Calcutta High Court
Dilip Kumar Gooptu & Ors vs Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd on 28 January, 2015
Author: Debangsu Basak
Bench: Debangsu Basak
C.S. No. 245 of 1995
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction
Dilip Kumar Gooptu & Ors.
Vs.
Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd.
For the Plaintiffs : Mr. Jishnu Saha, Sr. Advocate
Mr. A.K. Awasthi, Advocate
Mr. Aishwarya Kr. Awasthi, Advocate
For the Defendant : Mr. Moloy Ghosh, Sr. Advocate
Mr. C.K. Dutt, Advocate
Hearing concluded on : December 09, 2014
Judgment on : January 28, 2015
DEBANGSU BASAK, J.
The suit is for specific performance of an agreement claimed to be entered into in July 1994 and in the alternative vacant and peaceful possession of premises no. 3D, Camac Street, Kolkata and for mesne profits.
The plaintiff had granted a lease of a portion of premises no. 3D, Camac Street, Kolkata to the predecessor-in-interest of the defendant on November 28, 1963 for a term of ten years and eleven months. The predecessor-in-interest of the defendant came into possession of the suit premises pursuant to such deed of lease. The predecessor-in-interest of the defendant carries on the business of a petrol pump at the suit premises. The deed of lease allowed the defendant option of two extensions of 10 years each. The predecessor in interest of the defendant exercised its two options. The lease stood extended upto July 31, 1994. According to the plaintiffs, the original lessor died on July 17, 1989. By a registered deed of trust dated January 20, 1981 the original lessor demised the premises in favour of the plaintiffs herein. The lease stood determined by efflux of time on July 31, 1994. By a letter dated April 25, 1994 the defendant offered to take the premises on lease for a period of 21 years effective from August 1, 1994 with an option to renew the same for a further period of 10 years.
According to the plaintiff an agreement was entered into between the parties on July 19, 1994. Such agreement as understood by the plaintiffs is enumerated in paragraph 11 of the plaint. According to the plaintiff, since the defendant had failed and neglected to act in terms of such agreement, the plaintiffs are entitled to specific performance thereof and in the alternative eviction of the defendant from the suit premises along with mesne profits. At the commencement of trial of the suit the plaintiffs gave up its right to claim specific performance. The same is recorded in the Order dated June 18, 2014. The plaintiffs limited their claim for eviction and mesne profits in the suit.
The defendant has entered appearance and is contesting the suit. The defendant has filed a written statement. The defendant claims that the lease was renewed from time to time till July 31, 1994. The defendant claims that the suit property became vested with the State of West Bengal under the provisions of the Calcutta Thika and Other Tenancies and Land (Acquisition and Regulation) Act, 1981. The defendant admits having made a request for execution of a fresh lease in view of the imminent expiry of the existing lease by efflux of time. According to the defendant such request was made without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the defendant that, the suit property stood vested with the State of West Bengal under the provisions of the Calcutta Thika and Other Tenancies and Lands (Acquisition and Regulation) Act, 1981.
With regard to the agreement pleaded by the plaintiff in paragraph 11 of the plaint, the defendant admits that meetings between the parties took place. The defendant however states in its written statement that, the Chief Regional Manager of the defendant had limited authority and could not agree to the proposed increase of rent. According to the defendant, the proposed increase of rent was exorbitant. The defendant denies the factum and validity of the alleged agreement and claims that the plaintiffs are not entitled to the specific performance of the alleged agreement as prayed for. The defendant claims that no question of vacating the suit premises arise as the defendant has become a tenant under the State of West Bengal and is protected by the provisions of the Calcutta Thika and Other Tenancies and Lands (Acquisition and Regulation) Act, 1981.
The issues in the suit were settled on June 18, 2014 and were modified on June 25, 2014. They are as follows:-
(i) Whether the defendant is a thika tenant in respect of the suit property under the provisions of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy (Acquisition and Regulation) Act, 1981?
(ii) Are the plaintiffs entitled to the decree for vacant and peaceful possession of the premises no. 3D, Camac Street, Kolkata?
(iii) Are the plaintiffs entitled to a decree for mesne profits?
If so, at what rate and for which period?
(iv) To what relief, if any, are the plaintiffs entitled? The first issue is taken up for consideration. An affirmative answer to the first issue and in favour of the defendant would not entitle the plaintiffs to any reliefs in the suit.
