Greater Noida Industrial Development ... vs Smt. Rajbala And 3 Others on 3 August, 2017

[Cites 33, Cited by 1]

Allahabad High Court

Greater Noida Industrial Development ... vs Smt. Rajbala And 3 Others on 3 August, 2017

Writ Petition No.21457 of 2017 has been filed by Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority, Gautam Budh Nagar1 to not only assail the award dated 30 June 2016 passed by Kamta Prasad Singh, Additional District Magistrate (Land Acquisition), Greater Noida2 made under section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 18943 on the application filed by Raj Bala, wife of Rajendra Singh, who has been impleaded as respondent no.1 to the writ petition but also for a direction upon the State through the Collector, Gautam Budh Nagar to recover the amount received by Raj Bala under the said award with interest at the rate of 18% per annum from the date of payment and for taking action against K.P. Singh who made the award.

Writ Petition No.21587 of 2017 has been filed by Greater Noida with prayers identical to that of Writ Petition No.21457 of 2017, namely to assail the award dated 30 June 2016 passed by K.P. Singh under section 28-A of the Act on the application filed by Rajendra Singh, who has been impleaded as respondent no.1 in the writ petition and also for a direction upon the State through the Collector, Gautam Budh Nagar to recover the amount received by Rajendra Singh under the award with interest at the rate of 18% per annum from the date of payment and for taking action against K.P. Singh who made the award.

Writ Petition No.32543 of 2017 has been filed by Raj Bala to assail the recovery notice dated 30 June 2017 issued by the Additional District Magistrate (Land Acquisition), Gautam Budh Nagar4 requiring Raj Bala to deposit Rs.45,14,212/-, which she had received as compensation under the award dated 30 June 2016 made by K.P. Singh under section 28-A of the Act, within one month from the date of receipt of the notice, failing which, it was stated, it would be recovered as arrears of land revenue.

All the three petitions basically deal with the applications filed by Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala under section 28-A of the Act and the orders passed on the said applications. Section 28-A of the Act deals with re-determination of the amount of compensation awarded by the Collector under section 11 of the Act. It provides that persons interested in all other land covered by the same section 4(1) notification who are also aggrieved by the award of the Collector, may by written application to the Collector within three months from the award of the Reference Court, require the amount of compensation payable to them to be re-determined.

The records reveal that a notification under section 4(1) of the Act was issued on 1 March 1989 acquiring large tracts of land for development of an Industrial Area in Tehsil Sikandarabad of District Bulandshahar (now Tehsil Sadar of District Gautam Budh Nagar). This was followed by a declaration made under section 6 of the Act on 31 March 1989. Land belonging to Raj Bala and Rajendra Singh were included in the aforesaid notification and declaration. The award was made by the Special Land Acquisition Officer on 13 December 1991 in which the market rate of the land was determined at Rs.11/- per square yard. Both, Raj Bala and Rajendra Singh filed Reference Applications under section 18 of the Act which were registered as LAR No.324 of 1992 and LAR No.325 of 1992. The Reference Court by its award dated 18 July 1994 enhanced the market rate of the land from Rs.11/- per square yard to Rs.39.50 per square yard. Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala also filed First Appeals in the High Court under section 54 of the Act for enhancement of the compensation. They were registered as First Appeal No.282 of 2007 and First Appeal No.283 of 2007. It was urged by learned counsel for the appellants that in regard to the same acquisition, the Reference Court in some other matters had enhanced the compensation to Rs.65/- per square yard, which enhancement had been upheld by the High Court and the Supreme Court. The High Court Court, while deciding the aforesaid First Appeals filed by Rajendra Singh and his wife Raj Bala, noted that both the parties in the Appeals were not at issue in this regard and had agreed that the market rate of the acquired land determined at Rs.65/- per square yard had been affirmed. The High Court, accordingly, decided the two Appeals on 25 April 2014 in the following terms :

"Learned counsel for both the parties are not at issue in this regard and agreed that market value of the acquired land determined @ Rs.65/- per sq. yard has been affirmed.

The issue in these two appeals is squarely covered by the aforesaid judgment.

In view of above, these two appeals are liable to be dismissed and accordingly stand dismissed."

The market rate had been enhanced from Rs.39.50/- per square yard to Rs.65/- per square yard and, therefore, the two First Appeals should have been allowed but an error crept and they were dismissed. It is for this reason that both Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala filed applications in these two decided First Appeals for correction of the operative part of the order. However, during the course of hearing of the applications it was pointed out by learned counsel for Greater Noida that earlier Greater Noida had filed applications in these two decided First Appeals for dismissing the Appeals with costs for the reason that the two Appellants had in fact entered into a settlement before the Executing Court that they were fully satisfied with the award rendered by the Reference Court and they would not raise any claim for enhancement of compensation in future. It was also stated that the Execution Cases had been dismissed for this reason by order dated 9 May 2005 passed by the District Judge. Applications for modification of the judgment were also filed by Greater Noida pointing out these facts and after inviting objections from the appellants, the High Court by a detailed order dated 30 July 2014, not only recalled the judgment and order dated 25 April 2014 but dismissed both the two First Appeals with costs assessed at Rs.25,000/- against each appellant. The Court noticed that it had been misled into passing the order as distorted and incorrect facts had been placed. The relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced below :

"It may be noticed at this stage that when the matter was heard and judgment dated 25-4-2014 was delivered it was with the consent of the learned counsel for both the parties. At that time, the counsel appearing for both the parties never pointed out the aforesaid facts which further misled the Court to believe that the issue involved in the appeal is squarely covered by the judgment rendered in First Appeal No. 111 of 2005. However, today Sri B.B. Jauhari who is now representing the Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority has come up with the modification application along with an affidavit mentioning all the details which stand verified from the record of the case. The Court records with displeasure that it was misled, by placing distorted and incorrect facts, to pass the judgment and order dated 25.04.2014.

When the appellants agreed before the executing court to accept the award rendered in reference in full and final satisfaction of their claim and the execution was closed vide order dated 9.5.1995, there was no reason or occasion for the appellants to continue the appeal any further and it was solemn duty of the appellants and their counsel to have pointed out this fact before the Court which they miserably failed. Even the counsel appearing for Greater Noida Authority also at that time did not place the correct facts.

There is no denial on the part of the appellant that they had accepted the award made in the reference in full and final satisfaction of their claim.

For the aforesaid facts and discussion, the judgment dated 25-04-2014 is recalled.

Both the appeals are dismissed with cost which is assessed Rs.25,000/- (Twenty Five thousand) against each appellant in both the appeals. The appellants shall deposit the cost with the District Legal Service Authority, Gautam Budh Nagar within a period of one month from today, failing which the District Legal Service Authority may realize the same in accordance with law.

Registry is directed to send a copy of this judgment to the District Legal Service Authority, Gautam Budh Nagar."

(emphasis supplied) Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment dated 30 July 2014, both the appellants filed Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No.34557 - 34558 of 2014 before the Supreme Court. They were, however, dismissed as withdrawn by order dated 10 April 2015 in view of the statement made by learned counsel for the petitioners that they would file applications under section 28-A of the Act. The order passed by the Supreme Court is reproduced below :

"After some arguments the learned counsel for the petitioners seeks leave to withdraw these petitions so as to enable the petitioners to apply for change in the compensation as per the provisions of Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act. Permission granted.

Consequently, the special leave petitions are dismissed as withdrawn."

Thereafter, both Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala filed applications under section 28-A of the Act on 28 April 2016. The State of Uttar Pradesh was impleaded as opposite party no.1, while Greater Noida was impleaded as opposite party no.2. The two applications are identically worded and the following facts, in brief, were stated for re-determination of the amount of compensation on the basis of an award given by the Reference Court on 27 March 1999 in LAR No.91 of 1992 :

i. The Special Land Acquisition Officer made the award on 13 December 1991;

ii. The Reference Court gave the award on 30 December 1991 on their applications filed under section 18 of the Act and two Execution Case Nos.41 of 1994 and Execution Case No.43 of 1994 were filed by them for execution of the awards of the Reference Court. A compromise was entered into between the parties in the Execution Cases that the market rate of the land should be Rs.39/- per square yard;

iii. Two First Appeals were filed by them in the High Court for enhancement of the amount determined by the Reference Court and a consent order dated 25 April 2014 was passed by the High Court in these two First Appeals that the market rate of the land should be Rs.65/- per square yard;

iv. The appellants filed two Special Leave to Appeals before the Supreme Court. They were decided on 10 April 2014 by directing the petitioners to claim the enhanced market rate of Rs.65/- per square yard under section 28-A of the Act; and v. Thus, the compensation should be re-determined on the basis of the market rate determined at Rs.65/- per square yard in award dated 27 March 1999 made in LAR No.91 of 1992 arising out of the same acquisition.

