Himachal Pradesh High Court
_______________________________________________________ vs State Of H.P. & Ors on 14 May, 2026
Author: Sandeep Sharma
Bench: Sandeep Sharma
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr.MMO No.502 of 2019 Reserved on:30.04.2026 .
Date of Decision: 14.05.2026 _______________________________________________________ Dr. Tilak Raj Sharma .......Petitioner Versus State of H.P. & Ors. .....Respondents _______________________________________________________ Coram:
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge.
of Whether approved for reporting? 1 Yes.
For the petitioner: rt Mr. Ankush Dass Sood, Senior Advocate with Mr. P.D. Nanda, Ms. Shweta Joolka, Mr. Gaurav Chaudhary and Mr. Ruchirangad Singh, Advocates.
For the Respondents: Mr. Rajan Kahol & Mr. Vishal Panwar, Additional Advocates General with Mr. Ravi Chauhan & Mr. Anish Banshtu, Deputy Advocates General, for respondents No.1 to 3-State.
Mr. Ram Murti Bisht, Advocate, for respondent No.4.
_______________________________________________________ Sandeep Sharma, Judge(oral):
By way of the instant petition filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, prayer has been made on behalf of the petitioner for quashing and setting aside the charge-sheet/challan arising out of FIR No. 50 dated 10.03.2015, registered under Sections 504, 506 and 507 of the Indian Penal Code at Police Station Palampur, District Kangra, Himachal Pradesh, as well as consequent 1 Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?::: Downloaded on - 16/05/2026 12:19:17 :::CIS 2
proceedings pending adjudication competent Court of law qua the petitioner.
.
2. For having bird's eye view, facts relevant for adjudication of the case at hand, are that FIR sought to be quashed in the instant proceedings came to be instituted at the behest of respondent No.4 (hereinafter to be referred to as 'complainant'), who at the relevant of time was working as Senior Scientist in the Department of Agricultural Biotechnology, CSKHPKV, Palampur, Himachal Pradesh, alleging rt therein that he has received a derogatory email message from the email address [email protected] at 7:11 p.m. on 10.02.2019 and the contents of email are as under:-
"We will fuck your mom and sis bete. We are closely watching you and guaging your notorious moves. What you have uttered about ABVP is known to everyone. Whatsoever rubbish is happening in this University is all your brainchild and you are our next target after this bastard, who has already lost his mental balance. We have found that you are even a bigger bastard than this man whom we are fucking everyday and you are licking his shit all day at his residence madarchod. Tu to gaya bhosadi ke. Always lick the shit of person in power, bhainchod".
The contents of the above e-mail are very derogatory, demeaning disgraceful and abusive to me and my family. It is therefore humbly prayed that the person and the IP address from where this e-mail message originated be traced and the faulty be proceeded against as per the provisions of Section 66A of the Information Technology Act.
3. Complainant alleged that contents of the e-mail are very derogatory, demeaning, disgraceful and abusive to him as well as his ::: Downloaded on - 16/05/2026 12:19:17 :::CIS 3 family members, as such, person responsible for sending the said e-
mail, along with the IP address from where the e-mail originated, be .
traced and proceeded against in accordance with the provisions of Section 66-A of the Information Technology Act (in short, the "IT Act").
On the basis of aforesaid complaint, FIR came to be lodged against unknown person under Section 66-A of the IT Act. Police, during of investigation, found that email originated from IP 117.251.72.229.
During investigation, it was also found that aforesaid IP belonged to rt BSNL and was accessed through a GSM connection registered with BSNL, North Zone, Chandigarh. Nodal Officer, BSNL, HP, Shimla, who was requested vide letter No.2061/5A dated 03.06.2015 to provide the full particulars of the person, to whom the afore IP address was allotted at the time when the email message was sent from the email address detailed hereinabove, who in turn sent communication dated 11.06.2015 through email, disclosing therein that IP 117.251.72.229, from where email in question generated was allocated to BSNL mobile No.94180-57601 registered in the name of Sh. Tilak Raj Sharma, S/o Sh. Jai Dev Sharma, Biotechnology, CSKHPKVV, Tehsil Palampur, Kangra, Himachal Pradesh. In the afore background, petitioner herein came to be named in the FIR.
4. After completion of investigation, Police presented challan under Section 173 Cr.P.C in the competent Court of law under Sections 504, 506 & 507 of Indian Penal Code against the petitioner.
::: Downloaded on - 16/05/2026 12:19:17 :::CIS 4However, Section 66-A of IT Act, under which FIR was initially registered, had been deleted. Before afore proceedings could be .
taken to its logical end, petitioner approached this Court in the instant proceedings for quashing of FIR as well as consequent proceedings pending in the competent Court of law.
5. Vide order dated 30.08.2019, Coordinate Bench of this of Court stayed further proceedings in Case No.69-II/2016, titled as State of Himachal Pradesh VS. Tilak Raj Sharma, pending before rt the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Palampur, District Kangra, Himachal Pradesh,
6. Pursuant to notices issued in the instant proceedings, respondents-State as well as complainant have filed reply, wherein facts, as have been noticed hereinabove, have not been disputed, rather stand admitted. It has been specifically averred in the reply filed by the respondents that once it stands duly established on record that email, which is not only derogatory and abusive, but also contains threat, was sent by the petitioner, prayer made on behalf of the petitioner for quashing of FIR deserves to be rejected at the threshold.
