Jharkhand High Court
The State Of Jharkhand vs Prashant Kumar Mishra Son Of Late K.P. ... on 18 May, 2020
Equivalent citations: AIRONLINE 2020 JHA 373
Author: Ravi Ranjan
Bench: Chief Justice, Sujit Narayan Prasad
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
L.P.A. No.22 of 2018
With
I.A. No.415 of 2018
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1. The State of Jharkhand
2. The Secretary, Department of Human Resources Development
(Higher Education) Government of Jharkhand, office at Project
Building, P.O. and P.S. Dhurwa, District Ranchi
.... .... Appellants
Versus
1. Prashant Kumar Mishra Son of Late K.P. Mishra resident of 201,
Shaivya Apartment, Lake Road, P.O. Hazaribagh, P.S. Sadar District
Hazaribagh
2. Dr. Madan Mohan Pathak Son of Late Nageshwar pathak resident of
Om Sai Enclave, Matwari Road, Near Hirabag Chowk, P.O.
Hazaribagh P.S. Sadar District Hazaribagh
3. Dr. Tarakant Shukla Son of Late Triguna Nand Shukla resident of
301/B, Shanya Apartment, Jheel Road, Noora, P.O. Hazaribagh P.S.
Sadar, District Hazaribagh
4. Ajay Kumar Sharma Son of Late B.D. Shastri, University Department of
Zoology, Vinoba Bhave University, Hazaribagh, resident of Near Ram
Nagar Mala, P.O. Hazaribagh, P.S. Sadar District Hazaribagh
5. Prakash Kumar Son of Late Bihari Prasad Bhagat resident of New
Colony (Behind Police Station) Holding No.427 P.O. Jhumri Telaiya,
P.S. Jhumri Telaiya, District Koderma
6. Dr. Sajal Mukherjee Son of Late Dr. P.S. Mukherjee, resident of
Boddom Bazar, Malavia Road, Hazaribagh P.O. Hazaribagh, P.S.
Sadar District Hazaribagh
7. Baleshwar Prasad Singh Son of Sri Ram Bilas Singh resident of
Mandirgali Old Firebrigage, Hazaribagh, P.O. Hazaribagh, P.S. Sadar
District Hazaribagh
8. Shailendra Kumar Sinha Son of Late Daya Shankar Prasad resident of
Nagendra Kumar Flat No.302, P.O. ISM Campus, Dhanbad, P.S.
Saraidhela, District Dhanbad
9. Parmeshwar Mahto Son of Late Pela Ram Mahto resident of Behind
Mohan Petrol Pump, GT Road, Govindpur, P.O. Govindpur P.S.
Govindpur, District Dhanbad
2
10. Dr. Subodh Kumar Sinha Son of Late Muneshwar Prasad resident
of Opp Forester's Training School, Canary Hill Road, Hazaribagh, P.O.
Hazaribagh, P.S. Sadar District Hazaribagh
11. The Vice Chancellor, Vioba Bhave University, Hazaribagh, P.O. and
P.S. Hazaribagh, District Hazaribagh
12. The Registrar, Vioba Bhave University, Hazaribagh, P.O and P.S.
Hazaribagh, District Hazaribagh
13. University Grant Commission, Bahadur Shah Zafar Marg New
Delhi-110002 P.O. ITO P.S. Darya Ganj Delhi .... .... Respondents
With
L.P.A. No.661 of 2019
With
I.A. No.9493 of 2019
1. The State of Jharkhand
2. The Secretary, Department of Human Resources Development
(Higher Education) Govt. of Jharkhand, having office at Nepal House,
P.O. and P.S.-Doranda and District Ranchi
.... .... Appellants
Versus
1. Prashant Kumar Mishra, son of Late K.P. Mishra resident of 201,
Shaivya Apartment, Lake Road, P.O. Hazaribagh, P.S.- Sadar District-
Hazaribagh
2. Dr. Madan Mohan Pathak, son of Late Nageshwar Pathak, resident of
Om Sai Enclave, Matwari Road, Near Hirabag Chowk, P.O.-
Hazaribagh P.S.- Sadar, District- Hazaribagh
3. Dr. Tarakant Shukla, son of Late Triguna Nand Shukla, resident of
301/B, Shanya Apartment, Jheel Road, Noora, P.O. Hazaribagh, P.S.-
Sadar, District- Hazaribagh
4. Ajay Kumar Sharma, son of Late B.D. Shastri, University, Department
of Zoology, Vinoba Bhave University, Hazaribagh, resident of Near
Ram Nagar Mala, P.O.- Hazaribagh, P.S.- Sadar, District- Hazaribagh
5. Prakash Kumar, son of Late Bihari Prasad Bhagat, resident of New
Colony (behind Police Station), Holding No.427, P.O.- Jhumri Telaiya,
P.S.- Jhumri Telaiya, District- Koderma
6. Dr. Sajal Mukherjee, son of Late Dr. P.S. Mukherjee, resident of
Boddom Bazar, Malavia Road, Hazaribagh P.O.- Hazaribagh, P.S.-
Sadar District- Hazaribagh
7. Baleshwar Prasad Singh, son of Sri Ram Bilas Singh resident of
Mandirgali Old Firebrigade, Hazaribagh, P.O.-Hazaribagh, P.S.- Sadar
District- Hazaribagh
8. Shailendra Kumar Sinha, son of Late Daya Shankar Prasad, resident
of Nagendra Tower, Flat No.302, P.O.- ISM Campus, Dhanbad, P.S.-
Saraidhela, District- Dhanbad
9. Parmeshwar Mahto, son of Late Pela Ram Mahto, resident of Behind
Mohan Petrol Pump, GT Road, Govindpur, P.O. & P.S.- Govindpur,
District- Dhanbad
3
10. Dr. Subodh Kumar Sinha, son of Late Muneshwar Prasad, resident
of Opp. Forester's Training School, Canary Hill Road, Hazaribagh,
P.O.- Hazaribagh, P.S.- Sadar District- Hazaribagh
11. The Vice-Chancellor, Vinoba Bhave University, Hazaribagh, P.O. &
P.S.- Hazaribagh, District- Hazaribagh
12. The Registrar, Vinoba Bhave University, Hazaribagh, P.O & P.S.-
Hazaribagh, District- Hazaribagh
13. University Grants Commission (UGC) through its Secretary, New
Dehli .... .... Respondents
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CORAM : HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
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For the Appellants : Mr. Manoj Tandon, A.A.G.
