Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On:28.05.2025 vs Surat Singh Negi on 24 June, 2025
2025:HHC:19450 IN THEHIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr.Revision No. 112 of 2022 Reserved on:28.05.2025 Date of Decision: 24th June,2025.
Jagat Singh Negi ....Petitioner Versus Surat Singh Negi ....Respondent Coram Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? No. For the Petitioner : Mr Udit Shaurya Kaushik,Advocate.
For the Respondent : Mr. Ankush Dass Sood, Senior Advocate with Mr. Ruchirangad Singh , Advocate.
Rakesh Kainthla,Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition against the order dated 04.01.2022 passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kinnuar at Reckong Peo, District Kinnaur, Himachal Pradesh (learned Trial Court) vide which complaint filed by the petitioner (complainant before the learned Trial Court) was dismissed under Section 203 of Code of Criminal Procedure Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes 2 2025:HHC:19450 (Cr.P.C.). (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.)
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present revision are that the complainant filed a complaint before the learned Trial Court for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 499, 500, 503 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted that the complainant was a Member of the Legislative Assembly of Himachal Pradesh from the Kinnuar Legislative Assembly Constituency. The respondent/accused addresseda public gathering at Ram Leela Ground, Reckong Peo on 06.12.2016 and called the complainant a corrupt person. The exact words spoken by the accused are as under:-
"जहा ाचार चरम सीमा पर है वहां िवकास पूरी तरह अव है , जगतिसंह ाचारी है , और इस मंच के मा म से कहना चा ं गा िक हमारे ठे केदारों को तंग करना बंद करदे , हमारे पंचायती राज सं थानों के लोगों को तंग करना बंद करदे , पूरा िक ौर तो परे शान है लेिकनआपका रकांगिपओ म कुतुबमीनार बनर हा है , कुतुबमीनार, सुना है िकक ा म वाइट हाउस बना िदया लेिकनआप को यह नही ं भूलना चािहए िक िक ौर िक जनता है जो ाचार करे गा उसे घर बैठना पड़े गा और आपको अपने िपताजी से सबक लेना चािहए उनपर भी 1962 से 1967 के बीच म ाचार के आरोप लगे थे , उसके बाद वािपस नही ं आये , जमानत ज़ होता रहा."3
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3. These allegations were made with mala fide intention, knowingfully well that these would lower the reputation of the complainant in the eyes of the public. The respondent/accused also made allegations of corruption against the complainant's father, who was an honest person, and no allegation of corruption was evermade against him. Therefore, the complaint was filedto take action against the accused.
4. Learned Trial Court recorded the preliminary evidence and held vide order dated 04.01.2022 that the success of Vibrant democracy is dependent upon the knowledge of the electorate.
The politicians are expected not to be thin-skinned and hypersensitive about mudslinging by the opposition, particularly during the election rally. The complainant did not exhaust the alternate remedy before the Election Commission of India or the People's Representation Act. The allegations made by the respondent/accused relate to the conduct of the complainant as a politician/public servant. The elections were scheduled in the year 2017, and the public rally was held in connection with the election.
The complainant won the election, and there is nothing to show that he sustained any harm from the utterances made by the 4 2025:HHC:19450 accused. No cognisance could have been taken regarding the allegation made against the complainant's father without a specific complaint on his behalf. The allegations do not constitute defamation; therefore, the complaint was dismissed under Section 203 of the Cr.P.C.
5. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Trial Court, the complainant filed the present petition, asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in dismissing the complaint.
The accused made a defamatory statement knowingfully well that it would damage the complainant's reputation. The speech made by the accused did not fall within any of the exceptions of Section 499 of the IPC. The utterances made by the accused were circulated amongst the electorate. The honesty and integrity of the complainant and his father were compromised. Learned Trial Court brushed aside the evidence of the complainant and his witnesses and the mobile recording, which, prima facie, establishes the case of the petitioner. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.
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6. I have heard Mr. Udit Shaurya Kaushik, learned counsel, vice Mr. Nitin Thakur, learned Counsel for the petitioner/complainant, and Mr. Ankush Dass Sood, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr. Ruchirangad Singh, learned counsel for the respondent/accused.
7. Mr. Udit Shaurya Kaushik, learned counsel for the petitioner/complainant, submitted that the accused made a defamatory statement against the petitioner and his father.