7. Precisely, the grouse of the petitioner, as has been highlighted in the petition and further canvassed by Mr. Ankush Dass Sood, learned Senior Counsel representing the petitioner, is that FIR sought to be quashed in the instant proceedings is a sheer abuse of process of law by the complainant, who intentionally, with a view to ::: Downloaded on - 16/05/2026 12:19:17 :::CIS 5 ruin the career and future prospects of the petitioner, has concocted a false story. Mr. Sood, learned Senior Counsel, further argued that .
though there is no concrete evidence adduced on record by the prosecution to prove that email, which is claimed to be derogatory, was sent from the IP address of the petitioner, but even otherwise, no case under Sections 504, 506 & 507 Indian Penal Code ought to have of been registered against the petitioner. He submitted that once complainant had requested to register the case under Section 66-A of rt IT Act and aforesaid provision of law has already been struck down by Hon'ble Apex Court, there was otherwise no occasion, if any, for the police to lodge FIR, rather complaint made by the complainant ought to have been filed. While referring to the provisions contained under Sections 504, 506 & 507 of Indian Penal Code, Mr. Sood contended that no FIR could have been registered against the petitioner under aforesaid provisions of law without there being prior permission of Judicial Magistrate. He submitted that since offences committed under aforesaid provisions of law are non-cognizable, no FIR could have been registered without there being permission granted by Judicial Magistrate in terms of Section 154 Cr.P.C. While making this Court peruse contents of email, which is claimed to be derogatory and abusive, Mr. Dass further argued that in no manner, petitioner cannot be said to have extended threats to the complainant. Hence, registration of the case under Section 506 Indian Penal Code is totally ::: Downloaded on - 16/05/2026 12:19:17 :::CIS 6 uncalled-for. Similarly, Mr. Dass also referred to Section 504 of Indian Penal Code to state that there is nothing to suggest that petitioner .
intentionally insulted the complainant, thereby provoking him to break public peace or commit any other offence. He further submitted that once it is the case of the prosecution that email, which is claimed to be derogatory and abusive, was sent from the email address of the of petitioner, no case under Section 507 of Indian Penal Code could have been otherwise registered because to invoke Section 507 of rt Indian Penal Code, it is incumbent upon prosecution to prove that whoever commits the offence of criminal intimidation by an anonymous communication shall be charged under aforesaid provision of law. He submitted that since on account of discrepancies, as have been pointed out hereinabove, case of the prosecution is likely to fall in all probabilities, no fruitful purpose would be served by subjecting the petitioner to ordeal of protracted trial, who otherwise on account of lodging of FIR and pendency of criminal case, has already suffered a lot for his being not considered for promotion to the higher post.
8. To the contrary, Mr. Rajan Kahol, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent-State and Mr. Ram Murti Bisht, learned counsel for the complainant, while refuting the aforesaid submissions made at the behest of the petitioner, vehemently argued that present petition filed by the petitioner is a sheer abuse of process ::: Downloaded on - 16/05/2026 12:19:17 :::CIS 7 of law. They submitted that there is a foolproof case against the petitioner. They submitted that though there is ample evidence .
adduced on record suggestive of the fact that derogatory and abusive email was sent from the IP address of the petitioner, but even if argument raised at the behest of the petitioner is accepted that some other person used the laptop of the petitioner, such fact is required to of be proved in accordance with law by the petitioner, which cannot be done in the instant proceedings, rather such fact can only be proved rt in trial by leading cogent and convincing evidence. They submitted that Section 506 of Indian Penal Code is cognizable and non-bailable within the territory of Himachal Pradesh as per Notifications No. Home (C) F(8) 1/77 dated 09.03.201978 and No. Home-11(E)5-10/80 dated 06.09.1980, respectively. Hence, there is no illegality in the investigation of the case by the police in respect of cognizable offence and other offences arising out of and connected with cognizable offence, nor in taking cognizance thereof by the learned trial Court.
While referring to Section 154 (3) Cr.P.C., learned counsel representing the respondents further argued that in case one offence is cognizable and other is not, both can be investigated together.
They further argued that if contents of derogatory and abusive email are read juxtaposing provisions contained under Sections 504, 506 & 507 of Indian Penal Code, no illegality can be said to have been committed by the Investigating Agency, while charging the petitioner ::: Downloaded on - 16/05/2026 12:19:17 :::CIS 8 under aforesaid provisions of law. They further submitted that documentary and electronic evidence adduced by the Investigating .
Agency prima facie proves that the petitioner was the sole handler of the email account, which was used by him to send abusive and threatening emails to the complainant. They further submitted that the documentary and electronic records collected by the police pertaining of to the internet searches conducted by the petitioner on the University internet network system also establish that the petitioner is the rt perpetrator of the crime. They further submitted that petitioner is a habitual delinquent and harbours enmity against the respondent/complainant as is evident from the instances given in the detailed reply filed to the main petition by the respondent/complainant.
They further submitted that petitioner threatened the complainant through email by using fake email account with injury to his person and sexual assault upon his mother and sister, which offence falls within the ambit of moral turpitude as held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in various pronouncements.
9. Crux of the arguments raised at the behest of the respondents is that allegations made in the complaint prima facie disclose that commission of criminal offences and evidence collected on record by the prosecution is sufficient to prove the guilt of the petitioner under aforesaid provisions of law.
::: Downloaded on - 16/05/2026 12:19:17 :::CIS 910. I have heard learned counsel of the parties and gone through the record carefully.
.
