenged on the ground of legislative competency under Constitution, and violation of the fundamental rights or any other provisions thereof. Ordinance is at par with the legislation except the requirement as mentioned as it appears from clause (2) of Article 213 of the Constitution of India which is set out hereunder:
213. Power of Governor to promulgate Ordinances during recess of Legislature.--(1)
(2) An Ordinance promulgated under this article shall have the same force and effect as an Act of the Legislature of the State assented to by the Governor, but every such Ordinance-
(a) shall be laid before the Legislative Assembly of the State, or where there is a Legislative Council in the State, before both the Houses, and shall cease to operate at the expiration of six weeks from the re-assembly of the Legislature, or if before the expiration of that period a resolution disapproving it is passed by the Legislative Assembly and agreed to by the Legislative Council, if any, upon the passing of the resolution or, as the case may be, on the resolution being agreed to by the Council; and
(b) may be withdrawn at any time by the Governor.
(3) . . . . .
It is undisputed that the State Legislature is competent to enact aforesaid subject for which ordinance has been issued. In case of T. Venkata Reddy case (2 supra) cited by the learned Advocate General, the Supreme Court in paragraph-14 of the report after considering the earlier decisions in the case of A.K. Roy v. Union of India reported in (1982) 1 SCC 271 has stated the legal position as follows:
The language of clause (2) of Article 123 and of clause (2) of Article 213 of the Constitution leaves no room for doubt. An Ordinance promulgated under either of these two articles has the same force and effect as an Act of Parliament or an Act of the State Legislature, as the case may be. When once the above conclusion is reached the next question which arises for consideration is whether it is permissible to strike down an Ordinance on the ground of non-application of mind or mala fides or that the prevailing circumstances did not warrant the issue of the Ordinance. In other words, the question is whether the validity of an Ordinance can be tested on grounds similar to those on which an executive or judicial action is tested. The legislative action under our Constitution is subject only to the limitations prescribed by the Constitution and to no other. Any law made by the Legislature, which it is not competent to pass, which is violative of the provisions in Part III of the Constitution or any other constitutional provision is ineffective. It is a settled rule of constitutional law that the question whether a statute is constitutional or not is always a question of power of the Legislature concerned, dependent upon the subject matter of the statute, the manner in which it is accomplished and the mode of enacting it. While the courts can declare a statute unconstitutional when it transgresses constitutional limits, they are precluded from inquiring into the propriety of the exercise of the legislative power. It has to be assumed that the legislative discretion is properly exercised. The motive of the Legislature in passing a statute is beyond the scrutiny of courts. Nor can the courts examine whether the Legislature had applied its mind to the provisions of a statute before passing it. The propriety, expediency and necessity of a legislative act are for the determination of the legislative authority and are not for determination by the courts. An Ordinance passed either under Article 123 or under Article 213 of the Constitution stands on the same footing. When the Constitution says that the Ordinance-making power is legislative power and an Ordinance shall have the same force as an Act, an Ordinance should be clothed with all the attributes of an Act of Legislature carrying with it all its incidents, immunities and limitations under the Constitution. It cannot be treated as an executive action or an administrative decision.
Thus it is clear that all the grounds raised by the petitioners to challenge the above Ordinance cannot be considered except as to constitutional validity namely whether the said Ordinance hits Article 14 of the Constitution of India or any other provisions thereof.
It will appear from the said Ordinance the object is to reconstitute the market committee and not the market committee of the special markets. The Legislature thinks it fit to reconstitute only the market committee and for this purpose amendment is sought to be made. It is also the absolute domain of the Legislature how many members would be in the committee and what is the duration of the committee, the Court cannot go into details as to motive behind it. The Court shall presume the motive of the legislature is bona fide and for the interest of the people. Thus, we do not find any fault overruling the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners, that by reducing the number of members of the market committee alone and also term of office of the members thereof by the said Ordinance, provision of Article 14 of the Constitution has been violated, as because the committee of special market is left untouched. We think function of this committee for a class intelligently different from that of under Section 5. As we have already observed there is no dispute with regard to legislative competency namely field in which impugned Ordinance is issued. We hold that clause-2 by which clauses (a)
(b) (c) & (d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) of Section 5 of the said Act are sought to be amended, is not discriminatory. It is for the Legislature to fix number of members or the term of office either by way of increase or decrease as and when situation will arise.
