Gujarat High Court
Ahmedabad Manufacturing And Calico ... vs Union Of India on 5 December, 1980
Author: G.T. Nanavati
Bench: G.T. Nanavati
JUDGMENT S.H. Sheth, J.
1. This group of petitions raise common questions of law. The facts which have led to the emergence of the controversy are as follows. In 1974, Parliament amended the companies Act, 1956, and inserted s. 58A. Section 58A read with s. 642 empowered the Central Govt. to make rules in relation to the deposits which a company might receive from its share holders or the public. Section 58A came into force on 1st February, 1975. On 3rd February, 1975, the Central Govt. made rules which are known as the companies (Acceptance of Deposits) Rules, 1975. They were amended from time to time. However, on 30th March, 1978, r. 3A was inserted and it came into force on 1st April, 1978. Under this rule, a company is required to deposit or invest a sum which shall not be less than ten per cent. of the amounts of its deposits maturing during the year ending on 31st March, next year. The modes of deposits or investment have been specified in that rule. Several companies, which have filed these petitions, felt aggrieved by this rule because a part of the deposits which they might accept from their members or the public would not be available for being ploughed into business.
2. The averments made in special Civil Application No. 1138 of 1978 bring out clearly the result which follows from the implementation of r. 3A. Prior to 31st March, 1978, Arvind Mills Limited, the petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 1138 of 1978, accepted deposits amounting to Rs. 1,09,69,402 which would mature during the year commencing on 1st March, 1978, and ending on 31st March, 1979. According to the petitioner, it was required to deposit of invest, under r. 3A, a sum of Rs. 10,96,940 on or before 30th June, 1978. The grievance which petitioners are making is that the rule-making authority can make rules prescribing the limit up to which, the manner in which, and the conditions subject to which, the deposits may be invited or accepted by a company. However, in the name of prescribing conditions subject to which deposits may be invited or accepted by a company, the rule-making authority cannot lay down a restrictive and onerous condition such as the one incorporated in r. 3A which either wholly or partly deprives a company of the benefit of a part of the deposits already accepted by it. The petitioners, therefore, contend that is beyond the power of the rule-making authority to make r. 3A, which forces or compels a company to invest or deposit in any one of the three kinds of securities specified in r. 3A, a part of the deposits accepted by it. The purpose of accepting the deposits is defeated when a company which accepts deposits is required to part with what it has legitimately received from the public or its members. Principally, upon this grievance, all these petitions have been founded.
3. There are certain petitions - not all - in which the constitutional validity of s. 58A has been challenged. However, in all the petitions r. 3A has been challenged on the ground the it is ultra vires s. 58A of the companies Act, 1956, and art. 14 of the Constitution.
4. The contentions which arise from the pleadings are as follows :
(1) Section 58A of the companies Act, 1956, is ultra vires arts. 245 and 246 of the constitution.
(2) Rule 3A of the companies (Acceptance of deposits) Rules, 1975, is ultra vires s. 58A of the Companies Act, 1956, inasmuch as it transgresses the scope and ambit of s. 58A.
(3) In any case, r. 3A is ultra vires s. 58A to the extent to which it is made to apply to the deposits accepted by a company prior to 1st April, 1978, and maturing thereafter.
(4) Rule 3A violates art. 14 and is arbitrary because it defeats and frustrates the very purpose of allowing a company to receive deposits from its members or the public.
5. Before we proceed to examine these contentions, it is necessary to state the no other contention has been raised by the learned Advocate general who appears on behalf of the petitioners in some cases and by Mr. Nanavaty who appears on behalf of the petitioners in the other cases. It appears that the contention in regard to art. 19(1)(g) has been raised in some of the petitions but it has not been raised before us. It is also necessary to clarify that the first contention arises out of pleadings in some of the petitions and does not arise in all the petitions.
6. Before we proceed to examine the contentions which have been raised before us, it is necessary to have a look at s. 58A of the Companies Act, 1956. Sub-section (1) provides as under :
"The central Government may, in consultation with the reserve Bank of India, prescribe the limits up to which, the manner in which, and the conditions subject to which, deposits may be invited or accepted by a company either from the public or from its members."
