Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Mohd Shakir vs Gnctd on 8 January, 2026
1
O.A. No. 644/2024
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
PRINCIPAL BENCH, NEW DELHI
O.A. No. 644/2024
Reserved on: 16.12.2025
Pronounced on: 08.01.2026
Hon'ble Mr. R.N. Singh, Member (J)
Hon'ble Mr. B. Anand, Member (A)
Mohd. Shakir
Age 31 years
S/o Shaikh Mohd. Mushtaq
R/o H. No. 523/4, Gali No. 22
Jafrabad, Delhi - 53.
..Applicant
(By Advocate: Mr. Sachin Chauhan)
VERSUS
1. Govt. of NCT of Delhi
through the Chief Secretary
Govt. of NCTD
A-Wing, 5th Floor, Delhi Secretariat
New Delhi -13.
2. The Commissioner of Police
Police Headquarters
Jai Singh Road, New Delhi.
3. The Joint Commissioner of Police
Eastern Range, Delhi
Through the Commissioner of Police
Jai Singh Road, New Delhi.
4. The Deputy Commissioner of Police
East District, Delhi
Through the Commissioner of Police
Jai Singh Road, New Delhi.
...Respondents
(By Advocate: Mr. Gyanendra Singh)
2026.01.09
ANJALI 12:25:51
+05'30'
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O.A. No. 644/2024
ORDER
Hon'ble Mr. B.Anand, Member (A):
By way of filing of this Original Application (O.A.) under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the applicant seeks the following relief(s):
"8.1 To quash and set aside an order dated 13.7.2023 whereby the extreme punishment of dismissal from service is inflicted upon the applicant, order dated 27.12.2023, whereby the statutory appeal of the applicant has been rejected and to further direct the respondents to reinstate the applicant back in service with all consequential benefits including seniority & promotion and pay & allowance.
And/or Any other relief that this Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper may also be awarded to the applicant."
2. Pursuant to notice, the respondents have filed reply and have disputed and contested the claim of the applicant. The applicant has filed rejoinder and reiterated his claim and the grounds pleaded in support thereof.
Facts in a Nutshell:-
3. The brief factual matrix of the case as gleaned from the records is that the applicant, HC (Exe.) Mohd. Shakir, No. 1211/E (PIS No. 28110238), was posted at Police Station Shakarpur and was performing general duties such as sentry duty and picket duty. On 14.06.2023, information was received from Police Station Seemapuri that the applicant, while posted at PS Shakarpur, was found using a motorcycle which had been reported stolen from Police Station Mandawali vide FIR No. 6139/23 dated 25.02.2023. The Station House Officer, PS Shakarpur, was accordingly requested to verify the said information.
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4. Upon verification of records, it was found that the applicant was on leave and was required to report back for duty on 13.06.2023. However, he failed to report back and was marked absent vide DD No. 64 dated 13.06.2023 of PS Shakarpur.
Thereafter, the applicant was called and a detailed enquiry was conducted. During the enquiry, the applicant disclosed that he was acquainted with one Mr. Deepak, stated to be working with Delhi Civil Defence in the PS Kalyanpuri area. The applicant stated that about 15-20 days prior thereto, Mr. Deepak had informed him about a motorcycle parked behind PS Kalyanpuri, which was allegedly stolen. It was further stated that the applicant took the key of the said motorcycle, got a forged number plate prepared, replaced the original number plate and started using the said motorcycle.
5. Efforts were made to verify the facts from the said Deepak;
however, he was found to be residing in Odisha. On being contacted telephonically, Deepak denied having handed over any stolen motorcycle to the applicant. It also emerged during the enquiry that the applicant had earlier been verbally warned for not performing his duties in a professional manner. Further, the owner/manager of an OYO hotel falling within the jurisdiction of PS Mandawali informed the authorities that the applicant had stayed in the hotel for over one month without paying the rent and that a complaint in this regard had already been lodged.
6. A preliminary enquiry was thereafter conducted through ACP/P.G. Cell, East District. The preliminary enquiry revealed that the applicant was found using the stolen motorcycle and that he was on leave during the period when the motorcycle was stolen. During 2026.01.09 ANJALI 12:25:51 +05'30' 4 O.A. No. 644/2024 the enquiry, the applicant stated that he had taken the motorcycle only 2-4 days prior and claimed that he was not aware that the motorcycle was stolen. He also claimed that all dues of the hotel had been cleared.
7. During the course of the preliminary enquiry, Deepak stated that the applicant had been using a white Apache motorcycle since February 2023 and that the applicant had informed him that he had purchased the said motorcycle for a sum of ₹8,000/- from Seelampur. Deepak further stated that he was aware that the motorcycle was stolen and denied the allegations made by the applicant. The owner/manager of the OYO hotel, namely Ram Kumar, along with his partner Nishant Verma, stated that the applicant had stayed in the hotel along with Ms. Upasana Sharma from December 2022 to March 2023 and that an amount of ₹78,000/- was outstanding towards hotel rent. Post-dated cheques issued by Ms. Upasana Sharma were dishonoured. They also identified the recovered motorcycle as the one used by the applicant during his stay in the hotel. Ms. Upasana Sharma also stated that she stayed with the applicant continuously for about three months and that the applicant used a white Apache motorcycle during the said period.
8. The owner of the stolen motorcycle, Mohd. Noman, was also examined during the enquiry; however, the CCTV footage did not establish the identity of the rider of the motorcycle. From the material collected during the preliminary enquiry, contradictions were found in the statements of the applicant and Deepak, and the 2026.01.09 ANJALI 12:25:51 +05'30' 5 O.A. No. 644/2024 disciplinary authority concluded that the applicant had knowingly used a stolen motorcycle.
9. Considering the gravity of the allegations and the surrounding circumstances, the disciplinary authority formed an opinion that it was not reasonably practicable to conduct a regular departmental enquiry, as witnesses were unlikely to come forward to depose against a police official. Being satisfied that the conduct of the applicant amounted to grave misconduct unbecoming of a member of a disciplined force and that the same attracted the provisions of Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India, the applicant was dismissed from service vide order dated 13.07.2023 after obtaining concurrence from the competent authority. The statutory appeal preferred by the applicant was rejected vide order dated 27.12.2023.
10. Aggrieved by the said orders, the applicant has approached this Tribunal by filing the present Original Application, seeking quashing of the dismissal order dated 13.07.2023 and the appellate order dated 27.12.2023, along with consequential reliefs.
Learned counsel for the applicant submissions:-
11. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that the impugned order dated 13.07.2023, whereby the applicant has been dismissed from service by invoking Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India, and the appellate order dated 27.12.2023, rejecting the statutory appeal, are wholly illegal, arbitrary and unsustainable in law.
12. It is submitted that the applicant was appointed on compassionate grounds as a Constable in Delhi Police in the year 2011 after the death of his father, who was also in police service and 2026.01.09 ANJALI 12:25:51 +05'30' 6 O.A. No. 644/2024 died on duty. During the course of service, the applicant earned promotion to the post of Head Constable (Executive) and maintained a satisfactory service record. The applicant is the sole bread earner of his family consisting of eight sisters, all of whom are dependent upon him. Prior to the impugned action, the applicant was posted at Police Station Shakarpur.
13. Learned counsel submits that the extraordinary power under Article 311(2)(b) has been invoked in the present case without fulfilling the mandatory constitutional pre-conditions. The Disciplinary Authority dispensed with the regular departmental enquiry on vague, generalized and presumptive grounds, without recording any cogent, objective or convincing material to demonstrate that holding a regular enquiry was not reasonably practicable.
14. It is contended that the entire impugned action is founded solely on a preliminary enquiry, which in law has no evidentiary value. The Disciplinary Authority has proceeded as if the allegations against the applicant already stood proved, and on such presumption, imposed the extreme penalty of dismissal. Such an approach is per se illegal and violative of the principles of natural justice.
15. At this stage, learned counsel places strong reliance on the judgment of this Hon'ble Tribunal in OA No. 1383/2020 and connected matters, Sumit Sharma v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors., decided on 10.02.2022. In the said judgment, while dealing with identical dismissals of Delhi Police officials under Article 311(2)(b), this Hon'ble Tribunal categorically held that conclusions of guilt 2026.01.09 ANJALI 12:25:51 +05'30' 7 O.A. No. 644/2024 cannot be drawn merely on the basis of a preliminary enquiry; vague apprehensions regarding witnesses not coming forward are insufficient to dispense with a regular enquiry; and the gravity of allegations cannot be a ground to bypass the constitutional safeguard of a departmental enquiry. The Tribunal further held that where a preliminary enquiry was possible, a regular departmental enquiry was also practicable, and invocation of Article 311(2)(b) in such circumstances amounted to abuse of power and violation of binding departmental circulars.
16. Learned counsel further relies upon OA No. 2097/2019, Neeraj Kumar v. Delhi Police, decided on 01.11.2019, OA No. 2867/2019, Inspector Jasmohinder Singh, decided on 16.10.2020, OA No. 702/2019, Inspector Dharmender Singh Dangi, decided on 07.01.2021, OA No. 1912/2015, Kripal Singh v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors., decided on 11.03.2021, and OA No. 1114/2018, Tara Dutt v.