The Legislature, who is the only authority, to feel necessity of constituting the committee with different number of members and variant term of office of the members in two separate committee per se cannot be a ground to hold the same is discriminatory, consequently violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, the said clause-2 of the Ordinance is constitutionally valid.
Now, we shall examine clause-3 of the said Ordinance to find whether it is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India or any other provisions of the Constitution of India or not.
On reading of the above clause-3 of the Ordinance, it appears to us that existing members, vice-chairmen and chairmen of the market committee are sought to be removed prematurely and in their place some other person or persons to be appointed to discharge the functions of the committee till reconstituted. In the writ affidavits we find that the chairman-cum-members of the market committee were appointed on various dates in 2013 except one being 7th petitioner in W.P.No.24877 of 2014 who was appointed on 3.2.2012. Therefore, going by the provisions of sub- section (3) of Section 5 of the said Act they should remain in office for a period of three years from the date of appointment. Precisely all of them were to remain in office till 2016 except 7th petitioner in W.P. No.24877 of 2014 till 2015 with rider of extension which might be granted for one year. We do not find the aforesaid amendment is sought to be given any retrospective effect. In absence of any stipulation thereof, it can safely be held that the said Ordinance has to take prospective effect. Even going by reduced term all the petitioners except one (7th petitioner in W.P.No.24877 of 2014) are entitled to remain in office till 2015 if not 2016 in the event of extension is granted. The removal of all of the petitioners vide clause-3 by way of legislative action appears to be discriminatory as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners, as future appointees in the office of the members, vice-chairmen and chairmen are liable to be removed or denuded of their power under the existing provisions as provided under Sections 5, 6, 6(A) & 6(B) of the said Act whereas the above petitioners are sought to be removed prematurely taking away procedural safeguard established by law against vulnerability of arbitrary, whimsical action of removal as provided in Sections 5, 6, 6(A) & 6(B). The petitioners and each of them have been picked up as a class to treat in discrimination with the class of future members, vice-chairmen and chairmen without any intelligible differentia as similar provision of removal has not been made by way of amendment like the present one for future members, vice- chairmen and chairmen who are kept with procedure safeguard as above against summary dismissal. Article 14 permits reasonable classification, but does not permit any classification without intelligible differentia as settled by Supreme Court firmly. We are unable to comprehend what is the difference between the present members, vice-chairmen and chairmen of the market committee and future members of the same committee for which different provision with regard to their removal, is required. No explanation is forthcoming for this impermissible differentiation, by counter affidavit, in absence thereof what petitioners contend is correct, that is for political purpose. Supreme Court in case of Dr. D.C. Wadhwa case (1 supra) has discarded forcefully this sort of classification as rightly contended by the learned lawyers for the petitioners. By clause-3 of the Ordinance, the petitioners and each of them have not been treated in equality with future appointees as above who belong to the same class in contravention of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Article 14 of the Constitution of India reads as follows:
14. Equality before law. The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.
We hold that by making the above provision by insertion of clause-3 of the Ordinance the petitioners and each of them have been treated with naked discrimination. In other words equal protection of laws has not been given as guaranteed in Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The petitioners are entitled to be protected as regards their term of office and their functioning as Chairmen qua members against arbitrary, whimsical removal like present one by Sections 5(3) (5) (7), 6(A) & 6(B) of the said Act at par with future counterpart. This right of equality has been taken away by above clause. Hence clause-3 of the said Ordinance is also bad and the same violates clause (2) of Article 13 of Constitution of India. Clause (2) of Article 13 of the Constitution of India reads as follows:
13. Laws inconsistent with or in derogation of the fundamental rights:-
(1) .. (2) The State shall not make any law which takes away or
abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void.(3)
(4) ..
