Punjab-Haryana High Court
Mohinder Singh And Ors. vs Union Of India (Uoi) on 15 October, 2001
JUDGMENT M.M. Kumar, J.
1. This judgment will dispose of Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 79, 80, 121 and 122 of 1987 titled as Mohinder Singh v. Union of India, Raghunath Singh and Ors. v. Union of India, Jagir Singhand Anr. v. Union of India and Puran Singh and Ors. v. Union of India respectively, as the common question of law and facts have been raised and both the appeals have arisen out of the common judgment dated 26.11.1986 rendered by learned Single Judge. The learned Singh Judge has partly allowed the EFA No. 712 of 1986 and EFA No. 711 of 1986 filed by Mohinder Singh and Raghunath Singh and others.
2. On 10.6-1965, an order was passed for acquisition of land belonging to Mohinder Singh measuring 386 Kanals 11 Maria situated in the area of village Daulatpur near Pathankot for defence purposes. This order was passed by the Land Acquisition Collector vide notice No. 1475/MLRG/Reader and the same was published in the Punjab Government Gazette dated 25.6.1965. The land was acquired under the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952 (for brevity '1952 Act'). The land of the other appellants namely Raghunath Singh and others was also acquired vide notification published under Section 7(1) of 1952 Act. The land in that case was situated in villages Mehmoon and Lamnie. The Senior Sub Judge, Gurdaspur (Shri Manmohan Singh Ahluwalia) was appointed as Arbitrator under Section 8(1)(b) of 1952 Act for the purpose of making the award and to determine the amount of compensation. He was also to determine the question of apportionment in relation to the said acquisition under 1952 Act. The Arbitrator pronounced his award on 25.7.1977 and awarded Rs. 2,000/- per kanal for Nehari land, Rs. 1750/- per kanal for Banjar Jadid land Rs. 1,000/- per kanal for Barani land, Rs. 500/- per kanal for Banjar Qadim land and Rs. 250/- for gair mumkin land. Apart from the price of the land, interest @ 6% per annum on the enhanced amount w.e.f. 25.6.1965 untill realisation was also awarded alongwith solatium @ 15% on the enhanced amount. Dissatisfied with the compensation and other benefits awarded to the land owners, only one land-owner namely Hoshnak Singh came in appeal to the High Court in FAO No. 194 of 1977. The Union of India also filed numerous appeals against the award of the Arbitrator. The appeals filed by the Union of India and the cross objections filed by the claimants came up for hearing before this Court on 6.4.1983. The Court was pleased to enhance compensation in some of the appeals and in the judgment titled as Hoshnak Singh v. Union of India 1983 P.L.J. 438. The operative part of the judgment reads as under:-
"The landowner claimants were obviously under a handicap to produce any sale instance in support of their claim for compensation at the rate of Rs. 500/- per marla on account of the fact, as already indicated, that the suit land was under occupation of the military authorities right from the year 1947-48, having been requisitioned for their purposes. As already pointed out, as a matter of fact, much more area than the suit land surrounding it was requisitioned by the military authorities and therefore no sale transactions could possibly take place in the vicinity of this area. The learned counsel for the claimants, however rely on a judgment of this Court in RFA No. 1971 (Hoshnak Singh v. State of Punjab and others) decided on February 27, 1980, dealing with the market value of the land acquired in pursuance of a notification published under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act on July 6, 1982, whereby the rate of compensation was determined at Rs. 200/- per marla or Rs. 32,000/- per acre. The acquired area in that case was located on Pathankot Jullundur road but just outside the municipal limits of the town. In the light of this judgment, the learned counsel for the claimants vehemently contended that treating the finding recorded in this judgment as the base, the appellants in these cases are entitled to be awarded compensation at a much higher rate than Rs. 200/- per marla on account of the interregnum of about three years between the two notifications of acquisition. The submission of the learned counsel apparently is not devoid of merit. As already pointed out, there is also no evidence on record on behalf of the respondent authorities which can possibly detract anything from this claim of the learned counsel for the appellants. Thus, treating the rate determined vide judgment in RFA No. 193 (supra) as the base, I raise the compensation for the suit land in village Daulatpur by 25% i.e. to Rs. 250/- per marla.
Besides the above noted rate of compensation payable to the claimants-appellants and cross-objectors they are also held entitled to the payment of solatium and interest at the rate of 15% and 6% per annum respectively in terms of the judgment in Shankar Singh's case (supra) which indisputably is inter parties and has attained finality. All this, however, is subject to the claim made by them in their memorandum of appeals and cross-objections and the Court fee paid thereon. They too would have proportionate of their appeals and cross-objections.
As a natural consequence of the above noted conclusion of mine the appeals filed by the Union of India fail and are dismissed but with no order as to costs."
3. Thus it is obvious that the appellants did not file any first appeal or cross objections. The appeals/cross objections filed by Hoshnak Singh and others were considered in the above mentioned judgment and the benefit of enhanced compensation was given to them alone. Therefore, there is no order/decree enhancing the amount of compensation in the case of the appellants. It is further appropriate to mention that against the judgment in Hoshnak Singh's case (supra) no Letters Patent Appeal was filed nor any objections were filed either by the appellants or by Hoshnak Singh and others. The Union of India, however, challenged the judgment in Hoshnak Singh's case in LPA No. 1140 of 1983 which was dismissed in terms of the orders passed in LPA No. 1128 of 1983 decided on 16.12.1983.
4. The appellants having not filed the first appeal like Hoshnak Singh and to take the benefit of enhanced compensation awarded in FAO No. 194 of 1977 in Hoshnak Singh's case (supra) followed a self devised procedure by filing an Execution Application No. 93 of 1984 in the Court of Additional District Judge, Gurdaspur. The appellants described themselves as Decree Holder in the afore-mentioned application and claimed entitlement to the enhanced compensation.