For the Respondent Nos.1 to 10 : Mr. Saurabh Arun, Advocate
For the Respondent Nos.11 & 12: Mrs. Indrani Sen Choudhary, Advocate
: Dr. Ashok Kr. Singh, Advocate
For the Respondent No.13 : Mr. Laxman Kumar, Advocate
------
C.A.V. on 27.02.2020 Delivered on 18/05/2020
Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.
Both the letters patent appeal has been filed after period of limitation, however, delay condonation application has been filed being I.A.No.414 of 2018 in L.P.A.No. 22 of 2018 and I.A.No.9493 of 2019 in L.P.A.No.661 of 2019.
This Court, after considering the reason for condoning the delay, has condoned the delay, so far as it relates to L.P.A. No.22 of 2018, by allowing interlocutory application being I.A.No.414 of 2018 vide order dated 12.09.2019, similarly, the delay in filing L.P.A.No.661 of 2019 has also been condoned the delay by allowing I.A.No.9493 of 2019 vide order dated 27.02.2020.
L.P.A. No.22 of 2018 & L.P.A.No.661 of 2019 These two intra-court appeals are against the judgment dated 20.06.2017 passed in W.P.(S) No.4162 of 2013, the subject matter of L.P.A.No.22 of 2018 and against the order dated 22.03.2018 passed in Civil Review No.83 of 2017, the subject matter of L.P.A. No.661 of 2019. 4
2. This Court, prior to scrutinizing the legality and propriety of the impugned orders which are the subject matter of the instant appeals requires to refer the certain facts of the case which enumerates as hereunder:-
3. The writ petitioners have been appointed initially as Lecturer on different dates in different colleges at the time of approaching to this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. They have disclosed that they were working as Reader in different departments under the Vinoba Bhave University except petitioner nos.8 and 9, as petitioner no.8 is working in P.K. Roy College, Dhanbad and petitioner no.9 is working in R.S. More College, Govindpur.
The writ petitioners have been granted benefit of time bound promotion by virtue of different notifications issued in this regard granting them the said benefit to discharge their duties to the post of Reader and having found to be eligible to hold the post of Reader and as per the University Grants Commission Regulation, it was the case of the writ petitioners before the Writ Court that after introduction of provision of Career Advancement Scheme of the University Grants Commission which provides about minimum length of service for eligibility to move into the grade of Lecturers Senior Scale would be four years for those with Ph.D., five years for those with M.Phil. and six years for those at the level of Lecturers and for eligibility to move into the grade of Reader/Lecturer- Selection Grade, the minimum length of service of the Lecturer in Senior Selection Grade shall be uniformly five years. As such, the writ petitioners have shown to be eligible for being placed at the Lecturer Selection Grade in the scale of Rs.12000-420-18300/- at the time of promotion to the post of Reader under the Scheme, but they have been placed in the pay scale 5 of Rs.10000-15200/-, which according to the writ petitioners, are highly arbitrary and improper as because, according to the writ petitioners, when they are eligible to hold the post of Ph.D. Degree, as such, in view of the eligibility criteria fixing to take benefit under Career Advancement Claim Scheme of the University Grants Commission, they have become eligible after imparting four years of service to be placed in the Senior Selection Grade and after five years of the Service i.e., in the 9th year of their service, they have become eligible to be placed in the Selection Grade of Lecturer with the scale of pay of Rs.12000-420-18300/- but instead of providing the aforesaid pay scale after 10th year of service, they have provided with pay scale of Rs.10000-15200/-.
It is the further case of the writ petitioners that the authorities in a highly arbitrary manner have fixed a cut-off date i.e., 01.03.1989 laying down therein that the appointees who have appointed prior to 01.03.1989 as Readers would be placed in the pay scale of Rs.12000-420-18300/- but who have promoted after 01.03.1989, were provided with lesser scale of Rs.10000-15200/-, although they were posted as Reader as also they were imparting the same duties and are being discharged by the appointees prior to 01.03.1989.
It is the further case of the writ petitioners that the State of Jharkhand has implemented the U.G.C. packages including the Pay Revision and a letter to that effect has been issued on 13.11.2001 by the respondent no.2 to the various Universities accepting the University Grants Commission packages but the scale of pay which they have been provided, is not in accordance with University Grants Commission packages showing two different pay scales in the same class making the class amongst class itself which is a highly arbitrary exercise of the State of Jharkhand.
6
It is the further case of the writ petitioners that while taking such decision, the State of Jharkhand has not taken into consideration the notification issued by the University Grants Commission on 24.12.1998 issued for the purpose of revision of a pay scale to provide minimum qualification for appointment to teacher in Universities and Colleges and other measures of maintenance of students, but in contravention to the said notification, two pay scales have been fixed for the post of Readers which is nothing but an arbitrary and discriminatory attitude of the respondent-State of Jharkhand.
The writ petitioners have made representation before the Competent Authority but having not been considered, ultimately, the writ petitioners have filed writ petition before the Court invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India inter-alia on the ground that when the University Grants Commission have come out with a notification dated 24.12.1998 showing the pay scale of the Reader, there cannot be two pay scales by fixing a cut-off date 01.03.1989, while according to the writ petitioners, they are possessing requisite eligibility criteria to hold the post of Reader and as such, there cannot be any discrimination.
4. After calling upon, the appearances have been made by the respondents and counter affidavit has been filed inter-alia stating therein that there is no discrimination rather a reasonable classification has been made by granting lesser pay scale to the writ petitioners in comparison to the appointees who have promoted as Reader prior to 01.03.1989.
5. According to the respondent-State of Jharkhand, since the writ petitioners have been promoted under the time bound promotion scheme introduced by the State Government and as such, lesser pay scales have been granted in their favour i.e., pay scale of Rs.3000-5000/- to such 7 Readers who have promoted after 01.03.1989 under the aforesaid promotion Scheme, whereas the Readers promoted prior to 01.03.1989, have been given pay scale of Rs.3700-5700/-.
