Madhya Pradesh High Court
Maganlal vs Shri Krishna Jain Mahila Kala Kendra ... on 7 March, 2024
Author: Subodh Abhyankar
Bench: Subodh Abhyankar
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT INDORE
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SUBODH ABHYANKAR
WRIT PETITION No. 25899 of 2022
BETWEEN:-
MAGANLAL S/O HIRALAL RUNWAL, AGED ABOUT
80 YEARS, OCCUPATION: BUSINESS CHOUMUKHI
PUL, RATLAM (MADHYA PRADESH)
.....PETITIONER
(BY SHRI VISHAL LASHKARI, ADVOCATE)
AND
SHRI KRISHNA JAIN MAHILA KALA KENDRA
THROUGH MANAGING TRUSTE AND PRESIDENT
KANTILAL S/O CHANDMALJI MANDLECHA, AGED
ABOUT 70 YEARS, OCCUPATION: BUSINESS
DHANMANDI, RATLAM (MADHYA PRADESH)
.....RESPONDENTS
(BY SHRI V.A.KATKANI, ADVOCATE)
...................................................................................................
Reserved on : 13.12.2023
Pronounced on : 07.03.2024
...........................................................................................................
This petition having been heard and reserved for orders, coming
on for pronouncement this day, the court passed the following:
ORDER
Heard finally, with the consent of the parties.
2] This petition has been filed by the petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against the order dated 20.10.2022, passed by the District Judge, Ratlam in Miscellaneous Judicial Case No.33/2022, whereby, the petitioner‟s application filed under Order Signature Not Verified Signed by: BAHAR CHAWLA Signing time: 3/7/2024 6:24:38 PM 2 VII Rule 11 of the CPC has been rejected.
3] Although, this petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against the order passed by the District Judge, Ratlam and is not maintainable, however, considering the fact that the arguments were already heard on 13.12.2023, this Court finds it expedient to decide it finally while invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 4] In brief, the facts of the case are that the respondent Shri Krishna Jain Mahila Kala Kendra is a public Trust registered under the M.P. Public Trusts Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as „the Act of 1951‟) which had filed an application for recording change in the Trust register under Section 9 of the Act of 1951 on 26.09.2020 before the Registrar of Public Trust, Ratlam which was registered as Case No.11/B-13/(03)/19-20, and the Registrar, Public Trust passed the order on 21.09.2021, and accordingly passed the compliance order dated 07.12.2021 along with the amendment order dated 27.12.2021. Thus, the change was made in the register w.e.f. 27.12.2021. 5] Being aggrieved of the order dated 07.12.2021, the respondent preferred an application under Section 25(3) of the Act of 1951 before the Civil Judge, Ratlam on 16.02.2021, which was registered as Miscellaneous Judicial Case No.33/2022. The aforesaid proceeding was challenged by the petitioner by filing an application under Section 151 of the CPC on 14.03.2022, which was dismissed by the District Judge on 04.04.2022, and being aggrieved, the petitioner preferred M.P. No.2902/2022 before this Court, which was allowed by this Court on 21.09.2022, and directed the District Judge, Ratlam to decide Signature Not Verified Signed by: BAHAR CHAWLA Signing time: 3/7/2024 6:24:38 PM 3 the matter afresh. However, learned District Judge, Ratlam has passed the impugned order on 20.10.2022, again dismissing the petitioner‟s application. Hence, this petition.
6] Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the impugned order is bad in law for the reason that the provisions of Section 25(3) of the Act of 1951 were not applicable and in fact, a suit ought to have been filed under Section 8 of the Act of 1951, which applied to any finding recorded under Section 6 of the Act of 1951, and as per Section 9(3), the provisions of Section 8 shall apply to any finding under Section 9, which provides for change in the Register of Trust. Thus, it is submitted that a civil suit ought to have been filed by the respondent within six months‟ time from the date of publication of notice under Sub-Section (1) of Section 7 and thus, the application under Section 25(3) was misconceived. It is also submitted that the term „Civil Court‟ used in Section 8 and 12 of the Act of 1951 indicates the lower Court of civil jurisdiction as provided in M.P. Civil Court Rules and Orders.