11. Before ascertaining the genuineness and correctness of the submissions and counter-submissions having been made by the learned counsel for the parties vis-à-vis prayer made in the instant petition, this Court deems it necessary to discuss/elaborate upon the of scope and competence of this Court to quash the criminal proceedings, while exercising power under Section 482 of Cr.PC (now 528 of BNSS).
rt
12. A three-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy and others, 1977 (2) SCC 699, held that High Court while exercising power under Section 482 Cr.PC is entitled to quash the proceedings, if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed.
13. Subsequently, in case titled State of Haryana and others v. Bhajan Lal and others, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, the Hon'ble Apex Court, while elaborately discussing the scope and competence of High Court to quash criminal proceedings under Section 482 Cr.PC laid down certain principles governing the jurisdiction of High Court to exercise its power. After passing of aforesaid judgment, issue with regard to exercise of power under ::: Downloaded on - 16/05/2026 12:19:17 :::CIS 10 Section 482 Cr.PC, again came to be considered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in case bearing Criminal Appeal No.577 of 2017 (arising out of .
SLP (CrL.) No. 287 of 2017) titled Vineet Kumar and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Anr., wherein it has been held that saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose i.e. court proceedings ought not of be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution.
14. rt The Hon'ble Apex Court in Prashant Bharti v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2013) 9 SCC 293, relying upon its earlier judgment titled as Rajiv Thapar and Ors v. Madan Lal Kapoor, (2013) 3 SCC 330, reiterated that High Court has inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.PC., to quash the proceedings against an accused, at the stage of issuing process, or at the stage of committal, or even at the stage of framing of charge, but such power must always be used with caution, care and circumspection. In the aforesaid judgment, the Hon'ble Apex Court concluded that while exercising its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.PC, Court exercising such power must be fully satisfied that the material produced by the accused is such, that would lead to the conclusion, that his/their defence is based on sound, reasonable, and indubitable facts and the material adduced on record itself overrule the veracity of the allegations contained in the accusations levelled by the ::: Downloaded on - 16/05/2026 12:19:17 :::CIS 11 prosecution/complainant. Besides above, the Hon'ble Apex Court further held that material relied upon by the accused should be such, .
as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the actual basis of the accusations as false. In such a situation, the judicial conscience of the High Court would persuade it to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash such criminal of proceedings, for that would prevent abuse of process of the court, and secure the ends of justice. In the aforesaid judgment titled as rt Prashant Bharti v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2013) 9 SCC 293, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:-
"22. The proposition of law, pertaining to quashing of criminal proceedings, initiated against an accused by a High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as "the Cr.P.C.") has been dealt with by this Court in Rajiv Thapar & Ors. vs. Madan Lal Kapoor wherein this Court inter alia held as under: (2013) 3 SCC 330, paras 29-30)
29. The issue being examined in the instant case is the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., if it chooses to quash the initiation of the prosecution against an accused, at the stage of issuing process, or at the stage of committal, or even at the stage of framing of charges. These are all stages before the commencement of the actual trial. The same parameters would naturally be available for later stages as well. The power vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., at the stages referred to hereinabove, would have far reaching consequences, inasmuch as, it would negate the prosecution's/complainant's case without allowing the prosecution/complainant to lead ::: Downloaded on - 16/05/2026 12:19:17 :::CIS 12 evidence. Such a determination must always be rendered with caution, care and circumspection. To invoke its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. the High Court .
has to be fully satisfied, that the material produced by the accused is such, that would lead to the conclusion, that his/their defence is based on sound, reasonable, and indubitable facts; the material produced is such, as would rule out and displace the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused; and the material produced is of such, as would clearly reject and overrule the veracity of the allegations contained in the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant. It should be sufficient to rule out, rt reject and discard the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant, without the necessity of recording any evidence. For this the material relied upon by the defence should not have been refuted, or alternatively, cannot be justifiably refuted, being material of sterling and impeccable quality. The material relied upon by the accused should be such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the actual basis of the accusations as false. In such a situation, the judicial conscience of the High Court would persuade it to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash such criminal proceedings, for that would prevent abuse of process of the court, and secure the ends of justice.
30. Based on the factors canvassed in the foregoing paragraphs, we would delineate the following steps to determine the veracity of a prayer for quashing, raised by an accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.:-
30.1 Step one, whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable, i.e., the material is of sterling and impeccable quality?::: Downloaded on - 16/05/2026 12:19:17 :::CIS 13
30.2 Step two, whether the material relied upon by the accused, would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused, i.e., the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint, i.e., the material is such, as .
would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false. 30.3 Step three, whether the material relied upon by the accused, has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such, that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution/complainant?
of 30.4 Step four, whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice?
30.5 If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it rt to quash such criminal - proceedings, in exercise of power vested in it under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.
Such exercise of power, besides doing justice to the accused, would save precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as, proceedings arising therefrom) specially when, it is clear that the same would not conclude in the conviction of the accused."
15. It is quite apparent from the bare perusal of aforesaid judgments passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court from time to time that where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him/her due to private and personal grudge, High Court while exercising power under Section 482 Cr.PC can proceed to quash the proceedings.
