Punjab-Haryana High Court
Surjit Kaur And Ors. vs State Of Punjab And Ors. on 2 July, 2003
Equivalent citations: AIR2004P&H152, (2004)137PLR146, AIR 2004 PUNJAB AND HARYANA 289, (2004) 2 PUN LR 146, (2003) 4 RECCIVR 399, (2004) 1 LACC 3
Author: Jasbir Singh
Bench: Jasbir Singh
JUDGMENT V.K. Bali, J.
1. The pertinent question that needs determination in the present writ filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is as to whether the petitioners, whose land was acquired, for execution of a scheme under the provisions of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922, and who have not only received compensation of such land but even on reference, also received enhanced compensation, can challenge the acquisition proceedings, primarily on the ground that land is not to be put to the use for which it was acquired for changing the scheme for some other purpose.
2. For the purpose of deciding the question aforesaid, facts of the case need a necessary mention. The pleaded case of petitioners is that Pritam Singh, their predecessor-in-interest, was allotted land measuring 4 Bighas 17 Biswas in village Nur Bhaini, District Ludhiana, under the Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 on February 27, 1959. The respondent-Improvement Trust, Ludhiana, framed a development scheme known as Model Town Extension Part-I Scheme under Section 36 of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922 (here-in-after referred to as 'the Act'), which is equivalent to Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, on September 16, 1960. Meanwhile, the land, allotted to the petitioners was cancelled vide order dated March 29, 1962 because of some dispute pertaining to classification of land being urban or sub-urban and the land reverted to the Central Government. The scheme was, however, sanctioned by the Government as declaration under Section 42 of the Act, which is equivalent to Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, followed on May 7, 1964. The Collector made award on March, 31, 1965, wherein land allotted to Pritam Singh was also included, even though land of those, who were similarly situated, had since been exempted. Meanwhile, vide orders dated February 12, 1981, allotment of land made to Pritam Singh was restored in favour of the petitioners in an appeal that was filed against order dated March 29, 1962. The petitioners, however, remained in possession throughout. In 1984, the respondent-Trust issued notice under Section 9 of the Act to the occupants and invited claims. Some of the occupants, however, filed writ petitions in this Court which were allowed on July 25, 1984 and notifications, Annexures P3 and P4, issued under Sections 36 and 42 of the Act were quashed. Petitioners, being displaced persons, as pleaded in the writ petition, were allotted two plots No. 173 and 174 and they even deposited full price of Rs. 31,000/- but the Trust did not earmark the plots nor delivered possession of the same. Meanwhile, the petitioners had received compensation of Rs. 43,140/ as determined by the Land Acquisition Collector, even prior to 1970. On August 30, 1994, petitioners made representation to the respondent-Trust for exemption of their land because it was not abutting any road and remained unutilised by the Trust. It is the case of petitioners that a conscious decision was taken and consequently, resolution bearing No. 280 dated August 30, 1994 was passed to exempt the land of the petitioners. The case was referred to the State Government for sanctioning the exemption. Later on, without notice to the petitioners, the Trust withdrew the resolution by passing another resolution dated July 23, 1996. Constrained, the petitioners moved yet another representation for exemption of their land on May 9, 2000 to the Trust and other higher authorities. However, the petitioners came to know that various authorities, like Director, Local Government and Joint Secretary, Local Government had recommended the exemption of land of petitioner on their representation. It is the case of petitioners that respondent-Trust passed some resolution for alteration of layout plan by reviving the scheme of 1960 on July 9, 1998 and the Government accorded the sanction vide notification dated April 29, 1999. They further learnt that the respondent-Trust had decided to construct MIG/LIG flats by changing the original scheme and re-naming the same as Model Town Extension Part-II. A copy of the advertisement for inviting the applications published by the respondent-Trust on August 15, 2002 has been placed on record as Annexure P10.
3. It is so pleaded and argued by learned counsel for the petitioners that in view of change in the scheme from the original to Model Town Extension-11, notifications, Annexures P3 and P4 and award, Annexure P5, have necessarily to be set aside as the scheme envisaged under the notifications aforesaid and the award had elapsed and had been abandoned qua the land of petitioners.
