Madhya Pradesh High Court
Chhabilal Gond (S.T.) (Died) Through ... vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 25 October, 2024
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VIVEK JAIN
WRIT PETITION NO. 2747 of 2015
NETRAM GOND (S.T.)
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
.........................................................................................................
Appearance:
Shri Aseem Trivedi -Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Praveen Namdeo - Govt. Advocate for respondents / State.
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WITH
WRIT PETITION NO. 2748 OF 2015
CHHABILAL GOND (S.T.) (DEAD) THR. LRS. SURENDRA KUMAR BHALAVI
(GOND) AND ORS.
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PFADESH AND OTHERS
.........................................................................................................
Appearance:
Shri Aseem Trivedi -Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Praveen Namdeo - Govt. Advocate for respondents / State.
Shri H.S. Rajput - Advocate for respondent No.5.
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WRIT PETITION NO. 2765 of 2015
ATUL GOND (S.T.)
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PFADESH AND OTHERS
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: NAVEEN KUMAR
SARATHE
Signing time: 26-10-2024
1:13:17 PM
2
.........................................................................................................
Appearance:
Shri Aseem Trivedi -Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Praveen Namdeo - Govt. Advocate for respondents / State.
Shri H.S. Rajput - Advocate for respondent No.5.
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ORDER
(Reserved on 23.10.2024) (Pronounced on 25.10.2024) All these petitions involve common question of law and revolve on similar facts therefore, all these petitions are being decided by this common order. For the sake of convenience, facts and reference to documents is taken from WP No. 2747 of 2015.
2. In the present petition challenge is made to the notification under Section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 dated 01.07.2013 so also the consequential award dated 15.10.2013 passed by the Collector (Land Acquisition), District Seoni for acquisition of the land of the petitioners for the purpose of establishment of power plant to be established by Respondent No.5 i.e. M/s Jhabua Power Limited at Tehsil Ghansaur, Disttt. Seoni. It is the beneficiary company for which the acquisition has taken place. The challenge to proceedings and the consequential award is pressed on the sole ground that the award has been passed on 15.10.2013 and it could not have been passed on 15.10.2013 because the Parliament had already enacted the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (for short the "Act of 2013") which was enacted and received Presidential assent on 26.09.2013 and was published in the official gazette of Government of India on 27.09.2013. Therefore, the succeeding law relating to compulsory acquisition of land was already put in place on 26.09.2013. On such Signature Not Verified Signed by: NAVEEN KUMAR SARATHE Signing time: 26-10-2024 1:13:17 PM 3 assertion, it is the contention of the petitioners that the proceedings under the erstwhile Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short "Act of 1894") stood abated in terms of mandatory provisions of Section 24 of the Act of 2013, or alternatively, the proceedings will be deemed to have continued under the Act of 2013 and award was to have been passed as per the successor Act of 2013. However, the award was unauthorisedly passed under the old Act i.e. the Act of 1894.
3. It is the contention of the petitioners that the authorities could not have passed award (Annexure P-11) on 15.10.2013 because the successor enactment had already been enacted as on 26.09.2013 by the Parliament and received Presidential assent as on 26.9.2013, and thus, after 26.09.2013 the authorities did not have any power, competence and authority to pass awards under the old Act i.e. Act of 1894.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioner further relies on Section 114 of the Act of 2013 which is repeal and savings clause which mentions as per Section 114(1) that the Act of 1894 hereby stands repealed. Thus, it is the case of the petitioners that the Act of 1894 ceased to be in existence as on 26.09.2013 and therefore, no award under the Act of 1894 could have been passed on 15.10.2013.
5. It is further contended by learned counsel for the petitioners that it is true that the date of enforcement of Act of 2013 would be 01.01.2014 because the Central Government vide notification No. S.O. 3729(E) dated 19.12.2013 appointed 01.01.2014 as the date for enforcement of Act of 2013. However, it is the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Act came into existence on 26.09.2013 and only the date of enforcement was postponed to 01.01.2014 by force of Section 1(3) of the Act of 2013. Therefore, the Act of 2013 was validly a part of statue book as Signature Not Verified Signed by: NAVEEN KUMAR SARATHE Signing time: 26-10-2024 1:13:17 PM 4 on 15.10.2013 when the award in question has been passed by the authorities. Therefore, the award (Annexure P-11) is a nullity and cannot be put to act an execution to hold that the lands of the petitioners have been acquired by force of the said award dated 15.10.2013 as it is passed in accordance with the old Act i.e. Act 1894.
