Income Tax Appellate Tribunal - Delhi
Ansal Landmark Townships (P) Ltd., New ... vs Assessee on 21 July, 2014
IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL
DELHI BENCH 'A': NEW DELHI
BEFORE J.S. REDDY, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER
AND
SHRI GEORGE GEORGE K., JUDICIAL MEMBER
ITA No. 2859/Del/2012
Assessment Year: 2008-09
DCIT, vs. Ansal Landmark
Circle 1(1), Room No. Townships (P) Ltd.,
390, C.R. Building, 11th Floor, Narain Mazil,
New Delhi. 23, Barakhamba Road,
New Delhi.
(Appellant) (Respondent)
ITA No. 2972/Del/2012
Assessment Year: 2008-09
Ansal Landmark vs. Addl. CIT,
Townships (P) Ltd., Range-1,
11th Floor, Narain Mazil, New Delhi.
23, Barakhamba Road,
New Delhi.
(Appellant) (Respondent)
&
ITA No. 877/Del/2013
Assessment Year: 2009-10
Ansal Landmark vs. DCIT,
Townships (P) Ltd., Circle 1(1), Room No.
11th Floor, Narain Mazil, 390, C.R. Building,
23, Barakhamba Road, New Delhi.
New Delhi.
(Appellant) (Respondent)
ITA Nos. 2859, 2972/D/2012 & 877/D/2013 2
Appellant by: Ms. A. Mishra, CIT(DR)
Respondent by: Sh. S.D. Kapila, Adv. & Sh. R.R. Maurya, Adv.
ORDER
PER J.S. REDDY, A.M.
ITA Nos. 2859 & 2972(Del) of 2012 are cross appeals directed against the order of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) dated 13.03.2012 for the A.Y. 2008-09. ITA No. 877(Del) of 2013 is an appeal filed by the assessee directed against the order of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)-IV, New Delhi dated 01.11.2012 for the A.Y. 2009-10. As the issue arises in all the appeals are common. For the sake of convenience they are heard together and disposed off by way of this common order.
1.1 Facts in brief extract from para 4 of CIT(Appeals) order for the A.Y. 2008-
09. 1.2 Aggrieved the assessee carried the matter in appeal. The assessee filed an application under Rule 46A before the ld. CIT(A) for admission of additional evidence on the ground that it was prevented by sufficient cause from producing certain evidences before the AO. These were admitted by the First Appellate Authority after obtaining remand report from the Assessing Officer. The admission of additional evidence by the ld. CIT(A) is accepted by the revenue. The First Appellate Authority granted part relief for the A.Y. 2008-09.
2. Aggrieved Revenue as well as the assessee are in appeal for the A.Y. 2008-09.
ITA Nos. 2859, 2972/D/2012 & 877/D/2013 32.1 The grounds of revenue are as follows:
1. "The ld. CIT(A) has erred on facts and in law in deleting addition of Rs. 1,35,97,000/- on account of profits reworked for sub-project, Meerut.
2. The ld.CIT(A) has erred on facts and in law in deleting addition of Rs. 1,11,97,000/- on account of profits re- worked for sub-project, Meerut built up.
3. The ld. CIT(A) has erred on facts and in law in deleting addition of Rs. 17,11,40,000/- on account of profits sub- project Ghaziabad plotted.
4. The ld. CIT(A) has erred on facts and in law in deleting addition of rs. 2,75,71,810/- on account of profits sub- project Karnal Ph-1, Plotted.
5. The ld. CIT(A) has erred on facts and in law in deleting addition of Rs. 2,75,49,170/- on account of profits sub- project Karnal, Group Housing."
2.2 The assessee is in appeal on the following grounds:
1. "That ld. CIT(A) has erred both on facts and in law in confirming the disallowance of Rs. 5,30,96,607/- u/s 40(a)(ia) being payment made for purchase of technical know how by the appellant company from Ansal Properties & Infrastructure Limited. His finding that the technical know how provided by Ansal Properties & Infrastructure Limited under "Agreement for transfer of know how" did not represent transfer but represented professional and technical services liable to TDS u/s 194J of the Income-tax Act.
2. That without prejudice to the foregoing ground and without in any manner detracting there from, even ITA Nos. 2859, 2972/D/2012 & 877/D/2013 4 assuming for the sake of argument that the agreement also included provision of some incidental services, the transfer of technical know how as provided in the agreement could not be ignored and the entire payment could not be disallowed u/s 40(a)(ia).