16. The Hon'ble Apex Court in case tilted Anand Kumar Mohatta and Anr. v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) Department of Home and Anr, AIR 2019 SC 210, has held that abuse ::: Downloaded on - 16/05/2026 12:19:17 :::CIS 14 of process caused by FIR stands aggravated if the FIR has taken the form of a charge sheet after investigation and as such, the abuse of .
law or miscarriage of justice can be rectified by the court while exercising power under Section 482 Cr.PC. The relevant paras of the judgment are as under:
16. Even otherwise it must be remembered that the provision invoked by the accused before the High Court is Section 482 of Cr. P.C and that this Court is hearing an appeal from an order under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. Section 482 of Cr.P.C reads as follows:-
rt "482. Saving of inherent power of the High Court.-
Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice."
17. There is nothing in the words of this Section which restricts the exercise of the power of the Court to prevent the abuse of process of court or miscarriage of justice only to the stage of the FIR. It is settled principle of law that the High court can exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C even when the discharge application is pending with the trial court ( G. Sagar Suri and Anr. V. State of U.P. and Others, (2000) 2 SCC 636 (para 7), Umesh Kumar v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Anr. (2013) 10 SCC 591 (para 20). Indeed, it would be a travesty to hold that proceedings initiated against a person can be interfered with at the stage of FIR but not if it has advanced, and the allegations have materialized into a charge sheet. On the contrary it could be said that the abuse of process caused by FIR stands aggravated if the FIR has taken the form of a charge sheet after investigation. The power is undoubtedly conferred to prevent abuse of process of power of any court."
::: Downloaded on - 16/05/2026 12:19:17 :::CIS 1517. The Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. The State of Maharashtra and Anr, (2019) 9 .
SCC 608, has elaborated the scope of exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.PC, the relevant para whereof reads as under:-
"7. Section 482 is an overriding section which saves the inherent powers of the court to advance the cause of justice. Under Section 482 the inherent jurisdiction of the court can be of exercised (i) to give effect to an order under the CrPC; (ii) to prevent the abuse of the process of the court; and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. The powers of the court rt under Section 482 are wide and the court is vested with a significant amount of discretion to decide whether or not to exercise them. The court should be guarded in the use of its extraordinary jurisdiction to quash an FIR or criminal proceeding as it denies the prosecution the opportunity to establish its case through investigation and evidence. These principles have been consistently followed and re-iterated by this Court. In Inder Mohan Goswami v State of Uttaranchal, this Court observed.
"23. This Court in a number of cases has laid down the scope and ambit of courts' powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Every High Court has inherent powers to act ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice, for the administration of which alone it exists, or to prevent abuse of the process of the court. Inherent power under Section 482 CrPC can be exercised:
(i) to give effect to an order under the Code;
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of the court, and
(iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice.
24. Inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C though wide have to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution and only when exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in this section itself. Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading to ::: Downloaded on - 16/05/2026 12:19:17 :::CIS 16 injustice is brought to the notice of the court, then the court would be justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers in absence of specific provisions in the statute."
.
8. Given the varied nature of cases that come before the High Courts, any strict test as to when the court's extraordinary powers can be exercised is likely to tie the court's hands in the face of future injustices. This Court in State of Haryana v Bhajan Lal conducted a detailed study of the situations where the court of may exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction and laid down a list of illustrative examples of where quashing may be appropriate. It is not necessary to discuss all the examples, but a few bear relevance to the present case. The court in Bhajan Lal noted rt that quashing may be appropriate where, (2007) 12 SCC 1 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 "102. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2). ..........
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."
In deciding whether to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482, the Court does not adjudicate upon the veracity of the ::: Downloaded on - 16/05/2026 12:19:17 :::CIS 17 facts alleged or enter into an appreciation of competing evidence presented. The limited question is whether on the face of the FIR, the allegations constitute a cognizable offence.
.
As this Court noted in Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v State of Maharashtra, 2018 SCC OnLine SC3100 ("Dhruvaram Sonar"):
"13. It is clear that for quashing proceedings, meticulous analysis of factum of taking cognizance of an offence by the Magistrate is not called for. Appreciation of evidence is also not permissible in exercise of inherent powers. If of the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance has been taken, it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of its inherent powers."
18. rt Aforesaid law, clearly stipulates that court can exercise power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to quash criminal proceedings, in cases, where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
19. Now being guided by the aforesaid proposition of law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court, this Court would make an endeavor to examine and consider the prayer made in the instant petition vis-à-
vis factual matrix of the case.
20. At first instance, it came to be argued at the behest of petitioner that since petitioner is alleged to have committed offences punishable under Sections 504, 506 & 507 of Indian Penal Code, which are non-cognizable, the Investigating Officer could not have straightaway lodged FIR, rather in that situation, permission ought to ::: Downloaded on - 16/05/2026 12:19:17 :::CIS 18 have been obtained from the Judicial Magistrate. However, having carefully perused Section 155 of Cr.P.C, this Court is not persuaded .
to accept the aforesaid contention raised at the behest of the petitioner. Section 155 Cr.P.C. reads as under:-
"Section 155 - Information as to non-cognizable cases and investigation of such cases.
of
1. When information is given to an officer in charge of a police station of the commission within the limits of such station of a non-cognizable offence, he shall enter or cause to be entered the substance of the information in a book to rt be kept by such officer in such form as the State Government may prescribe in this behalf, and refer, the informant to the Magistrate.
2. No police officer shall investigate a non-cognizable case without the order of a Magistrate having power to try such case or commit the case for trial.
3. Any police officer receiving such order may exercise the same powers in respect of the investigation (except the power to arrest without warrant) as an officer in charge of a police station may exercise in a cognizable case.