Two separate awards both dated 30 June 2016 were made by the Special Land Acquisition Officer on these two applications filed under section 28-A of the Act. Both the awards are identically worded, except for the change in the names of the parties. The awards, briefly, are as follows :

i. The applicants have demanded re-determination of the compensation under section 28-A of the Act on the basis of the award made by the Reference Court in LAR No.91 of 1992 (Rameshwar Singh & Another Vs. State of U.P. & Another) on 27 August 1999, the judgment rendered by the High Court in First Appeal No.282 of 2007 (Rajendra Singh Vs. Greater Noida & Another) on 25 April 2014 and the judgment of the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal Nos.34557-34558 of 2014 (Rajendra Singh & Another Vs. Greater Noida & Another);

ii. The said judgments have been perused. LAR No.91 of 1992 (Rajendra Singh & 22 others Vs. State of U.P. & Another) decided on 27 August 1999 determined the market rate of the land at Rs.65/- per square yard. Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala had filed two First Appeals in the High Court placing reliance on the aforesaid award in LAR No.91 of 1992. The Appeals were dismissed by the High Court on 25 April 2014. Thereafter both Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala filed Special Leave to Appeals in the Supreme Court in which an order was passed on 10 April 2015 dismissing them as withdrawn so as to enable them to apply for change in the compensation as per the provisions of Section 28A of the Act;

iii. In compliance of the aforesaid order, records relating to acquisition of land of village Haldauna have been perused. The records reveal that together with the land of village Kasna, land situated in Gujarpur, Aaichhar and Haldauna were also acquired by the same notification dated 1 March 1989 issued under section 4(1) of the Act;

iv. From the records, it is clear that the land of the applicants are situated in village Haldauna and neither Raj Bala nor Rajendra Singh had filed any Reference Application under section 18 of the Act. In such circumstances, the application filed by Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala were maintainable under section 28-A of the Act; and v. The market rate of the land belonging to the applicants is, therefore, required to be determined at Rs.65/- per square yard under section 28-A of the Act as this rate was determined in LAR No.91 of 1992 that was decided on 27 March 1989. However, prior to receiving the said compensation, the applicants should execute an indemnity bond that in case any contrary order is passed, then the amount can be recovered from the movable/ immovable property of the applicants. Further, a demand letter should be sent to the acquiring body, namely Greater Noida, for deposit of the enhanced amount of compensation.

Greater Noida has filed Writ Petition No.21457 of 2017 and Writ Petition No.21587 of 2017 to assail these two awards, both dated 30 June 2017, made under section 28-A of the Act. Subsequently a notice dated 30 June 2017 was sent by the ADM (LA) to both Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala for deposit of the amount received by them under the said awards dated 30 June 2017. Raj Bala has filed Writ Petition No.32543 of 2017 to assail this notice.

Sri B.B. Jauhari has made submissions on behalf of Greater Noida in Writ Petition No.21457 of 2017 and Writ Petition No.21587 of 2017.

In Writ Petition No.21457 of 2017, Sri Y.D. Sharma has made submissions on behalf of respondent no.1-Raj Bala, while Sri M.C. Chaturvedi, learned Additional Advocate General has made submissions on behalf of State-respondent nos.2, 3 and 4. Sri Amit Saxena has made submissions on behalf of respondent no.4-K.P. Singh.

In Writ Petition No.21587 of 2017, Sri S.K. Mishra, learned counsel has made submissions on behalf of respondent no.1-Rajendra Singh while Sri M.C. Chaturvedi, learned Additional Advocate General has made submissions on behalf of the State-respondent nos.2, 3 and 4. Sri Amit Saxena has made submissions on behalf of respondent no.4-K.P. Singh.

Sri Y.D. Sharma has made submissions on behalf of the petitioner Raj Bala in Writ Petition No.32543 of 2017, while the learned Additional Advocate General Sri M.C. Chaturvedi has made submissions on behalf of the State-respondents. Sri B.B. Jauhari has made submissions on behalf of respondent no.3-Greater Noida.

Counter affidavits have been filed on behalf of the State-respondents and K.P. Singh in the two writ petitions filed by Greater Noida. No prayer has been made on behalf of Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala for filing the counter affidavit, presumably for the reason that Raj Bala has also filed a writ petition.

Sri B.B. Jauhari, learned counsel appearing for Greater Noida has submitted that the applications filed by Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala filed on 28 April 2016 under section 28-A of the Act were not maintainable as the two applicants had filed Reference Applications under section 18 of the Act and even First Appeals before the High Court which where dismissed. Learned Counsel, therefore, submitted that not only should the awards be set aside but a direction should also be issued to the claimants to deposit the amount they received on the basis of these two awards with interest at the rate of 18% per annum. Learned counsel further submitted that the applications filed under section 28-A of the Act cannot be said to be maintainable merely because a statement had been made by learned counsel appearing for the two applicants before the Supreme Court that the petitioners desired to withdraw them so as to enable them to file applications for change in the compensation as per the provisions of section 28-A of the Act. Learned counsel submitted that not only fraud had been committed by the two applicants in filing the two applications under section 28-A of the Act to obtain compensation which was not due to them, but even the officers of the State had colluded with the applicants as a result of which the two applicants received the amount which they were not entitled to receive.

Learned Additional Advocate General has placed before the Court the records of the department relating to payment of compensation to Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala and has also placed the various communications exchanged between ADM (LA) and Greater Noida as also the applications filed under section 28-A of the Act.

Sri Y.D. Sharma, learned counsel appearing for Raj Bala and Sri S.K. Mishra, learned counsel appearing for Rajendra Singh have, however, supported the impugned awards by submitting that when the other tenure holders had been granted compensation on the basis of the market rate determined at Rs.65/- per sqaure yard, the applicants who are covered by the same notification issued under section 4(1) of the Act, could not have been denied the benefit under section 28-A of the Act. To support their contentions, learned counsel relied upon certain decisions which shall be referred to at the appropriate stage. Learned counsel also referred to the communications dated 2 June 2016 and 21 June 2017 sent by K.P. Singh, the then Additional District Magistrate (Land Acquisition), Greater Noida and the communication dated 25 October 2016 sent by the then Additional Chief Executive Officer, Greater Noida5 to support their contention that Greater Noida did not object to the demand of compensation made by the ADM (LA). Learned counsel also contended that no consent had been given by the applicants that they would not seek enhanced compensation in future and in any case, the amount cannot be demanded from them without inviting objections.

Sri Amit Saxena, learned counsel appearing for K.P. Singh, who made the two awards under section 28-A of the Act, has, however, contended that the awards were passed in a bona fide manner and in fact the applicants had concealed material facts inasmuch as it was not stated in the applications that the judgment and order dated 25 April 2014 passed in the two First Appeals filed by Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala had been recalled and the two First Appeals had been dismissed subsequently on 30 July 2014 with costs. It is his submission that communications dated 2 June 2016 and 21 June 2016 were sent to the ACEO for deposit of the amount of compensation and by the letter dated 28 October 2016, the ACEO informed that the amount of Rs.1,05,39,050/- which had earlier been made available by Greater Noida could be utilised for compliance of the awards dated 30 June 2016 and additional demand, if required, could also be made. Learned counsel also pointed out that K.P. Singh was subsequently transferred on 12 December 2016 and the payment was not made by him on 17 February 2017 and in fact it is only on 22 March 2017 that the Greater Noida filed the application for recall of the award dated 30 June 2016.

We have considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties.

The issues involved in these petitions relate to the filing of two applications by Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala on 28 April 2016 under section 28-A of the Act. It would, therefore, be appropriate at this stage to refer to the provisions of the Act relevant for consideration of the issues. The award is made by the Collector under Section 11 of the Act. Section 18 provides that any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter may be referred by the Collector for the determination of the amount of compensation by the Court. It is as follows:

"18 Reference to Court:

(1) Any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court, whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the persons to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested.

(2) The application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken: Provided that every such application shall be made,

(a) if the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award, within six weeks from the date of the Collector's award;

(b) in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under section 12, sub-section (2), or within six months from the date of the Collector's award, whichever period shall first expire."

Section 28-A of the Act deals with re-determination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the award of the Reference Court and is reproduced :

"Re-determination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the award of the Court. - (1) Where in an award under this Part, the Court allows to the applicant any amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11, the persons interested in all the other land covered by the same notification under Section 4, sub-section (1) and who are also aggrieved by the award of the Collector may, notwithstanding that they had not made an application to the Collector under section 18, by written application to the Collector within three months from the date of the award of the Court require that the amount of compensation payable to them may be re-determined on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the Court:

Provided that in computing the period of three months within which an application to the Collector shall be made under this sub-section, the day on which the award was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded.

(2) The Collector shall, on receipt of an application under sub-section (1), conduct an inquiry after giving notice to all the persons interested and giving them a reasonable opportunity of being heard, and make an award determining the amount of compensation payable to the applicants.

(3) Any person who has not accepted the award under sub-section (2) may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court and the provisions of Sections 18 to 28 shall, so far as may be, apply to such reference as they apply to a reference under Section 18."

The averments made in the writ petition and in the affidavits by the parties and the documents available in the file produced by the State reveal the following material facts in connection with the applications filed under section 28-A of the Act, the making of the awards and payment of compensation under the award :

i.

13.12.1991 The Special Land Acquisition Officer made the award under section 11 of the Act for the land acquired and determined the market rate of the land at Rs.11/- per square yard.

ii.

18.7.1994 LAR No.324 of 1992 filed by Raj Bala and LAR No.325 of 1992 filed by Rajendra Singh were decided by the Reference Court under section 18 of the Act on 18 July 1994. The market rate of the land acquired was enhanced to Rs.39.50/- per square yard.

iii.

