Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Ajab Singh vs Delhi Police on 12 December, 2025
Central Administrative Tribunal
Principal Bench,
New Delhi
O.A. No.2302 of 2005
Orders reserved on : 21.11.2025
Orders pronounced on : 12.12.2025
Hon'ble Mr. R.N. Singh, Member (J)
Hon'ble Mr. Rajinder Kashyap, Member (A)
Ajab Singh
Ex-Constable of Delhi Police
(PIS No.28883514)
R/o I-37, Near Okhla Tent,
Harkesh Nagar, New Delhi-20
...Applicant
(By Advocate: Shri S.K. Gupta)
VERSUS
1. Govt. of NCT of Delhi
Through Commissioner of Police,
PHQ. IP Estate, New Delhi
2. Joint Commissioner of Police
Northern Range, PHQ,
IP Estate, New Delhi
3. DCP (Central District)
Daryaganj, Delhi
....Respondents
(By Advocate: Shri Rajeev Kumar)
ORDER
Hon'ble Mr. Rajinder Kashyap, Member (A):
By filing the present OA under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the applicant is seeking the following reliefs:
"(a) To call for the records of the case and set aside/quash the impugned orders as mentioned in Para-1 of OA and 2026.01.07 RAVI KANOJIA16:14:16 +05'30' Item No.19/C-2 2 OA No.2302 OF 2005
(b) To direct the respondents to reinstate the applicant in service with all consequential benefits including promotion/seniority and arrears of pay, which ought to follow on acquittal and setting aside of impugned Orders.
(c) To direct Rule 15(iii) & 16 (iii) of DP (P&A) Rules to be ultra virus.
(d) To award costs in favour of the applicant.
(e) To pass any order or orders, which this H0n'ble Tribunal
may deem just & equitable in the facts & circumstances of the case."
FACTS OF THE CASE IN BRIEF
2. The applicant was working as a Constable in Delhi Police. While working as Wireless Operator attached with ACP/Pahar Ganj, an FIR No.14/1996 under Section 395/397/34 IPC & 27/54/59 of Arms Actwas registered against the applicant including Inspector Nawal Kishore, the then SHO/Nabi Karim and three persons, namely S/Shri Dhir Singh (Constable), Bhisham Kumar(Constable) and Balkishan at PS Mahipalpur on 18.3.1996, as is evident from page 49 of the paperbook, and the applicant was suspended on 18.3.1996 and thereafter,vide order dated 22.3.1996 passed by the Disciplinary Authority, the applicant was dismissed from service by invoking the provisions of Article 311 (2)(b) of the Constitution of India.
2.1 Subsequently, the applicant and co-accused were acquitted by the learned Trial Court in the said criminal case vide judgment dated 18.1.2000 (Annexure A-5), the relevant portion of the same reads as under:-
"Since there is nothing incriminating against the accused persons, their statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. dispenses with. From the above discussion, it is clear that the charge levelled against the accused persons cannot be proved as the star witnesses of the prosecution are not available. Accused persons are entitled to an acquittal. They are accordingly acquitted. They are on bail. Their bail 2026.01.07 RAVI KANOJIA16:14:16 +05'30' Item No.19/C-2 3 OA No.2302 OF 2005 bonds stand cancelled and sureties are discharged. File be consigned to the record room."
2.2 After acquittal, when the applicant was not reinstated in service, he hadapproached this Tribunal by filing OA No.2880/2002,which was allowed by this Tribunal vide Order/judgment dated 02.09.2003 by quashing the aforesaid punishment order dated 22.3.1996. Consequently, the applicant was reinstated on 24.11.2003 and the disciplinary enquiry was initiated vide order dated 4.6.2004 against the applicant on the same set of allegations, which led to registration of the aforesaid FIR No.14/1996, as if the applicant had not been acquitted. Accordingly, the IO was appointed to conduct the inquiry in the matter. Thereafter, a Memorandum dated 12.7.2004 had been issued to the applicant vide which summary of allegations had been stated, which reads as under:-
"SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS It is alleged against Const. Ajab Singh No. 719/C that while attached to ACP/PG as Wireless Operator, he along with one Inspr. Nawal Kishore No.D-14, the then Addl.SHO/Nabi Karim, and two constablesDhir Singh and Bisham Kumarhatched a criminal conspiracy to rob passenger coming with gold from Dubai on the night intervening 17/18.03.1996. In order to execute their plan they took one revolver, 32 bore from one person namely Bal Kishan and service pistol of 9 mm and then Const. Ajab Singh along with his associates mentioned above went to IGI Airport in two Maruti cars.
In the morning on 18.03.1996, Const. Ajab Singh along with his associates chased Maruti Van No.DNA3409 from IGI Airport at 6.20 a.m. They forced Maruti Van driver Prem Narain to stop the van near Rangpuri Chowk. They attempted to rob the passengers namely:(1)Sayeed Mohideen,(2) Sayed Ahmed,(3) Sanjay,(4) Fakarudeen Ahmedwho were carrying 20 kgs. Gold at the point of revolver/pistol. Meanwhile a PCR staff namely HC Ram Singh No. 65/PCR and Const. Ram Karan No.4768/PCR managed to apprehend accused Dhir Singh and Bhisham Kumar redhanded while Inspr. Nawal Kishore and Ct. Ajab Singh managed to flee from the spot in Maruti cars mentioned above. Webley Scott revolver belonging to Bal Kishan was recovered from accused Dhir Singh at the spot. Apart from it, two packets of chilly powder were also recovered from them.A case FIR 2026.01.07 RAVI KANOJIA16:14:16 +05'30' Item No.19/C-2 4 OA No.2302 OF 2005 No.14/96 under Sections 395/397/34 IPC & 27/54/59 Arms Act, PS Mahipalpur, was registered in this connection.
Ct. Ajab Singh was evading arrest since the date of registration of the case. Whereas Const. Ajab Singh played prominent role in planning and practical implementation of this daring armed robbery. Const. Ajab Singh was arrested on 22.03.1996.
The above act on the part of Const. Ajab Singh No.719/C amounts to grave misconduct, criminal propensity, and unbecoming of the Police Officer under the provision of the Delhi Police (Punishment & Appeal) Rules, 1980."
2.3 On 15.07.2004 (Annexure A-7), the applicant submitted an application seeking certain additional documents to enable him to submit his defence. However, according to the applicant, neither the same were provided nor any reasons were assigned by the I.O. for non- supply of the same. However, on denial of the charges by the applicant, a detailed enquiry was conducted by the I.O, who examined 6 witnesses. However, it is the case of the applicant that I.O. framed charges against the applicant on the same set of allegations as mentioned in summary of allegations. According to the applicant, I.O. illegally and arbitrarily framed charges against him and co-accused though there was neither any material nor any evidence to frame the charges against the applicant, which shows total non application of mind on the part of the IO. Therefore, the applicant submitted his defence statement to the I.O. dated nil (Annexure A-8).
2.4 Thereafter, it is stated that, the applicant submitted a list of 7 DWs to be examined but the I.O. allowed only 6 DWs to be examined, who proved the innocence of the applicant. But the IO submitted his Inquiry Report dated nil (Annexure A-2) to the Disciplinary Authority vide which returning the finding that the charges levelled against the applicant as 'proved'.
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2.5 Thereafter, the Disciplinary Authority agreeing with the
aforesaid findings of the I.O., issued a show cause notice to the applicant to make representation against the said findings of the I.O. which the applicant submitted on 09.02.2005 (Annexure A-9). Subsequently, the Disciplinary Authority vide order dated 19.2.2005 (Annexure A-3) dismissed the applicant with immediate effect. Aggrieved by the aforesaid dismissal order, the applicant has filed his appeal dated 18.03.2005 (Annexure A-10) to the Appellate Authority which was considered by the Appellate Authority but the same was rejected vide order dated 18.08.2005 (Annexure A-4). Hence, this OA.