GNCT of Delhi & Ors., decided on 17.06.2021, wherein this Hon'ble Tribunal has consistently held that Article 311(2)(b) cannot be invoked on conjectures, assumptions or generalized fears, and that the more serious the charge, the greater is the obligation to adhere to principles of natural justice by holding a regular departmental enquiry.
17. It is further submitted that one Mr. Rajesh Yadav, SI, had also approached this Tribunal by filing O.A. No. 3315/2024 titled Rajesh Yadav v. Home Affairs and Others, which came to be partly allowed by this Tribunal vide order dated 17.07.2025, with certain directions.
Learned counsel submits that in the said case as well, this Tribunal examined the legality of the action taken by the Delhi Police and 2026.01.09 ANJALI 12:25:51 +05'30' 8 O.A. No. 644/2024 reiterated the requirement of strict compliance with constitutional safeguards and due process before inflicting major penalties. The said decision further reinforces the settled position that mechanical invocation of extraordinary powers, without adherence to principles of natural justice, cannot be sustained.
18. It is submitted that the present case is squarely covered by the aforesaid judgments. The applicant is a subordinate police official and there is no material on record to show that he ever attempted to threaten, intimidate or influence any witness. The reasons recorded in the impugned order are stereotyped, mechanical and based purely on suspicion and surmises.
19. Learned counsel further submits that the statutory appeal preferred by the applicant on 17.08.2023 was rejected by the Appellate Authority vide order dated 27.12.2023 in a non-speaking and mechanical manner, without dealing with the detailed grounds raised by the applicant or the binding precedents cited. Such an appellate order suffers from complete non-application of mind and is unsustainable in law.
20. In view of the settled law laid down by this Hon'ble Tribunal in Sumit Sharma (supra), Rajesh Yadav (supra) and other connected matters, and in the absence of any legally sustainable reasons for dispensing with the departmental enquiry, learned counsel submits that the impugned dismissal order dated 13.07.2023 and the appellate order dated 27.12.2023 deserve to be quashed and set aside, with all consequential benefits.
2026.01.09 ANJALI 12:25:51 +05'30' 9 O.A. No. 644/2024 Learned counsel for the respondents submissions:-
21. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submits that the Original Application is wholly devoid of merit and is liable to be dismissed. It is contended that the impugned order of dismissal dated 13.07.2023, passed under Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India, as well as the appellate order dated 27.12.2023, have been passed strictly in accordance with law, after due application of mind, and upon consideration of the gravity of the misconduct committed by the applicant.
22. It is submitted that the facts emerging from the preliminary enquiry clearly establish that the applicant was found in possession and use of a motorcycle reported stolen in FIR No. 6139/23 of PS Mandawali and that the same was being used with a forged number plate. The applicant himself admitted his acquaintance with one Deepak and his use of the said motorcycle, though he attempted to shift the blame. The statements of Deepak, the hotel owner, his partner, and Ms. Upasana Sharma, coupled with other material collected during enquiry, revealed serious contradictions in the applicant's version and clearly pointed towards his conscious and knowing use of the stolen vehicle.
23. Learned counsel further submits that the conduct of the applicant was not confined merely to the use of a stolen motorcycle, but also involved prolonged unauthorised stay in an OYO hotel without payment of dues, thereby reflecting conduct wholly unbecoming of a member of a disciplined force. Such acts, it is 2026.01.09 ANJALI 12:25:51 +05'30' 10 O.A. No. 644/2024 contended, have not only tarnished the image of the Delhi Police but have also eroded public confidence in the institution.
24. It is vehemently argued that the decision of the disciplinary authority to dispense with a regular departmental enquiry was neither arbitrary nor mechanical. The authority recorded specific satisfaction, based on the surrounding facts and circumstances, that it was not reasonably practicable to conduct a regular enquiry, as witnesses were unlikely to depose against a police official owing to fear, influence, and the nature of the allegations. The requirement under Article 311(2)(b) is one of subjective satisfaction based on objective material, which, in the present case, has been duly met.
26. It is further contended that the reliance placed by the applicant on alleged procedural lapses is misconceived. In terms of Rule 15(3) of the Delhi Police (Punishment & Appeal) Rules, 1980, the file of the preliminary enquiry does not form part of the formal departmental record. Therefore, the contention that the preliminary enquiry vitiates the action taken is legally untenable.
27. Learned counsel also submits that the appellate authority independently examined the grounds raised by the applicant and, upon due consideration, concurred with the findings of the disciplinary authority, holding that the applicant was knowingly using a stolen motorcycle and that the punishment imposed was commensurate with the gravity of misconduct. Thus, both the disciplinary and appellate orders are reasoned, speaking orders and suffer from no legal infirmity.
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28. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents submits that this Bench of the Tribunal, vide order dated 03.07.2025, has dismissed O.A. No. 2450/2024 titled Rohitash Singh v.
Commissioner of Police & Ors. While dismissing the said O.A., the Tribunal had taken into consideration the seriousness of the offence/allegations levelled against the applicant therein, in the light of the judgments of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi as well as the Hon'ble Supreme Court. He further submits that, as is evident from the impugned order dated 13.07.2023, while invoking the provisions of Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution, the respondents had duly considered the gravity and seriousness of the allegations, as also the fact that the delinquent officials, while working in the Delhi Police, were holding influential positions. However, he has fairly conceded that the factual situation and the nature of the order in the present case are the same as those in Rajesh Yadav (supra).
29. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and with their assistance have carefully gone through the pleadings available on records.
30. It is an admitted position that the reasons assigned for dispensing with the regular departmental enquiry while dismissing the applicant are identical to those recorded in the case of the delinquent official Rajesh Yadav, to the effect that it was not reasonably practicable to conduct a regular departmental enquiry. It is also undisputed that the statutory appeal preferred by the applicant has been rejected by the respondents.
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31. Undisputedly, the applicant has placed reliance upon the judgment rendered by this Tribunal in Rajesh Yadav (supra), wherein the judgment passed in O.A. No. 3316/2024 titled Varun Chechi v.
Home Affairs & Others was duly considered. In the said case, the applicant, Varun Chechi, who was working as a Sub-Inspector at the relevant point of time, was dismissed from service by invoking the provisions of Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India. The said O.A. was partly allowed by this Tribunal vide order dated 22.05.2025, and appropriate directions were issued to the respondents. For the sake of clarity, the judgment rendered in Varun Chechi (supra), as reproduced and relied upon in the case of Rajesh Yadav (supra), is extracted hereunder:-
"By way of this OA, the applicant has sought the following reliefs under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985:-
"1. To quash and set aside the impugned order dated 14.11.2023 whereby the extreme punishment i.e. dismissal from service has been imposed upon the applicant by invoking the power under Art. 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India and order dated 08.08.2024 whereby the appeal of the applicant is rejected by the respondents and To further direct the respondents to reinstate the applicant in the service with all consequential benefits including seniority & promotion and pay & allowances."
2. The brief facts of the case are that on13.11.2023, the officials of CBI had conducted a raid in the area of PS B.K. Road on the complaint of Sh. Manoj Kumar S/o Sh. Shyam Singh, R/o Mohali Punjab. During the raid, SI (Exe.) Rajesh Yadav No.D-6547 was caught red handed while handling bribe of Rs.4.5 lac at the instance of SI(Exe.) Varun Chechi - applicant, from the complainant as part payment of the total demand of Rs.25 Lac. Further, as per the information SI(Ex.) Varun ChechiNo.D-5790 was also involved in this case and his voice recording regarding demand of bribe is available with CBI officials. Verification proceedings were conducted on 11 and 12 November - 2023. The applicant was absconding and his mobile phones were switched off. He was marked absent on 13.11.2023 PS BK Road and accordingly, an FIR was registered on 13.11.2023 u/s 7 of PC Act, 1988, PS, CBI, ACB, New Delhi and on the very same day, he was placed under 2026.01.09 ANJALI 12:25:51 +05'30' 13 O.A. No. 644/2024 suspension. It is submitted that on the very next day, the Disciplinary Authority (DA) issued an order dated 14.11.2023 whereby the applicant was dismissed from service by invoking the power under Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India that too without conducting a departmental enquiry. It is submitted that the applicant denies each and every allegations as being alleged in FIR and present dismissal order dated 14.11.2023 on which basis the extreme punishment, i.e. dismissal from service is being imposed by invoking Article 311(2)(b) of Constitution of India.
3. It is submitted that the reasons recorded by the DA for dispensing with the departmental enquiry are vague based on suspicions and surmises as the allegation made against the applicant are presumed to be true by the DA and the applicant is yet to be subjected to trial. The applicant has also not been given any opportunity in respect of the allegation made in the order of DA by virtue of disciplinary enquiry. The DA presumes on the basis of a Preliminary Enquiry and SHO report that the allegations made against the applicant are proved. The reasons recorded by the DA that the applicant is in custody and for that reason, the applicant cannot be subjected to a departmental enquiry again shows non application of mind of DA.
4. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that the power under Article 311(2)(b) has been used only as a short cut method so as to avoid the applicant from being subjected to a departmental enquiry and for that reason such vague, evasive reasons are being recorded to dispense with the DE.
