Allahabad High Court
Jitendra Pratap Singh vs Upsanchalak Chakbandi Sultanpur Camp ... on 26 September, 2025
Author: Alok Mathur
Bench: Alok Mathur
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC-LKO:61018 Reserved on 7.8.2025 Delivered on 26.9.2025 A.F.R. Writ B No.12083 of 2019 Jitendra Pratap Singh.....Petitioner Versus Upsanchalak Chakbandi Sultanpur Camp Lucknow and others ...Opposite parties Honble Alok Mathur, J.
1. Heard Sri Vijay Bahadur Verma, learned counsel for the petitioner, as well as learned Standing counsel for the State-respondents and Sri Upendra Nath Mishra, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Amit Kumar Singh for the private respondents.
2. The petitioner, being aggrieved by the rejection of his claim with regard to the property situated at Khata no.26 in village Adharkhera, Parghana Mahona, Tehsil Bakshi Ka Talab, District Lucknow, from Jagan, which was purchased jointly by his mother, Smt Kulwanta Devi, and Lalta Singh, has assailed the orders dated 02/03/1960 passed by the Assistant Consolidation Officer, order dated 11/03/2015 passed by the Settlement Officer of Consolidation, and order dated 16/02/2019 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation.
3. According to the petitioners, the disputed land was purchased vide a registered sale deed on 19/03/1959 by Sri Kamta Singh, the father of the petitioner, who paid the consideration for the purchase of the said land, which was registered in the name of Smt. Kulwanta Devi, his wife, and Lalta Singh, his brother. Lalta Singh moved an application for mutation based on the aforesaid Sale dated 19/03/1959 before the Assistant Consolidation Officer, and the land was mutated only in the name of Lalta Singh.
4. It is the case of the petitioners that the said land continued to be in joint possession of the mother of the petitioner and a younger brother-in-law (Devar), and she was not aware that Lalta Singh had got the land mutated in his own name only, even though, as per the sale deed, the land was jointly purchased.
5. It was submitted that in the meantime, the consolidation operation had been held in the said village twice, the 1st proceedings were conducted between 1960 and 1966, and secondly from 1996 to 2002. The mother of the petitioner, namely Smt. Kulwanta Devi has died in the meantime. The petitioner stated that he is the son and legal heir, along with the party No. 2 of Smt. Kulwanta Devi, and that they came to know about the mutation of the disputed land in the name of Lalta Singh, only on 23/09/2013 from inspection of the record, and after taking legal opinion, challenged the order of mutation dated 02/03/1960 by filing an appeal before the Settlement of the Consolidation, Lucknow.
6. The appeal was decided and rejected on 11/03/2015, thereby declining to condone the delay in filing the said appeal. Before the appellate authority, it was the case of the petitioner that the entire sale consideration for the sale of the disputed property was given by their father, Sri Kamta Singh, while the sale deed was executed in favour of Smt. Kulwanta Devi and Lalta Singh. The father of the petitioner, Kamta Singh, was working in the police department and was posted in Moradabad. He superannuated from service in 1971 from Sitapur, and the appellant was living with him all along and therefore was not aware of the mutation proceedings having been carried out by Lalta Singh. After his retirement, his father started living in the village Teghna Mau and died in 1990, and during this period, the appellant could hardly visit Lucknow or find out about the disputed land. It was further stated that the petitioner and his brother got involved in the agricultural work in the disputed land jointly with the successor in interest of Lalta Singh, and there was therefore never any doubt about their ownership, nor did they suspect any wrongdoing that Lalta Singh would have got the land mutated in his name only to the exclusion of Smt. Kulwanta Devi fraudulently had further categorically denied that the Smt. Kulwanta Devi had entered into any sort of compromise or agreement with Lalta Singh before the consolidation officer so that the land could be mutated in his name alone.
7. Before the Settlement Officer of Consolidation, the opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2 accepted the fact that the sale deed was jointly in the name of Lalta Singh and Smt. Kulvanta Devi and there was no legal basis for having the land recorded in the name of only Lalta Singh to the exclusion of Kulvanta Devi.
8. The Settlement Officer of Consolidation considered the fact that in the second round of consolidation notification under Section 52 had already been issued on 22.8.2003 and was of the view that once the first consolidation proceedings had been concluded, then the petitioner lost any right to file an appeal with regard to orders passed in the second consolidation proceedings. In the said circumstances, the Settlement Officer of Consolidation found that the delay of 53 years is an extremely long length of time and no satisfactory explanation has been given by the petitioner, apart from which the consolidation proceedings have been conducted twice, and such a long delay cannot be condoned and thereby dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioner.
9. The petitioner, being aggrieved by the order of the Settlement Officer of Consolidation dated 11.3.2015, filed a revision before the Deputy Director of Consolidation. Before the revisional authority, it was submitted that the petitioners had duly explained the delay in filing the said appeal, apart from which the opposite party had not filed any objection, and accordingly stated that the delay in filing the appeal ought to have been condoned. The Deputy Director of Consolidation examined the entire factual controversy and the grounds taken by the petitioner, and also considered the objection of the opposite parties and upheld the order of the Settlement Officer of Consolidation. He has further taken into consideration that the brother of the petitioner, Yogendra Pratap Singh, has not joined him in filing the appeal and has been made the respondent in the revision.
10. Considering the aforesaid facts, he found that the delay of 53 years is not liable to be condoned and accordingly rejected the same.