6. The learned counsel for the petitioner relies on judgment of Supreme Court in case of State of Kerala and ors. Vs. Mar Appraem Kuri Company Ltd. and ors. reported in 2012(7) SCC 106 to submit that the Act is deemed to be made on the date it is enacted by the Parliament. On similar terms reliance is placed on judgment of Supreme Court in case of G. Mohan Rao v. State of T.N., (2022) 12 SCC 696 to submit that an Act is made on the date it is validly enacted by the Parliament or the legislature. Therefore, the Act of 2013 was validly made as on 26.09.2013 and hence, award passed after 26.09.2013 is non-est and without authority of law.
7. In sum and substance, the contention of the petitioners is that the proceedings even if continued after 26.09.2013 should have continued under the Act of 2013 and the award could have been passed in terms of provisions of Act of 2013 and not in terms of provisions of Act of 1894. Therefore, the award deserves to be set aside and the State may be granted liberty to initiate fresh proceedings in terms of the Act of 2013 or in the alternative, directions can be issued to re-assess compensation in accordance with the provisions of Act of 2013 to the respondents.
8. Per contra, it is contended by learned counsel for the respondents that the project in question has already been executed on the land in question and the land has been fully utilized by construction of thermal power project on the land. It is further contended that the date of commencement of Act is 01.01.2014 and there was no legal impediment in Signature Not Verified Signed by: NAVEEN KUMAR SARATHE Signing time: 26-10-2024 1:13:17 PM 5 passing awards just prior to the date of commencement of the Act i.e. 31.12.2013. The date on which enactment was "made" is irrelevant for the purpose of enforcement of the Act and the force of Section 24 would apply only from the date of enforcement of Act and not from the date when the Act is "made". Therefore, the petition is devoid of merits and substance. Reliance is also made on a notification dated 29.01.2014 issued by the State Government whereby the State Government has clarified that the date of enforcement of Act of 2013 is 01.01.2014 and the provisions of Act of 2013 would apply only in case awards have not been passed up to 01.01.2014. The aforesaid notification/instructions dated 29.01.2014 are on brought on record as Annexure R-5(1) by the respondent No.5. Thus, on these assertions the petitions are prayed to be dismissed.
9. Heard the learned counsel for the rival parties and perused the record.
10. The sole question that arises for consideration in the present case is that whether after 26.09.2013 i.e. the date on which the Act of 2013 was made by the Parliament, it was still open for the authorities to have passed the award under the Act of 1894 up to 31.12.2013 because the Act of 2013 has been enforced w.e.f. 01.01.2014. It is undisputed between the parties that after 01.01.2014 admittedly the provisions of Act of 2013 would apply but the question raised in the present petition is for the award which was passed on 15.10.2013 i.e. between 26.09.2013 up to 31.12.2013.
11. As per Section 1(3) of the Act of 2013 it has been provided that this Act shall come into force on such date as the Central Government may notify in the official gazette. Section-1 is as reads as under:-
"1. Short title, extent and commencement- (1) This Act may be called the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013.Signature Not Verified Signed by: NAVEEN KUMAR SARATHE Signing time: 26-10-2024 1:13:17 PM 6
(2) It extends to the whole of India. [ the words "except the State of Jammu and Kashmir" omitted by the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganization Act, 2019 (34 of 2019), secs. 95,96 and fifth Sch, Table-1 (w.e.f. 31.10.2019) (3) It shall come into force on such date as the Central Government may by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint:
Provided that the Central Government shall appoint such date within three months from the date on which the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 received assent of the President."
(emphasis supplied)
12. It is undisputed that the Central Government notified 01.01.2014 as the date of enforcement vide notification dated 19.12.2013.
13. The learned counsel for the petitioner has heavily relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Mar Appraem Kuri Company Ltd (supra) to submit that the legislation is "made" on the date it is enacted by the legislature and enactment is deemed to be "made" on the date on which it is enacted. Enforcement or commencement of the Act is different issue but the Act is validly made on the date of enactment by the Parliament or State Legislature. In similar terms reliance is placed on judgment of Supreme Court in case of G. Mohan Rao (supra).