Mr. Moloy Ghosh, learned Senior Advocate for the defendant contends that, the suit premises is vested with the State of West Bengal under the provisions of the Calcutta Thika and Other Tenancies and Lands (Acquisition and Regulation) Act, 1981 and the subsequent amendments thereof. He points out that the State of West Bengal has issued a notice dated May 20, 2010 under the provisions of the West Bengal Thika Tenancy (Acquisition and Regulation) Act, 2001 in respect of the suit premises being Exhibit-
1. The defendant has deposited rent in respect of the suit premises with the Thika Tenancy Controller. He refers to a challan dated February 1, 2010 being Exhibit-2 showing a deposit of Rs.13,80,601/- in such respect. He also refers to Exhibit-3 being a Summons dated May 12, 2012 issued by the Controller of Calcutta Thika Tenancy in Misc. Case No. 29 of 2010 in respect of the suit premises and submits that, the Summons was sent both to the plaintiffs as well as the defendant.
Mr. Jishnu Saha, learned Senior Advocate for the plaintiffs submits that, the parties never treated the suit property to have vested with the State of West Bengal under the provisions of the Calcutta Thika and Other Tenancies and Lands (Acquisition and Regulation) Act, 1981 or the subsequent amendments thereof. He points out that, the defendant applied for and obtained extension of the deed of lease. In fact, in July 1994 the defendant had entered into negotiations for a new lease. He submits that, the unilateral deposit of rent with the Thika Controller does not vest the suit property with the State of West Bengal under the provisions of the Calcutta Thika and Other Tenancies and Lands (Acquisition and Regulation) Act, 1981 or any statutory amendment thereof. He contends that, the plaintiffs are the owners of the land and that the suit property did not vest with the State of West Bengal in any manner whatsoever. He submits that, the State of West Bengal did not declare the suit property to have vested with it under the provisions of any Act. He relies upon 2011 Volume 3 Calcutta High Court Notes (Calcutta) page 534 (Sabita Rani Majilya v. State of West Bengal) and submits that, the Thika Controller is to decide the right of thika tenancy. In the instant case, such decision has not been taken by the Thika Controller.
The claim of vesting of the suit property requires consideration in the light of the evidence on record and the law cited at the bar. There is no document on record declaring the suit property to be a property vested with the State of West Bengal under the Calcutta Thika and Other Tenancies and Lands (Acquisition and Regulation) Act, 1981 or the West Bengal Thika Tenancy (Acquisition and Regulation) Act, 2001. Exhibit-1 is a notice under the West Bengal Thika Tenancy (Acquisition and Regulation) Act, 2001. Exhibit '3' is a Summons dated May 12, 2012 issued. Neither Exhibit '1' nor Exhibit '3' declare or establish that the suit property is vested with the State of West Bengal under the provisions of the Act of 1981 or the Act of 2001. The unilateral deposit of rent by the defendant with the Thika Controller without reference to the plaintiff would not bind the plaintiff to such unilateral act of the defendant. The plaintiff had granted lease to the defendant in 1963 in respect of the suit property where the defendant had carried on the business of a petrol pump. There is no evidence on record to suggest that the structures at the suit premises are Katcha in nature so as to attract the provisions of vesting under the thika tenancy laws. The defendant has failed to establish the suit premises stands vested with the State of West Bengal and that the plaintiff cannot claim a decree for eviction of the defendant thereupon.
In Sabita Rani Majilya (supra) the question before the Division Bench was whether the Thika Controller had the jurisdiction to decide thika tenancy right of any person who allegedly filed a return under the Calcutta Thika and Other Tenancies and Lands (Acquisition and Regulation) Act, 1981. Such question was answered by holding that a proceeding initiated in respect of a return filed under the Act of 1981 was saved under sub-section (2) of Section 27 of the Act of 2001.
I have not found any material to come to a finding that the suit property is a thika tenancy.
In such circumstances the first issue is answered in the negative and against the defendant.