11. Learned counsel for the petitioner assailing the impugned orders has submitted that there is no dispute with regard to the fact that, as per the sale deed dated 19.3.1959, the land was purchased jointly in the name of Lalta Singh, son of Babu Madhav Singh and the mother of the petitioner, namely Kulvanta Devi. He further submitted that any order of mutation passed on the basis of the aforesaid registered sale deed ought to have been made jointly in the name of Kulvanta Devi and Lalta Singh, but by exercising undue pressure and with collusion of revenue authorities, Lalta Singh got the land mutated only in his own name in proceedings under Section 9 of U. P. Consolidation of Holdings, Act. He submits that in the appeal, he had given adequate reasons so that the appellate authority could set aside the delay, much as the father of the petitioner, who was working in the police department, served in various districts, and the petitioner, who was a student, had been accompanying his father wherever he was posted. He further submits that his father superannuated from service in 1971 from Tigahana Mau and died in 1990. It is further stated that the petitioner and his brother started agricultural activities along with his relatives on the disputed land, and it is only in 2013 that he came to know that the land had been recorded exclusively in the name of Lalta Singh. They inspected the record and filed an appeal. It was stated that the delay has been satisfactorily explained, and there is no finding that the grounds given by the petitioner were false or incorrect, or that they had any knowledge about the order dated 02/03/1960.
12. It was vehemently submitted that there is no dispute that the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents had fraudulently got the entire land mutated in the name of Lalta Singh and accordingly in such circumstances benefit of Section 17 of the Limitation Act was available to the petitioners and any solemn act which has been done fraudulently cannot be sustained and, therefore, in the peculiar facts of the present case the revision preferred by the petitioner ought to have been allowed.
13. The petitioners have further submitted that any order which has been obtained by fraud is a nullity and non-est in the eyes of the law, and if that being the case, the order obtained by fraud can be challenged in any court at any time or even in collateral proceedings. The basis of the aforesaid arguments is that Lalta Prasad had got the land mutated clandestinely without disclosing this fact to the predecessor of the interest of the petitioner exclusively in his name, even though the said mutation was made based on the sale deed dated 19.3.1959.
14. The petition has been vehemently opposed by Sri Upendra Nath Mishra, Senior Advocate, assisted by Sri Amit Kumar Singh as well as Learned Counsel for respondent no.6. It was stated that a family settlement was arrived at between the parties where it was stated that both the brothers had resolved that they shall keep their lands separately whereas Kamta Prasad shall relinquish his rights in favour of Lalta Prasad in the disputed land. It was stated that it is on the basis of the said compromise that by means of an order dated 02.03.1960, his land came to be recorded only in the name of Kamta Prasad. It was further stated that as the village fell into consolidation operations from 1960-66, where no objections were filed by the petitioner, and Smt Kulwanta Devi died in 1980, and during her lifetime, no objections were filed against the order dated 02.03.1960. It was submitted that the second consolidation proceedings were initiated in 1996 and concluded in 2003, and no dispute was raised by the petitioner or his brother, and accordingly supported the order passed by the Settlement Officer of Consolidation in the second consolidation proceedings. He submits that such inordinate delay in initiating legal proceedings cannot be condoned.
15. It was further submitted that as the petitioner had not filed any objection under Section 9 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, they were precluded from invoking the provisions of Section 11 of the 1953 Act and, therefore, the appeal preferred by the petitioner itself was not maintainable.
16. It was further submitted that all the disputes relating to title are decided in consolidation proceedings and no objection/appeal or revision was preferred by the petitioner during the first consolidation proceedings and in allowing the statutory prohibition provided for under Section 49, the appeal filed by the petitioner was not maintainable accordingly it was submitted that there is no infirmity in the impugned orders dated 2.3.1960, 11.3.2015 and 16.2.2019 and prayed for dismissal of the writ petition.
17. Considering the rival contentions, it is noticed that there is no dispute with regard to the essential facts in issue. The dispute in the present case relates to the property situated at Khata No. 26 in Village Adharkhera, Parghana Mohana, Tehsil Bakshi Ka Talab, District Lucknow, which was jointly purchased by means of a registered sale deed dated 19.3.1959 in the name of Smt. Kulvanta Devi and Lalta Singh. On the basis of the application given by Lalta Singh, aforesaid property came to be recorded exclusively in the name of Lalta Singh by means of order dated 2.3.1960 passed by Assistant Consolidation Officer after a delay of nearly 53 years the appeal has been filed by the petitioner challenging the order dated 2.3.1960 which has been rejected on the ground of limitation by means of order dated 11.3.2015 and even Deputy Director of Consolidation has rejected the revision by his order dated 16.2.2019.
18. The appellants in the said case had pleaded that the orders passed by the competent authority under the Consolidation of Holdings Act had attained finality and Kamta Singh and Smt Kulvanta Devi had lost their right, title, and interest in the subjected land and further that the appeal was filed hopelessly time barred and, therefore, the Deputy Director of Consolidation also rejected the revision preferred by the petitioner.
19. Per contra, the petitioners/respondents had contended that neither Section 49 of the Act of 1953 nor the Consolidation Officer was competent to interfere with the ancestral rights as tenure holder on the subject land of Kamta Singh. It was further urged that Smt Kulvanta Devi was a co-tenure holder of the subject land along with Kamta Singh or his successor, and the possession of the land continued in favour of all the co-tenure holders, and even if one of them was in actual physical possession, the said possession was permissible on behalf of all the co-owners. It was submitted that the initial order was passed during the first consolidation proceedings by the Assistant Consolidation Officer on 02/03/1960.
20. In the present dispute, the appellate authority has already noticed that neither the sale deed is controverted, nor the fact that the property ought to have been mutated in the joint name of Lalta Singh and Smt Kulvanta Devi.