5. The Union of India through the Military Estate Officer, Pathankot deposited an amount of Rs. 30,06,148.52 including principal, interest and solatium. Later on one Shri B.L. Chhabra, Sub Divisional Officer, Military Estate Office, Pathankot made statement that he had no objection to the delivery of refund voucher in the sum of Rs. 30,06,148.52 to the appellants. The payment of above said amount was released to them. Subsequently, it came to light that the aforesaid amount had been got paid from the union of India in execution and received by the appellants by fraud and mis-representation, in as much as, the appellants had not filed any appeal in the High Court as was done by Hoshnak Singh nor they had filed cross objections. They could not have described themselves as decree holders and the Union of India as Judgment debtor. Consequently, an application was filed by the Union of India before the learned Additional District Judge, Gurdaspur seeking direction for restitution of amount of Rs. 30,07,148.52 from Mohinder Singh and other appellants which was allowed and a direction as issued to refund the afore-mentioned amount to Union of India with 24% interest. This application was allowed on 16.1.1986 being Misc. Application No. 3 of 1985. A perusal of the order dated 16.1.1985 shows that the learned Additional District Judge found the conduct of the appellants contumacious. He framed as many as 8 issues and his findings on issue Nos. 1, 2 and 3 reads as under:
"15. Faced with this position staring in the face, the ld. counsel for Mohinder Singh, etc. submitted that Mohinder Singh etc. are entitled to compensation which has to be the market value of the land acquired irrespective of whether the market value of the land acquired was determined at their instance or at some other instance in the same scheme. In support of this submission he drew my attention to Bhag Singh and Ors. v. Union Territory, Chandigarh, (1985) Punjab Acts and Precedents 446). On the strength of this authority, it was submitted that this court can at best ask the respondent to pay court fees on the enhanced amount enhanced by the Hon'ble High Court and this court cannot call upon them to refund this amount which they have received. Suffice it to say as executing court the jurisdiction of this court is very limited. Executing Court is simply to see whether there was any decree/award in their favour or not, if there was no decree or award in their favour, they could not put in execution claiming enhanced amount ordered by the Hon'ble High Court. As to whether it is or it is not open to them to have the benefit of the enhanced amount per the order of the Hon'ble High Court on payment of court fees on the enhanced amount, that question does not fall within the ambit of this Court. That question falls within the jurisdiction of the Hon'ble High Court the benefit of whose award they are claiming. I thus conclude that Mohinder Singh etc., were neither appellants before the Hon'ble High Court nor cross objectors in the appeals filed by the Union of India and therefore, they were not entitled to the benefit of enhancement to the order of the Hon'ble High Court dated 6.4,1983 delivered in FAO No. 1977. It was an act of day piracy committed by Mohinder Singh etc. upon the Union of India. Still worse is that, they are now trying to ligitimize this act of piracy. All these issues are found against Mohinder Singh etc."
Similarly, on issue No. 4 the following findings were returned:-
"The Union of India is not estopped. Why cannot Union of India claim refund of the amount from Mohinder Singh etc., if Mohinder Singh etc. had received this amount by mis-representation and by inducing Union of India into this belief that they were entitled to this amount. This issue is found against Mohinder Singh etc."
The Learned Additional District Judge in para 20 under the heading Relief recorded his anguish over the manner in which the parties have acted. The same deserves a mention in toto and reads as under:-
"20. Before parting, I am constrained to express my anguish over the manner in which the department has acted. Department appears to have acted in a very irresponsible and wreckless manner. The department i.e., Sh. B.L. Chhabra S.D.O. Defence Estates, Shri Ved Parkash, Defence Estate Officer, Pathankot, the Director Defence Lands and Cantonment Ministry of Defence, Northern Command, Post Office Satwari, Jammu Cantt, all appear to have acted in a very wreckless and irresponsible manner in that Sh. B.L. Chhabra, Shri Ved Parkash without going through the judgment of the Hon'ble Single Judge of the High Court recommended the deposit of the amount and the Director Defence Lands and Cantonments, Ministry of Defence, Northern Command, Post Office, Satwari, Jammu Cantt: sanctioned the deposit of this amount without going through the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court dated 6.4.1983. The department should not have played foul with the contributions made by the Tax Payers into the State exchequer. By acting irresponsibility and wrecklessly, the department had deprived the State of such a large sum of money. Where money matters are involved, utmost caution is required to be taken. On account of this irresponsible and wreckless behaviour of the department, sometimes the confidence of the people in courts is also shaken. It flings surprise on the people as to how such a large sum of money has been paid to Mohinder Singh, etc., by the court when they did not hold any decree in their favour respecting that amount.
21. Mohinder Singh etc. have played still more foul. They put in an execution without realising that there is no award by the Hon'ble High Court in their favour. It speaks of their evil mind that without their being any award in their favour, they put in execution application and the worse part is that instead of depositing the amount in a sporting spirit, they took up frivolous and false defence to be able to withhold on to them the payment received by them.
22. It was an act of piracy committed by Mohinder Singh etc., upon the Union of India. It was clear fraud and mis-representation upon which they have sought to thrive. They thrived on their fraud and mis-representation but for limited period.
23. In view of what I have said above, this application for restitution is allowed with costs. Counsel fee Rs. 1000/-. In addition, Mohinder Singh etc., are burdened with Rs. 1000/- as special costs, Mohinder Singh etc., shall refund the sum of Rs. 30,06,148.52 to the Union of India and also interest thereon at the rate of 24% per annum from the date when they got the amount in pursuance to the order of this court till they pay back the amount in compliance with this order. In case the amount drawn by them through execution is lying deposited in any Nationalised Bank, the rate of interest will be what the bank is awarding on that amount. Properties belonging to Mohinder Singh etc. shall remain under attachment till realisation, Similarly, their bank Accounts will remain frozen till payment back by them into this Court."
6. The order of the learned Additional District Judge were challenged in EFA No. 712 of 1986. While dealing with the various contentions, the learned Single Judge has held as under:-
"I have given my thoughtful consideration to the above submissions of the learned counsel for the appellants but I express my inability to agree with the same. The appellants without doubt made a misrepresentation. They styled themselves as decree holders and sought execution of the judgment of this Court for the enhanced amount of compensation which had, in fact, not been passed in their favour. No doubt, by inadvertence the learned Additional District Judge issued notice to the Union of India but for the reasons which remain unexplained the Union of India also hastened to deposit in court the amount claimed in execution and on statement made by its officer that there was no objection to the payment of this amount to the appellants, the court ordered the payment of the same to them. The appellants could not blow hot and cold. The learned counsel for them has not been able to show any provision in the Act which empowers any authority to execute the decree of this Court to secure payment of enhanced amount of compensation to the land-owners. The process of such an execution could only be initiated in a court of law. Indubitably, therefore, when the learned Additional District Judge issued notice to the Union of India on the application of the appellants, he did so as a court within the meaning of the Code. The amount was deposited by the Union of India in the court and the same was ordered to be paid to the appellants by the Court. Therefore, the remedy for the wrong done to the Union of India in this regard could only be secured through the court and thus in my view restitution application was rightly filed.
