Bombay High Court
Mohd. Hanif vs Additional Commissioner And ... on 18 December, 1980
JUDGMENT V.S. Deshpande, J.
1. The petitioner was elected Councillor of the Paithan Municipal Council in or about the month of November 1974. On 3rd May, 1978 the Chief Officer of the said Municipal Council submitted a report to the Collector, Aurangabad. The report indicated that the petitioner had incurred a disqualification under section 44(1)(a) read with section 16(1)(ac) of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as "the said Act."). The cause of disqualification is alleged to be a conviction of the petitioner on 21st September, 1977 by the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Shevgaon, for an offence under section 85(1) of the Bombay Prohibition Act.
2. The Collector issued a show-cause notice to the petitioner to submit his say in the matter. As his say was not found to be satisfactory, the Collector declared the petitioner to have been disqualified and consequently he declared the seat to have become vacant under section 44(3) of the said Act. The petitioner appealed to the Additional Commissioner and Additional Regional Director of Municipal Administration, Aurangabad, but the said appeal was dismissed on 10th July, 1980. The validity of this order is challenged in this Special Civil Application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
3. Under section 16(1)(ac) of the said Act a person is disqualified to become a Councillor if he "has been convicted by a Court in India of any offence involving moral turpitude, unless a period of five years has elapsed since the date of such conviction", section 44(1)(a) of the Act renders any Councillor to have become disqualified to hold office as such, if at any time during his term of officer, he is or becomes subject to any of the disqualifications specified in section 16 except the disqualification specified in Clause (h) of sub-section (1) of that section. We are not concerned in this case with Clause (h) of sub-section (1) of section 16 of the Act. It is not in dispute that the learned Judicial Magistrate. First Class, Shevgaon, did convict the petitioner for an offence under section 85(1) read with section 66(1)(b)(i) of the Bombay Prohibition Act. An extract from the register of summary cases placed on record shows that the petitioner had committed that offence at about 4-30 p.m. at Shevgaon in Nitya Seva Hospital on 23-2-1974. The allegation against him was that in the evening of the said date and time the petitioner went to public place like Nitya Seva Hospital, was found drunk and behaving in a disorderly manner under the influence of drink. The petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge and voluntarily and prayed for mercy. This is how he was convicted and sentenced to suffer imprisonment till the rising of the Court and to pay a fine of Rs. 20/- for an offence under section 85(1) and Rs. 15/- for the offence under section 66(1)(b) of the Bombay Prohibition Act.
4. The sole question that arises for consideration is whether the offence for which the petitioner was admittedly convicted on 21st September, 1977 and the five year period had not expired when the report was made, can be said to have involved any moral turpitude.
5. Shri Santosh Bora, the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner, contends that the act of getting drunk or the act of going to any public place such as the hospital or the act of abusing or behaving in a disorderly manner does not involve any moral turpitude whatsoever even if such conduct is found to be objectionable or otherwise actionable. In support of his contention he relied on a judgment of the Punjab High Court in Chandgi Ram v. Election Tribunal, , and a judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Mangli v. Chakki Lal, . He also relied on the cases referred to in the said Mangali's case and a judgment of the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Buddha Pitai v. Sub-Divisional Officer, .
6. Now, the expression "moral turpitude" has not been defined anywhere. The conception in the very nature of things cannot be put in a straight jacket so as to admit of any degree of precision. It must necessarily depend on the facts of each case. In Chnadgi Ram's case Mahajan J., of the Punjab High Court was called upon to decide whether mere conviction for offence under section 19(f) of the Arms Act can be said to involve moral turpitude. In paragraph (4) of the judgment the learned Judge has observed :
"........'Moral turpitude is a phrase which can hardly be accurately defined. It can have various shades of meaning in the various sets of circumstances. Normally as this phrase is understood, it is used in law with reference to crimes which refer to conduct that is inherently base, vile or depraved and contrary to the accepted Rules of morality whether it is or is not publishable as a crime. They do not refer to conduct which before it was made punishable as a crime was generally not regarded as wrong or corrupt."
The learned Judge in this regard relied on the observations of Tandon, J. in Baleshwer Singh v. District Magistrate and Collector, , which also is relied on in Mangalis' case. With respect, we find ourselves in agreement with the test laid down by Mahajan J. Chandgi Ram's case. It is difficult to hold that the conduct of the petitioner in getting drunk and going to public places, such as the hospital and behaving there in a disorderly manner is not base or vile as contemplated in the observations of Mahajan, J. in Chandgi Ram's case. It also cannot be said that it does not imply disposition of the person charged with the particular conduct as observed by Tandon, J. in Baleshwar Singh's case supra. It is true that this conduct may not stand the test laid down by Srivastava, J. in Managali's case supra. In paragraph 5 of the judgment, Srivastava, J. has referred to three categories of acts which according to him, involve moral turpitude. It is difficult to hold that the three categories mentioned therein could have been intended to be exhaustive or that any other conduct cannot come within the conception of moral turpitude. It is obvious that the question whether a particular offence involves moral turpitude or not cannot depend on abstract notions of the rights and wrongs involved or the harm or the good coming out of the act, but has to be judge by reference to the reaction of the people as to how the act could have been looked upon in the society where the act has been committed. Acts of baseness or acts varying an element of vileness or acts which are harmful to society in general or contrary to accepted rules of right and duties between man and man are also liable to be construed as being covered by the conception of moral turpitude.
7. Strong reliance was placed by Shri Bora on the judgment of a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Budha Pitai v. Sub-Divisional Officer, . The question which arose for consideration in that case was, whether an offence under section 16 read with section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act was an offence involving moral turpitude. It was on this ground that the Pradhan of a Gaon Sabha elected under the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947, was sought to be disqualified. The Court by majority held that the said offence did not involve any moral turpitude as such and was not sufficient to disqualify the Pradhan from holding that office. We are unable to equate an offence under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act with an offence under section 85(1) of the Bombay Prohibition Act. The impugned act therein by itself could not be said to have been considered as an offence but for the specific provision of the special enactment the said act was merely found to be a technical breach of the Rules framed under the Prevention of food Adulteration Act. According to the majority every ingredient of section 16 read with section 7 of the Prevention of Food Alteration Act did not involve moral turpitude. In our opinion, the facts of that cases are distinguishable. We however, find that the test laid down by the learned Judges does not in any way differ from the two tests quoted by us above. Desai, C.J. has quoted from Roscoe Pound's book on Jurisprudence VII. II at page 261.
"In order to maintain the social interest in the general security, to prevent conflict, and to maintain a legal order in the place of private war, the law must deal with many things which are morally indifferent."
At page 278 it is stated as follows :
"Security has also to be kept in mind, and if its dictates have to be tempered by morals and morality theirs have to be tempered by those of security and measured by what is practicable in a legal order."
8. The acts of the petitioner amount to moral turpitude judge by these facts. We are unable to se any merit in the contentions of Shir Bora. The rule is, therefore, discharged. No order as to costs.