On the second issue Mr. Ghosh for the defendant contends that the plaintiffs have pleaded renewal of the original lease dated November 28, 1963 for two periods of time. He submits that, the claim of the plaintiffs for a decree for eviction is founded on the basis that the lease stood determined by efflux of time. He points out that, the plaintiffs have not pleaded extension of the original lease and, therefore, the plaintiffs should not be allowed to contend that, the present case is an extension of lease and not a renewal of lease. He emphasizes that, there is a distinction between an extension of a lease and the renewal of a lease. He relies upon 2004 Volume 1 Supreme Court Cases page 1 (State of U.P. & Ors. v. Lalji Tandon) and All India Reporter 1973 Supreme Court page 2609 (Delhi Development Authority v. Durga Chand Kaushish) in this regard.
Mr. Ghosh points out that, there is no registered document evidencing the renewal of the original lease. He contends that, the letters dated February 19, 1974 being Exhibit 'C' and January 18, 1984 being Exhibit 'D' could not be treated as a renewal of the lease for 10 years each. He refers to Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and Section 17(1)(i)(d) of the Registration Act, 1908 as well as Section 49 thereof. Referring to All India Reporter 2000 Supreme Court page 3523 (Anthony v. K.C. Ittoop and Sons & Ors.) he contends that, Exhibits 'C' and 'D' could not be treated as a renewal of the lease for ten years each in view of their non-registration.
Mr. Saha for the plaintiffs contends that, clause 3(d) of the registered lease deed dated November 28, 1963 being Exhibit 'B' allows the defendant the options of two extensions of the lease period with such extensions being 10 years each. The defendant had exercised such options of extensions. The first option of extension was exercised by Exhibit 'C' being the letter dated February 19, 1974. The letter dated February 19, 1974 referred to clause 3(d) of Exhibit 'B' while the defendant had sought extension thereof. The option for the second extension was exercised by the defendant by the letter dated January 18, 1984 being Exhibit 'E'. The defendant itself referred to clause 3(d) of Exhibit 'B'. Mr. Saha contends that, an extension of lease does not require execution or registration of a new deed or document. In support of such proposition he relies upon All India Reporter 1965 Calcutta page 55 (Lalit Mohan Dey v. Smt. Satadalbasini Dasi), All India Reporter 1977 Calcutta page 226 (Syed Ali Kaser v. Mustt. Ayesha Begum), All India Reporter 1997 Calcutta page 278 (Ranjit Kumar Dutta v. Tapan Kumar Shaw & Anr.) and All India Reporter 2008 Calcutta 75 (Renuka Seal & Ors. v. Sabitri Devi & Ors.).
Mr. Saha contends that, the defendant exercised the option to extend the lease and not to renew the lease as is evident from the extension letters being Exhibits 'B' and 'C' themselves. He points out the pleadings of the parties and submits that, the plaintiffs have pleaded that the defendant applied for obtained extension of lease and that pleading has not been denied by the defendant. The defendant has not made out a case to the effect that the defendant had applied for renewal of lease and not an extension thereof. The defendant has also not pleaded that the defendant having obtained a renewal of the lease by Exhibits 'B' and 'C' the same are required to be registered. The case of vesting under the Calcutta Thika and Other Tenancies and Land (Acquisition and Regulation) Act, 1981 or the subsequent amendment thereof has not been pleaded in the written statement by the defendant. The defendant should not be permitted to contend beyond the pleadings and the evidence on record. Evidence beyond the pleadings should not be admitted at the trial. He refers to All India Reporter 1966 Supreme Court 1861 (Bhagat Singh & Ors. v. Jaswant Singh) and All India Reporter 1980 Calcutta page 381 (Shantilal Saraogi & Anr. v. Mukund Lal Kothari & Anr.) in support of such contentions.
In Lalji Tandon (supra) the difference between an extension of lease and a renewal thereof has been emphasised. The facts of Lalji Tandon (supra) would demonstrate that, the question before the Supreme Court was whether a renewal of lease done in accordance with the original lease should contain a clause for renewal again or not. It has been held that the requirement of a deed renewing a lease deed to contain a clause for a fresh renewal would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, regard being had to the intention of the parties as displayed in the original covenant for renewal and the surrounding circumstances.
Durga Chand Kaushish (supra) has laid down that a renewal of a lease is a grant of a fresh lease. It is called renewal because it postulates the existence of a prior lease. In all other respect it is a fresh lease. Anthony (supra) has held that in the facts of the case the parties intended to create a lease although the document creating such lease was not registered.