It is not disputed that the order of restitution passed by the learned Additional District Judge is not within the confine of Section 144 of the Code. He has, in fact, expressly invoked his inherent jurisdiction under Section 151 of the Code while passing this order. A mistake of the court cannot be made to cause injury to any one. Injury thus made could be repaired by it."
7. The learned Single Judge modified the order of learned Additional District Judge with regard to special costs of Rs. 10,000/- and the rate of interest of 24% per annum. While setting aside the order of special costs of Rs. 10,000/-, the rate of interest was reduced to 12% per annum. However, the order of recovery of the amount of Rs. 30,06,148.52 from the appellants was upheld. It is against the order of learned Single Judge that the present appeals have been preferred.
8. We have heard Shri M.L. Sarin, learned Senior counsel for the appellants and Shri R.S. Rai, learned Senior Standing counsel for Union of India and with their assistance have also perused the record and various documents placed on record.
9. Shri M.L. Sarin, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants has made the following submissions:-
(a) Under the 1952 Act, no Court is envisaged. Under Section 8(1)(b) of 1952 Act, learned Additional District Judge merely acts as an Arbitrator. Therefore, he has no jurisdiction to order restitution of the amount of Rs. 30,06,148.52. He relied on Section 19 of 1952 Act in support of his argument. He further submitted that the learned Additional District Judge has no power to act as an executing court and the amount of enhanced compensation paid was not in pursuance to any order passed by the learned Additional District Judge. The amount has been deposited by the Union of India on their own. For this proposition, he relied on paragraph 8 of a Full Bench judgment in the case of Syed Ajaz Ali Khan and Ors. v. Mohammad Rafiq and Ors. 1974 Allahabad 178.
(b) Under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, no power of restitution could be exercised for passing an order of the recovery of the amount of Rs. 30,06,148.52. For this proposition, he relics on a Division Bench judgment in the case of Ram Mehar v. Union of India, AIR 1987 Delhi 130.
(c) The proper remedy for Union of India to recover the afore-mentioned amount deposited and paid to the appellants was to file a civil suit and not a restitution application where the appellant could have claimed set off as they are entitled to the benefit of Section 23 (1-A) and Section 23(b) of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 (for brevity 'the 1894 Act'). For this proposition, reliance has been placed on a decision in the case of S.N. Banerji and Anr. v. Kuchwar Lime and Stone Co. Ltd. and Anr., A.I.R. 1941 Privy Council 128.
(d) The payment of enhanced compensation to the tune of Rs. 30,06,148.52 was just and fair amount of compensation within the meaning of Section 8(b) and (e) of 1952 Act. He submitted that the benefit of various provisions like Section 23(1)-A, 23(b) and Section 28-A of 1894 Act were available to the appellants. Hence, the payment of an amount of Rs. 30,06,148.52 is absolutely fair and in any case were payable in the eyes of law. For this proposition, he relied on a judgment in the case of Bhag Singh and Ors. v. Union Territory of Chandigarh, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 1576 and a Full Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Banta Singh and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., (1988-2)94 P.L.R. 49 (F.B.) and also para 9 of the case of The Scheduled Caste Co-operative Land Owning Society Ltd., Bhatinda v. Union of India and Ors., AIR 1991 SC 730.
(e) There was no misrepresentation on the part of the appellants nor they committed any lapse. Therefore, the findings of all the Courts below that there was misrepresentation are unsustainable.
(f) An additional submission has been made with regard to connected LPA No. 80 of 1987 that without recording a finding that some misrepresentation has been made or a fraud has been committed, order of restitution for paying back the amount of Rs. 24,97,440.34 could not have been made. He submitted that there was conscious application of mind and the office of DEO Pathankot calculated the amount of compensation which was payable to the appellants and forwarded the same to the Director, Defence, Lands and Cantonments, Ministry of Defence, Northern Command, P.O. Satwari, Jammu Cantt., who is sanctioning authority and after verifying the records, they had deposited the compensation payable to the appellants.
10. On the other hand, Shri R.S. Rai, learned Senior Standing Counsel appearing for the respondents-Union of India made the following submissions:-
(i) That the scheme of Section 8 of 1952 Act with regard to payment of compensation for acquiring the land is entirely different that the scheme of 1894 Act. According to the learned counsel, under Section 8(1)(a) of the 1952 Act, there can be acquisition of land and the compensation can be fixed by agreement and has to be paid in accordance with such agreement, if any. The other method of determination of compensation contemplated by Section 8(1)(b) of 1952 Act is that an Arbitrator can be appointed who would determine the fair and just compensation. Therefore, the machinery contemplated under Section 28-A of 1894 Act conferring power on the Collector to redetermine the amount of compensation is entirely different than the one provided by 1952 Act. A complete machinery has been provided under 1952 Act. A person whose land has been expropriated for defence purposes, is competent to file an appeal under Section 11 of 1952 Act.
(ii) In any case the appellants never invoked the provisions of Section 28-A of 1894 Act and at the same time he also did not invoke the provisions of 1952 Act.
(iii) The appellants claiming themselves to be the decree-holders and the respondents as judgment-debtors filed an application claiming that enhancement has been given in the case of Hoshnak Singh's case (supra) and accordingly they should also be allowed enhanced compensation. The Court of the learned Additional District Judge was completely mislead and an amount of Rs. 30,06,148.52 was deposited by the respondents.
(iv) That under the 1952 Act there is no concept of market value. The only obligation imposed on the Arbitrator is to award just and fair compensation. It is only on appeal under Section 11 of 1952 Act that the appellate authority could enhance compensation. The Union of India i.e., the appellants on their own could not enhance the compensation. The appellants never filed any such appeal as provided by Section 11 of 1952 Act.
(v) The appellants filed execution application on the proforma for execution meant for decree-holders. No notice could have been issued and the appellants would not have ever got the enhanced compensation of Rs. 30,06,148.52 had they not misrepresented.
(vi) Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that there is no parallel provision under the 1952 Act vis-a-vis Section 28-A of 1894 Act. He further submitted that under 1952 Act, rules have been framed in 1953 which are know by the same name. Under Rule 9(5), an offer is made to the expropriater of land and within 15 days of the receipt of offer, such person is required to communicate in writing to the competent authority his acceptance or otherwise offer. If he accepts the offer, then an agreement with the Central Government in Form 'K' is entered into. Otherwise under Rule 10 arbitration can be invoked. The argument is that the land owner of one Block of land could enter into an agreement for awarding of compensation, whereas the land owner of the adjoining land may ask for arbitration. There is no such procedure under the 1894 Act and, therefore, both the acts are different in their machinery, nature and contents.
