Delhi District Court
Amit Gupta vs Ritu Kaneja on 26 November, 2025
IN THE COURT OF SH. RUPINDER SINGH DHIMAN, ACJ-cum-
CCJ-cum-ARC, PATIALA HOUSE COURT, DELHI
RC ARC NO. 77384/16 (Old No. 907/14)
Sh. Amit Gupta
S/o Sh. Ved Prakash Gupta,
R/o B-1100, Shastri Nagar,
Delhi - 110007. ..........Petitioner
Versus
Smt. Ritu Kaneja @ Ritu Khaneja
W/o Sh. Rakesh Kaneja
R/o B-1100, Ground Floor,
Shastri Nagar, Delhi - 110052. ......Respondent
Date of Institution of the 05.04.2014
case
Under Section 14(1)(e) r/w Section 25B,
Delhi Rent Control Act.
Date of reserving Judgment 09.10.2025
Date of judgment 26.11.2025
Decision Eviction petition is
dismissed
Vide circular bearing no. 41/DHC/Gaz/G-7/VI.E2 (a)/2025 dated 17.10.2025,
the undersigned had been transferred. However, as arguments had been heard by the
undersigned in the present matter, prior to transfer and matter is reserved for order,
therefore, in view of directions contained in Note no. 2 of the aforementioned
circular, the order is being pronounced by the undersigned
JUDGMENT
1) This judgment shall dispose of the eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act (hereinafter called as the DRC Act).
RC ARC No. 77384/16 Amit Gupta Vs. Ritu Khaneja Page no. 1 of 23 PETITION
2) Briefly stated, it is alleged by the petitioner that he is landlord/co-owner of one shop, on ground floor, measuring 15'2'' x 9' of property bearing no. B-1100, Shastri Nagar, Delhi - 110052 (hereinafter referred to as tenanted premises) and more specifically shown in red colour in the site plan. It is stated that there are five shops and one store room on the ground floor of property bearing no. B-1100, Shastri Nagar, Delhi - 110052 (hereinafter referred to as subject premises). It is alleged that in one shop petitioner is running his business of cosmetic goods and the store room is being used to store/keep the goods and the said portion is shown in green colour in the site plan. It is averred that the respondent is a tenant in the tenanted premises shown in red colour and the remaining shops on the ground floor are in the occupation of other tenants as shown in blue colour in the site plan. It is further stated that the first floor of the subject premises is used for residence. It is however stated that the petitioner is the sole bread earner of his family and is unable to meet the expenses of the treatment of his son and education of his children. It is averred that the wife of the petitioner is a housewife but she has experience in tailoring and embroidery and therefore she wants to start a boutique to help the family in meeting the expenses of the family. Hence, it is averred that the petitioner has bonafide requirement of the tenanted premises for the purpose of starting of a boutique by his wife. It is also averred that the petitioner and his wife do not own any property in Delhi or any other state. Hence, it is prayed that an eviction order may be passed in favour of the petitioner.
RC ARC No. 77384/16 Amit Gupta Vs. Ritu Khaneja Page no. 2 of 23 LEAVE TO DEFEND
3) Upon issuance of summons under the Third Schedule of the DRC Act, the respondent filed leave to defend application contesting the matter. Vide order dated 06.08.2014, leave to defend application was allowed. Thereafter, vide order dated 25.07.2016 application of the petitioner Under Section 151 CPC was allowed and the amended/fresh site plan was taken on record. Matter was then fixed for filing of the written statement by the respondent.
WRITTEN STATEMENT
4) In the written statement, respondent contested the bonafide need of the petitioner and also alleged that various alternative accommodations are available with the petitioner. Further, the respondent also contented that a sum of Rs. 17,65,000/- had been taken by the father of the petitioner at the time of induction respondent and without refunding the same, petitioner cannot evict the respondent.
REPLICATION
5) Thereafter, petitioner denied the averments of the respondent in the replication and reiterated his need of the tenanted premises.
TRIAL Petitioner's Evidence
6) In order to prove his case, petitioner examined himself as PW-1. He tendered in evidence, his affidavit Ex. PW-1/A and relied upon the following documents: -
(i) Ex. PW-1/1 is copy of site plan.
