Allahabad High Court
Arvind Nath Seth And Others vs State Of U.P. Thru Secy. And Others on 20 December, 2013
Bench: V.K. Shukla, Suneet Kumar
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
A.F.R.
Court No. - 39
Reserved on 23.10.2013
Delivered on 20.12.2013
Review Application No. 207705 of 2012
In
Case :- WRIT - C No. - 20839 of 2011
Petitioner :- Arvind Nath Seth And Others
Respondent :- State Of U.P. Thru Secy. And Others
Counsel for Petitioner :- M.K. Gupta,V.D. Sharma
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,A. Khanna,Mahesh Narain Singh,N. Misra,V.D.Mishra
Along with
Case :- WRIT - C No. - 23111 of 2012
Petitioner :- Meerut Development Authority, Meerut
Respondent :- State Of U.P. Thru Secy. And Others
Counsel for Petitioner :- Anurag Khanna
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,M.K.Gupta,Varun Dev Sharma
Hon'ble V.K. Shukla,J.
Hon'ble Suneet Kumar,J.
(Delivered by Suneet Kumar,J.) Heard Sri M.D. Singh Shekhar, Senior Advocate assisted by Sri S.F.A. Naqavi, Advocate, Sri B. Dayal, Advocate & Sri Mahesh Narain Singh, Advocate in support of the review application filed against the judgment dated 03.04.2012 passed in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 20839 of 2011(Arvind Nath Seth and others vs. State of U.P. And others) and Sri Shashi Nandan, Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Vivek Chaudhary, Advocate, who have appeared opposing the review application.
The facts, briefly is, that the petitioners allege that they are recorded Bhumidhar of Plot No. 498 measuring 2.3350 hectare, Plot No. 500 measuring 7-15-2 and Plot No. 501 measuring 3.541 hectare situated in Village Kaseru Buxar, Mawana Road, Meerut and in support of their assertion they have filed extracts of the Khatauni (Record of rights) and Khasra (Field register). The said plots are situated at the crossing of Meerut National Highway going from Meerut to Parikshatgarh. The petitioners through a society had submitted a lay out plan to the Nagar Palika, Meerut in the year 1974 for sanction, to develop a residential housing scheme on the plots in question. At the relevant time, the Development Authority was not in existence and the powers vested with the Nagar Palika, Meerut. The Development Authority came into existance in Meerut in 1976. The Nagar Palika Meerut sanctioned the lay out plan No. 98 on 25-3-1974 as per the then approved master plan.
The map was sanctioned with the condition that petitioners would leave 150 feet wide strip of land abutting the nala, as road is proposed in the master plan. The society developed the residential colony as per the sanctioned plan and also left the 150 feet road. Forty of the residential plots were facing the 150 feet road and were accessible only from the said road.
According to the petitioners, the cause for filing the writ petition arose when an advertisement dated 22.9.2006 was published by the Development Authority for cutting and sale of trees standing on the aforementioned strip of road. The advertisement categorically stated that the road is proposed to be constructed by the Development Authority. The petitioners immediately, thereafter, claiming to be the owners of the said land objected to the cutting of trees and approached this Court by filing Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 67294 of 2006 which was disposed of by order dated 11.12.2006. The order passed in the writ petition is as follows:-
This writ petition has been filed raising various grievances including right, title and interest of the land, which is required for widening of road. If further gives rise to a question as to whether the land for road widening, can be taken in possession by the respondents without making payment of compensation to the present petitioners.
After hearing Shri A.K. Goyal, learned counsel for the petitioners and Shri B.Dayal, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, we dispose of the writ petition requesting the respondent, i.e. the learned Vice Charmian, Meerut Development Authority to consider and decide all the legal factual issues involved herein expeditiously by passing a speaking and reasoned order and in case it is held that the petitioners are entitled for compensation of the land of which they are being deprived, he must ensure the payment of compensation.
The proceedings may be concluded expeditiously, preferably within the period of 10 weeks from the date of filing a certified copy of this order before him.
In pursuance of the aforementioned order, the Vice Chairman of the Development Authority vide order dated 6.3.2007 rejected the claim of the petitioners stating therein that a society in the name and style of Chandra Nagar Sehkari Grih Nirman Samiti (referred to as Society) had submitted a lay out plan to develop a residential colony in the name and style of "Radha Garden" residential colony. The prescribed authority of the regulated area Meerut sanctioned the lay out map in the year 1974. Vice Chairman further stated that in the sanctioned lay out map on the north-west direction in the Meerut master plan 150 feet vide road was proposed connecting Mawana marg to Parikshitgarh marg and further it was stated that the residents of the Radha Garden Residential Colony could access their colony from the said 150 feet wide road and large number of residential plots have their frontage on the said road. The Vice Chairman had taken notice of the fact that the society had also approached the State Government for construction of the said 150 feet wide road and the State Government vide letter dated 15th September, 1997 stated that the society vide its complaint dated 28.3.1997 had requested that the said road be constructed as the residents of the colony were facing hardships and further the said road was a link between two major roads as already mentioned earlier. The Development Authority vide order dated 1.8.1997 informed the State Government that the said 150 feet link road was proposed in the master plan and shall be taken up for construction in the second phase. After enactment of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973, the Meerut Development Authority has already been constituted and hence the enforcement of the master plan and the proposed road is to be constructed by the Development Authority.
Vice Chairman had further stated that the Development Authority had also developed a colony in the name and style Gang Nagar residential project which is in the vicinity of Radha Garden Residential society and the said colony is also accessible by the 150 feet road wide road and hence the said road is a public road. The Development Authority had not acquired the said land, as the owners, as well as the housing society, had approached the Competent Authority for developing a residential colony. Lay out map was sanctioned with the condition that they would have to leave 150 feet wide road as proposed in the master plan. The lay out plan was sanctioned and the society accordingly developed the residential colony. Since then it is being used as public road and the petitioners cannot claim title nor is the Development Authority required under law to pay any compensation to them for merely maintaining it.
Aggrieved by the order passed by the Vice Chairman, the petitioners preferred Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 29231 of 2007 (Arvind Nath Seth and others vs. Meerut Development Authority and others). The said writ petition was disposed of by order dated 23.3.2009 directing the petitioners to approach the Appellate Authority viz. Chairman/Commissioner, Meerut Division Meerut who was directed to decide the claim of the petitioners regarding payment of compensation.