(vii) The Court could order restitution under Section 144, read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure while exercising inherent jurisdiction as the law of restitution encompasses all claims founded on the principle of unjust enrichment. For this proposition, the learned counsel relied on the decision in the case of Mrs. Kavita Trehan and Anr. v. Balsara Hygiene Products Ltd., (1995-1)109 P.L.R. 315 (S.C.) (paragraphs 14 and 24 at page 447), Union Carbide Corporation etc. etc. v. Union of India, etc. etc. A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 248 (paragraph 76 at page 295) and Rajjab v. Ghulam Hussain Khan, A.I.R. 1931 Oudh. 12.
(viii) Section 28-A of 1894 Act does not apply to a case where a reference has been sought and secured under Section 18 or even to a case where an appeal has been filed. The procedure of Section 28-A of 1894 Act if allowed to follow in the present case would mean that the delay is condoned on the ground that in other case enhanced compensation has been awarded.
(ix) By ordering restitution, a wrong has been undone and the order of the learned Additional District Judge as upheld by the learned Single Judge are just and fair orders.
11. Before dealing with the respective arguments of the learned counsel for the parties, it would be advantageous to refer to the provisions of Sections 5, 8, 9, 10 and 11 1952 Act as well as Sections 23, 24, 25 and 28-A of the 1894 which are as under:-
"5. Rights over requisitioned property.- (i) All property requisition under Section 3, shall be used for such purposes as may be mentioned in the notice of requisitioned.
(2) where any premises are requisitioned under Section 3, the competent authority may order the landlord to execute such repairs as may be necessary and are usually made by landlords in that locality and as may be specified in the notice, within such reasonable time as may be mentioned therein, and if the landlord fails to execute any repairs in pursuance of such order, the competent authority may cause the repairs specified in the order to be executed at the expense of the landlord and the cost thereof may, without prejudice to any other mode of recovery, be deducted from the compensation payable to the landlord.
8. Principles and method of determining compensation.- (1) where any property is requisitioned or acquired under this Act, there shall be paid compensation the amount of which shall be determined in the manner and in accordance with the principles hereinafter set out, that is to say-
(a) where any amount of compensation can be fixed by agreement, it shall be paid in accordance with such agreement:
(b) the Central Government may, in any particular case, nominate a person having expert knowledge as to the nature of the property requisitioned or acquired to assist the arbitrator and where such nomination is made, the person to be compensated may also nominate an assessor for the same purpose:
(d) at the commencement of the proceedings before the arbitrator, the Central Government and the person to be compensated shall state what in their respective opinion is a fair amount of compensation.
(e) the arbitrator shall, after hearing the dispute, make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to him to be just and specifying the person or persons to whom such compensation shall be paid; and in making the award, he shall have regard to the circumstances of each case and the provisions of Sub-sections(2) and (3), so far as they are applicable.
(f) where there is any dispute as to the person or persons who are entitled to the compensation, the arbitrator shall decide such dispute and if the arbitrator finds that more persons than one are entitled to compensation, he shall apportion the amount thereof amongst such persons;
(g) nothing in the Arbitration Act, 1940 shall apply to arbitrations under this Section.
(2) the amount of compensation payable for the requisition of any property shall, subject to the provisions of Sub-sections (2A) and (2B), consist of-
(a) a recurring payment, in respect of the period of requisition, of a sum equal to the rent which would have been payable for the use and occupation of the property, if it had been taken on lease for that period; and
(b) such sum or sums, if any, as may be found necessary to compensate the person interested for all or any of the following matters, namely-
(i) pecuniary loss due to requisitioning;
(ii) expenses on account of vacating the requisitioned premises:
(iii) expenses on account of reoccupying the premises upon release from requisition; and
(iv) damages (other than normal) wear and tear) caused to the property during the period of requisition, including the expenses that may have to be incurred for restoring the property to the condition in which it was at the time of requisition.
(2A). The recurring payment, referred to in Clause (a) of sub Section (2) in respect of any property shall, unless the property is sooner released from requisition under Section 6 or acquired under Section 7, be revised in accordance with the provisions of sub Section (2B)-
(a) in a case where such property has been subject to requisition under this Act for the period of five years or a longer period immediately proceeding the commencement of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property (Amendment) Act, 1975-
(i) first with effect from the date of such commencement, and
(ii) secondly with effect from the expiry of five years,
(iii) thirdly with effect from the expiry often years, from such commencement:
(b) in a case where such property has been subject to requisition under this Act immediately before such commencement for a period shorter that five years and the maximum period within which such property shall, in accordance with the provisions of sub Section (1A) of Section 6, be released from requisition or acquired, extends beyond five years from such commencement,
(i) first with effect from the date of expiry of five years from the date on which possession of such property has been surrendered or delivered to, or taken by, the competent authority under Section 4, and
(ii) Secondly with effect from the date of expiry of five years, and thirdly with effect from the date of expiry often years, from the date on which the revision made under sub Clause (i) takes effect;
(c) in any other case,-
(i) first with effect from the date of expiry of five years from the date on which possession of such property has been surrendered or delivered to, or taken by, the competent authority under Section 4, and
(ii) secondly with effect from the date of expiry of five years and thirdly with effect from the date of expiry often years, from the date on which the revision under sub Clause (i) takes effect.
(2B) The recurring payment in respect of any property shall be revised by re-determining such payment in the manner and in accordance with the principles set out in Sub-section (i) read with Clause (a) of Sub-section (2), as if such property had been requisitioned under this Act on the date with effect from which the revision has to be made under Sub-section (2A).
(3) The compensation payable for the acquisition of any property under Section 7 shall be price which the requisitioned property would have fetched in open market, if it had remained in the same condition as it was at the time of requisitioning and been sold on the date of acquisition."
"9. Payment of Compensation.- The amount of compensation payable under an award shall subject to any rules made under this Act, be paid by the competent authority to the person or persons entitled thereto in such manner and within such time as may be specified in the award.
10. Appeals from orders of requisitioning -
(1) Any person aggrieved by an order of requisition made by the competent authority under sub Section (2) of Section 3 may, within twenty one days from the date of service of the order, prefer an appeal to the Central Government;
Provided that the Central Government may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of twenty one days, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal in time.