9.5.1995 Two execution case bearing Execution Case No.41 of 1994 filed by Rajendra Singh and Execution Case No.43 of 1994 filed by Raj Bala were disposed of and consigned to record by the District Judge, Bulandshahar as payment was made pursuant to a compromise entered into between the parties in the form of affidavits filed by the two claimants Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala wherein they categorically stated that the decree holders have entered into a compromise with Greater Noida and that they are satisfied with the decreetal amount and shall not claim any further amount against this acquisition in future.

iv.

1995

Two defective First Appeals bearing Nos.(5) of 1995 and (16) of 1995 were filed by Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala for enhancement of the compensation. These Appeals were dismissed in default on 9 July 2005 but they were restored on 15 December 2006. The deficiency in Court Fees was made good and they were numbered as First Appeal Nos.282 of 2007 and First Appeal No.283 of 2007.

12.12.2007 Both the First Appeals were admitted and the notices were issued to the respondents. The respondent-Greater Noida put in appearance and filed an application with an affidavit for dismissal of the Appeal on the ground that the claimants had entered into a settlement before the Executing Court that they would not raise any claim in future for enhancement of the compensation and in fact the Execution Cases were thereafter consigned to record on 9 May 2005 on the basis of the said compromise vi.

28.8.2008 The Court directed the appellants to file a counter affidavit to the averments made in the affidavit within three weeks but no counter affidavit was filed by the appellants.

vii.

12.2.2014 However, an application was filed by the appellants on 12 February 2014 to bring on record a supplementary affidavit stating therein that for the land covered by the same section 4(1) notification, the Reference Court at the instance of another tenure holder subsequently awarded Rs.65/- per square yard and the said judgment of the Reference Court was affirmed in the First Appeal filed by Greater Noida. It was also stated that subsequently the Supreme Court also dismissed the Special Leave Petition.

viii.

25.4.2014 Both the First Appeal Nos.282 of 2007 and 283 of 2007 were decided by the High Court as both the parties were not at issue and agreed that the market value of the acquired land determined at Rs.65/- per square yard had been affirmed. However, though the market rate of the land was enhanced from Rs.39.50 per square yard to Rs.65/- per square yard, these Appeals were dismissed.

ix.

27.5.2014 The appellants filed a correction application with a prayer that the Appeals should be allowed and when the said applications were being heard, Noida filed a modification application with an affidavit pointing out that in fact the appellants had agreed before the Executing Court that they would not make any claim for enhancement of compensation in future and so the two Appeals should be dismissed.

30.7.2014 On being apprised of the correct facts brought on record in the modification application, the Court recorded its displeasure as it had been misled into passing the judgment dated 25 April 2014 on the basis of distorted and incorrect facts. The Court noted that there was no reason or occasion for the appellants to continue the appeals any further as they had entered into a settlement before the Executing Court and, therefore, it was the solemn duty of the appellants and their counsel to have pointed out the facts before the Court. The Court also noted that even the counsel for the Greater Noida did not place the correct facts. The judgment dated 25 April 2015 was, accordingly, recalled and the two First Appeals were dismissed with costs assessed at Rs.25,000/- against each appellant.

xi.

10.4.2015 Petitions to Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) Nos.34557-34558 of 2014 were filed by Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala against the judgment dated 30 July 2014 of the High Court. However, after some arguments, learned counsel for the petitioners sought leave to withdraw these petitions so as to enable the petitioners to apply for change in the compensation as per the provisions of section 28-A of the Act. The Supreme Court granted permission and the Special Leave Petitions were dismissed as withdrawn.

xii.

15.4.2015 The Advocate for Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala sends a letter to the ACEO for considering the representation/application for enhancement of compensation under section 28-A of the Act. The said letter is marked by ACEO to the ADM (LA) on 21 April 2015 and on 21 April 2015 it is marked by the ADM (LA) to an officer in his office. The application enclosed with the said letter clearly mentioned that though by a consent order, the market rate of the land was enhanced to Rs.65/- per square yard by the High Court but since the appeals were dismissed, applications were filed for correction of the operative part of the order but the High Court dismissed the same on 30 July 2014 for the reason that the two appellants had agreed to take Rs.39/- per square yard as compensation as per their affidavits filed on 15 February 1995.

xiii.

11.5.2015 The ADM (LA) sends a communication to ACEO. After making reference to the judgment dated 25 April 2014 of the High Court in the two First Appeals filed by Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala against the award in LAR No.324 of 1992 and LAR No.325 of 1992, as also to the decision of the Supreme Court rendered on 10 April 2015, the ADM (LA) a calculation sheet is enclosed in which amount of Rs.50.32 lacs and Rs.43.75 lacs have been determined to be paid to Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala and the communication requires Greater Noida to deposit the said amount so that the decision of the High Court can be complied with.

xiv.

6.6.2015 Advice is sought by ACEO from its panel lawyer on the aforesaid communication dated 11 May 2015. The panel lawyer gives his opinion on 6 June 2015 that the High Court in its judgment dated 30 July 2014 commented that it was misled into passing the earlier judgment dated 25 April 2014 and so the judgment dated 25 April 2014 was recalled and the Appeals were dismissed with costs of Rs. 25,000/- on each appellant. It was also specifically stated that while dismissing the First Appeals on 30 July 2014, the High Court had observed that the appellant had accepted the award before the Executing Court and, therefore, there was no reason or occasion for the appellant to continue the appeal and that the High Court had also observed that it was the duty of the appellants and their counsel to point out what had transpired before the Executing Court and even learned counsel appearing for the Greater NOIDA did not place the correct fact on record. The opinion further, after referring to the order of the Supreme Court, states that the order of High Court dismissing the Appeals stands. It was, however, advised that, if any, amount remained to be paid on the basis of the award of the Reference Court, then the same should only be paid after verification of the records and there should be no delay in making this payment even if the application under Section 28-A of the Act is not filed.

xv.

26.6.2015 Senior Executive Officer (Legal) of Greater Noida sends a letter dated 26 June 2015 to the ADM (LA) in connection with the aforesaid communication dated 11 May 2015 and points out that after the decision rendered by the High Court on 25 April 2014 in the two First Appeals, a subsequent decision was taken by the High Court on 30 July 2014. The ADM (LA) was, therefore, asked to ensure compliance of the judgment dated 30 July 2014 passed by the High Court in the two First Appeals as also the judgment dated 10 April 2015 of the Supreme Court.

xvi.

30.6.2015 ADM (LA) sends a letter dated 30 June 2015 to the ACEO in response to the letter dated 26 June 2015. After making reference to the decision of the High Court in the two First Appeals and the decision dated 14 April 2015 of the Supreme Court, he states that the calculation sheet had been prepared and sent for preparing a Bank Draft of Rs.50.32 lacs and Rs.43.75 lacs in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court rendered on 10 April 2015 but the amount had not been deposited. It was also stated that this amount should be deposited so that the concerned land owners could be paid the compensation under section 28-A of the Act in accordance with the directions issued by the Supreme Court.

xvii.

28.4.2016 Both Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala filed separate applications under section 28-A of the Act before the Collector which were referred to ADM (LA) to act in accordance with Rules.

xviii.

2.6.2016 K.P. Singh, ADM (LA) sends a communication dated 2 June 2016 to ACEO. After making reference to the applications dated 28 April 2016 filed by Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala, the ADM (LA) required the amount to be deposited in accordance with the judgment rendered in the two First Appeals on 25 April 2014. He further stated that the High Court had enhanced the market rate of the land to Rs.65/- per square yard in the judgment rendered on 25 April 2014 and, therefore, an amount of Rs.1.05 crore for satisfaction of the judgments in both the Appeals should be deposited. The calculation chart enclosed with the letter also refers to the judgment dated 25 April 2014 rendered by the High Court in two First Appeals as also the judgment dated 10 April 2015 rendered by the Supreme Court.

xix.

21.6.2016 K.P. Singh, ADM (LA) again sends a letter dated 21 June 2016 to the ACEO in connection with the applications filed by Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala under section 28-A of the Act. After making reference to the award rendered by the Reference Court on 27 August 1999 in LAR No.91 of 1992 (Rameshwar Singh & Another Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.), the ADM (LA) writes that in case the applications are accepted, the amount would have to be paid and so the amount mentioned in the calculation sheet sent earlier on 2 June 2016 should be deposited. The ADM (LA) also enclosed a copy of the award prepared under section 28-A of the Act and the ACEO was asked to send a draft of Rs.1.05 crores in the name of the ADM (LA).

xx.

30.6.2016 The applications filed by Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala are decided on 30 June 2016. Market rate of the land is re-determined at Rs.65/- per square yard on the basis of the market rate of the land determined in Reference No.91 of 1992 (Rameshwar Singh and another, decided on 27 August 1999).

xxi.

25.10.2016 Shishir, on transfer to the post of ACEO sends a letter dated 25 October 2016 to ADM (LA) in connection with the letter dated 21 June 2016 earlier sent by K.P. Singh. A copy of the opinion dated 6 June 2015 earlier given by the panel Advocate of Greater Noida is enclosed and it is stated that taking into consideration the opinion rendered by the Advocate on 6 June 2015, amount of Rs.1.05 crores that was demanded should be met from the funds earlier provided by the Authority and if any further amount is required, the same can be asked.

xxii.

12.12.2016 K.P. Singh-ADM (LA) is transferred and Adhar Kishore Mishra takes over as ADM (LA).

xxiii.

