Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
Patil Chandramouliswar Reddy vs Madige Pedda Dasthagiri on 28 August, 2019
Author: J. Uma Devi
Bench: J. Uma Devi
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE M. SEETHARAMA MURTI
AND
THE HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE J.UMA DEVI
Land Grabbing Appeal no.1 of 2019
JUDGMENT:(Per Hon'ble Sri Justice M.Seetharama Murti) The unsuccessful respondent in I.A.no.1675 of 2018 in LGOP no.79 of 2017/petitioner in the LGOP filed this appeal under Section 7(A) (3) of the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 ['the Act', for brevity] assailing the order, dated 07.02.2019, of the learned Judge of the Special Tribunal under A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act-Principal District Judge, Kurnool, passed in the said I.A.no.1675 of 2018 in the said L.G.O.P.no.79 of 2017.
2. We have heard the submissions of Sri Patil Chandramouliswar Reddy, appellant/Party-in-person; and, of Sri G.Venkata Reddy, learned counsel appearing for the respondents 1 to 13. We have perused the material record.
2.1 The parties in this appeal shall hereinafter be referred to as arrayed in the appeal for convenience and clarity.
3. To begin with it is to be noted that the appellant herein filed the above said L.G.O.P.no.79 of 2017 ('LGOP', for brevity) on the file of the Court of the Special Tribunal under A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act- cum-Principal District Court, Kurnool, ['Special Tribunal', for brevity] seeking verbatim the following reliefs:
'(a) To declare that the petitioner is absolute owner of the petition schedule land as described in the petition schedule.
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(b) To declare that respondents 1 to 13 as land grabbers of the petition schedule land and for consequential direction to respondents number 1 to 13 to deliver vacant possession of the petition schedule land by removing all types of objections that is removing cattle grass and its fencing by R4 and R8 and foundation stones laid by R5 and R8 for construction of houses at the petition schedule land and all other obstacles placed at and over the petition schedule land to show their illegal occupations over the said land immediately.
(c) Direct the respondents 1 to 13 to pay the compensation of Rs.10,000/- each towards illegal use and occupation and obstructing the petitioner to enjoy the petition schedule land from 01.12.2015 up to the filing of this petition.
(d) Grant such other interior reliefs as the Honourable Court deems fit and proper to protect the interest of the petitioner in the circumstances of the case.
(e) Costs of the petition.' The schedule land as mentioned in the schedule annexed to the LGOP, as is evident from the copy of the same filed with material papers, is verbatim as follows:
"That the petition schedule land is situated at survey number 91 full extent is Acres 6.98 cents. The petitioner is holding Acres 3.49 cents of Thippanur Village of Gonegandla Mandal, Kurnool District and Sub Registration of Gudur then and now at Kodumur within registration District of Kurnool.
Bounded By East Rastha Survey number 67. West remaining portion of survey number 91 held by Boya Roganna hires. North rastha on survey number 90. South Bodepadu village site.
The old survey number is 91 and sub divided by 91/1 extent Acres 6.93 cents. Survey number 91/2 is Acres 0.05 cents."
MSRM, J& JUD, J LGA No.1 of 2019 3 3.1 The respondents herein, who are also the respondents in the said LGOP filed the subject interlocutory application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, ('Code', for short) requesting to reject the said LGOP filed by the appellant herein. The appellant herein having filed a counter in the said interlocutory application resisted the said application. Nonetheless, on merits and by the order impugned in this appeal, the Special Tribunal allowed the application of the respondents herein and rejected the LGOP filed by the appellant herein. Aggrieved thereof, the appellant is before this Court.