3. Earlier this OA was allowed by this Tribunal vide Order/Judgment dated 27.09.2007 as the parties were ad idem that this matter was covered in favour of the applicant by the decision of this Tribunal in the case of Sh. Nawal Kishore v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi and others (OA No.1015/2006) decided on 25.4.2007. Therefore, for parity of reasons given in OA No.1015/2006, this OA was allowed in the same terms. However, in the matter of Nawal Kishore (supra), the respondents have preferred a Writ Petition (Civil) No.7541/2007, titled Joint Commissioner of Police vs. Nawal Kishore before the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi, as also the aforesaid Order/Judgment dated 27.09.2007 passed in this case by way of Writ Petition (Civil) No.4711/2008, titled Joint Commissioner of Police vs. Ajab Singh. The Hon'ble High Court vide Order/Judgment dated 16.09.2014 passed in Nawal Kishore's case (supra) set aside the Order/Judgment dated 25.04.2007 passed by this Tribunal in Nawal 2026.01.07 RAVI KANOJIA16:14:16 +05'30' Item No.19/C-2 6 OA No.2302 OF 2005 Kishore's case, the relevant portion of the Hon'ble High Court above Order/Judgment reads as under:-
"8. Rule 16(x) of the Delhi Police (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1980 which empowers every disciplinary authority to proceed and record its orders either accepting, modifying or disagreeing with conclusions of the Enquiry Officer (EO) reads as follows:
"(x) On receipt of the Enquiry Officer's report the disciplinary authority shall consider the record of the inquiry and pass his orders on the inquiry on each charge. If in the opinion of the disciplinary authority, some important evidence having a bearing on the charge has not been recorded or brought on the file he may record the evidence himself or sent back the enquiry to the same or some other enquiry officer, according to the circumstance of the case for such to be duly recorded. In such an event, at the end of such supplementary enquiry, the accused officer shall again be given an opportunity to lead further defence, if he so desires, and to submit a supplementary statements, which he may wish to make."
9. A textual reading of the Rule- particularly the first sentencereveals that the disciplinary authority is duty bound to consider the record and pass its own orders on the enquiry on each charge . There can be no doubt that the emphatic manner of the wording of the Rule places an obligation upon the Disciplinary Authoirty to pass his orders on the enquiry on each charge. This necessarily implies independent application of mind to the evidence led in respect of each charge and the recording of reasons for the conclusions. Intrinsically connected with this is the power of the disciplinary authority to disagree-whenever records so warrant- with the conclusions of the EO. The CAT's reasoning, with due respect, in our opinion, appears to be based on complete ignorance of the first sentence of the Rule. The second part of the Rule empowering the disciplinary authority to remit the matter to the Enquiry Officer is conditional upon an opinion formation that some important material having a bearing on the charge has not not been recorded. Whilst in the circumstances of the case, the remit order might not have been justified, nevertheless, the final order of the CAT quashing the entirety of the proceedings is unwarranted in law. In other words, having found that the Disciplinary Authority's recourse to the power to remit being conditioned upon opinion formation that some important evidence had been missed out, was not justified, the CAT ought to have quashed the final order and left it to the disciplinary authority to proceed further from that stage. In our opinion, the impugned order suffers from a fundamental infirmity in complete misreading of the Rule. The first submission of the respondent based upon the findings of the CAT in this regard are, therefore, unsound and rejected. So far as the second ground with regard to initiation of proceedings after judicial acquittal goes, the relevant provision reads as follows:
"12. Action following judicial acquittal- When a police officer has been tried and acquitted by a criminal court, he shall not be punished departmentally on the same charge or on a different charge upon the evidence cited in the criminal case, whether actually led or not unless:
(a) the criminal charge has failed on technical grounds, or 2026.01.07 RAVI KANOJIA16:14:16 +05'30' Item No.19/C-2 7 OA No.2302 OF 2005
(b) in the opinion of the court, or on the Deputy Commissioner of Police the prosecution witnesses have been won over; or
(c) the court has held in its judgment that an offence was actually committed and that suspicion rests upon the police officer concerned; or
(d) the evidence cited in the criminal case discloses facts unconnected with the charge before the court which justify departmental proceedings on a different charge; or
(e) additional evidence for departmental proceedings is available."
10. No doubt, in this case, charges could not be proved in the criminal trial. The record reveals that the star witnesses, including the complainant, did not respond to summons and, therefore, did not participate during the trial. However, the disciplinary authority appears to have applied its mind and proceeded in terms of Rule 12(b),(c) and (d). The Disciplinary Authority in his note observed that the EO had not appreciated the evidence of PW-2, which related to the allegation contained in the charges with respect to manipulation of record and tampering of evidence made by the delinquent official/ applicant. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that the blanket bar against the departmental proceedings, following acquittal in criminal charges would apply in this case. The CAT's reasoning on this aspect also is erroneous.
11. For the above reasons, we are of the opinion that the impugned order cannot stand; it is accordingly set aside. The disciplinary authority shall proceed further and record his findings on the material available to him. In case of a disagreement with the report dated 22.11.2004 of the EO, the said disagreement note shall be furnished to the respondent/applicant in accordance with law and procedure outlined in the judgment of the Supreme Court in Punjab National Bank and Ors. v. Sh. Kunj Behari Misra, 1998 (7) SCC 84, and applicable rules, if any, shall be followed. The entire exercise shall be completed as expeditiously as possible, and preferably within six months."
3.1 The above mentioned Writ Petition preferred by the respondents in the case of the present applicant (Ajab Singh) was disposed of by the Hon'ble High Court vide Order/Judgment dated 20.05.2025, as the Order/Judgment of this Tribunal rendered in this case earlier dated 27.09.2007 was set aside and the present OA was restored before this Tribunal, the relevant paras of the judgment dated 20.05.2025 read as under:-
4. The learned counsels for the parties submit that as the Impugned Order had relied on the Order dated 25.04.2007 passed by the learned Tribunal in OA No.1015/2006, which now stands set aside, the 2026.01.07 RAVI KANOJIA16:14:16 +05'30' Item No.19/C-2 8 OA No.2302 OF 2005 Impugned Order be also set aside and the proceedings be remanded back to the learned Tribunal for a fresh consideration of the OA filed by the respondent, that is, OA No. 2302/2005.
5. Accordingly, the Impugned Order dated 27.09.2007 is set aside. OA No. 2302/2005 is restored before the learned Tribunal.
6. We are informed that pursuant to remand, the OA filed by Mr. Nawal Kishore is now listed before the learned Tribunal on 04.08.2025. The OA No.2302/2005 on its remand shall also be listed before the learned Tribunal on the said date, that is, 04.08.2025.
7. The parties shall appear before the learned Tribunal on 04.08.2025.
There is no necessity of issuance of fresh notice to the parties.
8. Considering the fact that the OA was filed in 2005 and that the present petition was pending since the year 2008, the learned Tribunal is requested to decide the same expeditiously and preferably within a period of three months of its first listing before the learned Tribunal." 3.2 In above circumstances, this matter is heard afresh by this Tribunal.
CONTENTIONS OF THE APPLICANT
4. Learned counsel argued that impugned orders are illegal, arbitrary, unjustified, unreasonable as also issued in violation of the principles of natural justice.
4.1 Learned counsel submitted that the charges/allegations before the learned Trial Court as well as the departmental authorities are the same and the witnesses as well as evidence in both the proceedings are identical and once the defence of the applicant that he was falsely implicated by the complainant in the said criminal case has been accepted by the learned Trial Court of competent jurisdiction in the absence of any incriminating evidence against him, the disciplinary enquiry is liable to be set aside/quashed, having been initiated without application of mind to the provisions of Rule 13 of the Delhi Police 2026.01.07 RAVI KANOJIA16:14:16 +05'30' Item No.19/C-2 9 OA No.2302 OF 2005 (Punishment &Appeal) Rules, 1980 and is, therefore, in violation thereof.
4.2 Learned counsel also submitted that although pendency of the criminal case is no bar for initiating disciplinary enquiry, but in the present case, the disciplinary enquiry has been initiated after a lapse of about eight years from the date of registration of the criminal case, however, admittedly no D.E. was initiated in the beginning till reinstatement. Therefore, the present D.E. is a sham act, as they have violated the settled principle that "A Government servant shall not be drawn into two parallel proceedings unnecessarily." Therefore, the applicant's case falls squarely within the above settled position of law. 4.3 Learned counsel also submitted that the respondents failed to appreciate that the applicant, who was prosecuted in a criminal case and was acquitted, cannot be subjected to a parallel departmental enquiry on the very same charges. Once the learned Trial Court has exonerated him, the departmental authority, including the appellate authority, cannot proceed on identical facts and allegations. 4.4 Learned counsel further submitted that the respondents failed to appreciate that, as per the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Kishan Lal vs. Union of India, reported in 1982 (1) SLR 573, acquittal of a Government servant on benefit of doubt is a complete acquittal on merits, and consequently the concerned Government servant is entitled to full pay and allowances.