RC ARC No. 77384/16 Amit Gupta Vs. Ritu Khaneja Page no. 3 of 23
(ii) Mark A is the copy of the sale deed dated 30.11.1965.
The document referred to evidence affidavit Ex. PW-1/2 is being tendered as Mark A.
(iii) Mark B is the exchange deed dated 19.03.1990. The document referred to evidence affidavit Ex. PW-1/2 is being tendered as Mark B.
(iv) Mark C is the Will dated 04.10.1985. The document referred to evidence affidavit Ex. PW-1/2 is being tendered as Mark C.
(v) Mark D is the sale deed dated 19.03.1990. The document referred to evidence affidavit Ex. PW-1/2 is being tendered as Mark D.
(vi) Ex. PW-1/6 (colly) is the copy of rent receipt.
7) He was duly cross examined at length on 05.02.2018, 08.01.2019, and 04.04.2019. Petitioner also summoned record from the office of Sub-Registrar and examined witness PW-2 Praveen Kumar who stated that the summoned record has been transferred to Department of Delhi Archives. Petitioner then summoned record from Department of Archives through PW-3 Sevajit who produced the record with respect to sale deed executed on 13.11.1965 which is Ex. PW-3/1, exchange deed executed on 10.04.1964 which is Ex. PW-3/2, Will dated 04.10.1985 of Devi Ram Gupta which is Ex. PW-3/3 and relinquishment deed dated 19.05.1990 executed by Shanti Swaroop which is Ex. PW- 3/4. Counsel for respondent raised the objection that the testimony of the said witness does not prove the execution of the aforesaid documents and originals of the said documents are required to be proved or secondary evidence be led for which no permission has been obtained. In his cross examination, PW-3 stated that he is neither an executant or witness of RC ARC No. 77384/16 Amit Gupta Vs. Ritu Khaneja Page no. 4 of 23 these documents and he has no personal knowledge of the said documents.
8) Thereafter, petitioner also summoned record qua the signatures of his father Ved Prakash Gupta from Canara Bank and examined PW Navneet Kumar Singh who was again inadvertently mentioned as PW-3. He produced the account opening form of saving account of Ved Prakash Gupta which was inadvertently again marked as Ex. PW-3/1. In his cross examination, he stated that he cannot identify the signature of account holder on the account opening form as it was not opened during his service. He also stated that he cannot identify the signatures of the official of the bank at that time.
9) No other witness was examined by the petitioner and he closed his evidence on 03.05.2019.
Respondent's Evidence
10) Matter was then adjourned for respondent's evidence. Respondent firstly tendered evidence through her attorney/husband Rakesh on 27.02.2020. However, he was only partly examined in chief and thereafter dropped by the respondent as a witness. Respondent Ritu Khaneja then examined herself as RW-1. She tendered in evidence her affidavit Ex. RW-1/A and relied upon the following documents: -
i) Mark-R : Photocopy of Rent Agreement dated 01.07.1992 (which is already marked as R) (objected to RC ARC No. 77384/16 Amit Gupta Vs. Ritu Khaneja Page no. 5 of 23 the mode of proof as the deponent is neither the signatory nor the executor).
(ii) Ex.RW-1/2: Copy of Rent Agreement dated 27.09.2005 (which is already marked as R-16) (OSR)
(iii) Ex.RW-1/3: Copy of Possession Letter dated 27.09.2005 (which is already marked as R-17) (OSR) (in para no. 10 of the affidavit, the rent agreement has been wrongly exhibited as Ex.RW1/2) (objected to the mode of proof as the deponent is neither the signatory nor the executor).
(iv) Ex.RW-1/4: Copy of Receipt dated 27.09.2005 (which is already marked as R-24) (OSR)
(v) Ex.RW-1/5: Copy of Receipt dated 27.09.2005 (which is already marked as R-28) (OSR)
(vi) Ex.RW-1/6: Original Photograph on which I identify as shop with the shutter at Point A.)
(vii) Ex.RW-1/7 to Ex. RW-1/10: Original Photographs (details of the same have been given in para 17 of affidavit Ex.RW1/A.