Lalit Mohan Dey (supra) has considered the distinction between a tenancy by holding over and a tenancy under a renewal clause. It has held that a lease for the period under the renewal clause of a lease deed would not be an independent lease. It would be an integral part of the original lease. Syed Ali Kaser (supra) has considered the provisions of Section 3(1)(b) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 and found on the facts of that case, the subsequent period of one year for which the lessee has exercised his option in terms of the lease could not be called to be a fresh lease. The Division Bench has held the same to be a continuation of the lease as originally executed and, therefore, the lessee was found not to be entitled to the protection under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 as the lease was outside the purview of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 by virtue of Section 3(1)(b) of the Act of 1956.
Ranjit Kumar Dutta (supra) has held that, the renewal of a lease is a creation of a fresh lease and that a fresh lease is required to be registered according to law. It goes on to hold that where no fresh lease is created in terms of the renewal clause of the original registered deed of lease no question of registering it arises. If the lessee continues in possession in exercise of an option over the lease property if the initial period is over he continues in possession in the property of the original registered deed of lease, as a part of the period of the original deed of lease. In the facts of the case under consideration, the defendant has exercised the right of extension for two periods of time by Exhibits 'C' and 'E'. Therefore, in the facts of this case, it cannot be said that, any new lease came into existence between the parties.
Renuka Seal & Ors. (supra) has noted that a renewal of a lease can be made only through a bilateral process while an extension of a lease however can be made through an unilateral process inasmuch as such an extension can be made on the option of one of the parties to the lease as the party to the other part has no option than to accept the extension of period exercised by the party entitled to it and extend the lease in terms of the provisions of the original registered lease deed.
The conduct of the parties and the evidence on record therefore have to be considered to find out whether the parties extended the lease or whether there was renewal of the lease.
Clause 3(d) of Exhibit 'B' being the registered deed of lease is as follows:-
"That the landlords will on the written request of the tenant made 2 calendar months before the expiry of the period of 10 years 11 months hereby agreed and if there shall not at the time of such request be an existing breach or non-observance of any of the covenants on the part of tenant hereinbefore contained grant to it a lease of the demised premises for the further terms of 10 years from the expiration of the said term at rent of Rs.2750/- per month and containing the like covenants and provisions as are herein contained including the proviso similar to the proviso for granting a renewal of the lease at the option of the tenant for a further term of ten years but at an enhanced rent of Rs.3025/- per month."
Clause 3(d) in my view, allows the defendant a right to apply for extension of the period of the lease for two periods of 10 years each and it obliges the plaintiffs as lessors to accept such extensions, if applied for. In my view, the extension of the period of lease is automatic on the defendant applying for the same with the plaintiffs. The period of the lease would stand extended for the term agreed upon the plaintiffs receiving the request for an extension in accordance with the terms of the lease deed without the parties to the lease deed being required to do anything more. Applying the ratio of Renuka Seal & Ors. (supra) since clause 3(d) of Exhibit 'B' allows the defendant to obtain an extension of the period of the lease on making a request for the same to the plaintiffs, I consider such clause to be one for extension rather than a clause for renewal of the lease.
The evidence on record demonstrates that the parties entered into a registered deed of lease being Exhibit 'B'. Clause 3(d) of Exhibit 'B' allows the defendant to apply for and obtain extensions of the lease for two periods of 10 years each. By the letter dated February 19, 1974 being Exhibit 'C' the defendant referring to clause 3(d) of Exhibit 'B' exercised its right under clause 3(d) of Exhibit 'B' for a period of 10 years commencing from August 1, 1974. The second option was exercised by the defendant by a letter dated January 18, 1984 being Exhibit 'E'. Again the defendant refers to clause 3(d) of Exhibit 'B' and exercises the right thereunder. At neither of these points of time did the parties insist upon or agree to execute a deed renewing the lease. The facts of this case lead one to a conclusion that the parties refer to renewal and extension of lease interchangeably without making a distinction between the two. The intention of the parties has to be gathered from the conduct of the parties contemporaneously. The evidence on record demonstrates that, the defendant applied for and obtained the two extensions of the period of lease that Exhibit 'B' permitted the defendant to apply for and obtain. The plaintiff had on such an application allowed the defendant the extensions of the period of lease as applied for without the parties executing any deed in respect thereof. Neither of the parties insisted upon execution of any deed of renewal. After the exercise of the first option of extension the defendant acted thereupon, and paid the enhanced rent to the plaintiffs. At the time of exercise of the option for the second time also the defendant paid the enhanced rent and did not call for execution of a deed of renewal of lease. In such circumstances, Exhibit 'C' nor 'E' being the letters for extension of the period of the lease can be construed, in my opinion, as applications for the renewal of lease and not as an application for extension thereof. In such circumstances, once it is held that Exhibits 'C' and 'E' are letters seeking extension of the period of the lease, the same does not require registration as the same are not renewal of deeds of lease.