Therefore, the acquittal of the applicant is a complete acquittal on 2026.01.07 RAVI KANOJIA16:14:16 +05'30' Item No.19/C-2 10 OA No.2302 OF 2005 merits, and the initiation of departmental enquiry on the very same set of facts, evidence and charges is liable to be set aside/quashed. 4.5 Learned counsel argued that Rules 15(iii) & 16(iii) of the Delhi Police (Punishment & Appeal) Rules, 1980, if invoked, violates the principles of natural justice. The very purpose of these provisions is to enable the Enquiry Officer to bring on record only such material which cannot otherwise be proved, and that too only when the witnesses are unavailable, and not when they are available to be examined. Bringing on record statements recorded during preliminary enquiry/ investigation, without producing the witnesses for cross-examination, amounts to violation of law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Mysore vs. Shivabasappa, reported in AIR 1963 SC 375. Therefore, reliance on Rule 15(iii) & 16(iii) of the Rules ibid is wholly unsustainable in law.
4.6 Learned counsel also argued that non-examination of material witnesses vitiates the entire enquiry. The applicant was gravely prejudiced, as the examination of these witnesses would have revealed whether the allegations were true or false. These are the best persons to speak about the alleged allegations. Thus, the applicant was deprived of his right of cross-examination of these witnesses, as they were not called and examined at any point of time in the D.E. Therefore, the entire enquiry is liable to be set aside/quashed.
4.7 Learned counsel also argued that whole enquiry is vitiated on the ground of violation of Rule 10 (1) of the Rules ibid as well as violation of the principles of natural justice. The applicant had requested for 2026.01.07 RAVI KANOJIA16:14:16 +05'30' Item No.19/C-2 11 OA No.2302 OF 2005 additional documents, but the same were not supplied to him, though falsely mentioned in the order-sheet dated 28.08.2004 that the documents had been supplied. This has been observed by the Appellate Authority in its order, thereby establishing that the applicant had no knowledge earlier. Thus, the applicant was deprived of reasonable opportunity to effectively cross-examine the PWs and defend himself in the D.E. 4.8 Learned counsel also submitted that the statements recorded in the preliminary enquiry/investigation were illegally relied upon in violation of Rule 15(iii) and 16(iii) of DP (P&A) Rules. As per these rules, statements recorded during preliminary enquiry can be brought on record only when the witnesses are not available. In the present case, the witnesses were available but deliberately not examined. Therefore, reliance on such statements without examining the witnesses during the regular departmental enquiry violates the principles of natural justice. Hence, the enquiry is liable to be quashed.
4.9 Learned counsel also submitted that the respondents failed to appreciate that this Tribunal has already held in Narender Singh vs. CP (O.A. No. 1093/1999 decided on 11.10.2000) and followed in Rajvinder Singh vs. CP (O.A. No. 1071/2002 decided on 17.04.2002), that if the allegations disclose a cognizable offence, the DE can be initiated only after registering a criminal case. In the present case, the Disciplinary Authority proceeded mechanically without following the procedure under the Rules ibid while initiating the DE vide order dated 04.06.2004.
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4.10 Learned counsel also submitted that the Appellate Authority's
order is in violation of the principles of natural justice as the comments of the Disciplinary Authority on the appeal were considered by the Appellate Authority while rejecting the appeal, without giving the applicant an opportunity to rebut those comments. Hence, the Appellate Authority's order is liable to be set aside/quashed. 4.11 Learned counsel further argued that in the aforesaid criminal case FIR No.14/96, the applicant was not named as an accused and the alleged confession extracted by the police was illegally used against him in the DE. This so-called disclosure statement was recorded behind his back and has been denied by the applicant before the learned Trial Court as well as in the departmental enquiry. Therefore, reliance on the alleged disclosure statement is illegal. Consequently, the punishment order is liable to be set aside/quashed.
4.12 Learned counsel also submitted that the statement of PW-1 is totally false and unreliable, which is evident from the fact that the applicant was not muffled-faced when produced before the court and therefore TIP was not conducted. The IO deliberately avoided TIP knowing well that the applicant would not be identified. Thus, the alleged identification is baseless and cannot be relied upon. 4.13 Learned counsel further submitted that the respondents failed to appreciate that the applicant was acquitted by the learned Trial court on merits, and not on technical grounds as wrongly assumed by the Enquiry Officer. Since the prosecution witnesses were allowed to be fully cross-examined before the criminal court, the acquittal was based on 2026.01.07 RAVI KANOJIA16:14:16 +05'30' Item No.19/C-2 13 OA No.2302 OF 2005 lack of evidence and not on technicality. Hence, the findings in the DE, which contradict the findings of the learned Trial court, are perverse and liable to be set aside.
4.14 Learned counsel by placing reliance on the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India vs. Madhusudan Prasad, reported in 2001 (1) SCC 47, and submitted that in the said judgment, it has been held that where a person is removed from service without holding any enquiry and without even issuing any show-cause notice prior to dismissal from service, there is a clear violation of the principles of natural justice. In such a situation, the employee cannot be denied back wages for the period between the date of dismissal and the date of reinstatement. Therefore, treating the intervening period as 'not spent on duty' as per the Order of punishment dated 19.02.2005 in the departmental enquiry is illegal and contrary to law. The payment of full pay and allowances for the intervening period and treating that period as spent on duty for all purposes shall follow as a compulsory consequence. Thus, the applicant is entitled to full pay and allowances for the intervening period.
4.15 Learned counsel also argued that the alleged co-accused persons, including Fakhruddin Ahmed and others, who were allegedly the persons with the applicant, were falsely implicated and an FIR No.14/96 under relevant sections was registered. One of the key co-accused, Shri Bhisham Kumar, whose O.A. No. 1163/2006 is pending adjudication before this Tribunal, had also challenged similar allegations. The non- examination of such material witnesses vitiated the entire enquiry 2026.01.07 RAVI KANOJIA16:14:16 +05'30' Item No.19/C-2 14 OA No.2302 OF 2005 because their examination would have clearly revealed whether the allegations were truthful or false. These persons were the best witnesses to speak about the alleged incident. The applicant was deprived of his valuable right to cross-examine them as they were not examined at any stage in the D.E. Therefore, the whole enquiry is liable to be set aside/quashed.
4.16 Learned counsel also submitted that the entire enquiry stands vitiated on the ground that the alleged confession(s) or disclosure statements recorded behind the back of the applicant were used illegally. Such statements were neither proved nor corroborated by any legally admissible evidence. This violates the settled legal principle that a disclosure statement by an accused before police, unless proved strictly in accordance with the Indian Evidence Act, is inadmissible. Hence, findings of guilt based on such inadmissible material are liable to be quashed.
4.17 Learned counsel also argued that the findings recorded in the departmental enquiry are perverse, baseless, unsupported by evidence and contrary to the findings of the learned Trial Court in the said criminal cse. When the learned Trial Court, after full trial and proper appreciation of evidence, has acquitted the applicant on merits, the departmental authority cannot mechanically record a finding of guilt on the same set of allegations without any independent evidence. Therefore, the impugned orders are unsustainable in law. 4.18 Learned counsel argued that the respondents failed to appreciate that the learned Trial court had categorically found that the alleged 2026.01.07 RAVI KANOJIA16:14:16 +05'30' Item No.19/C-2 15 OA No.2302 OF 2005 disclosure statement said to have been made by the applicant was never established during trial. The applicant had consistently denied having made any such statement. Hence, the punishment imposed solely on the basis of such an unproved and disputed document cannot be legally sustained and deserves to be quashed.
4.19 Learned counsel also argued that the Disciplinary Authority failed to appreciate that the learned Trial Court had examined all the material witnesses, and after a full-fledged trial, had acquitted the applicant on merits by holding that the prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. Once the learned Trial Court, after a complete appraisal of evidence, found the allegations unsubstantiated, the Disciplinary Authority could not have reached a contrary conclusion without any independent evidence. The departmental findings are therefore perverse and liable to be set aside.
4.20 Learned counsel further submitted that as such the disciplinary proceedings suffer from procedural irregularities, legal infirmities, and violations of mandatory rules. The Enquiry Officer failed to ensure compliance with the Delhi Police (P&A) Rules, 1980. Mandatory safeguards, such as providing all relied-upon documents, producing witnesses for cross-examination, ensuring natural justice, and conducting a fair enquiry, were ignored. These vitiate the entire proceedings.
4.21 Learned counsel also argued that the applicant was never afforded a proper and reasonable opportunity to defend himself. The applicant sought relevant documents, relied-upon statements, and 2026.01.07 RAVI KANOJIA16:14:16 +05'30' Item No.19/C-2 16 OA No.2302 OF 2005 other material necessary to prepare his defence, but the same were not supplied. Despite this, the Enquiry Officer proceeded with the enquiry, thereby depriving the applicant of an effective opportunity of defence. Consequently, the enquiry stands vitiated on this ground alone. 4.22 Learned counsel thus argued that the impugned orders are based on surmises, conjectures, and assumptions rather than evidence on record. No substantive or admissible evidence was produced to support the findings against the applicant. The conclusions drawn by the Enquiry Officer are not supported by any credible material and hence are arbitrary and unsustainable.