5. Learned counsel for the applicant submitted that appeal preferred against the order of the DA was also rejected by the Appellate Authority, vide order dated 08.08.2024 with the following directions:-
"I have carefully gone through the appeals filed by the appellant Si (Exe.) Rajesh Yadav, No. D-6547 (PIS No. 16190404) and SI (Exe.) Varún Chechi, No. D-5790 (PIS No. 16140192), as well as relevant record available on file and also heard them in O.R. on 29.07.2024, during which they reiterated the same pleas which they have already mentioned in their written appeals. In their appeals, they have submitted various court judgment/order in support of their version. As per rule 15 of Delhi Police (Punishment & Appeal) Rules-1980, the PE is a fact finding enquiry and as per point No. 3 of the rule, the suspected police officer may or may not be present at a PE but when present he shall not cross examine the witness. Further, SI Rajesh Yadav was in the custody of ACB, CBI and SI Varun Chechi was absconding and as such it was not possible to give reasonable opportunity to both for being heard in the enquiry. The case/matter was decided after completion of the PE. In compliance of the circular issued from PHO vide No. 5545-645/P.Cell/Vig. Dated 11.09.2007 and 2513-2612/P.Cell/(P.Misc.)/Vigilance dated 18.04.2018, the P.E. report was forwarded to Spl.CP/L&O(Zone-II), Delhi for necessary concurrence to dismiss the appellants under article 311(2)(b) of the constitution of 2026.01.09 ANJALI 12:25:51 +05'30' 14 O.A. No. 644/2024 India and the same was approved by the Competent Authority. Further, the PE concluded the demand of an illegal gratification of Rs. 25 Lac from Sh. Manoj Kumar for not arresting family members of accused Nirmal Singh Bhangu. The act and circumstances of the case were so serious that it was not reasonably practicable to conduct a regular DE against the appellants as there is reasonable belief that the witnesses may not come forward to depose against them owing to their influential positions. The contents of FIR No. RC-0032023A0043 dated 13.11.2023 u/s 7 of P.C. Act 1988, PS CBI, New Delhi, Delhi and the PE conducted into the matter had proved the involvement of the appellants in this case. The act committed by them had not only tarnished the image and brought disgrace to the organization but also demoralized other police personnel and such misconduct cannot be tolerated in any disciplined organization. Therefore, I am of opinion that the decision of the Disciplinary Authority for invoking article 311(2) (b) of Constitution of India is fully justified and I find no reason to interfere with the punishment of dismissal awarded to the appellants by the Disciplinary Authority vide order No. 4476-4576/HAP(D-1)/NDD dated 14.11.2023. Hence, the appeals submitted by SI (Exe.) Rajesh Yadav, No. D-6547 (PIS No. 16190404) and SI (Exe.) Varun Chechi, No. D-5790 (PIS No. 16140192) are, hereby rejected after due consideration."
6. Learned counsel for the applicant contends that the impugned order dated 14.11.2023 whereby the extreme punishment i.e. dismissal from service has been imposed upon the applicant by invoking the power under Art. 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India and the impugned order dated 08.08.2024 whereby the appeal of the applicant is rejected by the respondents is wrong, illegal and arbitrary.
7. In support of their claim, learned counsel the applicant is placing reliance on the following recent judgment qua the same respondents on the issue of invoking the Article 311(2)(b) being dealt by the different judicial forums:
a. Dushyant Kumar CAT- OA/1019/2023 - Para No.- 9 & 10, HC-W.P. No. 2407/2024 - Para No.-14 &16;.
b. Deepak CAT- OA/542/2023 with OA/591/2023 Para No.- 16 to 20 c. Manjeet HC- W.P. - 1258/2023 - Para No.- 11 to 13 d. Jagmal Singh HC- W.P. - 4201/2024-Para No.- 10 & 11, Supreme Court- SLP No.- 11681/2024 e. Sant Ram-HC- W.P. ©-5562/2024 & 11, Re instatement order 16.07.2024 Para No.-10
8. The learned counsel for the applicant has also brought on record the recent Circular Dated 13.05.2024 issued by DCP Legal Division/PHQ Delhi in pursuance of the Judgment of the Hon'ble High court but still the impugned orders are being 2026.01.09 ANJALI 12:25:51 +05'30' 15 O.A. No. 644/2024 passed in a stereotyped manner without due application of mind.
9. Learned counsel for the applicant along with the present OA is filing the list of witnesses filed by the prosecution along with the challan before the Hon'ble trial court so as to establish that majority of the witnesses in the list of witnesses are official witnesses and further is annexing the deposition of the sixth witness which has already taken place before the trial court so as to establish that the reasons which are recorded by the authorities to invoke Article 311(2)(b) in the present case of the applicant are nearly based on suspicion and surmises; in fact, the trial is taking place in the court and the witnesses are coming and deposing and rest of the witnesses are official witnesses.
10. Learned counsel also submits that the order of the Disciplinary Authority of invoking the power under Art. 311(2)
(b) is absolutely arbitrary, unwarranted and unconstitutional. The reasons recorded by the Disciplinary Authority to dispense with the Departmental Enquiry by stating that the same is not reasonably practical are based on a surmise that the allegation made against the applicant are presumed to be true by the Disciplinary Authority. The applicant is yet to be subjected to trial and further the applicant has not been given any opportunity in respect of allegation made in the order of Disciplinary Authority by virtue of DE but still the Disciplinary Authority presumes on the basis of a Preliminary Enquiry and SHO report (done at the back of applicant), that the allegation made against the applicant are proved. The perusal of Art. 311(2)(b) will establish that to invoke the power under Art. 311(2)(b), the authorities are to record why the DE is not reasonably practical, but here in the present case, DA is recorded as per material and investigation it has been presumed that the allegation against the applicant are proved. This is not a pre-condition to invoke the power under Art. 311(2)(b) hence there is absolute non-application of mind.
11. Learned counsel for the applicant also submits that the Disciplinary Authority is totally overlooking the fact, the applicant is only a Sub-Inspector in Delhi' police and the witnesses against the applicant would be CBI officials and thus there cannot be any chance of influencing any witness by the applicant. The Disciplinary Authority's reasons have to be based on some material placed on record before the authorities and the same cannot be proved on the basis of probabilities and assumptions. It is a matter of record that within 24hours of registration of FIR, the order of dismissal order is being passed. In such circumstances, the reasons that there is a possibility of influencing of witness of case is absolutely absurd and untenable in the eyes of law. The same reasoning is not supported by any material on record. It is pure assumption. Such reasoning by the DA to invoke the power under Art. 311(2)(b) has been dealt with by Hon'ble Tribunal (PB) in various cases and a few cases are quoted within the body of present statutory appeal.
12. Learned counsel for the applicant states that the reasons recorded by the Disciplinary Authority that the applicant is in 2026.01.09 ANJALI 12:25:51 +05'30' 16 O.A. No. 644/2024 custody and for that reason the applicant cannot be subjected to a Departmental Enquiry, again shows non-application of mind of Disciplinary Authority. The power under Art. 311(2)(b) has been used only as a short cut method so in order to avoid the applicant to a Departmental Enquiry and for that reason such vague, evasive reasons are being recorded to dispense with the DE. The applicant was on duty (office work in his office at PS Barakhamba Road) when the so called alleged raid took place in the afternoon (13.11.2023) and on the next day the dismissal from service order is being passed by the Disciplinary Authority. The applicant was arrested on 14.11.2023 and was in police custody for 2 days and finally granted regular bail on 4.12.2023, the order is annexed alongwith the present statutory appeal.
13. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that to presume the applicant is holding an influential position is totally unwarranted and false. The applicant is SI in Delhi Police; the witnesses against the applicant would be CBI officials and other officials of Delhi Police who are higher in rank, the so called complainant is a stooge of a high profile financial criminal who has managed to siphon thousands of crores of Rupees from millions of investors. On the contrary, the applicant is pitted against high 'profile complainant who is well connected with influential peoples in the society.
14. Learned counsel is also placing reliance on the very latest judgment of Hon'ble Tribunal in case of Kuldeep Singh (OA No. 3058/2011), decided on 28.07.2023 to contend that in this case also, the DA, without conducting the departmental inquiry against the grave offence committed by the applicant therein, came to the conclusion that it will not be reasonably practicable to conduct a regular departmental enquiry against the applicant.
15. Learned counsel for the respondents opposed the submissions made by the applicant by filing the reply in which it is clearly submitted that the applicant was absconding at the time of conducing PE and it was not possible to hear him in person during the P.E. Further, there was a possibility that the applicant could have influenced witnesses with his official position, not to appear during the DE proceedings if initiated. Therefore, the provision of Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India were invoked in the present case.
16. Learned counsel for the respondents also submits that on 13.11.2023. a raid was conducted by ACB, CBI at PS Barakhamba Road where in on the instructions of applicant, SI Rajesh Yadav accepted the bribe amount of Rs. 4.5 Lac from the complainant and was caught red handed by the CBI team. The tainted money was also recovered from his possession. The other alleged applicant was found absconding and could not be apprehended. During the course of investigation. SI Rajesh Yadav was arrested in the above RC and on 14.11.2023 2 days P.C. remand was granted by the Special Court, Rouse Avenue. Delhi.