(viii) Ex.RW-1/11 to Ex. RW1/41: Original Rent receipts (already marked as R-32 to R-68) (in my para 28 of my affidavit the word R-63 be read as R-68 and RW-1/11 to RW-1/42 as Ex. RW-1/11 to Ex. RW-1/42)
11) She was duly cross examined at length by the counsel for petitioner on 23.01.2024 and 15.02.2024. Respondent also examined Lalit Kumar as RW-2. He tendered in evidence his affidavit which is Ex.RW-2/A and relied upon the following documents: -
(i) Ex. RW-1/2 is the rent agreement dated 27.09.2005.
(ii) Mark R-24 is the receipt dated 27.09.2005, the original of which has been brought by the respondent and his photocopy of same is Ex. RW-2/1.
RC ARC No. 77384/16 Amit Gupta Vs. Ritu Khaneja Page no. 6 of 23
(iii) Ex. RW-2/2 is the receipt dated27.09.2005 which bears my signature at Point X1 and signature of Rakesh Anand at point Y1 and signature of Deepak Chopra at point R30 & R31, original of which has been brought by the respondent and seen by me.
12) He was duly cross examined at length on 11.05.2022 by the counsel for petitioner. Thereafter, respondent sought to summon Deepak Chopra as a witness. However, despite multiple attempts was unable to trace the said witness. Hence, respondent closed his evidence on 03.09.2024.
FINDINGS
13) Then, final arguments were advanced by the respective counsels on behalf of both the parties. Both the parties also filed written submissions in support of their arguments. At the outset, it is stated that there is no doubt regarding the case laws relied upon on behalf of both the parties where the Superior Courts have laid down the principles with respect to provisions of the DRC Act, 1958 in different factual scenarios. However, each case has its own distinguishing facts and circumstances and each matter has to be decided in its own factual background. It is trite to state that in a petition u/s 14(1)(e) of DRC Act in order to get an eviction order the petitioner/landlord is required to establish the following: -
(i) That he/she is the owner/landlord of the property;
(ii) That he/she requires the premises bonafide and RC ARC No. 77384/16 Amit Gupta Vs. Ritu Khaneja Page no. 7 of 23
iii) That he/she does not have any other alternative suitable accommodation for this purpose.
LANDLORD-TENANT RELATIONSHIP
1) As far as the landlord-tenant relationship is concerned, the respondent has disputed the same. RW1 deposed that a sum of Rs. 16 lacs were paid to Ved Prakash and documents of sale purchase were prepared. RW1 has placed reliance upon RW1/2, RW1/3, RW1/4 and RW1/5, all dated 27.09.2005. Though petitioner has denied the said documents but even if for sake of arguments, said documents are admitted to be correct, bare perusal of said documents show that the terms of the same do not amount to a sale deed. It is contended that though the word Goodwill is used but market price had been paid.
However, said contention is contradicted by the pleadings of the respondent itself. The respondent herself has pleaded that the father of petitioner had agreed to refund the amount taken as security at the time of vacation of shop by respondent. It is trite to state that the sale consideration is not refundable. Hence, at best, if the case of respondent is taken to be true, her status in the premises is that of a tenant who has given a refundable security. Here, I find it pertinent to refer to the case of Puran Chand Aggarwal Vs. Lekh Raj RC Rev. No. 291/2012 decided by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi on 16.04.2014, wherein it was observed: -
"31. As regards the argument of the petitioner that he has spent 2,50,000/- in construction and has also paid RC ARC No. 77384/16 Amit Gupta Vs. Ritu Khaneja Page no. 8 of 23 2,25,000/- to the petitioner's brother as per agreement, the original agreement was not filed in the trial court. Even otherwise, in case any amount is paid to the brother of the respondent that has no relevance to the facts and circumstances of the present case. Similar is the case of spending money for construction. The petitioner is entitled to recover the said amount, if recoverable in law. The said plea taken by the petitioner does not help the case of the petitioner and it is not a triable issue.