4. In response to notice issued by this Court, respondents have entered defence and hotly contested the case of the petitioners. It has, inter-alia, been pleaded in the preliminary objections of the written statements filed by respondents 2 and 3 that the petitioners have not only come to this Court with soiled hands but have further got the interim orders by not disclosing the fact that on the same questions which now have been raised in the present petition they lost the legal battle up to this Court in R.S.A. No. 877 of 1998 and, thus, on this ground alone, present petition needs to be dismissed with heavy and exemplary costs. Petitioners have further got an interim order in their favour by wrongly stating the facts and by not disclosing the factum of finality of the similar legal proceedings inter-se between them arid the Trust. It is pleaded that it is settled proposition of law that in such a situation not only that writ petition deserves to be dismissed but the petitioners are also liable to be saddled with exemplary heavy costs. While giving the details of the suit, it is pleaded that Pritam Singh, predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners, had instituted a suit for permanent injunction against the Improvement Trust, Ludhiana, raising the same questions, as involved in the present petition and involving the same land in question which was dismissed by the Sub Judge 1st Class, Ludhiana, vide order dated August 16, 1986. The Civil Court returned findings that the award with regard to suit property was given on March 31, 1965 and possession of the same was delivered to the Trust by the Land Acquisition Collector. The plaintiff also recetyed compensation of the land acquired on February 8, 1966 as also enhanced compensation. The plaintiff also admitted the receipt of compensation from the Trust. It was found by the Civil Court that no injunction could be granted to the plaintiff when he had received compensation for the land acquired and accepted the same as well. It was further pleaded that no relief could be granted to him with regard to plot Nos. 173 and 174 alleged to have been allotted to him by the Improvement Trust. It was further held that he had failed to established his title with regard to these plots. Feeling aggrieved against the judgment and decree dated August 16, 1988, plaintiff filed an appeal which was dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge, Ludhiana, vide judgment and decree dated January 9, 1998. It was found that acquisition was quashed only regarding land measuring 17 Bighas 6 Biswas 1 Biswansis of village Noor Bhaini. Insofar as land measuring 4 Biggas 16 Biswas 9 Biswansis is concerned, that was not included in the land qua which the acquisition was quashed and as such plaintiff could not draw any support from the judgment in CWP No. 867 of 1984. He could not claim to be owner of the land in suit as the same had been acquired according to the provisions of law. The award was given and compensation was paid to him. The possession was taken from him and the Trust was put in possession. It was also found that the plaintiff could have pursued the remedy available to him for getting possession of the plot Nos.173 and 174 allotted to him. He could not resist the possession of the Trust qua land which had been duly acquired. The plaintiff, represented by his legal representatives, i.e., present petitioners, came up in appeal before this Court by way of RSA No. 877 of 1998. The Hon'ble Single Bench of this Court, vide a detailed order, dismissed the appeal by inter-alia, observing thus:-
"It would bear repetition that quashing of the acquisition in CWPs No. 860 to 877 of 1984 did not concern the land in suit. Land in suit was acquired according to the provisions of law. Plaintiff was recorded owner in possession of the suit land in the revenue record at the time when it was acquired. There was no equity in favour of the plaintiff when he had been paid compensation and he had accepted the compensation and possession had been taken from him. Assuming that he had re-entered the land, he was not entitled to the equitable relief of injunction. After he had received compensation, his re-entry into land will be viewed as an act of trespass on his part. Plots were allotted to the plaintiff by the Trust and he paid price thereof vie receipts Ex.P2 to P35 to the Trust. Plaintiff could pursue his remedy so far as these plots are concerned but he had no right to thwart possession of the Trust in lieu of these plots.
xx xx xx xx xx In view of the fact that land in suit of which the plaintiff was owner, was acquired by the Trust for the Model Town Extension Scheme No. 1 for which, he had been paid compensation and of which possession had been taken from him by the Trust, he is not entitled to injunction. This appeal fails and is dismissed. Improvement Trust is, however, directed to treat the plaintiff as local displaced person and if possession of plots No. 173 and 174 cannot be given to him/his LRs, they be given some other plot/plots in this scheme if not in this scheme in some other scheme of the Trust on the price prevailing at the time of allotment being charged by the Trust."