17. Learned counsel for the respondents also submitted that from the above facts and perusal of the RC and the report of 2026.01.09 ANJALI 12:25:51 +05'30' 17 O.A. No. 644/2024 SHO/B.K.Road, it was established that applicant had demanded a bribe of Rs.25 Lac from Sh. Manoj Kumar for not arresting the daughter and son-in-law of accused Nirmal Singh Bhangu in FIR No. 16 dated 09.02.2018 u/s 406/420 IPC PS Barakhamba Road being investigated by him. The alleged demand was also found established in the recorded conversations held between SI Varun Chechi (applicant) and the complainant. Further, SI Rajesh Yadav also found involved in accepting the bribe amount of Rs. 4.5 Lac from the complainant on the instructions of St Varun Chechi (applicant) and was caught red handed with the bribe money.
18. Learned counsel for the respondents also submitted that it was also evident that there are several incriminating evidences against St Varun Chechi (applicant) and St Rajesh Yadav for their involvement in the illegal act of demand and acceptance of bribe amount from complainant Sh. Manoj Kumar for not arresting the relatives of accused Nirmal Singh Bhangu. Moreover, alleged SI Varun Chechi (applicant) was also found absconding and was marked absent.
19. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that while the SI Rajesh Yadav was in the custody of ACB, CBI and SI Varun Chechi (applicant) was absconding and as such it was not possible to give reasonable opportunity to both for being heard in the enquiry. Accordingly. SI Rajesh Yadav and SI Varun Chechi (applicant) were placed under suspension on 13.11.2023. Moreover, there was a possibility of influencing the witnesses of the case by SI Rajesh Yadav and SI Varun Chechi (applicant).
20. It is further submitted that Preliminary Enquiry concluded that by demanding an illegal gratification of Rs. 25 Lac from Sh. Manoj Kumar for not arresting family members of accused Nirmal Singh Bhangu in FIR No. 16/2018 PS B.K. Road and by accepting the bribe amount of Rs. 4.5 Lac from Sh. Manoj Kumar, SI Varun Chechi (applicant) and Sl Rajesh Yadav had shown gross misconduct in the discharge of their official duties. The allegations against SI Rajesh Yadav and S.I. Varun Chechi (applicant) were serious in nature, which rendered them in unbecoming of a police officer.
21. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the act committed by the applicant had not only tarnished the image and brought disgrace to the organization but also demoralized other police personnel. The misconduct committed by them has put the entire police force to shame. Such misconduct cannot be tolerated in any disciplined organization like Delhi Police, whose basic duty is to protect the life and property of the citizen of the society apart from upholding law of land.
22. Learned counsel for the respondents also averred that the act and circumstances of the case were so serious that it would not be reasonably practicable to conduct a regular departmental enquiry against the SI Rajesh Yadav and SI Varun Chechi (applicant) as there was reasonable belief that the witnesses might not come forward to depose against them owing to their influential positions. It also calls for great courage to depose against the desperate persons and the task 2026.01.09 ANJALI 12:25:51 +05'30' 18 O.A. No. 644/2024 become more acute and difficult where the police personnel could use their job to influence the statement of the witnesses. It was highly probable that during the entire process of departmental proceedings, the complainant and witnesses would be put under constant fear or threat to their person and property from SI Rajesh Yadav and SI Varun Chechi (applicant). Under these circumstances, the then disciplinary authority was personally satisfied that conducting a regular D.E. against SI Rajesh Yadav and St Varun Chechi (applicant) was not practicably possible.
23. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that after having committed above gravest conduct, if the above named police officials were allowed to continue in the police force, it would be detrimental to public interest and further tarnish the image of police force in society. Therefore, in order to send a clear message to such undesirable elements in the police force and to maintain discipline as well as to prevent recurrence of such incidents, it had become absolutely necessary to dismiss Sl Rajesh Yadav No. D-6547 and SI Varun Chechi No. D-5790 (applicant) from service as they were completely unfit to continue further in police service. The contents of case FIR No. RC-0032023A0043, dated 13.11.2023 u/s 7 of P.C. Act. 1988. P.S. CBI. ACB, New Delhi, Delhi and the Preliminary Enquiry conducted into the matter had proved their involvement in this case, and therefore, they both deserve to be dismissed under Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India and the same was approved by the Disciplinary Authority.
24. Learned counsel for the respondents also submitted that SI..(Exe.) Rajesh Yadav, No.D/6547 & applicant were dismissed from the service under Article 311(2) (b) of the Constitution of India vide order dated 14.11.2023 and their suspension period from 13.11.2023 to the date of issue of dismissal order was decided as period "Not spent on duty" for all intents and purposes.
25. Learned counsel for the respondents also submitted that the indulgence of a police official in such a criminal act would destroy the faith of the people in the law enforcement system and no witness would come forward for any enquiry. The involvement of the applicant in such criminal act was not only undesirable but it also amounted to serious misconduct and indiscipline. It is under these given set of compelling circumstances, the rules under Article 311(2)(b) of Constitution of India were invoked in this case. S.1.(Exe.) Rajesh Yadav. No.D 6547 and the applicant were not to be allowed to continue in police service and was to be dismissed immediately without following the procedure of regular Departmental Proceedings, although purpose of the fact finding was really not needed as the contents of the case FIR and the Preliminary Enquiry conducted into the matter had proved their involvement in this case. As such the punishment under appeal was inflicted upon the applicant by passing a speaking and reasoned order which is legal and justified.
26. Learned counsel for the respondents further contended that as per Rule 15 of Delhi Police (Punishment & Appeal) Rules, 1980, the Preliminary Enquiry is a fact finding enquiry and 2026.01.09 ANJALI 12:25:51 +05'30' 19 O.A. No. 644/2024 according to Point No.3 of the Rule, the suspected police officer may or may not be present at a Preliminary Enquiry but when present he shall not cross-examine the witness. Whereas in DE, the presence of delinquent is essential. As such there is a difference between PE & D.E. Since the applicant was absconding, it was not practicably possible to conduct the DE in the present case. Hence, the PE was conducted.
27. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that after completion of the Preliminary Enquiry, in compliance of the Circulars issued from PIIQ vide Nos. 5545 645/P.Cell/Vig., dated 11.09.2007 and 2513-2612/P. Cell (P. Misc.)/Vigilance, dated 18.04.2018. the P.E. report was forwarded to Spl. CP/L&O/Zone-11. Delhi for seeking necessary concurrence to dismiss Sl (Exe.) Rajesh Yadav No. D-6547 and Sl (Exe.) Varun Chechi No. D-5790 (applicant) under article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India and the same was approved by the Competent Authority.
28. The learned counsel for the respondents contends that the Preliminary Enquiry proved that by demanding an illegal gratification of Rs. 25 Lac from Sh. Manoj Kumar for not arresting family members of accused Nirmal Singh Bhangu in FIR No. 16/2018 PS B.K. Road and by accepting the bribe amount of Rs. 4.5 Lac from Sh. Manoj Kumar. Sl Varun Chechi and SI Rajesh Yadav(applicant) had shown gross misconduct in the discharge of their official duties. The allegations against S.I.(Exe.) Rajesh Yadavand SI (Exe.) Varun Chechi (applicant) were serious in nature, which rendered them unfit to be retained in service.
29. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and with their assistance, perused the pleadings available on record.
30. It is seen that the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority have come to the decision on the presumption that alleged offence has been committed by the applicant, so there is no need to conduct the departmental enquiry, these reasons cannot stand to the scrutiny of law for invoking the power under provision of Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India. It needs to be tested whether the reasons recorded in the impugned order for imposition of Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India are justifiable or the provisions of above mentioned Article of the Constitution of India are invoked only to avoid the disciplinary enquiry and get rid of the applicant in convenient manner. The Disciplinary Authority did not mention the reasonable grounds even when Preliminary Enquiry was ordered against the applicant. It could be seen from the appellate order that Appellate Authority had rejected the appeal in a mechanical manner without addressing specific submissions of the applicant and merely on presumptions that the allegation against the applicant is presumed to be proved and the witness might not have come forward to depose against the applicant. The Appellate Authority is simply assuming that the allegations against the applicant stands proved and this justification is good enough to invoke the Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India and dismiss the applicant. The Appellate Authority did not take into consideration that in the present case, that majority of the 2026.01.09 ANJALI 12:25:51 +05'30' 20 O.A. No. 644/2024 witnesses are official witnesses. If preliminary enquiry is possible, then the departmental enquiry is also possible. Similarly, if the trial is possible then the departmental enquiry is also possible. Moreover, 11 out of the 19 witnesses were either personnel of the Delhi Police or officers of the CBI and two are from Pvt. Telecom agencies and they can early be called to participating in the enquiry. However, both disciplinary authority and appellate authority did not make any efforts to conduct departmental enquiry and resorted to invocation of provision of Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India to impose the penalty of dismissal. This could be construed as strong bias of respondents towards the applicant and their disdain approach to uphold Rule of Law. The respondents being senior police officer holding high position are required to run the administrative decision making lawfully. Earlier also while deciding other matters, we have pointed out that a serious course correction is needed in the respondent Department while handling such cases and it is for their betterment if they take effective steps in that direction. We need not further ponder upon this point and leave it here.