14) Besides, petitioner only has to show that he has a better title than that of the tenant. The principle is very clear that once a tenant always a tenant. The tenant cannot dispute the title of his landlord or his successor-in-interest. Further, the law in this regard has been elaborately dealt with in the case of in Ramesh Chand vs. Uganti Devi reported as 157 (2009) DLT 450 the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi held:
".......... The imperfectness of the title of the premises cannot stand in the way of an eviction petition under section 14 (1) (e) of the DRC Act, neither the tenant can be allowed to raise the plea of imperfect title or title not vesting in the landlord and that too when the tenant has been paying rent to the landlord. Section 116 of the Evidence Act creates estoppels against such a tenant. A tenant can challenge the title of landlord only after vacating the premises and not when he is occupying the premises. In fact, such a tenant who denies the title of the landlord, qua the premises, to whom he is paying rent acts dishonestly.........".
RC ARC No. 77384/16 Amit Gupta Vs. Ritu Khaneja Page no. 9 of 23
15) Thus, a tenant is estopped from challenging the ownership or denying the title of the landlord. Hence, the contention that title documents of the petitioner is not valid or that they have been forged and fabricated, does not assist the case of respondent when respondent herself has filed rent receipts showing tender of rent to the petitioner. Even otherwise, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bansraj Laltaprasad Mishra v. Stanley Parker Jones (2006) 3 SCC 91 had held that:
".....13. The underlying policy of section 116 is that where a person has been brought into possession as a tenant by the landlord and if that tenant is permitted to question the title of the landlord at the time of the settlement, then that will give rise to extreme confusion in the matter of relationship of the landlord and tenant and so the equitable principle of estoppel has been incorporated by the legislature in the said section.
16) In the present case, a specific question was put to the petitioner in cross examination that after the death of his father, respondent has been paying rent to the petitioner. Hence, respondent has attorned to the petitioner has her landlord. Therefore, now cannot resile from the admission and challenge the title of the petitioner. Moreover, a mere bald denial of the title of the petitioner by the respondent does not assist the case of respondent. In the case of Bharat Bhushan Vij Vs. Arti Teckchandani 2008(153) DLT 247, the Hon'ble High Court held that it was not in the domain of the tenant to challenge the Will of the deceased landlord. It was observed that if a landlord is able to show that there is a testament in his favour, he is deemed to have discharged his RC ARC No. 77384/16 Amit Gupta Vs. Ritu Khaneja Page no. 10 of 23 burden of proving the ownership under the Act. If the tenant takes a frivolous objection about ownership, it cannot be entertained unless the tenant comes forward as to who was the landlord/owner of the premises and to whom he has been paying rent after the death of the original owner. Accordingly, it can be stated that the petitioner is the owner /landlord of the tenanted premises and the respondent is tenant in the said premises. Thus, the first ingredient of landlord-tenant relationship between the parties in the present case, stands established.
BONAFIDE REQUIREMENT AND NON-AVAILABILITY OF ALTERNATIVE ACCOMMODATION
17) Since the two issues are interconnected, therefore, the said two issues are taken up together. It is pertinent to note here the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Abid-ul-Islam Vs. Inder Sain Dua, (2022) 6 SCC 30 where it was stated by the Hon'ble court that requirement is the existence of bona fide need, when there is no other "reasonably suitable accommodation". Therefore, there has to be satisfaction on two grounds, namely, (i) the requirement being bona fide and (ii) the non-availability of a reasonably suitable residential accommodation. Such reasonableness along with suitability is to be seen from the perspective of the landlord and not the tenant. Further, it is a well settled proposition of law that it is not sufficient that any kind of the property should be available to the petitioner/landlord to rule out the benefit of 14(1)(e) of D.R.C. Act. The property available with the petitioner/landlord should also be reasonably suitable property. In M M Quasim vs/ Manohar Lal Sharma, (1981) 3 SCC 36, the Apex Court RC ARC No. 77384/16 Amit Gupta Vs. Ritu Khaneja Page no. 11 of 23 has that the landlord does not have an unfettered right to choose the premises but merely showing that the landlord has some other vacant premises in his possession may not be sufficient to negative the landlord's claim if the vacant premises were not suitable for the purpose for which he required the premises. Furthermore, it is the prerogative of the landlord to determine which premises best suits his requirements. In the light of said contentions, I proceed to consider the contentions of both parties.