4. The case of the respondents in support of their request for rejection of the LGOP filed by the appellant may be stated, in brief, as follows:
The appellant filed the original LGOP on the file of the Special Tribunal for the above said reliefs alleging inter alia that the respondents are the land grabbers and for recovery of vacant possession of the schedule land. However, these respondents filed a counter denying the rights of the appellant herein over the schedule land and also claiming that the land is part and parcel of Ac.6.93 cents in Sy.no.91/1 of Bodepadu village and that the said land is in possession and enjoyment of all the respondents herein and other fifty (50) SC community people for more than 100 years and that their colony is also known as SC Colony in the village. There is no land on ground as alleged in the petition. The total extent of Ac.6.93 cents is totally covered with houses. The appellant being an Advocate and being well versed in law, has cast an eye over the site in occupation of these respondents and also MSRM, J& JUD, J LGA No.1 of 2019 4 in the occupation of SC community people and filed the present case with a dishonest intention to grab the subject property. Neither the appellant nor his ancestors owned and possessed the said land and they do not have any manner of right over the said land. The said land of Ac.6.93 cents in Sy.no.91/1 of Bodepadu village is situated in a remote rural area and it does not come under the definition of either 'urban property' or under 'urban agglomeration' as defined under Section 2 of the Act and the same is evident from the report submitted by the Mandal Tahasildar, Gonegandla. Thus, the present land in dispute does not fall within the definition of Section 2 of the Act. As such, the learned Special Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain the LGOP. The Mandal Tahasildar, Gonegandla, while submitting his report categorically stated that these respondents are in possession of the said property for more than 80 years and that they cannot be called as land grabbers and that the appellant herein has no right whatsoever over the said land. As per the settled law, for taking cognizance of the case under the Act, the appellant must make out a strong prima facie case that he has absolute right over the disputed property and that the opposite parties ex facie are land grabbers. The appellant shall produce tangible evidence in the above regard. In the case on hand, the appellant has not produced any material much less tangible material to make out a prima facie case. In the absence of tangible evidence placed by the appellant and in the light of the report of the Mandal Tahasildar, Gonegandla, which is adverse to the case of the appellant, it follows that the appellant has failed to make out a prima facie case for taking cognizance of the LGOP. The Special Tribunal shall take into account the material such as report of the Mandal MSRM, J& JUD, J LGA No.1 of 2019 5 Tahasildar concerned and other facts while arriving at satisfaction for taking cognizance of the case. In the present case, the appellant miserably failed to make out a prima facie case and hence, the present LGOP is not a fit case for taking cognizance. There are no grounds or any material for taking cognizance. There is no cause of action. Hence, the LGOP filed by the appellant may be rejected.
5. Per contra, the case of the appellant, as stated in his counter filed in the subject interlocutory application, may be stated, in brief, as follows:
The deponent of the affidavit filed in support of the subject interlocutory application is an illiterate. The affidavit filed by him in support of the interlocutory application does not satisfy the requirements of law and rules of practice. The deponent did not state that he is authorized by the other respondents to give the affidavit on their behalf. Hence, the intended application is not maintainable. In the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the deponent stated that he and the remaining twelve respondents and 50 other SC community people are enjoying the schedule land and the remaining other land in Sy.no.91/1 full extent of Ac.6.93 cents for more than hundred years. But, neither the respondents nor the said other people have filed any documentary proof to show their possession over a single cent of land covered by the schedule property. They have also not filed any village panchayat record showing their long possession and enjoyment over the land being claimed by them. The schedule land is a private patta land belonging to this appellant. The appellant's grandfather, Patil Pulla Reddy, purchased the MSRM, J& JUD, J LGA No.1 of 2019 6 petition schedule land, on 17.06.1933, under registered document no.846 of 1933 from one Boya Bangarigadu S/o Boya Jelligidigadu and the same is recorded in the ROR in the name of the appellant's father, Girshwar Reddy, after demise of Patil Pulla Reddy. The said fact is evident from the report of the Mandal Tahasildar. The appellant is a private person. Whether the private land/schedule land is situated in remote rural area or not and whether it is situated in an 'Urban area' or whether it comes under the 'Urbanized nature of land' is immaterial. The Act is enacted with avowed objectives. The Government, having noticed certain organized attempts on the part of certain lawless persons operating individually and in groups to grab either by force or by deceit or