Madhya Pradesh High Court
Ram Lakhan Gupta vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh Thr on 20 February, 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:6650
1 WP. No. 3417 of 2017
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT G WA L I O R
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ANAND SINGH BAHRAWAT
WRIT PETITION No. 3417 of 2017
RAM LAKHAN GUPTA
Versus
STATE OF M.P. AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri S.K. Sharma- Advocate for petitioner.
Shri Ravindra Dixit- Government Advocate for the respondent/State.
Reserved on : 30.01.2026
Pronounced on : 20.02.2026
___________________________________________________________________
ORDER
This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the petitioner seeking the following reliefs:-
(i) That, the impugned order dated 24.01.2017 be declared illegal and be quashed.
(ii) That, respondents may kindly be directed to prepared the list of selection for group -4 vacancies only from the Signature Not Verified Signed by: MONIKA SHARMA Signing time: 2/23/2026 1:41:57 PM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:6650 2 WP. No. 3417 of 2017 candidate who were eligible on the last date of application 21.11.2016 as per the existing rules.
(iii) That, respondents be also directed to prepare the merit list as per the criteria set by the Apex Court wherein the reserve candidate cannot be shifted to the vacancy of general category on basis of acquiring the higher marks.
(iv) That, any other relief which this Hon'ble High Court may deem fit, with cost of the petition."
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that, by the impugned order dated 24.01.2017, respondent No.2 has illegally regularized the candidature of certain candidates who were not eligible as on the last date for submission of applications under the prevailing rules. It is contended that, despite being ineligible, some candidates misrepresented their eligibility and submitted applications for selection to the Group-4 vacancies. In order to accommodate such candidates, the impugned order was issued during the pendency of the selection process by altering the eligibility criteria, thereby causing serious prejudice to a large number of candidates who did not apply in view of the original prescribed criteria. An action which could not have been undertaken directly has thus been carried out indirectly and is, therefore, without jurisdiction. It is further submitted that, by way of the impugned order, the minimum typing speed requirement was reduced from 30 words per minute to 20 words per minute after the expiry of the last date for submission of applications. As a result, several candidates who would have been eligible under the revised criteria did not apply pursuant to the original notification. Hence, the impugned order is arbitrary, illegal, and discriminatory in nature.
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3. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents/State submits that, in exercise of powers under Article 309 of the Constitution of India, His Excellency the Governor of Madhya Pradesh has framed the Madhya Pradesh Junior Service (Joint Qualifying) Examination Rules, 2013. As per Rule 10(1)(C) of the said Rules, possession of a valid CPCT Score Card has been made mandatory. It is contended that these statutory rules were not considered by the Indore Bench while deciding W.P. Nos. 7880/2016, 7883/2016, and 6110/2017, and therefore, the present petition is not maintainable. He also reliance upon the judgment dated 15.09.2017 passed by the Indore Bench in W.P. No. 6100/2017, wherein a similar prayer for consideration without a CPCT certificate was rejected. It is further submitted that the General Administration Department, vide notification dated 24.01.2017, made possession of a CPCT Score Card mandatory, as reflected in para 3(vi) of the circular. It is contended that the complete advertisement issued by the Professional Examination Board clearly incorporated the said requirement, and therefore, no illegality can be attributed to the impugned action. Consequently, the respondents were justified in not recommending the petitioner's name for want of the requisite CPCT qualification. It is further submitted that in W.P. No. 6627/2017 (Alok Singh vs. State of M.P.), involving similar facts, this Court has dismissed the petition.