18) In the present matter, petitioner has averred that that the wife of the petitioner is a housewife but she has experience in tailoring and embroidery and therefore she wants to start a boutique to help the family in meeting the expenses of the family. Hence, it is averred that the petitioner has bona fide requirement of the tenanted premises for the purpose of starting of a boutique by his wife. However, it is contended on behalf of the respondent that the need is not genuine and the eviction petition has been filed with an ulterior motive to evict the respondent for seeking higher rent. It is contended that the petitioner already has sufficient earning as his children are attending a good private school. Further, petitioner already has sufficient income and the need is not pressing but a fanciful desire. It is also contended that wife of petitioner is a housewife with no prior experience and she would never run any business. However, in this regard, it is pertinent to note that a person cannot be expected to sit idle and reach a state of starvation before his need is considered bona fide. Reliance in this regard is placed upon the RC ARC No. 77384/16 Amit Gupta Vs. Ritu Khaneja Page no. 12 of 23 decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghunath G. Panhale Vs. M/s Chaganlal Sunderji & Co. AIR 1999 SC 3864 wherein it was observed that:
"A landlord need not lose his existing job nor resign it nor reach a level of starvation to contemplate that he must get possession of his premises for establishing a business."
19) Further, in Ram Babu Aggarwal Vs. Jay Kishan Dass 2009 (4) RCR (Civil) 748, it was held that merely because the landlord has no prior experience in business, it cannot be a ground to doubt his bonafide. Also, the Hon'ble Supreme court in Baldev Singh Bajwa vs Monish Saini (2005) 12 SCC 778 has held that whenever a landlord seeks eviction of the tenant for bonafide need, the controller shall presume the need as genuine and bonafide. Furthermore, the provision of Section 19 (2) of DRC Act is to be emphasized which protects a tenant in case the landlord recovers possession of any premises and the premises are not occupied by the landlord or by the person for whose benefit the premises are held within two months of obtaining such possession or having obtained the possession, the same are re-let to any other person within three years from the date of obtaining the possession. Thus, the said contention is also devoid of merits and does not render the need of the petitioner as malafide.
20) Next, it is contended that the need is not bonafide as petitioner has the entire first and second floor available for projected requirements. In this context, however, it is pertinent to note that the RW1 has in her cross examination admitted that petitioner is residing on the first floor RC ARC No. 77384/16 Amit Gupta Vs. Ritu Khaneja Page no. 13 of 23 and there are tenants on the second floor. Therefore, the said two floors as per the admission of respondent herself are already occupied and not lying vacant. Moreover, even if, the said portions are assumed to be vacant, it is pertinent to note the judgement of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Uday Shankar Upadhyay v. Naveen Maheshwari (2010) 1 SCC 503 is to be noted where it was held that it is not for the Courts to say that the landlord should shift to the first floor or any higher floor as it is well known that shops and businesses are usually conducted on the ground floor, because the customers can reach there easily. It was reiterated that the Court cannot dictate to the landlord which floor he should use for his business and that is for the landlord himself to decide. Thus, a ground floor premises is more suitable for commercial purpose than the premises on upper floor as it has more footfall of the customers. Reliance in this regard is placed upon the decision of Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in case of Dilip Singh Kapoor & Ors Vs. Neeraj Khanna & Anr, RC.REV. 66/2017, decided on 31.08.2022. It is trite to state that an alternative accommodation, to entail denial of claim of landlord, must be reasonably suitable, obviously in comparison with tenanted premises, where from the landlord is seeking eviction. Furthermore, the landlord being the best judge of his own requirement is the best person to decide as to which premises, he has to choose for conducting his business and a tenant cannot force the landlord to conduct his business from upper floors. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rahabhar Productions Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Rajendera Kumar Tandon 72 (1998) DLT 629 that the landlord is not disentitled from seeking RC ARC No. 77384/16 Amit Gupta Vs. Ritu Khaneja Page no. 14 of 23 recovery of the possession of a ground floor merely on the plea that he is also in possession of first floor and second floor so long as the court is satisfied with respect to the bonafide requirement of the landlord for the tenanted premises. Thus, the said contention is devoid of merits.