Learned Trial Court erred in dismissing the complaint on the irrelevant consideration, calling a person corrupt is per se defamatory, and the fact that the complainant was re-elected is irrelevant; therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. He relied upon the judgment of this Court in Jagat Singh Negi vs. Surat Singh Negi, 2024:HHC468, in support of his submission.
8. Mr. Ankush Dass Sood, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent/accused, submitted that the learned Trial Court had rightly held that the petitioner did not approach the Election Commission of India against the words uttered by the respondent.
62025:HHC:19450 The petitioner was a public servant, and he should not be too sensitive to the speeches made by the political parties; exposing a public servant does not amount to defamation. He relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Manoj Kumar Tiwari vs. Manish Sisodia 2023 15SCC 401 and the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Parabhu Chawla vs. State of U.P. 2020.AHC:9165 in support of his submission.
9. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at bar and have gone through the records carefully.
10 The allegations made by the respondent, freely translated into English,read as under:
"Where corruption is at its peak, development is completely blocked, Jagat Singh is corrupt, and I would like to say through this platform that stop harassing our contractors, stop harassing the people of our Panchayati Raj Institutions. The entire Kinnaur is distressed, but your Qutub Minar is being built in Reckong Peo Qutub Minar. I have heard that the White House has been built in Kalpa, but you should not forget the people of Kinnaur.Whoever indulges in corruption will have to sit at home, and you should learn a lesson from your father; he too was accused of corruption between 1962 to 1967, he did not return after that, his security kept getting confiscated."7
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11. In the present case, the respondent/accused categorically stated that the complainant/petitioner is a corrupt person (जगत िसंह ाचारी है). He said that the petitioner should not forget that the people of Kinnaur would make a corrupt person sit at home (िक ौर िक जनता है जो ाचार करे गा उसे घर बैठना पड़े गा).
The allegations that the petitioner is corrupt prima facieattract the provisions of Section 499 of the IPC.
12. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana vs Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335, that if any imputations of corruption are made against a person holding a high office, such a person has a right to approach the Court under Section 500 of IPC besides suing for damages. It was observed:-
"104. It may be true, as repeatedly pointed out by Mr Parasaran, that in a given situation, false and vexatious charges of corruption and venality may be maliciously attributed against any person holding a high office and enjoying a respectable status thereby sullying his character, injuring his reputation and exposing him to social ridicule to spite him on account of some personal rancour, predilections and past prejudices of the complainant. In such a piquant situation, the question is what would be the remedy that would redress the grievance of the verily affected party? The answer would be that the person who dishonestly makes such false allegations is liable to be proceeded against under the relevant provisions of the Penal Code, 1860 -- namely under 8 2025:HHC:19450 Section 182, 211 or 500 besides becoming liable to be sued for damages." (Emphasis supplied)
13. It was held in Prabhu Chawla (supra)that imputation of fraud, dishonesty and corruption would amount to defamation. It was observed:
"15. In a matter, complaining of an offence of defamation, the alleged statement has to be appreciated in a manner which will be read, understood and viewed by a right- thinking and reasonable-minded person of ordinary prudence. The statement has to be read and understood in its entirety and not selectively, in piecemeal, or by adding something which is not there. Natural and ordinary meaning of words would be supplied, and what meaning and message it would convey to a man of ordinary prudence is a crucial aspect. Imputation of fraud, dishonesty and corruption in any manner directly attributed to the complainant, no doubt, would amount to defamation, but every statement which is not liked by the complainant himself cannot be said to be a defamatory statement. (Emphasis supplied)
14. The learned Trial Court was swayed by Article 19 of the Constitution of India. It was rightly submitted that this Article is not absolute but subject to the exceptions carved out in it.It was held by the Delhi High Court in Vinai Kumar Saxena v. Aam Aadmi Party, (2022) 5 HCC (Del) 662, that Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution affords the right of freedom of speech and expression to all persons but the same is subject to restriction, which includes defamation. A person cannot make a defamatory 9 2025:HHC:19450 statement to tarnish the reputation of a person in the garb of the right to speech and expression. It was observed:-
20. Before turning to the submissions of the parties, it is deemed apposite to spell out the contours of free speech, as provided in Article 19 of the Constitution of India. Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution affords the right of freedom of speech and expression to all persons. However, the same is subject to restrictions under Article 19(2), which includes defamation. Therefore, the right to freedom of speech and expression is not unfettered in the garb of which defamatory statements can be made to tarnish the reputation of a person. The fundamental right to freedom of speech has to be counterbalanced with the right to thereputation of an individual, which has been held to be a basic element of the right to a life consecrated in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment in Umesh Kumar v. State of A.P. [Umesh Kumar v. State of A.P., (2013) 10 SCC 591: (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 338: (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 237]"
15. Therefore, the learned Trial Court fell into error while holding that the accused was justified in calling the petitioner corrupt; such a right cannot be given to anyone as long as the offence of defamation exists in the statute books. Calling a person corrupt is,per se, defamatory as it tends to lower the estimation of the person in the eyes of the public and cannot be justified by resorting to Article 19 of the Constitution of India.