7. This is the most material part of the section which requires our consideration. Sub-section (2) lays down the procedure which is necessary to be followed before a company or any person on behalf of a company invites deposits from the members of the public or from its shareholders. It, inter alia, requires that an advertisement shall be published showing the financial position of the company and that it shall be issued in such form and in such manner as may be prescribed. Sub-section (3) provides for matters relating to the renewal, after s. 58A came into force. Sub-section (4) requires a company under the circumstances specified therein to repay the deposits to the depositors within thirty days or such other time as the Central Govt. may allow in that behalf. Sub-section (5) lays down consequences of failure on the part of a company to repay the deposits in accordance with the provisions of sub-s. (3) or sub-s. (4) of s. 58A. Sub-section (6) lays down the consequence if a company accepts or invites any deposit in excess of the limit prescribed under sub-s. (1) or in contravention of the manner or condition prescribed under sub-section or in contravention of the provisions of sub-s. (2). Sub-section (7) excludes from the operation of s. 58A banking companies and such other companies as the Central Govt. may, after consultation with the Reserve Bank of India, specify in that behalf. It also lays down that except the provisions relating to advertisement contained in clause (b) of sub-s. (2), nothing in s. 58A shall apply to such classes of financial companies as the Central Govt. may, after consultation with the Reserve Bank of India, specify in that behalf. Sub-section (8) which was inserted in 1977 empowers the Central Govt. to grant extension of time to a company or a class of companies in respect of matters specified therein. The rule-making power is found in sub-s. (1) of s. 58A which we have extracted above. Section 642 also confers upon the Central Govt. the rule-making power. Sub-section (1) of s. 642 provides :
"(1) In addition to the powers conferred by section 641, the central Government may, by notification in official Gazette, make rules -
(a) for all or any of the matters which by this Act are to be, or may be, prescribed by the Central Government; and
(b) generally to carry out the purposes of this Act."
Sub-section (2) of s. 642 empowers the Central Govt. to make a rule under sub-s. (1) for punishing a person who contravenes the provisions of sub-s. (1). Sub-section (3) requires the Central Govt. to lay on the table of the House the rules which it makes under the Act.
8. We now turn to the Rules. Rule 2(b) defines "deposit" in the following terms :
"'deposit' means any deposit of money with, and includes any amount borrowed by, a company, but does not include. .."
9. It is not necessary to reproduce in this judgment what is excluded from the concept of "deposit". Rule 2(c) defines "depositor" in the following terms :
"'depositor' includes any person who has given a loan to company."
10. Rule 2(d) defines the expression "free reserves". Rule 3 lays down the manner of acceptance and renewal of deposits by companies. Rule 3(2) provides :
"On and from the commencement of these rules no company shall accept -
(i) any deposit against an unsecured debenture or any deposit from a shareholder (not being a deposit accepted by a private company from its shareholders) or any deposit guaranteed by any person who, at the time of giving such guarantee is a director of the company, ..."
11. We now turn to rule 3A which makes a provision for the maintenance of liquid assets. It reads as follows :
"3A (1) Every company shall, before the 30th day of April of each year, deposit of invest, as the case may be, a sum which shall not be less than ten per cent. of the amount of its deposits maturing during the year ending on the 31st day of March next following, in any one or more of the following methods, namely :
(a) in a current or other deposit account with any scheduled bank, free from charge or lien;
(b) in unencumbered securities of the Central Government or of any State Government;
(c) in unencumbered securities mentioned in clauses (a) to (d) and (ee) of section 20 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 (2 of 1882)."
12. Sub-rule (2) of r. 3A provides :
"The amount deposited or invested, as the case may be, under sub-rule (1), shall not be utilised for any purpose other than for the repayment of deposits maturing during the year referred to in that sub-rule, provided that the amount remaining deposited of invested, as the case may be, shall not at any time fall below ten per cent. of the amounts of deposits maturing until the 31st day of March of that year."
13. Having referred to s. 58A and the relevant rules, we now turn to examine the first contention which has been raised by Mr. Nanavaty, in the petitions in which he appears, on behalf of the petitioners. According to him, s. 58A is ultra vires arts. 245 and 246 of the constitution because the subject-matter of s. 58A squarely falls within the scope and ambit of Entry 30 in the state List. Entry 30 in the State List in the Seventh schedule reads as follows : "Money-lending and money-lenders; relief of agricultural indebtedness". The question, which we are required to consider, is whether acceptance of deposits by a company from its members or the public constitutes "money-lending" and brings into existence "money-lenders". On behalf of the Union of India, it has been contended by Mr. Chandrashekhar that the subject-matter of s. 58A squarely falls within the scope and ambit of Entries 43 and 44 in the Union List in the Seventh Schedule. Entry 43 reads as follows :
"Incorporation, regulation and winding-up of trading corporations, including banking, insurance and financial corporation but not including co-operative societies."