21) Further, the contention that respondent has no other place for business or are dependent upon tenanted premises for livelihood has no bearing on the merits of present case. In case titled as "Satyawati Sharma Vs. U. O. I. AIR 2008 SC 3148", it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that Section 14 (1)(e) of the 1958 Act is violative of the doctrine of equality embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution of India in so far as it discriminates between the premises let for residential and non-residential purposes when the same are required bonafide by the landlord for occupation for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him and restricts the latter's right to seek eviction of the tenant from the premises let for residential purposes only. Furthermore, it is a well settled principle of law that a Rent Controller has to see the bonafide requirement of the petitioner and not the comparative hardship of the respondent. Reliance in this regard is placed upon the Apex Court's decision in Bega Begum and Ors. v. Abdul Ahad Khan and Ors (1979) AIR 272 that the inconvenience loss and trouble resulting from denial of decree of eviction in favour of the landlord far outweigh the prejudice or the inconvenience which will be caused to the tenant. Thus, there is no bar on landlord for seeking recovery of non-residential RC ARC No. 77384/16 Amit Gupta Vs. Ritu Khaneja Page no. 15 of 23 premises on the ground of bonafide need under Section 14 (1) (e) of DRC Act.
22) Next, it is contended that the petitioner has also alternative accommodation in the form of Shop A in the subject premises itself. It is stated that PW1 in his cross examination has admitted that the said shop is in his possession and lying locked. It is stated that PW1 has falsely stated that some goods/household articles are lying in it whereas it is vacant and available as an alternative accommodation. However, RW1 in her cross examination has admitted that the said shop is a very small shop and much less than half of the tenanted premises. Hence, when seen in comparison with the tenanted premises, the said purported accommodation cannot be considered as a suitable alternative when as per the admission of respondent itself, it is much smaller. It is no longer res integra that the court cannot make choices for the landlord qua the premises from where he should run his business. The landlord possesses the prerogative to determine his specific requirements, exercising full autonomy in this regard. It is not within the purview of the courts to impose directives on the landlord regarding the nature or quality of their chosen usage of the tenanted premises. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the Delhi High Court have repeatedly held that the Courts are not to sit in the armchair of the landlord and dictate as to how the available property of the landlord is to be best utilized by him. The landlord is the absolute owner of his property and is the best person to decide which property is to be utilized in what way. Reliance is placed upon the decision of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in RC ARC No. 77384/16 Amit Gupta Vs. Ritu Khaneja Page no. 16 of 23 case of Praveen & Anr. Vs. Mulak Raj & Ors. RC Rev. 417/2016 in this regard. Even otherwise, in the case of Ragavendra Kumar vs. Firm Prem Machinery AIR 2000 SC 534, the Hon'ble Supreme court held that it is settled position of law that the landlord is best judge of his requirement for residential or business purpose and he has got complete freedom in the matter. Reference may also be made to the case of Prativa Devi (Smt) v. T.V. Krishnan (1996) 5 SCC 353. Hence, the said contention does not render the need of landlord as malafide.
23) Further, it is contended that the need is not bonafide as the petitioner has created artificial scarcity of accommodation by letting go of Shop D. Per Contra, it is deposed by the petitioner that after the demise of his father on 19.08.2012, the said shop was sold by him and his sister to other sister Geeta vide sale deed dated 03.02.2016. In this regard, it is contended by the petitioner that the plea that the landlord has sold some property or let out some property is not a ground to deny the order of the eviction to the landlord. Reliance has been placed upon various judgments in this regard. Merely taking a plea that the respondent/landlord has in the past sold some property or let out some property has in Narender Kumar Shah Proprietor Jay Bharat Steels Vs. Malti Narang 2014 SCC Online Del 3839 and Anil Kumar Bagania Vs. Shiv Rani 2014 SCC Online Del 6645 been held to be not a ground for denying order of eviction to landlord on the ground of self-requirement of premises. However, it is pertinent to note that the crux of said judgments is that if in the past, landlord has sold/let out some property, RC ARC No. 77384/16 Amit Gupta Vs. Ritu Khaneja Page no. 17 of 23 then, it is not a ground to deny the eviction order. But in the present case, the eviction petition was filed in April 2014 whereas the said shop has been sold by the petitioner in February 2016. Thus, the facts of the present matter are distinguishable from the said cases. In the present case, PW1 has admitted that the said shop was in his possession prior to execution of sale deed. Thus, in the present matter respondent has pleaded and proved (a) the particulars of purported alternative premises; (b) the right/title of the landlord to the same; (c) that the said premises were vacant and available for use at the time of pleaded requirement of landlord; (d) how the landlord has deprived himself thereof i.e. by sale or letting. The said facts are sufficient to rebut presumption of need being bonafide in favour of the petitioner and raises doubt upon the case of petitioner. The legislation is enacted for the benefit of those class of landlords who genuinely require the premises for their needs and do not have any other accommodation. Therefore, the requirement must be sincere and honest and not a pretense to evict the tenant. But in the present case, PW1 has admitted that Shop D was available at the time of filing of eviction petition but never utilized for the projected bonafide need. Hence, the case of the petitioner cannot stand on its own legs.