21. Before we delve into the factual scenario and the defensibility of the order condoning delay, it seems prudent to state the obligation of the court when dealing with an application for condonation of delay and the approach to be adopted while considering the grounds for condonation of such a substantial delay.
22. In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another v. Mst. Katiji and others(1987) 2 SCC 107, a two-Judge Bench observed that the legislature has conferred power to condone delay by enactingSection 5of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on merits. The expression sufficient cause employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice, for that is the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. The learned Judges emphasized the adoption of a liberal approach while dealing with the applications for condonation of delay, as ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late, and refusal to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated. It was stressed that there should not be a pedantic approach, but the doctrine that is to be kept in mind is that the matter has to be dealt with in a rational common-sense pragmatic manner and cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred over the technical considerations. It was also ruled that there is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately or on account of culpable negligence and that the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice on technical grounds, as it is the duty of the court to remove injustice. In the said case the Division Bench observed that the State, which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status and the courts are required to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of interpretation of the expression sufficient cause.
23. In G. Ramegowda, Major and others v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore, (1988) 2 SCC 142 Venkatachaliah, J. (as his Lordship then was), speaking for the Court, has opined thus:-
The contours of the area of discretion of the courts in the matter of condonation of delays in filing appeals are set out in a number of pronouncements of this Court. See :Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal v. Rewa Coalfield Ltd.[3] ;Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari[4] ;Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. V. Nirmala Devi[5] ;Lala Mata Din v. A. Narayanan[6] ;Collector, Land Acquisition v. Katijietc. There is, it is true, no general principle saving the party from all mistakes of its counsel. If there is negligence, deliberate or gross inaction, or lack of bona fide on the part of the party or its counsel, there is no reason why the opposite side should be exposed to a time-barred appeal. Each case will have to be considered on the particularities of its own special facts. However, the expression sufficient cause inSection 5must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring appeals are required to be condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides is imputable to the party seeking condonation of the delay.
24. In O.P. Kathpalia v. Lakhmir Singh (dead) and others, AJR (1984) 4 SCC 60, the Supreme court was dealing with a fact-situation where the interim order passed by the court of first instance was an interpolated order, and it was not ascertainable as to when the order was made. The said order was under appeal before the District Judge, who declined to condone the delay, and the said view was concurred with by the High Court. The Court, taking stock of the facts, came to hold that if such an interpolated order is allowed to stand, there would be a failure of justice and, accordingly, set aside the orders impugned therein, observing that the appeal before the District Judge deserved to be heard on the merits.
25. In State of Nagaland v. Lipok AO and others, the Court, after referring toNew India Insurance Co. Ltd. V. Shanti Misra,N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy,State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani andSpecial Tehsildar, Land Acquisition v. K.V. Ayisumma, came to hold that adoption of strict standard of proof sometimes fails to protect public justice and it may result in public mischief.
26. In this context, we may refer with profit to the authority in Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Limited v. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation and another, (2010) 5 SCC 459 where a two-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court has observed that the law of limitation is founded on public policy. The legislature does not prescribe limitation with the object of destroying the rights of the parties, but to ensure that they do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek remedies without delay. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a period fixed by the legislature. To put it differently, the law of limitation prescribes a period within which a legal remedy can be availed for redress of the legal injury. At the same time, the courts are bestowed with the power to condone the delay if sufficient cause is shown for not availing the remedy within the stipulated time. Thereafter, the learned Judges proceeded to state that this Court has justifiably advocated adoption of a liberal approach in condoning the delay of short duration and a stricter approach where the delay is inordinate.
27. In Improvement Trust, Ludhiana v. Ujagar Singh and others, AIR 2010 SC 228, it has been held that while considering an application for condonation of delay, no straitjacket formula is prescribed to come to the conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not. It has been further stated therein that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which the party acts and behaves.
28. A reference to the principle stated in Balwant Singh (dead) v. Jagdish Singh and others, (2010) 8 SCC 685 would be quite fruitful. In the said case the Court referred to the pronouncements in Union of India v. Ram Charan, AIR 1964 SC 215, P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala, (1997) 7 SCC 556 andKatari Suryanarayana v. Koppisetti Subba Rao, AIR 2009 SC 2907 and stated thus:-
25. We may state that even if the term sufficient cause has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the party concerned. The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of reasonableness as it is understood in its general connotation.
26. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of a party to arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right has accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party.
Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly.
29. In the case of Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, AIR 2012 SC 1629 the Honble Supreme Court referred to the pronouncement in Vedabai v. Shantaram Baburao Patil, (2001) 9 SCC 106 wherein it has been opined that a distinction must be made between a case where the delay is inordinate and a case where the delay is of few days and whereas in the former case the consideration of prejudice to the other side will be a relevant factor, in the latter case no such consideration arises. Thereafter, the two-Judge Bench ruled thus: -
23. What needs to be emphasized is that even though a liberal and justice-oriented approach is required to be adopted in the exercise of power underSection 5of the Limitation Act and other similar statutes, the courts can neither become oblivious of the fact that the successful litigant has acquired certain rights on the basis of the judgment under challenge and a lot of time is consumed at various stages of litigation apart from the cost.
24. What colour the expression sufficient cause would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on the bona fide nature of the explanation. If the court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay. Eventually, the Bench, upon perusal of the application for condonation of delay and the affidavit on record, came to hold that certain necessary facts were conspicuously silent and, accordingly, reversed the decision of the High Court which had condoned the delay of more than seven years.