4.23 Learned counsel also submitted that the Appellate Authority failed to discharge its statutory duty to independently examine the evidence and consider the grounds raised in the appeal preferred by the applicant. The Appellate Authority's order is cryptic, non-speaking, and devoid of reasoning. It merely affirms the findings of the Disciplinary Authority without applying an independent mind. Hence, the Appellate Authority's order deserves to be quashed.
4.24 Learned counsel also argued that the punishment awarded is shockingly disproportionate to the alleged misconduct, even assuming without admitting that any misconduct was made out. It is well settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court that punishment must be commensurate with the gravity of the proven charge. In the present case, the punishment imposed is excessive, harsh, and arbitrary, in total disregard of judicial discipline, and, therefore, liable to be interfered with.
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4.25 Learned counsel reiterated that the respondents failed to
appreciate that the entire disciplinary enquiry was initiated after an inordinate and unexplained delay of nearly eight years from the date of the alleged incident. Such an extraordinary delay, without any justification, renders the proceedings unfair and oppressive. It has been held in a catena of judgments that unexplained delay in initiating disciplinary action causes prejudice to the charged officer and vitiates the enquiry. Hence, the disciplinary action is liable to be quashed on this ground alone.
4.26 Learned counsel also reiterated that the long and unexplained delay in holding the departmental enquiry adversely affected the applicant's right to a fair defence. Material witnesses became unavailable, memories had faded, and relevant documents could not be effectively traced. Such prejudice, coupled with procedural lapses, strikes at the root of the enquiry and renders the findings unsustainable. 4.27 Learned counsel submitted that during the pendency of the criminal case, it was neither legal nor proper to keep the departmental enquiry pending indefinitely and then suddenly revive it after several years without any justification. The respondents failed to follow the mandatory principles laid down in the Rules ibid as well as judicial precedents regarding simultaneous departmental and criminal proceedings. Hence, the enquiry stands vitiated. 4.28 Learned counsel further submitted that the applicant had a blemish-free service record throughout his career and had been performing his duties diligently to the satisfaction of the department.
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The impugned punishment order fails to consider his long and untainted service, which ought to have been taken into account as a mitigating factor while imposing any penalty. The punishment imposed is, therefore, disproportionate and unreasonable. 4.29 Learned counsel argued that the impugned orders suffer from non-application of mind. The Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority failed to appreciate the evidence correctly, ignored material facts favourable to the applicant, and relied on inadmissible and uncorroborated material. The orders are mechanical, arbitrary, and therefore liable to be set aside.
4.30 Learned counsel further argued that the entire disciplinary action stems from malice, bias, and vindictiveness. The proceedings appear to have been initiated with a predetermined mindset to punish the applicant rather than to ascertain the truth. Such colourable exercise of power vitiates the entire disciplinary mechanism, making the impugned orders unsustainable in law.
4.31 Learned counsel also submitted that the impugned orders violate Articles 14, 16, and 21 of the Constitution of India. They deny the applicant equality before law, equal protection of the law, fair procedure, and protection of his livelihood without due process. Therefore, the impugned orders are unconstitutional and must be set aside.
5. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents by referring to the counter reply filed on behalf of the respondents, submitted that the applicant was dealt with departmentally under the provisions of the 2026.01.07 RAVI KANOJIA16:14:16 +05'30' Item No.19/C-2 19 OA No.2302 OF 2005 Delhi Police (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1980, alleging therein that while attached with ACD, ACP/Pahar Ganj as Wireless Operator, he along with Insp. Nawal Kishore No. D-34, the then Addl. SHO/Nabi Karim, and two Constables Dheer Singh and Bisham Kumar, hatched a criminal conspiracy to rob the passengers coming with gold from Dubai on the night intervening 17/18.03.1996. In order to execute their plan, they took one revolver .32 bore from one person, namely, Bal Kishan and a service pistol of 9 mm, and then applicant along with associates mentioned above went to IGI Airport in two Maruti cars.In the morning on 18.03.1996, applicant along with his associates chased Maruti Van No. DNA-3404 coming from IGI Airport at 6.20 a.m. They forced Maruti Van driver Prem Narain to stop the said van near Rangpuri Chowk and tried to rob passengers, namely, Sayeed Monideen, Sayeed Sanjay and Fakamdeen Ahmed, who were carrying 5 kgs. gold at the point of revolver/pistol. Meanwhile, PCR Van (Zebra-20) emerged at the scene and the PCR staff, namely, H.C. Ram Singh No. 65/PCR and Ct. Ram Ratan No. 4768/PCR managed to apprehend accused Dheer Singh and Bisham Kumar, while Insp. Nawal Kishore and applicant managed to flee from the spot in the Maruti cars mentioned above. Webley Scot revolver belonging to Bal Kishan was recovered from accused Dheer Singh at the scene. Apart from it, two packets of chilly powder were also recovered from them. A case FIR No.14/96 under Sections 395/397/34 IPC and 27/54/59 Arms Act, P.S. Mahipal Pur was registered in this regard. Applicant was evading his arrest since the date of registration of the case, whereas applicant played a prominent role in 2026.01.07 RAVI KANOJIA16:14:16 +05'30' Item No.19/C-2 20 OA No.2302 OF 2005 planning and practical implementation of this daring armed robbery. The applicant was arrested on 22.03.1996. Before initiating the DE, the applicant was dismissed from the force under Article 311(2)(b) vide order No.4456-4556/HAP-AC-II/G dated 22.03.1996. The applicant had filed the above mentioned O.A. against the above said punishment and this Tribunal vide its judgment dated 02.09.2003 in the said case had directed to reinstate the applicant in service and initiate a DE against him. For the above said misconduct and as per directions of this Tribunal, regular DE was ordered against the applicant vide order dated 04.06.2004 and the same was entrusted to W/Inspr. Yashodha Rawat, Addl. SHO/P.D. Nagar. Later on, it was transferred to Inspr. Mangal Sen, Addl. SHO/Kamla Market, who completed the DE and submitted his findings concluding therein that the charges levelled against the applicant are substantiated and proved beyond reasonable doubt. Tentatively agreeing with the findings of the E.O., a copy of the findings was served upon the applicant vide office U.O. dated 24.01.2005. The applicant submitted his representation against the aforesaid findings recorded by the IO. After going through the DE file, findings of the E.O., representation submitted by the applicant against the said findings, and the relevant documents on record, the Disciplinary Authority heard the applicant in O.R. on 17.02.2005. Keeping in view the grave misconduct, the applicant was awarded the punishment of dismissal from the force vide order dated 19.02.2005. Thereafter, he had filed an appeal to the Jt. C.P./NR, who considered and rejected the same vide order dated 18.08.2005. Hence, this O.A. 2026.01.07 RAVI KANOJIA16:14:16 +05'30' Item No.19/C-2 21 OA No.2302 OF 2005 5.1 Learned counsel also submitted that before initiating a regular departmental enquiry against the applicant, the judgment of the learned Trial Court of Ms. Indermeet Kaur Kochhar, Addl. Sessions Judge, New Delhi, dated 18.01.2000 in the above-said case had thoroughly been considered. The acquittal of the applicant in the criminal case is on technical grounds. Rule 12 (a) of the Delhi Police (Punishment & Appeal) Rules, 1980 is very much clear in this regard that if the criminal charge has failed on technical grounds, the defaulter can be punished departmentally on the same charge or on a different charge upon the evidence cited in the criminal case, whether actually led or not. Moreover, departmental action was initiated against the applicant as per the judgment dated 02.09.2003 of this Tribunal in OA No.2880/2002 earlier filed by the instant applicant. 5.2 Learned counsel also submitted that during the DE proceedings, the charge levelled against the applicant that he was arrested and challaned in the case FIR No.14/96 dated 18.3.1996 under Sections 395/397/34 IPC, PS Mahipalpur has fully been proved by the depositions of the PWs and the evidence on record. 5.3 Learned counsel further submitted that all the documents relied upon have been supplied to the applicant against his proper receipt. From the perusal of order sheet of DE fit, it is mentioned that he has produced only six DWs in his defence.