3. That without prejudice to and independent of then foregoing grounds, since the payments that had been made during the year itself and did not represent the amount payable to Ansal Properties & Infrastructure Limited on 31st March, 2008, the same could not be disallowed u/s 40(a)(ia).
4. That the impugned order is against the law and on facts of the case."
2.3 For the A.Y. 2009-10 the assessee filed an appeal on the following grounds:
1.1 "That the ld. CIT(Appeals) has erred in law in rejecting the ground taken by the Appellant that in view of the amended provisions contained in the second proviso to section 40(a)(ia) and the first proviso to sec. 201 inserted by the Finance Act, 2012, the sum of Rs.
4,76,30,766/- paid by the appellant to M/s Ansal Properties & Infrastructure Limited could not be disallowed in as much as the recipient M/s Ansal Properties & Infrastructure Limited (i) had furnished its return of income u/s 139; (ii) had also taken into account aforesaid amount in the computation of income in such return and (iii) had paid tax due on the income declared by it in then return. He has erred in law in holding that since the second proviso to sub clause (ia) was inserted ITA Nos. 2859, 2972/D/2012 & 877/D/2013 5 by the Finance Act, 2012 w.e.f. 1.4.2013, the same did not have retrospective application.
1.2 That the ld. CIT(A) failed to appreciate that the amendment similarly made in first proviso to clause (ia) of section 40(a) by the Finance Act, 2010 although mentioned as applicable w.e.f. 1.4.2010 was held to be retrospectively applicable and the same parameters, consideration and principles also applied to the amendment under consideration of the second proviso.
2. That without prejudice to and independent of the aforesaid ground, the ld. CIT(Appeals) has erred in law in not accepting the ground of appeal that, even otherwise, payment having been made by then appellant during the relevant previous year and no part thereof remaining unpaid on 31.3.2009, the same could not be disallowed u/s 40(a)(ia) and by not following the decision of the Vishakhapatnam Special Bench of the Hon'ble ITAT in Merilyn Shipping & Trnasports vs. Addl. CIT (2012) 136 ITD 23 and the decision of the Hon'ble ITAT Hyderabad Bench 'A' in Teja Constructions vs. ACIT (2010) 39 SOT 13 (HYD) (URO) duly cited before him.
3.1 That without prejudice to and independent of the foregoing grounds, the ld.CIT(Appeals) has erred both on facts and in law in confirming the disallowance of Rs. 4,76,30,766/- u/s 40(a)(ia) being payment made for purchase of technical know how by the appellant company from Ansal Properties & Infrastructure Limited. His finding that then technical know how ITA Nos. 2859, 2972/D/2012 & 877/D/2013 6 provided by Ansal Properties & Infrastructure Limited under "Agreement for transfer of know how" did not represent transfer but represented professional and technical services liable to TDS u/s 194J of the Income- tax Act was wholly erroneous and unsustainable. 3.2 That without prejudice to the foregoing ground and without in any manner detracting therefrom, even assuming for the sake of argument that the agreement also included provision of some incidental services, the transfer of technical know how as provided in the agreement could not be ignored and the entire payment could not be disallowed u/s 40(a)(ia).
4. That the impugned order is against the law and on facts of the case."
3. The ld. Departmental Representative Ms. A. Mishra, CIT(DR) relied on the order of the Assessing Officer and submitted that the method of computation of profit from projects followed by the assessee has been rightly rejected by the AO, as it is not in conformity with the Accounting Standard (AS - 7), on construction contracts (revised 2002) issued by the Council of the Institute of Chartered Accountant's of India. She submitted that only percentage completion method is approved in this Accounting Standard.
She took us through para 7 to 18 of the assessment order and relied on the same.
4. The ld. Counsel for the assessee Sh. S.D. Kapila on the other hand submitted that in all the grounds of the Revenue, effectively it only disputed the finding of the CIT(A) on the method of accounting. He submitted that the ITA Nos. 2859, 2972/D/2012 & 877/D/2013 7 assessee has been following this particular method of accounting over the years and that the Real Estate Projects undertaken by the assessee are spread over for more than one year. He submitted that the method of accounting or method of computing profits in the earlier year, as well as in the subsequent year to the impugned A.Y. 2008-09, has not been disturbed by the Revenue and on those circumstances, the First Appellate Authority was right in holding that the method of accounting cannot be disturbed in the intermediate year. Further he submits that accounting standard-7 does not apply to Real Estate Companies.