30. Considering the submissions of the petitioner, it is found that the act of moving the application before the Assistant Consolidation Officer, and having the property recorded exclusively in the name of Lalta Singh on the basis of the sale deed dated 19/03/1959 was an act of fraud on Smt Kulvanta Devi, and therefore in such circumstances the said order itself was non-est, illegal and arbitrary, and further that the said fact was concealed from Smt Kulvanta Devi and her legal heirs who were the joint property holders, which also amounted to fraud. Further, the order obtained fraudulently is liable to be set aside, and any delay caused in filing the appropriate application ought to have been condoned. Undoubtedly, on the execution of the sale deed, Lalta Singh and Kulwant became the joint owners of the property, and accordingly, the property ought to have been registered jointly in their names. Merely because Lalta Singh got the property mutated in his name alone in the revenue records would not deprive Kulvanta Devi of the benefits of ownership of the said property. The respondents could not offer any defence regarding the said aspect that the property ought to have been recorded in the joint names.
31. Though before the Deputy Director of Consolidation, a vain attempt was made to justify the order dated 02/03/1960 on the ground that the property was purchased by Lalta Singh out of his own funds, and Smt. Kulvanta Devi had entered into a settlement before the Assistant Consolidation Officer. No document was filed in this regard, and in the said circumstances, both the authorities below did not accept the aforesaid argument and rejected the same.
32. This court, after considering the rival contentions, is of the considered view that the disputed property ought to have been recorded in the joint names of Lalta Singh and Smt. Kulvanta Devi, when the application for mutation was based on the sale deed dated 19/03/1959, which clearly shows that the property was jointly purchased. We see no reason as to why the land was recorded only in the name of Lalta Singh and therefore have no hesitation in holding that Lalta Singh had fraudulently got the land recorded in his name, to the exclusion of Smt Kulvanta Devi, in collusion with the authorities. We also take note of the provisions of section 17 of the Limitation Act, which is reproduced here under:_
17.Effectoffraudormistake. (1)Where,inthecaseofanysuitorapplication forwhichaperiodoflimitation isprescribedby thisAct,
(a) The suit or application is based upon the fraud ofthedefendantorrespondentorhisagent;or
(b)theknowledgeoftherightortitleonwhicha suitorapplicationisfoundedisconcealedbythe fraudofanysuchpersonasaforesaid;or
(c) the suit or application isfor relieffrom the consequencesofamistake;or
(d)where any documentnecessarytoestablish the right of the plaintiff or applicant has been fraudulentlyconcealedfromhim, the period of limitation shall not begin to run until plaintiff or applicant has discovered the fraudorthemistakeorcould,withreasonable diligence,havediscoveredit;orinthecaseofa concealed document, until the plaintiff or the applicantfirsthadthemeansofproducingthe concealed document or compelling its production:
33. Accordingly, in case Section 17 is applied, then the period of limitation would commence from the date of discovery of fraud. In the present case, the reasons for the delay have been duly considered by the Settlement Officer Consolidation, where it was stated that the father of the petitioner, who was working in the police department, served in various districts, and the petitioner, who was a student, had been accompanying his father wherever he was posted. He further submits that his father superannuated from service in 1971 from Tigahana Mau and died in 1990. It is further stated that the petitioner and his brother started agricultural activities along with his relatives on the disputed land, and it is only in 2013 that he came to know that the land had been recorded exclusively in the name of Lalta Singh. Though the delay was of extremely long length of time, but the delay caused was satisfactorily explained, and also that these facts were never controverted by the respondents, coupled with the fact that the order assailed in the appeal was itself obtained by fraud accordingly, such delay was which was duly and satisfactorily explained was entitled to be condoned, and both the authorities below have committed manifest error in declining to condone the delay and dismissing the appeal and revision preferred by the petitioner.
34. With regard to the delay caused in setting aside an order obtained by fraud, the Honble Supreme Court in the case of A. V. Papayya Sastry and others Vs. Govt. of A.P. and others, (2007) 4 Supreme Court Cases 221 have held as under:-
Now, it is well settled principle of law that if any judgment or order is obtained by fraud, it cannot be said to be a judgment or order in law. Before three centuries, Chief Justice Edward Coke proclaimed;
"Fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal".
It is thus settled proposition of law that a judgment, decree or order obtained by playing fraud on the Court, Tribunal or Authority is a nullity and non est in the eye of law. Such a judgment, decree or order by the first Court or by the final Court has to be treated as nullity by every Court, superior or inferior. It can be challenged in any Court, at any time, in appeal, revision, writ or even in collateral proceedings. In the leading case of Lazarus Estates Ltd. v. Beasley, (1956) 1 All ER 341 : (1956) 1 QB 702 : (1956) 2 WLR 502, Lord Denning observed:
"No judgment of a court, no order of a Minister, can be allowed to stand, if it has been obtained by fraud."
In Duchess of Kingstone, Smith's Leading Cases, 13th Edn., p.644, explaining the nature of fraud, de Grey, C.J. stated that though a judgment would be res judicata and not impeachable from within, it might be impeachable from without. In other words, though it is not permissible to show that the court was 'mistaken', it might be shown that it was 'misled'. There is an essential distinction between mistake and trickery. The clear implication of the distinction is that an action to set aside a judgment cannot be brought on the ground that it has been decided wrongly, namely, that on the merits, the decision was one which should not have been rendered, but it can be set aside, if the court was imposed upon or tricked into giving the judgment. It has been said; Fraud and justice never dwell together (fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant); or fraud and deceit ought to benefit none (fraus et dolus nemini patrocinari debent).
Fraud may be defined as an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing some unfair or undeserved benefit by taking undue advantage of another. In fraud one gains at the loss of another. Even most solemn proceedings stand vitiated if they are actuated by fraud. Fraud is thus an extrinsic collateral act which vitiates all judicial acts, whether in rem or in personam. The principle of 'finality of litigation' cannot be stretched to the extent of an absurdity that it can be utilized as an engine of oppression by dishonest and fraudulent litigants.