14. To appreciate the aforesaid contention of the petitioners, it is relevant to consider Article 254 of the Constitution of India which was the subject matter in both the judgments before the Supreme Court that have been heavily relied by learned counsel for the petitioner. Article 254 of the Constitution of India speaks about inconsistencies between laws made by the Parliament and laws made by the Legislature of the States. The said Article speaks about the provisions of law made by legislature of the State being repugnant to provisions of law made by the Parliament and what would be effect of such repugnancy in the matter of different laws framed by the different legislatures and Parliament as contained in different lists Signature Not Verified Signed by: NAVEEN KUMAR SARATHE Signing time: 26-10-2024 1:13:17 PM 7 i.e. Union list, State list or Concurrent list as appended to the Constitution by way of VIIth Schedule thereof.
15. Article 254 of the Constitution of India reads as under:-
254. Inconsistency between laws made by Parliament and laws made by the Legislatures of States-
(1) If any provision of a law made by the Legislature of a State is repugnant to any provision of a law made by Parliament which Parliament is competent to enact, or to any provision of an existing law with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List, then, subject to the provisions of clause (2), the law made by Parliament, whether passed before or after the law made by the Legislature of such State, or, as the case may be, the existing law, shall prevail and the law made by the Legislature of the State shall, to the extent of the repugnancy, be void.
(2) Where a law made by the Legislature of a State with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List contains any provision repugnant to the provisions of an earlier law made by Parliament or an existing law with respect to that matter, then, the law so made by the Legislature of such State shall, if it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent, prevail in that State:
Provided that nothing in this clause shall prevent Parliament from enacting at any time any law with respect to the same matter including a law adding to, amending, varying or repealing the law so made by the Legislature of the State.
16. The stress on the aforesaid Article 254 is on the laws 'made' by the Parliament and 'made' by the legislatures of the States. The aforesaid Article 254 speaks about repugnancy as relatable to making of laws and it is not related to enforcement of laws. It is under this background that the Supreme Court in the aforesaid two cases interpreted the aspect of the date on which the law is deemed to be 'made', so as to determine the repugnancy between the two laws which would arise to bring the repugnancy within the mischief of Article 254 of the Constitution of India.
Signature Not Verified Signed by: NAVEEN KUMAR SARATHE Signing time: 26-10-2024 1:13:17 PM 8In the case Mar Appraem Kuri Company Ltd the Supreme Court has held as under:-
24. That, under Article 254(1), the repugnancy of the State law to the law made by Parliament is to be considered with reference to the law made. The words "law made" have reference to the enactment of the law. In this connection, it was pointed out that the words "law made"
have been used at seven places but there is no mention to the commencement of a law in Article 254. Thus, according to the learned counsel, repugnancy arose when the (Central) Chit Funds Act, 1982 received the assent of the President and on its publication in the Official Gazette and not on its commencement, which till date is not there in the State of Kerala. In consequence, the Kerala Chitties Act, 1975 became void on 19-8-1982 when the (Central) Chit Funds Act, 1982 was made after receiving the assent of the President.
35. Article 245 deals with extent of laws made by Parliament and by the legislatures of States. The verb "made", in past tense, finds place in the Head Note to Article 245. The verb "make", in the present tense, exists in Article 245(1) whereas the verb "made", in the past tense, finds place in Article 245(2). While the legislative power is derived from Article 245, the entries in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution only demarcate the legislative fields of the respective legislatures and do not confer legislative power as such. While Parliament has power to make laws for the whole or any part of the territory of India, the legislature of a State can make laws only for the State or part thereof. Thus, Article 245 inter alia indicates the extent of laws made by Parliament and by the State Legislatures.
36. Article 246 deals with the subject-matter of laws made by Parliament and by the legislatures of States. The verb "made" once again finds place in the Head Note to Article 246. This article deals with distribution of legislative powers as between the Union and the State Legislatures, with reference to the different Lists in the Seventh Schedule. In short, Parliament has full and exclusive powers to legislate with respect to matters in List I and has also power to legislate with respect to matters in List III, whereas the State Legislatures, on the other hand, have exclusive power to legislate with respect to matters in List II, minus matters falling in List I and List III and have concurrent power with respect to matters in List III. (See Subrahmanyan Chettiar v. Muttuswami Goundan [AIR 1941 FC 47 : (1940) 2 FCR 188] .) Signature Not Verified Signed by: NAVEEN KUMAR SARATHE Signing time: 26-10-2024 1:13:17 PM 9
49. In clause (1) of Article 254 the significant words used are "provision of a law made by the legislature of a State", "any provision of a law made by Parliament which Parliament is competent to enact", "the law made by Parliament, whether passed before or after the law made by the legislature of such State", and "the law made by the legislature of the State shall, to the extent of repugnancy, be void". Again, clause (2) of Article 254 speaks of "a law made by the legislature of a State", "an earlier law made by Parliament", and "the law so made by the legislature of such State". Thus, it is noticeable that throughout Article 254 the emphasis is on law-making by the respective legislatures.