14. Entry 44 reads as follows :
"Incorporation, regulation and winding-up of corporations, whether trading or not, with objects not confined to one State, but not including universities."
15. It has been submitted by Mr. Chandrashekhar that s. 58A applies to non-banking non-financial companies and that it does not regulate the deposits from a "money-lender". According to him, a "depositor" is not a "money-lender". It regulates, as submitted by Mr. Chandrashekhar, the financial activities of a company. In our opinion, "acceptance of deposits" by a company from its members or the public does not constitute "money-lending" on the part of the depositors, though it may mean "borrowing" by the company. Assuming, however, that the depositors are money-lenders, their activities are not regulated in any manner whatsoever by s. 58A. It subjects the financial transactions of a company to social control. Therefore, the subject-matter of s. 58A in so far as trading corporations are concerned falls squarely within the expression "regulation ... of trading corporations" within the meaning of Entry 43 in the Union List in the Seventh Schedule. In the case of corporations, it falls squarely within the expression "regulation ... of corporation" used in Entry 44 in the Union List in the Seventh Schedule, indeed if its objects are not confined to one State.
16. Mr. H. M. Mehta has invited our attention to the decision of the Madras High Court in Mayavaram Financial Corporation Ltd. v. Reserve Bank of India [1971] 41 Comp Cas 890. The question which arose in that case was whether the subject-matter of Non-Banking Financial Companies (Reserve Bank) Directions, 1966, issued under ss. 45J to 45L of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934, fell within the scope and ambit of Entries 38 and 36 in the Union List or entrenched upon Entry 30 in the State List. It was held in that case that the said directions fell within Entries 38 and 36 of the Union List and not within the scope and ambit of Entry 30 of the State List. It is not necessary to make any detailed reference to that decision because s. 58A makes it abundantly clear that it does not seek to control the money-lender but seeks to control the borrower. It, therefore, cannot fall within the scope and ambit of Entry 30 in the State List. In our opinion, it falls squarely within Entries 43 and 44 of the Union List and, therefore, it was within the legislative competence of parliament to enact. The first contention raised by Mr. Nanavaty in the petitions, in which he appears, therefore, fails and is rejected.
17. The second contention which has been raised on behalf of all the petitioners is that r. 3A is ultra vires s. 58A. The learned Advocate-General advanced this contention and divided it in two parts :
(i) Application of r. 3A in regard to deposits accepted after 1st April, 1978, when the rule came into force and which would necessarily mature thereafter.
(ii) Rule 3A in so far as it was made applicable to deposits which were accepted prior to 1st April, 1978, by a company but which would mature after 1st April, 1978.
18. Let us now examine the first part of the contention which has been raised by the learned Advocate-General. Section 58A enables the Central Govt. to prescribe three matters, indeed, in consultation with the Reserve Bank of India :
(i) the limits up to which the deposits may be invited or accepted by a company either from the public or from its members;
(ii) the manner in which the deposits may be invited or accepted by a company; and
(iii) the conditions subject to which the deposits may be invited or accepted by a company either from the public or from its members.
19. No dispute has been raised before us in relation to the limit or the manner. The controversy which has been seriously raised before us relates to the amplitude of the expression "conditions subject to which deposits may be invited or accepted by a company either from the public or from its members". The learned Advocate-General has argued that if we conjointly read these three factors, then it becomes quite clear that the limit which the Central Govt. may prescribe for a company has relation to the deposits themselves. Similarly, the manner in which the Central Govt. may prescribe for a company to invite or accept deposits necessarily has reference to the "deposits". According to him, therefore, "the conditions subject to which deposits may be invited or accepted by a company" must necessarily have relation to deposits and nothing else. In other words, according to the learned Advocate-General, the conditions contemplated by s. 58A are as between a company and its depositors and not conditions as between the company and the Central Govt.