16. The learned Trial Court was swayed by the promotion of a healthy and vibrant democracy by the right of criticism. As 10 2025:HHC:19450 already stated, there is a right to criticism, but not a right to abuse and defame any person. Granting the right to abuse and defame a person will not make a democracy healthy and vibrant, but will turn it into a mudslinging arena where the opposition and dissent will be crushed by abuses and slurs.
17. In Manoj Kumar Tiwari (supra), a series of Tweets were made by the accused asking 24 questions related to the construction of a building. It was further stated that the answers would disclose the scam in the construction of the room. Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the words 'I will expose your scam' may not amount to defamation.
18. In the present case, respondent/accused never said that he would expose the scam of the petitioner/complainant;
rather, he categorically called the petitioner/complainant a corrupt person. This is quite distinct from exposing a scam of a person.
19. Learned Trial Court further held that the petitioner was elected and there was no harm to him.The learned Trial Court erred in equating harm to loss in elections and overlooked the provisions of Section 499 of the IPC,which mention harm to the 11 2025:HHC:19450 reputation of the person. It was held by the Bombay High Court in Alex Pimento v. Emperor, 1920 SCC OnLine Bom 43,that it is not necessary to prove the actual harm to the person, and it is sufficient that the words are capable of causing harm to the reputation of the person. It was observed:
"Two points have been raised in support of this application: first that the offence of defamation of which the petitioners have been found guilty, is not complete as there is no proof in this case that the defamatory words actually caused harm to the reputation of the person with reference to whom they were used; and, secondly, that certain evidence on behalf of the prosecution was improperly admitted by the Trial Court after the defence evidence was closed.
2. As regards the first point, Mr. Thakor has relied upon Expl. 4, S. 499, I.P.C., and upon the judgment of Davar, J, in Anandrao Balkrishna v. Emperor [A.I.R. 1915 Bom. 28: 27 I.C. 657. Apart from the decisions, it seems to me that the words of the section lend no support whatever to the contention urged on behalf of the applicants. The words of the section material relevant to the point under consideration are:
"Whoever makes or publishes any imputation concerning any person, intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm the reputation of such person, is said to defame that person."
3. Explanation 4 points out as to when an imputation is said to harm a person's reputation within the meaning of this section. But what is necessary to complete the offence is that there must be an imputation with reference to a person 12 2025:HHC:19450 intending to harm, or knowing, or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm the reputation of the person against whom the imputation is made. The expression used in the section is:
"intending to harm or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm" and not "harming."
4. There is an obvious difference between the meanings of these two expressions and the argument based upon Expl. 4 involves the result that there is no difference between the two expressions. Such a result cannot be accepted. If the legislature intended that it was an essential part of the offence of defamation that harm should be caused to the reputation of the person against whom the imputation was made, the words "intending to harm or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm"
5. Could have been omitted, and the word "harming" could have been easily substituted therefor to convey the meaning which is now sought to be put upon the section. I do not say that the question of actual harm to the reputation of a person can never be relevant in determining the question of intention, or knowledge, or belief required by the section. In some cases, it may be very useful to know whether any actual harm has resulted in determining whether the person making the imputation had the necessary intention or knowledge. But the proof of actual harm is not essential.
6. All the decided cases, except the one which has been relied upon by Mr. Thakor, are against his contention. In the case relied upon by him, undoubtedly Davar, J., took the view which is in his favour. Heaton, J., took a different view in that case; and I expressed no opinion on the point as I did not consider it necessary for the purpose of the decision in that case to do so. The point, however, has been raised now, and the view which found favour with Davar, J., has 13 2025:HHC:19450 been relied upon before us. I have carefully considered all the reasons stated by Davar, J., in his judgment. With great respect, I am unable to agree with Davar, J., and agree with Heaton, J., on this point. I think that the offence in this case was complete without any proof of actual harm to the reputation of the person defamed.