50. Broadly speaking, law-making is exclusively the function of the legislatures (see Articles 79 and 168). The President and the Governor are a part of the Union or the legislatures of the States. As far as Parliament is concerned, the legislative process is complete as soon as the procedure prescribed by Article 107 of the Constitution and connected provisions are followed and the Bill passed by both the Houses of Parliament has received the assent of the President under Article 111. Similarly, a State legislation becomes an Act as soon as a Bill has been passed by the State Legislature and it has received the assent of the Governor in accordance with Article 200. It is only in the situation contemplated by Article 254(2) that a State legislation is required to be reserved for consideration and assent by the President. Thus, irrespective of the date of enforcement of a parliamentary or State enactment, a Bill becomes an Act and comes on the statute book immediately on receiving the assent of the President or the Governor, as the case may be, which assent has got to be published in the Official Gazette.
51. The legislature, in exercise of its legislative power, may either enforce an Act, which has been passed and which has received the assent of the President or the Governor, as the case may be, from a specified date or leave it to some designated authority to fix a date for its enforcement. Such legislations are conditional legislations as in such cases no part of the legislative function is left unexercised. In such legislations, merely because the legislature has postponed the enforcement of the Act, it does not mean that the law has not been made.
61. The entire above discussion on Articles 245, 246, 250, 251 is only to indicate that the word "made" has to be read in the context of the law-making process and, if so read, it is clear that to test Signature Not Verified Signed by: NAVEEN KUMAR SARATHE Signing time: 26-10-2024 1:13:17 PM 10 repugnancy one has to go by the making of law and not by its commencement.
17. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid case has clearly held that to test the repugnancy one has to go by making of law and not by its commencement. In Para-51 of the aforesaid judgment it has been considered by the Supreme Court that the legislature, in exercise of its legislative power, may either enforce an Act, which has been passed and which has received the assent of the President or the Governor, as the case may be, from a specified date or leave it to some designated authority to fix a date for its enforcement. Such legislations are conditional legislations as in such cases no part of the legislative function is left unexercised. In such legislations, merely because the legislature has postponed the enforcement of the Act, it does not mean that the law has not been made.
18. The Supreme Court was considering the sole question whether the law is deemed to be 'made' because Article 254 relates to repugnancies between laws 'made' and not laws 'enforced' or 'commenced'. Similarly, in the case of G. Mohan Rao (supra) the Supreme Court has held that the a law is said to be made on the date it obtains presidential accent and making of law is a demarcated procedure which concludes with the assent of the President under Article 111 or Article 254 or of the Governor under Article 200.
19. The other relevant concept is commencement which unlike making of a law is not a part of legislative process but it is an offshoot of the successful culmination of legislative process. It has been held that commencement is a question following legislative process and does not overlap with it. The commencement could be from a date of making assent or from a retrospective date or from a future date but it does not affect the fact that legislation has come into the statute book and the provisions Signature Not Verified Signed by: NAVEEN KUMAR SARATHE Signing time: 26-10-2024 1:13:17 PM 11 leading to repugnancy as well as other provisions of the chapter of legislative relations between the Union and the State have become active from that point of making of law. The following has been held in the case of G. Mohan Rao (supra) :-
"72. We may now consider the argument that retrospectivity from 26-9-2013 was fatal to the 2019 Act as on that date, there was no 2013 Act in operation and when the 2013 Act came into operation on 27-9-2013, the State enactments would again become repugnant. In our view, even this plea is untenable. For, a law is said to be "made" on the day it obtains Presidential assent. Throughout the chapter on federal relations, the word "made" or "make" is used in the Constitution while referring to legislative activity. Making of law implies a clearly demarcated procedure which culminates with the assent of the President under Article 111 or under Article 254 (if legislated on same subject-matter) or of the Governor under Article
200. Notably, Articles 111, 200 and 254 are part of the constitutionally prescribed legislative procedure itself. The other concept relevant for this discussion is of "commencement".