3.1.2017 The ADM (LA)-Adhar Kishor Mishra writes a letter to ACEO for making available the amount determined under the award dated 30 June 2016 and also points out that opinion said to have been given by the Panel Lawyer of Greater Noida on 6 June 2016 is not available. It is also stated that the amount earlier made available by Greater Noida was under different heads and not under Section 28-A of the Act and, therefore, it is not clear as to from which head the amount should be paid to the claimants. ACEO has, therefore, been asked to immediately make available the opinion given by the Panel Lawyer and the amount of Rs.1.05 crores for payment to the claimants.

xxiv.

18.2.2017 ADM (LA)-Adhar Kishor Mishra writes a letter dated 18 February 2017 to the Chief Treasury Officer, Gautam Budh Nagar for payment of Rs.54.91 lacs to Rajendra Singh and Rs.45.14 lacs to Raj Bala. The amount is subsequently transferred in the account of Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala.

xxv.

6.3.2017 Greater Noida files an application before ADM (LA) for stay of the award dated 30 June 2016. The ADM (LA) makes a note to stop payment till disposal of case.

xxvi.

22.3.2017 An application is filed by Greater Noida before the ADM (LA) supported by an affidavit for recall of the award dated 30 June 2016.

xxvii.

18.4.2017 Another application is filed by Greater Noida for stay of the award.

xxviii.

22.4.2017 An application is again filed by Greater Noida with a prayer that the award dated 30 June 2016 should remain stayed till the disposal of the application.

xxix.

25.4.2017 The ADM (LA)-Adhar Kishor Mishra sends a letter dated 25 April 2017 to ACEO. It refers to the application dated 21 April 2015 filed under Section 28-A of the Act and the decision rendered by the Supreme Court on 10 April 2015. It also refers to the communication dated 11 May 2015 sent by ADM (LA) for making available the amount on the basis of the application filed under Section 28-A of the Act and the communication dated 26 June 2015 sent by the Senior Executive Officer (Legal), Greater Noida in which reference was made to the judgment dated 30 July 2014 passed in the two First Appeals. The communication then refers to the letter dated 25 October 2016 sent by Greater Noida regarding the opinion given by the Panel Lawyer on 6 June 2015 and states that the demand was made on the basis of the opinion given by the Legal Adviser. Greater Noida was informed that since the award was rendered on 30 June 2016 on the basis of the decision rendered by the Supreme Court on 10 April 2015 and 9 months had lapsed, Greater Noida should explain under which rule the application for recall can be entertained.

xxx.

26.4.2017 The ACEO-Vimal Kumar Sharma writes a letter dated 26 April 2017 to the ADM (LA) pointing out that when Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala had filed applications under Section 18 of the Act and had also obtained the compensation, then under what circumstances, the award could have made under Section 28-A of the Act. A request is also made to ADM (LA) to dispose of the stay application filed by Greater Noida.

xxxi.

30.6.2017 Notices are issued by ADM (LA), Greater Noida to Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala for deposit of the amount of compensation paid to them on the basis of the award dated 30 June 2016, failing which it has been stated, proceedings for recovery of the amount would be initiated as arrears of land revenue.

In view of the facts stated above and the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties, the following issues arise for consideration in these petitions :

A. Whether the applications filed by Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala under section 28-A of the Act were maintainable ?

B. Whether the procedure contemplated under section 28-A of the Act was followed by ADM (LA) ?

C. Whether it was open to Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala to file applications under section 28-A of the Act after they had given an undertaking in the execution proceedings arising out of the award of the Reference Court that they will not seek enhancement of the compensation and when the two First Appeals filed by them for enhancement of the compensation had been dismissed by the High Court on 25 April 2014 for the reason that the aforesaid undertaking had been given by them ?

D. Whether Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala had stated false facts in their applications filed under Section 28-A of the Act and whether they had also concealed material facts ?

E. Whether the ADM (LA)-K.P. Singh had colluded to confer undue benefit to Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala while deciding their applications ?

F. Whether the officers of Greater Noida had colluded to confer undue benefit to Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala in obtaining the higher compensation under section 28-A of the Act ?

G. Whether ADM (LA)-Adhar Kishore Misra was justified in making the payment under the awards and whether he also overlooked material facts in making the payment and not deciding the recall application filed by Greater Noida ?

'A' To ascertain whether the applications filed by Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala under Section 28-A of the Act were maintainable, the required conditions to be met for filing the applications have to be examined. These conditions have been elaborately pointed out by the Supreme Court in Union of India & Anr. Vs. Pradeep Kumari & Ors.6 and they are as follows :

"10. ................ a person would be able to seek re-determination of the amount of compensation payable to him provided the following conditions are satisfied :-

(i) An award has been made by the court under Part III after the coming into force of Section 28-A;

(ii) By the said award the amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11 has been allowed to the applicant in that reference;

(iii) The person moving the application under Section 28-A is interested in other land covered by the same notification under Section 4(1) to which the said award relates;

(iv) The person moving the application did not make an application to the Collector under Section 18;

(v) The application is moved within three months from the date of the award on the basis of which the re-determination of amount of compensation is sought; and

(vi) Only one application can be moved under Section 28-A for re- determination of compensation by an applicant."

(emphasis supplied) In the present petitions, the Court is concerned with two of these requirements mentioned at (iv) and (v) namely, that the applicant must not have filed the reference application under section 18 of the Act and the application under section 28-A of the Act must have been filed within three months from the date of the award of the Reference Court which has been stated to be the basis for re-determination of the compensation. These two requirements have necessarily to be satisfied for an application to be maintainable under Section 28-A of the Act.

The first requirement is apparent from a bare perusal of the provisions of the Act. Section 18 of the Act clearly provides for a remedy to any person interested who has not accepted the award made by the Special Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 of the Act to require the matter to be referred by the Collector for determination of the compensation by the Court. Under Section 20, the Court will proceed to determine the objections. Section 25 provides that the amount of compensation awarded by the Court shall not be less than the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11 of the Act.

Section 28-A of the Act purports to provide a remedy to any person interested who has not preferred an application to the Collector under Section 18 for re-determination of the compensation, if at the instance of other persons covered by the same notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Act, the Reference Court enhances the compensation. It provides that any such person interested may, by written application to the Collector, within three months from the date of award of the Court, require that the amount of compensation payable to them may be redetermined.

The objects and reasons for introduction of Section 28-A by Act No.68 of 1984 are as follows:

"Considering that the right of reference to the civil court under section 18 of the Act is not usually taken advantage of by inarticulate and poor people and is usually exercised only by the comparatively affluent landowners and that this causes considerable inequality in the payment of compensation for the same or similar quality of land to different interested parties, it is proposed to provide an opportunity to all aggrieved parties whose land is covered under the same notification to seek re-determination of compensation, once any one of them has obtained orders for payment of higher compensation from the reference court under section 18 of the Act."

Thus, it is clear from a bare perusal of Section 28-A of the Act and the objects and reasons for introduction of Section 28-A of the Act that a person who has availed the remedy provided for under Section 18 of the Act cannot file an application under Section 28-A of the Act.

The Supreme Court has time and again also observed that a person interested who has not filed an application under Section 18 of the Act can only file an application under Section 28-A of the Act.

In Scheduled Castes Co-operative Land Owning Society Limited, Bhatinda Vs. Union of India & Ors.7 the Supreme Court held that Section 28-A of the Act applies only to those claimants who had failed to seek a reference under Section 18 of the Act and would, therefore, not apply to a case where the claimant had sought and secured a reference under Section 18 of the Act. The observations are :

"4. .................. It is obvious on a plain reading of Sub-section (i) of Section 28A that it applies only to those claimants who had failed to seek a reference under Section 18 of the Act. The redetermination has to be done by the Collector on the basis of the compensation awarded by the Court in the reference under Section 18 of the Act and an application in that behalf has to be made to the Collector within 30 days from the date of the award. Thus only those claimant who had failed to apply for a reference under Section 18 of the Act are conferred this right to apply to the Collector for redetermination and not all those like the petitioners who had not only sought a reference under Section 18 but had also filed an appeal in the High Court against the award made by the reference court. The newly added Section 28A, therefore, clearly does not apply to a case where the claimant has sought and secured a reference under Section 18 and has even preferred an appeal to the High Court. This view, which we take on a plain reading of Section 28A, finds support from the judgment of this Court in Mewa Ram v. State of Haryana."

(emphasis supplied) In Bhagti (Smt.) (deceased) through her Lrs. Jagdish Ram Sharma Vs. State of Haryana8, the Supreme Court also observed that an application can be filed under Section 28-A only if a reference had not been made under Section 18 of the Act:

"6. Thus only those claimants who had failed to apply for a reference under Section 18 of the Act are conferred with the right to apply for redetermination under Section 28-A(1). But all those who had not only sought a reference under Section 18 but had also filed an appeal in the High Court against the award made by the Reference Court are not entitled to avail of the remedy under Section 28-A. ....................."

(emphasis supplied) The judgments of the Supreme Court in Scheduled Castes Co-operative Land Owning Society Limited and Pradeep Kumari were followed by the Supreme Court in Desh Raj (deceased) through LRs & Anr. Vs. Union of India & Anr.9 and in State of Orissa & Ors. Vs. Chitrasen Bhoi10.