5. The ld. CIT(DR) stated that the accounting policy followed by the assessee is not disputed by the Department. He submitted that the assessee's projects have attributes of fixed price contract and so the profit can be estimated right from the beginning and that income has to be estimated when Revenue gets crystallized. Not recognizing revenue till 30% or 50% completion of the project, results into postponement of tax liability.
This Benchmark as per the ld. DR is an erroneous.
5.1 She further submitted that comparable case adopted by the CIT(A) was of the sister concern of the assessee and hence they are not reliable.
Different benchmarks are adopted and by different reputed companies which as per the ld. DR are correct comparables and profit can be recognized after completion of 20 to 25% of the project. She disputed the manner of ITA Nos. 2859, 2972/D/2012 & 877/D/2013 8 calculation of profits of sub-project (a) & (b) of Meerut, as well as of Ghaziabad plots projects.
6. The rival contentions heard on a careful consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case and a perusal of the papers on record and the orders of the authorities below, we hold as follows.
7. The ld. CIT(A) in our considered opinion was right in holding that a) AS-7 is not applicable to Real Estate b) Bench mark for recognizing revenues adopted by the assessee are reasonable, c) The rule of consistency applies in this case, d) In order to invoke sec. 145(3), the AO must necessarily express dissatisfaction about the correctness and completeness of the accounts and also note that such system of accounting is not regularly followed by the assessee, e) The correctness of the overall profit from the project is not disputed by the AO only year of taxability is disputed.
8. The Delhi 'G' Bench of the ITAT in the case Sabh Infrastructure Limited, New Delhi vs. DCIT, Circle 7(1), vide ITA No. 4572(Del) of 2009 and ITA No. 2813(Del) of 2010 order dated 24/02/2012 at para 9 onwards held as follows:
"9. We have carefully consider the submissions and perused the records. We find that Ld. Commissioner of Income Tax(Appeals) has given a finding that assessee company falls under the category of real estate developer and not a ITA Nos. 2859, 2972/D/2012 & 877/D/2013 9 construction contractor. In that view of the matter, clearly AS-9 issued by the ICAI is applicable to the assessee and AS-7 is applicable to the construction contractor. Further it is seen that assessee has been consistently following this method of accounting in the previous years since long and it has not been disturbed. Moreover, we find that method of accounting adopted by the assessee is an accepted method of accounting. In this regard, assessee has placed reliance upon the following cases laws which are also relevant
(i) C.I.T. vs. Manish Buildwell Pvt. Ltd., Delhi High Court, in ITA No. 928/2011 dated 15.11.2011. In para 8& 9 of this decision, the Hon'ble Jurisdictional High Court has expoundedas under:-
"8. It is well settled that the project completion method is one of the recognized methods of accounting. In Commissioner of Income Tax and Another vs. Hyundai Heavy Industries Co. Ltd. (2007) 291 ITR 482 (SC) the Supreme Court held as follows:-
"Lastly, there is a concept in accounts which is called the concept of contract accounts. Under that concept, two methods exist for ascertaining profit for contracts, namely "completed contract method" and "percentage of completion method". To know the results of his operations, the contractor prepares what is called a contract ITA Nos. 2859, 2972/D/2012 & 877/D/2013 10 account which is debited with various costs and which is credited with revenue associated with a particular contract. However, the rules of recognition of cost and revenue depend on the method of accounting. Two methods are prescribed in Accounting Standard No. 7. They are "completed contract method" and "percentage of completion method". This view was reiterated by the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Bilahari Investment P Ltd. (2008) 299 ITR 1 (SC) with the following observations:
"Recognition / identification of income under the 1961 Act is attainable by several methods of accounting. It may be noted that the same result could be attained by any one of the accounting methods. The completed contract method is one such method. Similarly, the percentage of completion method is another such method. Under the completed contract method, the revenue is not recognized until the contract is complete. Under the said method, costs are accumulated during the course of the contract. The profit and loss is established in the last accounting period and transferred to the profit and loss account. The said method determines results only when the contract is completed. This method leads to objective assessment of the results of the contract. On the other hand, the ITA Nos. 2859, 2972/D/2012 & 877/D/2013 11 percentage of completion method tries to attain periodic recognition of income in order to reflect current performance. The amount of revenue recognized under the method is determined by reference to the stage of completion of the contract. The stage of completion can be looked at under this method by taking into consideration the proportion that costs incurred to date bears to the estimated total costs of contract. The above indicates the difference between the completed contract method and the percentage of completion method." (underlining ours)
9. After the above judgements of the Supreme Court it cannot be said that the project completion method followed by the assessee would result in deferment of the payment of the taxes which are to be assessed annually under the Income Tax Act. Accounting Standards 7 (AS7) issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India also recognize the position that in the case of construction contracts, the assessee can follow either the project completion method or the percentage completion method. In view of the judgements of the Supreme court (Supra),the findings of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), upheld by the Tribunal, does not give rise to any substantial question of law. Further, the tribunal has also found that there was no justification on the part of the assessing officer to ITA Nos. 2859, 2972/D/2012 & 877/D/2013 12 adopt the percentage completion method for one year (the year under appeal) on selective basis. This will distort the computation of the true profits and gains of thebusiness. For these reasons, we are of the view that no substantial question of law arises. We, therefore, decline to admit question nos. 2 and 3."