Commencement of law, unlike making of law, is not a part of the legislative process. Rather, it is an offshoot of the successful culmination of the legislative process. In other words, commencement is a question which follows the legislative process and intent and does not overlap with it. The commencement of law could be from the date of making (assent), or from a back date or even from a future date. But it does not affect the fact that the legislation has stepped into the statute book and the provisions relating to repugnancy as well as other provisions of the chapter of legislative relations between the Union and the State have become active from that point onwards, as they are concerned with the date of making. Thus, for checking repugnancy, the relevant point of time would be the date of making i.e. date of assent and not date of commencement. This understanding finds approval from the decision of this Court in Mar Appraem Kuri [State of Kerala v. Mar Appraem Kuri Co. Ltd., (2012) 7 SCC 106 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 69] thus :
(SCC p. 133, paras 60-61) "60. ... We have to read the word "made" in the proviso to Article 254(2) in a consistent manner.
61. The entire above discussion on Articles 245, 246, 250, 251 is only to indicate that the word "made" has to be read in the Signature Not Verified Signed by: NAVEEN KUMAR SARATHE Signing time: 26-10-2024 1:13:17 PM 12 context of the law-making process and, if so read, it is clear that to test repugnancy one has to go by the [Ed. : The words between two asterisks have been emphasised in original as well.] making [Ed. : The words between two asterisks have been emphasised in original as well.] of law and not by its [Ed. : The words between two asterisks have been emphasised in original as well.] commencement [Ed. : The words between two asterisks have been emphasised in original as well.] ."
20. It is evident from the aforesaid two judgments heavily relied by the counsel for the petitioner that for the purpose of checking repugnancy between two laws in relevant point of time would be the date of making of law which is the date of enactment and consequential assent and not the date of commencement. It is further held that the provisions relating to relations between Union and State and looking to repugnancy between two laws become active from the date the law is 'made' by receiving Presidential or Gubernatorial assent.
21. The argument of learned counsel for the petitioner that the law i.e. Act of 2013 had been made as on 26.09.2013 is undoubtedly correct but the petitioner is confusing the aspect of making of law with commencement of law. As per Section 1(3) of Act of 2013 the enforcement of the said Act has been postponed and it was subsequently enforced from 01.01.2014. The Act of 2013 would become relevant from 26.09.2013 for those purposes where the making of Act is relevant. However, that date would not be relevant for the purpose where the relevant fact is enforceability or commencement of the Act.
22. Section 3 (13) of the General Clauses Act 1897 defines commencement of a law as the date of its enforcement which as under :-
(13) "Commencement" used with reference to an Act or Regulation, shall mean the day on which the Act or Regulation comes into force;Signature Not Verified Signed by: NAVEEN KUMAR SARATHE Signing time: 26-10-2024 1:13:17 PM 13
23. Section 5 (3) of the General Clauses Act contains provisions for coming into operation of the enactments in the following terms :-
5. Coming into operation of enactments.--
[(1) Where any Central Act is not expressed to come into operation on a particular day, then it shall come into operation on the day on which it receives the assent,--
(a) in the case of a Central Act made before the commencement of the Constitution, of the Governor- General, and
(b) in the case of an Act of Parliament, of the President.] (3) Unless the contrary is expressed, a [Central Act] or Regulation shall be construed as coming into operation immediately on the expiration of the day preceding its commencement.
(emphasis supplied)
24. In Common Cause v. Union of India, (2003) 8 SCC 250, the Supreme Court, while interpreting aforesaid section 5, held as under :-
27. From the facts placed before us it cannot be said that the Government is not alive to the problem or is desirous of ignoring the will of Parliament. When the legislature itself had vested the power in the Central Government to notify the date from which the Act would come into force, then the Central Government is entitled to take into consideration various facts including the facts set out above while considering whether the Act should be brought into force or not. No mandamus can be issued to the Central Government to issue the notification contemplated under Section 1(3) of the Act to bring the Act into force, keeping in view the facts brought on record and the consistent view of this Court.
28. The submission that by virtue of Section 5 of the General Clauses Act, the Act has come into force is misconceived.
Section 5 of the General Clauses Act has no application.