otherwise lands belonging to the Government, a local authority, a religious or charitable institutions or an endowment including wakf or any other private person, enacted the law to arrest and curb such unlawful activities. Section 2(cc) of the Act defines 'land belonging to a private person'. Section 2(d) defines 'land grabber'. Section 2(e) defines 'land grabbing'. Section 2(i-b) defines 'Special Tribunal'. The respondents herein in their affidavits filed in support of the petition are denying the statements made by the appellant in his LGOP and are relying upon the report submitted by the Mandal Tahasildar, Gonegandla. The said report is a false report. No documentary evidence is produced by these respondents along with their counter filed in the LGOP. They have not obtained any record from the Mandal Revenue Officer. Their only reliance is on a false and incorrect report prepared by the Mandal Revenue Officer concerned (MRO). Whether the possession of the appellant is legal or illegal will be decided by law Courts and not by the MSRM, J& JUD, J LGA No.1 of 2019 7 Executive Officers like the Mandal Revenue Officers. A strong prima facie case is made out by the appellant in his LGOP by producing legal evidence, namely,
(a) Registered document no.846/1933 purchased by his grandfather namely, Patil Pulla Reddy, on 17.06.1933 in Sy.no.91/1 of Ac.3.49 cents on Northern side land in that survey number;
(b) The revenue record ROR in Sy.no.91/1 in the name of his father Giriswar Reddy; and
(c) Succession to the said land by the respondent from his own brothers, to take cognizance of the case and the honourable court after considering the petition statement and the documents filed in support of the petition took cognizance, and issued process against applicants/respondents.
Further, the appellant got the schedule land by means of succession. Therefore, there is ample evidence for the Special Tribunal to take cognizance of the case. The appellant is a private person. He is having ownership and title to the schedule land. He is entitled to lawful possession of the land, which was grabbed by the respondents. The MRO's report regarding the possession is subject to judicial examination during the course of trial and after full-fledged trial. The appellant already filed objections to the report of the MRO. Neither the respondents nor the MRO submitted any documents/revenue records as required under the rules formulated under the Act. Since the appellant made out a prima facie case regarding his title in respect of the land grabbed by the respondents and also substantiated his right to recover MSRM, J& JUD, J LGA No.1 of 2019 8 possession of the same, not only by producing registered documents but also revenue records and, as the appellant is claiming recovery of possession by means of succession in respect of the land originally purchased by his grandfather, the contention of the respondents that no prima facie case is made out for taking cognizance is false. The Special Tribunal has rightly taken cognizance of the case. The subject interlocutory application is a frivolous application filed without any valid reasons. It is a vexatious application for delaying disposal of the LGOP. While delaying the matter, the land grabbers are constructing their houses without having any title in respect of the schedule land. After filing of the LGOP, an application is filed for addition of 14th respondent and others; and, another application filed under Order XXXIX Rules 7 & 8 of the Code is coming up for enquiry before the learned Special Tribunal. Order VII Rule 11 (a) of the Code dealing with rejection of the plaint deals with a case where it does not disclose a cause of action. This appellant clearly pleaded the material facts and also the cause of action. No reasons much less valid reasons are assigned in support of the request for rejection of the LGOP filed by this appellant. The application filed for rejection of the LGOP is not maintainable. Hence, the said application may be dismissed.
6. The appellant/party-in-person made submissions in line with his pleadings and has drawn our attention to the provisions of law, which are adverted to in his pleadings, and further contended as follows:
The order of the Special Tribunal rejecting the LGOP is contrary to law and facts of the case. The said order is unsustainable under facts MSRM, J& JUD, J LGA No.1 of 2019 9 and in law. The Special Tribunal has already taken cognizance of the case. Hence, the application filed by the respondents for rejection of the LGOP is not maintainable. The respondents have no right to ask for rejection of the LGOP filed by this appellant. Section 1(2) of the Act states that the Act extends to the whole of the State of Andhra Pradesh including the schedule land, which is within the territory of the State of Andhra Pradesh. The grounds raised by the respondents in their application require detailed and full-fledged enquiry on facts and law. Hence, the application filed by the respondents ought not to have been allowed by the Special Tribunal. The Special Tribunal failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it and acted with material irregularity. The Special Tribunal had illegally allowed the application filed by the respondents for rejection of the LGOP. Hence, the appeal may be allowed and the impugned order may be set aside and the application filed by the respondents for rejection of the LGOP may be dismissed with costs.