6. Learned Single Judge of this Court after hearing the parties has passed the order, which is the subject matter of the instant appeals, holding the government decision dated 13.11.2001 as contained under Annexure-1 to the writ petition and order dated 31.05.2005(Annexure-4) as not sustainable and accordingly, quashed and set aside. Further, holding the writ petitioners are entitled to the pay scale of Rs.12000-420- 18300/- in place of Rs.10000-15200/- along with the arrears of the pay scale with effect from 01.01.2006.
After disposal of the aforesaid writ petition, a petition has been filed for review of the judgment pronounced on 20.06.2017 in W.P.(S) No.4162 of 2013 by the writ petitioners for making necessary correction by way of review to the effect to direct the authorities to allow the pay scale in favour of the writ petitioners with effect from 01.01.1996 in place of 01.01.2006 but due to typographical error in the impugned order, in place of 01.01.1996, it has been reflected as 01.01.2006.
Learned Single Judge in exercise of power of review and after going across the pleading made in the writ petition as also considering the submission made on behalf of the learned State Counsel who have submitted before the learned Single Judge that the review application may be allowed by correcting the entitlement of pay scale with effect from 01.01.1996 by modifying it from 01.01.2006 and accordingly, the learned Single Judge has modified the order dated 20.06.2017.
7. Both the appeals have been filed against the order passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(S) No.4162 of 2013 dated 20.06.2017 and the order passed in Civil Review No.83 of 2017 dated 22.03.2018 inter- 8 alia on the ground that since the writ petitioners have accepted the State Government beneficiary Scheme, cannot subsequently change their stand and claim for University Grants Commission Scale of Reader.
Further on the ground that if the writ petitioners ought to take benefit of U.G.C. pay scale, they have to relinquish the benefits already availed by them under the State Government beneficiary Scheme.
Further ground has been agitated while assailing the order passed by the learned Single Judge that there is no consideration while quashing the order as contained under Annexure-1 and Annexure-4 to the writ petition, the decision of the Central Government as contained in letter dated 17.06.1987/02.07.1988 and letter dated 18.10.2002.
Learned counsel appearing for the appellants has vehemently argued the case by assailing the impugned orders on the aforesaid ground and has submitted that impugned orders are not sustainable in the eye of law.
8. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondents-writ petitioners have submitted that there is no error in the order passed by the learned Single Judge, since according to them, there cannot be class amongst class that to when they are discharging their duties of similar nature and having similar eligibility conditions.
9. It has been argued on behalf of the writ petitioners that right from the recommendation of 4th Pay Revision and up to recommendation of 6th Pay Revision, there are only one pay scale for the post of Reader and as such, there cannot be two slabs of pay scales merely on account of the fact that the post writ petitioners have got, is by virtue of getting benefit under the time bound promotion scheme, rather according to the learned counsel appearing for the respondents, the moment they are eligible to hold the post of Reader irrespective of their entering in the cadre through 9 different sources, they will be entitled to get the same pay scale.
It has further been argued that it is not the case of the State Government that they are not fulfilling the eligibility criteria as provided by the U.G.C. to hold the post of Reader.
Further, it has been submitted with respect to the ground agitated in the memo of appeal to the effect that so long as the Central Government decision based upon which the impugned order has been issued, will not be quashed, there is no justification in quashing the impugned decision of the State of Jharkhand, since the decision of the State of Jharkhand is based upon the decision of the Central Government but while rebutting the said ground, the submission has been made that specific stand has been taken by the writ petitioners in the writ petition at paragraph-10 showing the eligibility criteria as has been prescribed in the letter issued by the Government of India dated 31.05.2005 specifically making a plea about fulfillment of eligibility criteria has not been denied as would be evident from the counter affidavit and hence, it is not the case of the State- respondent that the writ petitioner are not fulfilling the eligibility criteria to get the pay scale of Rs.12000-420-18300/- and as such, there is no question of agitating the ground to the effect so long the Government of India letter is not quashed by the learned Single Judge, there is no justification in quashing the letter issued by the State of Jharkhand dated 31.05.2005.
Further submission has been made raising the legal issue that when the University Grants Commission Regulation has come out with a pay scale, the State of Jharkhand cannot come out with two pay scales by issuing executive instruction and hence, communication dated 31.05.2005, is nullity in the eye of law being not within the jurisdiction of the State authority to come out with such executive instruction laying down 10 two pay scales contrary to the University Grants Commission Regulation.
10. This Court, after having heard the learned counsel for the parties and after appreciating their arguments and considering the document which is available on record, deem it fit and proper to discuss about the certain legal position as has been agitated by the learned counsel appearing for the parties to the effect that it has been argued about the legal sanctity about communication dated 31.05.2005 as contained under Annexure-5 which is one of the impugned order in the writ petition.
Submission about the same has been made holding the impugned orders jurisdiction since according to the learned counsel appearing for the respondents, the State authority has got no jurisdiction to come out with a decision by way of executive instruction prevailing upon the decision taken by the U.G.C. vis-à-vis under the Jharkhand State University Act, 2000.
11. This Court in order to answer this issue, deem it fit and proper to discuss about the provision of Jharkhand State University Act, 2000.
Prior to coming into the effect of Jharkhand State University Act, 2000 by virtue of enactment of Bihar Reorganization Act, 2000 after bifurcation of the erstwhile State of Bihar in two successor States i.e., existing State of Bihar and the existing State of Jharkhand, there was an Act in the name of "Bihar State University Act, 1976" enacted in order to make earlier law consistent with inconformity with the standards of University Grants Commission to regulate the University of the State of erstwhile State of Bihar, hereinafter referred to as "The Act, 1976".
Section 34 of the Act, 1976 provides a provision of the Statutes which reads as hereunder:-
"34. The Statutes- Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Statutes may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely;
(a) the institution of Fellowship, Scholarships, 11 exhibitions, medals and prizes;
(b) the designations and powers of the officers of the University;
(c) the constitution, powers, functions and duties of the authorities of the University;
(d) the admission of educational institutions as colleges and the withdrawal of privileges from Colleges so admitted:
(e) the institution of Colleges and hostels and their maintenance and management:
(f) the classification of teachers of the University, the manner of their appointment and their recognition;
(g) the constitution of pension, insurance or provident fund for benefit of the officers, teachers and other servants of the University, and the teacher of Colleges:
(h) the maintenance of the register of registered graduates;
(i) the number, qualification, grade, pay reservation of posts for 1[scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, Backward Classes, Women and economically weaker sections] and conditions of service of teachers, officers and other servants of the University including the creation of new posts after considering, as the case may be, the recommendations of the Academic Council and the Syndicate, in the case of creation of other posts, and the recommendation of the Syndicate, in the case of posts of officers and servants of the University;
(j) the maintenance of accounts of the income and expenditure of the University including the income and expenditure of Colleges and the forms and registers in which such accounts shall be kept;
(k) the maintenance of a register of teachers;
(l) the conferment of honorary degrees and distinctions;
(m) all other matters which are or may be prescribed by the Ordinance of the Statutes."