5.4 Learned counsel also submitted that the disciplinary authority after considering the statements of PWs/DWs, findings of the E.O. and representation submitted by the applicant against the findings of the 2026.01.07 RAVI KANOJIA16:14:16 +05'30' Item No.19/C-2 22 OA No.2302 OF 2005 E.O. and relevant documents on record, has awarded the punishment of dismissal from the force to the applicant vide order dated 19.2.2005 and entire suspension period was decided as period 'not spent on duty' for all intents and purposes rightly and the punishment is proportionate to the gravity of misconduct committed by him. Further, in DE file, it is found the applicant being a desperate type of person, who do not deserve to continue in department where its members are supposed to keep safety and security of life and property of citizen of nation. His desperate attempt to rob the gold merchants shows that the applicant is a black sheep in Police department. The orders of the Disciplinary Authority as well as the Appellate Authority are quite just and legal.
5.5 Learned counsel further submitted that moreover, as per the statement of PW-6, Inspr. Rati Ram, Crime Branch, who investigated the case, the applicant admitted himself regarding his involvement in the said case, as he went to IGI Airport along with Consts. Dheer Singh and Bhisham Singh etc. to rob the gold. The applicant was evading his arrest since the date of registration of case. Whereas the applicant played prominent role in planning and practical implementation of this daring armed robbery. He was arrested in this case on 22.3.96. The plea that his name was not figured in the FIR is not correct, as he managed to flee from the spot and during the course of investigation the other accused i.e. Const. Dheer Singh and Const. Bhisham Kumar had disclosed his name as such further action was taken against him as per law. As per statement of PW-1, it has clearly been deposed that applicant 2026.01.07 RAVI KANOJIA16:14:16 +05'30' Item No.19/C-2 23 OA No.2302 OF 2005 was not muffled face when he surrendered in the Court and one day P.C. was already got that is why T.I.P. was not got conducted and complainant identified him, therefore, there was no need of T.I.P. Supplementary statement of complainant was recorded U/s. 161 Cr. P.C. The findings of the E.O. is legal and justified.
5.6 Lastly, learned counsel submitted that the present OA deserves to be dismissed by this Tribunal.
6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the pleadings available on record as well as the judgments relied upon by the applicant's counsel, as noted above.
ANALYSIS
7. The undisputed fact are that the applicant, a Constable in Delhi Police, was working as a Wireless Operator under ACP/Pahar Ganj when an FIR No.14/1996 under Sections 395/397/34 IPC and 27/54/59 Arms Act was registered against him and four others on 18.03.1996 relating to an alleged attempted armed robbery of passengers carrying gold from Dubai. The applicant was suspended on the same day and dismissed from service on 22.03.1996 under Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution. Subsequently, the learned Trial Court acquitted the applicant and co-accused on 18.01.2000, as key prosecution witnesses did not appear and no incriminating material was available. After his acquittal, the applicant filed OA No.2880/2002, which was allowed by this Tribunal on 02.09.2003 vide which his dismissal from service was quashed, and consequently, he was reinstated on 24.11.2003. A fresh departmental inquiry was initiated on 04.06.2004 on the same 2026.01.07 RAVI KANOJIA16:14:16 +05'30' Item No.19/C-2 24 OA No.2302 OF 2005 allegations that formed the basis of the said FIR. The Inquiry Officer recorded prosecution evidence and permitted only six of the seven defence witnesses sought by the applicant and after completion of the said inquiry, the IO held the charges as 'proved'. After considering the representation of the applicant preferred against the aforesaid IO's report, the Disciplinary Authority concurred with the finding of the IO and dismissed the applicant again vide Order dated 19.02.2005. His statutory appeal was also rejected by the Appellate Authority vide Order dated 18.08.2005, prompting the present OA. This OA was initially allowed on 27.09.2007 by this Tribunal, following the reasoning given in OA No.1015/2006 preferred by one Shri Nawal Kishore (supra). However, the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in W.P.(C) 7541/2007 set aside the Tribunal's decision rendered in Nawal Kishore (supra), holding that the Tribunal had misapplied Rule 16(x) of the Rules ibid and failed to appreciate the scope of Rule 12 of the Rules ibid concerning departmental action after acquittal. Consequently, in W.P.(C) 4711/2008 filed by the respondents in the present case, the Hon'ble High Court similarly set aside the Tribunal's Order dated 27.09.2007 and restored the instant OA, i.e., OA No.2302/2005 for fresh adjudication.
8. Since this matter pertains to departmental proceedings, we deem it apt to observe that it is settled principle of law that in departmental proceedings, the Disciplinary Authority is the sole judge of facts. Once findings of fact, based on appreciation of evidence are recorded by the Disciplinary Authority and Appellate Authority, normally the 2026.01.07 RAVI KANOJIA16:14:16 +05'30' Item No.19/C-2 25 OA No.2302 OF 2005 Court/Tribunal may not interfere with those factual findings unless it finds that the recorded findings were based either on no evidence or that the findings were wholly perverse and/or legally untenable. The adequacy or inadequacy of the evidence is not permitted to be canvassed before the High Court/Tribunal, since the High Court/Tribunal does not sit as an Appellate Authority, over the factual findings recorded during departmental proceedings, while exercising the power of judicial review. The Tribunal cannot, normally speaking, substitute its own conclusion, with regard to the guilt of the delinquent, for that of the departmental authorities.
8.1 In this regard, it is profitable to mention that by referring catena of judgments on the point of scope of judicial review by the Courts/Tribunals, the Three Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India [(1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80] wherein it has been held as under:
"13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary enquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the court/tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel [Union of India v. H.C. Goel, (1964) 4 SCR 718 : AIR 1964 SC 364] this Court held at SCR p. 728 (AIR p. 369, para 20) that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued."
(emphasis supplied) 8.2 In another case in the matter of Union of India vs. P. Gunasekaran reported in (2015) 2 SCC 610, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that while re-appreciating evidence the High Court cannot act as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings. The Court 2026.01.07 RAVI KANOJIA16:14:16 +05'30' Item No.19/C-2 26 OA No.2302 OF 2005 held the parameters as to when the High Court shall not interfere in the disciplinary proceedings as under:-
"13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not:
(i) reappreciate the evidence;
(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same
has been conducted in accordance with law;
(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can
be based.
(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;
(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience."
8.3 In another judgment rendered by the Three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of SBI vs. Ajay Kumar Srivastava, reported in (2021) 2 SCC 612: (2021) 1 SCC (L&S) 457, by referring the law laid down in B.C. Chaturvedi (supra) and catena of other judgments, the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under:-
"22. The power of judicial review in the matters of disciplinary inquiries, exercised by the departmental/appellate authorities discharged by constitutional courts under Article 226 or Article 32 or Article 136 of the Constitution of India is circumscribed by limits of correcting errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice and it is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an appellate authority............"
23. It has been consistently followed in the later decision of this Court in H.P. SEB v. Mahesh Dahiya [H.P. SEB v. Mahesh Dahiya, (2017) 1 SCC 768 : (2017) 1 SCC (L&S) 297] and recently by the three-Judge Bench of this Court in Pravin Kumar v. Union of India [Pravin Kumar v. Union of India, (2020) 9 SCC 471 : (2021) 1 SCC (L&S) 103] .
24. It is thus settled that the power of judicial review, of the constitutional courts, is an evaluation of the decision-making process and not the merits of the decision itself. It is to ensure fairness in treatment and not to ensure fairness of conclusion. The court/tribunal may interfere in the proceedings held against the delinquent if it is, in any manner, inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the 2026.01.07 RAVI KANOJIA16:14:16 +05'30' Item No.19/C-2 27 OA No.2302 OF 2005 mode of enquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached or where the conclusions upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority are perverse or suffer from patent error on the face of record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued. To sum up, the scope of judicial review cannot be extended to the examination of correctness or reasonableness of a decision of authority as a matter of fact.
25. When the disciplinary enquiry is conducted for the alleged misconduct against the public servant, the court is to examine and determine:
(i) whether the enquiry was held by the competent authority;
(ii) whether rules of natural justice are complied with;
(iii) whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence and authority has power and jurisdiction to reach finding of fact or conclusion.
(emphasis supplied)
26. It is well settled that where the enquiry officer is not the disciplinary authority, on receiving the report of enquiry, the disciplinary authority may or may not agree with the findings recorded by the former, in case of disagreement, the disciplinary authority has to record the reasons for disagreement and after affording an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent may record his own findings if the evidence available on record be sufficient for such exercise or else to remit the case to the enquiry officer for further enquiry.