Mr. Saha has contended that, in absence of pleadings both with regard to the renewal of the lease as sought to be urged on behalf of the defendant in course of argument as well as vesting under the thika tenancy, the defendant should not be allowed to urge the same. In Bhagat Singh & Ors. (supra) the Supreme Court has held that, where a claim has never been made in the defence presented, no amount of evidence can be looked into in respect of a plea which was never put forward.
In Shantilal Saraogi & Anr. (supra) the Division Bench has held that, where a claim has never been made in the defence no amount of evidence can be looked into upon a plea which was never put forward. The plea that the defendant applied for and obtained any renewal of Exhibit 'B' and not an extension thereof has not been pleaded in the written statement. In absence of such pleading, I am afraid, I am not in a position to allow the defendant to canvass the same. I have also found from the conduct of the parties that the defendant requested for and obtained an extension of the lease from the plaintiffs rather than a renewal thereof.
The last of the extensions of the lease expired by efflux of time on July 31, 1994. The defendant is not entitled to the protection under the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. In fact, the defendant has not asked for any protection under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. The defendant has not vacated the suit premises after the expiry of the period of the lease in spite of a request being made. The defendant is, therefore, liable to be evicted from the suit premises.
The second issue is, therefore, answered in the affirmative and in favour of the plaintiffs.
On the third issue, Mr. Ghosh submits that, the defendant has been paying occupation charges to the plaintiffs in terms of the Order dated July 16, 2010 and, therefore, is not liable to pay any mesne profits at all. Without prejudice to such contention he submits that, so far as the quantification of mesne profits is concerned, the documents tendered in evidence on behalf of the plaintiffs cannot be allowed to be relied upon in evidence inasmuch as the documents relied upon are not adequately stamped under Section 35 of the Stamp Act, 1899. He relies upon various provisions of the Evidence Act, 1872 and submits that, oral evidence cannot substitute documentary evidence and that a judgment must be passed upon facts declared by the Evidence Act, 1872 to be relevant and duly proved. He submits that, the plaintiffs have sought to introduce secondary evidence without complying the Section 63(2) of the Evidence Act, 1872.
Mr. Saha submits that, the plaintiffs have adduced adequate evidence on the quantification of mesne profits. The plaintiffs have produced such of the documents as are available to them with regard to establishing their claim on mesne profits. He submits that, the issue of adequacy of stamp and registration of the documents tendered in evidence are irrelevant as such documents are tendered and relied upon by the plaintiffs are limited to the question of rent payable in respect of parties governed by such documents to establish the claim for mesne profits in the suit. Those documents have no direct bearing to the merits of the suit excepting the calculation of mesne profits.
Mr. Saha submits that, the plaintiffs are not required to prove the quantum of mesne profits very definitely. He relies upon All India Reporter 1996 Delhi page 32 (Vinod Khanna & Ors. v. Bakshi Sachdev), All India Reporter 1996 Calcutta 226 (Sm. Moitrali Mukherjee v. Manik Chand Johuri & Anr.), Indian Law Reporter 2010 Volume 3 Delhi 766 (Concep India Private Ltd. v. CEPCO Industries Pvt. Ltd.), Indian Law Reporter 2011 Volume 2 Delhi 350 (Roshan Lal Vegetable Products Pvt. Ltd. v. Param International & Anr.) and 2013 Volume 3 Calcutta High Court Notes page 222 (Casyab Pvt. Ltd. v. Central Bank of India) in support of such proposition.
Mr. Saha next refers to the prayers with regard to the mesne profits made in the plaint and submits that, the plaintiffs have claimed inquiry into mesne profits also apart from a certain amount on account of mesne profits. He submits that the plaintiffs may claim mesne profits beyond the claim provided the plaintiffs have proved such quantum in evidence. In support of such contention he relies upon All India Reporter 1963 Andhra Pradesh page 42 (Magunta Kota Reddy v. Pothula Chendrasekhara Reddy) and 2013 Volume 3 Calcutta High Court Notes page 222 (Casyab Pvt. Ltd. v. Central Bank of India).