It is evident from the provision of Section 34 of the Act, 1976 that the Statutes have been made for one or any of the matters and one of it is as under sub-section (I) of Section 34 wherein the statutes is to be made to govern the conditions of service of teachers, officers and other servants of the University including the creation of new posts after considering, as the case may be, the recommendations of the Academic Council and the syndicate, in the case of creation of other posts, and the recommendation of the Syndicate, in the case of posts of officers and servants of the 12 University.
Section 36 provides a method as to how the statutes are to be made, the same reads as hereunder:-
"36. Statues how made.- (1)The Senate may, either on its own motion or on submission by the Syndicate, make Statutes, or amend or repeal it: provided that-
(a) the Senate shall not consider any statute having the effect of charging the number of post of teachers, officers and servants of the University, their pay scales or pay order; unless such a draft is recommended by the Chancellor for the considerations of the Senate;
(b) the Syndicate shall not propose any such statutes, as may affect the status, powers and constitution of any authority of the University, unless that authority has been allowed an opportunity to furnish written opinion upon the proposed changes, and the Senate shall have to consider such option expressed in writing; and
(c) in matters relating to status, powers, functions and constitution of the Academic Council, it shall be lawful for the Academic Council to initiate such Statutes and forward it to the Syndicate, which shall submit it to the Senate with such recommendations as it may like to make.
(2) if the draft of any Statutes or a portion thereof, after being presented by the Syndicate before the Senate is sent back to the Syndicate for reconsideration, and the Syndicate does not agree, after reconsideration, to the amendments suggested by the Senate, then it shall be lawful for the Senate to pass the Statutes or a portion of the Statutes in such form, as it may deem appropriate, and the decision of the Senate shall, subject to the provision contained in sub Section (3) and sub section (4), be final:
[(3) where the Senate has passed the draft of any statute if shall be submitted to the Chancellor who shall declare that he assents thereto as passed by the Senate or with such amendments as he deems proper:] Provided that the Chancellor may as soon as possible after the presentation to him of the draft of the Statute so passed for assent, return the draft together with a message requesting that the Senate shall reconsider the draft and when the draft is so returned, the Senate shall reconsider the draft accordingly and if the draft is passed again by the Senate with or without any amendment and is presented to the Chancellor for assent, the Chancellor for assent, the Chancellor shall declare either that [he assents thereto with such amendments which he deems proper] or that he withholds assent there from:13
(4) Where any member of the Senate proposes to the Senate of the draft of any Statute, the Senate shall refer the same to the Syndicate, and it shall thereupon be the duty of the Syndicate to consider the draft and the Syndicate may either recommend to the Senate that the proposal be rejected or submit the draft to the Senate in such forms as the Syndicate may approve, and the provisions of this section shall apply in the case of any draft so submitted as they apply in case of the draft proposed to the Senate by the Syndicate. (5) A statute passed by the Senate shall have no validity until it has been assented to by the Chancellor.
[(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in the above clauses, if at any time when the Senate is not in session and the Chancellor is satisfied that it is necessary to frame Statutes on any subject, the Chancellor after obtaining the advice of the Department of Higher Education, Government of Jharkhand] shall send the draft Statutes for opinion to the Syndicate of the University and it shall be binding on the Vice Chancellor to convene a meeting of the Syndicate for consideration of the drafts statutes within 10 days of receipt of the said draft. The Chancellor shall then give his assents to the Statutes with such amendments as may deem necessary in the light of the opinion of the Syndicate. The Statutes shall be deemed to have come into force in the University form the date of assent.
Statutes framed in this manner shall be placed before the next meeting of the Senate for confirmation:
1[Provided that if there be any financial implication which may arise under the statute, it shall not be enforceable unless prior approval of the State Government has been obtained.] [(7)Notwithstanding anything contained in the clause, if at any time the Chancellor is satisfied that it is necessary to frame Statues of any subject of common interest, after obtaining the advice of the Committee of there Vice-chancellors constituted by the Chancellors, shall send the Draft Statute to all the Vice-Chancellors for opinion, who shall send their opinion within 10 days from the receipt of draft. The Chancellor shall give assent to the Statute with such amendment as he may deem necessary in the light of the opinion of the Vice- Chancellors. The Statute shall be deemed to come into force in the Universities from the date of assent:
Provided that the State Govt. may also suggest the Chancellor to frame Statute of any subject of common interest of all the Universities.] It is evident from the aforesaid provision as contained under Section 36 as referred above that the statutes is to be passed by the Senate and 14 unless and until, the same has been assented to by the Chancellor, it has no validity as would appear from sub-section 5 to Section 36 of the Act.
After creation of the State of Jharkhand, a new Act in the name of Jharkhand State University Act, 2000 has been enacted by way of adoption of the Act, 1976 and therefore, proviso to Section 34 and Section 36 as available under the Act, 1976 have become part of the Jharkhand State University Act, 2000, hereinafter referred to as "The Act, 2000".
In the context of the fact, it also requires to refer the University Grants Commission Act, 1956, hereinafter referred to as "The Act, 1956", which has been enacted to make provision in the coordination and determination of standards of University and for that purpose, University Grants Commission was established.
12. In order to achieve the object and intent of the Act, 1956 as under
Section 26, whereby and whereunder, the power has been conferred upon the Commission to make regulation by notifying in the Official Gazette consistent with those Acts and the Rules made thereunder for the following purpose which reads as hereunder:-
"26. Power to make regulations.--(1) The Commission [may, by notification in the Official Gazette, make regulations] consistent with this Act and the rules made thereunder,--
(a) regulating the meetings of the Commission and the procedure for conducting business thereat;
(b) regulating the manner in which and the purposes for which persons may be associated with the Commission under section 9;
(c) specifying the terms and conditions of service of the employees appointed by the Commission;
(d) specifying the institutions or class of institutions which may be recognised by the Commission under clause (f) of section 2;
(e) defining the qualifications that should ordinarily be required of any person to be appointed to the teaching staff of the University, having regard to the branch of education in which he is expected to give instruction;
(f) defining the minimum standards of instruction for the grant of any degree by any University;
(g) regulating the maintenance of standards and the co-
ordination of work or facilities in Universities.