9. The Ld. CIT(A) in para 7.4 held as follows:
7.4 "On careful examination of the matter, I am of then view that the impugned additions are not sustainable for the reasons that firstly, the method is regularly employed by the appellant and has been accepted by the department in earlier years; secondly, there is no mandatory Accounting Standard prescribing the method of working out percentage stage of completion and thirdly, this being the case of a company and the rate of tax being uniform in all the years, there is no loss to the revenue because the overall taxable profits of the project till completion arrived at by the appellant has been accepted by the AO in the assessment. The controversy is limited only to what percentage of the accepted overall taxable projected profits should be assessed in different years. The decision of the jurisdictional High Court in (2011) 336 ITR 374 also helps the appellant as the tax ratios being uniform in the case of a company, there is no loss to revenue. Besides, it will involve recalculations of year-wise profits in earlier and later years, total taxable profits remaining the same. Under the facts ITA Nos. 2859, 2972/D/2012 & 877/D/2013 13 and circumstances as mentioned above and respectfully following the decision of the Hon'ble Jurisdictional High Court as cited supra and the Rule of Consistency.
I find that the impugned additions cannot be sustained. The same are, therefore, deleted."
9.1 This view is consistent with the view taken by the Tribunal in the case of M/s Sabh Infrastructure Limited. Hence we uphold the same.
9.2 Moreover the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Excel Industries Limited, [2013] 358 ITR 295 held as follows:
"As the method of computation of profits have not been disturbed by the Revenue either for the earlier assessment years or for the later assessment years. The method cannot be disturbed in this particular assessment year."
9.3 Hence, we upheld the order of the CIT(Appeals) and dismissed the appeal of the Revenue.
10. ITA No. 2972(Del)2012:
This is appeal filed by the assessee. The main issue is disallowance u/s 40(a)(ia). The assessee moved an application under Rule 11 of the ITAT Rules to file the following additional grounds:
"Without prejudice to Grounds Nos. 1, 2 & 3, the impugned payment of Rs. 5,30,96,607/- could not in law be disallowed u/s 40(a)(ia) in view of the insertion of the second proviso to section 40(a)(ia) by the Finance Act, 2012 because of the fact that the recipient, Ansal Properties & Infrastructure Limited had already included the income embedded in these payments in its ITA Nos. 2859, 2972/D/2012 & 877/D/2013 14 return of income filed on 31.03.2010 and had paid tax thereon."
As this is a legal ground and as the proviso itself was inserted by the Finance Act, 2012, we admit the ground.
10.1 The assessee submits that the payee i.e. Ansal Properties & Infrastructure Limited has paid all its taxes and filed its return of income.
And hence the second proviso to section 40(a)(ia) by Finance Act, 2012 w.e.f. 01.04.2013 is applicable. He relied on the orders of the Agra Bench of the Tribunal in ITA No. 337/Agra/2013 order dated 29th May, 2013 for the proposition that the second proviso to section 40(a)(ia) is declaratory and curative in nature and it has retrospective effect from 01.04.2005.