5. A copy of order passed by this Court in the RSA aforesaid has been placed on record as Annexure R2/1.
6. While giving facts of the case pertaining to scheme, it has been averred that notifications under Sections 36/42 of the Act were indeed issued and award was also rendered by the Land Acquisition Collector on March 31, 1965 for about 165 acres of land. As per the award and Jamabandi for the year 1959-60, Pritam Singh was owner of land measuring 4 Biggas 16 Biswas 19 Biswansis. According to award dated March 31, 1965, land measuring 17 Bighas, 6 Biswas and 8 Biswansis belonged to the Central Government and the Trust was advised to acquire this land by negotiation with the Regional Settlement Commissioner, Jalandhar, by the Land Acquisition Collector. There was no mistake including the land previously owned by Pritam Singh in award dated March 31, 1965 because as per revenue record the land was owned by Shri Pritam Singh. As per the award, Shri Pritam Singh duly received compensation of the legally acquired land on March 31, 1965 and the possession of land was also delivered to the Trust on February 8, 1966. It is then pleaded that insofar as writ petition filed in this Court by some other land owners is concerned, decision of the same could not come to the rescue of petitioners inasmuch as acquisition proceedings were quashed only qua the land which belonged to the Central Government and was allotted/transferred to various persons and was separate and distinct from the land which was allotted to various persons. It is the positive case of respondent-Trust that representations of the petitioners were dismissed on January 2, 2003 by the competent authority. Insofar as construction of flats is concerned, it is the case of respondent-Trust that the flats are being constructed legally as the scheme is being implemented on the validly acquired land. It is then pleaded that scheme had wrongly been mentioned in the advertisement as Part-II whereas it was Part-I, as clarified letter on in the advertisement dated September 2, 2002, which appeared in the various newspapers. Without specifically denying the change brought about in the scheme, it is pleaded that the petitioners have no right whatsoever to challenge the acquisition proceedings regarding which they received compensation almost 40 years ago.
7. Short affidavit of Deepak Raj Garg, Joint Secretary to Government of Punjab, Department of Local Government has been filed on behalf of respondent No. 1, wherein it has been pleaded that reply filed by respondent No. 2 be treated as reply filed on behalf of respondent No. 1 as well.
8. Petitioners have filed replication to the written statement filed on behalf of respondents 1 and 2 wherein, it is pleaded that the suit was filed by the petitioners for injunction for restraining the respondent Trust from dispossessing the petitioners without due course of law. The suit was dismissed and the appeals were also dismissed by the learned District Judge as well as by the High Court. It has further been pleaded that petitioners are still in possession and the proceedings for taking possession by the respondent-trust under the old scheme, if any, was a paper transaction. It is then pleaded that the petitioners undertake to return the amount of compensation received by their predecessor-in-interest after adjusting the amount paid by him to the respondent-Trust as instalments for the price of plot Nos. 173 and 174 allotted to him. They have further undertaken to pay other charges such as development charges etc. in case the land of the petitioners was exempted from acquisition as also to abide by the terms and conditions that may be imposed for the release of the land in dispute by this Court. It has also been pleaded that the cause of action to file the present petition had arisen to the petitioners from resolution dated August 30, 1994 (Annexure P7) from the abandonment of the old scheme and framing of the new scheme which was illegally sanctioned by the respondent-State on April 29, 1999 vide notification, Annexure P-9 as also from the action of the respondent-State of not deciding the representations, Annexure P8 and P8/A filed by the petitioners till filing of the writ petition. It is stated that it is only in the written statement that it has been disclosed for the first time that representations made by the petitioners were rejected vide memo dated January 2, 2003. Further cause of action to the petitioners arose from the news item dated August 15, 2002 (Annexure P10). From this news item, the petitioners came to know that the respondents had abandoned the old scheme known as Model Town Extension Part-I Scheme of the year 1960 and had framed a new scheme known as Balmiki Nagar and Model Town Extension Part-II Scheme.