[(h) regulating the establishment of institutions referred to in clause (ccc) of section 12 and other matters relating to such 15 institutions;] [(i) specifying the matters in respect of which fees may be charged, and scales of fees in accordance with which fees may be charged, by a college under sub-section (2) of section 12A; [(j) specifying the manner in which an inquiry may be conducted under sub-section (4) of section 12A.] (2) No regulation shall be made under clause (a) or clause (b) or clause (c) or clause (d) 1[(or clause (h) or clause (i) or clause (j)] of sub-section (1) except with the previous approval of the Central Government.
[(3) The power to make regulations conferred by this section [except clause (i) and clause (j) of sub-section (1)] shall include the power to give retrospective effect from a date not earlier than the date of commencement of this Act, to the regulations or any of them but no retrospective effect shall be given to any regulation so as to prejudicially affect the interests of any person to whom such regulation may be applicable.]"
It is evident from the provision of Section 26 as referred hereinabove under Section 26(1)(c) that the Commission has been empowered to make regulation specifying the terms and conditions of service of the employees appointed by the Commission.
It is further relevant to refer the provision of Section 2(f) which provides definition of "University" which means a University established or incorporated by or under a Central Act, a Provincial Act or a State Act, and includes any such institution as may, in consultation with the University concerned, be recognized by the Commission in accordance with the regulations made in this behalf under this Act.
Section 3 of the Act, 1956 provides that the Central Government may, on the advice of the commission, declare, by notification in the Official Gazette, that any institution for higher education, other than a University, shall be deemed to be a University for the purposes of this Act, and on such a declaration being made, all the provisions of this Act shall apply to such institution as if it were a University within the meaning of clause (f) of section 2.
It is evident from joint reading of Section 2(f) and Section 3 that a University will be treated to be University if the provision of the University 16 Grants Commission Act, 1956 will strictly be adhered to.
Further, it is evident from the provision of Section 26 that the Commission has been empowered to make regulation which binds all the Universities to follow such regulation.
The provision of Section 26 contains a provision about making regulation about terms and conditions of the Service as also the qualification for making a candidate eligible to hold the teaching post in the University, if the said University is treated to be University within the meaning of Section 2(f) of the University Grants Commission Act, 1956.
There is no dispute that the salary of an employee is a service condition.
It requires to refer the provision of Jharkhand State University Act, 2000 as has been referred hereinabove about the Statute making power as provided under Section 36. Any Statute as referred under Section 34 of the Act, 2000 having legal sanctity is passed by the Senate without being approved by the Chancellor.
The question which is to be answered by this Court:-
"whether by way of executive instruction, as has been issued by the State of Jharkhand dated 13.11.2001 and 31.05.2005, two pay scales for the post of Reader can be allowed to be sustained".
The well settled law is that a statutory provision cannot be sup- planted by executive instruction. If any modification/alteration or repealment or addition is required to be made in any available legislation, the same is required to be made as per the procedure laid down under the Act or by a legislation to be made by the Parliament or the State legislature, as the case may be.
The issue fell for consideration before the Hon'ble Apex Court in the cases of State of U.P. and Ors. Vrs. Babu Ram Upadhyaya, reported in 17 AIR 1961 SC 751 and State of Tamil Nadu Vrs. M/s. Hind Stone etc., reported in AIR 1981 SC 711, wherein it has been laid down that executive instructions cannot amend or supersede the statutory rules or add something therein, no the orders be issued in contravention of the statutory rules for the reason that an administrative instruction is not a statutory Rule nor does it have any force of law; while statutory rules have full force of law provided the same are not in conflict with the provisions of the Act.
It is further settled position of law that if there is a between executive instruction and the Rules framed under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution, the Rules will prevail as has been decided by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India Vrs. Sri Somasundaram Vishwanath, reported in AIR 1988 SC 2255, reiterating the same view the Hon'ble Apex Court in the cases of Union of India Vrs. Rakesh Kumar, reported in AIR 2001 SC 1877, Khet Singh Vrs. Union of India, reported in (2002) 4 SCC 380, Laxminarayan R. Bhattad and Ors. Vrs. State of Maharashtra and Anr., reported in (2003) 5 SCC 413 and Delhi Development Authority Vrs. Joginder S. Monga, reported in (2004) 2 SCC 297, observing that statutory rules create enforceable rights which cannot be taken away by issuing executive instructions.
In the case of Senior Superintendent of Post Offices, Allahabad and Ors. Vrs. Izhar Hussain, reported in (1989) 4 SCC 318, it has been laid down therein at paragraph-6 and 8 that a statutory rule cannot be modified or amended by executive instructions. A valid rule having some lacuna of gap can be supplemented by the executive instructions, but a statutory rule which is constitutionally invalid cannot be validated with the support of executive instructions.
Similar view has been expressed in the case of S. Sivaguru Vrs. 18 State of Tamil Nadu and Ors., reported in (2013) 7 SCC 335, wherein at paragraph-49, it has been laid that the executive instruction cannot sup- plant the statutory rules, in view of the ratio of law laid down in the case of Sant Ram Sharma Vrs. State of Rajasthan, reported in AIR 1967 SC 1910.
This Court, in view of the aforesaid settled position as has been settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court as referred hereinabove, is of the view that the notification dated 13.11.2001 cannot be allowed to sustain in the eye of law, it is for the reason, admittedly the executive instructions dated 13.11.2001 and 31.05.2005 have been issued by the State of Jharkhand but there is no provision in the "Jharkhand State University Act, 2000", empowering the State Government to come out with any law governing the service conditions which includes the salary of the teaching employee working in the University, rather the reference of service condition which would be evident from the provision of sub-section (I) to Section 34 of the Act, 2000, wherein reference about condition of Service of the teachers has been made as also the procedure of making a statute as provided under Section 36 of the Act, 2000.