7. The words used in this case are clearly defamatory. The words found to have been used by the first petitioner are these:
"What a liar you are, you are a worthless chap, you are a shameless priest, a robber, you have cheated the Government."
8. The second petitioner is found to have used these words:
"You have cheated the Government, you have robbed Rs. 500 from Juvan." There can be no doubt that the person who used the words intended to harm the reputation of the person with reference to whom they were used."
20. A similar view was taken by the Calcutta High Court in Gobinda Pershad Panday and Ors. vs. G.L. Garth:
MANU/WB/0095/1900, wherein it was observed: -
"The Magistrate had before him a complaint of defamation as well as of dishonestly using a forged document under Section 471, Indian Penal Code. Penal Code. The alleged forgery consisted of affixing a false signature to a letter on which the charge of defamation proceeded. At the trial, the evidence was, no doubt, principally directed to the charge under Section 471, and it appears that, at the close of the trial, the Magistrate suddenly turned round and convicted the accused of defamation, having no charge before him of that offence. On appeal, the Sessions Judge very properly found fault with such a proceeding. He seems, however, to have followed the Magistrate into an error regarding the 14 2025:HHC:19450 evidence necessary to prove the offence of defamation, for he points out that there is no evidence to show that the complainant has been injuriously affected by such alleged defamation. That, however, is not necessary to constitute an offence of defamation as defined in Section 499, Indian Penal Code. The law requires merely that there should be an intent that the person who makes or publishes any imputation should do so intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm, the reputation of such person." (Emphasis supplied)
21. Learned Trial Court also held that the recourse had to the Election Commission of India, and the complaint was not maintainable. There is no provision of law which bars a person from filing a criminal complaint when an offence is disclosed because of the availability of the alternative remedy. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Trisuns Chemical Industry v. Rajesh Agarwal, (1999) 8 SCC 686: 2000 SCC (Cri) 47that the availability of the remedy of arbitration is no ground to quash the criminal proceedings. It was observed at page 690:
"9. We are unable to appreciate the reasoning that the provision incorporated in the agreement for referring the disputes to arbitration is an effective substitute for a criminal prosecution when the disputed act is an offence. Arbitration is a remedy for affording relief to the party affected by a breach of the agreement, but the arbitrator cannot conduct a trial of any act which amounted to an offence, albeit the same act may be connected with the discharge of any function under the agreement. Hence, those are not good reasons for the High Court to axe down 15 2025:HHC:19450 the complaint at the threshold itself. The investigating agency should have had the freedom to go into the whole gamut of the allegations and to reach a conclusion of its own. Pre-emption of such investigation would be justified only in very extreme cases as indicated in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335: 1992 SCC (Cri) 426]."
22. Hence, the availability of the alternative remedy will not help the petitioner.
23. Further, there is nothing on record to show that the speech was made during the elections. The elections for the Himachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly were held on 9.11.2017, almost a year after the speech was made; therefore, the speech cannot be connected to the election, giving a right to the petitioner to approach the Election Commission of India.
24. The complaint has also been filed for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 504 of the IPC. The ingredients of Section 504 of IPC were explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohammad Wajid v. State of U.P. (Criminal Appeal No. 2340/2023 decided on August 8, 2023, as under: -
"25. Section 504 of the IPC contemplates intentionally insulting a person and thereby provoking such person insulted to breach the peace or intentionally insulting a person knowing it to be likely that the person insulted may 16 2025:HHC:19450 be provoked so as to cause a breach of the public peace or to commit any other offence. Mere abuse may not come within the purview of the section. But, the words of abuse in a particular case might amount to an intentional insult provoking the person insulted to commit a breach of the public peace or to commit any other offence. If abusive language is used intentionally and is of such a nature as would in the ordinary course of events lead the person insulted to break the peace or to commit an offence under the law, the case is not taken away from the purview of the Section merely because the insulted person did not actually break the peace or commit any offence having exercised self-control or having been subjected to abject terror by the offender. In judging whether particular abusive language is attracted by Section 504, IPC, the court has to find out what, in ordinary circumstances, would be the effect of the abusive language used and not what the complainant actually did as a result of his peculiar idiosyncrasy or cool temperament or sense of discipline. It is the ordinary general nature of the abusive language that is the test for considering whether the abusive language is an intentional insult likely to provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace, and not the particular conduct or temperament of the complainant.