31. In the recent matter decided on 14.08.2024 by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in W.P. (C) No.11276/2024 and CM Appl. 46705/2024. CM Appl. 46706/2024 in the matter of The Commissioner of Police & Ors. vs OM Prakash &anr., wherein the Commissioner of Police has been directed by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi to look into the matters where Article 311 (2)
(b) of the Constitution of India has been invoked by the police authorities and police personnel have been removed from the service. Only on presumptions and assumptions without any material, coming to the conclusion or that it was not reasonably practicable to conduct regular departmental enquiry as witness might not come forward to decide the case and Appellate Authority depose against a police officer respondents have rejected the appeal which could be construed as bad in law.
32. It is apparent that the Disciplinary Authority has assumed as if the allegations made in criminal case (FIR) already stand proved and thus with this presumptions, the present impugned order has been issued. Once the order of Disciplinary Authority is based on assumption as if the allegations made against the applicant already stand proved that too on the content of FIR, the same act is enough to vitiate the order of Disciplinary Authority as the same being bad in law and being based on assumptions, suspicion and surmises. Further, the Disciplinary Authority is assuming that the offence has been committed by the applicant and under this assumption, the present order of Disciplinary Authority is being passed invoking Article 311 (2)
(b) of the Constitution of India. There are circulars, judgment of judicial forums which clearly states that if the allegations are grave then more opportunity should be provided to the delinquent official to put forward his defense. The applicant has not been subjected to a departmental enquiry and merely on assumptions the disciplinary authority adopting a short cut and has invoked the power under Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India. The reasoning recorded by Disciplinary Authority is based on suspicion and surmises. The reasoning recorded by Disciplinary Authority for dispensing away the departmental enquiry has been dealt by this Tribunal in 2026.01.09 ANJALI 12:25:51 +05'30' 21 O.A. No. 644/2024 various OAs qua the same department i.e. Delhi Police. It is observed that most of witnesses are official witness in criminal case; once the criminal trial and preliminary enquiry are possible, then departmental enquiry is also possible.
33. As stated above, the applicant is only Sub Inspector in Delhi Police, if as per the allegations, the case of the department is so good on merit then come what may the applicant should be given a chance to put forward his defense in disciplinary enquiry. The preliminary enquiry was conducted by the respondents in order to construe that the allegations are true against the applicant that too at the back of the applicant. This fact clearly shows that Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India has been adopted as a convenient method in the present case. The impugned order is passed with the presumption that the allegations are proved against the applicant. In such a situation, Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India cannot be invoked on the same as it amounts to abuse of process of law.
34. In the public interest and even as per Rule of law, it was incumbent upon the respondent authorities not to put to use Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India in present case and to give opportunity to the applicant to put forward his defence in the departmental enquiry. The gravity of misconduct alleged in the present case cannot be a ground to invoke the power under Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India. The applicant as per rule of law must be given opportunity to put forward his defence in regular Departmental Enquiry until and unless the same is not reasonably practical. The reasons recorded in present impugned order dispensing away with the Departmental Enquiry are just not tenable in the eyes of law. Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India has been used as a short cut method. Admittedly in the present case a Preliminary Enquiry was conducted through ACP/B. K. Road/NDD, the order of dismissal from service was passed by Disciplinary Authority, if preliminary enquiry is possible then disciplinary enquiry is also possible. This Tribunal in various judgments has allowed many petitions in respect of use of Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India, on the same ground that if PE is possible then DE is also possible.
35. The reasoning to dispense away with the departmental enquiry cannot be based on suspicion and surmises and probability. Once the Disciplinary Authority records that there is a probability that complainant and witness are put on constant fear and threat as a reason to dispense away with departmental enquiry, the onus to establish that such situation prevails is based on the efforts made by them to conduct departmental enquiry and imminent failure to hold the said departmental enquiry due to such actions of the applicant. Therefore, on the one hand taking no action to conduct disciplinary enquiry and while on the other citing the imaginary reasons of giving threat to witnesses etc., are the reasoning based on mere probability, suspicion and surmises and cannot be attached any credence. No material is placed before the authority to come to the conclusion that Departmental Enquiry is not possible and invocation of Article 311 (2) (b) of the 2026.01.09 ANJALI 12:25:51 +05'30' 22 O.A. No. 644/2024 Constitution of India is the only solution available to the respondents.
36. It is also observed that the power under Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India has been invoked subsequent to a preliminary enquiry. No such material even through preliminary enquiry was conducted is being placed before any of the authorities on the basis of which the conclusion would be drawn that the departmental enquiry is not practicable or even remotely supports the vague reasons recorded to dispense with the departmental enquiry. The cases in which preliminary enquiry is being conducted but in absolute violation of circular dated 11.09.2007 and straightaway the Disciplinary Authority passed an order under Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India, is in violation of circular dated 11.9.2007 which was framed by department in pursuance of judgment of Hon'ble Tribunal in case of Suresh Kumar Vs. GNCTD in O.A. No. 2500/2006.
37. The Appellate Authority records that Preliminary Enquiry into the matter was conducted. The facts and circumstance of the case were such that it was not reasonably practicable to conduct a regular departmental enquiry, cannot be a ground to invoke the Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India. The copy of preliminary enquiry report is not supplied to the applicant nor the applicant has been part of the preliminary enquiry but on the contrary the law is that Preliminary Enquiry is possible then even the departmental enquiry is also possible and in such cases the Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India is not invoked. The applicant is placing its reliance on the judgment of Hon'ble Tribunal decided on 23.04.2018 whereby the Hon'ble Tribunal after relying the judgment of Tarsem Singh, Hon'ble Apex Court whereby the Hon'ble Tribunal clearly stating "29. In Tarsem Singh's case Apex Court while allowing the appeals categorically observed "if a preliminary enquiry could be conducted, we fail to see any reason as to why a formal departmental enquiry could not have been initiated against the applicant. Reliance placed upon such a preliminary enquiry without complying with the minimal requirements of the principle of natural justice is against all canons of fair play and justice'. Accordingly, in the facts of the present OAs, we hold the issue in favour of the applicant. 30. In the circumstances and for the aforesaid reasons, all the OAs are allowed and the impugned orders are set aside with all consequential benefits. Since the applicant was under
suspension as on the date of passing of the impugned orders, they would thus remain under suspension and the respondents shall take an appropriate decision regarding revocation or continuation of the same. The respondents shall proceed against the applicant departmentally, as per rules and the treatment of suspension period shall be dependent on the same. No costs."
38. In the present case, when a Preliminary Enquiry is possible then even a Departmental Enquiry is also possible and thus the 2026.01.09 ANJALI 12:25:51 +05'30' 23 O.A. No. 644/2024 reasoning recorded by the Disciplinary Authority for dispensing away with the Departmental Enquiry is bad in law. As also stated above, the disciplinary authority did not even make the slightest possible effort to initiate a departmental inquiry as only after initiating a departmental inquiry a disciplinary authority can come to the conclusion that departmental inquiry is not reasonably practicable. Without making any efforts and only acting on the presumption and surmises, the disciplinary authority on its own, came to the conclusion that departmental inquiry is not practicable. No order for initiating the Departmental Enquiry was made by the department thus it is wrong to say that the present Departmental Enquiry is not reasonably practicable.
39. The disciplinary authority is not able to apply its mind that the power under Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India has to be exercised with a pre-condition. The pre-condition is that if a disciplinary enquiry is not reasonably practical and to arrive at such conclusions, the Disciplinary Authority has to record reasons. The present reasoning is based on the assumption that the applicant has committed the alleged crime and thus departmental enquiry is not required. The Disciplinary Authority on the presumption that the act committed by the applicant is so grave that it is practically not feasible to conduct enquiry, has hence, came to conclusion that there is no need to conduct the departmental enquiry the scrutiny of law for invoking the power under Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India. The law on the subject is that graver are the allegation then more opportunities should be provided to the delinquent official to submit the defence. The gravity of the charge will never be an imminent factor in deciding whether power under Art 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India is to be invoked or not.
40. The present case is a case of absolute misuse of power vested in the Disciplinary Authority under Article 311 (2) (b) of Constitution of India and hence bad in law. The reasons recorded by the authorities to dispense away with the departmental enquiry do not withstand the scrutiny of law. The so called reasons recorded by the authorities in the impugned order to invoke the power under the Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India as being mentioned are only to avoid the departmental enquiry. It is a well settled law that without conducting any departmental enquiry, if the finding of guilt against the applicant has been arrived on to, the same act is enough to vitiate the order of the disciplinary authority. There is a finding of guilt against the applicant without conducting the Departmental Enquiry and further not even giving the opportunity to the applicant to put forward his defence and the same is enough to vitiate the order of the disciplinary authority.
The authorities failed to consider that no substantial material has been collected to come on to a conclusion that witness will be discouraged to appear in a D.E. Thus the order of the authorities establishes non-application of mind, bias, arbitrariness and to adopt a short cut method of dismissing the applicant by invoking the power under Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India only keeping in mind the gravity of the allegations.