In pursuance of the aforementioned order the Chairman/Commissioner Meerut Division Meerut vide order dated 29.12.2010 was of the view that since the property in question continues to be recorded in the name of the petitioners in the revenue record and hence the Development Authority without acquiring the said property could not have constructed the road. The Commissioner further stated that since the said strip of land is a road under the master plan, therefore, it is the duty of the Development Authority to construct the road. Since it is the duty of the Development Authority to construct the road therefore, it is incumbent upon the Development Authority to compensate the petitioners and thereafter construct the road.
The order of the Chairman was not complied by the Development Authority.
The petitioners filed writ petition no. 20839 of 2011, seeking, inter alia, the following reliefs:-
I.)to issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the Meerut Development Authority, Meerut to ensure compliance of the order of the Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut dated 29.12.2010 (Annexure-1 to the instant writ petition).
II.)To issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the Meerut Development Authority, Meerut to pay compensation to the petitioners at market value + solatium, interest etc. as per the principles laid down under the Land Acquisition Act with regard to the land belonging to the petitioners and on which Meerut Development Authority, Meerut had constructed a master plan road, within a fixed period which this Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper in the circumstances of the instance case.
This Court after hearing the parties and perusing the affidavits filed on behalf of the respective parties allowed the writ petition. The relevant extracts of the said judgment dated 3.4.2012 which is sought to be reviewed as follows:-
By means of the present writ petition the petitioners seek the following reliefs:-.................
We have given our thoughtful consideration to the various plea raised by the learned counsel for the parties. We find that it is not in dispute that the petitioners are the owners of the land measuring 150 ft. width abutting the Nala which they were required to leave it open for construction of public road under the master plan. The public road has been constructed by the Meerut Development Authority in terms of the master plan. However, by construction of the public road over the land of the petitioners, the Meerut Development Authority did not become the owner of the land unless the land is acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act or by mutual agreement or the petitioners donate the land. In the present case neither the land in question has been acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 nor it is the case of the respondents that the petitioners have donated the land. Merely because under the sanctioned layout plan the petitioners were required to leave open the land in question for construction of public road would not divest them of their title/ownership. Even for achieving the public purpose the constitutional provisions are to be complied with.
Article 300-A of the Constitution of India specifically provides that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. There is no provision in the master plan which deprives any person of his property without payment of any compensation. That being the position, we are of the considered opinion that the Meerut Development Authority is liable to pay compensation at the current market price in respect of the land on which they have constructed the road and which belongs to the petitioners. The Meerut Development Authority is, therefore, directed to pay the current market price at prevailing circle rate in respect of the land belonging to the petitioners on which the public road has been constructed. The Meerut Development Authority shall pay the amount within a month from the date a certified copy of this order is filed before the respondent no.2.
The writ petition stands allowed.
Aggrieved by the aforementioned order and judgment the Development Authority preferred a Special Leave Petition. No. 17411 of 2012 (Meerut Development Authority and others vs. Arvind Nath Seth). The Supreme Court vide order dated 10.7.2012 dismissed the said Special Leave Petition in limine.
During the pendency of the aforementioned Special Leave Petition, it appears, that the Development Authority had sought opinion from their counsels and were advised accordingly to assail the order dated 29.12.2010 of the Commissioner, failing which, the Development Authority will have no legs to stand on. The Development Authority on the said advice preferred Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 23111 of 2012 Meerut Development Authority vs. State of U.P. and others challenging the order of the Commissioner dated 29.12.2010, inter alia, seeking the following relief:-
I.)to issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the order impugned dated 29.12.2010 passed by respondent no. 2 (filed as Annexure-1 to this petition):
The petitioners of writ petition no. 20839 of 2011 are arrayed as opposite parties in the said writ petition.
On the consent of the parties and on the pleadings and affidavits already available on record, the connected writ petition and review application is being decided together under rules of the Court.
It has been argued that there is an error apparent on the face of record as admittedly the petitioners Arvind Nath Seth and others are not owners of the plot in question, which is earmarked, as public street and even if it is accepted that the petitioners are owners, no right can be claimed over the public street, which is being used as public street since 1975.The Court has been mislead to rely upon Article 300-A for payment of compensation, whereas, the statute under which the petitioner is entitled to compensation has not been pointed out. Petitioners are also guilty of suppressing material facts and if the same was disclosed their writ petition was not maintainable and, in any case, they are not entitled to any compensation for public street which admittedly was never acquired by the State. Finally Sri M.D. Singh Shekhar stated that in case the judgment and order dated 3.4.2012 is allowed to stand, the Development Authority shall have to pay approximately Rs. 25 crores to the petitioners and that would render them bankrupt.
The petitioners have filed Contempt Application (Civil) No. 3236 of 2012 (Arvind Nath Seth and others vs. Tanver Zafar Ali, V.C., Meerut Development Authority) wherein the Development Authority has deposited Rs. 1,92,87,400/- towards compensation and the petitioners are claiming 25 crores. Since large amount of public money is involved, the judgment needs to be reviewed.
Sri Shashi Nandan, Senior Advocate on the contrary has argued that there is no grounds made out to review the judgment and order dated 3.4.2012. There is no error apparent on the face of record and even if the property in question has not been acquired, but since the development authority has metalled/maintained the said road then, in that eventuality, the petitioners are entitled to compensation as their names continue to find place in the revenue records as owners. Lastly it has been contended that since the order of the Chairman, Development Authority, namely, Commissioner, Meerut, Division, Meerut was not assailed by the Development Authority hence there is no illegality or infirmity in the order dated 3.4.2012. The Development Authority being inferior to the Chairman, could not have filed the subsequent writ petition assailing the order of the Chairman without approval of the State Government.
From the facts, as stated above, the following points needs determination:-
i.)whether the review application to review the judgment dated 03.04.2012 passed in Writ Petition No. 20839 of 2011 (Arvind Nath Seth and others vs. State of U.P. And others is maintainable?
ii.)whether the petitioners are entitled to compensation in view of Article 300-A?
iii.)whether road in question i.e. 150 feet wide road is a public road/street?
Point No. I :-
As regards the power of the Court to review its judgment, principles and scope has already been settled by judgments of the Supreme Court on the point. Review can never be an appeal in disguise but at the same time it cannot be denied that justice is a virtue which transcends all barriers, rules or procedure. Technicalities of law cannot stand in the way of administration of justice. Law is to bend before justice.