7] It is further submitted that an application under Section 25(3) is not maintainable against an order passed under Section 9. It is submitted that the learned District Judge, Ratlam had no jurisdiction to hear the matter under Section 25(3), which was not maintainable. Thus, it is submitted that the impugned order be set aside and the application filed by the respondent under Section 25(3) be dismissed. 8] In support of his submissions, counsel for the petitioner has relied upon certain decisions rendered by this Court in the cases of Badriprasad Gaurishankar Shukla and Ors. Vs. Umashankar Signature Not Verified Signed by: BAHAR CHAWLA Signing time: 3/7/2024 6:24:38 PM 4 Munnulal and Ors. passed in C.R. No.318 of 1960 decided on 10.01.1961; Seth Trilokchand Kalyanmal Digambar Jain and Ors. Vs. Sushil Kumar Kasliwal and Ors. passed in M.P. No.6301 of 2019 decided on 07.10.2021; and Yug Dharma Public School Vs. Employees Provident Fund Organization passed in M.P. No.4278 of 2022 decided on 01.12.2022.
9] The prayer is opposed by the counsel for the respondent and it is submitted that no illegality or jurisdictional error has been committed by the learned District Judge, Ratlam, in passing the impugned order, as all the provisions of the of the Act of 1951 from Section 4 to 9 have been taken care of in the impugned order, holding that the case falls under Section 25(3) of the Act of 1951. Thus, it is submitted that the petition being devoid of merits is liable to be dismissed.
10] Heard counsel for the parties and perused the record. 11] So far as the impugned order is concerned, the learned Principal District Judge (PDJ) has opined that it makes no difference if the application has been filed before him u/s.9(3) or u/s. 25(3) of the Act of 1951 as in both the cases, these applications shall be heard by him only as the District Judge, being the Civil Court as provided under the Act of 1951, and these applications would be registered as MJC (Miscellaneous Judicial Case), and would be decided only on the basis of the arguments of the parties as there is need to record the evidence. 12] The learned PDJ has also held that even if the application filed by the petitioner was u/s.9, in fact, it was an application u/s.25 only because the vacancies were filled after the death of the three trustees Signature Not Verified Signed by: BAHAR CHAWLA Signing time: 3/7/2024 6:24:38 PM 5 and after a direction to this effect was made by the Registrar to have the trustees elected within 90 days. Thus, it is held by the PDJ that only he has the jurisdiction to decide the application u/s.25(03). 13] From the record, it is apparent that the register of Public Trust has been changed by the Registrar vide its order dated 07.12.2021, and subsequently, it has been amended vide order dated 27.12.2021. 14] On perusal of the record it is found that initially the order dated 21.09.2021 was passed on an application filed under Section 9 of the Act of 1951 by the respondent, through Kanhaiyalal, the then working trustee, and the order has been passed by the Registrar, Public Trust under Section 9 only, directing the applicant to conduct the election of the trust and inform the same to the Registrar and thereafter, the change was made in the register vide order dated 07.12.2021 and a minor correction in the aforesaid order was made in the amendment order dated 27.12.2021. The certificate to this effect has also been issued on 27.12.2021. Thus, for all the practical purposes, the proceedings were under Section 9 only and it is trite that to challenge the entries made under Section 9, the only recourse available is through Section 8 and Section 9(3), which prescribes filing of the civil suit within six months time.