In S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by LRs. V. Jagannath (dead) by LRs. & Ors. (1994) 1 SCC 1 : JT 1994 (6) SC 331, this Court had an occasion to consider the doctrine of fraud and the effect thereof on the judgment obtained by a party. In that case, one A by a registered deed, relinquished all his rights in the suit property in favour of C who sold the property to B. Without disclosing that fact, A filed a suit for possession against B and obtained preliminary decree. During the pendency of an application for final decree, B came to know about the fact of release deed by A in favour of C. He, therefore, contended that the decree was obtained by playing fraud on the court and was a nullity. The trial court upheld the contention and dismissed the application. The High Court, however, set aside the order of the trial court, observing that "there was no legal duty cast upon the plaintiff to come to court with a true case and prove it by true evidence". B approached this Court. Allowing the appeal, setting aside the judgment of the High Court and describing the observations of the High Court as 'wholly perverse', Kuldip Singh, J. stated:
"The courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the court, must come with clean-hands. We are constrained to say that more often than not, process of the court is being abused. Property-grabbers, tax- evaders, bank-loan- dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life find the court - process a convenient lever to retain the illegal-gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person, who's case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation".
(emphasis supplied) The Court proceeded to state: "A litigant, who approaches the court, is bound to produce all the documents executed by him which are relevant to the litigation. If he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the other side then he would he guilty of playing fraud on the court as well as on the opposite party".
The Court concluded: "The principle of 'finality of litigation' cannot be pressed to the extent of such an absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants".
InIndian Bank v. Satyam Fibres (India) Pvt. Ltd., (1996) 5 SCC 550 : JT 1996 (7) SC 135, referring to Lazarus Estates and Smith v. East Elloe Rural District Council, 1956 AC 336 : (1956) 1 All ER 855 : (1956) 2 WLR 888, this Court stated;
"The judiciary in India also possesses inherent power, specially underSection 151C.P.C., to recall its judgment or order if it is obtained by Fraud on Court. In the case of fraud on a party to the suit or proceedings, the Court may direct the affected party to file a separate suit for setting aside the Decree obtained by fraud. Inherent powers are powers which are resident in all courts, especially of superior jurisdiction. These powers spring not from legislation but from the nature and the Constitution of the Tribunals or Courts themselves so as to enable them to maintain their dignity, secure obedience to its process and rules, protect its officers from indignity and wrong and to punish unseemly behaviour. This power is necessary for the orderly administration of the Court's business".
(emphasis supplied) InUnited India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rajendra Singh & Ors., (2000) 3 SCC 581 : JT 2000 (3) SC 151, by practising fraud upon the Insurance Company, the claimant obtained an award of compensation from the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. On coming to know of fraud, the Insurance Company applied for recalling of the award. The Tribunal, however, dismissed the petition on the ground that it had no power to review its own award. The High Court confirmed the order. The Company approached this Court.
Allowing the appeal and setting aside the orders, this Court stated;
"It is unrealistic to expect the appellant company to resist a claim at the first instance on the basis of the fraud because appellant company had at that stage no knowledge about the fraud allegedly played by the claimants. If the Insurance Company comes to know of any dubious concoction having been made with the sinister object of extracting a claim for compensation, and if by that time the award was already passed, it would not be possible for the company to file a statutory appeal against the award. Not only because of bar of limitation to file the appeal but the consideration of the appeal even if the delay could be condoned, would be limited to the issues formulated from the pleadings made till then.
Therefore, we have no doubt that the remedy to move for recalling the order on the basis of the newly discovered facts amounting to fraud of high degree, cannot be foreclosed in such a situation. No Court or tribunal can be regarded as powerless to recall its own order if it is convinced that the order was wangled through fraud or misrepresentation of such a dimension as would affect the very basis of the claim.
The allegation made by the appellant Insurance Company, that claimants were not involved in the accident which they described in the claim petitions, cannot be brushed aside without further probe into the matter, for, the said allegation has not been specifically denied by the claimants when they were called upon to file objections to the applications for recalling of the awards. Claimants then confined their resistance to the plea that the application for recall is not legally maintainable. Therefore, we strongly feel that the claim must be allowed to be resisted, on the ground of fraud now alleged by the Insurance Company. If we fail to afford to the Insurance Company an opportunity to substantiate their contentions it might certainly lead to serious miscarriage of justice".
35. Honble Supreme Court in the case of Prashant Singh and others Vs. Meena and others, (2024) 6 Supreme Court Cases 818 while dismissing the appeals held as under:-
14. The power to declare the ownership in an immovable property can be exercised only by a Civil Court, save and except when such jurisdiction is barred expressly or by implication under a law. Section 49 of the 1953 Act does not and cannot be construed as a bar on the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to determine the ownership rights.3
15. Having held so, it is not difficult to explain that Kalyan Singh had acquired ancestral rights as a tenure holder. He was co-owner in the suit land much before the consolidation proceedings commenced. Hence, the only declaration and adjudication of rights of Ramji Lal or 1Attar Singh v. State of U.P., 1959 Supp (1) SCR 928, para 3.2Amar Nath v. Kewla Devi, (2014) 11 SCC 273, para 17.3Karbalai Begum v. Mohd. Sayeed, (1980) 4 SCC 396, para 12-13.Kalyan Singh that a Consolidation Officer could undertake under Section 49 of the 1953 Act was to avoid the fragmentation of their respective land holdings and consolidate or redistribute the parcels of land among them. As analyzed above, the provision does not enable the Consolidation Officer to grant ownership to Ramji Lal in respect of a property, which, before the consolidation proceedings, never vested in him. Vice versa, the Consolidation Officer could not take away the ownership rights of Kalyan Singh which he had already inherited much before the commencement of the consolidation proceedings.