(2) On receipt of an appeal under Sub-section(1), the Central Government may, after calling for a report from the competent authority and giving an opportunity to the parties of being heard and after making such further inquiry, if any, as may be necessary, pass such orders as it thinks fit and the order of the Central Government shall be final:
(3) Where an appeal is preferred under Sub Section (1), the Central Government may stay the enforcement of the order of the competent authority for such period and on such conditions as it thinks fit.
11. Appeals from awards in respect of compensation.- Any person aggrieved by an award of the arbitrator made under Section 8 may, within thirty days from the date of such award, prefer an appeal to the High Court within whose jurisdiction the requisitioned or acquired property is situate:
Provided that the High Court may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal in time."
"23. Matters to be considered in determining compensation.
(1) In determining the amount of compensation to be awarded for land acquired under this Act, the Court shall take into consideration-first, the market value of the land at the date of the publication of the notification under Section 4, sub Section (1);
Secondly, the damage sustained by the person interested, by reason of taking of any standing crop or trees which may be on the land at the time of the Collector's taking possession thereof:
thirdly, the damage (if any) sustained by the person interested, at the time of the Collector's taking possession of the land by reason of servering such land from his other land.
fourthly, the damage(if any) sustained by the person interested, at the time of the Collectors taking possession of the land, by reason of the acquisition injuriously effecting his other property, movable or immovable, in any other manner, or his earning-
fifthly, if, in consequence of the acquisition of the land by the Collector, the person interested is compelled to change his residence or place of business, the reasonable expenses (if any) incidental to such change; and sixthly, the damage (if any) bona fide resulting from diminution of the profits of the land between the time of the publication of the declaration under Section 6 and the time of the Collector's taking possession of the land.
(1-A) In addition to the market value of the land as above provided, the Court shall in every case award an amount calculated at the rate of twelve per centum per annum on such market value for the period commencing on and from the date of the publication of the notification under Section 4, Sub-section (1), in respect of such land to the date of the award of the Collector or the date of taking possession of the land, whichever is earlier.
Explanation.- In Computing the period referred to in this Sub-section, any period or periods during which the proceedings for the acquisition of the land were held on account of any stay or injunction by the order of any Court shall be excluded) (2) In addition to the market value of the land, as above provided, the Court shall in every case award a sum of thirty per centum on such market value, in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition.
24. Matters to be neglected in determining compensation.- But the Court shall not take into consideration-
firstly, the degree of urgency which has led to the acquisition;
secondly, any disinclination of the person interested to part with the land acquired:
thirdly, any damage sustained by him which, if caused by a private person, would not render such person liable to a suit:
fourthly, any damage which is likely to be caused to the land acquired, after the date of the publication of the declaration under Section 6, by or in consequence of the use to which it will be put:
fifthly, any increase to the value of the land acquired likely to accrue from the use to which it will be put when acquired:
sixthly, any increase to the value of the other land of the person interested likely to accrue from the use to which the land acquired will be put;
seventhly, any outlay or improvements on, or disposal of, the land acquired, commenced, made or effected without the sanction of the Collector after the date of the publication of the notification under Section 4, sub Section (1): or eighthly, any increase to the value of the land on account of its being put to any use which is forbidden by law or opposed to public policy.
25. Amount of compensation by Court not to be lower than the amount awarded by the Collector. - The amount of compensation awarded by the Court shall not be less than the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11.
28-A. Redetermination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the award of the Court. - (1) Where in an award under this Part, the Court allows to the applicant any amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11, the persons interested in all the other land covered by the same notification under Section 4, Sub-section (1) and who are also aggrieved by the award of the Collector may, notwithstanding that they had not made an application to the Collector under Section 18, by written application to the Collector within three months from the date of the award of the Court require that the amount of compensation payable to them may be re-determined on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the Court:
Provided that in computing the period of three months within which an application to the Collector shall be made under this sub-section, the day on which the award was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded.
(2) The Collector shall, on receipt of an application under Sub-section (1), conduct an inquiry after giving notice to all the persons interested and giving them a reasonable opportunity of being heard and make an award determining the amount of compensation payable to the applicants.
(3) Any person who has not accepted the award under Sub-section (2) may, by written application to the Collector require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court and the provisions of Sections 18 to 28 shall, so far as may be, apply to such reference as they apply to a reference under Section 18."
12. A perusal of the various provisions of the two Acts makes it obvious that entirely different machinery has been provided under the 1952 Act than the one envisaged under the 1894 Act with regard to determination of compensation. It is further clear that under the 1952 Act compensation can be fixed by agreement between the parties which shall be paid in accordance with such agreement and in the absence of any agreement, the compensation is to be assessed by the Arbitrator. The Arbitrator is required to make the award determining the amount of compensation which appear to him to be just. It is further clear that under the 1952 Act no solatium or interest has been provided. On the contrary in 1894 Act, there is no provision for payment of compensation by agreement nor there is no provision for appointment of Arbitrator, 1894 Act provides for uniform procedure namely under Sections 11, 11A and 12 the Collector has to announce the award and on a reference to the Court under Section 18, the award could be challenged before the specified Court which is the Court of District Judge in Punjab and Haryana. Under Sections 23 and 24 various factors have been mentioned which are required to be taken into consideration and which are required to be neglected from consideration in determining the compensation. Under Section 23, the factors required to be taken into consideration are market value of the land on the date of publication of notification under Section 4(1) and the damage sustained by the interested person by reason of taking of standing trees, crops, severing one piece of land from the other the acquisition injuriously affecting his other movable or immovable property etc. etc., Under Section 23 (1-A) which is added by an Act No. 68 of 1984, 12 percent additional compensation over and above the market value is required to be assessed and awarded from the date of notification under Section 4(1) and 13 percent solatium is also required to be awarded. No such provision is available under the 1952 Act. Under Section 28 A which was added by Act No. 68 of 1984, further provision has been made in order to bring uniformity in the award of compensation in as much as an interested person/claimants can apply to the Collector, even if he has not filed an application for enhancement of compensation under Section 18 before the reference Court, to redetermine the amount of compensation on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the Court. Again, there is no such provision in the 1952 Act.