6.1 In support of the above submissions, the appellant placed reliance on the decision in Chenna Basavanna v. Special Court under A.P Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act1 and has drawn the attention of this Court to the following paragraph in the said decision:
'The preamble to the Act refers to the organized attempts on the part of certain lawless persons and groups of persons to grab the land belonging to Government, local authorities and other institutions as well as private persons and the necessity to enact the law to arrest and curb immediately such unlawful activity of land grabbing. Therefore, both the Statement of 1 2003 (2) ALD 607 MSRM, J& JUD, J LGA No.1 of 2019 10 Objects and reasons as well as the Preamble to the act recite the ground and cause of enacting the Act, the evils sought to be remedied. Therefore, it is permissible for the Court to look for the reason or spirit of the Act. Having regard to the explicit object and purpose of the Act and the evils sought to be remedied by enacting the Act, we cannot accept the contention of Sri Venkataramana that the Special Court ought not to have taken cognizance of the case, simply because, the extent and value of the land in question, in relative terms, are not large and high respectively.' Further, by placing reliance on the decision in Kale & Others v. Deputy Director of Consolidation2, it was sought to be contended that no case is made out by the respondents herein for rejection of the LGOP.
7. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents, while reiterating the case pleaded by the respondents in support of their request for rejection of the LGOP filed by the appellant, supported the order impugned and further contended as follows: 'The learned presiding judge of the Special Tribunal having adverted to the facts correctly and the legal position in proper perspective passed a well-reasoned order. Such a well-reasoned order does not warrant interference. The appellant has not made out any grounds much less valid grounds in this appeal warranting interference with the impugned order. As per the law laid down in the decision in Mohd. Siddiq Ali Khan and others v. Shahsun Finance Limited, Chennai and another3, the Special Tribunal is obligated under law to take cognizance of the case basing on the material placed by a party, who filed the LGOP. The Special Tribunal lacked inherent jurisdiction to entertain the LGOP. The 2 1976 AIR (SC) 807 3 2005 (2) ALD 675 (F.B) MSRM, J& JUD, J LGA No.1 of 2019 11 petitioner/appellant failed to make out a cause of action for invoking the provisions of the Act and to maintain the LGOP in respect of the land admittedly situated in a remote village. As such, the LGOP shall not be entertained and shall be rejected in view of the provision of Section 1(3- A) of the Act. The Special Tribunal rightly rejected the LGOP filed by the appellant. The appeal is liable for dismissal.'
8. Now, the points for determination are:
(i) Whether the Special Tribunal-cum-Principal District Court, Kurnool, is not having inherent jurisdiction to entertain the LGOP filed by the appellant as being contended by the respondents? And, if so, and in the facts and circumstances of the case, whether the LGOP filed by the appellant is liable for rejection?
(ii) Whether the order impugned of the Special Tribunal is unsustainable under facts and in law as being contended by the appellant herein?
(iii) To what relief?