27. It is true that strict rules of evidence are not applicable to departmental enquiry proceedings. However, the only requirement of law is that the allegation against the delinquent must be established by such evidence acting upon which a reasonable person acting reasonably and with objectivity may arrive at a finding upholding the gravity of the charge against the delinquent employee. It is true that mere conjecture or surmises cannot sustain the finding of guilt even in the departmental enquiry proceedings.
28. The constitutional court while exercising its jurisdiction of judicial review under Article 226 or Article 136 of the Constitution would not interfere with the findings of fact arrived at in the departmental enquiry proceedings except in a case of mala fides or perversity i.e. where there is no evidence to support a finding or where a finding is such that no man acting reasonably and with objectivity could have arrived at those findings and so long as there is some evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by the departmental authority, the same has to be sustained."
(emphasis supplied)
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8.4 Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the State of Karnataka &
Anr. vs. Umesh (2022) 6 SCC 563: (2022) 2 SCC (L&S) 321, emphasised about the scope of judicial review by the Courts/Tribunal in the matter of disciplinary/departmental inquiry and held that: -
"22. In the exercise of judicial review, the Court does not act as an appellate forum over the findings of the disciplinary authority. The court does not re-appreciate the evidence on the basis of which the finding of misconduct has been arrived at in the course of a disciplinary enquiry. The Court in the exercise of judicial review must restrict its review to determine whether: (i) the rules of natural justice have been complied with; (ii) the finding of misconduct is based on some evidence; (iii) the statutory rules governing the conduct of the disciplinary enquiry have been observed; and (iv) whether the findings of the disciplinary authority suffer from perversity; and (vi) the penalty is disproportionate to the proven misconduct."
9. Having regard to the factual matrix of the present case and keeping in view the above noted observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, we observe at the outset that having regard to the judgment dated 18.01.2000 of the learned Trial Court in the said criminal case, the acquittal of the applicant in FIR No.14/1996 was not an honourable or clean acquittal, but one rendered on the basis of benefit of doubt. Upon such acquittal, the respondents resumed the disciplinary proceedings, in terms of Rule 12 of the Delhi Police (Punishment & Appeal) Rules, 1980. For ready reference, Rule 12 of the Rules ibid provides as follows:
"12. Action following judicial acquittal - When a police officer has been tried and acquitted by a criminal court, he shall not be punished departmentally on the same charge or on a different charge upon the evidence cited in the criminal case, whether actually led or not, unless:
(a) the criminal charge has failed on technical grounds; or
(b) in the opinion of the court, or of the Deputy Commissioner of Police, the prosecution witnesses have been won over; or
(c) the court has held in its judgment that an offence was actually committed and that suspicion rests upon the police officer concerned; or 2026.01.07 RAVI KANOJIA16:14:16 +05'30' Item No.19/C-2 29 OA No.2302 OF 2005
(d) the evidence cited in the criminal case discloses facts unconnected with the charge before the court which justify departmental proceedings on a different charge; or
(e) additional evidence for departmental proceedings is available."
10. A plain reading of Rule 12 makes it clear that although the general principle prohibits initiation of departmental proceedings on the same charges and evidence after a criminal acquittal, the Rule itself carves out five specific exceptions. Where any of these exceptions apply, departmental action is not barred. We are of the considered view that the present case squarely falls within the scope and operation of sub- rule (a) of Rule 12 of the Rules ibid, and is, therefore, governed by the procedure and consequences prescribed therein.
11. It is well settled by a catena of judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, including in Ajit Kumar Nag v. G.M. (Indian Oil Corporation), reported in (2005) 7 SCC 764; State of Rajasthan v. Heem Singh, reported in (2021) 12 SCC 569; and Deputy Inspector General v. S. Samuthiram, reported in (2013) 1 SCC 598, that an acquittal in a criminal case does not, by itself, operate as a bar against departmental proceedings. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has consistently held that the standard of proof in a disciplinary enquiry is that of preponderance of probabilities, which is markedly lower than the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt applicable to criminal trials.
12. In view of the above settled legal position, this Tribunal is of the considered opinion that the initiation and continuation of departmental proceedings against the applicant, even after his acquittal, cannot be 2026.01.07 RAVI KANOJIA16:14:16 +05'30' Item No.19/C-2 30 OA No.2302 OF 2005 faulted so long as the case falls within the contours of Rule 12 of the Rules ibid or is otherwise supported by the jurisprudence permitting departmental action on a lower standard of proof. Thus, the initiation of departmental proceedings in this case post-acquittal is legally valid.
13. Although there was some delay in issuing the charge memorandum, the applicant has failed to show any specific prejudice caused. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in P.V. Mahadevan v. MD, T.N. Housing Board, 2005 SCC (L&S) 861, and State of A.P. v. N. Radhakishan, (1998) 4 SCC 154, ruled that both delay and resulting prejudice have to be demonstrated. In this case, the incident was serious in nature. Relevant records and witnesses were available. The applicant effectively participated in the enquiry. Hence, delay, by itself, cannot vitiate proceedings.
14. The applicant failed to identify any document, which was relevant, vital to defence, and withheld by the department deliberately. With a view to examining whether the principles of natural justice were duly complied with, whether the finding of misconduct is supported by some evidence, whether the statutory rules governing the conduct of departmental inquiries were adhered to, whether the conclusions of the Inquiry Officer suffer from perversity, and whether the penalty imposed is disproportionate to the proved misconduct, we have carefully scrutinised the departmental inquiry records produced by the respondents. Upon such scrutiny, we find that all relied-upon documents were duly furnished to the applicant under his acknowledgment. Documents that do not form part of the relied-upon 2026.01.07 RAVI KANOJIA16:14:16 +05'30' Item No.19/C-2 31 OA No.2302 OF 2005 list are not required to be mandatorily supplied, and non-supply of such documents does not vitiate the inquiry. Further, Rule 10 of the Delhi Police (Punishment &Appeal) Rules, 1980 provides that:
"Rule 10. Maintenance of discipline - The previous record of an officer, against whom charges have been proved, if shows continued misconduct indicating incorrigibility and complete unfitness for police service, the punishment awarded shall ordinarily be dis-missal from service. When complete unfit-ness for police service is not established, but unfitness for a particular rank is proved, the punishment shall normally be reduction in rank."
Thus, no violation of natural justice occurred.
15. Rules 15 & 16 of the Delhi Police (Punishment & Appeal) Rules, 1980, provide as under:
"15. Preliminary enquiries.- (1) A preliminary enquiry is a fact finding enquiry. Its purpose is (i) to establish the nature of default and identity of defaulter(s). (ii) to collect prosecution evidence, (iii) to judge quantum of default and (iv) to bring relevant documents on record to facilitate a regular departmental enquiry. In cases where specific information covering the above mentioned points exists, a Preliminary Enquiry need not be held and Departmental enquiry may be ordered by the disciplinary authority straightway. In all other cases a preliminary enquiry shall normally proceed a departmental enquiry.
(2) In cases in which a preliminary enquiry discloses the commission of a cognizable offence by a police officer of subordinate rank in his official relations with the public, departmental enquiry shall be ordered after obtaining prior approval of the Addl. Commissioner of Police concerned as to whether a criminal case should be registered and investigated or a departmental enquiry should be held.
(3) The suspected police officer may or may not be present at a preliminary enquiry but when present he shall not cross-examine the witnesses. The file of preliminary enquiry shall not form part of the formal departmental record, but statements there from may be brought on record of the departmental proceedings when the witnesses are no longer available. There shall be no bar to the Enquiry Officer bringing on record any other documents from the file of the preliminary enquiry, if he considers it necessary after supplying copies to the accused officer.
All statements recorded during the preliminary enquiry shall be signed by the person making them and attested by enquiry officer.
16. Procedure in departmental enquiries.- The following procedure shall be observed in all departmental enquiries against police officers of subordinate rank where prima facie the misconduct is such that, if proved. It is likely to result in a major punishment being awarded to the accused officer:
2026.01.07 RAVI KANOJIA16:14:16 +05'30' Item No.19/C-2 32 OA No.2302 OF 2005
(i) A police officer accused of misconduct shall be required to appear before the disciplinary authority, or such Enquiry Officer as may be appointed by the disciplinary authority. The Enquiry Officer shall prepare a statement summarizing the misconduct alleged against the accused officer in such a manner as to give full notice to him of the circumstances in regard to which evidence is to be regarded. Lists of prosecution witnesses together with brief details of the evidence to be led by them and the documents to be relied upon or prosecution shall be attached to the summary of misconduct. A copy of the summary of misconduct and the lists of prosecution witnesses together with brief details of the evidence to be led by them and the documents to be relied upon for prosecution will be given to the defaulter free of charge. The contents of the summary and other documents shall be explained to him.