24) Furthermore, it is pertinent to note that petitioner has not led best evidence with respect to Shop C/Amit Juice Corner which leads to further doubt about the genuineness of the projected requirement. It is pertinent to note that the shop C is stated to be on rent by the petitioner RC ARC No. 77384/16 Amit Gupta Vs. Ritu Khaneja Page no. 18 of 23 but during cross examination PW1 admitted that the phone numbers displayed on the sign board of AMIT JUICE CORNER are that of the father of the petitioner. PW1 also stated that on the demise of his father, he surrendered the said numbers, but no explanation was given as to why the phone numbers of his father were displayed on the shop's sign board which is purportedly on rent. This lends credence to the version of the respondent that Shop C/Amit Juice Corner is being run by the Petitioner Amit himself. The best evidence in this case would have been rent agreement/rent receipts with respect to Shop C but petitioner did not produce the same leading to the adverse inference against the petitioner. Moreover, petitioner did not even disclose the particulars of the tenant of said shop. It is no longer res integra that landlord must give full details and plan of his present accommodation to show that same is not suitable. The suitability of the present accommodation cannot be gauged unless landlords disclose the manner in which they are using present accommodation. In this regard, reliance is placed upon Inder Lal Vs. Brij Mohan, 1972 RLR 172. Hence, the said conduct too impeaches the credibility of PW1 and renders his plea with respect to need being bonafide in doubt. The satisfaction of the two requirements i.e., bonafide need and no reasonably suitable accommodation has been time and again emphasized by the Supreme Court of India in several cases. In the case Deena Nath Vs. Pooran Lal, (2001) 5 SCC 705, the Supreme Court observed:
"The Legislature in enacting the provision has taken ample care to avoid any arbitrary or whimsical action RC ARC No. 77384/16 Amit Gupta Vs. Ritu Khaneja Page no. 19 of 23 of a landlord to evict his tenant. The statutory mandate is that there must be first a requirement by the landlord which means that it is not a mere whim or a fanciful desire by him; further, such requirement must be bonafide which is intended to avoid the mere whim or desire. The 'bonafide requirement' must be in praesenti and must be manifested in actual need which would evidence the Court that it is not a mere fanciful or whimsical desire. The legislative intent is made further clear by making the provision that the landlord has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned. This requirement lays stress that the need is pressing and there is no reasonably suitable alternative for the landlord but to get the tenant evicted from the accommodation."