9. POINT No.1:
9.1 To begin with it is necessary to note the following facts/aspects.
LGOP is filed by the appellant against the respondents herein in respect of the schedule land of Thippanur Revenue village of Gonegandla Mandal, Kurnool District, of an extent of Ac.3.49 cents out of Ac.6.98 cents in Sy.no.91 old and Sy.no.91/1 (new). In the LGOP, it is stated by the appellant that the schedule land in Sy.no.91/1 is situated adjacent to Badepadu village at the 'L' turn road corner. Before adverting to the aspect of jurisdiction, it is pertinent to note that the appellant in his LGOP stated as follows: 'That the schedule land was purchased by his MSRM, J& JUD, J LGA No.1 of 2019 12 paternal grandfather, Reddy Patil Pulla Reddy from one Boya Bangarigadu S/o Boya Jelligidigadu, under a registered document no.846 of 1933, on 17.06.1933. And that his father succeeded to the said property and that in a partition effected under registered partition deed, dated 20.08.1940, amongst Reddy Patil Pulla Reddy and his two Sons, the schedule land was allotted to the father of the appellant and that Patil Kamalnabha Reddy and Patil Yugandhar Reddy are elder brothers of the appellant and that they gave up their right in the land in dispute under an agreement, dated 26.08.2016, and that on 15.03.2016, when the appellant is getting the thorny bushes removed from the schedule land, the respondents, who grabbed the schedule land, objected by claiming the schedule land as their own without any lawful right or entitlement and that the respondents had occupied the schedule land illegally and are raising foundations for construction of two houses and had placed grass for cattle. In spite of his demands, the respondents did not choose to vacate the land and that, therefore, the respondents are land grabbers and are liable to be evicted from the schedule land.' In the LGOP, a declaration that he is the absolute owner of the schedule land and that the respondents are the land grabbers of the schedule land was sought. Further, directions to the respondents to deliver vacant possession of the schedule land to the appellant as well as pay compensation are also sought.
9.2 The respondents filed a detailed counter resisting the LGOP filed by the appellant. They denied the claim of the appellant/petitioner in the LGOP including the title pleaded by the appellant in the LGOP and stated that the respondents have been in possession of their respective MSRM, J& JUD, J LGA No.1 of 2019 13 extents and that they made certain constructions for living and that the appellant has chosen to file the LGOP against the respondents by leaving aside others, who are similarly placed like them. They further denied the allegation that they are land grabbers of the schedule land and prayed for dismissal of the LGOP filed by the appellant. 9.3 It is borne out by record and it is not in dispute that the Special Tribunal called for a report from the Mandal Tahasildar, Gonegandla, and the report was filed before the Special Tribunal, on 10.04.2017. It is also not in dispute that the contents of the said report support the case of the respondents herein and that the appellant had, therefore, filed objections to the said report. The appellant is also claiming that the said report is an incorrect and false report. Be that as it may. 9.4 We have gone through the provisions of law pointed out by the appellant. The relevant provisions of the Act read as under:
Section 1(3):
'It applies to all lands situated within the limits of urban agglomeration as defined in clause (n) of Section 2 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 and a Municipality.' Section 1 (3-A):
'It applies also to any other lands situated in such areas as the Government may, by notification, specify, having due regard to,--
(a) The urbanizable nature of the land, or
(b) The usefulness or potential usefulness of such land for commercial, industrial, pisi culture or prawn culture purposes.' MSRM, J& JUD, J LGA No.1 of 2019 14 Section 2(e):
'Land Grabbing' means every activity of grabbing of any land (whether belonging to the Government, a local authority, a religious or charitable institution or endowment, including a wakf, or any other private person) by a person or group of persons, without any lawful entitlement and with a view to illegally taking possession of such lands, or enter into or create illegal tenancies or lease and licenses agreements or any other illegal agreements in respect of such lands, or to construct unauthorized structures thereon for sale or hire, or give such lands to any person on rental or lease and licence basis for construction, or use and occupation of unauthorized structures; and the term 'to grab land' shall be construed accordingly.
Section 2(cc):
'Land belonging to a private person' means any land belonging to,-
(i) An evacuee;
(ii) A military personnel; or
(iii) Any other private individual;
The value or the extent of which or the nature of the evil involved shall be of substantial nature or in the interest of justice required.' Section 2(i)(i-b) of the Act defines a 'Special Tribunal', which includes the Court of District Judge. Section 7-A of the Act states about the constitution of the Special Tribunal. Special Court constituted in terms of Section 7 of the Act as is defined in Section 2(i)(ia) of the Act, is a Forum, which has jurisdiction over the then State of Andhra Pradesh, which is now abolished.