It is not in dispute that not being satisfied with the award made by the Special Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 of the Act on 13 December 1991, both Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala had filed reference applications under Section 18 of the Act which applications were registered as LAR No.324 of 1992 and LAR No.325 of 1992 and the amount of compensation was enhanced by the Reference Court in the awards dated 18 July 1994 by increasing the market rate of the land from Rs.11/- per square yard to Rs.39.50/- per square yard. The applications filed under section 28-A of the Act were, therefore, clearly not maintainable and should have been rejected on this ground alone. The records indicate that both Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala had, in their applications filed under section 28-A of the Act, specifically stated in paragraph 4 that against the award rendered by the Special Land Acquisition Officer on 13 December 1991, Reference Applications had been filed by them and the Reference Court had enhanced the market rate to Rs.39.50/- per square yard against which Execution Cases had been filed and First Appeals had also been filed in the High Court for further enhancement to Rs.65/- per square yard but surprisingly K.P. Singh-ADM (LA) has still stated in the awards that after perusing the records, it was clear that both Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala had not filed Reference Applications under section 18 of the Act.

The applications filed by Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala were also required to be rejected for the reason that they were admittedly filed beyond three months from the date of award of the Reference Court in LAR No.91 of 1992 on which reliance had been placed by the two applicants. The award in LAR No.91 of 1992 was made on 27 March 1999 and the applications under section 28-A of the Act were filed on 28 April 2016. It needs to be remembered that the time period for filing the application is three month and it cannot be extended.

This issue was examined by the Supreme Court in State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Marri Venkaiah11 and it was held that time cannot be extended on the ground of knowledge of the award. The relevant observations are :

"7. "Plain language of the aforesaid section would only mean that the period of limitation is three months from the date of the award of the court. It is also provided that in computing the period of three months, the day on which the award was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining the copy of the award is to be excluded. Therefore, the aforesaid provision crystallises that application under Section 28-A is to be filed within three months from the date of the award by the court by only excluding the time requisite for obtaining the copy. Hence, it is difficult to infer further exclusion of time on the ground of acquisition of knowledge by the applicant."

(emphasis supplied) The Supreme Court clarified that the limitation of three months would not commence from the date of the knowledge of the award but from the date of the award and in this context, distinguished the earlier decision of the Supreme Court rendered in Harish Chandra Raj Singh Vs. Land Acquisition Officer12 since that related to limitation provided for under Section 18 of the Act. In this connection, the relevant paragraphs are as follows:

"11 .......In that case, the Court interpreted the proviso to Section 18 of the Act and held that clause (a) of the proviso was not applicable in the said case because the person making the application was not present or was not represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award. The Court also held that notice from the Collector under Section 12(2) was also not issued, therefore, that part of clause (b) of the proviso would not be applicable. The Court, therefore, referred to the second part of the proviso which provides that such application can be made within six months from the date of the Collector's award. In the context of the scheme of Section 18 of the Act, the Court held that the award by the Land Acquisition Officer is an offer of market price by the State for purchase of the property. Hence, for the said offer, knowledge, actual or constructive, of the party affected by the award was an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice. Therefore, the second part of the proviso must mean the date when either the award was communicated to the party or was known by him either actually or constructively.

12. The aforesaid reasoning would not be applicable for interpretation of Section 28-A because there is no question of issuing notice to such an applicant as he is not a party to the reference proceeding before the court. The award passed by the court cannot be termed as an offer for market price for purchase of the land. There is no duty cast upon the court to issue notice to the landowners who have not initiated proceedings for enhancement of compensation by filing reference applications; maybe, that their lands are acquired by a common notification issued under Section 4 of the Act. As against this, under Section 18 it is the duty of the Collector to issue notice either under Section 12(2) of the Act at the time of passing of the award or in any case the date to be pronounced before passing of the award and if this is not done then the period prescribed for filing application under Section 18 is six months from the date of the Collector's award."

(emphasis supplied) The Supreme Court referred the earlier decisions rendered by it in Union of India Vs. Mangtu Ram13 and Tota Ram Vs. State of U.P.14 wherein the same issue was dealt with.

In State of Orissa and Ors. Vs. Chitrasen Bhoi15, the Supreme Court also observed that the limitation for filing the application under Section 28-A of the Act would commence from the date of the making of the award by the Reference Court and the delay in filing the application cannot be condoned.

The Supreme Court in Popat Bahiru Goverdhane and Ors. Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer and Anr.16 again reiterated that the period of limitation cannot be extended and the relevant observations are :

"8. The sole question for the consideration of the Court is whether limitation for filing the application for re-determination of the compensation under Section 28A of the Act would commence from the date of the award or from the date of knowledge of the court's award on the basis of which such application is being filed?.

.....................

10. The issue involved herein is no more res-integra. The appellants' case before the High Court as well as before us has been that the limitation would commence from the date of acquisition of knowledge and not from the date of award. Though, Shri Gaurav Agarwal, learned counsel for the appellants, has fairly conceded that there is no occasion for this Court to consider the application of the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter called the ''Act 1963') inasmuch as the provisions of Section 5 of the said Act.

.................

13. This Court in Union of India & Ors. v. Mangatu Ram & Ors.; and Tota Ram v. State of U.P. & Ors. dealt with the issue involved herein and held that as the Land Acquisition Collector is not a court and acts as a quasi judicial authority while making the award, the provisions of the Act 1963 would not apply and, therefore, the application under Section 28-A of the Act, has to be filed within the period of limitation as prescribed under Section 28-A of the Act. The said provisions require that an application for re-determination is to be filed within 3 months from the date of the award of the court. The proviso further provides that the period of limitation is to be calculated excluding the date on which the award is made and the time requisite for obtaining the copy of the award.

...................

16. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim "dura lex sed lex" which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. "A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation."

Thus, for both these reasons stated above, the applications filed under Section 28-A of the Act by Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala had to be rejected. These two factual aspects were very clear from the records since a bare perusal of the applications filed by Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala under Section 28-A of the Act reveal these facts. No other factual aspect was actually required to be examined by the ADM (LA)-K.P. Singh but still the applications were allowed and the market rate of the land was enhanced from Rs.39.50 per square yard to Rs.65/- per sq. yard.

This apart, an application can be filed under Section 28-A of the Act for re-determination of the compensation determined by the Special Land Acquisition Officer on the basis of the an award subsequently rendered by the Reference Court in regard to a land covered by the same Section 4(1) notification and not for re-determination of the award of the Reference Court if, in regard to the same acquisition, the Reference Court at the instance of another tenure holder grants some more compensation than that awarded earlier by the Reference Court to the applicant.

Learned counsel appearing for Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala, however, contended that the applications filed under Section 28-A of the Act were maintainable for the reason that not only had the Supreme Court directed the two petitioners namely Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala to seek re-determination of the compensation under Section 28-A of the Act based on the award rendered by the Reference Court on 27 August 1999 in LAR No. 91 of 1992, but even otherwise no discrimination could have been adopted by the State in payment of compensation. In support of their contentions, learned counsel relied upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in A. Vembusekaran v. Spl. Tahsildar, Namakkal rendered in Civil Appeal No. 6899 of 2002 decided on 18 February 2016 and in Food Corporation of India, Faridkot, Punjab v. Makhan Singh17 in Civil Appeal No. 1711-1737 of 1992 decided on 21 April 1992.

These two contentions advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners cannot be accepted. The Supreme Court had not directed Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala to seek re-determination of the compensation under Section 28-A of the Act. As the order dated 10 April 2015 would indicate, it was the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners who had, after some arguments, made a statement before the Supreme Court that the petitioners wanted leave of the Court to withdraw two petitions so as to enable the petitioners to apply for change in the compensation as per the provisions of Section 28-A of the Act. It is this permission to withdraw the petition that was granted by the Supreme Court and consequently the petitions were dismissed as withdrawn. The order of the Supreme Court does not direct the petitioners to file applications under Section 28-A of the Act nor does it permit the petitioners to file applications under Section 28-A of the Act dehors the essential requirements of section 28-A of the Act. It is the petitioners who, on their own, had got the petitions dismissed since they wanted to file applications under Section 28-A of the Act. The petitioners, therefore, cannot be permitted to contend that the applications filed by them under Section 28-A of the Act were required to be examined on merits without examining as to whether the essential requirements set out in Section 28-A of the Act for filing the applications were satisfied or not.

The second contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners that Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala were entitled to the same market rate of Rs. 65/- per square yard as was awarded to some other tenure-holders, cannot also be accepted. Both Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala had claimed the enhanced market rate of the land at Rs. 65/- per square yard in the two First Appeals filed by them in the High Court on the basis of the awards rendered by the Reference Court in LAR No. 91 of 1992 but this claim was specifically rejected by the High Court in its judgment dated 30 July 2014 for the reason that they had categorically stated in the execution proceedings arising out of the awards given by the Reference Court in their matters, that they would not seek higher compensation in future proceedings. Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala could have claimed enhanced compensation in the First Appeals on the basis of parity and they did claim but their claim was not accepted and the Special Leave to Appeals filed by them in the Supreme Court against the dismissal of the two First Appeals were also dismissed as withdrawn. It was, therefore, not open to the applicants to raise this claim in the applications filed by them under Section 28-A of the Act and nor is it permissible to raise this issue in these petitions to defend the awards. The decisions relied upon by the learned counsel would, therefore, not help them.