In the facts of the present case the petitioners nowhere mentioned in the writ petition that it is the Society that has approached the Nagar Palika, Meerut for sanction of the layout map. It was not disclosed as to whether the petitioners were members of the society or even if they continued to remain owners of the said parcel of land. The fact that the petitioners have vide agreement to sale dated 29.12.1974 transferred possession of the plots in question to the society. Whether agreement to sale was followed by sale deed is also not disclosed. Only this much is clear that it was the society that approached the Nagar Palika, Meerut for sanction and the onus to fulfill the terms and conditions of sanction was upon the society.
Another relevant fact that was not disclosed was that proceedings were initiated in respect of plots under Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 for imposition of ceiling limit on excess vacant land. In the said proceedings the Society appeared before the Competent Authority though petitioners were put to notice, with a plea that the land already left as open space towards parks and roads may be excluded from ceiling. It is only after the said exclusion the society was able to retain the plots for housing development. The petitioners never appeared or pursued the matter before ceiling authorities. The fact that the names of the petitioners continued to be recorded in revenue records is admitted. The judgment sought to be reviewed would not have been passed but for the erroneous assumption that the petitioners are owners of the land. Non disclosure/suppression of relevant facts that go to the root of the matter is abuse of process of the Court and the Court can review to avoid miscarriage of justice.
The officials of the Development Authority were either callous or there was some kind of nexus with the petitioners in not challenging the order of the Commissioner/Chairman dated 29.12.2010 which was against the Development Authority. This Court had no option but to proceed assuming the order of Chairman as final. The Court cannot be a silent spectator to technical pleas of maintainability of the review application, when public money to the tune of Rs. 25 Crores is involved. The Supreme Court in Lily Thomas Etc. Etc. v. Union of India & Ors., (2000) 6 SCC 224 explained the scope of review. Para 52 is quoted below:-
52. The dictionary meaning of the word "review" is "the act of looking; offer something again with a view to correction or improvement. It cannot be denied that the review is the creation of a statute. This Court in Patel Narshi Thakersh and Ors. v. Pradyunman singh ji Arjun singh ji held that the power of review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. The review is also not an appeal in disguise. If cannot be denied that justice is a virtue which transcends all barriers and the rules or procedures or technicalities of law cannot stand in the way of administration of Justice. Law has to bend before Justice. If the Court finds that the error pointed out in the review petition was under a mistake and the earlier judgment would not have been passed but for erroneous assumption which in fact did not exist and its perpetration shall result in miscarriage of justice nothing would preclude the Court from rectifying the error..........(Ref. Board of Control for Cricket in India & Anr. Vs Netaji Cricket Club & Ors., (2005) 4 SCC 741 & Inder Chand Jain v. Motilal 2009 (14) SCC 663.
The dismissal of Special Leave Petition in limine will not attract the doctrine of merger nor will it be confirmation of the order/judgment in issue by the Supreme Court. In the present case dismissal of the Special Leave Petition by non speaking order will not amount to confirmation of the reasoning of the High Court, vide Gangadhara Palo Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer & Anr (2011) 4 SCC 602. Paras 5, 6 and 7 is as follows:
Para-5:- We regret, we cannot agree. In our opinion, it will make no difference whether the review petition was filed in the High Court before the dismissal of the Special Leave Petition or after the dismissal of the Special Leave Petition. The important question really is whether the judgment of the High Court has merged into the judgment of this Court by the doctrine of merger or not.
Para-6:- When this Court dismisses a special leave petition by giving some reason, however meager (it can be given of just one sentence), there will be a Court dismissing the special leave petition. According to the doctrine of merger the judgment of the lower Court merger into the judgment of the Higher Court. Hence, if some reason, however, merger, are given by this Court will dismissing the special leave petition, then by the doctrine of merger, the judgment of the High Court merges into the judgment of this Court and after merger there is no judgment of the High Court. Hence, obviously, there can be no review of the judgment which does not even exist.
Para-7:- The situation is totally different where a special leave petition is dismissed without giving any reason whatsoever. It is well settled that special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution of India is a discretionary remedy, and hence a special leave petition can be dismissed for a variety of reasons and not necessarily on merits. We cannot say what was in mind of the Court while dismissing the special leave petition without giving any reasons, there is no merger of the judgment of the High Court with the order of this Court. Hence, the judgment of the High Court can be devoid since it continues to exist through the scope of the review petition limited to errors apparent on the fact of the record. If, on the other hand, a special leave petition is dismissed with reason, however, meager (it can be even of just one sentence), there is a meager of the judgment of the High Court in the order of the Supreme Court. (See the decision of this Court in Kunhayammed vs. State of Kerala, S. Shanmugavel Nadar vs. State of T.N., State of Manipur vs. Thingujam Brojen Meetei and U.P. SRTC vs. Omaditya Verma) Similarly Supreme Court in Y. Satyanarayan Reddy vs Mandal Revenue Officer, A.P. (2009) 9 SCC 447
23. It is well-settled that the dismissal of a Special Leave Petition in limine does not amount to a clear affirmation of the High Court decision and it does not constitute any binding precedent. (See : Workmen vs. Board of Trustees of the Cochin Port Trust, (1978) 3 SCC 119; Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. vs. State of Bihar, (1986) 4 SCC 146; Supreme Court Employees' Welfare Association vs. Union of India, (1989) 4 SCC 187; CIT vs. Shree Manjunatheaware Packing Products & Camphor Works, (1998) 1 SCC 598; P. Nallammal & Anr. vs. State, (1999) 6 SCC 559; UP State Road Transport Corporation vs. Omaditya Verma & Ors., (2005) 4 SCC 424) The petitioners have not disclosed all material facts that go to the root of the matter, suppression was deliberate in order to obtain the judgment.
The petitioner had entered into an agreement to sell made on 29.12.1974 and 18.05.1981 with the society wherein it has been stated that the Prescribed Authority, Meerut vide letter dated 25.03.1974 sanctioned the lay out plan No. 98. The colony to be developed by the society is named "Rada Garden". Paragraph 3(b) of the agreement dated 18.05.1981 clearly states that since there has been a considerable delay on the part of the Development Authority/Public Works Department, Meerut, the construction of 150 feet wide road as shown in the approved lay out plan, was agreed to be constructed by the petitioner at his own expense by investing Rs. 50,000/-. It further provided that the society has assured that out of the development charges realized from the members/purchasers, the first party i.e. petitioners will be re-embursed full cost of construction of the road. The construction of the road was necessary to have access to the plots.