11. Ld. Departmental Representative, Ms. A. Mishra opposed the contention of the assessee.
12. After hearing the rival contentions, we find that the Agra Bench of the ITAT in the case of Rajiv Kumar Aggarwal (supra) held as follows:
"6. However, the stand so taken by the special bench was disapproved by Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of CIT Vs Rajinder Kumar (362 ITR 241). While doing so, Their Lordships observed that, "The object of introduction of Section 40(a)(ia) is to ensure that TDS provisions are scrupulously implemented without default in order to augment recoveries........Failure to deduct TDS or deposit TDS results in loss of revenue and may deprive the Government of the tax due and payable" (Emphasis by underlining supplied by us)". Having noted the underlying ITA Nos. 2859, 2972/D/2012 & 877/D/2013 15 objectives, Their Lordships also put in a word of caution by observing that, "the provision should be interpreted in a fair, just and equitable manner".
Their Lordships thus recognized the bigger picture of realization of legitimate tax dues, as object of Section 40(a)(ia), and the need of its fair, just and equitable interpretation. This approach is qualitatively different from perceiving the object of Section 40(a)(ia) as awarding of costs on the "assessees who fail to comply with the relevant provisions by considering overall objective of boosting TDS compliance". Not only the conclusions arrived at by the special bench were disapproved but the very fundamental assumption underlying its approach, i.e. on the issue of the object of Section 40(a)(ia), was rejected too. In any event, even going by Bharti Shipyard decision (supra), what we have to really examine is whether 2012 amendment, inserting second proviso to Section 40(a)(ia), deals with an "intended consequence" or with an "unintended consequence".
7. When we look at the overall scheme of the section as it exists now and the bigger picture as it emerges after insertion of second proviso to section 40(a)(ia), it is beyond doubt that the underlying objective of section 40(a)(ia) was to disallow deduction in respect of expenditure in a situation in which the income embedded in related payments remains untaxed due to non deduction of tax at source by the assessee. In other words, deductibility of expenditure is made contingent upon the income, if any, embedded in such expenditure being brought to tax, if ITA Nos. 2859, 2972/D/2012 & 877/D/2013 16 applicable. In effect, thus, a deduction for expenditure is not allowed to the assessees, in cases where assessees had tax withholding obligations from the related payments, without corresponding income inclusion by the recipient. That is the clearly discernable bigger picture, and, unmistakably, a very pragmatic and fair policy approach to the issue - howsoever belated the realization of unintended and undue hardships to the taxpayers may have been. It seems to proceed on the basis, and rightly so, that seeking tax deduction at source compliance is not an end in itself, so far as the scheme of this legal provision is concerned, but is only a mean of recovering due taxes on income embedded in the payments made by the assessee. That's how, as we have seen a short while ago, Hon'ble Delhi High Court has visualized the scheme of things - as evident from Their Lordships' reference to augmentation of recoveries in the context of "loss of revenue" and "depriving the Government of the tax due and payable".
8. With the benefit of this guidance from Hon'ble Delhi High Court, in view of legislative amendments made from time to time, which throw light on what was actually sought to be achieved by this legal provision, and in the light of the above analysis of the scheme of the law, we are of the considered view that section 40(a)(ia) cannot be seen as intended to be a penal provision to punish the lapses of non deduction of tax at source from payments for expenditure- particularly when the recipients have taken into account income embedded in these payments, paid due taxes thereon and filed income tax returns in accordance ITA Nos. 2859, 2972/D/2012 & 877/D/2013 17 with the law. As a corollary to this proposition, in our considered view, declining deduction in respect of expenditure relating to the payments of this nature cannot be treated as an "intended consequence" of Section 40(a)(ia). If it is not an intended consequence i.e. if it is an unintended consequence, even going by Bharti Shipyard decision (supra), "removing unintended consequences to make the provisions workable has to be treated as retrospective notwithstanding the fact that the amendment has been given effect prospectively". Revenue, thus, does not derive any advantage from special bench decision in the case Bharti Shipyard (supra).