4. Where a case relates to two or more offences of which at least one is cognizable, the case shall be deemed to be a cognizable case, notwithstanding that the other offences are non-cognizable."
21. Though in terms of aforesaid provision of law no police officer shall investigate a non-cognizable case without the order of a Magistrate having power to try such case or commit the case for trial, but careful perusal of Section 155 (4) Cr.P.C suggests that where a ::: Downloaded on - 16/05/2026 12:19:17 :::CIS 19 case relates to two or more offences of which at least one is cognizable, the case shall be deemed to be a cognizable case, .
notwithstanding that the other offences are non-cognizable. True it is that offences under Sections 504 & 507 of Indian Penal Code are non-cognizable, but offence under Section 506 of Indian Penal Code is cognizable in the State of Himachal Pradesh. At this stage, it would of be apt to take note of Sections 504, 506 & 507 of Indian Penal Code:-
"Section 504 of IPC:- Intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of the peace.
rt Whoever intentionally insults, and thereby gives provocation to any person, intending or knowing it to be likely that such provocation will cause him to break the public peace, or to commit any other offence, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.
Section 506 of IPC:- Punishment for criminal intimidation Whoever commits the offence of criminal intimidation shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both;
If threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc - and if the threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, or to cause the destruction of any property by fire, or to cause an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, of with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, or to impute unchastity to a woman, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both.
Section 507 of IPC:- Criminal intimidation by an anonymous communication ::: Downloaded on - 16/05/2026 12:19:17 :::CIS 20 Whoever commits the offence of criminal intimidation by an anonymous communication, or having taken precaution to conceal the name or abode of the person from whom the threat comes, shall be punished with imprisonment of either .
description for a term which may extend to two years, in addition to the punishment provided for the offence by the last preceding section.
22. Bare perusal of aforesaid provisions of law clearly reveals of that same are non-cognizable, as such, Investigation Officer could not have investigated a case registered under aforesaid provisions of law rt without there being order of a Magistrate having power to try such case or commit the case for trial. However, as has been taken note hereinabove, Section 506 of Indian Penal Code has been notified to be cognizable and non-bailable within the territory of Himachal Pradesh as per notifications detailed hereinabove. If it is so, no illegality can be said to have been committed by the Investigating Officer, while conducting the investigation in the case registered against the petitioner without there being order from the Magistrate of the area concerned. Since offence alleged to have been committed by the petitioner under Section 506 of Indian Penal Code is cognizable, while the other two offences alleged to have been committed by the petitioner under Section 504 & 507 of Indian Penal Code are non-
cognizable, Section 155(4) of Indian Penal Code would come into operation, which clearly provides that where a case relates to two or more offences of which at least one is cognizable, the case shall be ::: Downloaded on - 16/05/2026 12:19:17 :::CIS 21 deemed to be a cognizable case, notwithstanding that the other offences are non-cognizable. Now, this Court shall proceed to test the .
correctness of other submissions raised at the behest of the petitioner that no case is made out against the petitioner under Sections 504, 506 & 507 of Indian Penal Code.
23. Having carefully perused basic ingredients of Sections of 504 and 507 viz-a-viz contents of derogatory and abusive email allegedly sent by the petitioner, this Court is persuaded to agree with rt Mr. Ankush Dass Sood, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that no case much less case under aforesaid provisions of law is made out against the petitioner. Bare perusal of Section 504 of Indian Penal Code, which has been reproduced hereinabove, suggests that whoever intentionally insults, and thereby gives provocation to any person with the intent or knowledge that such insult would provoke either disturbance of public peace, or commission of any offence, shall be liable to be punished with imprisonment for a term, which may extend to two years or with fine, or with both. Section 504 of Indian Penal Code comprises of the following ingredients viz.:-
(a) intentional insult, (b) the insult must be such as to give provocation to the person insulted, and (c) the accused must intend or know that such provocation would cause another to break public peace or to commit any other offence. The intentional insult must be of such a degree that should provoke a person to break public peace or to ::: Downloaded on - 16/05/2026 12:19:17 :::CIS 22 commit any other offence. If a person intentionally insults another, intending or knowing it to be likely that such insult will provoke that .
person, and such provocation is likely to cause a breach of the public peace or the commission of any other offence, then the ingredients of Section 504 of the Indian Penal Code can be said to be satisfied. One of the essential elements constituting the offence is that there should of have been an act or conduct amounting to intentional insult and the mere fact that the accused abused the complainant, as such, is not rt sufficient by itself to warrant a conviction under Section 504 Indian Penal Code. Reliance in this regard is placed upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Fiona Shrikhande v. State of Maharashtra [Fiona Shrikhande v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 14 SCC 44 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 715 : AIR 2014 SC 957]. While placing reliance upon its earlier judgment passed in Fiona Shrikhande (supra), Hon'ble Apex Court, in case titled Madhushree Datt Vs. State of Karnataka and another along with Badrinarayana Jaganathan Vs. State of Karnataka and another, (2025) 3 Supreme Court Cases 612, decided on 24.01.2025, reiterated that mere act of insulting someone, does not fulfill its requirements of Section 504 of Indian Penal Code, rather insult, must be of such a nature as to provoke the person insulted to breach the public peace or engage in criminal conduct.