Vinod Khanna & Ors. (supra), Sm. Moitrali Mukherjee (supra), Concep India Private Ltd. (supra), Roshan Lal Vegetable Products Pvt. Ltd. (supra) and Casyab Pvt. Ltd. (supra) are of the view that, the Courts need not enter the intricacies of the calculations at arriving at a figure for mesne profits. A Court can grant mesne profits after trying to ascertain the prevailing market rate at the locale. In fact the Courts are allowed a large discretion in calculating mesne profits as definite evidence in this regard is hard to come by.
The plaintiffs for the purpose of quantum of mesne profits have relied upon various documents. Some of the documents tendered in evidence and as pointed out by Mr. Ghosh were marked exhibits subject to objections. The plaintiffs have tendered the documents in evidence essentially to establish the quantum of rent prevailing at the diverse period of time in or around the suit property. The question of registration of such documents or inadequacy of the stamp levied in respect of such documents is irrelevant as the documents are sought to be relied upon were sought to be introduced to establish a claim of mesne profits. The contents of the documents objected to are not called upon to be considered to adjudicate upon the substantive rights of the parties. The plaintiffs are seeking to establish the rent in the locality prevailing at different points of time where the suit premises is located. I am not in a position to accept the objections of the defendant with regard to the admissibility of the documents in evidence on this score.
Moreover, the witness of the plaintiffs has accepted that the parties in the agreement had paid rent in terms of the documents disclosed. Therefore, the rate of rent in respect of the properties lying in or around the suit premises stood established for the period of time for which the documents relate to.
On the issue of quantification of the mesne profits I am concerned with the rate of rent prevailing and no other terms of the documents sought to be relied upon by the plaintiff.
I find from the evidence on record that the plaintiffs have proved a rate of Rs.20/- per square feet to be prevailing for the period 1993 to 1995, a rate of Rs.23/- per square feet to be prevailing for the period 1996 to 2000, a rate of Rs.26/- per square feet to be prevailing for the period 2001 till 2007, a rate of Rs.29/- per square feet to be prevailing for the period 2008 to 2009, a rate of Rs.43/- per square feet to be prevailing for the period 2010 to 2012 and a rate of Rs.50/- per square feet to be prevailing for the period 2013-2014.
In Magunta Kota Reddy (supra) it has been held that a plaintiff may be allowed a quantum of mesne profits more than what is claimed in the plaint. The Division Bench of this Court in Casyab Pvt. Ltd. (supra) has expressed a similar view. In the instant case, the plaintiffs in addition to the quantification of its claim on the head of mesne profits have also prayed for inquiry into the amount of mesne profits receivable by it. On inquiry of the amount of mesne profits receivable by the plaintiffs I have already determined the same. The plaintiffs will, therefore, be entitled to mesne profits at the rate determined by me. The first question in issue no. 3 is, therefore, answered in the affirmative and in favour of the plaintiffs. The second question in the third issue is answered by holding that the plaintiffs are entitled to a decree for mesne profits at the rate and for the period as follows:-
Period Rate per square feet
1993 to 1995 Rs.20/-
1996 to 2000 Rs.23/-
2001 to 2007 Rs.26/-
2008 to 2009 Rs.29/-
2010 to 2012 Rs.43/-
2012 to 2014 Rs.50/-
The defendant, however, will be entitled to the adjustment of the payments made pursuant to the two orders of the Court. The plaintiffs will be entitled to the balance amount due and payable after giving credit to the defendant for all payments received by the plaintiffs from the defendant in terms of orders passed by this Court. The plaintiff will be entitled to the interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum on and from the date of the order. On the amount of mesne profits after adjustments as provided herein, in the event the defendant fails to pay the plaintiffs the balance sum within a period of four weeks from this date.
On the fourth issue I find that, the plaintiffs have paid a court- fees of Rs.10,000/-. The plaintiff will be entitled to costs assessed at Rs.20,000/- in the suit.
C.S. No. 245 of 1995 is decreed accordingly.
The department is directed to draw up and complete the decree as expeditiously as possible.
[DEBANGSU BASAK, J.]