'B' Another important aspect that needs to be examined is whether the ADM (LA) - K.P. Singh followed the procedure contemplated under Section 28-A of the Act for deciding the applications. The records indicate that though the State of Uttar Pradesh was impleaded as opposite party No. 1 and Greater NOIDA was impleaded as opposite party No. 2, notices were not issued to the said opposite parties and even the applications were not registered as case numbers have not been assigned. In fact, after the filing of the applications on 28 April 2016, ADM (LA)-K.P. Singh straight away wrote a letter dated 2 June 2016 to ACEO for deposit of an mount of Rs. 1.05/- crores calculated on the basis of the judgment rendered by the High Court on 25 April 2014 in the two First Appeals filed by Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala. This was followed by a communication dated 21 June 2016 to ACEO, in which copy of the award was also sent and Greater NOIDA was required to deposit Rs. 1.05/- crores. The award was then subsequently made on 30 June 2016. Thus, without even hearing the acquiring body which had to ultimately pay the amount, the two applications filed under Section 28-A of the Act were decided in a mechanical manner by awarding the same market rate as was awarded in LAR No. 91 of 1992. The requirement of giving notice to the acquiring body is a must so that it can lead evidence regarding the nature of the land of the claimant and the nature of the land involved in the award of the Reference Court on the basis of which, the applications have been filed. A bare perusal of sub-section (2) of Section 28-A of the Act also indicates that on receipt of the applications under Section 28-A of the Act, the Collector shall conduct an enquiry after giving notice to all the persons interested and give them reasonable opportunity of being heard. It is only thereafter that the Collector can make an award to determine the amount of compensation payable to the applicants. The ADM (LA) - K.P. Singh completely failed to adhere to any of the procedure contemplated under Section 28-A of the Act and the two awards, each dated 30 June 2016, rendered in the two applications filed by Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala under Section 28-A of the Act, therefore, deserve to be set aside on this ground also.

'C' It is also important to examine as to whether it was open to Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala to file applications under Section 28-A of the Act for re-determination of the compensation by treating the market rate of the land at Rs. 65/- per square yard based on the the award of the Reference Court in LAR No.91 of 1992 after dismissal of the two First Appeals filed by them in the High Court in which they had also sought enhancement of the market rate of the land to Rs. 65/- per square yard on the basis of the same award made in LAR No.91 of 1992.

It is clear from the judgment dated 25 April 2014 of the High Court in the two First Appeals that the two appellants had claimed enhanced market rate of Rs. 65/- per square yard on the basis of the award dated 23 August 1999 rendered by the Reference Court in LAR No. 91 of 1991 in regard to the land covered by the same Section 4(1) notification. The appellants had asserted that First Appeal No. 111 of 2000 filed against this award dated 23 August 1999 was dismissed by the High Court on 1 December 2015 and Special Leave to Appeal filed against the judgment of the High Court was dismissed on 31 March 2016 and, therefore, the same market rate should be awarded. Though the High Court initially did accept this contention, as is clear from the judgment dated 25 April 2014, but subsequently when the correct fact was brought to the notice of the High Court by Greater NOIDA that before the Executing Court the appellants had stated that they would not claim any further enhancement, the judgment dated 25 April 2014 was not only recalled but the two First Appeals were dismissed with costs of Rs. 25,000/- on each of the appellants.

However, undeterred by the dismissal of the two First Appeals with imposition of costs, both Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala filed applications under Section 28-A of the Act seeking re-determination of the compensation again on the basis of the award dated 23 August 1999 in LAR No.91 of 1992. The ADM (LA)-K.P. Singh has allowed the applications by award dated 30 June 2014 on the basis of the award rendered on 23 August 1999 in LAR No.91 of 1992. Thus, what was specifically denied to the two appellants in the two First Appeals has been granted by the ADM (LA) in the two applications subsequently filed under Section 28-A of the Act. It was, therefore, not open to Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala to claim re-determination of compensation under Section 28-A of the Act on the basis of the award rendered in LAR No.91 of 1992.

'D' It has now to be seen whether Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala had stated false facts in the two applications filed by them under Section 28-A of the Act and whether they had also concealed material facts. For this, it would be necessary to first state what was mentioned in the applications. Both the applications filed under Section 28-A of the Act are identically worded and state as follows :

(i) They refer to notification issued under section 4(1) of the Act and the declaration made under section 6 of the Act as also the award made by the Special Land Acquisition Officer on 13 December 1991 determining the market rate of the land at Rs.11/- per square yard.

(ii) They state that the Reference Court had, on their applications filed under section 18 of the Act, enhanced the market rate of the land to Rs.39.50/- per square yard.

(iii) They state that they had also instituted Execution Case No.41 of 1994 and Execution Case No.43 of 1994 for execution of the award of the Reference Court in which both of them had agreed that the compensation for the acquired land should be determined treating the market rate of the land as Rs.39.50/- per square yard.

(iv) The applicants then state that subsequently in LAR No.91 of 1992 arising out of the same acquisition proceedings, the Reference Court, at the instance of some other tenure holders, enhanced the market rate to Rs.65/- per square yard by award dated 27 August 1999 and this award of the Reference Court had been affirmed by the High Court on 1 December 2015 in First Appeal No.111 of 2000 filed under section 54 of the Act and that the order passed by the High Court affirming the award had also been affirmed by the Supreme Court as the Special Leave Petition was dismissed on 31 March 2016.

(v) The applicants, therefore, asserted in paragraph 8 of the applications that the market rate of the land should be determined at Rs.65/- per square yard under section 28-A of the Act.

(vi) The applicants also state in paragraph 9 that against the award of the Reference Court in their matters, they had filed First Appeal No.282 of 2007 and First Appeal No.283 of 2007 in which the High Court had passed a consent order on 25 April 2014 enhancing the market rate of the land from Rs.39.50/- per square yard to Rs.65/- per square yard.

(vii) The applicants further state in paragraphs 10 and 11 that against the order dated 30 July 2014 passed by the High Court in their First Appeals, they had filed Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No.34557 of 2014 and Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No.34558 of 2014 but the Supreme Court on 10 April 2015 directed the appellants to file applications under section 28-A of the Act and claim the enhanced rate of Rs.65/- per square yard as was granted to other claimants.

(viii) The applicants asserted in paragraph 12 of the applications that since the Supreme Court had directed that the applicants should claim enhancement of the amount under section 28-A of the Act, the applicants withdrew the Special Leave Petitions.

(ix) It is for this reason that the applicants stated in paragraph 13 that in terms of the order passed by the Supreme Court on 10 April 2015, they should be awarded the enhanced market rate at Rs.65/- per square yard.

At this stage, it would be pertinent to again refer to the orders passed in the two First Appeals filed by the appellants in the High Court and the order passed by the Supreme Court since the two applicants had requested the ADM(LA) to ensure compliance of the order passed by the Supreme Court.

Both Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala had filed First Appeals in the High Court under section 54 of the Act for enhancement of the compensation awarded by the Reference Court in the two References filed by them. These Appeals were initially filed as defective First Appeals bearing Nos.(5) of 1995 and (16) of 1995. These Appeals were dismissed in default on 9 December 2005 but were subsequently restored on 15 December 2006. The deficiency in Court Fees was made good and these Appeals were numbered as First Appeal No.282 of 2007 and First Appeal No.283 of 2007. The Appeals were admitted on 12 December 2007 and notices were issued to the respondents. Greater Noida, which was impleaded as a respondent, put in appearance and filed an application for dismissal of the Appeal on the ground that the appellants had in fact entered into a settlement before the Executing Court that they were not only satisfied with the amount of compensation determined by the Reference Court but they would also not claim any enhancement of compensation in future. The Court passed a detailed order on 20 August 2008 in the two First Appeals in view of the facts states in the applications filed by Greater Noida. The same is reproduced below :

"This appeal under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act has been filed by the claimant for enhancement of the compensation awarded to it in pursuance of the judgment dated 18.7.1994 passed in Land Acquisition Reference No. 325 of 1992. This appeal was filed in January 1995 with deficiency of Rs.71,315/-. The said deficiency in court fee was made good in December, 2006 and the appeal was admitted on 12.12.2007 whereafter notices were issued and now the opposite party no. 1, the beneficiary of the acquisition, has filed an application today for dismissing the appeal with cost on the ground that the claimant had entered into a settlement before the executing court with the understanding that he is fully satisfied with the award rendered in the reference and would not raise any further claim for enhancement and therefore, the execution was also closed vide order dated 09.05.1995.

Let a counter affidavit to the said application be filed within three weeks.

List after three weeks."

However, counter affidavit was not filed by the Appellants to the averments made in the applications and instead the Appellants filed an application after six years on 12 February 2014 to bring on record a supplementary affidavit. In the supplementary affidavit, the Appellants stated that the Reference Court in LAR No.91 of 1992 in regard to the same acquisition, at the instance of another tenure holder, had subsequently enhanced the market rate of the land to Rs.65/- per square yard and the award dated 27 August 1999 of the Reference Court was affirmed both by the High Court and the Supreme Court. The two First Appeals came up for final hearing before the Court on 25 April 2014 and after having noted the aforesaid facts, the two First Appeals were decided in the following terms :-

"Learned counsel for both the parties are not at issue in this regard and agreed that the market value of the acquired land determined @ Rs.65/- per sq. yard has been affirmed.

The issue in these two appeals is squarely covered by the aforesaid judgment.