Signature Not Verified Signed by: NAVEEN KUMAR SARATHE Signing time: 26-10-2024 1:13:17 PM 14Section 5 is applicable only when the Act does not express any date with effect from which the Act would come into force. It will apply to such cases where there is no provision like Section 1(3) of the Act or Section 1(2) of the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act. When the legislature itself provides that the date of coming into force of the Act would be a date to be notified by the Central Government, Section 5 of the General Clauses Act will have no application. It is plain and evident from the language of the provision. Section 5(1) provides that "where any Central Act is not expressed to come into operation on a particular day, then it shall come into operation on the day on which it receives the assent". Sub- section (3) provides that "unless the contrary is expressed, a Central Act or regulation shall be construed as coming into operation immediately on the expiration of the day preceding its commencement". In simple words it would mean that unless otherwise provided a Central Act would come into operation on the date it receives the Presidential assent and is construed as coming into operation immediately on the date preceding its commencement. Thus, if a Central Act is assented by the President on 23-8-1995 then it would be construed to have come into operation on the midnight between 22-8-1995 and 23-8-1995. Sub-section (3) has to be read as a corollary to sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides that the Act would come into operation on the date it receives the assent of the President where a particular day w.e.f. which the Act would come into force is not prescribed whereas sub-section (3) provides the exact time of the day/night when the Act would come into force. It would not apply to cases where the legislature has delegated the power to the executive to bring into force the Act from a date to be notified by publication in the Official Gazette.
25. Therefore, it is clear that the Act of 2013 came into operation immediately on expiration of 31.12.2013. The petitioner wants this Court to read "enforcement" or "commencement" as "making" of the law, which is certainly a far-fetched proposition that does not find any legal substratum to base upon.
Signature Not Verified Signed by: NAVEEN KUMAR SARATHE Signing time: 26-10-2024 1:13:17 PM 1526. In State of Orissa v. Chandrasekhar Singh Bhoi, (1969) 2 SCC 334 the Supreme Court held as under :-
"5. Before the High Court it was urged on behalf of the landholders that when the principal Act was enacted it became law in force, and the ceiling limit prescribed thereby became effective, even though Chapter IV, was not extended by a notification under Section 1(3) of the Act, and since the subsequent legislation seeks to restrict the ceiling limit and to vest the surplus land in the Government under Section 45 as amended, there is compulsory acquisition of land which may be valid only if the law provides for payment to the landholder for extinction of his interest, the market-value of that part of the surplus land which is within the ceiling limit under the principal Act. This argument found favour with the High Court. In their view the expression 'law in force' must be "construed only in the constitutional sense and not in the sense of its actual operativeness", and on that account it must be held that "there was a ceiling limit already provided by the principal Act as it was "law in forced" within the meaning of that expression as used in the second proviso to Article 31-A".
They proceeded then to hold that Section 47 of the Act as amended provided for payment of compensation at a rate which is less than the market-value of the land falling within the ceiling limit as originally fixed under Act 16 of 1960 and the guarantee of the second proviso to Article 31-A of the Constitution is on that account infringed. We are unable to accept this process of reasoning. The right to compensation which is not less than the market-value under any law providing for the acquisition by the State of any land in an estate in the personal cultivation of a person is guaranteed by the second proviso only where the land is within the ceiling limit applicable to him under any law for the time being in force. A law cannot be said to be in force unless it is brought into operation by legislative enactment, or by the exercise of authority by a delegate empowered to bring it into operation. The theory of a statute being "in operation in a constitutional sense" though it is not in fact in operation has, in our judgment, no validity."
Signature Not Verified Signed by: NAVEEN KUMAR SARATHE Signing time: 26-10-2024 1:13:17 PM 1627. The petitioner has argued that the authorities under the Act of 1894 were rendered functus officio to pass award immediately upon Presidential assent on 26.09.2013. The said argument is utterly misconceived because Section 24 of the Act which deals with the proceedings under the old Act having been lapsed would come into force from the date of enforcement. If Section 24 is deemed to have come into force from the date of enactment or "making", then Section 1(3) of Act of 2013 would be rendered redundant. The Supreme Court in the cases relied by the petitioner has itself clearly demarcated the line between enactment of law and enforcement of law. The petitioner seeks to obliterate the said demarcation line which is not permissible. The argument raised by the petitioner is utterly fanciful which cannot be countenanced by this Court.
28. Resultantly, it is held that the authorities under the Act of 1894 were having authority to pass award under the Act of 1894 up to 31.12.2013 and the award in question passed before 31.12.2013 cannot be held to be passed without authority of law on the ground that the award ought to have been passed under the Act of 2013. Consequently, petitions being devoid of merits stand dismissed. The petitioners are always at liberty to withdraw the compensation amount, if not withdrawn so far.
(VIVEK JAIN) JUDGE nks Signature Not Verified Signed by: NAVEEN KUMAR SARATHE Signing time: 26-10-2024 1:13:17 PM