Clause (n) of Section 2 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, reads as under:
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(n) "urban agglomeration",--
(A) in relation to any State or Union territory specified in column (1) of Schedule I, means,--
(i) the urban agglomeration specified in the corresponding entry in column (2) thereof and includes the peripheral area specified in the corresponding entry in column (3) thereof; and
(ii) any other area which the State Government may, with the previous approval of the Central Government, having regard to its location, population (population being more than one lakh) and such other relevant factors as the circumstances of the case may require, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare to be an urban agglomeration and any agglomeration so declared shall be deemed to belong to category D in that Schedule and the peripheral area therefor shall be one kilometre;
(B) in relation to any other State or Union territory, means any area which the State Government may, with the previous approval of the Central Government, having regard to its location, population (population being more than one lakh) and such other relevant factors as the circumstances of the case may require, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare to be an urban agglomeration and any agglomeration so declared shall be deemed to belong to category D in Schedule I and the peripheral area therefor shall be one kilometre;
9.5 Keeping in view the pleadings, the contentions and the provisions, which are adverted supra, it is now appropriate to deal with the core issue raised in the matter and covered by the points formulated.
9.6 Order VII Rule 11 of the Code reads as under:
Rejection of plaint- The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases: -
(a) where it does not disclose a cause of action;
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(b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the Plaintiff, on being required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;
(c) where the relief claimed is properly valued, but the plaint is returned upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the Plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp-paper within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;
(d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law;
(e) where it is not filed in duplicate;
(f) where the Plaintiff fails to comply with the provision of Rule 9: [Provided that the time fixed by the Court for the correction of the valuation or supplying of the requisite stamp-paper shall not be extended unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, is satisfied that the Plaintiff was prevented by any cause of an exceptional nature for correcting the valuation or supplying the requisite stamp-paper, as the case may be, within the time fixed by the Court and that refusal to extend such time would cause grave injustice to the Plaintiff.] In the considered view of this Court, Rule 11(a) of Order VII of the Code extracted supra is also relevant for consideration. 9.7 Dealing with the aspect of jurisdiction, it is to be re-noted that Section 1 of the Act deals with Short title, extent, application and commencement of the Act. No doubt, the Act extends to the whole of the State of Andhra Pradesh, as per Section 1(2) of the Act. However, Section 1(3) postulates that the Act applies to all lands situated within the limits of 'urban agglomeration' as defined in Clause (n) of Section 2 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (Central Act 33 of MSRM, J& JUD, J LGA No.1 of 2019 17 1976) and a Municipality. Further, Section 1(3-A) postulates that it applies also to any other lands situated in such areas as the Government may, by notification, specify, having due regard to, - (a) the urbanisable nature of the land, or (b) the usefulness or potential usefulness of such land for commercial, industrial, pisciculture or prawnculture purposes. In view of the above said provisions, it is to be now examined as to whether the provisions of the Act apply to the subject schedule land. Since the appellant filed the LGOP before the Special Tribunal, in our opinion, it is for the appellant to show that the provisions of the Act apply to the schedule land. Unless the appellant prima facie establishes that the Act applies to the schedule land and that unless a cause of action attracting the provisions of the Act to the schedule land has been shown in the LGOP, the Special Tribunal will not have jurisdiction to entertain the LGOP in regard to the land in question. Admittedly, the schedule land, even as per the averments in the LGOP and the schedule annexed to the LGOP is of an extent of Ac.3.49 cents of Thippanur village of Gonegandla Mandal, and therefore, the subject land is not falling within limits of 'urban agglomeration' as defined in Clause (n) of Section 2 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 and/or a Municipality. Thus, the land is neither within the limits of urban agglomeration nor within a Municipality. It is also not the case of the appellant that the Government, by a