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41. The applicant preferred an appeal against the punishment order of dismissal dated 14.11.2023 (Annexure-A/1). The Appellate Authority rejected the appeal on 08.08.2024 (Annexure A/2) by an absolutely non-speaking and mechanical order. The Appellate Authority failed to apply its mind that the law quoted by the applicant in the statutory appeal clearly establishes that the reasons recorded for dispensing with the DE are not legally tenable in the eyes of law. The Appellate Authority has merely stated in his order dated 08.08.2024 that "In their appeals, they have submitted various court judgments/order in support of their ground and has not proceeded to discuss these judgments. The present case is not a case for invoking the power under Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India. The Hon'ble Apex court has laid down clearly that the gravity of the charge will not be a tilting factor in deciding whether a Departmental Enquiry is a reasonably practicable or not. The graver the charge the opportunity to defend him should be more.
42. On this subject invocation of provision of Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India, this Tribunal has decided a number of cases. We examine the law laid down on this subject in some of the decided cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant.
43. The first judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant is the order dated 13.12.2023 of this Tribunal passed in OA No. 1019/20223 in the matter of Dushyant Kumar Vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi &Ors.. The relevant paras of the same are reproduced below:-
"8. A catena of cases of the Orders/Judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, Hon'ble High Court of Delhi and of this Tribunal on the issue as involved in the present case were also considered by the Division Bench (consisting one of us) while deciding the case of Ct. Sumit Sharma (supra).
9. Having regard to the above, we have carefully perused the impugned order(s), we find that nothing has been recorded in the impugned order(s) or shown to us that the applicant had ever threatened or harassed any of the witness (es) and/or the prospective witness (es). From the impugned orders, it is also evident that neither any effort was made by them to conduct an enquiry, nor there is any evidence that despite their best efforts, the respondents would not have been able to produce the witness (es) to lead evidence against the applicant. Further 18 OA No.1019/2023 nothing is brought on record that witness (es) has/have been threatened by the applicant or they were too scared of the applicant to come forward in the regular enquiry proceedings. It is also found that the disciplinary authority while passing the impugned order has very casually come to the conclusion that it would not be possible to conduct the departmental enquiry against the applicant, as no reason at all has been recorded in this regard and the applicant is guilty of committing grave misconduct and was involved in the aforesaid offences.
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10. Having regard to the above, we are of the considered view that impugned orders passed by the respondents are not only in violation of the settled law but also of their own circular dated 11.9.2007. The reasons given by the respondents for dispensing with the enquiry are not in consonance with the law settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and Hon'ble High Courts and followed by this Tribunal in a catena of cases, including in one referred to hereinabove.
11. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the present case, we are of the considered view that the instant OA is squarely covered by the common 19 OA No.1019/2023 Order/Judgment dated 10.2.2022 in Ct. Sumit Sharma (supra) and a batch of cases. Therefore, the present OA deserves to be partly allowed and hence, the same is partly allowed with the following directions:-
(i) Orders dated 03.10.2022 (Annexure A/1) and dated 10.3.2023 (Annexure A/2) passed by the disciplinary and appellate authorities respectively are set aside;
(ii) The applicant shall be entitled to all consequential benefits in accordance with the relevant rules and law on the subject;
(iii) The respondents shall implement the aforesaid directions within eight weeks of receipt of a copy of this order; and
(iv) However, the respondents shall be at liberty to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the applicant in accordance with the law.
12. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs."
The order of this Tribunal was challenged in the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in W.P. (C) 2407/2024 in the matter of Govt. of Delhi and Ors. Vs. Dushyant Kumar, The Hon'ble High of Delhi dismissed the Writ Petition being meritless. The relevant portion of the said judgment is as under:-
"14. In the light of the aforesaid, we have no hesitation in concurring with the Tribunal that the petitioners' decision to dispense with the enquiry was wholly unsustainable. The petitioners appear to have proceeded on an erroneous presumption that merely because a criminal case has been registered against the respondent, he was to be treated as guilty of the misconduct. No doubt, the respondent is a police officer, whose misconduct can never be condoned, but this would not imply that the principles of natural justice should be given a complete go by. As noted hereinabove, the petitioners have not given any valid reason for 2026.01.09 ANJALI 12:25:51 +05'30' 26 O.A. No. 644/2024 dispensing with the enquiry except for repeatedly stating that the respondent is guilty of serious misconduct. This course of action, in our view, is completely impermissible.
15. Before we conclude, we may also consider the decision in Ajit Kumar Nag (supra) relied upon by the petitioners. We, however, find that instead of forwarding the case of the petitioners, the said decision supports the case of the respondent. It would, therefore, be apposite to refer to paragraph no.44 of the said decision, which reads as under:-
"44. We are aware of the normal rule that a person must have a fair trial and a fair appeal and he cannot be asked to be satisfied with an unfair trial and a fair appeal. We are also conscious of the general principle that pre- decisional hearing is better and should always be preferred to post-decisional hearing. We are further aware that it has been stated that apart from Laws of Men, Laws of God also observe the rule of audi alteram partem. It has been stated that the first hearing in human history was given in the Garden of Eden. God did not pass sentence upon Adam and Even before giving an opportunity to show cause as to why they had eaten the forbidden fruit. (See R. v. University of Cambridge [(1723) 1 Str 557:93 ER 698] .) But we are also aware that the principles of natural justice are not rigid or immutable and hence they cannot be imprisoned in a straitjacket. They must yield to and change with exigencies of situations. They must be confined within their limits and cannot be allowed to run wild. It has been stated:, "To do a great right‟ after all, it is permissible sometimes "to do a little wrong‟. [Per Mukharji, C.J. in Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India [(1990) 1 SCC 613] (Bhopal Gas Disaster), SCC p. 705, para
124.] While interpreting legal provisions, a court of law cannot be unmindful of the hard realities of life. In our opinion, the approach of the Court in dealing with such cases should be pragmatic rather than pedantic, realistic rather than doctrinaire, functional rather than formal and practical rather than "precedential".
16. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the petitioners have not only ignored the decisions of the Apex Court laying down the parameters for applicability of Article 311(2)(b) of Constitution of India, but have also ignored their own circulars dated 21.12.1993 and 11.09.2007. We, therefore, find no infirmity with the impugned order.
17. The writ petition being meritless is, accordingly, dismissed with all pending applications."
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44. The second judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant is the order dated 16.04.2024 of this Tribunal passed in OA Nos. 542/2023 & 591/2023 in the case of Deepak vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors. by this Tribunal wherein the Tribunal held as under:-
"20. In the present case, as apparent from the reasons recorded by the respondents in the impugned order, it is apparent that the respondents have arrived at the conclusion for dispensing with the regular inquiry due to the involvement of the applicants in a grave and serious case. The respondents have jumped to the conclusion that on account of serious allegations, the applicants have become ineligible to be continued in police force. There is no finding that the 24 applicants and/or anybody on their behalf have at any point of time even attempted to influence or coerce any of the witness. Even there is no finding that the applicants in the captioned OAs who are very junior officers under the respondents were in a position to influence the witnesses who are generally senior officials working in the Government of India and particularly in CBI. It is also nowhere recorded by the respondents as to how if not only preliminary inquiry was found possible, but also the criminal trial is possible in the said case FIR with the support of more than nineteen witnesses and at no point of time the prosecution has even felt that those witnesses are not likely to turn up and regular inquiry was not possible in the matter. It is undisputed that regular inquiry is a Rule whereas dispensing with the same is only an exception. Though the respondents have recorded that if regular inquiry is initiated, the same is liable to take a long time, however, no reason has been given for the same and it is apparent that such reasoning and finding is based on surmises and conjectures.
21. In view of the aforesaid, we find that the impugned orders are not sustainable in the eyes of law. Accordingly, the OAs are allowed with the following order(s): (i) impugned orders dated 10.08.2022 and 25.01.2023 are set aside. The applicants shall be reinstated in service forthwith. (ii) the applicants shall be entitled for all consequential benefits in accordance with relevant rules and instructions on the subject. (iii) the aforesaid directions shall be complied with by the respondents as expeditiously as possible and preferably within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. (iv) the respondents shall be at liberty to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the applicants if they are so advised, of course in accordance with rules and instructions on the subject.
22. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs."
45. The third judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant is the Writ Petition (C) No. 1258/2023 & CM App. No.4759/2023 in the case of Commissioner of Police Delhi Police & Ors. Vs. Manjeet wherein the Hon'ble High 2026.01.09 ANJALI 12:25:51 +05'30' 28 O.A. No. 644/2024 Court of Delhi vide its judgement dated 22.04.2024 has held as under: -
"9. A bare perusal of the aforesaid reasons contained in the dismissal order makes it clear that the primary reason for the petitioners not holding any enquiry against the respondent was that due to seriousness of the offence alleged to have been committed by him it would not be reasonably practicable to conduct a regular departmental enquiry. It also emerges that on the basis of the allegations levelled against the respondent in the FIR coupled with the findings of the preliminary enquiry, the petitioners presumed that the respondent was guilty of a serious offence and therefore deserve to be dismissed at the earliest. This in our considered view, as has been rightly held by the learned Tribunal, could not be treated as a ground to reach a conclusion that it was not reasonably practicable to hold an enquiry against the respondent. The petitioners have sought to dispense with the enquiry in such a casual manner and that too only on the basis of a perceived notion that the respondent being a police personnel, an enquiry against him was likely to be difficult on account of his influence. This course of action is clearly violative of Article 311(2) (b) of the Constitution of India.