16. That being so, the order dated 08.05.1960 passed by the Consolidation Officer has rightly been held to be null and void and without any jurisdiction. It was passed usurping a power fraudulently, which never ever vested in a Consolidation Officer. The said order is thus liable to be ignored for all intents and purposes. Having held that, it is not necessary for us to go into the question of fraud played upon Kalyan Singh in securing that order with or without collusion of the Consolidation Officer. All that is required to be held is that the order dated 08.05.1960 had no binding force or any adverse effect on the rights of Kalyan Singh.
36. Learned counsel for the respondents in the present case have laid much emphasis on the aspect of delay and relied upon the following judgment of the Supreme Court, where the delay has not been condoned:-
1. Esha Bhattacharjee Vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others (2013) 12 SCC 649. (Paa No.15.8 and 15.10 and 22)
2. Vijay Narayan Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation and 6 others, Writ B No.218 of 2022 (page No.s 3, 6 and 7)
3. Nanda Vs. DDC Ghaziabad and others, Writ B No.9205 of 2001(para No.s 4 and 5)
4. PathapatiSubba Reddy (Died) BY L.R.s and Others Vs. The Special Deputy Collector (L.A.) SLP (Civil) No.31248 of 2018 (para No. 3, 7, 23 to 26 and 32)
5. Raj Kishore Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others passed in C.M.W.P. No.3372 of 1999 (Para No.s 3, 15 and 22) and
6. Jagdish Ram Vs. DDC, Barabanki and others, 2025:AHC-LKO:16108 (Para 19)
37. They have further stated that Statutory Bar under Section 11 A of Consolidation of Holdings Act, restraining from raising objections at any subsequent stage, if not raised under Section 9 earlier, is akin to the principle of res judicata and relied upon the following judgments:-
1. Gafoor and another Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others, AIR 1975 SC 1716 (para 3)
2. Smt. Kiran Devi Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Ghaziabad, 2008 (1) RJ 643 at 647and 648
3. Randhir Singh Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Saharanpur and 5 others, Writ B No.23936/2017 decided on 14.7.2017 (paga 2 and 3)
38. It was also contended by them that according to Section 49 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act, a person is restrained from raising ownership rights which already stood decided in consolidation proceedings, in any subsequent rounds of consolidation proceedings, and relied upon the following judgments:-
Ashok Kumar Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Allahabad Camp and others, 2009 (9) ADJ 32.
39. Considering the rival submissions in this regard, we find that the non-obstente clause used in section 49 of the act of 1953 that proceedings could ought to have been taken under this act imposes an absolute bar on civil or revenue Court from entertaining any proceedings in respect of declaration and adjudication of right of a tenure holder or adjudication of any other right arising out of Consolidation operations, for which person concerned ought to have or could have taken proceedings at the time when the villagers brought under consolidation operation by promulgation of notification under section 4 (2) of the act of 1953. Accordingly, finality is sought to be attached with regard to the declaration and adjudication of rights of tenure holders, and after culmination of the Consolidation proceedings and issuance of notification under section 52 of the Act of 1953, the civil or revenue courts do not have any jurisdiction to entertain any such litigation for adjudication to declare the right, title, and interest of the parties.
40. This view has also been taken and upheld by the Supreme Court in the case of Sita Ram vs Chhota Bhondey, AIR 1991 Supreme Court 249.
41. The object primarily appears to be allotting a compact area to the tenure holders in place of their scattered plots and this much is also reflected that with the passage of time, the area of operation of the aforementioned Act in question has been enhanced by providing that all such issues that can be answered after notification has been issued under Section 4(2) in reference of adjudication of rights arising out of consolidation proceedings be dealt with at one forum and declaration and adjudication of rights of tenure holders in respect of land lying in the area covered by notification under Section 4(2) of the Act and for adjudication of any other right arising out of consolidation proceedings.
42. A Division Bench of our Court, in the case of Amar Singh Vs. State of U.P., 2008 (104) RD 421, while considering the issue as to whether the suit filed was barred under Section 49 of the Act, held as follows:-
"The bar contained in Section 49 contemplates a bar of entertainment of suit by a civil or revenue court in respect of following:
(a) the declaration and adjudication of rights of tenure holders,
(b) adjudication of any other rights arising out of consolidation proceedings, and
(c) adjudication of any right in regard to which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953.
43. In view of the above, it is clear that any adjudication done with regard to land lying in the area in which a notification under Section 4(2) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 has been issued operates a bar of reagitating in any other revenue or civil Court. The second limb of Section also creates a bar with regard to adjudication of any other right regarding which proceedings could or ought to have been taken under U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953. The provision contains the principles of res judicata as well as principles of constructive res judicata.
44. This Court, in the case of Smt. Sudama v. Hansraj, reported in 1981 R.D. 116 has again reiterated the same view. The case of the appellant before the High Court was that the defendant abused their position in getting their name recorded as the sole tenure holder by practising fraud on the plaintiff by misrepresentation before the consolidation authorities. The court took the view that the suit under Section 229-B for declaration of the title was not barred. The following was observed by the Court:-
"The revenue court while dealing with the suit for declaration can, on coming to the finding that the entries made by the consolidation authorities were procured by fraud and were wrong, declare the plaintiff's right as tenure holder and direct that the entries be corrected accordingly."