13. It is appropriate to mention that the provisions of 1952 Act were challenged before the Apex. Court on the ground of discrimination, inasmuch as under the 1894 Act various benefits to the claimants have been provided by Sections 23(1)-A, 23(b) and 28-A of the 1894 Act which have not been allowed by the 1952 Act. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Hari Krishan Khosla (Dead) by LRs. 1993 Supp(2) S.C.C. 149 held that the failure to provide various benefits provided by 1894 Act like solatium @ 15% per annum and enhanced interest does not make the 1952 Act as discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The view has been followed in the case of Union of India and Ors. v. Swaran Singh and Ors., (1998)8 S.C.C. and also in the case of Union of India v. Asha Sharma (Smt) and Ors., (1998)2 S.C.C. 698. In paragraph 3 at page 594 in the case of Swaran Singh (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed as under:-
"The only question is whether the respondents are entitled to the payment of solatium and interest to the payment of solatium and interest under the provisions of Requisition and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952. The controversy is no longer res integra. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Union of India v. Hari Krishan Khosla had considered the entire controversy and had held that the respondents were not entitled to the payment of interest and solatium. The learned counsel for the respondents sought to place reliance upon a two-Judge Bench decision in Rao Narain Singh v. Union of India. In view of the decision in Hari Krishan Khosla case the ratio of Rao Narain Singh case is no longer good in law."
14. The first question to our mind which falls for determination in these appeals is as to whether the appellants obtained a sum of Rs. 30,06,148.52 by misrepresentation to the Court or without committing any lapse. We have examined the record and found that the proforma meant for execution of decree was filled up by the appellants holding themselves out to be the decree-holders and the respondents to be the judgment-debtors which resulted into an erroneous belief in the mind of the Court that a decree has been passed in favour of the appellants and notice of that application was given. It was on the basis of the notice given by the court that the amount claimed was deposited. This aspect has been considered by the learned Additional District Judge and he has concluded in paragraphs already quoted above that the act of Mohinder Singh to hold out himself as a decree holder was an act of day piracy committed by him upon the respondents. The learned Additional District Judge also found that even the department of the respondents acted in a very wreckless and irresponsible manner. The learned Single Judge also considered this aspect and found that the appellants undoubtedly had made mis-representation. They styled themselves as, decree-holders and sought execution of the judgment of this Court for enhanced compensation which had in fact not been passed in their favour. In view of the above, we are convinced that the appellants are guilty of making misrepresentation and committing fraud on the Union of India. The contentions of the learned counsel for the appellants have to be viewed and examined in the context of the findings given by the Courts below with regard to misrepresentation fraud.
15. The Law concerning practising of fraud on the Courts is absolutely clear by a catena of judgments of the Supreme court. It has been held that Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure confers inherent power on the Courts/Tribunals to recall an order earlier passed if fraud or collusion have been used to obtain the judgment/order. The case of United India Insurance Co. Ltd., v. Rajendra Singh and Ors., (2000)3 S.C.C. 581, presented before the Supreme Court in similar situation where the award was obtained from the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal by making mis-representation and committing fraud. The facts were that one Rajindra Singh and his son] Sanjay Singh claimed an amount of Rs. 4 lacs and Rs. 55 lacs alleging that Sanjay Singh was driving a two wheeler motorcycle and Rajindra Singh, his father, was a pillion. An ambassador car which was covered by a policy of the insurance of United India Insurance Co. Ltd. hit the claimants, causing injuries to both the them. The allegation of negligent driving of the car was sustained by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal and an award of Rs. 3,55,000/- in favour of Rajindra Singh pillion-rider and Rs. 1,52,000/- in favour of Sanjay Singh, the driver of the two wheeler was made with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of the claim petition. The award became final as no one filed the appeal. However, the United India Insurance Company Limited discovered a photo copy of the report prepared by the police which contained a narration that Rajindra Singh and Sanjay Singh had received the injuries in different circumstance at a different public place altogether i.e., they were operating their own tractor which got struck into a ditch and because of the jerk, the occupants of the tractor slipped down and sustained injuries. On discovery of these facts, the United India Insurance Company filed two applications under Sections 151, 152 and 153 of the Code of Civil Procedure before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal and requested for annulment of the award in view of the facts. The learned Tribunal dismissed the application accepting the plea of the claimants that it totally lacks jurisdiction to review or recall the awards. Even the High Court in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution took the view that there was no power of review under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. In these circumstances allowing the appeal of the Insurance Company, their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed as under:-
"11. Thus the Tribunal refused to open the door to the appellant company as the High Court declined to exercise its writ jurisdiction which is almost plenary for which no statutory constrictions could possibly be imposed. If a party complaining of fraud having been practiced on him as well as on the court by another party resulting in a decree, cannot avail himself of the remedy of review or even the writ jurisdiction of the High Court, what else is the alternative remedy for him? Is he to surrender to the product of the fraud and thereby became a conduit to enrich the imposter unjustly? Learned Singled Judge who indicated some other alternative remedy did not unfortunately spell out what is the other remedy which the appellant Insurance Company could pursue.
12. No one can possibly fault the Insurance Company for persistently pursuing the matter up to this Court because they are dealing with public money. If they have discovered that such public fund, in a whopping measure, would be knocked off fraudulently through a fake claim, there is full justification for the Insurance Company in approaching the Tribunal itself first. At any rate the High Court ought not to have refused to consider their grievances. What is the legal remedy when a party to a judgment or order of court latter discovered that it was obtained by fraud?
16. Therefore, we have no doubt that the remedy to move for recalling the order on the basis of the newly-discovered facts amounting to fraud of high degree, cannot be foreclosed in such a situation. No court or tribunal can be regarded as powerless to recall its own order if it is convinced that the order was wangled through fraud or misrepresentation of such a dimension as would affect the very basis of the claim."