He shall be required to submit to the enquiry officer a writtenreport within 7 days indicating whether he admits the allegations and if not, whether he wants to produce defence evidence to refuse the allegations against him.
(ii) If the accused police officer after receiving the summary of allegations, admits the misconduct alleged against him, the enquiry officer may proceed forthwith to frame charge, record the accused officer's pleas and any statements he may wish to make and then pass a final order after observing the procedure laid down in rule 15 (xii) below if it is within his power to do so. Alternatively the finding in duplicate shall be forwarded to the officer empowered to decide the case.
(iii) If the accused police officer does not admit the misconduct, the Enquiry Officer shall proceed to record evidence in support of the accusation, as is available and necessary to support the charge. As far as possible the witnesses shall, be examined direct and in the presence of the accused, who shall be given opportunity to take notes of their statements and cross-examine them. The Enquiry Officer is empowered, however, to bring on record the earlier statement of any witness whose presence cannot, in the opinion of such officer, be procured without undue delay, inconvenience or expense if he considers such statement necessary provided that it has been recorded and attested by a police officer superior in rank to the accused officer, or by a magistrate and is either signed by the person making it or has been recorded by such officer during an investigation or a judicial enquiry or trial. The statements and documents so brought on recode in the departmental proceedings shall also be read out to the accused officer and he shall be given an opportunity to take notes. Unsigned statements shall be brought on record only through recording the statements of the officer or magistrate who had recorded the statement of the witness concerned. The accused shall be bound to answer any questions which the enquiry officer may deem fit to put to him with a view to elucidating the facts referred to in the statements or documents thus brought on record.
(iv) When the evidence in support of the allegations has been recorded, the enquiry officer shall:
(a) If he considers that such allegations are not substantiated, either discharge the accused himself, if he is empowered to punish him or recommend his discharge to the Deputy Commissioner of Police or other officer, who may be so empowered or,
(b) Proceed to frame a formal charge or charges in writing explain them to the accused officer and call upon him to answer them.
2026.01.07 RAVI KANOJIA16:14:16 +05'30' Item No.19/C-2 33 OA No.2302 OF 2005
(v) The accused officer shall be required to state the defence witnesses whom he wishes to call and may be given time, not exceeding two working days, to prepare a list of such witnesses together with a summary of the facts they will testify and to produce them at his expense in 10 days. The enquiry office is empowered to refuse to hear any witness whose evidence he considers to be irrelevant or unnecessary in regard to the specific charge. He shall record the statements of those witnesses whom he decides to admit in the presence of the accused officer who shall be allowed to address question to them, the answers to which shall be recorded; provided that the enquiry officer may cause to be recorded by any other Police Officer superior in rank to the accused officer the statements of a witness whose presence cannot be secured without delay, expense or inconvenience and may bring such statements on record. When such a procedure is adopted, the accused officer may be allowed to draw up a list of questions he wishes to be answered by such witnesses. The enquiry officer shall also frame questions which he may wish to put to the witnesses to clear ambiguities or to test their veracity. Such statements shall also be read over to the accused officer and he will be allowed to take notes.
(vi) The accused officer shall, for the purpose of preparing his defence, be permitted to inspect and take extracts from such official documents as he may specify, provided that such permission may be refused for reasons to be recorded in writing, if in the opinion of the enquiry officer such records are not relevant for the purpose or against the public interest to allow him access thereto. The latest orders of the Government shall be applicable with regard to the charging of copying fees, etc.
(vii) At the end of defence evidence or if the Enquiry Officer so directs, at an earlier stage after the framing of charge the accused officer shall be required to submit his own version of facts. He may file a written statement for which he may be given a week's time, but he shall be bound to answer orally all questions arising out of the charge, the recorded evidence, his own written statement or any other relevant matter, which the enquiry officer may deem fit to ask.
(viii) After the defence evidence has been recorded and after the accused officer has submitted his final statement, the Enquiry Officer may examine any other witness to be called "court witness" whose testimony he considers necessary for clarifying certain facts not already covered by the evidence brought on record in the presence of the accused officer who shall be permitted to cross examine all such witnesses and then to make supplementary final defence statement, if any, in case he so desires.
(ix) The Enquiry Officer shall then proceed to record the findings. He shall pass orders of acquittal or punishment if himself empowered to do so, on the basis of evaluation of evidence. If he proposes to punish the defaulter he shall follow the procedure as laid down in Rule 16 (xii). If not so empowered he shall forward the case with his findings (in duplicate) on each of the charges together with the reasons therefore, to the officer having the necessary powers. If the enquiry established charges different from those originally framed, he may record findings on such charges, provided that findings on such charges shall be recorded only if the accused officer has admitted the facts constituting them or has had an opportunity of defending himself, against them.
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(x) On receipt of the enquiry Officer's report the disciplinary authority shall consider the record of the inquiry and pass his orders on the inquiry on each charge. If in the opinion of the disciplinary authority, some important evidence having a bearing on the charge has not been recorded or brought on the file he may record the evidence himself or sent back the enquiry to the same or some other enquiry officer, according to the circumstances of the case, for such evidence to be duly recorded. In such an event, at the end of such supplementary enquiry, the accused officer shall again be given an opportunity to lead further defence, if he so desires, and to submit a supplementary statements, which he may wish to make.
(xi) If it is considered necessary to award a severe punishment to the defaulting officer by taking into consideration his previous bad record, in which case the previous bad record shall form the basis of a definite charge against him and he shall be given opportunity to be defend himself as required by rules.
(xii) If the disciplinary authority, having regard to his findings on the charges, is of the opinion that a major punishment is to be awarded, he shall :-
(a) furnish to the accused officer free of charge a copy of the report of the enquiry Officer, together with brief reasons for disagreement, if any, with the finding of the enquiry Officer.
(b) Where the disciplinary authority is himself the Enquiry Officer, a statement of his own findings, and
(c) Give an opportunity to the accused officer to make a representation or submission in writing within a period of 15 days of the receipt of the above-mentioned documents. The disciplinary authority shall consider such representation/written submission given by the accused officer while deciding the matter and
(d) If the disciplinary authority, having regard to its findings on all or any of the charges and on the basis of the evidence adduced during the enquiry, is of the opinion that any of the penalties specified in rule 5 (i to vii) should be imposed on the Police Officer, it shall make an order imposing such penalty and it shall not be necessary to give the Police Officer any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed to be imposed."
16. From a cumulative reading of Rules 15(3), 16(iii), 16(v), and 16(viii) of the Rules ibid, it is clear that the scheme of the Delhi Police (Punishment & Appeal) Rules expressly empowers the Enquiry Officer to rely on previously recorded statements of witness(es) in specific situations. Rule 15(3) provides that although the preliminary enquiry record does not form part of the formal departmental record, statements 2026.01.07 RAVI KANOJIA16:14:16 +05'30' Item No.19/C-2 35 OA No.2302 OF 2005 from the preliminary enquiry may be brought on record when witnesses are no longer available, after supplying copies to the accused and following due procedure. Rule 16(iii) further empowers the Enquiry Officer to bring on record earlier statements of any witness whose presence cannot be procured without undue delay, inconvenience, or expense, provided the statements were duly recorded and attested in the prescribed manner. The accused must also be given an opportunity to take notes and respond. Rule 16(v) allows statements of witnesses to be brought on record through the officer, who recorded them when their personal presence cannot be secured. Rule 16(viii) authorizes calling "court witnesses" to clarify ambiguities or gaps, reinforcing that the Enquiry Officer may use all reliable material to ensure a fair and complete fact-finding process. Read together, these provisions clearly establish that when a witness turns hostile, becomes unavailable, or cannot be produced without undue delay or inconvenience, the Enquiry Officer is entitled to rely on their earlier duly recorded statements, subject to observance of procedural safeguards. This ensures that the enquiry is not frustrated merely because a witness resiles or avoids appearance, while still protecting the accused officer's right to notice, participation, and defence.
17. It is settled law that strict rules of Evidence Act do not apply to departmental enquiries and material collected during preliminary enquiry can be relied upon, if the delinquent is allowed to rebut it. The applicant was given adequate opportunity to cross-examine witnesses who were produced, and to rebut other material. No prejudice is shown.
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18. We also find that the prosecution examined material witnesses sufficient to establish a prima facie case. Non-examination of every listed witness is not fatal. The material on record forms a coherent chain supporting misconduct. It is evident from the deposition of PW-6, as well as the cross-examination conducted by the Inquiry Officer, that there exists material indicating the applicant's involvement in the aforesaid grave incident.