20. The next argument which he has raised is that a "condition" which can be prescribed under s. 58A read with s. 642 must be a "condition" which must be "operative in futuro". He has also tried to fortify the argument which he has raised by stating that the condition contemplated by s. 58A(1) are the conditions of acceptance or invitation and nothing else. He has invited our attention in that behalf to a few decisions to which we are shortly referring. On behalf of the learned Attorney-General, it has been argued by Mr. Chandrashekhar that there is no justification for confining the width and amplitude of the expression "conditions" to a narrow area as has been argued by the learned Advocate-General. According to him, the expression "condition" should receive an extensive connotation because s. 58A enacted by Parliament, is a social control measure intended to protect the depositors against the risk which is attendant upon the deposits which they make with a company. In case a company fails to discharge its obligations and is driven to winding-up proceedings, there must be some kind of protection for small depositors. According to Mr. Chandrashekhar, what has been done by the Central Govt. by making r. 3A is to provide a cover or protection for small depositors who deposit their moneys for a short-term extending from six months to thirty-six months. They do so in order to earn sumptuous interest. A company pays it in order that it is able to receive short-term finance for being ploughed into the business and for discharging its immediate obligations.
21. We see no reason why the expression "conditions subject to which" should be narrowly construed so as to have reference only to deposits alone. In a social control measure, it is necessary to discover its object and to so construe it that it serves its purpose if it is otherwise lawful and valid. It is difficult to uphold the argument advanced by the learned Advocate-General that the "condition" contemplated by r. 3A is not a "condition" connected with the "deposits". Though it may ex facie appear that it has nothing to do with "deposits" which a company accepts, on a closer scrutiny, we find that it has a very deep connection with those deposits. There is no doubt about the fact that any condition prescribed under s. 58A must be a fair and reasonable condition. It should also be a relevant condition. Any statutory condition which plays a protective role for the depositors in relation to the deposits which they make with a company necessarily has deep connection with the deposits. It is not an extraneous condition at all nor it is an irrelevant condition. It is wrong to say that such a condition is not a condition imposed in praesenti but that it is a condition imposed in futuro. It cannot be gainsaid that the expression "conditions subject to which" implies a condition precedent. Does r. 3A impose a condition precedent or a condition subsequent ? In our opinion, the imposition of the condition under r. 3A is anterior to the acceptance of deposits but its implementation is posterior. Therefore, when a company seeks the permission of the central Govt. to accept deposits from its members or from the public, it is subjected in praesenti to the condition contemplated by r. 3A. Acceptance of that condition by a company is prior to its acceptance of the deposits. However, compliance with that condition must, in the very nature of things, follow the acceptance of deposits. Therefore, the condition which r.3A contemplates is an anterior condition - a condition in praesenti and a condition which has great relevance to the deposits which the depositors make. It is, therefore, difficult to uphold the narrow construction advanced by the learned Advocate-General and to hold that r. 3A transgresses the ambit and scope of s. 58A.
22. Our attention has been invited by the learned Advocate-General to a decision of the House of Lords in Chertsey Urban District Council v. Mixnam's properties Ltd. [1965] AC 735 (HL). The respondents, who were the some years, applied to the District Council under the Caravan sites and control of Development Act, 1960, for a site licence as required under s. 3 of the Act. The District Council issued the licence. However, under s. 5(1), the District Council had the authority to subject the licensee of the site to conditions of tenancy. The District Council prescribed certain conditions which were challenged by the respondents in that case on the ground that they were ultra vires s. 5(1). It was contended on behalf of the respondent that conditions which s. 5(1) contemplated were limited to matters of town planning and public health. Upon the construction of the expression "conditions of tenancy" used in s. 5(1) of the Caravan sites and control of Development Act, 1960, the learned law Lords held that there was nothing in that Act suggesting any intention to authorise local authorities to go beyond laying down conditions relating to the use of the sites and that the general words of s. 5 could not be construed as entitling them to do so. Expounding this subject further, it has been laid down that permissible conditions must relate to the user of the licensed site and not to the user of the licensee's legal powers of letting or licensing caravan sites. Since the conditions complained of in that case went beyond the powers conferred by the Act upon the District Council, they were held ultra vires and void. The conditions in dispute in that case stipulated that the site rents shall be agreed with the Council, that security of tenure shall be granted to all caravan occupiers, that site rules shall be restricted to items normally covered by a tenancy agreement and necessary for the good administration of the site, that there shall be no restriction on caravan occupiers as to from whom they purchase the commodities which they require, that no caravan occupier entering the site shall be charged any premium and that no restriction shall be imposed on caravan occupiers. These conditions related to the transactions between the licensee of the site and the caravan occupiers. They had nothing to do with anything between the District Council and the site licensee. While construing the expression "conditions of tenancy" used in s. 5(1), what has been observed in that decision is as follows (at p. 751) :
"Whether general words in an Act should be given a limited meaning is a question which frequently arises, but so much depends on the particular circumstances that general statements of the law in other cases can be no more than guides."