The other relevant fact, which has been suppressed by the petitioner is that proceedings were initiated under the Urban Land(Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 in respect of the same property belonging to the petitioners. Under the said proceedings total area of 98,407.67 sq. meters of land belonging to the petitioner no. 2 was proposed to be declared surplus. In the said proceedings it is the society and not the petitioners who filed objections under Section 10(2) of the said Act. The Competent Authority after examining the entire facts vide order dated 17.1.1995 reduced the excess area to 16062 sq. meters belonging to petitioner no. 2 and 9550 sq. meters belonging to petitioner no. 3. The reduction in the area was on account of the fact that the society was able to impress upon the Competent Authority that they are owners of the property and they are developing the said property as per sanctioned layout map for residential purposes and all areas shown as open spaces and roads be reduced from the total area sought to be declared excess/surplus over ceiling limit. The Competent Authority has categorically stated that in respect of the plots in question all areas shown as roads and the open spaces will be reduced from the area to be declared excess. The same was allowed by the Competent Authority.
The petitioners have deliberately suppressed this fact that they had taken benefit of all the open spaces including roads in reducing the surplus area. The contention of the petitioner that the strip of land which has been earmarked as 150 feet vide road belong to them cannot be accepted. That itself is sufficient ground to review the judgment. The judgment was obtained by suppression and misrepresentation of facts that goes to the root of the matter. The review application is maintainable. The point no. I is accordingly decided.
Point No. II :-
Petitioners argue that they are entitled to compensation in view of Article 300-A of the Constitution of India. Article 300-A reads as follows:-
300-A:- Person not to be deprived of property save by authority of law._ No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law.
44th amendment Act, 1978 deleted Article 19(1)(f) and Article 31 from the Constitution of India and introduced Article 300-A. Deletion of Article 300-A would have an impact on the rights of the persons, who are deprived of their properties. Article 300-A examined in the light of the circumstances under which it was inserted would reveal that right to acquire, hold and dispose property has ceased to be fundamental right under the Constitution of India. Legislature can deprive a person of his property only by authority of law. Right to acquire, hold and dispose of property is not a basic feature of the Constitution but only a Constitutional right. Right to property, since no more a fundamental right, aggrieved person has to approach the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for redressal.
Article 300-A proclaims that no person can be deprived of his property save by authority of law, meaning thereby that a person cannot be deprived of his property merely, by an executive fiat, without any specific legal authority or without support of law made by the competent legislature. The expression 'property' under Article 300-A is confined not only to land alone, it includes intangibles likes copy rights and other intellectual property and embraces every possible interest recognized by law. Article 300-A protects private property against executive action.
The Constitution (7th Amendment Act) 1956 deleted List 1 entry 33, List 2 entry 36 and reworded List 3 entry 42 relating to 'acquisition' and 'requisitioning' of property.
List 3 entry 42 has used the words 'acquisition' and 'requisitioning' but Article 300-A has used the expression 'deprivation'. Deprivation takes within its fold 'acquisition' and 'requisitioning'.
The Constitution Bench in K.T. Plantation Private Ltd. vs. State of Karnataka (2011) 9 SCC 1 has in detail dealt with the history of the constitutional amendments as well as the scope of Article 300-A. The views of emminent jurists have also been taken into consideration. The Apex Court repelled the argument that compensation can be read into the wordings of Entry 42 of List 3.
Paragraph 188 is reproduced below:-
We find no apparent conflict with the words used in Entry 42 List III so as to infer that the payment of compensation is inbuilt or inherent either in the words "acquisition and requisitioning" under Entry 42 List III. Right to claim compensation, therefore, cannot be read into the legislative Entry 42 List III.
Article 300A gets invoked only when a statute deprives a person of his property. Deprivation is a precondition. Compensation or no compensation or illusive compensation has to be justified by the State on judicially, justiciable standards. The State can put restrictions on the right to property. The right to claim compensation or obligation to pay can be inferred in Article 300-A. Paragraph no. 189 and 190 of K.T. Plantation case (Supra) reproduced:
189. Requirement of public purpose, for deprivation of a person of his property under Article 300A, is a pre-condition, but no compensation or nil compensation or its illusiveness has to be justified by the state on judicially justiciable standards. Measures designed to achieve greater social justice, may call for lesser compensation and such a limitation by itself will not make legislation invalid or unconstitutional or confiscatory. In other words, the right to claim compensation or the obligation to pay, though not expressly included in Article 300A, it can be inferred in that Article and it is for the State to justify its stand on justifiable grounds which may depend upon the legislative policy, object and purpose of the statute and host of other factors.
190. Article 300A would be equally violated if the provisions of law authorizing deprivation of property have not been complied with. While enacting Article 300A Parliament has only borrowed 102 Article 31(1) [the Rule of law doctrine] and not Article 31(2) [which had embodied the doctrine of Eminent Domain]. Article 300A enables the State to put restrictions on the right to property by law. That law has to be reasonable. It must comply with other provisions of the Constitution. The limitation or restriction should not be arbitrary or excessive or what is beyond what is required in public interest. The limitation or restriction must not be disproportionate to the situation or excessive.
After the 44th Amendment Act, 1978, the constitutional obligation to pay compensation to a person who is deprived of his property primarily depends upon the terms of the statute and the legislative policy. Article 300A, however, does not prohibit the payment of just compensation when a person is deprived of his property, but the question is whether a person is entitled to get compensation, as a matter of right, in the absence of any stipulation in the statute, depriving him of his property.
Paragraph no. 191 and 192 of the K.T. Plantation Pvt. Ltd. (Supra) is reproduced:
191. The legislation providing for deprivation of property under Article 300A must be just, fair and reasonable as understood in terms of Articles 14, 19(1)(g), 26(b), 301, etc. Thus in each case, courts will have to examine the scheme of the impugned Act, its object, purpose as also the question whether payment of nil compensation or nominal compensation would make the impugned law unjust, unfair or unreasonable in terms of other provisions of the Constitution as indicated above.
192. At this stage, we may clarify that there is a difference between compensation and nil compensation. A law seeking to acquire private property for public purpose cannot say that no compensation shall be paid. However, there could be a law awarding nil compensation in cases where the State undertakes to discharge the liabilities charged on the property under acquisition and onus is on the government to establish validity of such law. In the latter case, the court in exercise of judicial review will test such a law keeping in mind the above parameters.