In case of Dimapati Sada Siva Reddi, Vice Chancellor, Osmania University v. Chancellor the Supreme Court while dealing with Section 13-A of Osmania University Act, 1966 whereby the term of the office of the vice-chancellor was sought to be taken away summarily in contravention of provisions of the parent Act, in paragraph-47 of the report made following observation, which is very appropriate for this case also:
47. While a Vice-Chancellor appointed under Section 12 of the Act can be removed from office only by adopting the procedure under Section 12(2), the services of the appellant, who was also a Vice Chancellor and similarly situated, is sought to be terminated by enacting Section 13-A of the Act. We do not see any policy underlying the Act justifying this differential treatment accorded to the appellant. The term of office of the Vice-Chancellors has been no doubt reduced under the First Amendment Act and fixed for 3 years for all the Vice-Chancellors. But, so far as the appellant is concerned, by virtue of Section 13-
A of the Act, he can continue to hold that office only until a new Vice-Chancellor is appointed by the Chancellor, and that appointment is to be made within 90 days. While all other Vice-Chancellors, appointed under the Act, can continue to be in office for a period of three years, the appellant is literally forced out of his office on the expiry of 90 days from the date of commencement of the Second Amendment Act. There is also no provision in the statute providing for the termination of the services of the Vice- Chancellors, who are appointed under the Act, in the manner provided under Section 13-A of the Act. By Section 13-A, the appellant is even denied the benefits which may be available under the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Act, which benefit is available to all other Vice-Chancellors.
In that case only the term of the vice-chancellor was terminated and it was found to be discriminatory between the incumbent vice chancellor and future vice-chancellor.
Taking note of this decision Supreme Court subsequently in the case of P. Venugopal v. Union of India struck down viz., proviso to sub-section (1A) of Section 11 of the All India Institute of Medical Sciences (Amendment) Act, 2007 intending to terminate term of the Director of All India Institute of Medical Sciences, holding the hostile discrimination has been meted out between two similarly placed persons.
In our view, the observations in paragraph-36 of the report in case of P.Venu Gopal case (4 supra) is very useful for this matter also. The same is set out hereunder:
36. From the aforesaid discussion, the principle of law stipulated by this Court is that curtailment of the term of five years can only be made for justifiable reasons and compliance with principles of natural justice for premature termination of the term of a Director of AIIMS squarely applied also to the case of the writ petitioner as well and will also apply to any future Director of AIIMS. Thus there was never any permissibility for any artificial and impermissible classification between the writ petitioner on the one hand and any future Director of AIIMS on the other when it relates to the premature termination of the term of office of the Director. Such an impermissible overclassification through a one-man legislation clearly falls foul of Article 14 of the Constitution being an apparent case of naked discrimination in our democratic civilised society governed by the rule of law and renders the impugned proviso as void ab initio and unconstitutional.
In the case on hand, of course, it is a not a singular candidate but a group of candidates who were equally aggrieved and equally placed and those were clubbed in one class and treated differently from other groups in the same office viz., future members and office bearers of the market committee.
In view of the above discussions, the contention of the learned Advocate General that similar provision made by way of Ordinance and accepted by the Legislature in 1995 as quoted above was accepted by all persons in our view does not deserve any merit because the same was never challenged. We think an unchallenged legislation on the same subject cannot be a material to accept another one being valid by the Court at the time of challenge. To put differently an enactment cannot be a precedent unlike judicial pronouncement of superior courts to accept constitutional validity. The decision of the Supreme Court in case of T. Venkata Reddy case (2 supra) is not helpful to accept constitutional validity of clause-3 as in that case by the Ordinance No.1 of 1984 the posts of part-time village officers in the undivided State of Andhra Pradesh was abolished and in its place provision was made for appointment of permanent Village Assistant. In that case, question of discrimination did not arise as all the posts were abolished. It was challenged on the ground amongst others being violative of Article 21 of Constitution of India.
We, therefore, accepting the contention of the learned counsel for the writ petitioners while overruling that of the learned Advocate General hold Clause-3 of the said Ordinance is not constitutionally valid. Accordingly, the same is struck down. In view of this declaration and striking down, consequential Government Order issued pursuant thereto is also void and illegal, the same is also struck down and that the petitioners and each of them shall be restored to their respective positions. We accordingly direct the Government to do so forthwith. The Writ Petitions are allowed to the extent as above. As prayed for by the learned Advocate General, we grant stay of operation of this order for a period of ten (10) days from date. There will be no order as to costs.
Consequently, pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall also stand closed.
_______________________ Kalyan Jyoti Sengupta, CJ _______________ Sanjay Kumar, J Dt. 07.11.2014