::: Downloaded on - 16/05/2026 12:19:17 :::CIS 2324. Allegedly, in the case at hand, petitioner sent a mail to the complainant containing highly derogatory and objectionable .
remarks. Since contents of email, which are the subject matter of the present case, have already been reproduced hereinabove, this Court does not see any necessity to take note of same again for the sake of brevity. No doubt, filthy expressions and language have been used by of the perpetrator against the mother and sister of the complainant in the afore communication, but there is nothing to suggest/conclude that rt petitioner, while sending aforesaid email, had intentionally provoked the complainant to commit breach of public peace or to commit any other offence. Perpetrator i.e. petitioner appears to have been disturbed by the certain utterances allegedly made by the complainant qua organization namely ABVP and to express his anguish, he allegedly sent email, thereby informing the complainant that he along with other like-minded persons was well aware of his activities. If the email in question is read in its entirety, it not only mentions/indicates about the petitioner, but also suggests that there was some another person at whose instance complainant allegedly uttered non-sense about organization named hereinabove.
25. The background facts, circumstances, the occasion, the manner in which words were used, the person or persons to whom they were addressed, the time and the conduct of the person who indulged in such actions are all relevant factors to be borne in mind ::: Downloaded on - 16/05/2026 12:19:17 :::CIS 24 while examining a complaint lodged for initiating proceedings under Section 504 of Indian Penal Code. No doubt, in the case at hand, .
petitioner used filthy language, while apprising the complainant about his uncalled-for act, but no allegation of extending threat is made against the petitioner in the complaint. Moreover, there is nothing to suggest that afore act of using filthy language and insulting the of complainant by the petitioner provoked him to commit breach of public peace or to commit any other offence. Therefore, from the material on rt record, the ingredients of offence under Section 504 of Indian Penal Code, as taken note hereinabove, are not satisfied. Again for ascertaining whether prima facie the provision of Section 506 of Indian Penal Code is made out, this Court need to read said provision juxtaposing contents of alleged derogatory email. As has been observed hereinabove, Section 506 of Indian Penal Code provides for punishment for alleged act of criminal intimidation, which is otherwise defined under Section 503 of Indian Penal Code. Bare reading of definition of "Criminal intimidation" reveals that there must be an act of threatening another person with injury to his person, reputation, or property, or to the person, reputation, or property of anyone in whom the threatened person is interested. Most importantly, the threat must be made with the intent to cause alarm to the person threatened or it must be to do any act which he is not ::: Downloaded on - 16/05/2026 12:19:17 :::CIS 25 legally bound to do or omit to do an act which he is legally entitled to do.
.
26. At the cost of repetition, it is reiterated that perusal of derogatory email in question though suggests that perpetrator i.e. petitioner used filthy language, not only against the complainant, but also against his family members, however, it is difficult to conclude of that, while doing so, he extended any threat of causing injury to the complainant, his family members, reputation, or property. Perpetrator rt i.e. petitioner, being disturbed with the alleged utterances made by the complainant with regard to organization namely ABVP, by way of email apprised the complainant that he along with other like-minded persons was aware of his activities, which he was allegedly doing at the instance of some other person. Though perpetrator had allegedly used expression "Tu to gya", but that would not be sufficient to constitute threat, if any, much less to constitute an offence under Section 506 of Indian Penal Code. Most importantly, to establish an offence of criminal intimidation, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to establish that perpetrator had the intention to cause alarm to the complainant or person threatened. There is nothing in complaint, on the basis of which FIR came to be instituted, to suggest that petitioner herein extended threats with intent to cause harm to the complainant, rather same appears to have been sent to express his anguish qua alleged uncalled-for activities of the complainant.
::: Downloaded on - 16/05/2026 12:19:17 :::CIS 2627. In afore background, this Court is persuaded to conclude that ingredients of Section 506 of Indian Penal Code prima facie are .
not disclosed against the petitioner.
28. Section 507 of Indian Penal Code reveals that whoever commits the offence of criminal intimidation by an anonymous communication, or having taken precaution to conceal the name or of abode of the person from whom the threat comes, shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to two years. Aforesaid rt provision of law could not have been invoked in the case of the petitioner for two reasons: first, the alleged criminal intimidation was not through anonymous communication; rather, as per the case of prosecution, same originated from the IP address of the petitioner.
Secondly, this Court, in the earlier part of the judgment, has already arrived at a conclusion that no offence of criminal intimidation, which is punishable under Section 506 of Indian Penal Code, is made out. If it is so, Section 507 of Indian Penal Code cannot be said to be applicable in the case of the petitioner. At this stage, this Court intends to take note of two judgments passed by Hon'ble Apex Court, which very aptly applies to the present case. In Fiona Shrikhande (supra), Hon'ble Apex Court, while interpreting Section 507 of Indian Penal Code, held that to attract said offence, there must be an act or conduct on the part of the accused, which must amount to intentional insult to a person with knowledge that it would provoke him to break ::: Downloaded on - 16/05/2026 12:19:17 :::CIS 27 public peace or to commit any other offence. Relevant paras of the afore judgment are extracted hereinbelow:-
.
"13. Section 504IPC comprises of the following ingredients viz. : (a) intentional insult, (b) the insult must be such as to give provocation to the person insulted, and (c) the accused must intend or know that such provocation would cause another to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. The intentional insult must be of such a degree that should provoke a person to break the public peace or to of commit any other offence. The person who intentionally insults intending or knowing it to be likely that it will give provocation to any other person and such provocation will rt cause to break the public peace or to commit any other offence, in such a situation, the ingredients of Section 504 are satisfied. One of the essential elements constituting the offence is that there should have been an act or conduct amounting to intentional insult and the mere fact that the accused abused the complainant, as such, is not sufficient by itself to warrant a conviction under Section 504IPC.