4. It is further submitted on behalf of respondent that the Full Bench of this Court in Manoj Kumar Purohit and Others vs. State of M.P. & Ors., reported in 2016(1) M.P.L.J. 449, had occasion to consider a similar issue. In para 11(b) of the said judgment, it was observed that a new service condition may be introduced through executive instructions and would remain operative so long as it is not expressly or impliedly repealed by a subsequent executive order, a rule Signature Not Verified Signed by: MONIKA SHARMA Signing time: 2/23/2026 1:41:57 PM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:6650 4 WP. No. 3417 of 2017 framed under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution, or by statute. It was further held that, in the absence of any specific prohibition in the Rules, a stipulation such as passing a Hindi typing test could validly be prescribed. He also reliance upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in Sitaram Jivyabhai Gavali vs. Ramjibhai Potiyabhai Mahala and Others (AIR 1987 SC 1293) and State of Rajasthan & Ors. vs. Rajendra K. Verma (2004) 13 SCC 706, wherein it has been recognized that additional conditions of service may be introduced by executive instructions, provided they do not run contrary to statutory rules. In view of the aforesaid judgments, it cannot be contended that, after amendment of the Madhya Pradesh Junior Service (Joint Qualifying) Examination Rules, 2013 vide notification dated 16.02.2015, the Rules could not be supplemented by executive instructions contained in the GAD circular dated 24.01.2017. There is no embargo in the 2013 Rules prohibiting prescription of such additional qualifications. On the contrary, the Rules prescribe educational qualifications and proficiency requirements for Group-IV posts, including typing and shorthand speed as recognized by the General Administration Department from time to time. Rule 10(b) does not restrict incorporation of qualifications as recommended by the General Administration Department from time to time. Therefore, prescription of the CPCT Score Card vide circular dated 24.01.2017 does not supersede the Recruitment Rules of 2013 but merely supplements and fortifies them in terms of the enabling provisions contained therein. Consequently, no arbitrariness can be attributed to the prescription of CPCT qualification as a mandatory condition and the present petition deserves to be dismissed.
5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
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6. The order dated 22.03.2024 of the Co-ordinate Bench of Indore Bench of M.P. High Court in the case of Dr. Jagram Verma Vs. State of M.P. and Ors. passed in W.P. No.25631/2021, relevant paras 16 to 18 of which are quoted below for ready reference and convenience:
"16] On the other hand, since the petitioner has already participated in the selection process, he is precluded from challenging the advertisement, as has been held by the Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Mustafa Vs. Union of India and others reported as (2022) 1 SCC 294, paras 35 to 41 of which read as under:-
"35. It is in this context, we have to examine whether the appellants are estopped from challenging the recommendations made by the Empanelment Committee, given the fact that they had taken a calculated chance, and not protested till the selection panel was made public. In our opinion, the ratio in Madan Lal v. State of J&K [Madan Lal v. State of J&K, (1995) 3 SCC 486 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 712] , would apply in the present case as when a person takes a chance and participates, thereafter he cannot, because the result is unpalatable, turn around to contend that the process was unfair or the selection committee was not properly constituted. This decision, no doubt, pertains to a case where the petitioner had appeared at an open interview, however, the ratio would apply to the present case as the appellant too had taken a calculated chance in spite of the stakes, that too without protest, and then has belatedly raised the plea of bias and prejudice only when he was not recommended. The judgment in Madan Lal [Madan Lal v. State of J&K, (1995) 3 SCC 486 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 712] refers to an earlier decision of this Court in Om Prakash Shukla v. Akhilesh Kumar Shukla [Om Prakash Shukla v. Akhilesh Kumar Shukla, 1986 Supp SCC 285 : 1986 SCC (L&S) 644], wherein the petitioner who had appeared at an examination without protest was not granted any relief, as he had filed the petition when he could not succeed afterwards in the examination. This principle has been reiterated in Manish Kumar Shahi v. State of Bihar [Manish Kumar Shahi v. State of Bihar, (2010) 12 SCC 576 :Signature Not Verified Signed by: MONIKA SHARMA Signing time: 2/23/2026 1:41:57 PM
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:6650 6 WP. No. 3417 of 2017 (2011) 1 SCC (L&S) 256] , and Ramesh Chandra Shah v. Anil Joshi [Ramesh Chandra Shah v. Anil Joshi, (2013) 11 SCC 309 : (2013) 3 SCC (L&S) 129] .