9. The crucial question, that arises for adjudication in this petition has been noted by us in the very beginning of the judgment. Assuming, that civil litigation culminating into judgment passed by this Court in RSA No. 877 of 1998 that was dismissed on May 31, 2000, was not on the primary cause of action as pleaded in the present petition, i.e., change in the original scheme known as Model Town Extension Part-I Scheme of the year 1960 to Balmiki Nagar Model Town Extension Part-II Scheme, the question that still arises is as to whether the petitioners or their predecessor-in-interest have not only received the compensation but also enhanced compensation on a petition filed by them as also plots that were allotted and which, concededly, are allotted to those, who are displaced persons from the scheme in lieu of land acquired from them, the petitioners would have locus standi to question the legality of the new scheme.
10. We have given our anxious thoughts to the questions framed by us, as mentioned above, and are of the firm view that petitioners are debarred to raise any objection with regard to change brought about in the original scheme of model town extension Part-I to Balmiki Nagar Model Town Extension Part-II Scheme, which, it may, however, be mentioned hens, has been described by the Improvement Trust to be an alteration of the old scheme, by their own act and conduct. The predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners received compensation of the land 40 years ago. The moment, predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners had accepted the compensation, he had acquiesced with the acquisition of his land. The predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners even sought reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act and the Tribunal, before whom the matter came, enhanced the compensation vide orders dated February 14, 1969. The enhanced compensation was received by him on May 23, 1969. The matter does not rest there inasmuch as the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners even accepted allotment of two plots which were allotted to him for the reason that he was displaced in execution of the Model Town Extension Part-I Scheme under the provisions of the said Act. He even deposited the instalments towards the allotment of two plots, referred to above.
11. Despite such impressive array of facts, as have been fully indicated above, Mr. Mittal, learned counsel for the petitioners still contends, on the basis of Division Bench judgment of this Court in Jain School Society (Registered), Panipat v. State of Haryana and Anr., (2001-3)129 P.L.R. 93, that if the authorities may not utilise the acquired land, the delay in challenging the acquisition proceedings can not be fatal. We are of the view that the judgment cited by learned counsel for the petitioners in Jain School Society's case (supra) has no parity on facts of the case in hand. The facts of the said case reveal that on October 29, 1976 the State of Haryana issued a notification under Section 4 read with Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, i.e., by invoking urgency provisions, for the construction of Handloom Complex of the Haryana State Handlooms and Handicrafts Corporation Limited at Panipat. On December 28, 1976, notification under Section 6 of the Act was issued. Despite the lapse of more than 24 years, no complex had been constructed. The petitioner in the said case, which was running a school, challenged notifications primarily on the ground that urgency provisions under Section 17 of the Act could not be invoked as also that in the facts of the case, it was misuse of statutory powers by the respondent-State. It was also urged that no compensation had been paid so far. The respondent-state did not file any reply which suggested that there was no urgency so as to entitle it to invoke the provisions of Section 17 of the Act. Reply was, however, filed by respondent No. 2, viz., the Haryana State Handlooms and Handicrafts Corporation Limited, Panipat, wherein, it was averred that writ petition was belated. It was also averred that the award had been announced and the amount as assessed was deposited with the Collector on October 20, 1977. On the pleadings of the parties, as referred to above, the Division Bench of this Court held that the State had indeed deprived the owners of their right to file objections. While coming to the conclusion aforesaid, it was pertinently noted that nothing had been done on the land from the year 1976 to 2001. Insofar as change of user is concerned, we rather find that judgment of the Division Bench turns against the petitioners. In para No. 9 of the judgment, contention of learned counsel for the respondents, Mr. Gupta, that the Government is competent to permit change of land use has been noticed and the observations made by the Division Bench are as under: -
"It is, undoubtedly, so. However, the issue is as to whether or not the State had justifiably invoked its urgency powers".