14. We may also indicate that it is not the law that the actual words or language should figure in the complaint. One has to read the complaint as a whole and, by doing so, if the Magistrate comes to a conclusion, prima facie, that there has been an intentional insult so as to provoke any person to break the public peace or to commit any other offence, that is sufficient to bring the complaint within the ambit of Section 504IPC. It is not the law that a complainant should verbatim reproduce each word or words capable of provoking the other person to commit any other offence. The background facts, circumstances, the occasion, the manner in which they are used, the person or persons to whom they are addressed, the time, the conduct of the person who has indulged in such actions are all relevant factors to be borne in mind while examining a complaint lodged for initiating proceedings under Section 504 IPC."::: Downloaded on - 16/05/2026 12:19:17 :::CIS 28
(emphasis supplied)
29. In Madhushree Datt (supra), Hon'ble Apex Court had an .
occasion to deal with the applicability of Sections 504, 506 and 507 of Indian Penal Code. Relevant paras of the afore judgment are extracted hereinbelow:-
"22. The next question for determination is, whether the mere of assertion of "filthy language" allegedly used by the appellants in scolding the complainant, is sufficient to establish commission of offences under Sections 504 and 509IPC.
rt
23. In the above context, it would be apt to consider the provisions contained in Section 504IPC.
24. A perusal of Section 504 IPC reveals that a mere act of insulting someone does not fulfil its requirements; the insult must be of such a nature that it provokes the person insulted to breach the public peace or engage in criminal conduct. Therefore, to establish the ingredients of Section 504 IPC, it must be demonstrated, based on the available material, that there was intentional insult with the intent or knowledge that such insult would provoke either disturbance of the public peace or the commission of any other offence.
26. In the instant case, the charge-sheet states that the appellants used "filthy language" while scolding the complainant; however, no such allegation is made against the appellants in the complaint. Furthermore, it is nowhere alleged that this act of using filthy language and insulting the complainant by the appellants, has provoked the complainant to commit breach of public peace or to commit any other offence. Therefore, from the materials on record, the ingredients of the offence under Section 504IPC, as explained in the abovesaid decision, are not satisfied.::: Downloaded on - 16/05/2026 12:19:17 :::CIS 29
27. For ascertaining whether, prima facie, the provision of Section 509IPC was attracted, it is essential to first understand the meaning of the term "modesty", to determine whether modesty has been insulted. While modesty is not explicitly defined in IPC, this Court .
has addressed the essence of a woman's modesty in the decision in Ramkripal v. State of M.P. [Ramkripal v. State of M.P., (2007) 11 SCC 265 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 674] Excerpts from the decision read as under : (SCC pp. 266-67, para 7) "7. ... '12. What constitutes an outrage to female modesty is of nowhere defined in IPC. The essence of a woman's modesty is her sex. The culpable intention of the accused is the crux of the matter. The reaction of the woman is very relevant, but its absence is not always decisive. Modesty in this rt Section is an attribute associated with female human beings as a class. It is a virtue which attaches to a female owing to her sex.' "
(emphasis supplied)
28. Further, this Court while discussing the test for outraging the modesty of a woman under Section 509IPC in Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill [Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill, (1995) 6 SCC 194 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 1059] , observed as under : (SCC p. 206, para 15) "15. In State of Punjab v. Major Singh [State of Punjab v. Major Singh, 1966 SCC OnLine SC 51 : AIR 1967 SC 63] a question arose whether a female child of seven- and-a-half months could be said to be possessed of "modesty" which could be outraged. In answering the above question Mudholkar, J., who along with Bachawat, J. spoke for the majority, held that when any act done to or in the presence of a woman is clearly suggestive of sex according to the common notions of mankind that must fall within the mischief of Section 354IPC. Needless to say, the "common notions of mankind" referred to by the learned Judge have to be gauged by contemporary societal standards. The other learned Judge (Bachawat, J.) observed that the essence of ::: Downloaded on - 16/05/2026 12:19:17 :::CIS 30 a woman's modesty is her sex and from her very birth she possesses the modesty which is the attribute of her sex. From the above dictionary meaning of "modesty" and the interpretation given to that word by this Court in Major Singh .
case [State of Punjab v. Major Singh, 1966 SCC OnLine SC 51 : AIR 1967 SC 63] it appears to us that the ultimate test for ascertaining whether modesty has been outraged, is the action of the offender such as could be perceived as one which is capable of shocking the sense of decency of a woman."
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29. The conclusion that emerges from the above discussion is that it will be essential for this Court to carefully assess the evidence presented, in order to determine whether there is sufficient material rt to establish the intention and knowledge on the part of the appellants, to insult the modesty of the complainant or, to put it pithily, whether any act was intended to shock the sense of decency of the complainant being a woman.
30. The term "filthy language", when examined in isolation, and without any contextual framework or accompanying words, indicating an intent to insult the complainant's modesty, does not fall within the purview of Section 509IPC. Had there been references to specific words used, contextual details, or any gestures--whether preceding, succeeding, or accompanying these words--that could demonstrate a criminal intent to insult the modesty, and it might have assisted the prosecution in establishing the case against the appellants.
31. In considering the term "filthy language" objectively, in the overall conspectus of the case, we are of the view that the appellants' actions do not demonstrate the requisite intent or knowledge that would reasonably lead to the conclusion that their conduct could provoke such a severe emotional response as to constitute an insult to a woman's modesty.