The final authority in passing a statute has been vested with the Chancellor, if passed by Senate as would be evident from sub-section 5 of Section 36 of the Act, 2000.
It is further admitted from the materials available on record that the executive instructions dated 13.11.2001 and 31.05.2005 cannot be presumed to be a decision of the authority in order to fulfil the lacuna of the statute governing the service condition of the teaching staff holding the post of Reader since herein the post of Reader is having one pay scale as per the notification issued by the University Grants Commission dated 24.12.1998 and further no such rule has been framed in exercise of power 19 conferred under the Act, 2000 by the competent authority laying down two pay scales of the post of Reader and hence, these executive instructions cannot be treated to be in fulfilling the lacuna rather it will be treated to be a policy decision taken by the State authority, even though, having no power under the Act, 2000, is not by way of supplementing the statutory available provision but is to sup-plant the aforesaid available provision.
13. This Court has examined these two executive instructions dated 13.11.2001 and 31.05.2005 also on the basis of the provision of Section 34 read with Section 36 of the Act, 2000, in order to examine as to whether these executive instructions will be allowed to take the shape of the statute within the meaning of Jharkhand State University Act, 2000(adapted) but according to the considered view of this Court, these executive instructions cannot be said to be an Act formulated by observing the procedure laid down under Section 36 of the Act, 2000, rather it would be evident from these notifications that issuing authority is the authority of the State Government and therefore, this Court, is of the considered view that these two notifications cannot be said to be a statute/regulation formulated after following the principle, as laid down under the Jharkhand State University Act, 2000(adapted).
In view of such finding, the question which has been formulated as, is being answered by this Court that these two notifications cannot be said to have any legal sanctity and further the said executive instructions cannot be said to be in supplement of the original statute containing the service conditions of having one pay scale for the post of Reader as per the guidelines of the University Grants Commission Regulation, rather it will only be said to be an effort to sup-plant the service conditions for the post of Reader showing two different pay scales of one post, which is not permissible as has been settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the 20 judgment as referred above.
14. It is the admitted case of the State of Jharkhand as has been discussed at length by the learned Single Judge that at the time of making recommendation of the 4th Pay Revision Committee, 5th pay Revision Committee as also 6th Pay Revision Committee, post of Readers are having one pay scale.
The question is that when the different recommendations of the Pay Revision Committees have also recommended one pay scale for the post of Reader, in such admitted fact can the State Government be allowed to come out with two different pay scales in the garb of floating the Scheme known as Time bound promotion scheme allowing the teaching employee holding the post of Lecturers to be posted as Readers, under the Time Bound Promotion Scheme.
15. It is not in dispute that the mode of recruitment may be two different sources but if an employee is possessing the eligibility criteria to hold the post having a pay scale which is higher, there cannot be any justification in denying the same pay scale to such employee merely for the reason that they have got the post under different scheme i.e. under Time Bound Promotion Scheme making them to receive lesser pay scale than those Readers who have been promoted under Career Advancement Scheme.
Herein in the instant case, it is the plea of the State of Jharkhand that the writ petitioners were granted promotion under the time bound promotion scheme and therefore, they will not be entitled to get the pay scale as per the aforesaid scheme and therefore, a cut-off date i.e., 01.03.1989 has been fixed, making it clear that an appointee prior to 01.03.1989 would be allowed to get higher pay scale i.e., the pay scale of Rs.12000-420-18300/- and the appointees after 01.03.1989 will be allowed to get the pay scale of Rs.10000-15200/- but there is no 21 justification in the impugned order of fixing the aforesaid cut-off date and it is settled position of law that the authority cannot be allowed to fix the cut- off date arbitrarily that too without any reason.
Further, as has been referred hereinabove that the service condition is under the Act, 2000 as provided under Section 34 thereof and when the pay scale comes under the service conditions and when the post of Reader is having one pay scale, there is no occasion for the State Government to come out with two different pay scales of the post of Reader in the garb of the Scheme known as Time bound promotion scheme that to without passing it from the Senate and without being approved by the Chancellor and that is the reason right from the recommendation of the 4th Pay Revision up to 6th Pay Revision, the post of Reader is having one pay scale and considering the aforesaid aspect of the matter, the learned Single Judge has come to a conclusive finding holding therein that the decision taken by the State of Jharkhand by coming out with the executive instructions dated 13.11.2001 and 31.05.2005, is having no force of law.
16. The State of Jharkhand, however, has taken a ground that the learned Single Judge has committed an error in quashing and setting aside the orders dated 13.11.2001 and 31.05.2005 but before quashing it, it was incumbent upon the learned Single Judge to quash the decision of the Central Government, as referred in the impugned order dated 31.05.2005.
The aforesaid submission is having no force as for the reason that when this Court has come to a conclusive finding holding the orders issued by the State of Jharkhand dated 13.11.2001 and 31.05.2005 as without jurisdiction and when the issuing authorities having no power to issue such executive instructions as per the detailed discussion made 22 hereinabove, the orders dated 13.11.2001 and 31.05.2005 contrary to the procedure laid down under Sections 34 and 36 of the Act, 2000, hence, whatever contents are available in the order, the same has got no relevance.
It requires to refer herein so far as the eligibility criteria to get the pay scale of Rs.12000-420-18300/-, the writ petitioners are fulfilling the aforesaid eligibility criteria, as would appear from the statement made by them at para-10 to the writ petition which is available on record that under the Career Advancement Scheme of the University Grants Commission which shows that minimum length of service for eligibility to move in the grade of Lecturers, Senior Scale would be four years for those with Ph.D., 5 years with those M. Phil and 6 years for those at the level of Lecturers and for eligibility to move into the grade of Reader/Lecturer-Selection Grade, the minimum length of service of the Lecturer in senior selection grade shall be uniformly 5 years.