25) Now the question arises what constitutes a "reasonably suitable accommodation". The wordings reasonably suitable accommodation is to be interpreted by looking at from the common man's perspective as to what in the given circumstances can be said a reasonably suitable accommodation. It is essentially a question of fact. It has to be seen from the eyes of common person's prudence and the question should be asked as to whether in the particular case, a person has a reasonably suitable accommodation or not to reside or to carry on business. If the answer comes in affirmative, then no matter what the landlord says in order to evict the tenant that the provisions of Section 14 (1) (e) of the Act does not get attracted. If the answer comes in negative, then no matter what the tenant states to refute the RC ARC No. 77384/16 Amit Gupta Vs. Ritu Khaneja Page no. 20 of 23 reasonableness and suitability of the accommodation, the eviction has to follow. In the present case, petitioner has not come to court with clean hands. Petitioner not only sold Shop D available to him at the time of filing the eviction petition without using the same for his projected requirement for two years but also not brought on record, the best evidence with respect to shop C to show its non-availability. Also, in this context, it is relevant to note that portion stated to be as Store/ Mark B in this site plan, also has access to the main road through passage and the said fact was admitted by the PW1. Admittedly, PW1 has not made any effort to use the said portion for his projected bonafide need as well. While it is not in dispute that the landlord is the best judge of his requirement and tenant cannot dictate the same, but every assertion made in this regard by the landlord cannot be held to be gospel's truth. Hence, it is clear that there cannot be any straight jacket formula to determine what can be reasonably suitable accommodation available with the landlord. Therefore, one cannot really say that one proposition which may hold good in one case can be equally applied to another case with equal strength without seeing the difference in the facts of the case. It is true that there are other cases where in the appropriate facts the courts have held that the landlord is the best judge to decide his convenience. The said are the line of the cases where the landlord is put to the extreme hardship by tenant's insistence that he should adjust to inconvenient premises by squeezing his needs. The facts of the present case are entirely different where the landlord is enjoying the property within the same location. However, he parted with RC ARC No. 77384/16 Amit Gupta Vs. Ritu Khaneja Page no. 21 of 23 possession of Shop D, failed to bring on record best evidence with respect to Shop C, did not use the portion B despite being available. Also, even though, individually shop A is small but admittedly it is vacant and congruous to the other portions. But no efforts have been made to utilize the same for the projected bonafide need, resulting in the inference that the need is not pressing but a mere desire. It is not the thumb rule that in every case the landlord always is the best judge and the court is helpless by not scrutinizing the stand of the tenant while testing the reasonableness and suitability of the alternative accommodation. Actually, it depends upon the case-to-case basis. The courts have otherwise also held consistently that even though the landlord is the best judge to decide his needs and he cannot be compelled by the tenant to accommodate at the place which is lesser in any way than the place which is sought to be evicted, still the court would examine the reasonableness and suitability of the existing accommodation by weighing what is available with the landlord vis-à-vis the plea of the tenant. The Supreme Court in the case of M.M. Quasim Vs. Manohar lal, AIR 1981 SC 1113 which is a three-bench decision passed by the court speaking through Hon'ble Desai, J. (as His Lordship then was) has categorically flawed this approach of mechanically stating that the landlord is the best judge without applying a judicious approach in the matter. In the words of Hon'ble Desai, J. it was observed thus:
"Before turning to the next topic, a word about the judicial approach to the question of personal requirement of the landlord under the Rent Act would RC ARC No. 77384/16 Amit Gupta Vs. Ritu Khaneja Page no. 22 of 23 not be out of place. The learned judge of the first appellate court while upholding the claim of personal requirement of respondent 1 has observed as under:
"...To reject this aspect by saying that the landlord has an unfettered right to choose the premises is to negative the very raison de'etre of the Rent Act. Undoubtedly, if it is shown by the tenant that the landlord has some other vacant premises in his possession, that by itself may not be sufficient to negative the landlord's claim but in such a situation the Court would expect the landlord to establish that the premises which is vacant is not suitable for the purpose of his occupation or for the purpose for which he requires the premises in respect of which the action is commenced in the Court..."
26) Accordingly, I find that the petitioner has failed to establish his bonafide need and non-availability of reasonably suitable alternative accommodation.
RELIEF
27) Hence, in the light of aforesaid discussion and findings, I find that the petitioner has failed to establish the essential ingredients of petition u/s 14 (1) (e) of DRC Act i.e., bonafide necessity and absence of reasonably suitable accommodation. Accordingly, the eviction petition stands dismissed. Parties to bear their own cost. Rupinde Digitally signed by Rupinder File be consigned to the record room. r Singh Singh Dhiman Date: 2025.11.26 Dhiman 10:01:23 +05'30' (RUPINDER SINGH DHIMAN) ACJ-cum-CCJ-cum-ARC, PHC Delhi/26.11.2025 RC ARC No. 77384/16 Amit Gupta Vs. Ritu Khaneja Page no. 23 of 23