26. Mere abuse, discourtesy, rudeness or insolence, may not amount to an intentional insult within the meaning of Section 504, IPC if it does not have the necessary element of being likely to incite the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace of an offence and the other element of the accused intending to provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace or knowing that the person insulted is likely to commit a breach of the peace. Each case of abusive language shall have to be decided in the light of the facts and circumstances of that case, and there cannot be a general proposition that no one commits an offence under Section 504, IPC if he merely uses abusive language against the complainant. In King Emperor v. Chunnibhai 17 2025:HHC:19450 Dayabhai, (1902) 4 Bom LR 78, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court pointed out that: --
"To constitute an offence under Section 504, I.P.C., it is sufficient if the insult is of a kind calculated to cause the other party to lose his temper and say or do something violent. Public peace can be broken by angry words as well as deeds."
27. A bare perusal of Section 506 of the IPC makes it clear that a part of it relates to criminal intimidation. Before an offence of criminal intimidation is made out, it must be established that the accused had an intention to cause alarm to the complainant.
28. In the facts and circumstances of the case and more particularly, considering the nature of the allegations levelled in the FIR, a prima facie case to constitute the offence punishable under Section 506 of the IPC may probably be said to have been disclosed, but not under Section 504 of the IPC. The allegations with respect to the offence punishable under Section 504 of the IPC can also be looked at from a different perspective. In the FIR, all that the first informant has stated is that abusive language was used by the accused persons. What exactly was uttered in the form of abuses is not stated in the FIR. One of the essential elements, as discussed above, constituting an offence under Section 504 of the IPC is that there should have been an act or conduct amounting to intentional insult. Where that act is the use of abusive words, it is necessary to know what those words were in order to decide whether the use of those words amounted to an intentional insult. In the absence of these words, it is not possible to decide whether the ingredient of intentional insult is present."
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25. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vikram Johar v. State of U.P., (2019) 14 SCC 207: (2019) 4 SCC (Cri) 795: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 609 that mere abuse is not sufficient to attract Section 504 of IPC. It was observed at page 217: -
21. Section 504 IPC came up for consideration before this Court in Fiona Shrikhande v. State of Maharashtra [Fiona Shrikhande v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 14 SCC 44: (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 715]. In the said case, this Court had the occasion to examine the ingredients of Section 504 IPC, which need to be present before proceeding to try a case. The Court held that in the said case, the order issuing process was challenged by filing a criminal revision. This Court held that at the complaint stage, the Magistrate is merely concerned with the allegations made out in the complaint and has only to prima facie satisfy whether there are sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused. In para 11, the following principles have been laid down: (SCC pp. 48-49) "11. We are, in this case, concerned only with the question as to whether, on a reading of the complaint, a prima facie case has been made out or not to issue process by the Magistrate. The law as regards the issuance of process in criminal cases is well settled. At the complaint stage, the Magistrate is merely concerned with the allegations made out in the complaint and has only to prima facie satisfy whether there are sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused, and it is not the province of the Magistrate to enquire into a detailed discussion on the merits or demerits of the case. The scope of enquiry under Section 202 is extremely limited in the sense that the Magistrate, at this stage, is expected to examine prima facie the truth or falsehood of the allegations made in 19 2025:HHC:19450 the complaint. The Magistrate is not expected to embark upon a detailed discussion of the merits or demerits of the case, but only consider the inherent probabilities apparent on the statement made in the complaint. In Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi [Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi, (1976) 3 SCC 736: 1976 SCC (Cri) 507], this Court held that once the Magistrate has exercised his discretion in forming an opinion that there is ground for proceeding, it is not for the Higher Courts to substitute its own discretion for that of the Magistrate. The Magistrate has to decide the question purely from the point of view of the complaint, without at all adverting to any defence that the accused may have."