36. More appropriate for our case would be an earlier decision in G. Sarana v. University of Lucknow [G. Sarana v. University of Lucknow, (1976) 3 SCC 585 : 1976 SCC (L&S) 474] , wherein a similar question had come up for consideration before a three Judge Bench of this Court as the petitioner, after having appeared before the selection committee and on his failure to get appointed, had challenged the selection result pleading bias against him by three out of five members of the selection committee. He also challenged constitution of the committee. Rejecting the challenge, this Court had held : (SCC p. 591, para 15) "15. We do not, however, consider it necessary in the present case to go into the question of the reasonableness of bias or real likelihood of bias as despite the fact that the appellant knew all the relevant facts, he did not before appearing for the interview or at the time of the interview raise even his little finger against the constitution of the Selection Committee. He seems to have voluntarily appeared before the committee and taken a chance of having a favourable recommendation from it. Having done so, it is not now open to him to turn round and question the constitution of the committee. This view gains strength from a decision of this Court in Manak Lal case [Manak Lal v. Prem Chand Singhvi, AIR 1957 SC 425] where in more or less similar circumstances, it was held that the failure of the appellant to take the identical plea at the earlier stage of the proceedings created an effective bar of waiver against him. The following observations made therein are worth quoting : (AIR p. 432, para 9) ''9. ... It seems clear that the appellant wanted to take a chance to secure a favourable report from the tribunal which was constituted and when he found that he was confronted with an unfavourable Signature Not Verified Signed by: MONIKA SHARMA Signing time: 2/23/2026 1:41:57 PM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:6650 7 WP. No. 3417 of 2017 report, he adopted the device of raising the present technical point."
37. The aforesaid judgment in G. Sarana [G. Sarana v. University of Lucknow, (1976) 3 SCC 585 : 1976 SCC (L&S) 474] was referred in Madras Institute of Development Studies v. K. Sivasubramaniyan [Madras Institute of Development Studies v. K. Sivasubramaniyan, (2016) 1 SCC 454 : (2016) 1 SCC (L&S) 164] ,in which selection to the post of Assistant Professor was challenged on the ground that shortlisting of candidates was contrary to the Faculty Recruitment Rules. The challenge was declined on the ground of estoppel as the respondent, without raising any objection to the alleged variations in the contents of the advertisement and the Rules, had submitted his application and participated in the selection process by appearing before the committee of experts.
38. Equally appropriate would be a reference to the decision of this Court in P.D. Dinakaran (1) v. Judges Inquiry Committee [P.D. Dinakaran (1) v. Judges Inquiry Committee, (2011) 8 SCC 380], in which the allegation was that one of the members of the committee constituted by the Chairman of the Council of States (Rajya Sabha) under Section 3(2) of the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 was biased. This judgment extensively recites and assimilates from both domestic and foreign judgments on the question of bias and prejudice and quotes the following observations in G. Sarana [G. Sarana v. University of Lucknow, (1976) 3 SCC 585 : 1976 SCC (L&S) 474] case : (G. Sarana case [G. Sarana v. University of Lucknow, (1976) 3 SCC 585 :
1976 SCC (L&S) 474] , SCC p. 590, para 11) "11. ... the real question is not whether a member of an administrative board while exercising quasi-judicial powers or discharging quasi-judicial functions was biased, for it is difficult to probe the mind of a person.
What has to be seen is whether there is a reasonable ground for believing that he was likely to have been biased. In deciding the question of bias, human probabilities and ordinary course of human conduct have to be taken into consideration."
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41. In P.D. Dinakaran (1) [P.D. Dinakaran (1) v. Judges Inquiry Committee, (2011) 8 SCC 380] , this Court held that the member in question had during a seminar spoken against the proposed elevation of the petitioner as a Judge of the Supreme Court and, therefore, the apprehension of likelihood of bias is reasonable and not fanciful, though in fact, the member may not be biased. Nevertheless, the writ petition was dismissed on the ground that the petitioner was not a lay person and being well- versed in law should have objected to the constitution of committee when notified in the Official Gazette, which factum was highly publicised in almost all newspapers.