45. Coming to the facts of the present case, the plaintiff's case was that the plot in dispute was purchased through a registered sale deed dated 17.3.1969, both by the plaintiff and defendant (writ petitioner), who was a co-sharer. The case of the plaintiff further was that it was the defendant petitioner who was looking after the cases in the court, and the plaintiff, who was living in the forest, being Gaderiya looking after his goats, was duped by the defendant in removing his name from the revenue record. The plaintiff has also claimed that after the sale deeds, both parties came in possession. A co-sharer who claim to be in possession of the property and whose name is not recorded in the consolidation proceeding is not debarred from bringing a suit under Section 229-B for correcting the entries and recording his name, also if the allegation is that his name was removed by practising fraud on him. The judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Karbalai Begum Vs. Mohd. Sayeed and others, AIR 1981 SC 77 fully supports the view taken by the courts below that the suit is not barred under Section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953.
46. Section 49 of 1953 Act under the scheme of things contemplates bar of entertainment of suit by a Civil Court/Revenue Court in respect of right of tenure holder, however exception has been carved out based on judicial pronouncement that when the name of a co-tenure holder could not be recorded by practising fraud, the entries in consolidation proceeding can be challenged and bar of Section 49 would not at all come into place since fraud vitiates even the most solemn proceeding.
47. Once we have proceeded to examine the parameters of the provisions of Section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953, the larger issue i.e. engaging our attention is as to whether an incumbent, who otherwise has interest in property, looses his right in the property in question and stands ousted from the property merely because he has not at all participated in the proceedings in question.
48. In respect of right in land, the provisions of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 are self sufficient and the provisions of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 as already quoted above had only limited role to play in respect to consolidation of agriculture holdings to facilitate better quality of agriculture activities, whereas U.P. Act No.1 of 1951 deals with all aspects including the acquisition of interest of intermediaries and its consequences, vesting of land for Gaon Sabha and its superintendence, management of control of land etc by the Land Management Committee and its tenural rights, classes of tenure, transfers, dissolution, division/ extension of rights, rent, ejectment, conferment of rights etc. U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act no point of time has ever proceeded to deal with the expansion of rights or with the conferment of rights, rather under the scheme of things provided under U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, the existing rights over the land under consolidation operation are only to be recognized under the provisions of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act and nothing beyond the same.The U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act does not deal with the grant of authority to grant substantive rights to a tenure holder, rather it is only empowered to recognize the existing rights of tenure holder and in the said direction a full-fledged mechanism has been provided for.
49. Landed property be it individually, jointly, or based on co-sharer confers rights over the property in question and the said rights in question can be defeated or be taken away only in accordance with law.
50. Apex Court in the case of N. Padmamma Vs. S. Ramakrishna Reddy, AIR 2008 SC 2834 held that a right of property is a human right and also a constitutional right and the same cannot be taken away except in accordance with law. Article 300-A of the Constitution protects such a right and as far as U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 is concerned, the purpose of the aforementioned Act is not at all to divest an incumbent of such right keeping in view the provisions of Article 300-A of the Constitution of India as its paramount object is to see that agricultural activity is to be carried out in one area and in case at the point of time of constituting one compact are, in respect of one compact area in case anyone has to raise any issue, he can come forward.
51. Apex Court, in the case of Rajiv Sarin vs. State of U.K.2011 (8) SCC 708 while considering the provisions of U.P.Z.A.L.R. Act alongwith K.U.Z.A.L.R. Act (Kumaun and Uttarakhand Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act 1960) took the view where appellants' father had acquired in the year 1945 propriety right in an estate which comprised of large tracts of forest spanning in and around and where by Gazette notification dated 21.12.1977 under Section 4-A of K.U.Z.A.L.R. Act as amended by U.P. Act No.15 of 1978, the rights, title and interest of hissedar in respect of forest land situated in the specified areas ceased w.e.f. 01.01.1978 and the same were vested in the State Government, qua the said forest land stand taken by the State that the right, title or interest of a hissedar could be acquired without payment of compensation cannot be accepted as every hissedar whose rights, title or interest are acquired under Section 4, shall be entitled to receive and be paid compensation. Said right has been recognised on the anvil of Article 300-A of the Constitution, which ensures that persons should not be deprived of property save by authority of law. The scrutiny of the subject matter of U.P.C.H. Act clearly reflects that at no point in time has the endeavour under the said Act been to deprive a person of his property; rather, said legislation was directly linked with agrarian reforms, an enactment under Schedule VII List II Entry 18 of "land".
52. Conscious of this situation, mention has been made that right in the property in question is not at all lost under the provisions of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953, rather the forum to regain the property in question is lost, being barred by operation of law.
53. Once a right in property cannot be taken away except in accordance with law, as Article 300-A of the Constitution protects such a right, in such a situation and in this background, the larger issue is that, would in such a situation, accepting for the purposes of the case that the rights are there even then, there is a loss of forum?
At this juncture, the two Judgements of the Apex Court are being looked into.