9. On a conceptual note, primary justification for such a disallowance is that such a denial of deduction is to compensate for the loss of revenue by corresponding income not being taken into account in computation of taxable income in the hands of the recipients of the payments. Such a policy motivated deduction restrictions should, therefore, not come into play when an assessee is able to establish that there is no actual loss of revenue. This disallowance does deincentivize not deducting tax at source, when such tax deductions are due, but, so far as the legal framework is concerned, this provision is not for the purpose of penalizing for the tax deduction at source lapses. There are separate penal provisions to that effect. Deincentivizing a lapse and punishing a lapse are two different things and have distinctly different, and sometimes mutually exclusive, connotations. When we appreciate the object of scheme of section 40(a)(ia), as on ITA Nos. 2859, 2972/D/2012 & 877/D/2013 18 the statute, and to examine whether or not, on a "fair, just and equitable" interpretation of law- as is the guidance from Hon'ble Delhi High Court on interpretation of this legal provision, in our humble understanding, it could not be an "intended consequence" to disallow the expenditure, due to non deduction of tax at source, even in a situation in which corresponding income is brought to tax in the hands of the recipient. The scheme of Section 40(a)(ia), as we see it, is aimed at ensuring that an expenditure should not be allowed as deduction in the hands of an assessee in a situation in which income embedded in such expenditure has remained untaxed due to tax withholding lapses by the assessee. It is not, in our considered view, a penalty for tax withholding lapse but it is a sort of compensatory deduction restriction for an income going untaxed due to tax withholding lapse. The penalty for tax withholding lapse per se is separately provided for in Section 271 C, and, section 40(a)(ia) does not add to the same. The provisions of Section 40(a)(ia), as they existed prior to insertion of second proviso thereto, went much beyond the obvious intentions of the lawmakers and created undue hardships even in cases in which the assessee's tax withholding lapses did not result in any loss to the exchequer. Now that the legislature has been compassionate enough to cure these shortcomings of provision, and thus obviate the unintended hardships, such an amendment in law, in view of the well settled legal position to the effect that a curative amendment to avoid unintended consequences is to be treated as retrospective ITA Nos. 2859, 2972/D/2012 & 877/D/2013 19 in nature even though it may not state so specifically, the insertion of second proviso must be given retrospective effect from the point of time when the related legal provision was introduced. In view of these discussions, as also for the detailed reasons set out earlier, we cannot subscribe to the view that it could have been an "intended consequence" to punish the assessees for non deduction of tax at source by declining the deduction in respect of related payments, even when the corresponding income is duly brought to tax. That will be going much beyond the obvious intention of the section. Accordingly, we hold that the insertion of second proviso to Section 40(a)(ia) is declaratory and curative in nature and it has retrospective effect from 1stApril, 2005, being the date from which sub clause (ia) of section 40(a) was inserted by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2004.
10. In view of the above discussions, we deem it fit and proper to remit the matter to the file of the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication in the light of our above observations and after carrying out necessary verifications regarding related payments having been taken into account by the recipients in computation of their income, regarding payment of taxes in respect of such income and regarding filing of the related income tax returns by the recipients. While giving effect to these directions, the Assessing Officer shall give due and fair opportunity of hearing to the assessee, decide the matter in accordance with the law and by way of a speaking order. We order so."
ITA Nos. 2859, 2972/D/2012 & 877/D/2013 2013. Respectfully following the same, we set aside the issue to the file of AO for the limited purpose of verification. The AO shall verify whether the payee has filed his return of income and paid of the taxes within stipulated time. If it has done so no disallowance shall be made.
14. In the result, the appeal of the assessee is allowed in part.
15. ITA No. 877/Del/2013:
This is an appeal filed by the assessee on the issue of disallowance u/s 40(a)(ia). Both parties agreed that the same issue has arisen in the previous year and hence their arguments are same.
16. Consistent with a view taken from the same issue earlier the A.Y. 2008-09 in ITA No. 2972(Del) of 2012, we set aside the matter to the file of AO for fresh adjudication. The AO shall apply the ratio of the decision of the ITAT in the case of Rajiv Kumar Aggarwal (supra).
17. In the result, the appeal is allowed for statistical purposes.
18. In the result, the appeal of the Revenue is dismissed and the appeals of the assessee are allowed for statistical purposes.
Order pronounced in the open court on 22.07.2014 Sd/- Sd/-
(GEORGE GEORGE K) (J.S. REDDY)
JUDICIAL MEMBER ACCOUNTANT MEMBER
Dated: 22/07/2014
*Kavita
ITA Nos. 2859, 2972/D/2012 & 877/D/2013 21
Copy to:
1. Appellant
2. Respondent
3. CIT
4. CIT(A)
5. DR, ITAT, New Delhi.
TRUE COPY
By Order
ASSISTANT REGISTRAR