15] This Court in the case of Seth Trilokchand Kalyanmal Digambar Jain and Ors (Supra) has had the occasion to reflect upon the meaning of Civil Court as provided under Section 8(1) of the Act of 1951 and while relying upon the earlier decision rendered in the case of Badri Prasad Vs. Umashanker reported as 1961 JLJ 329, it is held as under:-
Signature Not Verified Signed by: BAHAR CHAWLA Signing time: 3/7/2024 6:24:38 PM 6"10. This Court in the case of Badri Prasad (supra) noted the difference between the word „Court‟ used in sections 24, 25, 26, 27 and 28 of the Trusts Act in contrast to the words „a Civil Court‟ used in section 8 of the Trusts Act, The question framed was whether the phrase 'a Civil Court‟ has not been construed in the same manner as the phrase 'a Court' used in section 24 to 28 of the Trusts Act. In Badri Prasad (supra), this Court opined that the words „a Civil Court‟ have not been defined in the Trusts Act. This Court took assistance of section 3 of the M.P. Civil Court Act, 1958. The Court opined that the definition of „Civil Court‟ would be applicable to the phrase „a Civil Court‟ occurring in section 8 and 12 of the Trusts Act. In no uncertain terms it was held as under:--
"8. It is true that in Chapter 5 of the M.P. Public Trusts Act, 1951, the phrase used as "the Court", which would necessarily imply to Court of District Judge as defined by section 2(1) of the Act. But, the same phrase not having been used in Chapter 2, which contains sections 8 and 12 of the Act, it cannot be stated that the intention of the legislature was that a civil suit under section 8 of of the Act should be filed in the Court of the District Judge. Therefore, the ordinary grammatical meaning of the phrase would mean that the suit can be filed in a Civil Court of a competent jurisdiction, whether it be the Court of the Civil Judge Class II or the Court of Civil Judge Class I or the Court of Additional District Judge or the Court of District Judge. That will depetn upon the territorial jurisdiction, as also the pecuniary valuation of the suit."
11. The golden principle of interpretation is that legislature has used every word consciously and for a purpose. Attempt should be made to give meaning to each word, term and expression used in a statute. As on the one hand, it is not permissible to add words or to fill in a gap or lacuna, on the other hand effort should be made to give meaning to each and every word used by the Legislature. "It is not a sound principle of construction", said PATANJALI SHASTRY, C.J.I; "to brush aside words in a statute as being inapposite surplusage, if they can have appropriate application in circumstances conceivably within the contemplation of the statute"
and as pointed out by JAGANNADHADAS, J.:"It is incumbent on the courts to avoid a construction, if reasonably permissible on the language, which would render a part of the statute devoid of any meaning or application". "In the interpretation of statutes", observed DAS GUPTA, J.:"the courts always presume that the Signature Not Verified Signed by: BAHAR CHAWLA Signing time: 3/7/2024 6:24:38 PM 7 Legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the statute should have effect". The Legislature's deemed not to waste its words or to say anything in vain and a construction which attributes redundancy to the Legislature will not be accepted except for compelling reasons.
12. In view of this golden principle of interpretation, I am in respectful agreement with the view taken by this Court is Badri Prasad (supra).
13. This Court will be failing in its duty if the judgment cited by Shri A.S. Garg, learned Senior Counsel is not taken into account. In the said judgment of Shri Dev Mahadevji Mandir, Rehli (supra), this Court considered the meaning of term „Court‟ used in sections 26 and 27 of the Trusts Act. As noticed above, the legislature in its wisdom has used the word, „Court‟ in section 24, 25, 26, 27 and 28 of the Trusts Act whereas used the words, „a Civil Court‟ in section 8 and 12 of the Trusts Act. Indisputably, in this case, this Court is concerned with an application/suit filed under section 8 of the Trusts Act. Thus, the judgment cited by Shri A.S. Garg, learned Senior Counsel which is not related with section 8 of the Trusts Act cannot be pressed into service.