According to the writ petitioners, they are fitting into the formula and as such, they have specifically been pleaded about their eligibility to be placed at the Lecturer Selection Grade in the scale of 12000-420-18300/- at the time of promotion to the post of Reader under the Scheme, but they have been placed in the scale of Rs.10000-15200/-. But such statement has not been rebutted by the State of Jharkhand in the counter affidavit as would appear from the statement made in the counter affidavit as contained under paragraph-4(vii), (viii) and (ix) reads as hereunder:-
"(vii) That the Jharkhand State Government in the Department of HRD vide letter no.387 dt. 31.05.2005 (Annexure-4) of the writ petition) decided to give benefits of the pay scale of Rs.12000-425-18300 to the Readers of the Universities/Colleges who were getting the pay scale of 10000-325-15200 with the following conditions:-
(a) Readers who have the requisite qualification fixed by the UGC for giving promotion under Career Advancement Scheme i.e. who have the degree of Ph.D. will be given the benefit of higher pay scale as stated above.23
(b) Readers who do not have the requisite qualification i.e. the Ph.D. degree (fixed by the UGC) they were to be given the options either to hold the designation of Reader in the pay scale of (10000-325-15200) or to give the option of giving up the designation of Reader and opt for the designation of Lecturer (selection grade) and after the change of designation get the benefit of higher pay scale (Rs.12000- 18300).
(viii) That the benefit of higher pay scale has been granted notionally w.e.f 18.10.2002 whereas the actual monitory benefit is admissible from the date of issuance of the letter no. i.e. w.e.f. 31.05.2005.
(ix) That since the petitioners are entitled for the pay scale of 12000-18300 prior to 31.05.2005 so cannot be given any benefit on the basis of the pay scale."
17. This Court, after going across the factual aspect as pleaded by the writ petitioners vis-à-vis response of the State of Jharkhand, is of the view that such ground about holding the writ petitioners not eligible to get the said pay scale, is absolutely not available and no averment has been made in the counter affidavit to the effect that the writ petitioner are not eligible to get the said pay scale.
It is further evident from the document annexed as annexure-2 to the writ petition which makes a reference of notification issued by the University Grants Commission on 24.12.1998, wherein the pay scale of Lecturers in the Selection Grade Scale/Reader has been shown to be Rs.12000-420-18300/- which suggests that even the University Grants Commission have notified about one pay scale of Lecturer, Senior Selection Grade/Reader i.e., scale of Rs.12000-420-18300/- but it would be evident from the impugned orders that there is no consideration of the said U.G.C. notification as has been said by us hereinabove by making reference of Section 26 of the University Grants Commission Act, 1956, so far as it relates to service condition and regulation, is to be made by the University Grants Commission and if made, it is incumbent upon the University to follow the same but as would appear from the impugned orders, the State of Jharkhand has not considered the notification dated 24 24.12.1998 issued by the University Grants Commission.
Further, it appears from the impugned orders that the learned Single Judge has come out with the categorical finding about the applicability of the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Patna High Court delivered in the case of State of Bihar Vrs. Prof. Dr. Amarnath Singh, reported in 2005(4) PLJR 2005 (annexure-5) of the memo of paper book, however, the same has been disputed by the State of Jharkhand.
This Court, in order to reach to the conclusion about applicability of the aforesaid judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Patna High Court, deem it fit and proper to scrutinize the said judgment and accordingly, we, after appreciating the aforesaid judgment, has found therefrom that the issue fell for consideration about implementation of 1996 U.G.C. scales and the revised scales granted by the University Grants Commission to the teachers of the Universities with effect from 01.01.1986. The benefits of U.G.C. scales were made available to the teachers of the State of Bihar vide notification no.1044 HRD dated 07.08.1989, wherein different scales were made available to the Lecturers, Readers and University Professors. The U.G.C. again revised the pay scales of teachers vide U.G.C. notification of the year 1998 with effect from 01.01.1996 and accordingly, the teachers of the different Colleges of the State started demanding for grant of revised 1996 U.G.C. scales. The State government having considered the demands of the teachers finally decided to grant revised scales to the teachers in the manner disclosed in letter no.15/MF- 218/98(HE)1300 dated 20th July, 2001 addressed to the Vice-Chancellors of all the Universities putting certain riders in paragraphs 14 and 15 of the letter. The teachers of the University being aggrieved by the aforesaid riders challenged the same by way of writ petitions, which have been allowed by the learned Single Judge of the Hon'ble Patna High Court 25 holding therein that the condition imposed by the State Government in paragraph 14 of the Secretary's letter dated 20th July, 2001 for implementation of 1996 U.G.C. scales is bad, illegal and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, as it purports to make a classification, which is unreasonable, arbitrary and discriminatory adversely affecting the teachers promoted under the time bound statutes.
The learned Single Judge further held that the consequential conditions put in paragraphs 15 and 16 and all other provisions as laid down in the letter aforesaid also fall to the ground as being consequential conditions laid down in paragraph 14 of the letter aforesaid.
The Division Bench of Hon'ble Patna High Court, under Letters Patent Appeal Jurisdiction, has been pleased to affirm the order passed by the learned Single Judge by coming to the conclusion that no rationale, whatsoever, has been shown for the conditions put in paragraph 14 of the letter of the State government nor the same has been done with a purpose to achieve any object, which would subserve the purpose of the State vis- à-vis the University teachers.
This Court, therefore, is of the view that the issue fell for consideration before the Hon'ble Patna High Court is about treating the teaching staff discriminately, who have been promoted under the time bound statutes and the same plea has been agitated by the State of Jharkhand herein also while treating the writ petitioners differently by giving them lesser pay scale as because they have been promoted by giving the benefit under the Time bound scheme and as such, this Court is of the view that the Judgment of the Hon'ble Patna High Court, is applicable in the facts and circumstance of the case and hence, the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge to that effect, suffers from no infirmity.
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18. This Court has also gone across the judgment of the learned Single Judge on the touch stone of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, since the ground has been agitated by the learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioners that by extending the lesser pay scale to that of all the other employees holding the post of Reader is nothing but a hostile discrimination and as such, this Court after going across the Article 14 of the Constitution of India as also the various judgments rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the context of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and by making reference of one judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in the case of D.S. Nakara & Ors. Vrs. Union of India, reported in 1983 AIR 130, their Lordships of the Hon'ble Apex Court has been pleased to hold that Article 14 forbids class legislation but permits reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation but the classification must satisfy the twin tests of classification being found on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from those that are left out of the group and that differentia must have a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The thrust of Article is that the citizen is entitled to equality before law and equal protection of the law.
In the case of Ramana Dayaram Shetty Vrs. International Airport Authority of India & Ors., reported in AIR 1979 SC 1628, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has been pleased to observe that a discriminatory action of the Government is liable to be struck down, unless it can be shown by the Government that the departure was not arbitrary, but was based on some valid principle which in itself was not irrational, unreasonable or discriminatory.