23. This observation made in that decision has some significance for the present case. Reference therein has been made to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Pyx Granite Co. Ltd. v. Ministry of Housing and Local Government [1958] 1 A11 ER 625 in which Lord Denning has observed that the expression "such conditions as they think fit" means valid condition fairly and reasonably related to the permitted development. That statement of law was approved by the House of Lords in Fawcett Properties Ltd. v. Buckingham County Council [1961] AC 636.
24. We now turn to the decision of the House of Lords in Fawcett Properties Ltd. v. Buckingham County Council [1961] AC 636. The subject-matter of that decision was town and country planning. In that case, the question which arose was whether a local planning authority, which was empowered to develop land "subject to such conditions as they think fit", could impose a condition it thought fit. Construing that expression, the House of Lords has laid down that it does not give the local planning authority an uncontrolled power to impose whatever conditions it likes. In exercising their discretion, it has been further observed, that they must have regard to all the relevant considerations and disregard all improper conditions and they must produce a result which does not offend against common-sense. In other words, the conditions to be valid must fairly and reasonably relate to the permitted development, and a public authority which is entrusted with that discretion must act reasonably.
25. The next decision to which our attention has been invited is in The Queen v. The Mayor, & of Plymouth [1896] 1 QB 158. Under s. 6(1) of that Act, the committee could appoint such fishery officers as they deemed fit "subject to any restrictions or conditions as to expenditure made by the council or councils by whom a local fisheries committee is appointed". It true in connection with the appointment of particular officer could not be made after the officer had been appointed.
26. The last decision to which out attention has been invited by the learned Advocate-General is in Director, Enforcement Directorate, Government of India v. Saroj Kumar Bhotika [1978] 48 Comp Cas 649; AIR 1978 Cal 65. It was a case under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. The question which arose was whether the Reserve Bank of India, while allowing the sale of shares of a foreign concern, could impose the condition that shares could not be allotted to a larger industrial house and persons connected therewith. Such a condition was, in fact, imposed. It was held that that condition was liable to be struck down because it had no rational or proximate nexus with the object of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. Since, it was not the object of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act to prevent concentration of economic power, a condition imposed to achieve that object was not a valid condition. This decision has little application to the facts of the facts of the present case.
27. We are unable to come to the conclusion that a "condition" which r. 3A prescribes is de hors the subject-matter of s. 58A. We are also unable to come to the conclusion that it is not a fair and reasonable condition related to the "deposits" which a company accepts from a depositor. It is a fair and relevant condition which relates to deposits. In our opinion, therefore, r. 3A is not ultra vires s. 58A and is, therefore, valid in so far as it is applicable to deposits which a company received or may receive after 1st April, 1978, and which, therefore, necessarily mature thereafter.
28. So far as its applicability to deposits which a company received prior to 1st April, 1978 and which would mature thereafter is concerned, the question now is, to all effects and purposes, academic. A company can receive deposits for a period commencing from six months to thirty-six months. Since 1st April, 1978, thirty-two months have already passed. Therefore, deposits which the petitioners received prior to 1st April, 1978, for a period of thirty-two months or less have all matured and must have been repaid. For all purposes, therefore, its applicability is only to deposits which the petitioners received prior to 1st April, 1978, for a period exceeding 32 months - the maximum being 36 months. We, therefore, asked Mr. Chandrashekhar whether any purpose would be served by expressing an opinion on this question. Mr. Chandrashekhar told us that the Central Govt. shall not apply r. 3A to the petitioners in so far as the deposits, which they accepted prior to 1st April, 1978, and which matured or would mature after 1st April, 1978, are concerned. Therefore, in view or the statement which Mr. Chandrashekhar has made on behalf of the Central Govt., it is not necessary to express any opinion on this question because the petitioners' grievance in that behalf dose not survive.