There is a distinction between statutes providing for compulsory acquisition and laws providing for regulation of building operations and urban development. Such statutes need not necessarily provide for acquisition or deprivation of property, they merely provide that the property situated in the regulated areas/development areas would be regulated by the provisions of the said statute. No person can raise constructions or do development work in contravention of the provisions of the Act and regulations framed thereunder. Merely, because a resident or a developer has to subscribe to the requirements of a statute requiring for planned urban development, that alone would not amount to deprivation of property. Unlike statues which compulsory provide for acquisition and payment of compensation.
The parties contented that the layout map was sanctioned under the U.P. (Regulation of Building Operations) Act, 1958 (herein referred to as R.B.O. Act, 1958). It is relevant to point out that U.P. Urban Development Planning Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as Urban Development Act 1973) came into force in Meerut in the year 1976 when Meerut Development Authority was created.
The law as applicable on the date of sanction of the lay out plan of the petitioners shall be applicable. Entitlement of compensation is to be examined under the R.B.O. Act, 1958 and Regulations and Directions framed thereunder vide Commissioner Municipal Corporation, Shimla vs. Prem Lata Sood and Others (2007) 11 SCC 40, Union of India and Others v. Indian Charge Chrome and Another [(1999) 7 SCC 314], Kuldeep Singh v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi) (2006) 5 SCC 702.
In short whether there was deprivation of property under the R.B.O. Act, 1958. The provisions of this Act needs to be examined.
Section 3 of the R.B.O. Act, 1958 provides for declaration of regulated area, if it is in the opinion of the State Government, any area requires to be regulated in view of prevention of bad laying out of land, haphazard erection of buildings or growth of substandard colonies.
Section 3(1):- If, in the opinion of the State Government any area within U.P. requires to be regulated under this Act with a view to the prevention of bad laying out of law, haphazard erection of building or growth of sub-standard colonies or with a view to the development and expansion of that area according to proper planning, it may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare the area to be regulated area.
Section 6 provides that no person shall undertake or carry out development of any site in a regulated area except in accordance with the regulations and with previous permission of the prescribed authority in writing. Section 6 is reproduced below:-
Section 6:- Control of development and building operations in regulated area._ No person shall undertake or carry out the development of any site in any regulated area or (erect, re-erect or make any material change in) any building or make or extend any excavation or lay out any means of access to a road in such area except in accordance with the (regulations) if any, issued under (this Act) and with previous permission of the Prescribed Authority in writing.
Section 9 contemplates that any person who undertakes or carries out development of any site or erects any building or lay out or any means of access to a road in contravention of any regulations made under this Act or without permission referred to in Section 6 or in contravention of any condition subject to which such permission has been granted shall be punishable with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees and other sub-sections provide punishment for continuing as well as offenses by company.
Section 10 provides that the authority shall also have power for demolition of such buildings which have been constructed in violation.
The U.P. (Regulation of Building Operations) Direction, 1960 was framed under the R.B.O. Act, 1958. Direction 10-A provides for preparation of Master Plan. The State Government may get the master plan prepared for any regulated area either through the Controlling Authority or through such other agency as the State Government may think fit. The direction further provides that initially a draft master plan shall be prepared and thereafter by publication of notice in leading newspaper inviting objections on the draft master plan. After the expiry of the period for inviting objections the Controlling Authority or the agency may appoint a Committee of three members to consider the objections and submit its report within the time fixed. Committee shall allow reasonable opportunity of being heard to any person including representatives of Government Departments or Local bodies who have filed objections. Thereafter the Controlling Authority or the agency as the case may be, after the objections and the report of the committee, may finalize the master plan and submit the master plan along with its comments to the State Government for approval. The State Government may either approve the master plan without modifications or with such modifications as it may consider necessary or reject the plan. Immediately after the plan has been approved by the State Government, the same shall be published in the manner as State Government may specifying. Direction 10-A is as follows:-
10-A:- Preparation of Master Plan:- (1) If in the opinion of the State Government any regulated area requires to be developed according to a Master Plan, it may cause such a plan to be prepared either through the Controlling Authority or through such other agency as the State Government may think fit.
(2)The Master Plan shall be a comprehensive plan showing therein the existing and proposed location and general layout of_
a). Arterial streets and transportation lines;
b.) Residential sections;
c.) Business areas;
d.) Industrial areas;
e.) Educational institutions;
f.) Public Parks, play-grounds and other recreational facilities; g.) Public and semi-public buildings; and h.) Other land-uses which are necessary.
3.)On receipt of the orders of the State Government, the Controlling Authority or the agency, as the case may be, shall prepare the draft Master Plan and thereafter publish notice in at least one newspaper having circulation in that area, indicating the place or places where copies of the plan may be inspected and inviting objections in writing from the public with respect to the Master Plan within a period of not less than thirty days from the date of notice is published in the newspaper.
4.)After expiry of the aforesaid period, the Controlling Authority or the agency, as the case may be, if it deems necessary, shall appoint with the prior approval of State Government a committee consisting of three members, one of whom shall be a Town Planner, to consider the objections and submit its report within such time as may be fixed in this behalf.
5.)The Controlling Authority or the agency or the committee referred to above, as the case may be, shall allow reasonable opportunity of being heard to any person including representatives of Government Departments or Local Authorities, who have filed any objections and who have made a request for being so heard.
6.)The Controlling Authority or the agency, as the case may be shall after considering the objections and the report of the committee, if any finalize the Master Plan and submit the Master Plan along with its comments to the State Government for approval.
7.)The State Government may either approve the Master Plan without modifications, or with such modifications as it may consider necessary, or reject the plan with directions to the Controlling Authority or the agency, as the case may be to prepare a fresh plan according to such directions.
8.)Immediately after a plan has been approved by the State Government the Controlling Authority or the agency, as the case may be, shall publish it in such manner as the State Government may specify stating that the plan has been approved and naming a place where a copy of the plan may be inspected at all reasonable hours and upon the date of the first publication of the aforesaid notice the plan shall come into operation.
In R.K. Mittal and others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others (2012) 2 SCC 232 it was held that Development Plan (Master Plan) prepared in accordance with the Regulations would have statutory force and is binding both on the residents as well as the Development Authority.
It is not the case of the petitioners that they had ever objected to the proposed 150 wide road running through their land as proposed in the Master Plan. The Master Plan after approval of the State Government became final. The petitioners submitted a layout plan for development of residential colony for approval as per the approved Master Plan under Section 7 of the R.B.O. Act, 1958.