In view of above, these two appeals are liable to be dismissed and accordingly stand dismissed."

The market rate of the land had thus been enhanced in the aforesaid two First Appeals from Rs.39.50/- per square yard to Rs.65/- per square yard but the Appeals were mistakenly dismissed. This led to the filing of a Correction Application by the two Appellants. It is at this stage that the counsel for Greater Noida pointed out the facts relating to a compromise having been arrived at in the execution proceedings and, accordingly, the two Appellants prayed for and were allowed time to file a supplementary affidavit. A modification application was also filed by Greater Noida to bring on record the said facts. The Court, while hearing the two applications, recorded its displeasure since both the parties did not point out the aforesaid facts relating to the settlement that had been arrived at in the execution proceedings that the Appellants would not claim enhancement of compensation in any further proceedings at the time when the two First Appeals were initially heard on 25 April 2014. The Court noted that it had been misled by placing distorted and incorrect facts to pass the judgment and decree dated 25 April 2014. The judgment rendered in the two First Appeals on 25 April 2014 was, therefore, not only recalled but the Appeals were dismissed on 30 July 2014 with costs of Rs.25,000/- on each of the appellant as there was no reason or occasion to file the First Appeals.

Thus, the two First Appeals filed by Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala were dismissed on 30 July 2014 for the sole reason that the two Appellants had in fact, during the course of execution of the award of the Reference Court, had clearly given an undertaking on affidavit that they would not claim enhancement of the compensation in any further proceedings.

However, two Special Leave to Appeals bearing Nos.34557-34558 of 2014 were filed by Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala to assail the judgment dated 30 July 2014 of the High Court but they were dismissed as withdrawn on 10 April 2015 because after some arguments, learned counsel for the petitioners sought leave to withdraw the petitions so as to enable the petitioners to apply for change in the compensation as per the provisions of section 28-A of the Act.

It is in the light of the facts stated above that the Court has to determine as to whether Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala had deliberately stated false facts in the two applications filed by them under Section 28-A of the Act and whether they had also concealed material facts.

A bare perusal of the applications clearly reveal that the two applicants had deliberately stated false facts in the applications.

The applicants made an attempt to convey to the ADM (LA) that the High Court by a consent order dated 25 April 2014 had enhanced the market rate of the land to Rs.65 per sq. yard in the two First Appeals filed by them and that the Supreme Court in the two Special Leave to Appeals filed by them had directed the two applicants to file applications under Section 28-A of the Act to seek enhancement of the market rate of the land to Rs.65 per sq. yard. These two facts are false. Not only was the consent order dated 25 April 2014 passed by the High Court subsequently recalled on 30 July 2014 after hearing the applicants but a fresh order was also passed dismissing the two First Appeals by imposing costs upon the two appellants for having deliberately misled the High Court into the passing the order dated 25 April 2014. This should have served as a strong deterrent to the two Appellants but they proceeded to mislead the ADM (LA) also in their attempt to seek enhancement of the market rate of the land to Rs.65 per sq. yard. This, in fact, was a relief that had been specifically denied to them by the High Court in the two First Appeals. A perusal of the order dated 10 April 2015 passed by the Supreme Court in the two Special Leave to Appeals also clearly shows that after arguments had been heard for some time, it was the learned counsel appearing for Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala who stated before the Supreme Court that permission may be given to withdraw the two petitions since they intended to file applications under Section 28-A of the Act. The Supreme Court had not directed that the petitioners should file applications under Section 28-A of the Act but this is what was conveyed by Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala to the ADM (LA) in their applications filed under Section 28-A of the Act. Thus, false facts were deliberately stated in the two applications with an ulterior motive that ADM (LA) may enhance the compensation under Section 28-A of the Act.

It has now to be seen as to whether Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala had concealed material facts in their applications. The two applicants had referred to the filing of execution cases, but they deliberately withheld vital information relating to the undertaking given by them on affidavits that they will not claim any further enhancement of compensation than what was awarded by the Reference Court. This was the sole reason as to why the two First Appeals filed by them had been dismissed by the High Court and for withholding this material fact, the High Court imposed costs on them. It transpires that this did not serve as a deterrent on the two applicants because they withheld this information even in the applications filed by them under Section 28-A of the Act.

The second important information which the two applicants withheld is the judgment dated 30 July 2014 passed by the High Court in the two First Appeals. It needs to be noted that though in paragraph 9 of the application, the applicants had stated that the High Court had decided the two First Appeals filed by them on 25 April 2014 by a consent order, but in paragraphs 10 and 11 of the application, they very cleverly stated that it is against the judgment and order dated 30 July 2014 passed in the two First Appeals that they filed Special Leave to Appeals in the Supreme Court. As noted above, the High Court had initially, while deciding the First Appeals filed by Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala on 25 April 2014, enhanced the market rate by consent to Rs.65/- per square yard but subsequently when the correct facts were brought to the notice of the High Court by Greater Noida, these two First Appeals were not only dismissed on 30 July 2014 and the judgment dated 25 April 2014 was recalled but costs were also imposed on both Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala and that is why they had filed Special Leave to Appeals before the Supreme Court. The emphasis in the two applications is on the 'consent order dated 25 April 2014' passed by the High Court but there is no whisper in the two applications that the said order dated 25 April 2014 had been recalled by the High Court and subsequently both the First Appeals had been dismissed by judgment dated 30 July 2014. It was imperative for the two applicants to have referred to the judgment dated 30 July 2014 passed by the High Court because the judgment dated 25 April 2014 had been recalled.

The two applicants, however, made an attempt to make out a case that in LAR No.91 of 1992 arising out of same acquisition proceedings that was decided on 27 August 1999, the Reference Court had enhanced the market rate of the land to Rs.65 per sq. yard and, therefore, the applicants should also be awarded the same market rate of the land under Section 28-A of the Act and that is what the Supreme Court had also directed. The result of dismissal of the two First Appeals sealed the fate of the Appellants in claiming higher compensation, unless ofcourse the Supreme Court ordered otherwise, because the amount of compensation determined by the Reference Court in their matters treating the market rate of the land as Rs.39.50 per sq. yard stood affirmed by the High Court and the claim of the Appellants for enhancement of compensation by treating the market rate of the land as Rs.65/- per sq. yard stood rejected. It was, therefore, obligatory on the part of the appellants to have faithfully stated these facts in their applications but in their anxiety to obtain a higher market rate of the land, they deliberately not only stated false facts but also concealed material and vital facts. The award under Section 28-A of the Act is based primarily on false facts stated by the applicants.

Thus, it is not only a case where the two awards should be set aside and both Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala should be directed to refund the amount received by them under Section 28-A of the Act with interest at the rate of 12% per annum but heavy costs should also be imposed upon them for deliberately stating false facts and concealing material and vital facts in their applications. We, accordingly, propose to issue such directions.

It is, however, sought to be contended by learned counsel appearing for Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala that once the amount had been paid, it cannot be recovered without providing opportunity to them and in fact Greater Noida had also filed applications for recall of the order which are still pending disposal.

It is not possible to accept this contention of learned counsel. It has been found as a fact that the applications filed by them under Section 28-A of the Act were not maintainable and should have been rejected outright. Learned counsel appearing for Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala as also the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the State have not even attempted to satisfy the Court that the applications were maintainable under Section 28-A of the Act. In fact, the only submission advanced by learned counsel for Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala is that the two applicants were entitled to the same market rate as was awarded to the other tenure holders but, as noticed above, this was the contention which should have been made in the two First Appeals and in fact it was not only made but specifically rejected for the reason that the two applicants had given an undertaking in the execution proceedings arising out of the award of the Reference Court that they will not seek higher compensation in further proceedings. If the awards on the basis of which compensation was received by the two applicants cannot be sustained, it does not lie in the mouth of the two applicants to contend that so long as the award is not recalled by the ADM (LA), they should not be asked to refund the amount.

In fact, Raj Bala has also sought to question the notice that has been issued by the ADM (LA) for refund of the amount in Writ-C No.32543 of 2017. In view of the admitted position that the two applicants were not entitled to seek re-determination of the compensation under Section 28-A of the Act, the demand of justice and equity is that the money should be refunded and a Writ Court exercising extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution should not come to the aid of such persons as this would defeat justice and allow the jurisdiction to be abused. The jurisdiction by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is not meant for helping unscrupulous persons. For this reason also, it is not possible to accept the contention of learned counsel appearing for Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala that so long as the award is not recalled, they should not be asked to refund the amount.

The contention of learned counsel for Raj Bala that in fact no undertaking had been given by Raj Bala cannot also be accepted. The undertaking had been given both by Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala in the form of affidavits during the course of execution proceedings that had been initiated for execution of the award of the Reference Court and this fact has been noted in the judgment dated 30 July 2014 of the High Court in the two First Appeals filed by them. It cannot be denied that both Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala had given affidavits and in fact copies of these two affidavits were submitted by learned counsel of Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala with the covering letter dated 15 April 2015.

Learned counsel for Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala also submitted that the Supreme Court had directed them to file applications under Section 28-A of the Act for seeking higher market rate of Rs. 65/- per square yard. No such direction had been issued by the Supreme Court.

'E' It is necessary, in the facts and circumstances narrated above, to also examine whether the ADM (LA)-K.P. Singh had deliberately and with an intention to confer undue benefit to Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala allowed the two applicants the benefit of Section 28-A of the Act.