Notification, applied the provisions of the Act to the subject land having regard to the urbanisable nature of the land or usefulness or potential usefulness of such land for commercial, industrial, pisciulture or prawnculture purposes in terms of Section 1(3-A) of the Act. Undisputedly and admittedly, the subject land MSRM, J& JUD, J LGA No.1 of 2019 18 is in a village/rural area. The report of the Mandal Tahasildar concerned also evidences the said fact. Thus, on an analysis of facts with reference to the provisions of law, we are of the considered view that it is manifest that the appellant could not make out a case as required under facts and in law or show a cause of action for invoking the jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal and for the Special Tribunal to entertain and deal with the LGOP. The very averments in the LGOP of the appellant do not disclose a cause of action attracting either the provisions of the Act or the application of the Act to the schedule land and from the statement in the LGOP, it is manifest that the Act does not apply to the subject schedule land, which is situated in a village; and, hence, it follows that LGOP does not disclose a cause of action for invoking the provisions of the Act. Therefore, the fundamental requisite, namely, the application of the act to the land in question is not established since the averments in the LGOP on a plain and harmonious consideration do not disclose a cause of action attracting the application of the Act. It is well settled that the cause of action is a bundle of facts and the jurisdiction is part and parcel of such bundle of material facts constituting the cause of action. The Court has to read the entire LGOP as a whole to find out whether it discloses a cause of action for the special Tribunal to exercise the power or jurisdiction to grant the relief claimed in the LGOP in respect of the schedule land; and, where the LGOP discloses no cause of action, it is obligatory upon the court to reject the LGOP. Fundamentally, cause of action is a bundle of facts, which are required to be proved for obtaining relief and for the said purpose, the material facts are required to be stated. The LGOP, when read in entirety, it is MSRM, J& JUD, J LGA No.1 of 2019 19 beyond pale of controversy that the averments therein reflect plainly that the Special Tribunal constituted under the Act does not have jurisdiction to decide or deal with any question, which by or under the Act is to be decided or dealt with by the Special Tribunal. Once the material facts averred in the LGOP do not disclose a cause of action and do not satisfy the requirement for the Special Tribunal to exercise the power or jurisdiction vested in it by or under the Act and when the very averments in the LGOP, on a plain consideration, make it manifest that the Special Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain the LGOP filed by the appellant in respect of the schedule land situated in a village, it must be held that the appellant cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal as the Special Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to deal with instant claims related to the schedule land situated in a village and as the jurisdiction to resolve the dispute related to the schedule land vests in a forum other than the Special Tribunal.
9.8 In the light of the foregoing discussion, the points are accordingly answered holding that the Special Tribunal-cum-Principal District Court, Kurnool, is not having jurisdiction to entertain the LGOP filed by the appellant in respect of the schedule land and that the LGOP filed by the appellant is liable for rejection as no cause of action attracting the provisions of the Act is shown; and, as no cause of action is shown from the averments in the LGOP for the Special Tribunal to either exercise its jurisdiction under the Act or for entertaining the LGOP in respect of the schedule land.
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10. POINT No.2:
We have carefully gone through the order impugned. For the reasons assigned by the Special Tribunal and for the reasons aforementioned and the findings supra recorded by us under point no.1, we are satisfied that the order impugned, which is a well-reasoned and well-considered order, is sustainable both under facts and in law and that the same does not brook interference.
11. POINT No. 3:
In the result, the appeal is dismissed confirming the order of the Special Tribunal, however, making it clear that the order does not affect the right of the appellant herein to pursue the remedies against the respondents herein in respect of the schedule land by approaching an appropriate Forum, if he so desires.
There shall be no order as to costs.
Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.
_____________________ M. SEETHARAMA MURTI, J ____________ J. UMA DEVI, J 28th August, 2019 RAR MSRM, J& JUD, J LGA No.1 of 2019 21 THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE M. SEETHARAMA MURTI AND THE HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE J.UMA DEVI Land Grabbing Appeal no.1 of 2019 (Per Hon'ble Sri Justice M.Seetharama Murti) RAR Dated : 28-08-2019