12. The decision aforesaid, in our considered view, only deals with validity or desirability of invoking the urgency provisions under Section 17 of the Act in the peculiar facts and circumstances of that case. We may mention here that nothing with regard to locus standi of the landowner in challenging the acquisition proceedings, if he had received the compensation and accepted the award, was at all dealt with. This very judgment was cited before another Division Bench of this Court in CWP No. 9632 of 2001 decided on October 29, 2002, in which one of us (V.K. Bali, J.) was a member. While dealing with the judgment in Jain School Society's case (supra) in CWP No. 9632 of 2001, the Division Bench observed as follows:-
"The judgment in Jain School Society's case (supra) relied upon by the petitioner has been considered by an earlier Division Bench of this Court in CWP No. 5702 of 2001 decided on 13.8.2002 and it has been found that the statutory provisions of Section 16 and 48 of the Act have not been considered in the said judgment and therefore, the said judgment was not relied upon. In appeal, in fact, the operation of the said judgment has been stayed in the special leave petition by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In Capital Stone Crushers v. State of Haryana (1993-1)103 P.L.R. 622 and Trilok Singh Mohan Singh v. State of Haryana, (1994-2)107 P.L.R. 144 the provisions of Section 34 were not brought to the notice of the Court nor the amount of compensation was offered to the land owners for payment as is evident in the present case from the reading of the award itself. Since the statutory provisions had not been considered nor the issued was debated in a comprehensive manner, therefore, it does not lay down correct law".
13. Mr. Mittal, learned counsel for the petitioners, also relies upon some judgments that deal with change of user of land, i.e, putting the land to a public purpose other than for which it was acquired. The reliance is upon a DB judgment of this Court in Jaswant Singh and Ors. v. The State of Haryana and Ors., 1992 L.A.C.C. 287, but there is no need to make a detailed mention of the same and we may mention that the same does not appear to be dealing with the issue in hand as, once the petitioners are held having no locus standi to challenge the acquisition proceedings, there will be no need at all to go into this question, i.e, the question pertaining to change in land use for Model Town Extension Part-I Scheme, for which land was acquired, to Balmiki Nagar Model Town Extension Part-II Scheme.
14. Before we may part with this judgment, we would like to mention that learned counsel for the petitioners also relies upon Supreme Court Judgment in H.M.T. House Building Cooperative Society v. Syed Khader and Ors., A.I.R. 1995 Supreme Court 2244, Raja Anand Brahma Shah v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1081, Loku Ram v. Slate of Haryana, 1999(1) P.L.J. 1, Single Bench Judgment of Delhi High Court in M/s Mod/ml Travels and Transport Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India and Ors.,^ A.I.R. 1990 Delhi 56 and two Single Bench judgments of this Court in Punjab State and Ors. v. Sansar Preet Mandal and Ors., 1990(2) Rev. L.R. 346 and Kartar Singh and Ors. v. The State of Punjab, (1973)75 P.L.R. 743, but, in our view, these judgments do not deal with the pertinent question, on which we have decided this case.
15. In view of the discussion made above, we hold that once the land is finally acquired, compensation paid and possession taken over, it would vest with the Government, free from all encumbrances as would be evident from the relevant provisions of the Land Acquisition Act which are pari-materia to the provisions dealing with acquisition of land under the Town Improvement Act. The land acquisition proceedings, after the land has been finally acquired, cannot be challenged by a landowner. In this case, there is an added reason as to why the petitioner would be debarred in challenging the proceedings and the same is that not only that they have received compensation, but they have received enhanced compensation as well. They even accepted allotment of two plots and deposited money which plots were allotted to them only because of the reason that they were displaced persons and under the provisions of the said Act, they were entitled to allotment of said plots. They even deposited the instalments of the consideration, on which the said plots were allotted to them.
Finding no merit in this petition, we dismiss the same, leaving, however, the parties to bear their own costs.