54. Apex Court in the case of Amar Nath Vs. Kewla Devi and another AIR SCW 3110 has clearly ruled in reference of bar being placed under Section 49 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 that where plaintiff claimed himself to be belonging to a common ancestor as defendant and then order was passed against him by playing fraud and his right to be accorded as co-bhoomidhar in revenue records cannot stand extinguished merely because he withdrew objection, the Apex Court took the view that orders of consolidation officer suffers of legal malice as there is accepted withdrawal of plaintiff's objection without examining evidence produced as to ownership of land and bar under Section 49 has been held to be not attracted. Relevant extract of the said judgement reads as follows:-
"We do not think it necessary to remit the matter back to the High Court for fresh consideration. We feel it is sufficient to set aside the impugned judgment and uphold the well-reasoned judgment of the first appellate court where it was held that the very fact that the trial court held that it was proved that Amar Nath was s/o Vaij Nath based on the evidence on record, then automatically the court should have given half the portion of the disputed land to the appellant along with defendant no.1, Kewla Devi. Instead, the trial court as well as the Consolidation Officer have passed judgments that are bad in law as they have failed to see that the right of the appellant cannot simply be extinguished because of the defendants' plea that he has entered into a compromise. The defendants have taken undue advantage of the appellant's illiteracy and the Consolidation Officer has abdicated his role by allowing the objection of the appellant to be withdrawn and by not examining whether or not the appellant was indeed the S/o Vaij Nath who was the S/o Gaya. The order of the Consolidation Officer is thus bad in law and it has resulted in a grave miscarriage of justice. We think it fit to restore the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate court wherein the court declared that the appellant, Amar Nath is S/o Vaij Nath who was son of Gaya thereby holding that the order passed by the Consolidation Officer is void and illegal and the trial court was wrong in not quashing the order of the Consolidation Officer and that nowhere in the revenue record was his name recorded and fraud was committed against him as defendant no.1, Kewla Devi has got her name recorded in each and every revenue record. The judgment of the first appellate court is legal and valid as it is fair and keeping with the principles of justice. The trial court in its answer to issue nos. 1 and 10 has rightly held that Amar Nath is S/o Vaij Nath who was undisputedly the son of Gaya and if that fact was proved, then we see no reason why it was not directed for the appellant's name to be recorded in the revenue records. The right of the appellant over the suit schedule property cannot be extinguished simply because objection was withdrawn, over which there is a cloud of doubt anyway and also, the appellant has pleaded that he had no idea about the order of the Consolidation Officer in the first place. We find it highly likely that fraud was committed on him by the defendants as well as the Consolidation Officer by not recording his name in the revenue records as the defendants have taken undue advantage of his illiteracy so that the whole property goes to the defendants.
55. We further find that the controversy in this regard has been laid to rest by the Supreme Court in the case of Prashant Singh and others Vs. Meena and others, (2024) 6 Supreme Court Cases 818, where it has been observed that Section 49 of the 1953 Act contemplates a bar to the jurisdiction of the Civil or Revenue Court for the grant of a declaration or adjudication of rights of tenure holders in respect of land lying in an area for which consolidation proceedings have commenced. The Supreme Court has further held that Section 49 of the 1953 Act is a provision of transitory suspension of jurisdiction of the Civil or Revenue Court only during the period when consolidation proceedings are pending.
56. Notably, such suspension of jurisdiction of these Courts through the non obstante provision is only with respect to the declaration and adjudication of rights of tenure holders. In other words, unless a person is a pre-existing tenure holder, Section 49 does not come into operation, states the bench.
57. Further, the Supreme Court has observed that the object of the 1953 Act is to prevent fragmentation of the land holdings and consolidate them in such a fair and equitable manner that each tenure holder gets nearly equivalent land rights in the same revenue estate, and that the duty of a Consolidation Officer under Section 49 of the 1953 Act is to prevent fragmentation and consolidate the different parcels of land of a tenure holder. Such a power can be exercised only in respect of those persons who are already the tenure holders of the land. Conversely, the power under Section 49 of the 1953 Act cannot be exercised to take away the vested title of a tenure holder. No such jurisdiction is conferred upon a Consolidation Officer or any other Authority under the 1953 Act. The Supreme Court has further held that the power to declare the ownership in an immovable property can be exercised only by a Civil Court save and except when such jurisdiction is barred expressly or by implication under a law and that Section 49 of the 1953 Act does not and cannot be construed as a bar on the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to determine the ownership rights
58. The Court further observed that Kalyan Singh had acquired ancestral rights as a tenure holder, that he was a co-owner in the suit land, much before the consolidation proceedings commenced. Hence, the only declaration and adjudication of rights of Ramji Lal or Kalyan Singh that a Consolidation Officer could undertake under Section 49 of the 1953 Act was to avoid the fragmentation of their respective land holdings and consolidate or redistribute the parcels of land among them, remarks the Bench
59. It was accordingly held that section 49 does not enable the Consolidation Officer to grant ownership to Ramji Lal in respect of a property, which, before the consolidation proceedings, never vested in him, and clarified that vice versa, the Consolidation Officer could not take away the ownership rights of Kalyan Singh, which he had already inherited much before the commencement of the consolidation proceedings.
60. Considering the facts of the present case, we find that the petitioner is claiming his rights through Smt Kulvanta Devi, his mother, on the basis of a registered sale deed dated 19/03/1959. Therefore, even before the consolidation proceedings, Smt Kulvanta Devi was the joint owner of the property, and such rights cannot be taken away during the consolidation proceedings, and this court relies upon the law laid down by the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Prashant Singh and others Vs. Meena and others (Supra). With regard to the delay, we have already considered the said aspect and found that the same was duly explained and no objections were ever filed by the respondents and in the peculiar circumstances of the case, where the order impugned was based on fraud, the benefit of section 17 of the Limitation Act would accrue to the petitioner, and accordingly, the delay ought to have been condoned.
61. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned orders dated 11/03/2015 and 16/02/2019 are illegal and arbitrary, and are accordingly set aside. The order dated 02/03/1960, having been obtained by fraud, is also quashed.
62. As the land was purchased jointly in the names of Lalta Singh and Smt. Kulvanta Devi, it shall vest jointly in both and, after their death, with their legal heirs.
63. The parties would be at liberty to move an appropriate application before the competent authority/court for passing orders in compliance with the directions issued herein.
(Alok Mathur, J.) Order Date:-26/09/2025 RKM