In the facts of the case in hand, only plea which has been agitated 27 by the State of Jharkhand about mode of entry to the post of Reader i.e., by way of getting the benefit of Time bound promotion scheme but the question herein is that when the benefit has been enacted to extend it to the members of a class, can it be discriminating, by making a class amongst class by giving lesser pay scale in comparison to that of other employees who have entered in the cadre of Reader under the Career Advancement Scheme and further by fixing cut-off date 01.03.1989, depriving the higher pay scale of the writ petitioners, cannot be said to be a rational principle laid down by State authority that to without any authority of law as discussed above and hence, it cannot be said to be a reasonable classification and once the decision of the authority is based upon unreasonable classification, it has to be concluded about its vitiation by holding the decision legally untenable.
So far as the fixing the cut-off date 01.03.1989, the same is not sustainable being unreasonable and without any basis, reference in this context be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of D.R. Nim, I.P.S. Vrs. Union of India, reported in 1967 AIR 1301, wherein the appellant questioned his seniority which was to be determined in accordance with the provision contained in Indian Police Service (Regulation of Seniority) Rules, 1954. These Rules and Regulations are to ascertain the year of allotment of the person concerned over the determination of seniority, in doing so, the Government of India has directed that the Officers promoted to the Indian Police Service should be allowed to get the benefit of their continuous service with effect from 19.05.1951.
The appellant has challenged the order because the period of officiation from June, 1947 to May, 1951, was excluded for the purpose of fixation of seniority.
28
After taking into consideration, the Hon'ble Apex Court has been pleased to lay down as under:-
"It would be noticed that the date, May 19, 1951, to begin with had nothing to do with the finalization of the Gradation List of the Indian Police Service because it was a date which had reference to the finalization of the Gradation List for the I.A.S. Further this date does not seem to have much relevance to the question of avoiding the anomalous position mentioned in para 9 of the affidavit reproduced above. This date was apparently chosen for the I.A.S. because on this date the Gradation List for in the earlier persons recruited to the service had been finalized and issued in a somewhat stable stage. But why should this date be applied to the Indian Police Service has not been adequately explained.
Mr. B.R.L. Iyengar, the learned counsel for the appellant, strongly urges that selection of May, 19, 1951, as crucial date for classifying people is arbitrary and irrational. We agree with him in this respect.
It further appears from the affidavit of Mr. D.K. Guha, Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, dated December 9, 1966, that "the Government of India have recently decided in consultation with the Ministry of Law that the Ministry of Home Affairs letter No.2/32/51-AIS, dated the 25th August, 1955, will not be applicable to those SCS/SPS officers, who were appointed to IAS/IPS prior to the promulgation of IAS/IPS (Regulation of Seniority) Rules, 1954, and the date of the issue of the above letter if their earlier continuous offciation' was approved by the Ministry of Home Affairs and Union Public Service Commission. It further, appears that "in the case of Shri C.S. Prasad also, an IPS officer of Bihar, a decision has been taken to give the benefit of full continuous officiation in senior posts and to revise his year of allotment accordingly." But, it is stated that "as Shri Nim was appointed to IPS on the 29 22nd October, 1955, i.e. after the promulgation of IPS (Regulation of Seniority) Rules, 1954, and after the issue of letter dated 25.08.1955, his case does not fall even under this category.
The above statement of the case of the Government further shows that the date, May 19, 1951 was an artificial and arbitrary date having nothing to do with the application of the first and the second provisos to Rule 3(3). It appears to us that under the second proviso to Rule 3(3) the period of officiation of a particular officer has to be considered and approved or disapproved by the Central Government in consultation with the Commission considering all the relevant facts. The Central Government cannot pick out a date from a hat and that is what it seems to have done in this case and say that a period prior to that date would not be deemed to be approved by the Central Government within the second proviso."
This Court in the facts of this case has also found from the material available on record that what is the basis of fixing the cut-off date of 01.03.1989, has not been justified since no statement has been made by the respondent-State of Jharkhand either in the counter affidavit before the writ Court or by way of making pleading in the present memo of appeal and therefore, is of the view that the said cut-off date has arbitrarily been fixed by the Appellant-State of Jharkhand without any reason and as such, the discussion and the facts as available in the case of D.R. Nim, I.P.S. Vrs. Union of India (supra), is applicable herein also and hence, we, are not hesitant in holding that the cut-off date of 01.03.1989 is held to be non- tenable.
19. So far as L.P.A. No.661 of 2019 is concerned, this Court after going across the order passed by Review Court has found therefrom that the benefit which has been directed to be paid in favour of the writ petitioners 30 by the writ Court in W.P.(S) No.4162 of 2013 is with effect from 01.01.2006 and therefore, the review petition has been filed for modification of cut-off date of 01.01.2006 to that of 01.01.1996, the date when the 5th Pay Revision Committee recommendation has been given effect too.
20. The Instant Appeal (L.P.A.No.661 of 2019) is fit to be dismissed on two grounds first on facts because it is the admitted case of the appellants that the revision of pay scale has been sought to be disbursed from 01.01.1996 as would be evident from the impugned orders and further on the ground that the learned counsel appearing for the State of Jharkhand has given consensus in the impugned order dated 20.06.2017 passed in W.P.(S) No.4162 of 2013 to the effect that by making reference of 01.01.2006, a typographical error has been crept up and as such, by allowing the review petition, the same may be allowed by making it with effect from 01.01.1996. It is the settled position of law that when there is no dispute of fact and considering the aforesaid undisputed fact if the order has been modified with the consensus of the learned counsel for the State of Jharkhand, the appellant herein, there is no question of assailing the order passed by the Court of Law.
21. This Court, on the basis of the discussion, is of the considered view that the learned Single Judge has committed no error in reviewing the order dated 20.06.2017 passed in W.P.(S) No.4162 of 2013.
22. In the result, both the appeals fail and are dismissed.
23. Pending Interlocutory Application, if any, stands disposed of.
I agree (Dr. Ravi Ranjan, C.J.)
(Dr. Ravi Ranjan, C.J.)
(Sujit Narayan Prasad,J.)
Rohit/-
N.A.F.R.