Notwithstanding the awareness and knowledge, the petitioner did not object, which indicates that he was satisfied that the member had nothing against him. Therefore, belated plea taken by the petitioner did not merit acceptance and mitigates against bona fides of the objection to the appointment of the person as a member of the committee. ...................................... (Emphasis Supplied) 17] A perusal of the aforesaid decision clearly reveals that it is not the ratio of this case that when a person has participated in a proceeding/selection process etc., he is precluded from challenging the same, but the rider is that his or her objections must be voiced before participating in the said process. In other words, if a person is taking exception to any selection process or the like, he cannot do so after he has participated and failed in the same, however, if he has challenged such process at the earliest opportunity, before participating in the same, then, even if he or she participates in the said process afterwards, it would not be considered as his or her deemed waiver of the objection.
18] Thus, tested on the said anvil, it is found that the petitioner had challenged the impugned order by filing this petition on 30.05.2017, whereas, the impugned advertisement was also issued on 16.02.2015. In such circumstances, it is held that despite the petitioner's participation in the selection process, he cannot challenged the said advertisement on the principle of estoppel. The challenge was declined on the ground of estoppel as the petitioner, without raising any objection to the alleged variations in the Signature Not Verified Signed by: MONIKA SHARMA Signing time: 2/23/2026 1:41:57 PM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:6650 9 WP. No. 3417 of 2017 contents of the advertisement and the Rules, had submitted his application and participated in the selection process by appearing in it."
7. The order dated 10.09.2025 of this Court in the case of Smt. Bhawna Sharma Vs. State of M.P. and Ors. passed in W.P. No.2999/2014, relevant paras 7 and 8 of which are quoted below for ready reference and convenience:
"7. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Maharashtra Public Service Commission through its Secretary Vs. Sandeep Shriram Warade And Others reported in (2019) 6 SCC 362 has held as under:
"9. The essential qualifications for appointment to a post are for the employer to decide. The employer may prescribe additional or desirable qualifications, including any grant of preference. It is the employer who is best suited to decide the requirements a candidate must possess according to the needs of the employer and the nature of work. The court cannot lay down the conditions of eligibility, much less can it delve into the issue with regard to desirable qualifications being on a par with the essential eligibility by an interpretive re-writing of the advertisement. Questions of equivalence will also fall outside the domain of judicial review. If the language of the advertisement and the rules are clear, the court cannot sit in judgment over the same. If there is an ambiguity in the advertisement or it is contrary to any rules or law the matter has to go back to the appointing authority after appropriate orders, to proceed in accordance with law. In no case can the court, in the garb of judicial review, sit in the chair of the appointing authority to decide what is best for the employer and interpret the conditions of the advertisement contrary to the plain language of the same.
10. The fact that an expert committee may have been constituted and which examined the documents before calling the candidates for interview cannot operate as an Signature Not Verified Signed by: MONIKA SHARMA Signing time: 2/23/2026 1:41:57 PM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:6650 10 WP. No. 3417 of 2017 estoppel against the clear terms of the advertisement to render an ineligible candidate eligible for appointment.
11. The plain reading of the advertisement provides that a degree in Pharmacy or Pharmaceutical Chemistry or in medicine with specialisation in Clinical Pharmacology or Microbiology from a university coupled with the requisite years of experience thereafter in manufacturing or testing of drugs were essential qualifications. Preference could be given to those possessing the additional desirable qualification of research experience in the synthesis and testing of drugs in a research laboratory.
12. Manufacture has been defined as a process for making, altering, ornamenting, finishing, packing, labelling, breaking up or otherwise treating or adopting any drug or cosmetic with a view to its sale or distribution. Therefore, the experience of testing has to be correlated to the manufacturing process which naturally will be entirely different from the testing carried out in the research and development laboratory before the product is released for manufacture and sale in the market. To say that experience in testing of drugs in a research and development laboratory would be on a par with the testing done at the time of manufacture before sale cannot be countenanced and has to be rejected.