On the application made by the petitioners, the Prescribed Authority approved the plans or statements as is required under direction 8. Direction 8(a)(ii),(vi) and (vii) is reproduced below:-
Direction 8:- Saction of plans and statements.-(a) The Prescribed Authority shall not approve the plans or statements unless it is satisfied that:
i.) .........
ii.)The development and proposed use of the land and standards are in conformity with the proposal and standards of the Master Plan of the regulated area approved by the Controlling Authority.
iii.)All streets, roads, open spaces have been suitably graded, paved, drained, sewered and lighted in accordance with the approved standards and specifications of the Prescribed Authority and the site is suitably drained.
iv.)................
v.)................
vi.) The applicant has entered into an agreement with the local body concerned for the development of the land and for provision of other amenities and has either deposited the full estimated cost of the development and provision of other amenities with that local body in advance or has given to it a bank guarantee equivalent to such cost; or has entered into an agreement with that local body, providing that the full cost thereof may be realized by it out of the sale-proceeds of the plots that may be sold by the applicant.
Provided that any such agreement between the applicant and the local body may provide for any part of the development and provision of other amenities being carried out by the applicant himself, however that in respect of any such part he shall give adequate security to the local body to secure that he shall carry out such part of the development and provide other amenities in accordance with the approved standards and specifications to the satisfaction of the Controlling Authority.
Provided further that if the applicant so desires he may mortgage the entire land with local body before the layout is sanctioned and enter into an agreement with it providing that the plots shall be released for sale by it on condition that 50 per cent of the sale price or the proportionate cost of development and provision of other amenities whichever is higher, is before the release of each plots, deposited towards the payment of development charges to the local body.
The approval of lay out plan as per Master Plan will not entail any compensation as there is no deprivation of property.
Direction 14 of the R.B.O. Direction, 1960 provides for compensation on layout maps. Direction 14 provides for percentage of area under open spaces, roads and streets. The said direction requires ordinarily not less than 10 percent of the total area of land covered by a layout plan relating to sub-division of land and development of any street shall be provided as open spaces for the purposes of children park or other outdoor recreational use. The direction further states that in case the percentage of the total area under roads and open spaces exceeds 45 percent, the Prescribed Authority may with the approval of the State Government pay compensation for such excess. Direction 14 is reproduced below:-
14.) percentage of area under open spaces, roads and streets_ a.)ordinarily not less than 10% of the total area of land covered by a lay out plan relating to sub-division of land and development of any street shall be provided as open spaces for the purposes of children park or other outdoor recreational use.
b.) Where due to incorporation of the streets proposals of the Master Plan in the layout the percentage under roads and open spaces exceeds 45 percent of the total area, the Prescribed Authority may, with the approval of the State Government pay compensation for such excess.
Direction 14(b) is relevant to examine whether petitioners are entitled to compensation. The direction clearly states that normally ten percent of the total land for development would be left for streets and open space, but where the open space exceeds 45 percent of the total area, the Prescribed Authority is required to pay compensation, with the approval of the State Government, for the excess.
The petitioner has not setup a case either before this Court or before the Vice Chairman/Chairman of Development Authority that in the sanctioned layout the petitioner had to leave land for street and open space that exceeds the percentage as provided under Direction 14 and hence they are entitled to compensation. Mere leaving of open space and street is not deprivation of land. It is submitting one's land to be regulated as per law in order to develop it, that would not amount to deprivation of property and hence no compensation will follow. There is complete silence regarding the percentage of land under road and open spaces of the total area covered by layout plan. Invoking Article 300-A is of no avail as there is no deprivation of property as contemplated under the R.B.O. Act, 1958 and under direction 14 of the R.B.O. Direction, 1960.
Agreement if any entered between the petitioners and Nagar Palika was not produced nor there is any pleading to that effect.
In Babulal Badriprasad Verma vs. Surat Municipal Corporation and others (2008) 12 SCC 401 Supreme Court observed that statute providing for town planning is not a statute for acquisition of property. Para 33 of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced:
Para - 33:- We are, however, not unmindful of the fact that a statute of town planning ex facie is not a statute for acquisition of a property. An owner of a plot is asked to part therewith only for providing for better facilities of which he would also be a beneficiary. Every step taken by the State does not involve application of the doctrine of eminent domain.
The contention raised by the petitioners that since their names continues to be recorded in the revenue record, therefore, they are owners and the Development Authority is liable to pay compensation. Entries in revenue record does not as such create any right, ownership or title, it only indicates prima facie that the petitioners are owners. The factum of ownership and title has to be proved, once it is being disputed by the Development Authority. It is settled law that entries in revenue record have only fiscal purpose that is for payment of land revenue and no ownership is conferred on the basis of such entries, vide Suraj Bhan and others vs. Financial Commissioner and others 2007 (6) SCC 186 For the reasons stated herein above it is evident that the petitioners have not been deprived of their land of property which is sine qua non for invoking Article 300-A, nor can they be compensated.
The point no. II is accordingly, decided.
Point No. III It has been contended by the petitioners that 150 feet wide strip of land is a road and is being used as such by not only the residents of the colony but also the public. The said road connects two major roads. The street is recorded in the name of petitioners and hence are entitled for compensation. The contention cannot be accepted.
It is admitted case of the petitioners as well as Development Authority that it is a road being used by the public since 1975. The road/street is being used by the residents of the society as well as the residents of other colonies that have come up on the said road including colony developed by the Development Authority has come up on the said road. This point need not detain as long as it has been faintly resisted by the petitioners. The provisions pertaining to streets may be examined:
Nagar Palika is a body constituted under U.P. Municipalities Act 1960. Section 2(19) defines public street:
2(19) "Public street" means a street -
(a) which is declared a public street by the Municipality under the provisions of Section 22], or
(b) which with the consent, express or implied, of the owner of the land comprising the street has been leveled, paved, metalled, channelled severed or repaired out of the municipal or other public funds;
and Sub clause (23) defines street:
2(23)"Street" means any road, bridge, footway, lane, square, court, alley or passage which the public or any portion of the public, has right to pass along and includes, on either side, the drain or gutters and the land upto the defined boundary of any abutting property, notwithstanding the projection over such land of any verandah or other superstructure;
The Municipal Corporation Act, 1959 as is applicable presently defines, street in the following manner:-
Section 2(58) defines private street:
2(58)"private street" means a street which is not a public street;
Section 2(62) defines public street:
2(62)"public street" means any street -
(a) heretofore leveled, paved, metalled, channeled, sewered or repaired out of Corporation of other public funds; or
(b) which under the provisions of Section 290 is declared to be, or under any other provisions of this Act becomes, a public street;
Section 2(74) defines street:-
2(74) "street" includes any highway and any causeway, bridge, viaduct, arch, road, lane, foot-way, sub-way, court, alley or riding path or passage, whether a thoroughfare or not, over which the public have a right of passage or access or have passed and had access uninterruptedly for a period of twenty years; and, when there is a foot-way as well as a carriage way in any street, the said term includes both;
And Section 290 confers powers to declare private streets as public streets:-
Sub-section (1) of Section 290 is reproduced hereinbelow:-
290(1) When any private street has been levelled, metalled, flagged or paved, sewered, drained channelled and made good to the satisfaction of the (Municipal Commissioner) he may and, upon the request of the owners or of any of the owners of such street, shall, if lamp-posts and other apparatus necessary for lighting such street have been provided to his satisfaction, declare the same to be a public street by notice in writing put up in any part of such street, and thereupon the same shall become a public street and vest in the Corporation as such:-
Provided that no such street shall become a public street, if, within one month after such notice has been put up, the owner of such street or the greater part thereof shall by notice in writing to the (Municipal Commissioner), object thereto.