22. In para 13 of the judgment, this Court has noticed the ingredients of Section 504 IPC, which are to the following effect: (Fiona Shrikhande case [Fiona Shrikhande v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 14 SCC 44: (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 715], SCC p. 49) "13. Section 504 IPC comprises of the following ingredients viz. (a) intentional insult, (b) the insult must be such as to give provocation to the person insulted, and (c) the accused must intend or know that such provocation would cause another to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. The intentional insult must be of such a degree that it should provoke a person to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. The person who intentionally insults intending or knowing it to be likely that it will give provocation to any other person and such provocation will cause to breach the public peace or to commit any other offence, in such a situation, the ingredients of Section 504 are satisfied. One of the essential elements constituting the offence is that there should have been an act or conduct amounting to intentional insult, and the mere fact that the accused abused the complainant, 20 2025:HHC:19450 as such, is not sufficient by itself to warrant a conviction under Section 504 IPC."
23. In another judgment, i.e. Manik Taneja v. State of Karnataka [Manik Taneja v. State of Karnataka, (2015) 7 SCC 423: (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 132], this Court has again occasion to examine the ingredients of Sections 503 and
506. In the above case also, a case was registered for the offence under Sections 353 and 506 IPC. After noticing Section 503, which defines criminal intimidation, this Court laid down the following in paras 11 and 12 : (SCC pp. 427-28) "11.*** A reading of the definition of "criminal intimidation"
would indicate that there must be an act of threatening to another person, of causing an injury to the person, reputation, or property of the person threatened, or to the person in whom the threatened person is interested and the threat must be with the intent to cause alarm to the person threatened or it must be to do any act which he is not legally bound to do or omit to do an act which he is legally entitled to do.
12. In the instant case, the allegation is that the appellants have abused the complainant and obstructed the second respondent from discharging his public duties and spoiled the integrity of the second respondent. It is the intention of the accused that has to be considered in deciding as to whether what he has stated comes within the meaning of "criminal intimidation". The threat must be with the intention to cause alarm to the complainant to cause that person to do or omit to do any work. Mere expression of any words without any intention to cause alarm would not be sufficient to bring in the application of this section. But material has to be placed on record to show that the intention is to 21 2025:HHC:19450 cause alarm to the complainant. From the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that there was no intention on the part of the appellants to cause alarm in the mind of the second respondent, causing obstruction in the discharge of his duty. As far as the comments posted on Facebook are concerned, it appears that it is a public forum meant for helping the public, and the act of the appellants posting a comment on Facebook may not attract ingredients of criminal intimidation in Section 503 IPC." In the above case, the allegation was that the appellant had abused the complainant. The Court held that the mere fact that the allegation that the accused had abused the complainant does not satisfy the ingredients of Section 506 IPC.
24. Now, we revert back to the allegations in the complaint against the appellant. The allegation is that the appellant, with two or three other unknown persons, one of whom was holding a revolver, came to the complainant's house and abused him in filthy language and attempted to assault him, and when some neighbours arrived there, the appellant and the other persons accompanying him fled the spot. The above allegation, taking on its face value, does not satisfy the ingredients of Sections 504 and 506 as has been enumerated by this Court in the above two judgments. The intentional insult must be of such a degree that should provoke a person to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. The mere allegation that the appellant came and abused the complainant does not satisfy the ingredients as laid down in para 13 of the judgment of this Court in Fiona Shrikhande [Fiona Shrikhande v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 14 SCC 44: (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 715].
26. This position was reiterated in B.V. Ram Kumar v. State of Telangana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 275, wherein it was observed:
222025:HHC:19450 "19. For appreciating the necessary ingredients required to substantiate a charge under Section 504, IPC, a reference in this regard may be made to the judgment of this Court in Fiona Shrikhande v. State of Maharashtra (2013) 14 SCC 44, wherein the Court discussed the essential ingredients of Section 504, IPC. The Court held as follows: --
"13. Section 504 IPC comprises of the following ingredients viz. (a) intentional insult, (b) the insult must be such as to give provocation to the person insulted, and
(c) the accused must intend or know that such provocation would cause another to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. The intentional insult must be of such a degree that should provoke a person to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. The person who intentionally insults intending or knowing it to be likely that it will give provocation to any other person and such provocation will cause to break the public peace or to commit any other offence, in such a situation, the ingredients of Section 504 are satisfied. One of the essential elements constituting the offence is that there should have been an act or conduct amounting to intentional insult, and the mere fact that the accused abused the complainant, as such, is not sufficient by itself to warrant a conviction under Section 504 IPC."