The awards mention that the applications were filed on 28 April 2016. Though Greater Noida was impleaded as an opposite party, notice was not issued to Greater Noida and even the case was not registered. It appears that on the mere filing of the applications, ADM (LA)-K.P. Singh required the ACEO to deposit the amount by a letter dated 2 June 2016 on the basis of a calculation sheet that was enclosed. The calculation was claimed to have been done on the basis of the decision dated 25 April 2014 rendered by the High Court in the two First Appeals filed by Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala. The officer completely failed to even notice that the essential requirements for filing an application under Section 28-A of the Act were not satisfied since even a bare perusal of the applications would have indicated that both the applications deserved rejection for the simple reason that both the applicants had categorically stated that they had filed reference applications under section 18 of the Act and against the award made by the Reference Court in their matters, First Appeals had been filed in the High Court. The applications were hopelessly barred by time also and we fail to understand as to how an officer of about 17 years of standing should have overlooked this and it appears that in his anxiety to confer undue benefit to the two applicants, the officer deliberately overlooked the provisions of section 28-A of the Act. What is also important to note is that even though the Officer has made reference to the judgment dated 30 July 2014 passed by the High Court but he has conveniently failed to even peruse the judgment. The Supreme Court had dismissed the two Special Leave to Appeals filed against the judgment of the High Court dated 30 July 2014 and not 25 April 2014 and if that be the position, the Officer dealing with the application under section 28-A of the Act should have required the two applicants to place the judgment if it was not already in the file but that was not done. As an officer entrusted with the duty of deciding the applications filed under Section 28-A of the Act, he should have visualized as to why Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala would file two Special Leave to Appeals in the Supreme Court if the High Court had actually enhanced the compensation by a consent order from Rs.39.50/- per square yard to Rs.65/- per square yard. This should have prompted him to at least peruse the judgment against which the Appeals had been filed in the Supreme Court. Thus, in effect, what benefit the two applicants not get before the High Court in the two First Appeals filed by them, they had managed to obtain from the officer deciding the applications under section 28-A of the Act. It was also necessary for K.P. Singh to have before making the award examined whether the land of the applicants was identical to the land involved in the reference award. This apart, the officer completely failed to notice that even on receipt of the communication dated 25 October 2016 sent by ACEO in which reference was made to the opinion dated 6 June 2015 of the panel advocate, no attempt was made to seek such an opinion. This conduct of K.P. Singh has resulted in causing enormous loss to the State Government.

It has, therefore, become necessary that an enquiry should be conducted against such an officer as the records do, prima facie, indicate that the officer had colluded with the applicants to confer undue benefits to them.

'F' We find from a perusal of the original records produced by learned Additional Advocate General that a letter dated 15 April 2015 was sent by a lawyer representing Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala to the Chief Executive Officer, Greater Noida for consideration of the representation as per the order dated 10 April 2015 of the Supreme Court. With the letter, an application under section 28-A of the Act was enclosed. The said letter was marked to the ADM (LA) for necessary action on 21 April 2015 and on the same date the ADM (LA) marked it to one Sri Gyanendra. In paragraph 6 of the aforesaid application, it has been clearly stated that the applicants had filed an application for modification of the order dated 25 April 2014 passed in the First Appeals with a prayer that instead of the word "dismissed", the order should be "allowed" but by order dated 30 July 2014 the High Court dismissed the application on the ground that they had earlier agreed to take Rs.39/- per square yard as compensation as per the affidavit filed on 15 February 1995. What was enclosed with the said application was the judgment dated 25 April 2014, the affidavits dated 15 February 1995 filed in Execution Case No.41 of 1994 and and Execution Case No.43 of 1994, the order dated 10 April 2015 of the Supreme Court and the award of the Reference Court in LAR No.91 of 1992 (Rameshwar Singh & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.).

What further transpires from the records is that subsequently two communications each dated 11 May 2015 were sent by ADM (LA)-Shishir to the ACEO. After making reference to the judgment dated 25 April 2014 of the High Court and the judgment dated 14 April 2015 of the Supreme Court, the ADM (LA) required the Authority to prepare Bank Drafts of Rs.43.75 lacs and Rs.50.32 lacs to be paid to Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala for ensuring compliance of the judgment dated 25 April 2014 of the High Court and 14 April 2015 of the Supreme Court.

The records also indicate that in response to the aforesaid letters dated 11 May 2015, the Senior Executive (Law), Greater Noida informed the ADM (LA)-Shishir that after the judgment and order dated 25 April 2014 of the High Court, further orders had been passed on 30 July 2014. The ADM (LA) was, therefore, asked to conduct further proceedings only in the light of the judgment dated 30 July 2014 passed by the High Court and the order dated 10 April 2015 passed by the Supreme Court. What is surprising that in spite of the aforesaid letter dated 26 June 2015 sent by the Senior Executive (Law) of Greater Noida, ADM (LA)-Shishir sent two communications dated 30 June 2015 to the ACEO that the calculation chart had been prepared in accordance with the directions issued by the Supreme Court on 10 April 2015, but still the amount had not been deposited. The ACEO was asked to deposit the amount so that payment could be made under section 28-A of the Act in compliance of the directions issued by the Supreme Court. This letter does make reference to the communication dated 26 June 2015 but completely ignores the fact that in the said letter reference was made to the judgment dated 30 July 2014 subsequently passed by the High Court in the two First Appeals.

It would, therefore, be necessary that Shishir [earlier ADM (LA) and then ACEO] should file an affidavit by 23 August 2017 to explain his conduct and to also appear before the Court on 23 August 2017.

'G' It is also necessary for the Court to examine the conduct of Adhar Kishore Mishra who was posted as ADM (LA) after the transfer of K.P. Singh on 12 December 2016. Though the two awards were made on 30 June 2016, payments had not been made by that time Adhar Kishore Mishra had joined. In fact, as the records reveal, a communication dated 25 October 2016 was sent by ACEO to the ADM (LA). The letter stated that a copy of the opinion dated 6 June 2015 earlier given by the panel advocate was enclosed and it is on the basis of the said opinion rendered by the panel advocate that an amount of Rs.1.05 crores was demanded. Adhar Kishore Mishra sent a communication dated 3 January 2017 pointing out that the opinion said to have been given by the panel advocate on 6 June 2015 was not available. In such circumstances, it was obligatory on the part of Adhar Kishore Mishra to have first obtained the said opinion of the panel lawyer as that was to be the basis for making the payment but surprisingly no efforts were made by Adhar Kishore Mishra to peruse the opinion by asking Greater Noida to make available the said opinion. The opinion would have clearly revealed that all that was required to be done was to make payment of the amount under the award dated 18 July 1994 made in LAR No.324 of 1992 and LAR No.325 of 1992 filed by Raj Bala and Rajendra Singh on the applications filed by them under Section 18 of the Act. The opinion would have also clearly revealed that the judgment dated 25 April 2014 had been recalled by the High Court and a judgment was subsequently delivered on 30 July 2014 after taking note of the fact that the two applicants had given an undertaking in the execution proceedings that they would not seek any enhancement of compensation in further proceedings. Adhar Kishore Mishra, however, without making any further enquiry directed for making payment in February 2014. What is also to be noted is that when recall applications were filed by Greater Noida he has kept them pending and in fact has even asked Greater Noida to explain under what provision he could recall the order. It is, therefore, necessary to require Adhar Kishore Mishra to file an affidavit to explain his conduct and also appear before the Court on 23 August 2017.

Thus, for all the reasons stated above :

(i) Writ-C No.21457 of 2017 and Writ-C No. 21587 of 2017 filed by Greater Noida are allowed. The two awards dated 30 June 2016 passed on the two applications filed by Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala under Section 28-A of the Act are set aside with a direction that Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala should, within a period of six weeks from today, refund the entire amount paid to them under the two awards with interest at the rate 12% per annum, failing which the Collector, Gautam Budh Nagar shall recover the said amount as arrears of land revenue;

(ii) Writ Petition No.32543 of 2017 filed by Raj Bala to assail the recovery notice dated 30 June 2017 issued by the ADM (LA) requiring her to deposit the amount paid to her under the award, is dismissed;

(iii) Both Rajendra Singh and Raj Bala should also deposit Rs.5 lacs each as costs for having wilfully stated false facts and also for having deliberately concealed material and vital facts in their applications filed under section 28-A of the Act. Such costs should be deposited within a period of six weeks from today, failing which the Collector, Gautam Budh Nagar shall recover the said amount as arrears of land revenue;

(iv) The State Government shall immediately initiate disciplinary proceedings against K.P. Singh, the then ADM (LA). The State Government may also consider whether it would be necessary to place the said Officer under suspension during the pendency of the disciplinary proceedings. The disciplinary proceedings should be concluded within three months. A copy of the enquiry report and the punishment, if any, proposed should be placed before the Court on 3 November 2017; and

(v) Shishir, the then ACEO and Adhar Kishore Mishra, ADM (LA) should file their personal affidavits to explain their conduct and also appear before the Court on 23 August 2017.

The writ petitions have been decided but the matter has been kept pending only for the aforesaid directions contained at (iv) and (v) above.

Order Date :- 03.08.2017 GS/SK/Akram (Dilip Gupta, J.) (Dinesh Kumar Singh-I, J.)

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