14. In Badri Prasad (supra), this Court has dealt with the meaning and interpretation of the words „a Civil Court‟ occurring in section 8 of the Trusts Act whereas in Shri Dev Mahadevji Mandir, Rehli (supra), the Court considered word, „Court‟ for the purpose of an application filed under section 26 of the Trusts Act. Thus, interpretation given by previous Bench in Badri Prasad (supra) is mainly relating to Section 8 of the Trust Act whereas subsequent judgment in Shri Dev Mahadevji Mandir, Rehli (supra) is relating to Sections 26 and 27 of the Trusts Act. Thus, both the judgments are based on different provisions of the Trusts Act and it cannot be said that there is any cleavage of opinion between the Benches. In this case, the judgment of Badri Prasad (supra) is applicable because indisputably, the civil suit/application is filed under section 8 of the Trusts Act, and therefore, this Court is concerned with the meaning of words „a Civil Court‟.
15. This is trite that the judgment of a Court should be understood in the fact situation of case and on the basis of governing statutory provisions. A different fact or different applicable provision may make a lot of difference in precedential value of a judgment (See (2003) 2 SCC 111, Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill Private Limited).
16. In view of foregoing analysis, it can be safely held that since the words „a Civil Court‟ are used in section 8 of the Trusts Act, the learned District Judge was justified in transferring the suit Signature Not Verified Signed by: BAHAR CHAWLA Signing time: 3/7/2024 6:24:38 PM 8 before a Civil Court as per Section 3 of the M.P. Civil Courts Act, 1958. In absence of any violation of law, palpable procedural impropriety or perversity, interference is declined."
(Emphasis Supplied) 16] A perusal of the aforesaid decision clearly reveals that this Court has already held that the phrase „Civil Court‟, in the context of Section 8(1) would be the Civil Court as per Section 3 of the M.P. Civil Courts Act, 1958 and not the „Court‟, as the said word has not been used in respect of Section 8(1), as has been used in relation to Sections 24 to 28 of the Act of 1951. In such circumstances, the finding recorded by the learned PDJ that even assuming that Section 8(1) provides the matter to be decided by a Civil Court, the District Judge being a Civil Court can also exercise jurisdiction, runs contrary to the very provisions of the Act of 1951.
17] So far as the finding recorded by the PDJ that the application filed u/s.9 was actually an application u/s.25 and the case can be entertained by him u/s.25(3) is concerned, the same is also erroneous as the learned judge has wrongly interpreted the very provision of s.25(3) which reads as under:-
"S.25(3). If the working trustee fails to give any such information or to fill the vacancy within the time specified by him or to comply with any direction issued by the Registrar, the Registrar may, by order passed in writing, fill the vacancy and any person having interest in the public trust who may be aggrieved by the order of the Registrar, may apply to the Court for setting aside the order of the Registrar within thirty days from the date of such order."
(Emphasis Supplied) 18] A bare perusal of the aforesaid provision clearly means that an occasion to file an application u/s.25(3) would arise only when the working trustee fails to fill the vacancies by himself or as directed by Signature Not Verified Signed by: BAHAR CHAWLA Signing time: 3/7/2024 6:24:38 PM 9 the Registrar, and the vacancies are then filled by the Registrar himself. Thus, when the vacancies are filled by the Registrar Public Trust, such an order can be challenged by any person having interest in the public Trust only by filing an application u/s.25(3) of the Act of 1951. 19] In such circumstances, the impugned order being contrary to law and facts on record, is hereby set aside and the application filed by the petitioner under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC is hereby allowed and resultantly, the application filed u/s.25(3) before the PDJ stands rejected.
20] However, liberty is reserved to the respondents to take recourse of the remedy which is available to them under Section 8. 21] Needless to say, the time spent in prosecuting this petition and the earlier proceedings of this case shall be excluded from the period of limitation.
22] With the aforesaid, the petition stands allowed and disposed of.
(SUBODH ABHYANKAR) JUDGE Bahar Signature Not Verified Signed by: BAHAR CHAWLA Signing time: 3/7/2024 6:24:38 PM