::: Downloaded on - 16/05/2026 12:19:17 :::CIS 3132. Be that as it may, it goes without saying that each case must be assessed having regard to the specific facts and circumstances, not only of the case itself, but also of the individuals involved in the alleged incident. It is undisputed that the complainant and the .
appellants were positioned as an employee and senior officials, respectively. Moreover, it is evident from the case presented by both parties that a dispute existed between them with regard to the employment in question.
33. To reiterate, in the present case, the complaint does not indicate of that the appellants used language towards the complainant that would warrant an offence under Section 509IPC. However, the charge-sheet alleges that the appellants scolded the complainant rt using "filthy language". Notably, this allegation is also absent in the FIR.
34. In light of the employer-employee relationship between the appellants and the complainant; the existing dispute between them relating to the employment; the absence of any references to specific words used, contextual details, or accompanying gestures
--whether preceding or succeeding the alleged words--the failure to mention the use of any "filthy language" in the complaint; and the fact that this allegation is only found in the charge-sheet : there are serious concerns regarding the claim of insulting modesty of the complainant by the appellants. Considering the materials available on record, we are of the view that prima facie ingredients of an offence under Section 509IPC have not been disclosed.
35. This brings us to the offence under Section 506IPC, which the High Court has found to be prima facie disclosed against the appellants. Section 506IPC prescribes the punishment for the offence of criminal intimidation, while Section 503 defines the offence of criminal intimidation.
36. This Court had the occasion to examine the ingredients of Sections 503 and 506IPC in Manik Taneja v. State of Karnataka [Manik Taneja v. State of Karnataka, (2015) 7 SCC 423 :
::: Downloaded on - 16/05/2026 12:19:17 :::CIS 32(2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 132] , wherein it was observed as follows : (SCC p. 428, para 11) "11. ... A reading of the definition of "criminal intimidation"
would indicate that there must be an act of threatening to .
another person, of causing an injury to the person, reputation, or property of the person threatened, or to the person in whom the threatened person is interested and the threat must be with the intent to cause alarm to the person threatened or it must be to do any act which he is not legally bound to do or omit to do an act which he is legally entitled of to do."
37. In the present case, the complaint does not specifically attribute rt any threats or intimidation to the second accused. Therefore, ingredients of Section 506IPC, prima facie, are not made out against him. The argument that the first accused acted at the behest of the second accused is untenable, as Section 34IPC, which imposes vicarious liability in criminal matters, has not been applied in this case.
38. However, the complainant has stated in her complaint that she was threatened by the first accused, as detailed below:
"Then on 25-10-2013 at about 2.00 p.m. and 3.00 p.m. one Madhushiree Dutta (HR) asked me to forcefully resign or otherwise I will be sent out immediately. Further she abruptly asked me not to come for my work henceforth."
39. Before an offence of criminal intimidation to be made out against the first accused, it must be established that she had the intention to cause alarm to the complainant. A review of the alleged threat reveals that the complainant is primarily alleging illegal termination, which constitutes a civil dispute, rather than criminal intimidation. It is also the appellants' case, which has not been disputed by the complainant, that the complainant has filed a reference before the Labour Court challenging her termination and seeking reinstatement along with back wages. Given these circumstances and the ::: Downloaded on - 16/05/2026 12:19:17 :::CIS 33 materials on record, the ingredients of Section 506IPC, prima facie, are not disclosed against the first accused too.
30. In afore case, Hon'ble Apex Court, while relying upon its .
earlier judgments, reiterated that before offence of criminal intimidation is made out against the perpetrator, it must be established that she/he intentionally caused alarm to the complainant.
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31. In the instant case, there is nothing to suggest that there was intentional insult at the behest of the petitioner with intent or knowledge to provoke disturbance of public peace or commission of rt any other offence. Similarly, complaint, on the basis of which FIR came to be lodged, nowhere reveals that perpetrator i.e. petitioner had an intention to cause alarm to the complainant, rather as has been observed hereinabove, email, which is the subject matter of the present case, appears to have been sent to the complainant to make him aware that perpetrator i.e. petitioner herein as well as other like-
minded persons were aware of his activities, but while doing so, some filthy language was used, which is not sufficient to conclude criminal intimidation.
32. Having scanned the entire material adduced on record, vis-à-vis prayer made in the instant petition, this Court is persuaded to agree with learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that this Court, while exercising power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., may proceed to quash the charge-sheet/challan submitted against the petitioner, ::: Downloaded on - 16/05/2026 12:19:17 :::CIS 34 because continuance thereof would be sheer abuse of process of law, since, for the reasons stated herein above, case of prosecution is .
bound to fail against the petitioner in all probabilities. Otherwise also, in case prayer made on behalf of the petitioner is not accepted, he would be subjected to unnecessary ordeal of facing protracted trial, which otherwise is bound to fail.
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33. Consequently, in view of detailed discussion made herein above and law taken into consideration, present petition is allowed.
rt Charge-sheet/challan arising out of FIR No.50 dated 10.03.2015, registered under Sections 504, 506 and 507 of the Indian Penal Code at Police Station Palampur, District Kangra, Himachal Pradesh, as well as consequent proceedings, are quashed and set aside qua the petitioner. The petitioner is discharged henceforth.
All pending applications, stand disposed of.
(Sandeep Sharma), Judge May 14, 2026 (sunil) ::: Downloaded on - 16/05/2026 12:19:17 :::CIS