10. We have also considered the decision in Dushyant Kumar (Supra) and find that in the said case, this Court had rejected a similar challenge by the petitioners to the Tribunal's quashing of a dismissal order passed after dispensing with the enquiry. In fact, this Court after considering the circulars dated 21.12.1993 and 11.09.2007 issued by the petitioners themselves, observed that despite there being a requirement to record cogent reasons to dispense with the enquiry, the petitioners were passing cryptic orders dispensing with the enquiry in the most mechanical manner.
11. No doubt, the respondent is a police personnel and any misconduct on his part is liable to be dealt with appropriately. This, however, does not imply that the petitioners could, on the basis of the gravity of the charges levelled against him, with an enquiry on absolutely vague grounds. As noted hereinabove, the petitioners have given no reason whatsoever in the impugned order for dispensing with the inquiry. The impugned order of dismissal proceeds on the basis that the respondent's guilt had already been proved in the preliminary enquiry. Furthermore, it is not as if the respondent has been let off without any departmental action being taken against him, as the learned Tribunal has already granted time to the petitioners to initiate departmental proceedings against him as per law.
12. For the aforesaid reasons, we find no reason to interfere with the impugned order. The writ petition being meritless applications. is dismissed along with all applications.
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13. Before we conclude, we are constrained to observe that in a large number of petitions filed by the Commissioner of Police which are coming up before this Court, we are finding termination orders are being passed by the petitioners by dispensing with departmental enquiries in a most mechanical manner without recording any valid reasons. We, therefore, direct that a copy of this order be placed before the Commissioner, Delhi Police to ensure that in future, enquiries are not dispensed with without assigning justifiable reasons."
46. The fourth judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant is Writ Petition (C) No.4201/2024 on 20.03.2024 in case of Commissioner of Police and Anr. Vs. Jagmal Singh. The Hon'ble High Court of Delhi has held as under:-
"10. From a perusal of the aforesaid, we find that the petitioners have proceeded to dispense with the enquiry against the respondent only because of the grave nature of allegations levelled against him and have simply observed that since the respondent had lowered the image of the police department and goodwill of a uniformed organisation, an exemplary punishment of dismissal ought to be imposed upon him so as to send a clear message to undesirable persons and to prevent reoccurrence of such crimes. In the light of the aforesaid, we find absolutely no reason to differ with the conclusion arrived at by the learned Tribunal that the dismissal order passed by the petitioners did not contain any justifiable reason whatsoever for dispensing with the enquiry. What clearly emerges is that the petitioners have proceeded on the premise that such police officers, who are charged with serious misconduct, should be immediately dismissed from service. This approach, in our view to dispense with an enquiry, would not meet the parameters laid down under Article 311(2) (b) of the Constitution of India.
11. At the cost of repetition, we may reiterate that merely because the respondent was a police personnel, would not entitle the petitioners to give a complete go bye to the requirement of holding a departmental enquiry against him without recording any justifiable reasons as to why departmental enquiry could not be held against him.
12. For the aforesaid reasons, we find no infirmity with the impugned order. The writ petition, being meritless, is along with accompanying application, dismissed."
In the Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 11681/2024 filed by the Commissioner of Police &Anr. Vs. Jagmal Singh, the Hon'ble Supreme Court vide its judgment on 10.07.2024 has dismissed the said SLP and the judgment of Hon'ble Court of Delhi attained finality.
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47. The fifth and last judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant is decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi dated 23.04.2024 in W.P. (C) No. 5562/2024, CAV 181 /2024 CM Appl. 22929/2024 in the case of Commissioner of Police and Ors. Vs. Sant Ram in which Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in paras 9 to 12 has held as under:-
"9. A bare perusal of the aforesaid reasons contained in the dismissal order makes it clear that the primary reason for the petitioners not holding any enquiry against the respondent was their presumption that the respondent would threaten or intimidate the complainant and other witnesses. The petitioners were further of the view that a prolonged enquiry would cause more trauma to the complainant. It is also evident from the dismissal order that the petitioners had, on the basis of the evidence led in the preliminary enquiry, already made up their mind that the respondent was guilty of serious misconduct and had lowered the image of the police force in the eyes of the public.
10. In our considered view, even though the charges against the respondent are very serious and the interest of the complainant deserves to be protected, it does not imply that the principles of natural justice as also the provisions of section 11 of The Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 should be given a complete go by on the basis of mere presumptions. Only because the respondent is a police personnel, would in our view, not be a ground either to presume that the witnesses will not come forward to depose against him in a regular enquiry or to hold him guilty without conducting the statutorily prescribed departmental enquiry and that too in a matter like the present where the complainant and the witnesses are also police personnel. In fact, what emerges is that on the basis of the report of the preliminary enquiry itself, the petitioners presumed that the respondent was guilty of serious misconduct and therefore deserved to be dismissed at the earliest. This in our considered view, as has been rightly held by the learned Tribunal, could not be treated as a ground to reach a conclusion that it was not reasonably practicable to hold an enquiry against the respondent. This course of action, in our considered opinion, was clearly violative of Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India.
11. No doubt, the respondent is a police personnel and any misconduct on his part is liable to be dealt with appropriately. This, however, does not imply that the petitioners could, on the basis of the gravity of the charges levelled against him, dispense with the requirement of an enquiry on absolutely vague grounds. As noted hereinabove, the petitioners have given no reason whatsoever in the impugned order for dispensing with the inquiry. The impugned order of dismissal proceeds on the basis that the respondent's guilt had already been proved in the preliminary enquiry and had also been admitted by him. We therefore have no hesitation in agreeing with the learned Tribunal that the petitioners have dispensed with the enquiry only on the basis of a perceived notion that the respondent being a police personnel, would threaten the witnesses and holding of an enquiry would cause trauma to the 2026.01.09 ANJALI 12:25:51 +05'30' 31 O.A. No. 644/2024 complainant. Furthermore, we find that it is not as if the respondent has been let off without any departmental action being taken against him. As is evident from the impugned order, the learned Tribunal, while setting aside the dismissal order, has granted time to the petitioners to initiate departmental proceedings against him as per law.
12. For the aforesaid reasons, we find no reason to interfere with the impugned order. The writ petition being meritless is dismissed along with all accompanying applications.
48. In pursuance to the order of this Tribunal in OA No. 14/2018 titled as Sant Ram vs. Commissioner of Police and the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in W.P. (C) 5562/2024, CAV 181/2024 CM Appl. No.22929/2024, the respondents reinstated the services of the applicant Shri Sant Ram in that case. The order dated 26.07.2024 is reproduced as under:-
"In pursuance of judgment dated 06.02.2024 passed by the Principal Bench of Hon'ble Mr. R.N. Singh, Member (J) & Hon'ble Mr. Sanjeeva Kumar, Member (A), Central Administrative Tribunal, New Delhi in 0.A. No.14/2018 titled Sant Ram Vs. Commissioner of Police, Delhi & Ors. and judgment dated 23.04.2024 passed by the Hon'ble Ms. Justice Rekha Palli & Hon'ble Mr. Justice Saurabh Banerjee, High Court Delhi in W.P.(C) No.5562/2024, CAV 181/2024, CM Appl.22929/2024
- Stay, CM Appl. 22930/2024 - Ex./LLOD titled Commissioner of Police & Ors. Vs. Sant Ram as well as opinion of Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, Ld. Addl. Solicitor General of India that "this is not a fit case for filing of SLP", the order of the disciplinary authority passed vide No.1833 1900/HAP/PTC (P-II) dated 01.08.2017 vide which Const. (Exe.) Sant Ram, No.324PTC (PIS No.28060573) was dismissed from the Delhi Police force under Article311(2(b) of Constitution of India deciding his suspension period as period not spent on duty and the order passed by the Appellate Authority vide No.106 66/SO/Jt.C.P/Trg, dated 03.11.2017 rejecting his appeal, are set aside. Accordingly, Const. (Exe.) Sant Ram, No.324/PTC (PIS No.28060573) is hereby re instated in service from dismissal with immediate effect without prejudice to the further departmental action to be taken against him in accordance with the law.
He is deemed to be under suspension from the date of his dismissal as he had already been placed under suspension vide D.D.No.29-A/PTC/JK dated 22.07.2017 and formal issued vide order No.1738 70/HAP/PTC (DA-II) dated 26.07.2017. His dismissal/suspension period will be decided later on.
Let Const. (Exe.) Sant Ram, No.324/PTC (PIS No.28060573) be informed accordingly.
49. The learned counsel for the applicant has also drawn our attention to the following circular issued by the Office of Commissioner of Police in judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Writ Petition (C) No.1258/2023 & CM Appl. No. 4759/2023 in case of Commissioner of Police, Delhi vs. Manjeet, the "No. 174/C/HC/24 5110-60 DA-III/Court Cell/PHQ dated 13.05.2024 2026.01.09 ANJALI 12:25:51 +05'30' 32 O.A. No. 644/2024 To The Deputy Commissioner of Police, All District including Units, New Delhi.
Sub: W.P. (C) No. 1258/2023 & CM Appl. No. 4759/2023 in the matter of Commissioner of Police, Delhi vs. Manjeet.