16. Similar view has been taken in S.P. Chengalveraya Naidu v. Jagannath, (1995-1)109 P.L.R. 293 (S.C.):-
"Fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal observed Chief Justice Edward Coke of England about three centuries ago. It is the settled proposition of law that a judgment or decree obtained by playing fraud on the court is a nullity and non est in the eyes of law, Such a judgment/decree by the first court or by the highest court has to be treated as a nullity by every court, whether superior or inferior. It can be challenged in any court even in collateral proceedings:"
17. In Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres (India) Pvt. Ltd., (1996)5 S.C.C. 550, their Lordships of the Supreme Court took the following view;-
"This plea could not have been legally ignored by the Commission which needs to be reminded that the authorities, be they constitutional, statutory or administrative, (and particularly those who have to decide a lis) possess the fraud and justice never dwell together (Fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant). It has been repeatedly said that fraud and deceit defend or excuse no main (Fraus et dolus nemini patrocinari debent).
xx xx xx xx xx xx xx The judiciary in India also possesses inherent power, specially under Section 151 CPC, to recall its judgment or order if it is obtained by fraud on court. In the case of fraud on a party to the suit or proceedings, the court may direct the affected party to file a separate suit for setting aside the decree obtained by fraud. Inherent powers are powers which are resident in all courts, especially of superior jurisdiction. These powers spring not from legislation but from the nature and the constitution of the tribunals or courts themselves so a to enable them to maintain their dignity, secure obedience To its process and rules, protect its officers from indignity and wrong and to punish unseemly behaviour. This power is necessary for the orderly administration of the court's business. Since fraud affects the solemnity, regularity and orderliness of the proceedings of the court and also amounts to an abuse of the process of court, the courts have been held to have inherent power to set aside an order obtained by fraud practised upon that court. Similarly, where the court is misled by a party or the court itself commits a mistake which prejudices a party, the court has the inherent power to recall its order."
18. The Supreme Court still in another judgment dealt with the question as to whether the Courts after delivery of the order obtained by mis-representation and fraud becomes functus officio or they still retain jurisdiction to recall such order. The question arose in the case of Baidyanath Dubey v. Deonandan Singh and Anr., 1968 Supreme Court Decisions 275. The observations of their Lordships are apposite to the question before us which are as under:-
"It cannot be doubted that a Court has inherent powers to recall orders obtained by practising fraud on it, at the instance of a party to the proceedings. There is no question of the Court being functus officio because the Court retains the jurisdiction to recall such orders. The learned counsel referred to us the following observations made by Shah, J., in the dissenting judgment, in Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal.
"Inherent jurisdiction of the Court to make orders ex debtio justitiae is undoubtedly affirmed by Section 151 of the Code, but that jurisdiction cannot be exercised so as to nullify the provisions of the Code. Where the Code deals expressly with a particular matter, the provisions should normally be regarded as exhaustive."
But the majority in that case seems to have held otherwise, for Raghubar Dayal, J., observed:
"The Section (Section 151) itself says that nothing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to make orders necessary for the ends of justice. In the face of such a clear statement it is not possible to hold that the provisions of the Code control the inherent power by limiting it or otherwise affecting it. The inherent power has not been conferred upon the Court by virtue of its duty to do justice between the parties before it.
Further, when the Code itself recognizes the existence of the inherent power of the Court, there is no question of implying any powers outside the limits of the Code.
But here no question of nullifying any provisions of the Code arises. Order XXI, Rule 78 on which reliance was placed is no bar to the exercise of the jurisdiction under Section 151, Civil Procedure Code, in cases like the present where it is alleged that orders have been obtained by fraud practiced on the Court. It is not a case of any irregularity in publishing or conducting the sale. It has not been shown which other express provision of the Code would be nullified if the impugned orders are recalled by the Court under Section 151."
19. The first submission of the learned counsel for the appellants that the Addl. District Judge had no power to act as an executing Court and the amount of enhanced compensation paid was not in pursuance to any order passed or direction given by the learned Addl. District Judge merits outright rejection. It has come on record that the appellants have used proforma which is required for filing execution application holding themselves out be the decree holders and the Union of India-respondents as judgment debtors. It was on the basis of these declarations by the appellant that additional amount of compensation was paid by the Union of India-respondents. The process of the Court has been used in the practice of fraud and mis-representation and the Officers of the Union of India were also involved as is pointed out by the learned Addl. District Judge. Paragraph 8 of the Full Bench judgment in the case of Syed Ajaz Ali Khan (supra) cannot be considered to be a good law in view of the Supreme Court judgment in the case of Rajinder Singh's case (supra). The inherent powers even of the Tribunal in cases of mis-representation and fraud practiced on them have been kept intact by the Supreme Court in Rajinder Singh's case (supra) and, therefore, there is no reason for us to accept that the distinction subsist in view of para 8 of the Full Bench judgment of the Allahabad High Court. Rajinder Singh's case (supra) is also a case arising out of the award of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. Under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts under Section 175 of the Motor Vehicles Act are also barred and it is allowed by Section 19 of the 1952 Act. Moreover, it does not lie in the mouth of the appellants to advance this arguments once they themselves have invoked this very jurisdiction.
20. The second argument of the learned counsel for the appellants also merits rejection in view of the various judgments of the Supreme Court like Rajinder Singh's case (supra): Indian Bank's case (supra) and Jagan Nath's case (supra). The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Ram Mehar's cafe (supra) does not advance the case of the appellants. In that case, the Delhi High Court has awarded higher amount of compensation to the claimant who was awarded lessor compensation by the High Court earlier in point of time moved an application under Section 151 CPC read with Order 47, Rule 1 CPC. The Division Bench of the High Court took the view that under Section 28 A of the 1894 Act, a specific provision has been made for re-determination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the award of the Court. The Division Bench infact exercised its inherent jurisdiction and enhanced amount to the claimant as the claimant could not have gone back to the Collector for re-determination. Therefore, this judgment does not advance the case of the appellants.