19. We have also perused the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer and find that the same are based on consistent statements, established circumstantial links, relevant documentary records, and the overall conduct of the applicant. The Tribunal does not find any perversity, irregularity, or legal infirmity in the conclusions drawn by the Inquiry Officer. It is a settled position of law that the scope of judicial review in disciplinary matters is limited and does not extend to re- appreciation or re-evaluation of evidence unless the findings are so unreasonable that no prudent person could have arrived at them, as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in B.C. Chaturvedi (supra).
20. We have also carefully examined the orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority and are unable to accept the contention that they are non-speaking or unreasoned. On the contrary, both orders are well-reasoned and speaking, addressing the charges, the evidence adduced, as well as the defence submissions of the applicant. The record further reflects that the authorities have undertaken an independent and conscientious application of mind while arriving at their respective conclusions.
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21. Having regard to the charges levelled against the applicant and the nature of misconduct established, we are of the view that the penalty of dismissal is commensurate with the gravity of the proved allegations. The punishment cannot be said to be disproportionate or unreasonable, nor does it shock the conscience of the Tribunal. In this regard, we find support from the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of UOI v. G. Ganayutham, reported in 1997 (7) SCC 463. Thus, no interference is warranted.
22. In this case, while going through the pleadings, we also find that the respondents have used caste/sub caste while conducting official business, which is clearly violative of the recent order/judgment dated 16.9.2025 of the Hon'ble High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Application u/s 482 No. - 31545 of 2024, titled Praveen Chetri Versus State of U.P. and Another, in which while adjudicating this issue, the Hon'ble High Court has elaborately delved upon the issue of usage of caste / sub caste while conducting official business. For facility of reference, it would be appropriate to quote relevant paras of the said judgment, which are as follows: -
"23. This historical experience teaches us an essential lesson: the mere existence of law does not guarantee justice. Procedural codes, however well-structured, can fail to serve the people if they are not grounded in principles of JUSTICE, social, economic and political; LIBERTY of thought, expression, belief, faith, and worship; EQUALITY of status and of opportunity; and to promote among all FRATERNITY assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity and the integrity of the Nation.
24. Therefore, in the contemporary Indian judicial landscape, the pursuit of justice demands a holistic appreciation of the entire judicial framework rather than mere adherence to codified law and the law propounded through judgments. Structural judicial reform is urgently needed- reform that prioritizes justice not only in theory but in alignment with the rule of law, ensuring that the law and government policies serve WE, THE PEOPLE OF INDIA, not the other way around.
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25. Caste in India is not merely a system of social stratification - it isa deeply embedded psychological and legal phenomenon that influences identity, behaviour, and access to rights. Caste has been institutionalized over centuries through religious texts, social customs, and cultural practices. The caste-based notion of superiority, especially among historically privileged castes, persists in the collective consciousness despite constitutional guarantees of equality and dignity. It is a human-made construct- not a genetically evolved condition, like the evolution of humans from homo sapiens to present-day human beings; It's not a divinely ordained system.
26. The Constitution of India enshrines the principle of equality and explicitly prohibits caste-based discrimination through several key provisions. Article 14 guarantees "equality before the law" and "equal protection of the laws" to all individuals. Article 15(1) prohibits discrimination on the grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth. Yet, caste-based discrimination continues to exist in society, and the Courts have recognized this in various judgments, particularly in matters involving atrocity laws and reservations.
27. Many individuals from privileged caste(s) experience cognitive dissonance when confronted with their privilege. While they may intellectually accept constitutional equality, they often deny structural discrimination, attributing marginalized groups. This denial acts as a psychological defence mechanism to preserve caste identity and caste-based privileges without overt guilt. This fosters implicit bias and a persistent sense of social superiority, which resists rational legal intervention.
31. The resurgence of caste identifiers in public and digital spaces is not the beginning of a cultural phenomenon- it is a coded assertion of social power that contradicts India's constitutional values. In the northern part of India- in states like Uttar Pradesh, Haryana, Punjab, Rajasthan, and parts of Madhya Pradesh and Bihar- individuals commonly mark their cars, bikes, and sometimes homes with caste identifiers. Vehicles adorned with caste emblems, slogans or even warnings.
34. The collective political will, bureaucratic setup, and law enforcement agencies are oblivious to the aforementioned social trend. The reasons are best known to them; either they have accepted it as the future of the new India, or their cognitive behaviour and social psyche have been shaped by caste narcissism.
35. The police and other law enforcement agencies are not immune to these societal biases. They often reflect, reproduce, and sometimes intensify caste-based prejudices. It becomes necessary to deal with the cognitive behaviour of law enforcement officials in India when influenced by caste-ridden thought, combining insights from the conduct infused by social psychology, and behavioural patterns reflected in contemporary cases. This is evident from discrimination and segregation in the education and justice departments that remain rampant across India, driving inequality in education, life opportunities, and in justice delivery system.
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37. Even though Article 15 of the Indian Constitution protects individual Indians from discrimination based on religion, race, caste, sex and place of birth. Yet, nearly 75 years after the Indian Constitution came into force, the critical and influential institutions of State are still influenced by a malignant system that often adopts immoral caste, sex and religion-based preferences under the guise of so-called "independence" and "transparency" ........
38. The psyche behind an inflated ego is a myth, and the constitutional instrumentalities need to bust it. It is not just regressive- it is resistant to the idea of a progressive, transformed, developed, modern, and unified India. India's future lies in social integrity and participative democracy. Confronting this psyche requires more than regulation; it demands social re-education, moral awakening, and deconstruction of caste as a symbol of worth. The real pride of a citizen must lie not in caste, but in character- and not in legacy, but in equality and fraternity. Equality means equal opportunities for all, and fraternity means a collective sense of brotherhood. It is not a subject of good and impressive literature, but rather one to be embodied in practice through body, action, and behavior. It's about engaging your whole self.
39. To address the psychological dimensions of system-based privileges and behavior sentiments, legal reform must go beyond punitive measures, and the rule of law shall be given prominence while dealing with biases, and to eliminate such biases and prejudices, the sensitization of the judiciary and police through anti- bias training programmes and introducing new curricular reform to challenge casteist and sexiest narratives in schools and colleges, and in bureaucratic set-ups. Strengthening social justice jurisprudence with attention to lived experience, rather than just legal definitions, and implementing legal literacy campaigns to dismantle internalized superiority may serve a useful purpose in establishing a caste-less and gender-neutral society.
45. The law alone cannot change hearts and minds. The absence of sustained government programmes to eliminate discrimination may not fulfil its Constitution obligation towards a casteless society. India must move beyond punishment and economic schemes to create proactive programmes of education, awareness, and social reform to achieve constitutional morality and the vision of an equal and inclusive society in participative democracy. The affirmative programmes and economic schemes have their own worth but cannot substitute the aforesaid pro-active programmes.
46. The investigative impartiality and enforcement neutrality must be consciously cultivated, especially in a society where caste is pervasive. Writing or declaring the caste of an accused- without legal relevance-amounts to identity profiling, not objective investigation. It reinforces prejudice, corrupts public opinion, contaminates judicial thinking, violates fundamental rights, and undermines constitutional morality.
49. The sole purpose of the observation made herein above is merely an attempt to invoke constitutional morality and awaken a sense of compassion and justice in the conscience of those occupying the highest constitutional offices. Constitutional authorities must never forget that the dignity of the Nation does not emanate from lineage or caste affinity, but from adherence to constitutional morality and 2026.01.07 RAVI KANOJIA16:14:16 +05'30' Item No.19/C-2 40 OA No.2302 OF 2005 the collective effort of building a strong national character. Pride in ancestry or social identity cannot be a substitute for the values of equality, justice, and fraternity enshrined in the Constitution. True honour for one's office, and true service to the people, lies in upholding these principles with humility and devotion. Reverence for the Constitution, rather than for lineage, is the highest form of patriotism and the truest expression of national service. Such conduct, if any, by the constitutional authority undermines the constitutional morality."
23. In the result, for the forgoing reasons, we do not find any infirmity in the action of the respondents dismissing the applicant from service and therefore, the present OA being devoid of merit is dismissed.
23. Pending MA(s), if any, stand disposed of.
24. There shall be no order as to costs.
25. In view of the observation in para 22 above, respondents are directed to take corrective steps and to pave way for neutrality.
26. Registry is directed to return the department file (enclosed with this case file) produced by the respondents to the concerned and responsible officer of the respondents under proper receipt.
(Rajinder Kashyap) (R.N. Singh)
Member (A) Member (J)
/ravi/
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