Memo Enclosed please find here with a copy of letter No. 10264/W/DHC/ Writs/D-9/2023 dated 26.04.2024 received from the Registrar General, Delhi High Court alongwith copy of the order dated 22.04.2024 wherein the Hon'ble has observed that " in large number of petitions filed by the Commissioner of Police which are coming up before the this Court, we are finding termination orders are being passed b y the petitioners by dispensing with departmental enquiries in a most mechanical manner without recording any valid reasons. We, therefore, direct that a copy of this order be placed before the Commissioner of Police, Delhi to ensure that in future, enquiries are not dispensed with without assigning justifiable reasons.
It is, therefore, requested that the aforementioned directions of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi shall be taken into consideration before passing termination orders by dispensing with the departmental enquiries in future.
This issues with the approval of Commissioner of Police, Delhi.
(Hareesh H.P) Deputy Commissioner of Police Legal Division/ PHQ, Delhi"
Relying upon the circular issued on 11.09.2002, a similar order was passed by the respondents in the OA No. 1088/2021 as under:-
"The respondents, after considering the provisions of Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India and the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Tulsiram Patel (supra) and the Order(s)/Judgment(s) passed by this Tribunal have issued another circular dated 11.9.2007 (Annexure A/13 of the rejoinder filed in OA 467/2020). In the said circular, they have emphasized that the disciplinary authority should pass a speaking order(s) based and supported by material/facts on record for dispensing with prior inquiry and before passing such order(s), the disciplinary authority should be satisfied that it is not practicable to hold an inquiry in view of threat, inducement, intimidation, affiliation with criminals etc. and the disciplinary authority has no option but to resort to Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India. The said circular dated 11.9.2007 reads as under:-
2026.01.09 ANJALI 12:25:51 +05'30' 33 O.A. No. 644/2024 "CIRCULAR /2007 An analysis has been done by PHQ in 38 cases pertaining to the period between 1.1.2000 to 31.12.05 where action under Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India was taken against the defaulters. The analysis shows that out of the 38 cases, the action of the department has been upheld by CAT only in two cases and out of these two cases and only one case action was upheld by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi and most of these cases have been remanded back in the Department by the Tribunal for initiating departmental inquiry.
Though some cases are still pending in the Hon'ble High Court for decision, in a majority of cases, Disciplinary Authorities have resorted to Article 311 (2)
(b) on assumptions and conjectures. No speaking orders were passed based on and supported by material/facts on record for dispensing with prior enquiry. Orders for dismissal were passed arbitrarily violating Article 311 and the principles of natural justice.
Henceforth, it has been decided that whenever any Disciplinary Authority intends to invoke Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India, he must keep in mind the judgment in the case of UOI v. Tulsi Ram Patel, AIR 1985 SC 1416. Only in cases where Disciplinary Authority is personally satisfied on the basis of material available on file that the case is of such a nature that it is not practicable to hold an enquiry in view of threat, inducement, intimidation, affiliation with criminals etc. and keeping in view of specific circumstances of the case it is not possible that PWs will depose against the defaulter and disciplinary authority has no option but to resort to Article 311 (2) (b) should such an action be taken. Prior to such an order, a PE has to be conducted and it is essential to bring on record all such facts. It has also been decided that before passing on order under Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India, Disciplinary Authority has to take prior concurrence of Spl. CP/Admn.
This has the approval of C.P., Delhi.
Sd/-
S.N. SRIVASTAVA) JT. COMMISSIONER OF POLICCE:
HDQRS,: DELHI"
50. The Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in WP(C )No. 11276/2024 and CM Appl. No.46705/2024, CM Appl. No. 46706/2024 in the matter of The Commissioner of Police & Ors. vs. Om Prakash & Anr. decided on 14.08.2024 has taken a serious cognizance of the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority resorting to invocation of Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India. For facility of reference, the relevant portion of above-mentioned judgment is as follow:-
2026.01.09 ANJALI 12:25:51 +05'30' 34 O.A. No. 644/2024 "20. Accordingly, finding no error in the impugned order passed by the learned Tribunal, the present petition is dismissed.
21. Before parting with this matter, we hereby direct the Commission of Police Delhi to personally look into such matters and take proper decision so that Courts/Tribunals are not burdened with a case where departmental inquiries can be initiated. We hereby make it clear that if such like petitions are filed in future wherein dismissal or suspension orders are passed without holding any enquiry without any plausible reasoning, certainly heavy cost will be imposed and that too, will be recovered from the Officer, who takes such type of unwarranted decision.
22. A copy of this order be transmitted to the Commissioner of Delhi Police for information and compliance."
51. Having regard to the above, we are of the considered view that impugned orders passed by the respondents are in violation of the settled law. The reasons given by the respondents to dispense away with the enquiry are not in consonance with the law settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and Hon'ble High Court(s) and followed by this Tribunal in a catena of cases, a few of which are referred to hereinabove.
52. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances in the present case, we are of the considered view that the instant OA deserves to be partly allowed and the same is partly allowed with the following directions:-
(i) Orders dated 14.11.2023 (Annexure-A/1) of the Disciplinary Authority and dated 08.08.2024 (Annexure A/2) of the Appellate Authority, are set aside;
(ii) The applicant is reinstated in service and shall be entitled to all consequential benefits in accordance with the relevant rules and instructions on the subject;
(iii) The respondents shall implement the aforesaid directions within eight weeks of receipt of a copy of this order; and
(iv) However, the respondents shall be at liberty to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the applicant in accordance with the law. No order to cost."
8. From the aforesaid order, it is apparent that the binding precedents, i.e., the judgments of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi and those of the Hon'ble Apex Court have been taken into consideration, while passing the said order dated 22.05.2025. In the case of Rohitash Singh (supra), this Tribunal has recorded that the Appellate Authority applied its mind to the case and in particular, such authority has also kept in mind, the order of the Hon'ble High Court in W.P. (C) No. 1258/2023 vide order dated 22.04.2024. In this background and being satisfied by the application of mind of the Appellate Authority to 2026.01.09 ANJALI 12:25:51 +05'30' 35 O.A. No. 644/2024 the extent that in the given facts and circumstances, ordinarily, a regular inquiry was not possible, the Tribunal has dismissed the said OA. This would be evident from para 13, 17 and 18 of the Order dated 03.07.2025 in the case of Rohitash Singh (supra).
9. However, admittedly, the background of the present case and reasoning for dispensing with the regular inquiry are one and the same in both the case, i.e., in the case of Varun Chechi (supra) and that of the applicant in the present OA. Thus, the judgment in the case of Rohitash Singh (supra) is found to be not applicable in the present case.
10. In the light of the aforesaid, the present OA is partly allowed with the following directions:-
(i) Orders dated 14.11.2023 (Annexure A-1) of the Disciplinary Authority and dated 08.08.2024 (Annexure A-2) of the Appellate Authority, are set aside;
(ii) The applicant is reinstated in service and shall be entitled to all consequential benefits in accordance with the relevant rules and instructions on the subject;
(iii) The respondents shall implement the aforesaid directions within eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order; and (iv) However, the respondents shall be at liberty to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the applicant in accordance with the law.
11. In the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs."
Conclusion:
31. From the foregoing discussion, it is evident that while passing the order dated 22.05.2025 in Varun Chechi (supra), this Tribunal had duly taken into account the binding precedents laid down by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi as well as the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
On the other hand, in the case of Rohitash Singh (supra), this Tribunal recorded a categorical finding that the Appellate Authority had applied its mind to the facts of that case and had, in particular, kept in view the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in W.P. (C) No. 1258/2023, decided on 22.04.2024. Being satisfied that, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of that case, it was not reasonably practicable to conduct a regular departmental enquiry, 2026.01.09 ANJALI 12:25:51 +05'30' 36 O.A. No. 644/2024 this Tribunal dismissed the said O.A. This is apparent from paragraphs 13, 17 and 18 of the order dated 03.07.2025 passed in Rohitash Singh (supra).
32. However, it remains an admitted and undisputed position that the factual background of the present case, as well as the reasons recorded for dispensing with the regular departmental enquiry, are identical to those examined by this Tribunal in Varun Chechi (supra).
In view of this parity of facts, the judgment rendered in Rohitash Singh (supra) is clearly distinguishable and, therefore, cannot be made applicable to the present O.A.
33. Accordingly, the present case is squarely governed by the principles laid down by this Tribunal in Varun Chechi (supra).
34. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, and following the ratio laid down in Varun Chechi (supra), the present O.A. deserves to be partly allowed. Accordingly, the same is partly allowed with the following directions:
(i) The order dated 13.07.2023 (Annexure A-1) passed by the Disciplinary Authority and the order dated 27.12.2023 (Annexure A-2) passed by the Appellate Authority are hereby set aside;
(ii) The applicant shall be reinstated in service and shall be entitled to all consequential benefits in accordance with the relevant rules and instructions on the subject;
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(iii) The respondents shall implement the aforesaid directions within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order; and
(iv) However, the respondents shall be at liberty to initiate regular disciplinary proceedings against the applicant, strictly in accordance with law.
36. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
(B. Anand) (R.N. Singh)
Member (A) (Member (J)
/anjali/
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