21. The third argument of the learned counsel for the appellants again deserves to be rejected in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Rajinder Singh's case (supra), In that case a distinction has been drawn between fraud and mis-representation practised on the Court and the party. In a case where a fraud has been affected on the party, the remedy of restitution could be said to be appropriate remedy but not in a case where fraud and mis-representation has been practiced on the Court. The judgment of the Privy Council in the case of S.N. Benerjee's case (supra) relied on by the learned counsel for the appellants to argue that restitution cannot be resorted to under Section 144 has no application to the facts and circumstances of this case. In that case, the Secretary of the State in 1928 granted query leases to the Kuchwar Lime and Stone Company Ltd. for a term of 20 years of the queries in question. The condition in the lease deed was that the lessees would not transfer any right or interest or sublet all or any of the terms without the assent of the competent authority. Kuchwar Lime and Stone Company went into liquidation in 1933 and had agreed with one Bose for the sale to him of the rights under both the leases subject to the sanction of the competent authority. Under an unregistered document, it was agreed between the company and Bose that he would act as an agent for the Company, pay to the Company all the dues payable by it to the Government and working queries for his own profit. In 1934, the Government forfeited the leases for breach of the condition. It granted permission to S.N. Bnerjee and Ghosh to enter and work the queries. There was no execution of the lease deed. It was in these circumstances that the Kuchwar Lime and Stone Company brought a suit against the Secretary of the State that the leases granted to them may not be forfeited and prayed for an injunction to restrain them or their agents or granting lease to S.N. Banerjee and Ghosh or any other. The suit was dismissed by the High Court in February, 1936 and allowed the appeal and made declaration and granted injunction. The appeal was also dismissed by the Privy Council holding that the grant of rights to Bose by way of an unregistered agreement pending the sanction of the competent authority was invalid and it could not be valid to create forfeiture. During the intervening period, the Kuchwar Lime and Stone Company filed a contempt petition against the Secretary of the State as well as S.N. Banerjee and Ghosh. In the contempt petition, the High Court found the parties to be in contempt and on receiving apology ordered them to pay the costs. Thereafter S.N. Banerjee and Ghosh ceased to work the queries. They filed an appeal to the privy Council against the order of contempt and their appeal was allowed holding that there was no breach of injunction. It was in these circumstances that S.N. Banerjee and Ghosh applied for a petition to the High Court under Section 144 for restitution possession and the High Court having rejected their prayer S.N. Banerjee and Ghosh went before the Privy Council who dismissed their appeals. The Privy Council observed that restitution could be resorted to only if there was a variation in the terms of the decree. As there was no decree, therefore, the provisions of Section 144 would not be attached. It is thus clear that the judgment in S.N. Banerjee's case (supra) has no bearing on the facts before us, Hence, the reliance of the learned counsel on this judgment is misplaced. The Supreme Court has categorically held that the Tribunal or the Court always retain the power of passing order of restitution specially when there was mis-representation and fraud played on the Court. Moreover, the proposition enunciated with regard to the law of restitution encompasses all claims founded on the principle of unjust enrichment. Section 144 of the Code is not exhaustive it merely contemplates only a general law of restitution and restitution can be ordered under inherent powers where a particular case is not strictly covered within the ambit of Section 144 CPC. This view has been taken by the Supreme Court in the case of Kavita Trehan and Anr. v. Balsara Hygiene Products Ltd. (1994)5 S.C.C. 380. We are further of the view that once the forum of the Court has been used for the purposes of purported execution of a non existent decree, then the consequences flowing there from resulting into payment of a sum of Rs. 30,06,148.52 have to be considered in pursuance to the proceedings taken in the Court.
22. It is not a case where fraud has been practiced on the party to the suit or proceedings necessitating a direction to the defrauded party to file a separate suit seeking setting aside of the decree as is laid down in the case of Indian Bank's case (supra). In that case a distinction has been drawn by the Supreme Court as to whether a fraud or mis-representation has been made on the Court or fraud has been played on the party to the suit or proceedings. Therefore, we have no hesitation in rejecting the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants.
23. The next submissions of Shri M.L. Sarin, learned counsel for the appellants also lacks substance. Just and fair amount of compensation within the meaning of Section 8(b) of the 1952 Act has to be determined by the competent authority, i.e., Arbitrator. The judgment in Bhag Singh's case (supra) : Banta Singh's case (supra) and Scheduled Caste Cooperative Land owning Society's case (supra) have been given under the 1894 Act. In view of the view taken by the Supreme Court in Hari Kishan Khosla's case (supra), the principles laid down under the 1894 Act for granting various benefits cannot be extended to the land acquired under the 1952 Act. Therefore, there is no substance in the argument of the learned counsel. However, reliance has been placed on the observations made in para 9 of the Scheduled Caste Cooperative Land owning Society Ltd. 'case (supra) which reads as under: -
"Before we part, we may point out that the petitioner-society comprises of members belonging to the Scheduled Caste. Their land was expropriated for a public purpose. In law we are unable to entertain their claim as that would open up flood gates for similar application in innumerable cases which may have become final. Nonetheless, as pointed out by the Full Bench of the High Court, the Government is not precluded from paying the balance amount ex gratia to the society whose members belong to the economically deprived segment of the society. A copy of this judgment may be sent to the concerned department by a letter pointing out these observations for appropriate action."
24. A perusal of the above para shows that compassionate view was taken by the Supreme Court in view of the fact that the members of the cooperative land owning society belonged to economically backward segment of the society. It has been stated at the Bar by the learned counsel for the appellants that all other claimants whose land was expropriated for a public purpose have been granted the benefit of enhanced compensation except the appellant and he prayed that the government is not precluded from paying the balance amount to them on its own. We find no justification for accepting this submission of the learned counsel as in law there is no rule for the persons like the appellants.
25. The next contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that there was no mis-representation on the part of the appellants has to be rejected in view of the finding of the three courts that there was a fraud or mis-representation on the part of the appellants because; (a) there is no convincing reason furnished before us to reverse the findings of fact; and (b) after perusal of the record, we are satisfied that the fraud was committed and mis-representation was made in connivance with the officers of the respondents.
26. The last submission of the learned counsel for the appellant made on behalf of Raghu Nath and others is that in their cases no finding of mis-representation or fraud was recorded and in such a case, the order of restitution for paying back the amount of compensation could not have been made. This contention is without any merit and is factually incorrect. The learned Addl. District Judge in his order has specifically held that Inder Singh had played fraud and has made mis-representation and his legal representatives now representing him cannot thrive of the fraud or mis-representation. The observations of the learned Addl. District Judge recorded in para 21 are as under: -
"Inder Singh played still more foul. He put in execution without realising that there is no award by the Hon'ble High Court in his favour, It speaks of his evil mind that without there being any award in his favour, he put in execution application and the worse part is that instead of depositing the amount in a sporting spirit, the respondents took up frivolous and false defence to be able to withhold unto them the payment received by Inder Singh.
It was an act of piracy committed by Inder Singh upon the Union of India. It was sheer fraud and mis-representation upon which his L.Rs have sought to thrive. They thrived on fraud and misrepresentation but for limited period."
27. We are also unable to accept in contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that benefit of Section 23(1-A), 23 B and 28 A of the 1894 Act are available to the appellants. It is now well settled that the principles of acquisition under the 1952 Act are entirely different than those postulated by the 1984 Act and the benefits of 1984 Act given by Sections 23(1-A) 23 B and 28 A of the 1894 Act are not available to the claimants/interested persons.
28. In view of the reasons recorded above, we are of the view there is no merit in these appeals and the same are liable to be dismissed. Ordered accordingly. However, there will be no order as to costs.
Sd/-C.S. Singhvi, J.