14. We may also indicate that it is not the law that the actual words or language should figure in the complaint. One has to read the complaint as a whole and, by doing so, if the Magistrate comes to a conclusion, prima facie, that there has been an intentional insult so as to provoke any person to break the public peace or to commit any other offence, that is sufficient to bring the complaint within the ambit of Section 504 IPC. It is not the law that a complainant should verbatim reproduce each word or words capable of provoking the other person to commit any other offence. The background facts, circumstances, the 23 2025:HHC:19450 occasion, the manner in which they are used, the person or persons to whom they are addressed, the time, the conduct of the person who has indulged in such actions are all relevant factors to be borne in mind while examining a complaint lodged for initiating proceedings under Section 504 IPC." (emphasis supplied)
20. Thus, upon reading the complaint as a whole, if the Magistrate comes to a conclusion, prima facie, that there has been an intentional insult made by the accused to the complainant so as to provoke the latter to break the public peace or to commit any other offence, then only the act complained of would fall within the ambit of Section 504, IPC. The law does not mandate that the complainant should verbatim reproduce each word or words capable of provoking him/her to commit a breach of peace or any other offence. The background facts, circumstances, the occasion, the manner in which the offending words are used, the person to whom they are addressed, the time, the conduct of the person who has indulged in such actions are all relevant factors to be borne in mind while examining a complaint lodged for initiating proceedings under Section 504, IPC.
21. Further, this Court in the case of Mohammad Wajid v. State of U.P. 2023 SCC Online SC 951, while discussing Section 504, IPC, propounded the test for considering the circumstances wherein, an abusive language takes the form and shape of an intentional insult and held thus: --
"28. Section 504 of the IPC contemplates intentionally insulting a person and thereby provoking such person insulted to breach the peace or intentionally insulting a person knowing it to be likely that the person insulted may be provoked so as to cause a breach of the public peace or to commit any other offence. Mere abuse may not come within the purview of the section. But, the words of abuse in a particular case might amount to an intentional insult provoking the person insulted to 24 2025:HHC:19450 commit a breach of the public peace or to commit any other offence. If abusive language is used intentionally and is of such a nature as would in the ordinary course of events lead the person insulted to break the peace or to commit an offence under the law, the case is not taken away from the purview of the Section merely because the insulted person did not actually break the peace or commit any offence having exercised self-control or having been subjected to abject terror by the offender. In judging whether particular abusive language is attracted by Section 504, IPC, the court has to find out what, in ordinary circumstances, would be the effect of the abusive language used and not what the complainant actually did as a result of his peculiar idiosyncrasy or cool temperament or sense of discipline. It is the ordinary general nature of the abusive language that is the test for considering whether the abusive language is an intentional insult likely to provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace, and not the particular conduct or temperament of the complainant.
29. Mere abuse, discourtesy, rudeness or insolence, may not amount to an intentional insult within the meaning of Section 504, IPC if it does not have the necessary element of being likely to incite the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace of an offence and the other element of the accused intending to provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace or knowing that the person insulted is likely to commit a breach of the peace. Each case of abusive language shall have to be decided in the light of the facts and circumstances of that case, and there cannot be a general proposition that no one commits an offence under Section 504, IPC if he merely uses abusive language against the complainant." (emphasis supplied)
22. Needless to say, mere abuse, discourtesy, rudeness or insolence does not amount to an intentional insult within 25 2025:HHC:19450 the meaning of Section 504, IPC. Furthermore, it would be immaterial that the person who has been insulted and provoked did not actually break the peace or commit any offence.
23. Section 504, IPC consists of two parts. Firstly, the actus reus- being the intentional insult which gives rise to the provocation. Secondly, the mens rea, i.e., the intention or knowledge on the part of the accused that such intentional provocation is likely to cause the person insulted to break public peace or commit any other offence. The animus nocendi in Section 504, IPC is that the accused should 'intentionally insult' the other person with the intention or knowledge that the provocation caused by such insult is likely to result in the commission of a breach of public peace or any other offence by the person who has been so insulted. The offence is said to be complete once the accused person makes an 'intentional insult' with the aforesaid mens rea. Hence, intention or knowledge on the part of the accused person that his actions of making an 'intentional insult' have the potential to provoke the person insulted is sine qua non for the commission of the offence under Section 504, IPC.