A private road is one the soil of which belongs to the owner of the field, and is burdened with the right of exclusive way.
A private road may be defined as a road established by a private individual, or by public authority chiefly for the accommodation of an individual or individuals, and at his or their instance and expense. (Ref. P. Ramanatha Aiyar-The Major Law Lexicon 4th Edition 2010) Private roads are those which are open for the benefit of certain individuals to go from and to their homes for service of their lands and for the use of some estates exclusively (Glen on Highways, Pratt on Highways).
Private road means a street which is not a public road. A reading of the definitions of 'public street' and 'street' makes it clear that every vacant space cannot be described as a 'street'. If the vacant space is used by any person as a means of access to or from any public space or thoroughfare but shall not include any part of such space which the occupier of any such building has a right at all hours to prevent all other persons from using. If the vacant plot satisfies that description, it can be considered as a 'street'. However, every street cannot be said to be a public street. Before a street can be said to be a public street, it must have been leveled, paved, mettled or repaired out of municipal or public funds or it must have been declared under the Act, a 'public street' vide The Municipal Corporation of Ludhiana, vs. Oswal Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. AIR 1992 Punjab and Haryana 92.
Supreme Court in M/s Gobind Pershad Jagdish Pershad vs. New Delhi Municipal Committee AIR 1993 Supreme Court 2313 was of the view that before a space can be held to be a 'street' under the Act, there must be a dedication by the owner to the public. A way shall be presumed to have been dedicated as a street where it has been used for public for twenty years. The verandahs availed by the public was held to be 'street'. The user of the property is and always shall be with the public. The owner has no right at all times to prevent the public from using the same. When the owner of the property has, by his own volition permitted his property to be converted into a 'street', then he has no right to claim any compensation when the same property is made a 'public street' under the Act by metalling it by the Development Authority. (Ref. Municipal Committee, Karnal vs Nirmala Devi AIR 1996 (SC) 892, Banarsi Das vs. Ram Krishna AIR 1995 M.P. 147 & Sri Narsingh Das vs. State of H.P. and others AIR 1977 HP 84) In the facts of the present case, it is admitted position between the parties that 150 wide road is being used by the public, it is not exclusive private road for the members of the society. Other colonies have come up in the vicinity and one such colony developed by the Development Authority and the residents/public are accessible by the said 150 wide road, therefore, it is a "street" within the meaning of the Act. It 2006 i.e. after three decades the 'street' is being sought to be developed by the Development Authority, presuming that it is private property but the user of the property is and always was with the public and shall continue to be with the public in future too, then the owner of the property has no right to claim compensation. Since the 'street' has been developed, metalled and paved by the Development Authority, it will be a 'public street' within the meaning of the Act.
The residents of the society way back in the year 1997 requested the State Government to direct the Development Authority to construct the road. The State Government accordingly directed the Development Authority. Cross section of the society have also approached the Development Authority to construct the road, letter of District Bar Association, Meerut is on record, who have also demanded the construction of the road. In the letter there is reference that the road was earlier repaired from the funds of public representative. The demand for construction by the residents is being made under Section 33(4) of the Urban Development Act, 1973.
Section 33(4) is as under:-
33.Power of the Authority to provide amenity or carry out development at cost of owner in the event of his default and to levy cess in certain cases.
1.) ..............
2.) ..............
3.) ..............
4.) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing sub-sections where the Authority on the written representation by so many of the owners of any land in a development area as represent not less than one-half of the area, of that land, is satisfied that any amenity in relation to such land has not been provided which in the opinion of the Authority ought to have been or ought to be provided, or that any development of the land for which permission, approval or sanction had been obtained under this Act or under any law in force before the commencement of this Act has not been carried out, it may itself provide the amenity or carry out, the development or have it provided or carried out through such agency as it deems fit, and recover the expenses by levy of cess from all the owners of the said land:
Provided that if the owner making the said representation contend that the amenity had been agreed to be provided or the development had been agreed to be carried out by a coloniser or co-opertive housing society through or from whom the land was acquired by them, they shall file with the Authority a copy of such agreement, or of the deed of transfer or of the bye-laws of the society incorporating such agreement, and no action shall be taken by the Authority under this sub-section unless notice has been given to the coloniser or the society, as the case may be, to show cause why such action should not be taken:
Provided further that where the Authority is satisfied that the coloniser or the society has become defunct or is not traceable, no notice under the last preceding proviso need be issued.
4-A.) Where the authority provides any amenity in an area developed by it, the authority shall, till the responsibility for maintenance is assumed by the local authority as provided in Section 34, be entitled to recover, in the manner prescribed, from the owner of the land or building, such charges therefor as may be fixed by the State Government by a notified order, having regard to the expenses incurred for maintaining and continuing to provide such amenity.
Section 33 of the Urban Development Act, 1973 applies in the present case. Sub-Section (1) of Section 33 clearly states that any amenity or development for which permission or approval or sanction had been obtained under this Act or under any law in force before the commencement of this Act has not been carried out, then the Authority under Sub-Section (2) may itself provide the amenity or carry out the development and under Sub-Section (3) all expenses incurred by the Authority may be recovered by the Authority from the owner or person responsible for providing the amenity as arrears of land revenue.