13. The preference clause in Clause 4.7 only means that if a candidate with the required degree qualification and practical experience in the manufacturing and testing of drugs for stipulated period of years has an additional desirable attribute of a research experience in a research laboratory, other things being equal, preference could be given to such a candidate. The term "preference"
mentioned in the advertisement cannot be interpreted to mean that merely because a candidate may have had the requisite experience of testing in a research and development laboratory he/she possessed the essential Signature Not Verified Signed by: MONIKA SHARMA Signing time: 2/23/2026 1:41:57 PM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:6650 11 WP. No. 3417 of 2017 eligibility and had a preferential right to be considered for appointment."
8. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Zahoor Ahmad Rather and others Vs. Sheikh Imtiyaz Ahmad and others reported in (2019) 2 SCC 404 held in para 26 as follows:-
"26. We are in respectful agreement with the interpretation which has been placed on the judgment in Jyoti K.K. [Jyoti K.K. v. Kerala Public Service Commission, (2010) 15 SCC 596: (2013) 3 SCC (L&S) 664] in the subsequent decision in Anita [State of Punjab v. Anita, (2015) 2 SCC 170 :(2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 329]. The decision in Jyoti K.K. [Jyoti K.K. v. Kerala Public Service Commission, (2010) 15 SCC 596:
(2013) 3 SCC (L&S) 664] turned on the provisions of Rule 10(a)(ii). Absent such a rule, it would not be permissible to draw an inference that a higher qualification necessarily presupposes the acquisition of another, albeit lower, qualification. The prescription of qualifications for a post is a matter of recruitment policy. The State as the employer is entitled to prescribe the qualifications as a condition of eligibility. It is no part of the role or function of judicial review to expand upon the ambit of the prescribed qualifications.
Similarly, equivalence of a qualification is not a matter which can be determined in exercise of the power of judicial review. Whether a particular qualification should or should not be regarded as equivalent is a matter for the State, as the recruiting authority, to determine. The decision in Jyoti K.K. [Jyoti K.K. v. Kerala Public Service Commission, (2010) 15 SCC 596: (2013) 3 SCC (L&S) 664] turned on a specific statutory rule under which the holding of a higher qualification could presuppose the acquisition of a lower qualification. The absence of such a rule in the present case makes a crucial difference to the ultimate outcome. In this view of the matter, the Division Bench [Imtiyaz Ahmad v. Zahoor Ahmad Rather, LPA (SW) No. 135 of 2017, decided on 12-10-2017 (J&K)] of the High Court was justified in reversing the judgment [Zahoor Ahmad Rather v. State of Signature Not Verified Signed by: MONIKA SHARMA Signing time: 2/23/2026 1:41:57 PM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:6650 12 WP. No. 3417 of 2017 J&K, 2017 SCC OnLine J&K 936] of the learned Single Judge and in coming to the conclusion that the appellants did not meet the prescribed qualifications. We find no error in the decision [Imtiyaz Ahmad v. Zahoor Ahmad Rather, LPA (SW) No. 135 of 2017, decided on 12-10-2017 (J&K)] of the Division Bench."
8. It is settled law that the State is entitled to prescribe the qualification as a condition of eligibility and judicial review is not permissible to expand the ambit of the prescribed qualification. Similarly, equivalence or non-equivalence of a qualification is not a matter which can be decided in exercise of the power of judicial review. Whether a particular qualification should or should not be regarded as equivalent, is a matter for the State to determine and not for the court. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the contention of the petitioner cannot be accepted.
9. Ex. Consequential, petition fails and is hereby dismissed.
(Anand Singh Bahrawat) Judge Monika Signature Not Verified Signed by: MONIKA SHARMA Signing time: 2/23/2026 1:41:57 PM