29. The last contention which the learned Advocate-General has raised is that r. 3A is ultra vires art. 14 of the Constitution. According to him, r. 3A imposes an arbitrary condition or a condition which is extraneous to the subject-matter of the acceptance of deposits by a company. We are unable to uphold this argument raised by the learned Advocate-General. In our opinion, acceptance of deposits by a company from the members of the public of from its members necessarily implies its repayability to the depositors. What r. 3A Provides is cover or protection - indeed in a small measure - which will ensure the repayability of his deposit to a depositor. Ten percent of the deposits, which a company is required to deposit in any one of the three modes specified in r. 3A, is a recurring phenomenon. A company accepts deposits from its members of from the public and deposits ten per cent. thereof, say, in a scheduled bank. It draws upon that amount when the deposits which it has accepted from its depositors become mature for repayment and pays them. In the meanwhile, it may accept deposits from some other depositors and will deposit ten per cent. out of them, say, in a scheduled bank. Therefore, it is a continuous flow of ten per cent. of the deposits which a company may accept. It goes on drawing upon them for repaying its depositors and it goes on supplementing them by a fresh ten per cent. of the deposits which it may again receive from its depositors. We find that the object of r. 3A is to protect the depositors of a company. It cannot, therefore, be said that it is arbitrary and extraneous to the subject-matter of "acceptance of deposits" by a company. It is quite rational and apposite. In our opinion, therefore, it is not ultra vires art. 14.
30. Before we close, it is necessary to refer to a judgment of the Allahabad High Court, in Civil Miscellaneous Writ No. 8427 of 1978 and group, decided by a Division Bench of that Court on 9th July, 1979. The question which has been raised before us was the question which was raised before that High Court. While construing s. 58A, it has been observed by the learned judges that there is no warrant for a narrow interpretation of the expression "conditions subject to which deposits may be invited or accepted". It has also been observed in that decision that that expression does not appear to be confined to matters between the depositors and the company. It has next been observed in that decision that even if r. 3A is constructed as a direction for the utilization of the funds received by the company in the shape of deposits, it would still be within the scope of s. 58A of the Act. However, that is not the argument which has been raised by Mr. Chandrashekhar before us. Further, according to the Allahabad High Court, the principal object underlying r. 3A is to safeguard the interests of the company and the depositors. On behalf of the Central Govt., it was argued in that case that ten per cent. of deposits provide an adequate quantum of liquid funds which serve as a cushion to meet its commitments during any year by way of return of deposit as they mature during that year or in so far as repayability of the deposit maturing during that year is concerned. The Allahabad High Court, therefore, has held that r. 3A is not a gratuitous interference with the rights of the companies. They were also justified under s. 642 of the Companies Act. In that case, challenge under art. 14, art. 19(1)(g) and art. 301 was raised. So far as challenge under art. 14 was concerned, the Allahabad High Court has turned it down. So far as justifiability under r. 3A is concerned, all that can be said is that it will be valid if it is made "generally to carry out the purpose of this Act" as provided in clause (b) of sub-s. (1) of s. 642.
31. There is no doubt about the fact that r. 3A has been made to carry out the purposes of s. 58A. The purpose which it carries out is that it ensures the repayability of the deposits which a company accepts from the public or its members.
32. An attempt was made by Mr. Chandrashekhar to show that under sub-s. (3) of s. 642, this rule was placed by the Central Govt., before Parliament. It only means that Parliament has applied its mind to it and considered it. It does not, therefore, mean that is has attained the status of a Parliamentary stature. It remains all the same a delegated piece of legislation. Therefore, even though it was considered by Parliament, if it exceeds the amplitude of s. 58A, it must be struck down. But, that is not the situation in this case. We have already recorded the conclusion that the language used in s. 58A is wide enough to justify the validity of r. 3A.
33. In the result, since all the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners fail, all the petitions fail, and subject to the statement made by Mr. Chandrashekhar is relation to the deposits which the petitioners received prior to 1st April, 1978, and which matured or would mature thereafter, are dismissed. Rule in each of the petitions is discharged with no order as to costs.
34. Mr. A. C. Gandhi, who appears on behalf of the petitioners in some of the cases, and Mr. S. I. Nanavaty, who appears on behalf of the petitioners in the rest of the cases, apply for a certificate of fitness in each of these cases under art. 133(1) of the Constitution to enable the petitioners to appeal against this decision to the Supreme Court. These cases raise for the first time the question of interpretation of s. 58A(1). It is an all-India status. We, therefore, think that it is necessary for the Supreme Court to pronounce a final decision on this question. We, therefore, grant in each of these cases a certificate of fitness under art. 133(1) of the Constitution in order to enable the petitioners to appeal against this decision to the Supreme Court.