The scheme of the R.B.O. Act, 1958 and and Urban Development Act 1973 is merely regulatory as to how development is to be carried out in regulated area/development area as the case may be. Approval of the Master Plan does not automatically leads to vesting of open spaces viz greenbelts, roads, parks etc with the Development Authority, as that would amount of acquisition. The Acts envisages that after the Master Plan has come into force, private person, be if company, society or an individual may use the land or carry/undertake development as per Master Plan. The same is also binding upon the Development Authority in case the Authority wants to undertake development in the area. In case private person undertakes development, then it will have to be as per sanctioned layout map. The development carried out towards providing open spaces including roads will not be compensated as it does not amount to deprivation of private property. Compensation if any, as in the present set of facts could have been provided in case open space exceeded 45 percent of the total layout area as provided under direction 14 of the RBO Direction 1960, as was applicable on the date of sanction. The case is entirely different where the Development Authority wants to carry out development, itself, on private property then in that eventuality the land will have to be acquired under section 17 of the Urban Development Act 1973 by the State and then transferred to the Development Authority. Here in the present case the society has charged for the development of the 150 wide road and then reimbursed the petitioners as per agreement of 1984. The petitioners are not entitled to any compensation at all. If the 150 wide road is a 'street' within the meaning of the Act no compensation is payable on merely metaling or paving it by Development Authority, rather after such development it becomes a public 'street'. Conversely since the development work was undertaken by the private society and charged the purchasers/members for the road to develop it, even in that eventuality they are not allowed to be compensated as their was no deprivation of property in either case by the State or its agency. The Point No. 3 is decided accordingly.
The subsequent writ petition filed by the Development Authority challenging the order of the Chairman/Commissioner was opposed on the ground that Development Authority could not maintain writ petition against its Chairman as no approval was sought from the State Government. Rather Development Authority has to abide by the order.
An Officer of a Company or local body, may be, incompetent to challenge an order passed by any authority superior to the local body through suit or writ petition. He has to abide by the order. But that principle cannot be applied or imported to a situation where the juristic person itself becomes the aggrieved person.
In this context, we may refer to section 4 of the Urban Development Act 1973, Sub-clause (2) reads that Authority shall be a body corporate, having perpetual succession and common seal with a power to hold and dispose property and to contract and shall sue or be sued by the said name.
Legal concept envisaged in section 4(2) of the Act leaves no room for doubt that the Meerut Development Authority cannot be denuded of the right to move under Article 226 of the Constitution of India where any of its legal right is infringed by the authorities including the Chairman. The Supreme Court in Village Panchayat, Calangute vs. Additional Director of Panchayat-II and others (2012) 7 SCC 550 held that the legal character of the Panchayat is very much analogues to that of a municipality and it being a juristic person has a right to maintain petition under Article 226 against the Authority or Government, if itself, it becomes an aggrieved party. (Ref. State of Orissa v. Union of India 1995 Supp. (2) SCC 154 & Godde Venkateswara Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1966 SC 828) In the facts of the present case, the Vice Chairman on behalf of the Development Authority rejected the case of the petitioners for compensation on the ground that, they are not owners and further the street is a public street being used by the public and hence petitioners have no right to compensation. The said decision was overturned by the Chairman, monetary burden followed, to be borne by the Development Authority. The Development Authority being the aggrieved party had locus to maintain the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. More so, as the Development Authority has been fastened the liability to compensate, by the High Court, as they failed to challenge the order of the Chairman dated 29.12.2010, the writ petition by the Development Authority under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is maintainable and they need not seek approval of the State Government.
The Court takes notice of the fact that the petitioners have misused the constitutional forum as they have not disclosed all material facts. The petitioners did not disclose as to whether they continue to be the owners of the property or the ownership vests with the society. They did not disclose all the proceedings that were taken under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act 1976. The orders have been obtained by suppression of material facts. The Court would not have passed any orders in favour of the petitioners but for the suppression of facts. They had succeeded in obtaining order of being compensated which according to them amounts to Rs. 25 crores and the Meerut, Development Authority was compelled to deposite approximately Rs. 2 crores in order to avoid contempt proceedings. Suppression of facts and obtaining orders without disclosing material facts is misuse and abuse of the process of Court. This Court feels that a cost of Rs. 25 lacs each be imposed upon the petitioners to be paid by them to the Meerut Development Authority. The petitioners would deposit their share of the cost within three months failing which the District Magistrate, Meerut shall recover the said amount as arrears of land revenue.
The conduct of Sri Anurag Srivastava the then Chairman, Meerut Development Authority, Meerut is also not above the board. There appears to be some kind of nexus between the petitioners and the then Chairman. The Vice Chairman and Chairman are trained Revenue Officers and have performed duties both on the administrative side as well as presided revenue Courts, they are fully aware of the entries made in revenue records and the impact of such entires. The petitioners had set up a very simple case by suppressing all material facts that since their names continue to be recorded in the revenue records, therefore, they are entitled to compensation, as they have been deprived of their property while constructing the road by the Development Authority.
The Chairman/Commissioner, Meerut Division Meerut instead of examining all the pleas and objections raised by the Vice Chairman while rejecting the case of the petitioners, has simply accepted the plea of the petitioners or its face value and without perusing and examining the entire records since 1974. The conduct of the then Chairman has burdened the Development Authority to the tune of Rs. 25 crores of which the Development Authority had deposited Rs. 2 crores before this Court. This Court does not intend to pass any orders against the then Commissioner as he has not been put to notice, however, seeing his conduct Principal Secretary Urban Development and Housing is directed to set up an enquiry against the then Chairman/Commissioner, Meerut Division Meerut regarding his role while deciding the matter pertaining to the petitioners. The enquiry should be brought to its logical conclusion within three months.
In view of the reasons stated here in above, the Review Application No. 207705 of 2012 seeking to review the judgment dated 03.04.2012 passed in Writ Petition No. 20839 of 2011 is allowed.
The Writ Petition No. 20839 of 2011 ( Arvind Nath Seth and others vs. State Of U.P. Thru Secy. and others) is dismissed.
The Writ Petition No. 23111 of 2012 (Meerut Development Authority vs. State of U.P. and others) is allowed, the order dated 29.12.2010 passed by the Chairman Development Authority/Commissioner Meerut Division, Meerut is quashed.
The Registrar General of this Court is directed to refund the demand draft of Rs. 1,92,87,400/- to the Meerut Development Authority, Meerut deposited by them in Contempt Application (Civil) No. 3236 of 2012 (Arvind Nath Seth and others vs. Tanver Zafar Ali, V.C., Meerut Development Authority) Order date:- 20/12/2013 S. Prakash (Suneet Kumar,J.) (V.K. Shukla,J.)