24. The natural corollary of the above discussion is that if the accused does not intend to give provocation, the offence is not made out. An insult without an 'intention to insult' is not punishable under Section 504, IPC. Further, 'intentional insult' must be of such a degree that it has the potential to provoke a reasonable person to break the public peace or to commit any other offence.
25. It is trite that whether the person provoked further commits an illegal act or not is immaterial to draw the conclusion of culpability under Section 504, IPC. The 'intentional insult' and provocation must be so proximate and close that the accused has either the intention or the knowledge that the intentional insult made by him is likely to cause the provoked person to break public peace or commit some other offence. However, what would be the 26 2025:HHC:19450 nature of 'intentional insult' causing provocation, to draw culpability under Section 504, IPC, would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The test to be applied to determine if the intentional insult made by the accused is sufficient to cause provocation is that of a reasonable person, i.e., if the insult is sufficient to provoke any reasonable person to break the peace or commit any other offence, only then the accused will be liable for the offence under Section 504, IPC."
27. In the present case, nothing was stated in the complaint or the statement on oath that the words used by the accused were intended to provoke the complainant or any other person to commit a breach of peace. Hence, no grounds for summoning the accused for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 504 of the IPC are made out.
28. The complaint was also filed for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 506 read with Section 503 of the IPC. Criminal intimidation is provided in Section 503 of the IPC as under: -
503. Criminal intimidation Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of anyone in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits 27 2025:HHC:19450 criminal intimidation.
Explanation- A threat to injure the reputation of any deceased person in whom the person threatened is interested is within this section.
29. Section 503 requires that the threat of injury should have been within an intent to cause alarm to a person, to do an act, which a person is not legally bound to do or omit to do any act which he is legally entitled to do. It was laid down by this Court in Inder Pratap Singh Versus State of Himachal Pradesh 2003 (1) Crimes 345 (HC)that the complainant should have been alarmed by the threat advanced by the accused to attract section 506 of IPC. It was observed:
"21. Similarly, before an offence of criminal intimidation can be made out, it must be established prima facie, that the accused persons (like petitioners in the present case), intended to cause an alarm to the complainant party i. e., Jasbeer Singh. Mere threats, as alleged by him, extended by the petitioners, with a view to deter the complainant from interfering with what the petitioner believed to be his exclusive property would not constitute an offence of criminal intimidation."
30. Similar is the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vikram Johar (supra) wherein it was held at page 209: -
"25. Now, reverting back to Section 506, which is offence of criminal intimidation, the principles laid down by Fiona Shrikhande [Fiona Shrikhande v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 28 2025:HHC:19450 14 SCC 44 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 715] has also to be applied when question of finding out as to whether the ingredients of offence are made or not. Here, the only allegation is that the appellant abused the complainant. For proving an offence under Section 506 IPC, what are the ingredients which have to be proved by the prosecution? Ratanlal & Dhirajlal on Law of Crimes, 27th Edn. with regard to proof of offence states the following:
"... The prosecution must prove:
(i) That the accused threatened some person.
(ii) That such threat consisted of some injury to his person, reputation or property; or to the person, reputation or property of someone in whom he was interested;
(iii) That he did so with intent to cause alarm to that person; or to cause that person to do any act which he was not legally bound to do, or omit to do any act which he was legally entitled to do as a means of avoiding the execution of such threat."(emphasis supplied) A plain reading of the allegations in the complaint does not satisfy all the ingredients as noticed above.
31. Therefore, it is necessary to prove that the accused had caused an alarm to the complainant or had caused him to do anything which he would not have done or omitted to do anything which he would have done but for the threat. No person deposed that the complainant was alarmed by any threat. Therefore, the ingredients of Section 506 of the IPC were not satisfied.
32. Therefore, the learned Trial Court erred in dismissing the complaint filed by the plaintiff. Consequently, the present 29 2025:HHC:19450 petition is allowed, and the order dated 04.01.2022, passed by the learned Trial Court, is set aside. The accused be summoned for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 500 of the IPC. The parties, through their respective counsel, are directed to appear before the learned Trial Court on 07th July, 2025.
33. The present petition stands disposed of, so also the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any.
34. A copy of the judgment, along with a record of the learned Trial Court, be sent back forthwith.
(Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 24th June, 2025.
(Ravinder)